Victims and Prisoners Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Thursday 6th July 2023
(11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 View all Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 6 July 2023 - (6 Jul 2023)
The Chair
I inform Members about the normal preliminaries: phones and electronic devices should be on silent; no food or drinks are permitted in Committee apart from the water provided; and please give speaking notes to Hansard colleagues or email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Clause 24
Appointment of independent public advocate
Anna McMorrin (Cardiff North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 24, page 18, line 33, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to appoint an individual to act as an independent public advocate for victims of a major incident.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 21, in clause 24, page 19, line 2, leave out—
“appears to the Secretary of State to have”.
This amendment would alter the definition of a major incident so that an incident that has caused the death of, or serious harm to, a significant number of individuals is automatically defined as a major incident.
Anna McMorrin
I thank the organisations Inquest, Hillsborough Law Now and Justice for working with me on these amendments. I also pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood, who has shown such steadfast commitment in the fight for justice for the families of Hillsborough through so many years. I am sure that it brings a lot comfort to those families to know that they have a fierce advocate in this place.
My right hon. Friend first introduced her Public Advocate Bill to Parliament in 2016. It has subsequently been blocked 15 times in the past two Sessions—
Anna McMorrin
Twenty-two times—I thank my right hon. Friend for the correction. Furthermore, I put on the record my tribute to Lord Wills, who has twice attempted to legislate for an independent advocate, in 2014 and 2015. I hope that the Minister today has come with a different approach, will heed the words of my colleagues and will co-operate with regard to the issues raised by my right hon. Friend.
I also put on the record that Labour stands unequivocally with the Hillsborough families. We have called repeatedly for the Hillsborough law; making it a reality will be a priority of a Labour Government.
I state my bitter disappointment that we have reached the debate on part 2 of the Bill, yet the Government have still not responded to the report of the Right Rev. James Jones, “The patronising disposition of unaccountable power”, published six years ago in 2017. That is truly intolerable.
Part 2 of the Bill must ensure that lessons are learned and that never again will families bereaved by public disaster have to endure smear campaigns against their loved ones. Families must never again have to spend three decades campaigning to get truth and justice. Unamended, however—this is where my amendments come in—part 2 falls woefully short of that. There will be more public disasters—since Hillsborough, to name but a few, there has been the Westminster terror attack, the Manchester Arena terror attack and the Grenfell Tower fire.
Lord Wills, Minister of State for Justice from 2007 to 2010, stated in evidence that the Bill was fundamentally flawed. The proposals for the independent public advocate fail in the Justice Secretary’s aim. The Justice Secretary said that
“to deliver justice, victims must be treated not as mere spectators of the criminal justice system, but as core participants in it.”—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 583.]
However, the proposals do not give the bereaved families effective agency. Instead, as Lord Wills said:
“the Bill gives the Secretary of State unfettered powers to appoint an independent public advocate or not to do so, and unfettered powers to dismiss an independent public advocate.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 91, Q176.]
Lord Wills went even further, stating that the Secretary of State will have “too much unfettered discretion”.
Amendments 20 and 21 are aimed at correcting that issue, ultimately limiting the Secretary of State’s discretion over the appointment of an independent public advocate. It is deeply concerning that the clause does not require the Secretary of State to appoint an advocate; rather, the Secretary of State “may” do so. Without a duty on the Secretary of State always to appoint an advocate, some bereaved families may receive additional support to which other families are not entitled, worsening the inconsistencies that already exist in the post-death investigation system. That was rightly identified in 2021 by the Select Committee on Justice. For the advocate post to be effective, it should be a mandatory appointment with the duties and functions of the advocate arising in the event of a major disaster, rather than at the discretion of the Secretary of State.
It is equally concerning that the responsibility for declaring a major incident again lies with the Secretary of State. That cannot remain in the Bill. Amendment 21 would change the definition of “major incident” to ensure that a major incident is one where it causes the death of, or serious harm to, a significant number of individuals, rather than where it simply “appears to the Secretary of State” to have caused the death of, or serious harm to, a significant number of individuals. The discretion of the Secretary of State in both those matters is something that Opposition Members and stakeholders are deeply troubled by.
Maria Eagle
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Hosie. I begin by thanking my hon. Friend for her kind words about my long-standing efforts in respect of a public advocate, which arose out of my experience as a constituency MP seeking to represent some of the bereaved families of those who were killed at Hillsborough, and also survivors of Hillsborough—we often forget survivors. Many thousands of people in the ground on that day saw what happened and were subsequently pretty traumatised. Some have been in a terrible state for many years. I still meet people who tell me what happened to them on that day and say that they have never told anybody in the intervening 34 years.
One can imagine the state that some of the people are in in terms of their mental health, particularly when there has been a cover-up that has lasted for so many years seeking to blame fans for what happened, rather than an acceptance of responsibility. We must remember that within four months of the disaster, the first interim report of the first public inquiry placed responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the police, which they never accepted and then chose to campaign to overturn.
When I first met my constituents as an MP in 1997—I had known some of them before as a lawyer—the first thing they said to me was that the police had used the inquest to overturn the Taylor inquiry. Of course, I had the lawyer’s response and said, “No, inquests have a different purpose”, but I quickly understood what they meant when I saw what had happened.
In reality, the cover-up at Hillsborough began on the day and was then pursued at great cost and expense using taxpayers’ money over decades. In fact, at the second inquest, the same points were put by the police lawyers. Even now one hears similar arguments being put: “It was the Liverpool fans; they were ticketless; they were drunk. They pushed their way into the ground and killed their own.” One even hears it in the chants, which, mercifully, the Football Association is now trying to deal with. “Tragedy chanting”, as it is known, is done to Liverpool fans at grounds all over the country. That kind of issue resonates for decades for many thousands of people. That is why I am convinced we as a society must seek to get the aftermath of disasters right.
If we can stop things going wrong—as wrong as they have with Hillsborough—we can save a lot of money and a lot of heartache. We can certainly make sure that the families of those killed in disasters, who suddenly face the worst moments of their lives in the full glare of publicity, do not also have to deal with public authorities’ intent on not getting at the truth and finding out what happened to the families’ loved ones, or not supporting them in every way possible, and in some cases trying to blame them for what happened. In all the cases that I have come across, the authorities try to make sure that they do not get the blame. That defensiveness often drives the behaviour of public authorities in the aftermath of disasters.
That is why I rise to support amendments 20 and 21, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff North. Clause 24 gives total discretion to the Secretary of State, and there is no requirement about what he should consider in making the appointment and no requirement that he should consult those affected.
My experience of having to deal with disasters as a constituency MP does not just include the Hillsborough disaster. There have been others: the MV Derbyshire disaster happened long before I became an MP, the Alder Hey organ scandal was another that I had to deal with, and I have constituents affected by the Manchester Arena bombing. A number of other disasters have happened during my time in this House. One issue is always the same: the Secretary of State gaining the trust of those affected is an incredibly important part of ensuring that things do not go wrong.
The Secretary of State should be required to appoint an advocate, thus removing his discretion. We will have an argument—a discussion—later about whether the advocate should be a standing appointment. On balance, I think it should be, but if it is to be an ad hoc appointment, the Secretary of State should not have discretion about whether to appoint when there has been a major incident. There should always be an appointment. I therefore support amendment 20.
There is also an issue about how we define “major incident”. I always think of these things as public disasters in which a number of people have died—that is my definition—but the Government have chosen to define it slightly differently. No doubt the Minister can enlighten us about precisely how the Government see the interpretation of that phrase.
Anything that can give families some comfort that the Secretary of State is acting in their interests, not with unfettered powers and not without having to discuss things with them, would be an advance on the current drafting. For those reasons, I support the amendments.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Edward Argar)
At the outset, I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood for her campaigning on this issue over many years on behalf of not only her constituents, but others whom she has probably never met but who look to her for the leadership that she has shown. They will be grateful for everything that she has done. I also pay tribute to her for the tone that she consistently adopts, which is measured and reasonable.
The right hon. Lady and I had the opportunity to meet, and she introduced me to one of her constituents, whom we subsequently saw before the Committee. The right hon. Lady highlighted the issues of agency and transparency and why the families, having been through all that they have been through, approach these matters in a particular way and have the perspective that they do. We have talked about Hillsborough. Of course, this applies, in recent times, to Grenfell and Manchester Arena, and the survivors and the families of the victims of those horrific events. I also pay tribute to Lord Wills and to my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) for her work on this issue.
I hope that there is agreement across this Committee Room today on a determination to get it right. There may be discussion about what getting it right looks like, and there may be differences of opinion on that. However, this is a genuine opportunity for this House, for this Parliament, to do something of huge import, notwithstanding the fact that there may be areas where we disagree or approach the issue from slightly different perspectives. There should be a fair degree of consensus and a determination to get the right outcome.
I preface my remarks on all these amendments and clauses with this: I look forward to our discussions today, but I also look forward to the opportunity, where there are areas where we do not coalesce around a single approach, to use the summer recess and beyond, before the Bill comes back on Report, to work with the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, and others to see whether we can move closer together during those months. I hope that the right hon. Lady will take me up on that offer to engage throughout the coming months.
Anna McMorrin
I thank the Minister for his tone in setting out how he is prepared to work with us through the summer to improve the Bill, and specifically on the amendments. My right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood made heartfelt points about her conversations with constituents and the families impacted. We know that so many families have not had answers for so long, and it has touched many deeply. It goes far and wide across the country.
We tabled the two amendments because, as I set out in my argument, the Secretary of State has far too much discretion at the moment, which is deeply troubling. I therefore want to ensure that we work together to improve the clause and make it more robust, and to ensure that the Secretary of State does not have unfettered discretion. I will not push amendment 20 to a vote, but I appreciate that the Minister will work with us to make improvements. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Maria Eagle
I beg to move amendment 65, in clause 24, page 18, line 35, at end insert—
“(1A) In doing so, the Secretary of State must have regard to—
(a) the views of bereaved families,
(b) the relative benefits of an Independent Public Advocate, a public inquiry, or an Independent Panel in relation to cost, timeliness, and transparency of the major incident in question,
(c) any wider public interest”
This amendment would ensure that in exercising the Secretary of State’s discretion as to whether an Independent Public Advocate should be appointed, the Secretary of State must consider the views of the bereaved families and the relatives of how best to get the truth of what happened in the major incident concerned in a timely fashion.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 66, in clause 24, page 19, line 8, at end insert—
“(4A) An individual may be appointed as an advocate in respect of a major incident only if the Secretary of State has consulted the victims of that incident.”
