Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (First sitting)

Paul Maynard Excerpts

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 2nd July 2019 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I am conscious of the time, and I want to bring the Minister in shortly. Does anyone else have a simple, straightforward question they have not had a chance to put yet? I guess it is over to you, Minister.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Paul Maynard)]

Q For the benefit of the wider Committee, could you set out what, when people submit their evidence of fault, the court does with that piece of information? How is it handled by the court? What weight do they place on it?

Nigel Shepherd: The short answer is that the average time that court officials—this is now mostly done by legal advisers in regional divorce centres—have to scrutinise the evidence is four minutes per case, broadly. Although current legislation says that the court has a duty to investigate the situation as far as is reasonably practicable, the reality is that our process does not allow that to happen at all. If a petition goes in on behaviour, and it is not defended, the legal advisers looking at it are simply checking to make sure that the jurisdictional grounds are correct, and that there is the necessary legal connection between the behaviour and the breakdown—in other words, that the boxes are correctly ticked.

There is no investigation and, what is worse, if the respondent to that petition writes five pages on why it is all untrue, if it is not formally defended with an answer and a fee paid of £200, it is ignored. That is the worst of all worlds, because respondents, particularly those without the benefit of legal advice, think that they are saying that they disagree with something about the petition, but that nobody is listening. That makes it even worse. There is no realistic scrutiny at all in the system. It is impractical to have that scrutiny, because who knows really what goes on behind the closed doors of a marriage? That is why this change is fundamentally so important; it means that there is no pretence anymore. It is intellectually dishonest at the moment; that is what Sir James Munby said in the Court of Appeal in the case of Owens. We would be getting rid of that dishonesty and acrimony at the start of the process.

David Hodson: I can add to that as a part-time judge at the central London family court. Until two or three years ago, when we had divorce centres, part-time judges had to do four or five of these special procedures every time we sat. It took a matter of moments. We would give careful consideration to the document that had been drawn up by the legal adviser as to whether there were any procedural errors. We would look at the unreasonable behaviour allegations, but I find it difficult to remember in recent years—we have softened as the years have gone by—anything having been sent back. Sometimes it is so minuscule, but if it is undefended, it will go through.

The 1996 legislation had a knock-on effect. If Parliament decided in 1996 that no-fault divorce was appropriate, though Parliament subsequently did not bring it into force, should judges be turning around and saying no? Owens was a distinctive case. It was a defended case, whereas if it is undefended, as Nigel said, it will go through. That makes it a crying pity that people have got to go through that process in the first place.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)]

Q Good morning. You gave evidence a little while ago about the fact that in order to respond to a fault being mentioned in a divorce, a person has to memorise reams and reams of letters and make a very detailed, comprehensive response to the allegation, but unless they pay the money, they are not even going to be considered. One of the problems with a fault having to be alleged is that often, the respondent or the applicant will then have to spend quite a lot of money to get the process through, so it is almost a double whammy: they have to pay money to blame each other and get a divorce.

David Hodson: One of the Law Society’s concerns is the court fee. I appreciate that this is not in primary legislation, but may we express our concern? At the moment, it is £550.

[The Chair]

Minister, this will have to be your last question.

[Paul Maynard]

Q Do not worry, Chair; it is. To follow up on my previous question, what assessment have you made of the introduction of a joint application for a divorce? How might that change the dynamics of the process?

Nigel Shepherd: We are all in favour. It is absolutely right, and people ask for it all the time. People come in and say, “We both agree. Can we make this a joint decision? It is really important because we want to say to our children that this was a joint decision that we made as adults, rather than having Kramer v. Kramer—an applicant and petitioner against, with one person being blamed and the other not.” We are absolutely in support; it is a crucial part of the Bill.

Aidan Jones: We absolutely support that as well. We believe that is the right message. When the sadness of a divorce is approaching, it is the right message for the children to see that two adults can still co-parent and get on with each other. In the interests of the children, it is the best way forward.

David Hodson: We tried it under the present process in a number of cases where we had agreed particulars of unreasonable behaviour and cross-petitions. In other words, it went through on the petition of both the petitioner and respondent. Then we got the decree absolute, and we still had the original petitioner described as the petitioner, though it had gone through on the petition of the respondent as well, because there was a joint petition with jointly admitted unreasonable behaviour on both sides. That was so unfair. It is the unfairness of that decree absolute. If only we could have, “This is the marriage of x and y, and they have jointly asked for this.”

I think—we can discuss this—there will be a number of instances where there is a sole petitioner and a joint application for the decree absolute. Again, that embraces what we want to see—that by the end of the period before the application for the decree absolute, they have both come to terms with it. They may not have been okay with it at the beginning, but if at the end, they have come to terms with it, how much better that would be for the children, the future parenting and all those other issues. That is why we are desperately keen to see not only a change to our laws, but a change in the terminology—the way the forms are set out—because that signals so much more for the couple.

[The Chair]

I thank the panel for the evidence. We will move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Professor Liz Trinder and Mandip Ghai gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I think we shall move to the Minister.

[Paul Maynard]

Q Thank you both for your evidence so far. For the benefit of the wider Committee, will you set out some specific examples, where there is coercion and control in a relationship, of how the current process facilitates that coercion and control?

Mandip Ghai: Some of it has been mentioned already. Professor Liz Trinder has already mentioned how defending divorce petitions can be used as a tactic. One other thing that we find—I disagree with the previous panel, one of whom suggested that the time period of 20 weeks should start from service—is that sometimes perpetrators will avoid service, deliberately not responding to the petition even though they have received it, or avoiding being served with it, as a way to try to control the applicant and stop her from proceeding with the divorce. They might suggest that they will consent to the petition proceeding, or accept service, if she agrees not to make any financial claims or agrees various things related to children.

Professor Trinder: I agree absolutely with that. Defence is a very stark example; you get respondents defending—causing huge distress to and huge financial costs for the petitioner—not because they believe that the marriage is repairable or saveable but because they simply want to control the other party. Looking at the case files, there are very clear examples of that, so the removal of that ability to continue to control the petitioner in that way is a really welcome future from the Bill.

Mandip Ghai: The other way, which I mentioned earlier, is that sometimes the perpetrator will issue the divorce petition first to prevent her starting divorce proceedings based on his behaviour.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. Thank you. That brings us to the end of our oral session today. The Committee will meet again this afternoon to begin our line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Note that we will be in Committee Room 9 at 2 o’clock.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Matt Warman.)