Asked by: Alexander Stafford (Conservative - Rother Valley)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, what recent assessment he has made of the safety of British National (Overseas) passport holders in Hong Kong.
Answered by Anne-Marie Trevelyan - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
Under an exchange of Memoranda to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) passport holders are eligible for consular assistance in third countries, but not in Hong Kong, Macao or mainland China. Where we have humanitarian or human rights concerns about the treatment of BN(O) passport holders in Hong Kong, Macao or mainland China, we can lobby the relevant authorities, raise issues in international fora and demonstrate our political support. For example, on 8 March, we raised the alleged treatment of Andy Li at the UN Human Rights Council. Our diplomats in Hong Kong regularly attend court to observe a number of national security cases, including for Jimmy Lai's, the NSL 47 and others. On 16 February, the Foreign Secretary raised prosecutions under the National Security Law with his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Munich Security Conference.
Asked by: Alexander Stafford (Conservative - Rother Valley)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, what diplomatic support his Department provides to British National (Overseas) passport holders in Hong Kong.
Answered by Anne-Marie Trevelyan - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
Under an exchange of Memoranda to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) passport holders are eligible for consular assistance in third countries, but not in Hong Kong, Macao or mainland China. Where we have humanitarian or human rights concerns about the treatment of BN(O) passport holders in Hong Kong, Macao or mainland China, we can lobby the relevant authorities, raise issues in international fora and demonstrate our political support. For example, on 8 March, we raised the alleged treatment of Andy Li at the UN Human Rights Council. Our diplomats in Hong Kong regularly attend court to observe a number of national security cases, including for Jimmy Lai's, the NSL 47 and others. On 16 February, the Foreign Secretary raised prosecutions under the National Security Law with his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Munich Security Conference.
Asked by: Catherine West (Labour - Hornsey and Wood Green)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Deputy Foreign Secretary, what recent discussions he has had with his Vietnamese counterpart on furthering the bilateral relationship.
Answered by Anne-Marie Trevelyan - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
I visited Vietnam from 25-27 October 2023 to attend the South China Sea Conference and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) South East Asia Ministerial Forum, and to discuss regional security, investment and economic development. The UK and Vietnam continue to have positive cooperation on long-term strategic priorities such as energy transition and adaptation to climate change, maritime security in line with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, illegal immigration, trade, technology and investment, and on education and research partnerships. Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Philip Barton recently visited Vietnam on 25 March to meet with Vietnamese ministries to discuss further cooperation in these areas.
Asked by: Catherine West (Labour - Hornsey and Wood Green)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Deputy Foreign Secretary, how many UK-based staff from his Department worked in (a) HM Embassy or the High Commission and (b) Consulates General, Consulates or Deputy High Commissions in (i) China, (ii) South Korea, (iii) Vietnam, (iv) the Philippines, (v) India and (vi) the Asia Pacific region in 2023.
Answered by Anne-Marie Trevelyan - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
Mar24 UKB Data | |||
Location | A | B | |
(v) | India | 30-39 | 10-19 |
(iv) | Philippines | 10-19 | No UKB Staff |
(ii) | South Korea | 10-19 | No UKB Staff |
(iii) | Vietnam | 10-19 | Fewer than 10 |
(vi) | Asia Pacific Region | 180-199 | Fewer than 10 |
Scope | |
British Embassy | A |
British High Commission | A |
British Consulate | B |
British Consulate General | B |
British Deputy High Commission | B |
Countries in Scope of Asia Pacific Region |
Australia |
Brunei |
Cambodia |
Fiji |
Indonesia |
South Korea |
Laos |
Malaysia |
Myanmar |
New Zealand |
Papua New Guinea |
Philippines |
Samoa |
Singapore |
Solomon Islands |
Thailand |
Tonga |
Vanuatu |
Vietnam |
Staff in scope: UKB | |
Headcount data is presented as at: Mar24 | |
Locations:China (Withheld), India, Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam (Part (i) to (v), see list for (Part (vi). | |
Staff out of scope: Contingent Labour, Unpaid Liabilities, Ministers / NeDs / SpAds etc, third party suppliers, Staff working for other government departments, CB staff. | |
Headcounts are banded for release in line with advice from FCDO Information and Cyber Security Unit. |
Asked by: Lord Bishop of St Albans (Bishops - Bishops)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they plan to ban Chinese-made electric cars from sensitive national infrastructure sites.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
The UK takes the security and resilience of critical infrastructure seriously. Each Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sector has a Lead Government Department responsible for working with owners and operators to identify and mitigate risks to their sites. They are also supported by the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority who provide expert advice and guidance to both public and private organisations to identify risks and vulnerabilities to the UK’s national infrastructure.