This amendment ensures that the families are consulted by the Secretary of State about who is an advocate.
Maria Eagle
I very much welcome the fact that clause 24 enables the Secretary of State to appoint an independent public advocate, no matter how much we might disagree about how we should do it—whether it should be a standing appointment or done on an ad hoc basis, precisely what functions the independent public advocate will have, how he ought to go about his role and, indeed, what that role ought to be. I think there are some differences in all those areas, but there are no differences between us about the fact that there ought to be an independent public advocate.
Across the Committee and the House, we have recognised that something about the aftermath of public disasters—the Minister calls them major incidents; I call them public disasters—is remiss. The way in which we as a society respond to them does not work at present. Although we can hope to minimise the number of disasters, we can never stop them entirely. There have been more since Hillsborough, and there have been more since I introduced my Public Advocate (No. 2) Bill to the Commons and Lord Wills introduced the Public Advocate Bill to the Lords. It would be best if we could get a better arrangement. We all agree on that; the issue is just about how.
The amendment has arisen from my 26 years’ experience of campaigning with the Hillsborough families and survivors to get to the truth of what happened on the day. Usually, families want to know what happened to their loved ones, especially if they have lost them. They want to know that it will not happen to anybody ever again, because they feel the deep distress and pain of having to deal with these issues in the public glare and on all the newspaper front pages. Going suddenly from nowhere to that is pretty hard for people, so they want to know that it will not happen again.
Families want to know that their loved ones have not been lost in vain and that lessons will be learned, and they want to be able to have faith that the investigations over the subsequent period will get to the truth and will not be some way of covering up what happened in order to excuse the feelings—and usually the pockets—of the public authorities that might have some responsibility for it.
The role and functions of the public advocate, as set out in the clause, do not quite accord with what I think is necessary, but I hope that we can agree in due course to improve the Bill so that it becomes a turning point, which it can be, in how we as a society deal with the aftermath of public disasters and the terrible burdens they place on those who become victims, rather than it being a missed opportunity. Clause 24(1) gives the Secretary of State discretion to
“appoint an individual to act as an independent public advocate for victims of a major incident”.
A “major incident” is defined in subsection (2). As we have already mentioned, the clause as currently drafted gives the Secretary of State total discretion about whether to appoint an advocate. Under subsection (4), the person may be appointed only if the Secretary of State considers the person “qualified” and “appropriate”. Subsection (5) details that the person may be qualified by virtue of qualifications, their relationship with a “geographical or other community” or “any other matter” the Secretary of State considers relevant. He has total discretion to consider whether and who to appoint.
Nothing in clause 24 gives any kind of say or agency to the victims of the disaster, whether they be families of the deceased or survivors. That is an omission, and a missed opportunity. At this early stage, the Secretary of State could give the families immediate reassurance—that what they think matters, that their feelings matter and that they have some kind of role in how the state is going to deal with what has happened. Families and survivors of major incidents and disasters often feel powerless in the aftermath as the processes of the state begin to grind forward. Inquiries, inquests—they grind into gear and it makes families feel done to, rather than a part of: they feel that they have no power or role in these matters.
Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)
I thank my right hon. Friend for making such a meaningful speech about putting victims first, at the heart of the process. For the independent advocate to really play their role, the victims need to have a say on whether an independent advocate needs to be appointed. The role is there primarily for the victims, not for the Secretary of State.
Maria Eagle
I agree with that. It is easy to lose trust, and it is hard to gain it; it is very hard to regain it once it is lost—that is my experience of these things.
I will give one example. When Jack Straw became Home Secretary in 1997, he was convinced that something needed to be done, in the aftermath of the drama-documentary “Hillsborough”, which raised some of the issues about what had gone wrong. We should remember that that was some eight years after the disaster—a long time ago, but only eight years after the disaster. A lot of things had already gone wrong in that time. He did not want to set up another public inquiry. What he came to was the Stuart-Smith scrutiny, which looked again at some evidence and reported back a year later.
When Lord Justice Stuart-Smith went to Liverpool to meet the families, the families had been misinformed about precisely which floor of the building he was on, so they were a few minutes late. He immediately made a joke about how they were late like the Liverpool fans on the day. That was not funny; it was crass in the extreme. It showed that he had taken on board utterly the police account of events. People may not know—some will—that a key part of the police smears about Hillsborough, to try to deflect the blame, was that Liverpool fans had turned up late. It immediately destroyed any credibility for that inquiry. The families thought very carefully about walking out and not co-operating with it. I am absolutely certain that there were ructions in the Home Office at the time about what should be done.
I use the example to illustrate the point that the families must have trust in the person and in how the state is to proceed if such an inquiry is to work. The failure of that inquiry wasted a year, upset the families very deeply and destroyed some of the credibility that the new Government of the time had with the families about what could be done to put matters in respect of Hillsborough right. The inquiry revealed one thing that was of use in the end, which was that statements had been altered by the police. That was the first inquiry that reported on that point, but Lord Justice Stuart-Smith did not think it important because it had not fooled Lord Justice Taylor. He was right in that respect; he was wrong in others. With one comment, the trust of the families were gone. They were obviously not consulted about who should head the inquiry. A judge was asked for, a judge was put forward, and that was the unfortunate consequence.
Anna McMorrin
I rise to support my right hon. Friend on these two amendments. The pain of these bereaved families runs deep and the resonance of what happened, particularly at Hillsborough, runs incredibly wide, as we have heard described so brilliantly by my right hon. Friend. But of course the point is widely known and acknowledged across many of the debates and discussions that go on.
These are two core issues, right at the heart of the matter: inclusion of the bereaved families, who are going through that pain, in these decisions, and inclusion of those families when consulting. We need to ensure that they are consulted. They have felt disenfranchised. They have felt left behind. This change would make up for it.
Edward Argar
First, I should have said in response to the previous set of amendments that I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her tone on this part of the Bill and the way Opposition Front Benchers are approaching it. We may find that there remain, after Committee stage, some areas where we have differences, but I think it is incumbent on both sides of the House to work together, to the best of our ability, to try to find a way forward that delivers on our shared objectives.
The right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood mentioned Jack Straw in 1997. I can remember the Labour party coming to power in 1997—I had just finished my A-levels and left school at the time. I believe that that was when the right hon. Lady entered this House.
Edward Argar
Therefore I am always sensitive to the depth of experience and knowledge that the right hon. Lady brings as a parliamentarian to these proceedings. I am very grateful to her for these amendments, which seek to give agency to the families bereaved by a major incident—or public disaster, to use her terminology—provide them with influence over who is appointed as an advocate, and specifically define criteria to which the Secretary of State must have due regard when appointing an advocate.
The right hon. Lady is absolutely right to highlight the importance of trust and agency. First, on trust, we all know as politicians that it is very easy to very swiftly lose trust. It takes an awfully long time to rebuild it afterwards. That is why—this is my second point—she is absolutely right to highlight the importance of tone and language. In the aftermath of a major public disaster like the one that we have been discussing, particularly when it is many years down the line of—for want of a better way of putting it—having to fight the system to get the truth, people are, understandably, very sensitive to the language and tone, so I am sympathetic to the aims of these amendments. I want to say again that the Government do recognise the need to give families a voice and some sort of agency in decisions about the support that is provided.
My concern is that the practicalities of consulting families in the immediate aftermath of a disaster could be difficult, especially at a time when they are dealing with their immediate grief. At that point, they may not necessarily have coalesced into a support group—a single group or a number of groups—and may still be disparate individuals, with different views, who may not be in a position to compute what they might like to see in the future, because of the immediate consequences.
Maria Eagle
Perhaps a standing appointment is the answer, because such a person, who was there anyway, would be able immediately to spring into action and consult the families.
Edward Argar
This goes to my slight concern about the amendments. I am concerned that identifying and consulting bereaved families and victims, and trying to avoid missing anyone or people feeling that they did not have agency because they were not identified or engaged at the time, could risk delaying the IPA being appointed and support reaching victims. I take the right hon. Lady’s point, and I suspect that we will return to this when we talk about the nature of the appointment, but there are questions of timing and speed versus engagement, and how we would practically go about this. I know it is not the intention of the right hon. Lady, who wishes to ensure agency for families, and I am happy to continue our conversation to see if there is a way we can strike that balance between agency and engagement, but also avoid delay in practical terms. At present, victims would be able to make their representations to the Secretary of State, use their MPs and, ultimately, challenge a decision in court.
The Government intend to ensure that advocates are on the ground to provide support as swiftly as possible after a major incident. To ensure that support is tailored to a particular incident, our approach, which I suspect we will also debate later today, is to set up a register of advocates from a range of different professions, backgrounds and geographical areas. That will help to ensure that, as far as possible, those appointed have the necessary skills and expertise directly relevant to the incident in question or to the community or geography where it occurred. The views of the victims may well become apparent in the weeks following the appointment of an advocate and may have an important bearing on the appointment of a second or third advocate, or a team. One such advocate could, under the provisions as drafted, be put forward for appointment from the community affected by the major incident.
I recognise and understand the intent behind the amendments. In our conversations, the right hon. Lady has impressed on me just how important the sense of having agency and influence is for victims, survivors and families of victims in the aftermath of an incident. My concern is that there is a risk that the amendments could cause unnecessary delays in support reaching victims, which would run counter to the purpose of the IPA. None the less, given the right hon. Lady’s points about agency and the sense of powerlessness, I am happy to engage with her to see if there is a way that we can square the circle of timeliness, agency and engagement.
