Online Safety Bill

Darren Jones Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 19th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab)]

In the interest of time, I will just pose a number of questions, which I hope the Minister might address in summing up. The first is about the scope of the Bill. The Joint Committee of which I was a member recommended that the age-appropriate design code, which is very effectively used by the Information Commissioner, be used as a benchmark in the Bill, so that any services accessed or likely to be accessed by children are regulated for safety. I do not understand why the Government rejected that suggestion, and I would be pleased to hear from the Minister why they did so.

Secondly, the Bill delegates lots of detail to statutory instruments, codes of practice from the regulator, or later decisions by the Secretary of State. Parliament must see that detail before the Bill becomes an Act. Will the Minister commit to those delegated decisions being published before the Bill becomes an Act? Could he explain why the codes of practice are not being set as mandatory? I do not understand why codes of practice, much of the detail of which the regulator is being asked to set, will not be made mandatory for businesses. How can minimum standards for age or identity verification be imposed if those codes of practice are not made mandatory? Perhaps the Minister could explain.

Many users across the country will want to ensure that their complaints are dealt with effectively. We recommended an ombudsman service that dealt with complaints that were exhausted through a complaints system at the regulated companies, but the Government rejected it. Please could the Minister explain why?

I was pleased that the Government accepted the concept of the ability for a super-complaint to be brought on behalf of groups of users, but the decision as to who will be able a bring a super-complaint has been deferred, subject to a decision by the Secretary of State. Why, and when will that decision be taken? If the Minister could allude to who they might be, I am sure that would be welcome.

Lastly, there is a number of exemptions and more work to be done, which leaves significant holes in the legislation. There is much more work to be done on clauses 5, 6 and 50—on democratic importance, journalism and the definition of journalism, on the exemptions for news publishers, and on disinformation, which is mentioned only once in the entire Bill. I and many others recognise that these are not easy issues, but they should be considered fully before legislation is proposed that has gaping holes for people who want to get around it, and for those who wish to test the parameters of this law in the courts, probably for many years. All of us, on a cross-party basis in this House, support the Government’s endeavours to make it safe for children and others to be online. We want the legislation to be implemented as quickly as possible and to be as effective as possible, but there are significant concerns that it will be jammed up in the judicial system, where this House is unacceptably giving judges the job of fleshing out the definition of what many of the important exemptions will mean in practice.

The idea that the Secretary of State has the power to intervene with the independent regulator and tell it what it should or should not do obviously undermines the idea of an independent regulator. While Ministers might give assurances to this House that the power will not be abused, I believe that other countries, whether China, Russia, Turkey or anywhere else, will say, “Look at Great Britain. It thinks this is an appropriate thing to do. We’re going to follow the golden precedent set by the UK in legislating on these issues and give our Ministers the ability to decide what online content should be taken down.” That seems a dangerous precedent.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Chris Philp)]

indicated dissent.

[Darren Jones]

The Minister is shaking his head, but I can tell him that the legislation does do that, because we looked at this and took evidence on it. The Secretary of State would be able to tell the regulator that content should be “legal but harmful” and therefore should be removed as part of its systems design online. We also heard that the ability to do that at speed is very restricted and therefore the power is ineffective in the first place. Therefore, the Government should evidently change their position on that. I do not understand why, in the face of evidence from pretty much every stakeholder, the Government agree that that is an appropriate use of power or why Parliament would vote that through.

I look forward to the Minister giving his answers to those questions, in the hope that, as the Bill proceeds through the House, it can be tidied up and made tighter and more effective, to protect children and adults online in this country.

Automatic Computer-based Decisions: Legal Status

Darren Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 10th March 2021 Westminster Hall

[Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the legal status of automatic computer-based decisions.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I should apologise to a number of viewers of the debate for advertising its start time as 10.30 am, as opposed to 11 am. I would like to blame Microsoft Outlook, but in fact it was entirely my own fault.