As set out in the Integrated Review Refresh, China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses an epoch-defining challenge and an economic threat to a range of government policy areas, including CNI. The Government actively monitors threats to UK critical national infrastructure, and will not hesitate to take further action if necessary to protect sensitive assets where appropriate to protect national security.
Asked by: Lord Bishop of St Albans (Bishops - Bishops)
Question to the Department for Transport:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the potential impact upon national security of Chinese-made electric vehicles; and whether they plan to further investigate any risks that may arise.
Answered by Lord Davies of Gower - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Transport)
DfT co-chairs the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) group that developed two new international regulations related to connected vehicles – one on cyber security and one on software updates. The cyber security regulation sets out requirements to mitigate potential threats in vehicle construction, to monitor emerging threats and to respond to cyber attacks.
The Government takes national security extremely seriously. The Department for Transport (DfT) works closely with the transport sector and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and other Government departments, including the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) and Department for Science Innovation and Technology (DSIT), to understand and respond to cyber vulnerabilities associated with all connected vehicles, including electric vehicles.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what is the total cost to date of the removal of Hikvision cameras from Whitehall departments; and what estimate they have made of the cost to local authorities of removing Hikvision cameras from local council buildings.
Answered by Baroness Neville-Rolfe - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
It is a long-standing policy that the Government does not comment on security arrangements including the details of security systems. However, the UK takes national security extremely seriously and has taken robust action to secure and protect its national security infrastructure.
Following Royal Assent of the Procurement Act on 26 October 2023 the Government committed to publishing a timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the National Intelligence Law of China from sensitive sites within six months. This timeline is due to be published by 26 April.
Sensitive sites were defined “as any building or complex that routinely holds secret material or above; any location that hosts a significant proportion of officials holding developed vetting clearance; any location which is routinely used by Ministers; and any government location covered under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.”
While local authorities may choose to follow the lead of central government in removing surveillance equipment they are under no obligation to do so. We encourage all organisations to follow NCSC supply chain security guidance when selecting a technology supplier. This guidance clearly sets the security standards that suppliers should meet and the considerations that organisations should be making during the procurement process.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the report by the Coalition on Secure Technology, Chinese cellular (IoT) modules: Countering the threat, published in March, and its conclusions that Chinese-made cellular internet of things modules should be banned from UK critical national infrastructure.
Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
The security of the UK's critical national infrastructure is of utmost importance to the Government. We continue to monitor potential security threats, including the unique challenges posed by cellular internet-of-things (IoT) modules. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) and The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) produce advice and guidance on the security implications of internet connected components, which the Government follows where appropriate.
Existing legislation such as the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act (PSTI) 2022 are designed to address the emerging security threats posed by IoT technologies. These include a range of measures that can be employed even in an evolving threat landscape. Any action is only taken after a rigorous assessment.
The UK's approach to China is to enhance our national security protections, align with our partners, and to engage where it is in the UK's national interest.
Asked by: Matthew Offord (Conservative - Hendon)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, if he will make an assessment of the implications for his policies of fishing by China’s state-sponsored distant water fleet in the (a) Andaman Sea and (b) Gulf of Thailand.
Answered by Anne-Marie Trevelyan - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
The UK is committed to engaging with other countries, including China, to sustainably manage fisheries, protect ecosystems and combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. We support ocean protection through appropriate funding. For example, at the G7 Leaders Summit in Cornwall, the Government pledged £500 million to create our Blue Planet Fund to help developing countries protect the ocean from pollution, overfishing and habitat loss. We also push for multilateral action internationally, including through Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, the Convention of Biological Diversity and the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation. The UK remains committed to international law and UNCLOS.
China is building a network of fishing bases in developing countries across four continents. Comprising ports, boats, and fish processing plants, the bases service China's distant-water fleet: an armada of over 4,600 vessels (potentially many more) that operates in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of 42 countries and accounts for 14 percent of worldwide marine catch by value.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of (1) the call made by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture on 8 March that Hong Kong and China investigate the admission of evidence allegedly obtained by torture in the trial of Jimmy Lai, and (2) the statement by Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC that evidence which appears to have been procured by torture may be used in proceedings against Jimmy Lai.
Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
On 8 March the UK Ambassador and Permanent Representative, UK Mission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), UN and Other International Organisations (Geneva) highlighted the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture's comments and noted the allegation that some evidence to be used to prosecute Jimmy Lai had been obtained through the torture of Andy Li. Article 15 of the Convention against Torture, which China has ratified, prohibits the use of statements established to have been made as a result of torture in court proceedings. We are clear that no evidence gained via torture can be valid evidence.