Maria Eagle
I do not intend to press the amendments to a vote. The Minister is being his usual constructive self, and I am sure that over the summer between all of us we will be able to rewrite the Bill so it looks a lot more like mine. [Laughter.] Sorry, I let that slip. We will be able to improve the Bill significantly so that it will do an appropriate and, hopefully, good job for those caught up in public disasters. On the basis of the Minister’s assurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Anna McMorrin
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 24, page 19, line 8, at end insert—
“(4A) If the circumstances in subsection (2) are not met, the Secretary of State may still declare a major incident where there is a significant public interest in doing so.
(4B) Where the Secretary of State declares a major incident under subsection (4A), they must appoint an individual to act as an independent public advocate for victims of that incident.”
This amendment would enable the Secretary of State to designate incidents other than those that meet the definition of major incidents as such where there is a significant public interest in doing so.
Amendment 22 aims to alleviate the restrictive nature of granting a major incident only in the circumstances outlined in clause 24. It recognises that there may be incidents that do not have a direct impact on a significant number of people in the way that the definition of a major incident in the Bill requires, but that should none the less be considered major incidents for the purpose of appointing a public advocate. Such incidents include those where a relatively small number of people have died or suffered serious harm in circumstances that suggest serious systemic failings on the part of a public body, and those where there appears to be a serious risk that such circumstances may recur or that a significant number of people may be harmed in the future. In such instances, effective investigations into the deaths, so that lessons can be learned and further harm avoided, would be in the public interest. The appointment of an independent advocate in such cases would ensure that by promoting transparency, enabling victims to get to the truth and ensuring accountability, just as the former Lord Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), outlined in the Chamber during the debate on independent public advocates on 1 March.
As I have said, I disagree with the amount of discretion that the Bill outlines for the Secretary of State, but if clause 24 is not amended the Secretary of State should at least have the discretion to declare instances, such as those described in the Bill, that would not fall under the definition of major incidents currently provided, and therefore appoint an advocate in respect of them.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cardiff North for tabling the amendment, which would expand the scope of the IPA by giving the Secretary of State the power to appoint an IPA to support victims of an incident that does not meet the definition of a major incident in the Bill, but where the Secretary of State believes there is a significant public interest in doing so.
I understand the intention behind the amendment, particularly when taken alongside amendments 20 and 21, which we just debated. Amendment 22 would give back the Secretary of State some discretion to appoint an IPA following an event if they wanted to. However, it is important to remember that the IPA is intended to respond to exceptional events that present unique challenges. We use the term “major incidents”, but I acknowledge the term “public disaster” and I can understand why the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood uses it. I fear that the amendment may set a potentially unhelpful expectation and precedent that the IPA might be appointed to support victims who have not been caught up in a major incident, thereby increasing the scope and diluting the focus of the IPA. It would, for example, allow the appointment of an IPA where there are no injuries or fatalities. That is not the policy intention in part 2 of the Bill.
We are seeking to keep the focus narrowly on the intention to have the IPA in place for major incidents. We will debate some of the nuances and sub-elements of that, I suspect, but we want to keep that focus. In fact, not all events that involve fatalities or injuries will require the support of the IPA. Any event that results in harm and/or loss of life is a serious, but the intention and focus of the IPA is that it will become involved in only those circumstances where ensuring the effective engagement of the bereaved families and victims is likely to be a particular challenge and the IPA can add value in helping to give them agency.
Clause 24 already provides the Secretary of State with the necessary discretion when declaring a major incident to take account of a broad range of factors, which will probably include the public interest. As I have stated, we will publish a policy statement that sets out the factors to be considered. I note the intention behind the amendment, but I hope the hon. Member for Cardiff North will not press it to a Division.
Anna McMorrin
I thank the Minister for his reply. I accept his assurance that where it is in the public interest, declaring major incidents will be within the scope of the Secretary of State’s discretion. If I am wrong in that, perhaps he will intervene. I am grateful to him for putting that on record.
I would us to find a way to keep the focus on where there is a significant public interest—for example, when a relatively small number of people have died or suffered harm but the circumstances suggest serious systemic failings on the part of a public body. In those circumstances it would be in the public interest and lessons can be learned for the future. I hope we can move forward, as the Minister has given the assurance that an incident would be included, if that was in the public interest. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Maria Eagle
I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 24, page 19, line 23, leave out “or close friends”.
This amendment would narrow the definition of “victim” to close family members of those who have died or suffered serious harm as a result of the incident and make more certain who falls within the definition.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 68, in clause 24, page 19, line 24, at end insert—
“(8) For the purposes of clause 24 (7), close family members means—
(a) a husband, wife or civil partner from a marriage or partnership that was in existence at the time of the event;
(b) a child;
(c) a grandchild;
(d) a parent;
(e) a sibling;
(f) a half-sibling;
(g) a grandparent;
(h) a niece or nephew;
(i) a half-aunt or half-uncle;
(j) a cohabitant with the deceased;
(k) the executor of the deceased’s last will and testament;”.
This amendment defines the meaning of close family member in clause 24.
Maria Eagle
Amendment 67 and 68 are probing amendments, which are intended to explore who the Government intend to be the recipient of help from the public advocate that they are establishing under the Bill.
Clause 24(7)(a) defines the victims who are to benefit from the service of the public advocate, once appointed, as
“individuals who have been harmed by the incident (whether or not that harm is serious harm)”.
That seems to mean survivors, who are certainly one group that the public advocate should aim to help, but subsection (7)(b) says that victims also include
“close family members or close friends of individuals who have died or suffered serious harm as a result of the incident.”
The paragraph does not define “close family members”; nor does it define “close friends”, which is a much more uncertain and ambiguous term than “close family members”, although there is uncertainty in both.
Suppose that I am a second cousin. Is that “close family”? What about an aunt who is particularly close to a niece who has unfortunately died. Is that close enough? Or does it depend on the specific relationship in each case? If so, is the close family member supposed to prove that a family relationship that looks, on the face of it, to be a little distant is in fact close? What about a close friend? That could be anyone.
Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
I well remember being in Manchester on the day of the Arena bombing. I was not at the Arena, but the sense of shock in the city was palpable. One of the news items that day was about the sad loss of Nell Jones, a 14-year-old girl from Cheshire. Her teacher said of the class:
“They’ve lost a sister not a classmate”,
and explained that they had been together since reception class. I think there is a bit of scope for a close friend to be included.
Maria Eagle
I do not disagree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman about trying to cope with all situations, but it is quite hard—as a lawyer, he knows this—to get the definitions right. Through the probing amendments I am seeking to get the Government to be clear. Like most lawyers, I work on the assumption that uncertainty is undesirable—although it can be lucrative. In this context, wrangles over who might be allowed to get support are certainly not desirable.
The amendments are about trying to get the Government to set out a little more clearly than they do in the Bill precisely what they mean by these unusual phrases. I cannot think of another piece of legislation that refers to “close friends”. Perhaps the Minister will have an example that will show that I have not looked far enough—no doubt he will. That is the point of the probing amendments: simply to get to the bottom of precisely what the Minister is seeking to achieve.
Anna McMorrin
I completely support the probing amendments, and I am intrigued to hear what the Minister has to say in response.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood for her amendments. I appreciate that she is, both as a parliamentarian and with her legal background, exploring what greater clarity can be provided. I sympathise with her. I take her point about ambiguity occasionally being beneficial to the legal profession but not necessarily to others, and about the desire to be as clear as possible about whom the IPA will support.
Our concern is about placing a definition of “close family members” in the Bill. We are all conscious, from our constituency work and more broadly, that there is no set family structure. A person’s second cousin, aunt or whoever may be much closer to that person than a very close relative is. We have sought create a degree of flexibility, so that the Bill can capture those who need support. Our approach is to use guidance to more clearly define how that would work, while still allowing the IPA a degree of discretion and flexibility. I am happy to work with the right hon. Lady on that guidance. With her legal mind as well as her parliamentary one, we might square that circle.
I would not support removing the ability of the IPA to support a close friend of a victim, because I fear that doing so could have the unintended consequence of excluding some victims from support. There may be some circumstances where someone injured in a major incident cannot receive the support of the IPA directly and does not have any close family ties, but has a close friend, a companion or another person who is deeply affected by what has happened, and who may be the only person they have left. We would wish such people to have the agency to engage with the IPA and receive their support directly. We therefore think that it is appropriate to allow the IPA to provide support to a close friend. I do not imagine that necessarily being the norm, but the provision is a safeguard to avoid being unduly restrictive and inadvertently excluding people.
I am reminded of the bombing of the Admiral Duncan pub, when a number of people who were actually partners of victims, but who were not confident enough to be out, therefore described themselves as close friends. I would hope, as I think would all Members, that the world has moved on since then, but there is a risk that if we tighten the definition too much, people like that might not get the support they need. I hope that the world and society have moved on, but I just want to ensure that we have that safeguard in place.
I do understand the right hon. Lady’s intention in tabling the amendments, but I believe that they would narrow the definition of a victim in a such a way as inadvertently to exclude people who needed support. However, I am open to working with her—with her legal brain, as well as her parliamentary one—on the guidance to see whether we could, without being unduly prescriptive and while still being permissive, tighten it up a little more from a legal perspective. I am happy to work with her on that.
Maria Eagle
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, these ae probing amendments. The Minister is right that they narrowed the definition, but only to probe. On the basis of the assurances that he has given, I am quite content to withdraw the amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15—Appointment of a standing independent public advocate—
“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint an individual to act as an independent public advocate for victims of major incidents.
(2) The Secretary of State must pay to or in respect of an advocate—
(a) such remuneration as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;
(b) reasonable costs incurred by the advocate in connection with the exercise of their functions, including those incurred in connection with proceedings relating to the exercise (or purported exercise) of those functions;
(c) such other sums by way of allowances or gratuities as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(3) The Secretary of State must make provision for the advocate to have an efficient and effective system of support, including secretarial support, in connection with the exercise of their functions.
(4) The independent public advocate may undertake the functions set out in section [functions and powers of the independent public advocate] for a particular event when—
(a) invited to do so by the Secretary of State, or
(b) for that event both requirements one and two have been met.
(5) Requirement one is that, in the advocate’s opinion, a major incident has occurred.