I should also declare my interests. I am the chair of the Institute of Artificial Intelligence, which brings together legislators from around the world to discuss the implications of regulation of artificial intelligence. As Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, I call attention to our currently suspended but still live inquiry into the Post Office Horizon scandal, which I shall refer to today. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that I used to be employed as a solicitor with a law firm now called Womble Bond Dickinson, which represented the Post Office on the Horizon issue, but confirm that I did not personally act for the Post Office on that issue. I should also thank Paul Marshall, a barrister at Cornerstone Barristers, whose note to me has underpinned much of my contribution today, and Stephen Mason, a research fellow at the University of London’s Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, and his colleagues for their analysis.

The Minister knows that I come to the debate as a technology evangelist—someone who advocates harnessing the potential of technology to modernise our economy and our public services. There is, of course, a much wider debate about the need to update our laws and regulations, and indeed how we run government, due to the technological revolution, but today I will focus on the specific and important issue of how the law of evidence applies to automated computer-based decisions. That has wide-ranging implications across the public and private sector.

The case of the Post Office’s failed private prosecution of more than 1,000 sub-postmasters for accounting errors created by a computer system and not by the sub-postmasters resulted in what looks to be one of the largest miscarriages of justice in our country—a tragedy for our justice system, but also a personal tragedy for the sub-postmasters involved and their families, all stemming from a computer system. I understand that one victim of the Post Office Horizon scandal pleaded guilty to false accounting merely because she had been overwhelmed by the errors and because she could not face the prospect of a jury trial for theft, which was being threatened by the Post Office at the time. Another was wrongly imprisoned when eight weeks pregnant. I stress this point because computer-based decisions can lead not only to not getting a credit card but to untold human suffering in the face of miscarriages of justice. That is just one example.

As the Minister knows, automated computer-based decision making is more and more widespread with every passing year. The problem is that computer systems are not continuously reliable; latent errors can occur frequently. Achieving reliability in a computer system in the first place is difficult; it is even harder to assess and assure that reliability on an ongoing basis. Indeed, artificial intelligence, in its capacity as a general-purpose technology across every aspect of our economy, means that the number of decisions coming from software-based systems will increase and increase, both in the private sector and in the delivery of public services. The Minister, of course, understands that. The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, which is part of his Department, published a report only last year on algorithmic decision making, which concluded:

“We must ensure decisions can be scrutinised, explained and challenged so that our current laws and frameworks do not lose effectiveness, and indeed can be made more effective over time.”

However, the fact is that, as highlighted in the judgments of Mr Justice Fraser in the Post Office Horizon case of Bates v. Post Office, our laws are dramatically out of date. This is evidenced by the very nature of the dates of the legislation involved for criminal issues, such as the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. We all recognise, of course, that technology has moved on a great deal since then. That Act repealed section 69(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which until its repeal meant that computer-derived documents could not be used as evidence unless it could be shown that, at all material times, the computer was operating properly. At the time, the Law Commission recommended the repeal because of concerns that it was increasingly difficult to meet that threshold—in other words, in 1999 it was increasingly difficult to show that a computer was operating properly at material times.

The change in the law left an absence of formal statutory guidance, resulting in the courts applying to computers the presumption of being properly functioning traditional machines. In practice, that means that a party can rely on the presumption that a computer was operating reliably at all material times—that is to say, that the computer was always right. It is for the objector—in the Post Office case, the sub-postmaster—to prove that the computer was not operating reliably. This is perhaps an obvious point, but in my view that results in an unacceptable imbalance of power.

The owners of computer-based decisions are usually big companies or the state. An advanced computer system is not the same as a factory-floor machine. In contrast, the objectors are employees, customers or citizens who have no real prospect of being able to prove that a computer system owned by a company or the Government was not operating reliably. That has very wide-ranging implications.

If people found it difficult to prove a computer was operating reliably in the early 1990s, we can only imagine how difficult it might be to do that today, not least when machine-learning algorithms come to conclusions for reasons even the computer programmer does not understand. If the Post Office had been required to prove that its computer system was operating reliably, it would not have been able to do so, because we now know that it was not, and sub-postmasters would not have been wrongly imprisoned. The legal presumption that a computer is always right is therefore unsafe and liable to cause significant harm and injustice.