(6) A major incident is an incident that has caused the death of, or serious harm to, a significant number of individuals and involved—
(a) serious health and safety issues,
(b) a failure in regulation, or
(c) other events of serious concern.
(7) For these purposes, ‘harm’ includes physical, mental or emotional harm.
(8) In reaching an opinion under subsection (5), the advocate must have regard to previous decisions of the advocate.
(9) Requirement two is that the advocate has been asked to undertake their functions by fifty per cent plus one or more of the total of—
(a) representatives of those deceased due to the event, and
(b) any injured survivors of the event.”
Edward Argar
I will speak to clause 24 now, and to new clause 15 in my concluding remarks, once I have heard what the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood wishes to say about it.
Clause 24 enables the Secretary of State to appoint independent public advocates for victims of a major incident. Thankfully, major incidents—or public disasters—involving significant loss of life and serious injury are relatively rare in this country. However, they do happen, and when they do the processes that follow can be complex and daunting for victims and the bereaved. Despite the progress made in recent years, it is clear, as the right hon. Lady eloquently set out, that significant concerns remain about the extent to which the voices of the victims are heard, the agency that they have, and how fully they are supported in participating in the processes that aim to establish what happened and why. Clause 24 marks an important step forward.
As well as giving the Secretary of State the power to appoint an advocate, the clause defines “major incident” and “harm” for part 2 of the Bill. It is not possible to predict the exact nature of future incidents or disasters where an IPA may be required. The definition of a major incident is therefore intentionally broad to ensure that the Secretary of State has maximum flexibility to appoint an IPA to respond to a wide range of incidents.
The Government’s intention is to appoint an advocate as soon as possible after a major incident. Clause 24 sets out the sorts of things that the Secretary of State may consider when deciding whether an individual is appropriate to be appointed as an advocate. Those include previous qualifications, the individual’s geographical location and the impacted community and its needs. That ensures that decisions are made with a victim-centric approach. In taking a decision to appoint an advocate, the Secretary of State may have regard to the geographical area of the incident and, as previously set out, any particular community directly affected.
The Secretary of State will be able to appoint more than one advocate in respect of the same major incident where that is deemed necessary. Each major incident will be different and likely to require a specific set of skills and experience from the advocate. The clause seeks to ensure that there is enough flexibility to appoint the right people, and we believe that having the ability to appoint multiple advocates will help to provide the necessary resilience and diversity.
The Government believes it is right that the decision to stand up the IPA rests with the Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament for their decisions and for public expenditure. We do not think that a permanent body is necessary, given the rarity of the events in question. Nor do we believe that it is right to require victims to make such a decision when they are dealing with the immediate impact of their injuries and grief. However, we do recognise the importance of giving victims agency, which is why we are continuing to think about the role that victims can play in the appointment of more than one advocate following the immediate aftermath. I offer to work with the right. hon Lady to see if there is a way we can square that circle.
The clause also enables the Secretary of State to appoint a community leader if representations are made by the community. If an incident occurs and the IPA is not stood up, victims will be able to make representations to the IPA secretariat or their local elected MP to ask for one to be appointed. Those representations will be carefully considered, and a decision on whether to appoint an advocate can always be revisited.
Anna McMorrin
Most of my comments about my amendments still stand. It is incredibly important that we bear in mind the words of Lord Wills, who said that a different approach is needed. He quoted the Justice Secretary’s comment that
“victims must be treated not as mere spectators of the criminal justice system, but as core participants in it.”—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 583.]
At present, as Lord Wills says,
“the Bill gives the Secretary of State unfettered powers”.––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 91, Q176.]
I hope that we can work together to improve the clause as the Minister suggests.
Maria Eagle
Before I say a few things about clause 24 stand part, I would like to speak to my new clause 15.
At the beginning of our consideration of part 2 of the Bill, I said that my own Public Advocate Bill and the Government’s Bill envisage the role of a public advocate somewhat differently, although there are points of similarity. New clause 15 sets out roles and functions that are closer to what I would like to see in the Bill. It would require the Secretary to State to appoint an individual to act as a public advocate for victims of major incidents, and to ensure an efficient and effective means of support, with appropriate remuneration and reasonable costs, to carry out the functions assigned to the post. It would be a standing appointment, rather than an ad-hoc appointment on a case-by-case basis.
Sir Oliver Heald
I have been closely following the right hon. Lady’s points about consulting victims, but a standing appointment may not be suitable for each set of circumstances or each set of victims. How does she square that circle?
Maria Eagle
My own view is that these kinds of public disaster occur infrequently. My main worry is whether a single standing appointment would be able to cope if more than one disaster occurred at the same time. As I envisage it, the independence of the role and the fact that it is a standing appointment would enable that person to act swiftly. It would have to be somebody who is a people person and is able to relate to individuals in trauma. The appointment itself would have to take into account the kind of qualities that the person would need, but I believe a proper person could be found who would be suitable in most circumstances.
Sir Oliver Heald
Under the Bill’s approach, the Minister appointing a public advocate would be looking at the geography, the communities and the skills necessary for a particular major incident. With a standing appointment, we might end up with somebody who would be good for one incident but not another.
Maria Eagle
I acknowledge that there are pros and cons to both approaches. The right hon. and learned Gentleman is pointing out what he sees as the downside of a standing appointment. One could envisage circumstances in which a standing appointment may have downsides, but there are also upsides. In the end, to get their legislation through, the Government must judge which approach they prefer. I simply seek to persuade the Minister and the Government that a standing appointment may have more pros than cons—and more pros than an ad hoc appointment, which has downsides too. My approach has always been that there should be a standing appointment rather than an ad hoc one.
There was extensive support for that approach in this Committee’s evidence sessions. Bishop James Jones said:
“I do not think that that independence is sufficiently guaranteed by the Bill as it stands; I think it can be guaranteed only if it is a standing appointment.”—[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023, col. 87, Q168.]
He made the point that independence is tremendously important, and that that requires a standing appointment. He also said:
“Contrary to the Government’s proposal, I believe that there should be a standing independent public advocate. Why? Because in the immediate aftermath of a public tragedy, people are grief-stricken and traumatised. They are unprepared and disorientated, and they no longer feel in control of their life. It is in that immediate moment that they need an advocate—somebody who will represent them to Government and signpost them to the agencies that are available to support them in that moment of trauma.”—[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023, col. 86, Q166.]
Lord Wills, too, believes that there should be a standing appointment. That is perhaps not surprising, because the Bill he introduced in the Lords, which has just had its Second Reading, includes a standing appointment. He said:
“I believe it should be a standing appointment, for the reasons that the bishop set out extremely well. In the turmoil of the aftermath of a big public disaster, it is important that someone is on the ground immediately to support the families. I do believe that, and I think it is a perfectly achievable position to have. A secretariat could be drawn together at short notice—a standing secretariat, as it were. It would be doing work within the civil service, but when a public disaster happened it could be brought to bear to act as a secretariat for the independent public advocate.
I hate to think of what might happen. If you imagine a big terrorist incident, for example, the Government would be in turmoil anyway, and then they would have to find the time and space to go through all the selection processes, find out people’s availability and negotiate terms of reference. In the meantime, the poor families are left without anyone to support them, as they always have been up until now. It rather defeats the object of this whole exercise. So I am in favour of having a standing appointment.”—[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023, col. 93, Q179.]
We can see that there are pros and cons, whichever way one decides to do that. I just happen to have come down on the side of a standing appointment being preferable on balance. That is the approach that Michael Wills and I took when drafting our own version, which has the advantage of the postholder being able to go into action immediately with no delay required.
My new clause envisages two scenarios in which the advocate is called into action. The first is where the Secretary of State invites him to get involved; I hope the Minister will be pleased to see that I am not entirely excluding action by the Secretary of State. The second is if the advocate thinks a major incident has occurred that meets the requirement under new clause 15(6) and the advocate has been asked to undertake the function by a majority of representatives of the deceased and injured survivors of the incident.
That part of the clause puts into legislation my idea, and Lord Wills’s idea, that there should be agency for the families, that they must have a role in deciding whether the advocate gets involved and that the advocate himself should decide whether the definition of major incident or public disaster is met. Subsection (6) defines a major incident as one
“that has caused the death of, or serious harm to, a significant number of individuals and involved—
(a) serious health and safety issues,
(b) a failure in regulation, or
(c) other events of serious concern.”
The key difference from the Bill as drafted by the Government is that the affected families and survivors can get the advocate—who will already be in post—involved, should a majority of them wish to do so, even if the Secretary of State has not asked the advocate to get involved. The advocate can make it clear that he thinks that an incident meets the threshold for his involvement—if, indeed, he thinks that—on the basis of precedent. Obviously there will have to be a few involvements before precedent can come into it.
That would deliver one of the key requirements for a public advocate to succeed, in my view, which is to ensure that the affected families have some agency about whether his services should be called upon in respect of a particular incident. Those families must feel that they can call the advocate in to help them navigate the aftermath and get to the truth.
The trust and confidence of the families of the deceased and survivors is a crucial requirement for the post of public advocate to be introduced successfully. Enabling them to have a meaningful say in whether the advocate should be involved is an important way to establish that trust from an early stage. It also emphasises the independence of the advocate at a very early stage of his involvement: if the families ask him to get involved, and if he can decide that a particular incident falls within the definition of “serious incident” and triggers his possible involvement, it is quite clear that he is independent and is not being told what to do by the Government of the day, about whom there may be some suspicion among those who have been caught up in the incident.
The independence of the advocate from the Government is another vital way in which families and survivors can have trust and confidence, which can be gained at an early stage and reinforced thereafter during the processes that follow a public disaster. That was emphasised in our evidence session, particularly by Jenni Hicks, who is one of the Hillsborough mums. She said that
“as it stands at the moment, the Government’s suggestions for an independent public advocate just would not work. It would just not be independent, because it is too dependent on the Minister. It seems that the supposedly independent public advocate will be answerable to the Secretary of State, which does not sound like independence to me.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 112, Q212.]
Jenni said that she thought it was
“vitally important that we have this facility, but that we have it correctly”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 114, Q220.]
She said that independence is a key part. She also said:
“When you are caught up in disasters, particularly if there is propaganda surrounding it, you need to be able to trust—you would need trust in a public advocate in a team. By having to report to a Minister, you are thinking, ‘Well, who is in charge of this? Is it the public advocate or is it the Minister?’ I do not think that would go down very well.”—[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 115, Q220.]
Jenni speaks with decades of cynicism about what has happened to her in her quest to get to the truth, so one might take the view that she is jaded, but there is nobody more experienced than a Hillsborough mum in understanding what the state does to people after a public disaster. We would do well to listen to her experience and what she has to say.
Lord Wills said:
“In some way, families have to be given effective agency, and that must mean some fettering of the powers on the Secretary of State. I am agnostic about the way to do that, and I have always accepted that my private Member’s Bill was not perfect.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 95, Q183.]
He, too, is willing to change arrangements, and ensuring that the Secretary of State has regard to the wishes of the bereaved and surviving victims would be a good start at making a way forward.
When we come to later amendments, especially those related to the functions of the public advocate, I will talk a bit more about how the Bill is different from what I envisaged. However, I turn now to clause 24. I share one very large perspective with the Minister—that having a public advocate available to help victims in the aftermath of a disaster is entirely desirable—so I welcome the Government’s intention for this part of the Bill, even if I keep saying that I would do things differently. I hope he will not be too offended. My support for the clause arises from my long-standing experience.
For the families of the 97 who died at Hillsborough and the thousands of traumatised survivors who had to fight for a lifetime to be properly acknowledged by our society and to get the correct inquest verdicts of unlawful killing, it was 23 years until they got the truth fully acknowledged and had an apology from the Prime Minister of the day, David Cameron, for what they had to go through. That is despite the fact that the original public inquiry by Lord Justice Taylor laid the blame for the disaster squarely at the door of the South Yorkshire police and admonished them for their lies, within four months of the disaster occurring. They just carried on seeking to deflect the blame elsewhere. This part of the Bill should seek to remedy the problem of public authorities such as the South Yorkshire police using their entire budget, resources and effort over decades to try to avoid being blamed for what they have done wrong.
Decades of litigation resulted in deep trauma for the Hillsborough families and survivors. The lies, slurs and abuse that have been directed at families, victims and survivors over 34 years mean that no one has been held accountable for the unlawful killing—that is what it was—of 97 innocent children, women and men. It was only the Hillsborough Independent Panel, a non-legal process of getting to the truth through transparency and publishing documentation, that led to the full truth being reiterated to a shocked public 23 years after the event. That led to David Cameron’s apology to the families as Prime Minister at the Dispatch Box, not only for what had happened to them, but for the lies and slurs that had followed, all perpetrated by public authorities using taxpayers’ money to pay for it. That is how they did it—they did not raise the money themselves, as the families defending the reputations of their loved ones had to.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
My right hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. I am the Member of Parliament who represents the majority of the families affected by the Birmingham pub bombings. When things do not go right, untold damage is done to families’ mental and physical health, and—as she has said—to their trust in any institution. That has to be stopped. We have an opportunity to stop our constituents, many of whom have still not got their truth, from having to go through years of ill health again, at a cost to the taxpayer.
Maria Eagle
My hon. Friend is completely correct. She will know from her own constituency experience of representing those caught up in the Birmingham pub bombings how dangerous and awful it is, not only for the families involved. We are talking intergenerational, here. Many of those still active in trying to get more accountability in respect of Hillsborough were barely born—sometimes not even born—at the time it happened. They are daughters, sons and other relatives who were not even alive. And the effect is not just on families intergenerationally; it is felt across communities.
The damage that Hillsborough has done to faith in the police in Liverpool since that time has been enormous, and it is intergenerational. It was not the Merseyside police—it was South Yorkshire police and the West Midlands police. That does not just go away. Some 30,000 people turned up at Anfield on the 20th anniversary of the disaster. That is why the Hillsborough Independent Panel was set up; that is why we were able to get it set up. The rest of the country was amazed that, 20 years on, 30,000 people would turn up to the service. It would have been more, if they had let more in. I was there on that day. I was not surprised to see what we saw on that day.
In two years, the Hillsborough Independent Panel unravelled the lies of ages. By publishing the documents and its account of what had really happened, it was able, incontrovertibly, to lay to rest all those lies and slurs and to elicit a heartfelt apology from the then Prime Minister David Cameron—who I think was a bit shocked when he read the report and saw what had happened.
We must not let this happen again. The issue is about torpedoing cover-ups as well as helping families. It is about stopping things from going wrong. As a lawyer, I know that the only way Hillsborough could have been stopped from getting as bad as it has got would be to have stopped it from going wrong in the first place. I believe that creating a mechanism through which transparency and truth can be focused on at an earlier stage and be told at the beginning is the way to stop things from going wrong. The legal system does not always appear to be able to do it, and I believe that the Hillsborough Independent Panel-type process is the way in which we can do it.
I unequivocally welcome the Government’s commitment, but I urge the Minister and the Government to have more ambition for what can be achieved through the process. It should not just be signposting to get immediate help in the aftermath of a disaster for those caught up in it; it should be about nothing less than us preventing things from going wrong in the aftermath, as a society looking after and supporting those caught up through no fault of their own in such disasters. It should be about ensuring that the organs of the state do not use taxpayers’ money and their capacity to be defensive—that appears to be infinite—to prevent themselves from facing up to the truth of what has happened.
Edward Argar
I am grateful, as ever, to the right hon. Lady not only for her campaigning on behalf of her constituents and others, but for her ministerial career—the roles she held as Minister for Children, Minister for Northern Ireland and at the Ministry of Justice. What runs through that is her commitment to ensuring that those who are vulnerable, or who do not always have agency or a voice, are heard, and that their interests are respected and reflected in the actions of Government. I pay tribute to her. I also pay tribute to Lord Wills for not only his work but his evidence, as well as the meeting that the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood and I had with him previously.
I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for her new clause 15. It would fundamentally alter the structure and operation of the IPA by establishing a permanent independent public advocate. She and I probably fall on opposite sides of the debate about a standing or an ad hoc IPA. She rightly highlighted the pros and cons on both sides of that debate. She falls on one side, and I fall slightly more on the other. I suspect that we may yet return to that debate.
There are many possible models for an IPA. The clauses in part 2 of the Bill introduce an IPA that reflects the model we consulted on in 2018, with the responses we received to it. We have heard from victims that a swift deployment of the IPA to provide support in the immediate aftermath is vital. Our view is that the IPA as proposed in the Bill achieves that, while balancing the need to be mindful of public funds and the right process to be followed after a major incident.
New clause 15 would establish a permanent IPA that could determine independently of Government that an event is a major incident. As has been previously set out, we do not think that a permanent body is necessary, given the rarity of the events in question for which the IPA would be deployed. Furthermore, we believe it is right and proportionate that the Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament, decides what a major incident is and when to appoint an IPA.
Should individuals disagree with the Secretary of State’s decision in respect of a particular incident, I would expect my fellow right hon. and hon. Members to make full use of their positions to hold the Government to account through urgent questions and similar means of bringing Ministers to the Dispatch Box.
Jess Phillips
I appreciate what the Minister is saying. I cannot foresee any incident involving even one death, certainly not one involving multiple deaths, after which pressure would not be brought to bear on the Secretary of State to do that. In essence, we are asking victims to do the work in the aftermath—they have to get in touch with their Members of Parliament and immediately start pushing. Their family has just been blown up or their kid has been shot, and we are saying that, first and foremost, they have to become political activists to get their Member of Parliament to represent them to the Secretary of State, rather than providing a place for them to go in that circumstance—which feels kinder.
Edward Argar
I do not think that is in any way what is being suggested; the hon. Lady misunderstands. Our view is that the accountability for making that decision should rightly sit with the Secretary of State, not with another party.
The right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood takes a different view. I respect her perspective and understand where she is coming from. She rightly acknowledged that there were pros and cons to both approaches. She believes that the pros of a standing advocate outweigh the cons. I find myself on the other side of that argument and I suspect we might return to it. A decision by the Secretary of State could in extremis be challenged through the court system, but we do not envisage that being necessary.
The IPA will be supported by a permanent secretariat; the Ministry of Justice has already allocated funding for that. Clause 25, which we will turn to, provides for an effective system of support for the IPA by making provisions for a secretariat and remuneration. We therefore consider that that aspect is duplicative in the amendment tabled by the right hon. Lady.
I turn to the definition of a major incident and the specific points that the right hon. Lady has included. Again, we do not believe it is necessary to include additional considerations in the Bill. Given the unpredictable nature of the incidents in question, the definition of a major incident is purposefully broad—one might say “permissive” in this context—and further detail can be set out in a policy statement, as I mentioned earlier, while providing a degree of flexibility given what might be a subjective decision and the nature of the circumstances. That will ensure that the Secretary of State has maximum flexibility to appoint an IPA to respond to a wide range of incidents.
Defining a major incident as proposed in the new clause could arguably require a finding of fact or a pre-judgment of cause before the IPA could be deployed, especially regarding proving a failure in health and safety or regulation. Again, there is a risk that that could cause delays in the support of the IPA reaching the victims as well as presenting wider legal issues for the IPA. We believe that the definition in clause 24 as it stands is the right one for primary legislation, but, as I have said, I will provide additional detail through a policy statement and will work with the right hon. Lady on that if she so desires.
I turn finally to requirement two, which the IPA, as the right hon. Lady envisions, would need to meet before supporting victims. That would necessitate the IPA gaining the support of 50% plus one of the bereaved and injured. I sympathise with the intention to involve victims in the process—I take the point about agency and trust. However, I cannot see how that might work in practice without potentially, in the immediate aftermath of an incident, delaying the deployment of the IPA. That would cause concern.
In the immediate aftermath, it is unlikely that all eligible victims could be easily identified and surveyed to ascertain whether they would want an IPA to be deployed. They might not even be in the right place mentally or emotionally to be able to engage with such a question. Furthermore, the number of victims might change over time, and people might withdraw their consent, so the quorum approach is not the best way to address the issue.