I am not suggesting a return to the pre-1999 approach, but we need to find a new way to manage the risk and update our laws appropriately. As the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation said in its algorithmic decision-making report,

“we have a window of opportunity to get this right and ensure that these changes serve to promote equality, not to entrench existing biases.”

That is important, because if we are to harness the full potential of technology in our economy, the public need to have confidence in the way in which it is being used, and that there are appropriate rights of redress for those who fall foul of it.

I understand that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) has also been engaging with this issue and has referred the matter to the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, in his capacity as chair of the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. The reason I asked for a debate with the Digital team is my belief that this is broader than an issue merely for the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. I am therefore calling on the Minister to use the powers of the Government Department responsible for digital and technology issues to refer this matter to the Law Commission for formal consideration. I look forward to hearing his response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

I congratulate the Chair of the Select Committee on securing this important debate. He is absolutely right to say that the potential of technology to enhance the decision-making process, in the public sector just as much as the private sector, is something that this Government are absolutely committed to not only getting the maximum out of, but getting right as well. He is also absolutely right to highlight that legislation from decades ago is perhaps not 100% where we would wish it to be.

First, let me say that I share the concerns raised by him and other Members about the specific example he has raised and the treatment of postmasters, who are vital members of the community, in this whole affair. I also acknowledge that it highlights essential legal issues. I will address those shortly, although I should perhaps start by saying that he has been comprehensive in his own circumnavigation of the issues at hand.

On Horizon, the Government recognise that the dispute has had a hugely damaging effect on the lives of the affected postmasters and their families. Its repercussions are still being felt today. Over the years, the Horizon accounting system recorded shortfalls in cash in branches. At the time, the Post Office believed that those shortfalls were caused by postmasters, leading to dismissals, recovery of losses and, in some cases, criminal prosecution. Many hon. Members, me included, have listened to the stories of the postmasters affected and have been deeply moved by the impact on their livelihoods, their finances and often their health.

A group of 555 of those postmasters, led by former postmaster Alan Bates, brought a group litigation claim against the Post Office in 2017. In the findings of Mr Justice Fraser, it is clear just how wrong the Post Office was in its relationship with postmasters and that there were clear failings in the Horizon system. As I will explain, the Government are taking steps through an independent inquiry to ensure that lessons are learned and that a full analysis takes place.

The Post Office reached a full and final settlement with the group litigation claimants in December 2019 and apologised for its failings. That settlement was an important step towards addressing the wrongs of the past, but it was only the start of a long journey for the Post Office to repair and strengthen its relationship with postmasters.

As part of the settlement, the Post Office agreed to set up the historical shortfall scheme, open to current and former postmasters who may have experienced and repaid Horizon shortfalls but did not participate in the group litigation. That is an important step in ensuring that all those who were affected have the opportunity to seek resolution.

A number of postmasters with criminal convictions have applied to the Criminal Cases Review Commission to have their cases referred for appeal. To date, the commission has referred 51 cases either to the Court of Appeal or to the Crown court. The Government welcome the decision made by the Crown court in December 2020 to overturn six of those convictions.

However, a number of cases—42 in total—are still to be heard in the relevant Appeal Court at the end of March. It would not be appropriate for the Government to comment on those cases while the courts are still considering them, but I assure hon. Members that the Post Office is co-operating with the commission to the fullest extent.

More broadly, we must ensure that such a situation can never be allowed to occur again. In September 2020, therefore, the Government launched the Post Office Horizon IT inquiry, an independent inquiry led by Sir Wyn Williams. Sir Wyn’s inquiry will work to understand fully what happened, gather available evidence and ensure that lessons have been learned so that this cannot occur again. The inquiry will look specifically at whether the historical shortfall scheme is being delivered properly. The Government look forward to receiving that report in the summer.

In recent years, however, a lot has changed on standards and ethics relating to the management of algorithms and data in general. The hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) rightly pointed out the work of the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation. Crucially, that centre has not only “data ethics” but “innovation” in its title—those two things go hand in hand.