Victim engagement, agency and a sense of empowerment are, as the right hon. Lady says, vital. Those are good things, but they will not achieve what we seek: in the aftermath of a major incident, to carry the trust of people that the IPA is on their side. Although I understand its intent, our concern is that the new clause is not the best way to achieve that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Fay Jones.)
Victims and Prisoners Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Thursday 6th July 2023
(11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 View all Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 6 July 2023 - (6 Jul 2023)
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 69, in clause 25, page 19, line 31 at end insert
“,but only after consultation with bereaved families and victims”.
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult with victims before terminating the appointment on such grounds as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
This should not take long because it deals with an issue that we spent quite a lot of time talking about this morning: ensuring that families have some kind of say. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult with victims before terminating any appointment of an independent public advocate on such grounds as he might consider appropriate. As we discussed this morning, it is really about him not acting with unfettered discretion, but trying to gain the trust and confidence of families, and taking them with him in the decisions that he makes. It is a probing amendment, but I hope to hear from the Minister that he is not unsympathetic to it.
Anna McMorrin (Cardiff North) (Lab)
I endorse what my right hon. Friend has said.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Edward Argar)
It is a pleasure to be back before you this afternoon, Mr Hosie. I thank the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood for her amendment, which would require the Secretary of State to consult victims before terminating an advocate’s appointment on such grounds as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. That stands apart from a termination of appointment in accordance with the terms of appointment, which will cover issues such as incapacity, misconduct and a failure to exercise functions.
I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for highlighting that this is a probing amendment, and I hope that I can give her some reassurances. It would be helpful if I explained the rationale behind including the provision in the Bill, and I hope to reassure her that the power will be used carefully, and that we will consider the needs of victims when doing so. The Secretary of State will not take such a decision lightly, and any decision will be open to challenge through a judicial review in the courts. There are a few scenarios in which we imagine that the Secretary of State may use his or her discretion to terminate the appointment of an advocate using the power.
First, as the Committee may be aware, clause 26 allows the Secretary of State to appoint multiple advocates to support victims after a particular major incident. We will consider the clause in detail later, but briefly we believe that it is necessary to provide the IPA with resilience should major incidents happen concurrently, or should there be a very large number of victims to support. It is in that context that it may be necessary for the IPA to change its composition during its lifetime. We imagine being able to flex the resource required to support victims to allow the IPA to be as agile as possible, and following peaks of activity it may be prudent to reduce the number of advocates actively supporting victims. The power allows the Secretary of State the flexibility to do that.
Secondly, we have always stressed the importance of being able to deploy the IPA as quickly as possible following a major incident. It may be appropriate, following a greater understanding of the developing needs of the victims, to supplement one advocate for another who, on reflection, may turn out to be better suited by virtue of their skills or expertise. I believe that having that flexibility is important, and the amendment would remove that flexibility in the circumstances that I have outlined.
Thirdly, throughout the various debates on this part of the Bill it has been highlighted that victims must have confidence in the advocates in order for them to be effective. I entirely agree. I therefore imagine another use for the power to be removing advocates who may not command the confidence of victims, or standing down the IPA because victims decide that they no longer want the support offered. In all the circumstances that I have described above, let me be clear that the victims will be considered by the Secretary of State, and their needs will be paramount. I believe that victim agency is crucial, as the right hon. Lady set out. That has come through strongly during the debates on this part of the Bill.
Although the amendment serves as an important reminder of that principle, it is not necessary given the sets of circumstances that I outlined previously that require a degree of flexibility. If, in each of the examples that I have described, the Secretary of State were required to hold a formal and legal consultation with the victims, that could severely cut across the ability of the IPA to be flexible and to adapt quickly to changing demands. In the absence of any detail on how such a consultation would be held, it is difficult to see how that could be achieved in reality—especially in the initial aftermath, when the number and identity of the victims will be unknown. I note the intent behind the right hon. Lady’s probing amendment, but urge her not to press it.
Maria Eagle
In view of the Minister’s assurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Anna McMorrin
I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 25, page 20, line 4, at end insert—
“(4A) During their appointment the independent public advocate shall sit within the Ministry of Justice for administrative purposes, but shall be independent with respect to its functioning and decision-making processes, and discharge of its statutory duties.”
This amendment would clarify the functional and operational independence of the advocate.
I thank Inquest, Hillsborough Law Now and Justice for working with me on the amendment. I also pay tribute to Ken Sutton, secretary to the Hillsborough Independent Panel. He has worked with me through the whole of part 2 of the Bill, on this amendment and others. I pay tribute to his work and support.
As I said earlier, clauses 24 to 26 provide unfettered discretion to the Secretary of State—not only on whether to appoint an advocate following a major disaster, but on who the advocate is and how they will be resourced. That removes any semblance of independence from the advocate, who is instructed by and answers to the Secretary of State and not those most affected.
The issue of independence is a central concern for the many bereaved families and survivors. It is critical that support provided to families is operationally and functionally independent of Government, to allay families’ concerns about cover-ups, collusions and evasive practices, much of which we have heard detailed this morning. If that is not assured, the position is valueless, as it will be perceived as the Government merely extending their control over the investigatory landscape.
In the evidence sessions, we heard the Right Rev. James Jones state how crucial the independence of the advocate is. When asked if he believed whether the Bill provided enough independence, he answered:
“I am afraid I do not.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 87, Q168.]
I welcome the Government’s initiative and determination to continue to listen to various parties as they shape this appointment. However, I do not think that the independence is sufficiently guaranteed by the Bill as it stands. I echo the concerns expressed by the Right Rev. James Jones, and I hope that the Minister will heed them accordingly in his response.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for the amendment and her remarks. As she set out, her amendment seeks to clarify the functional and operational independence of the IPA. I support the intention behind it, and she highlighted the oral evidence we heard in Committee. We do, however, have some drafting concerns that need to be reflected on further, which means that at this point I cannot support the amendment. I will set out my reservations, which equally the hon. Lady might herself wish to reflect on.
It may be helpful not to refer specifically to the “Ministry of Justice”, to guard against any potential machinery of government changes. It is also important to ensure that the amendment would not prevent the Secretary of State from agreeing terms of reference with advocates, to provide them with guidance and clear parameters. I do, however, agree that the IPA must be independent and be seen to be so—and it will be. The Government are absolutely committed to an operationally independent IPA and I am happy to work with the hon. Lady to ensure that that is as clear as we can make it, or to find where we can reach consensus on some elements.
Our provisions ensure that the advocates will have autonomy to take decisions and utilise their experience in a manner that they deem appropriate. That is why the functions of the IPA as set out in the Bill are broad and non-exhaustive, and further allow the IPA to support victims as it sees fit. We are, therefore, already delivering on the functional independence in the Bill. The advocates will be supported by a permanent secretariat provided by the Ministry of Justice. Work is already under way to ensure appropriate separation between the Department and those working in the secretariat.
Finally, the advocates have the autonomy under the reporting function to include any relevant matters in their reports to the Secretary of State. Later, we will come to amendments to clause 29 on how that may interact with the independence of the IPA. As I will set out in more detail then, I am willing to work with the shadow Minister on that, to see if there is a landing zone that satisfies the Government’s position and the intentions behind the amendment.
I do not believe amendment 24 is necessary as it is already covered by the Government’s intent, and in our view it is already being delivered in the Bill. I am none the less grateful to the hon. Lady for tabling the amendment and allowing us the opportunity to have this brief debate.
Anna McMorrin
I am grateful to the Minister for his words of initial support for the wording in the amendment, and for his willingness to work with us as we move forward on ensuring the independence of the advocate. As the Bill is currently drafted, that independence is by no means assured. I am grateful to hear that the Minister is willing to work with me, and look forward to that. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Maria Eagle
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 25, page 20, line 7 at end insert—
“(6) An advocate appointed in respect of a major incident is to be regarded as a data controller under General Data Protection Regulations for the purposes of their role”.
This amendment ensures that the Independent Public Advocate is a data controller for the purposes of General Data Protection Regulations.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 72, in clause 27, page 20, line 36, leave out “assisting victims to access” and insert “accessing documents”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 70.
Amendment 73, in clause 27, page 20, line 37, leave out from “(1)” to end of line 39.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 70.
Maria Eagle
Amendment 70 would insert a subsection into clause 25, making it clear that an advocate appointed in respect of a major incident is to be regarded as a data controller for the purposes of the general data protection regulation in carrying out their role.
Amendments 72 and 73 to clause 27 are consequential upon the public advocate being a data controller, and would make it clear that they themselves can handle documents and do so lawfully, while removing some of the usual reasons why documents are withheld. The point of the amendments is to try to implement the lessons of the Hillsborough Independent Panel, which is why Lord Michael Wills and I have been bringing forward our own public advocate Bills over the years.
The Hillsborough Independent Panel was a stunning success. In just over two years, it did the job of establishing unequivocally and incontrovertibly the truth of what happened to each of the then 96 people who died at Hillsborough. It made it completely clear that many could have been saved and that the appalling behaviour of senior police commanders had been the cause of the disaster. It torpedoed the cover-up by South Yorkshire police of their culpability. It made abundantly clear that there had been no contribution from those killed or from other Liverpool fans to the disaster. That is what the legal system had failed to establish clearly over more than two decades, through myriad and repeated proceedings in every conceivable kind of court.
If a process like that could work for a disaster that was so contested at the time and that was more than two decades old, about which there were literally hundreds and thousands of documents, could not a similar process be used to prevent things going so wrong in the aftermath of other disasters? Things going wrong in the aftermath of disasters is surely what this legislation is seeking to try to prevent.
As Lord Wills said in his evidence to us:
“We have to accept that a cover-up is part of the pathology of a big public disaster. It is human nature. When something happens like Hillsborough, the Manchester Arena bombing or Grenfell Tower, it is a huge story for the nation, and obviously those in power at the time, who feel they might be blamed for it, will feel that they have to cover up in some way. We saw what the police did with Hillsborough: they created a false narrative as part of that cloud of unknowing that they wanted to create, to cover up. What they feared, rightly in the end, was that they would be blamed for it.
That is true of pretty much every public disaster: obviously the details are different, but there is that essential pathology. There is always a risk of cover-up. I hope this Bill, suitably amended, will raise the barriers against that, but it does not mean that we can drop our vigilance against the potential.”.––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 94, Q181.]
I think Lord Wills sets out there pretty clearly what he and I were seeking to do with our own proposals in our public advocate Bills. That is what I press the Government to aspire to. If we could manage to do this, it would make an enormous difference in the aftermath of future disasters and would hopefully prevent things from ever again going as wrong as they did with Hillsborough.
Part of what the Hillsborough Independent Panel was able to do was to lawfully collect and process documents. That turned out to be crucial. It worked on the basis of obtaining and publishing all documentation to ensure total transparency in what had been an atmosphere of deep suspicion. It was that approach that broke the logjam of suspicion among bereaved families and survivors, while getting at the truth in a way that was revelatory about the causes and aftermath of the incident. That was no small feat, but it was key to the success of the process. After more than two decades of failure to get to the truth and have it accepted, justice for those who were unlawfully killed was advanced. If we can learn the lessons of the Hillsborough Independent Panel and apply them by having a public advocate who has functions and powers to do what the Hillsborough Independent Panel did, we may be able to stop future disasters from going so appalling wrong over such an extended period as Hillsborough. That is what we should seek to do.
If the legislation aims a little lower than that—I fear it may do—and aims just to signpost victims to support services and help in the immediate aftermath, it will be valuable but we will have missed a major opportunity to prevent things from going as wrong as they did for those caught up, through no fault of their own, in the Hillsborough disaster. I believe that functions enabling the public advocate to handle documents and the power to set up an independent panel like the Hillsborough Independent Panel, which we will come to later, are vital to the success of the legislation and of the post that we all seek to create.
Anna McMorrin
I endorse the words of my right hon. Friend, who has spelled out in great detail the importance of having access to the correct data, and not just in the immediate aftermath. We must learn the lessons from what happened at Hillsborough, and ensure that in future there is access to important data and information.
Edward Argar
I am again grateful to the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood for her amendments. Amendments 70 and 72 would make the IPA a data controller, enabling them to obtain and review all documentation relating to a major incident. Amendment 73 sets out that advocates may support victims by establishing an independent panel to establish the truth of what happened. It is important that, in all our deliberations on this part of the Bill, we strive to continually remember just what a devastating tragedy Hillsborough was, and that its impact was compounded by the indefensible wait for the truth—indeed, the concealment of the truth. So I am entirely sympathetic to the intention behind her amendments.
When we have spoken about this matter in the past, the key themes of empowerment and agency have come through. Another key theme that the right hon. Lady has highlighted is the power of transparency as a way to address, as I think Lord Wills highlighted—she mentioned him in her remarks—the instinctive approach of public bodies and organisations to conceal, or seek to evade responsibility, when something has gone horrifically and tragically wrong. Given the terrible experience of those affected by the Hillsborough disaster, I appreciate the concern surrounding the danger of documents and information being destroyed, changed or suppressed by public bodies or others.
However, since the Hillsborough tragedy and the injustices that followed, there have been significant developments in the justice system that give us greater opportunities to get to the truth of what has happened. Statutory protection against cover-ups now exists. Under the last Labour Government—a Government in which the right hon. Lady served, I believe—section 35(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 came into force, making it a criminal offence to intentionally suppress, conceal, alter or destroy information during an inquiry, punishable by up to six months in prison or a fine. Secondly, the Public Records Act 1958, as amended, sets out the legal requirements for the care and preservation of public records.
The College of Policing will also introduce a new code of practice, titled “Police Information and Records Management”, which will be laid before Parliament, and which details key principles for the management of all police information and records. It will ensure that a broader range of police records are retained by forces in the future, meaning that there is less risk of losing or altering important records for future scrutiny, as occurred with Hillsborough. Furthermore, a statutory duty of co-operation was introduced in February 2020, placing a responsibility on police officers to give appropriate co-operation during investigations, inquiries and formal proceedings, and to participate openly and professionally in line with what is expected of a police officer when identified as a witness. A failure to co-operate is a breach of the statutory standards of professional behaviour and could result in disciplinary sanctions.
I also understand the right hon. Lady’s intention behind amendment 73: to allow advocates to set up an independent panel akin to the Hillsborough Independent Panel. I pay tribute to those who worked with and on that panel, which had a pivotal role in uncovering the truth. I point out that it did not have any data-compelling powers, but it none the less did phenomenal work in questing after the truth, and revealing information that had for so long eluded others.
Returning to amendments 70 and 72, the Government believe that the IPA’s key focus should be on supporting victims and the families of those affected by a major incident, rather than an investigatory approach. I appreciate that this is another area where the right hon. Lady and I may take a slightly different perspective, but I hope that we can continue to work through that in the coming months.
We consulted on the IPA in 2018, and the feedback from that consultation reinforced the need to provide clarity and support to victims following a major incident. The amendments would significantly change the purpose and role of the IPA and would introduce new responsibilities to collate, check and store information, diverting the focus away from the primary purpose that we envisaged. I appreciate that the right hon. Lady has been entirely consistent and transparent in putting her arguments with clarity. Our view is that introducing such data-controlling powers could conflict with the work of pre-existing investigative authorities, such as the work of inquiries, which already have the power under the 2005 Act to compel information and witnesses.
I appreciate that there are concerns about transparency, and as I have with previous groups of amendments, I can commit to considering with the right hon. Lady what more can be done in that respect. The IPA needs to be as effective as possible in supporting victims, and it is important that we get this right to the best of our ability in this House. Our concern is that giving the IPA the power to obtain and review all documentation could in practice introduce a further layer of complexity to the system, and I do not want to do that. I appreciate that there may be differences between the Government’s conception and that of the right hon. Lady of how the IPA will work in terms of its primary focus and function, but as before I am happy to work through that with her. I do not know whether we will be able to close the gap between us, but as with everything, I am happy to try.
Maria Eagle
I appreciate the Minister’s willingness to discuss the matter further. Obviously there is a difference between the Government’s view and my view and that of Lord Michael Wills, who introduced a Bill in the Lords, about what the focus ought to be, but I appreciate that the Minister is willing to discuss the matter further. Perhaps we might be able to come a bit closer in so doing. If we cannot, at least we will still have Report and the remaining stages to make further points. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
Clause 25 requires the Secretary of State to agree terms with an individual who is to be appointed as an advocate. The clause makes it clear that an individual officially becomes an advocate once they agree to their terms of appointment. The clause further provides for a framework by which advocates may be remunerated, removed and equipped with the necessary secretarial support to support victims. It is vital that at the outset terms are set out and agreed between the Secretary of State, who is accountable for his or her decision, and the individual who will act as an advocate. That will provide clarity and set out the expectations around the functions and scope of the advocate, and is in keeping with other independent appointments such as inquiry panel members.
As public money will be used to pay for the advocates, it is right to provide for that ability to agree terms mutually. The terms will include, as normal, conditions that could lead to the termination of an appointment, such as misconduct or incapacity. The advocate may resign after giving notice.
As previously discussed, the Secretary of State has a power under the clause to terminate the appointment of an advocate. I hope that the right hon. Lady and the Committee more broadly are reassured about the circumstances in which that power is likely to be used in practice. As I have set out, it may be necessary to replace an advocate if they do not command the confidence of victims; to reduce the number of advocates actively supporting victims where that is appropriate and the needs of victims decrease; or to substitute advocates in response to the changing needs of victims and a greater understanding of the expertise required. To highlight that, I point to the parallel power for Ministers in the Inquiries Act 2005. As I have said, and I think we all agree, the IPA must be operationally independent. That does not mean they can be unaccountable, and I believe our provision strikes an appropriate balance.
The clause enables the Secretary of State to pay advocates for their vital work and cover reasonable expenses such as travel and accommodation. We imagine that the IPA will spend time, especially in the immediate aftermath, in the affected community, and it is right that we provide them with the means and resources to be able to do that effectively. We will do right by victims by ensuring that the IPA is adequately resourced. We have already made progress on that front by providing funding for a full-time secretariat from the Ministry of Justice to support the advocates. The day rate or salary of the advocates is still under consideration, but it will be made public when certain. It will be proportionate and reflect the crucial role that they will play.
Finally, the clause makes it clear that advocates will not be servants or agents of the Crown. They will be independent, working on behalf of the victims of major incidents, and focused on ensuring that victims get the independent support they need.
Anna McMorrin
It is so important that the function and operational scope of the independent advocate is strong and clear, so that they can carry out their role to get to the bottom and the truth of an incident. We must ensure that we learn lessons from Hillsborough and the review panel that followed. At present, there is simply nothing independent about the advocate, but I appreciate the fact that the Minister is willing to work with us to ensure that we tighten up the wording, so that they are more independent and the Bill is as robust as possible.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her comments.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Appointment of multiple independent public advocates
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to appoint a lead advocate where multiple advocates have been appointed for the same major incident. The Government believe that the ability to appoint multiple advocates for the same major incident will ensure that the IPA has the necessary capacity and resilience to support victims.
Let us cast our minds back to 2017, when the awful and tragic events in Manchester and at Grenfell Tower happened only a few weeks apart. The number of victims in need of support was in the hundreds, if not higher, and it would not have been possible for a single advocate to provide the right amount of support to all the victims in two very different geographical locations. The clause is intended to deal with such situations by granting the Secretary of State the ability to appoint multiple advocates for the same and different major incidents. We hope that it gives the IPA the greatest ability to serve victims. It was endorsed by the respondents to the 2018 consultation.
Maria Eagle
Subsection (3) says:
“An advocate must have regard to any directions given by the lead advocate as to how they are to exercise their functions in respect of the incident.”
Having “regard to” is not necessarily “following the instructions of”. Is it not a recipe for chaos if there is a disagreement between advocates about the best way to act?
Edward Argar
The right hon. Lady will know the legal connotations of the phrase “have regard to”. What we are seeking to do is recognise that while there may be a lead advocate, there will potentially be other advocates in the team who have particular strengths and expertise. In appointing more than one advocate, I am sure that the Secretary of State will have due regard to ensuring that the team is coherent and able to work together.