The centre was established by my Department in 2017, but that is not the only area in which we have implemented change. Substantial steps have been taken to consider and address deficiencies in the application of algorithms where that lies within the remit of the DCMS and, crucially, beyond. I am confident that we are in a much stronger position than when the worst excesses of the Horizon affair took place, but there is more work to do.

If an automated decision is based on personal data, the UK general data protection regulation already applies. It provides regulatory tools to safeguard data subjects and identified or identifiable persons in automated decision making. Organisations processing personal data must also adhere to strong transparency requirements. Organisations, including public authorities, should ensure that the algorithms they deploy and procure, where based on personal data, generate sound and impartial decisions, and that that should be considered before such algorithms are used.

The UK GDPR contains provisions for protecting the interests of data subjects and their data. In particular, data protection impact assessments are mandatory for data processing that is high risk and require organisations to weigh up the impacts on privacy of data processing activities, including automated decision making.

In addition, the Government have introduced non-legislative tools that will be important as we move towards a world where not just algorithms but the ability for computers to amend algorithms—artificial intelligence—become more commonplace. Let me run through some of them. We were the first Government to publish a data ethics framework, which is a set of principles to guide the design of appropriate data use in the public sector, aimed at anyone working with data in the public sector. We published an ethics, transparency and accountability framework for automated decision making, and we have commissioned the Government Digital Service to deliver the review of artificial intelligence adoption in the public sector. We have also published an AI guide for Government.

There are also published guidelines on AI procurement in collaboration with the World Economic Forum’s Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It will inform and empower buyers in the public sector, helping them to evaluate suppliers and then confidently and responsibly procure the right AI technologies for the benefit of citizens. We have also published, along with the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Alan Turing Institute, “Explaining decisions made with AI”. This guidance gives organisations practical advice to help them explain the processes, services and decisions delivered or assisted by AI to the individuals affected by them. That is a crucial action that the hon. Member for Bristol North West mentioned.

Those various documents are updated with new thinking and insight from our public sector, civil society, industry and academic partners. We have also launched the new AI dynamic purchasing system, which is a framework that offers public sector customers a direct route to AI services in an emerging market, addressing ethical considerations when organisations buy AI services for use in the public sector.

The new and independent Regulatory Horizons Council has been appointed to scan the horizons for new technological innovations and provide the Government with impartial, expert advice on the regulatory reform required to support their rapid and safe introduction. More broadly, the Government are always monitoring how algorithms and data affect people’s lives. As they grow in importance in all our lives, we will consider what more we can do. That is why we are active in the international debates on algorithm and artificial intelligence regulations at the Council of Europe and, beyond that, at the OECD and in the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence.

The hon. Gentleman specifically asked whether the status of algorithms in the courts might be referred to the Law Commission, especially given the role played by the commission in first adjusting the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 on this topic. It is a suggestion worth very serious consideration, and my colleagues in the Ministry of Justice and I are grateful for it. He will know that it is not in the Law Commission’s current three-year plan of work, and it will take considerable time to establish the necessary work in order to address the underlying legal issue.

While we consider that route, the Government are also investigating whether there may be faster methods that we can use to address the legal status of algorithms in a court of law—the hon. Gentleman mentioned that himself. For example, once the Court of Appeal has made a determination in respect to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the judiciary Criminal Procedure Rule Committee could consider making changes in this area. The courts are expected to make their determination shortly, after which I look forward to taking up the matter with the Ministry of Justice and the Lord Chief Justice, the chair of that committee.

To close, I thank you, Mr Hollobone, and the hon. Gentleman. This is the beginning of the next phase in an ongoing debate. It is a hugely important issue, and seizing these opportunities for the benefit of citizens and everyone around the world is in all our interests. It will be a complex and involving conversation, and I look forward to having more conversations with the hon. Gentleman.

[Darren Jones]

rose—

[Mr Philip Hollobone (in the Chair)]

I am afraid that the hon. Member does not have the right of reply in half-hour debates. I know it is confusing and I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news, but we enjoyed his initial contribution.

Question put and agreed to.

Online Harms Consultation

Darren Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 15th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[Oliver Dowden]

Yes, I am happy to give my hon. Friend exactly that assurance. Companies must tackle illegal content on their platforms and protect children from harmful content and activity online. They really do need to build the right systems. As I said in answer to a previous question, I have seen the technology; there is no excuse anymore not to use it.

[Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab)]

I want to ask the Secretary of State two questions on the issue of how we understand what is harmful but perhaps legal. First, will Ofcom be given the powers that it already has for other regulated sectors to demand access to information about how a service is being used and what content is on it? Secondly, why has the Secretary of State abandoned age verification?

[Oliver Dowden]

On age verification, we are moving it from what we previously had, which was not dealing with user-generated content. Most pornography that children access is on sites that have user-generated content. Usually, that is the way that children stumble across it by mistake. It is really important that we broaden the scope of what we are doing, and that is precisely what we are addressing through this legislation.

Draft Electronic Communications and Wireless Telegraphy (Amendment) (European Electronic Communications Code and Eu Exit) Regulations 2020

Darren Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2020 General Committees

[Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab)]

I did not intend to contribute to this debate, but the Minister’s opening remarks have moved me to do so. First, I would like to declare my interests: previously I was a private practice lawyer and an in-house lawyer at BT, lobbying and working on the electronic communications code. I also chair the PICTFOR—Parliamentary Internet, Communications and Technology Forum—all-party parliamentary group, whose membership, as the Minister knows well, includes many companies interested in this legislation.

I would like to make one short contribution. I was interested to hear the Minister say that he has opened the door to a universal service obligation on mobile connectivity, with an intention, I think he said, to introduce further legislation in due course. We know from the pandemic, but also from before that, that many families on low incomes who cannot afford broadband connectivity rely on their mobile connectivity to access online education, shopping, social media and other types of services. I would be interested to hear from the Minister what intention the Government have to bring forward that legislation for a USO on mobile connectivity.

Online Harms

Darren Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 7th October 2020 Westminster Hall

[Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Edward, and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) on securing this important and timely debate. I also thank House officials for ensuring that Westminster Hall is open once again, so that we can have these debates. Before I begin my remarks, I will note my declarations of interest: my chairmanship of the parliamentary internet, communications and technology forum all-party parliamentary group, and of the APPG on technology and national security; my chairmanship of Labour Digital and the Institute of Artificial Intelligence; and my previous professional work on these issues as a technology lawyer, as noted in the Register of Members’ Financial Interest.

The online harms Bill will be a big and important piece of legislation, covering a range of difficult issues, from defining content that is harmful but not illegal and how we protect children, through to ensuring an effective regulatory framework that delivers a meaningful duty of care. Given the time, I will not rehearse the many important arguments for getting this right; I will keep my remarks short, both to give the Minister enough time to give substantive and full answers and so that other colleagues have a chance to contribute. The Secretary of State confirmed to the House in early September that the full response to the White Paper would be published this year—that is, 2020—and that legislation would be introduced early next year, which is 2021. On that basis, I have three sets of questions.

First, can the Minister confirm whether the publication of the full response to the White Paper is currently allocated to her Department’s forward grid, and if so, when it is pencilled in for publication? My understanding is that it will be published between now and December. Could she also tell us whether the Department has secured a legislative slot with the Leader of the House for First Reading, and if so, give us a rough idea of when that might be? Does the Department envisage a period of prelegislative scrutiny before Second Reading? If it does, what role will the House of Lords play in that?

Secondly, can the Minister reassure us that the initial scope of the duty of care and the enforcement powers being made available to the regulator have not been watered down, and that she agrees with me that, while it is difficult to define what is harmful but not illegal, Parliament is the body best placed to do so, not private companies? Will she also reassure us that the passage of this Bill will not be linked to negotiations with the United States on the UK-US trade deal, given that we know that the United States has placed liability loopholes for platforms in trade deals with other countries?

Finally, will the Minister confirm that the answer I received from the Security Minister on the Floor of the House--that the online harms Bill will include provisions for enhancing sovereign defensive and offensive digital capabilities--is correct? If so, will she tell us whether the progression of the Bill is linked to the ongoing integrated review?

[Sir Edward Leigh (in the Chair)]

Textbook timekeeping.

ARM: Foreign Acquisition

Darren Jones Excerpts

Monday 21st September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for securing this important debate. Does he agree with me that in assessing the risks of the takeover bid, we need to understand the possible repercussions for British jobs and industry if trade sanctions are put in place by President Trump, for example, as the Nvidia parent company is based in the United States?

[Daniel Zeichner]

I thank my hon. Friend the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. He makes an important point that I will come on to, but I return to the Government’s position, because I find their silence slightly ominous. It has only been breached by briefings to selected journalists and, frankly, that does not seem good enough to me.

It would be astonishing if this Government, with all their talk of world-beating test systems and taking back control, considered allowing us to lose further control of one of the only areas of technology in which we are genuinely world-beating and world-leading. It is particularly astonishing that the Government might be prepared to throw away British influence when it represents such a key bargaining chip in trade talks in a post-Brexit era. I do not think any other country in the world would allow such a jewel in the tech crown to be handed over in this way, so I urge the Government to scrutinise the deal carefully and to step in and use powers available to them to impose strict, legally binding conditions.

The sale raises a range of questions and issues of local, national and international significance. I have been raising them for many weeks now, as have trade unions and the co-founders of ARM. We have received little substantial response from Government, although I was pleased to have a direct discussion with Nvidia today. I invite the Minister to provide some answers from the Government’s perspective.

Since the announcement, Nvidia has made promises to keep ARM based in Cambridge, to hire more staff and to retain ARM’s brand, but without any legal guarantees, I fear those remain just promises—doubtless genuinely made—not guarantees. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government are seeking legal assurances in this deal to ensure that ARM’s headquarters remain in Cambridge and it retains the some 2,700 jobs it supports in my constituency and across the country? I am sure the Minister will say that it is hardly likely that Nvidia would ditch highly sought-after engineers, but members of Unite have told me that many jobs, particularly in IT, are much more vulnerable. Similarly, I am told that some 300 people in Cambridge work on graphics processors, an area in which Nvidia works. It could be a perfect match, or it could mean rationalisation and job cuts. 

There is little sign of much meaningful consultation with those who work for the company. Having followed the media commentary, it has struck me that those who work for ARM hardly seem to have a voice—a doleful consequence, I fear, of a largely non-unionised workforce. The money may be good, but when it comes to times such as this, the value of having professional negotiators acting on one’s behalf becomes apparent. I am grateful for the strong interventions from not only Unite but Prospect, which also has members at ARM. I have a further question: will the Minister confirm that Cambridge will continue to be the company HQ and explain how promises will be enforced? Anyone can make promises, but will they be kept? How will they be enforced? The deal will affect jobs not just now but in the future, and could have serious ramifications.

ARM’s current business model has been highly successful. It is based on remaining neutral in the tech market and licensing chip designs to any chip maker that wants them. ARM’s co-founder Hermann Hauser has warned that although SoftBank was able to maintain ARM’s neutrality, Nvidia is different: it is a chip maker itself, so companies using ARM will now find themselves as competitors with its parent company. Some could start to seek alternatives. Nvidia has said that it will maintain ARM’s neutrality, but we have no legal assurances. Will the Government be seeking assurances that ARM’s unique business model—and so its success—will be secured?

The sale has implications both internationally and diplomatically. If ARM becomes a subsidiary of the American company Nvidia, we will in effect be handing over control to the current US Government, as it could become subject to their foreign investment regulatory committee, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The Trump Administration will then ultimately hold the reins over which countries use the technology—which is used in almost all mobile phone chips in the world—and where it will be possible to export it.

It is quite clear that Trump has no qualms about interfering in the operations of tech companies to pursue his own foreign policy goals. Chinese tech companies have already voiced concerns that American ownership of ARM could jeopardise access to ARM technologies for their businesses. Some may not be bothered about that, but it highlights the real role that this UK-located tech giant plays in the international struggle for technological sovereignty.

We need guarantees that ARM is not going to be embroiled in American trade wars and that decisions over this key technology are not completely lost to us. As the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee said:

“The sale of @Arm raises questions of sovereignty. Control of tech is an essential element of independence and @UKParliament will have no say on the CFIUS decisions that go to the US President alone.”

I agree. To safeguard the UK’s interests, we need clear conditions on the takeover to exempt ARM’s tech from intrusive US regulations.

The takeover comes more than a year after the Government’s telecoms supply chain review report, in which the Government committed to diversifying the UK telecommunication supply chain. Since then, a plan to do just that has repeatedly been promised and repeatedly been delayed. Will the Minister explain just how selling this UK-headquartered, world-leading telecoms supplier to a competitor supports the diversification of the supply chain?

I understand that the Government say they are looking into the takeover and that Ministers are considering whether to refer it to the Competition and Markets Authority. I also appreciate that Government policy is in a state of flux, with a pattern of tech businesses being taken over, the status of the industrial strategy unclear, and the national security and investment Bill yet to be published, so we have to use what we have. The Government have the power to impose conditions on such takeovers if they threaten national security or financial stability, which the selling of ARM to Nvidia clearly does.

I appreciate that the Minister who will respond to this debate is the Minister for Digital and Culture, not a Minister from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy or the Minister for Security—that serves to highlight the complexity of the issue. Last time, the Chancellor took ownership; we need the same again. We need a coherent, cross-Government response, led from the top. I urge the Minister to consider such issues carefully, make the case to her colleagues and wake up to the threat that the deal poses unless strict, legally binding conditions are applied.

In conclusion, will the Minister confirm today whether it is the Government’s intention to refer the takeover to the Competition and Markets Authority? Do the Government intend to place clear conditions on the deal to guarantee that ARM’s HQ will stay in Cambridge; that jobs will be protected; that its unique business model will be secured; and that its technology will not be a lever in future trade negotiations that this Government have handed to our competitors?

--- Later in debate ---

[Darren Jones]

As a point of factual clarification, could the Minister confirm whether the impact of US trade sanctions is considered in the process that she set out with the CMA?

[Caroline Dinenage]

I think that that would depend on which aspect, of the four that are under consideration, the Secretary of State was looking at.

As the hon. Member for Cambridge and others know, the UK is a global leader in tech, with a proud history of innovation and invention. Our world-leading universities, financial sector and regulatory environment have produced pioneering researchers, scientific institutions and research projects, and the UK tech sector has the world’s highest proportion of overseas customers, driving our ability to forge global partnerships and attract the very best talent from around the world. From artificial intelligence to biotechnology, the UK has made huge breakthroughs, generating more billion-dollar tech firms than any other country in Europe. Nationally, we now have 82 companies that are worth more than $1 billion—more than France, Germany and the Netherlands combined.

We will, of course, continue to invest in science and technology and R&D-intensive emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and robotics. We will also continue to promote the UK as the very best place to start and grow a tech business. We have the skills, the location and the language, alongside a business-friendly environment, strong access to finance and a long-standing reputation for innovation.

5G Network and Huawei

Darren Jones Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

My right hon. Friend is very experienced in these matters and gets right to the heart of the issue. The issue of this country’s relationship with other countries of varying friendliness around the world will only become more pressing. We have to make the right decision now.

[Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab)]

I declare my interest as set out in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

The issue of internet-connected devices in our critical national infrastructure is related not just to 5G and Huawei, but to water, electricity and supermarket food distribution systems—every part of our way of life. Yet we are caught in the middle of a China, European Union and United States policy approach to developing these technologies. The Minister has been asked a few times today—he has not quite answered the question—what representations he has made to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to include in the Government’s industrial strategy sovereign capability in the manufacturing of technologies. We want absolute reassurance that technologies are safe in our critical infrastructure.

[Matt Warman]

I hoped that I had hinted at an answer earlier. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that Britain has to have an eye on the importance to our strategic interests of certain areas of our economy and of certain small companies growing in this country. We will continue to do that. It is a statement of the obvious that the areas where we will have to take an interest will grow over time.