It is important that if we are bringing different advocates with different areas of expertise into a team, their voices are able to be heard. There is an expectation that they will behave reasonably and have regard to that principle. Equally, I would not want the lead advocate to be able to silence the expertise of others in the team. It is a difficult balance to strike; like so many things do in public life and in our work, it requires people to behave in a reasonable and responsible manner. I am confident that that that will be the case, but the right hon. Lady is right to highlight the challenges were it not.
We will set up a register of individuals from a range of different professions, backgrounds and geographical areas to enable the IPA to respond to the broadest range of circumstances and the unpredictable nature of major incidents. It will also enable the Secretary of State to appoint an advocate as soon as possible and then appoint further advocates over a slightly longer period, including community advocates, to ensure that voices are reflected and the confidence of victims is maintained. That approach will allow for engagement with the families about the type of support they need from an IPA.
Anna McMorrin
We have no objection in principle to the appointment of multiple independent advocates for the same major incident, therefore creating a panel. However, will the Minister clarify the context in which that panel would operate? Importantly, would it be the same as the Hillsborough Independent Panel—granted the same powers—or would it still be open to Government interference? Will he set that out in his response?
Edward Argar
The IPAs are not envisaged as akin to the Hillsborough Independent Panel; they are to be set up as independent public advocates, but the office can have multiple holders simultaneously, if that makes sense, to draw on different expertise. The key element lies in the word “independent”. We are confident that the measures that we are putting in place will create and sustain that independence. I appreciate that the hon. Lady might press back on that on Report or in subsequent debate, but on that basis we consider the clause to strike the right balance.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Functions of an independent public advocate
Maria Eagle
I beg to move amendment 74, in clause 27, page 20, line 27, at end insert—
“(e) an independent panel to establish the truth of what happened”
This amendment enables the Independent Public Advocate to establish a Hillsborough Independent Panel type process to get at the truth of what happened at an early stage following an incident.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 75, in clause 27, page 20, line 39, at end insert—
“(e) establishing an independent panel in consultation with victims to establish the truth of what happened”.
This amendment enables the Independent Public Advocate to establish a Hillsborough Independent Panel type process to get at the truth of what happened at an early stage following an incident.
Maria Eagle
Amendment 75 would insert into the clause, which sets out the functions of the advocate, a power to establish an independent panel such as the Hillsborough Independent Panel in consultation with the families affected. Amendment 74 would enable the public advocate to provide support to victims in respect of an independent panel-type process, if such a process is ongoing in respect of a major incident.
It follows from what I said about amendments 70, 72 and 73 that I think the public advocate should that I think the public advocate should have a broader range of functions and powers than the Bill currently sets out. Indeed, it allows only for liaison between families and organs of the state and signposting to support services. That is all helpful, but it is not sufficient to fully learn the lessons from the success of the Hillsborough Independent Panel and apply them when disasters strike. The only other real function for the public advocate in clause 27 is a report-writing one. We will come to that when we debate clause 29, so I will not dwell on it now.
A key lesson from the 23 years it took the Hillsborough families to get to the truth of what happened to their loved ones is that most of the usual processes following disasters failed them. The original inquests did not establish the cause of death for each of the deceased, although their basic function was to uncover the who, what, where and why. The families were prevented from finding the truth by the police cover-up and a coroner who, overwhelmed by the extent of the task—I am being kind—imposed a 3.15 pm cut-off, which led to material facts being ignored. The inquests left more questions than answers, and most of them were taken up by perpetuating the Hillsborough slurs that the police were on a campaign to spread, dealing with things such as blood alcohol levels, even though a third of the victims were children, and the slurs about fans being ticketless.
The families did not find out when and how their loved ones died until the Hillsborough Independent Panel answered those questions for them 23 years after the event. Some mums, such as Anne Williams, simply went and found out herself. She knew precisely what had happened to her son, Kevin—when, where and how he died—long before that truth was acknowledged by the findings of the second inquests. She spent the rest of her life campaigning to get a new inquest for her son. It was repeatedly denied her, despite the fact that it was clear he was alive after 3.15 pm and may well have benefited from medical intervention.
Anne Williams was unwilling to acknowledge that her son’s death had been an accident, and she never collected the death certificate that said so. She was right: he was unlawfully killed, but it took her the rest of her life to be vindicated and have the accidental death verdict overturned. She lived to see the original verdict quashed, but she did not live to see the unlawful killing verdict at the second inquests. That relates to a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made this morning about the health consequences of these kinds of disasters on those affected by them. Anne Williams always knew that her son had been unlawfully killed.
When I first met my constituent Jenni Hicks as her MP in 1997, I was struck that she and her ex-husband, Trevor, were discussing a new bit of information that one of them had been passed about the movements of one of their daughters during her last moments. That was what the original inquests should have told them, but they did not even try to do so. As Jenni Hicks told us:
“We basically knew the truth but we could not get hold of the evidence; nobody could. It was not until the Hillsborough Independent Panel that we had that evidence, finally, and we finally—as I say, four years after HIP—had the correct inquest verdicts.”—[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 144, Q219.]
What a failure of our legal system.
For that reason, it would be an omission to legislate for a public advocate without enabling them to establish an independent panel in consultation with the families, to assist them in respect of an independent panel process, and to help if there are inquests or inquiries. As the Minister rightly said, the Bill puts transparency at the heart of proceedings occurring after disasters. Transparency for the families, freedom of information and the capacity for the public advocate to establish an independent panel are essential parts of what should be a successful reform if we get everything right.
Anna McMorrin
I rise to support absolutely what my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood says about the amendments. They are about getting to the truth of what happened, and ensuring there is true transparency and freedom of information. Bereaved families should see justice straightaway; they should not have to go through what many other families have tragically gone through.
Edward Argar
Again, I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood for tabling amendments 74 and 75, which I will address together. As she set out, the amendments would enable the IPA to establish an independent panel, akin to the Hillsborough Independent Panel, in consultation with victims. As we have said, those affected by the Hillsborough disaster had to wait far, far too long for truth. I again pay tribute to the Hillsborough Independent Panel, which played a crucial role in uncovering the truth and correcting the public narrative after so many years.
I turn to the substance of the amendments. As I mentioned previously, it is worth remembering that the Hillsborough Independent Panel was a non-statutory inquiry set up by the Home Secretary. Non-statutory inquiries are funded by public funds, so it is right that the decision to set one up remains with the Government. As I emphasised earlier, the Hillsborough Independent Panel did not have any data compelling powers. As Ken Sutton, who has been referenced previously and who led the secretariat for the Hillsborough Independent Panel, noted in our oral evidence sessions, the panel was able to access information and documentation without the need for data compelling powers. What is more, it is important to avoid any conflict between different investigatory functions. In my reading of them, the right hon. Lady’s amendments do not clarify what the role of an advocate would be in relation to the panel, how it would work in practice and, crucially, what impact it would have on the support available to victims.
I appreciate that the matter of debate between the right hon. Lady and I is whether the focus should be on support or the investigatory role, and how to draw that line, but if the IPA is primarily focused on supporting victims, signposting and building a relationship of trust with them, could they be considered to be truly impartial in an investigatory role? If they stepped away from their role as an advocate to focus on the work of the panel, would that affect the ability to support victims? I do not posit any direct answers to that, but I pose those questions, to which I suspect we will return subsequently, possibly on the Floor of the House or in discussions outwith this Committee.
I remind Members that the Hillsborough Independent Panel was established many years after the Hillsborough tragedy, which meant that it did not run the risk of undermining or prejudicing any ongoing formal legal proceedings. I note that in the helpful explanatory statement from the right hon. Lady, she states that she believes the panel should be established at an early stage following an incident. I am slightly wary of that and the possible interrelationship with other legal processes. Establishing an independent panel at an early stage—a panel that has the power to require disclosure of all relevant documents and information—could pose a threat to other investigatory processes, particularly criminal trials or other legal proceedings.
No one should suffer the same injustices as those affected by Hillsborough. Their tireless fight for the truth—and the right hon. Lady’s tireless fight for the truth on their behalf—is to be commended, but it should never need to be repeated. Victims and the wider public deserve to know the truth and to get answers to their questions. However, our concern is that the way to achieve this cannot be one that potentially puts a victim’s right to formal legal justice in jeopardy by duplicating or cutting across the work of other investigatory bodies. I recognise that there are questions about independence and the IPA’s power to get to the truth. I am happy to reflect on that further, and to reflect with the right hon. Lady on whether there are other ways that we can seek to achieve what she seeks without the potential legal jeopardy that might exist if it were done in this way.
Maria Eagle
I thank the Minister for his constructive approach to the amendments. I acknowledge that one of the big issues is that if an independent panel were established at an earlier stage, there might be questions about how it would interact with any inquiry, inquest or other ongoing legal proceedings. He is completely correct that by the time the Hillsborough Independent Panel was set up, it had 21 years of every possible legal proceeding imaginable—usually more than once—having taken place. I remember that in the newspaper article Andy Burnham and I put in the Liverpool Daily Post on the morning of the 20th anniversary, one of the reasons I said we should publish all the documentation was that no more legal proceedings were possible. That seemed to be correct at the time that I said it, although it did not turn out to be correct in the event. I acknowledge, though, that there is then an issue that has to be resolved—that is, how it would work if an independent panel were to be set up at an earlier stage and legal proceedings were still possible or ongoing. I acknowledge that my amendments do not deal with that; they were not intended to, but I acknowledge that it is a real public policy issue. I welcome the Minister’s offer to look at that more closely.
The advantage of having transparency at an early point is that one can torpedo cover-ups. There is significant public interest—and, over time, significant amounts of public money are saved—in managing to do so. That is desirable, and I hope we can work together in such a way that finds the best of both worlds. That is what we all want: the best of all possible worlds. If we can do that, we will be doing well. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 28 stand part.
New clause 1—Victims of major incidents: registration of death—
“(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 or the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, a qualified informant (within the meaning in those Acts) may register the death of a person who was a victim of a major incident.
(2) Subsection (1) applies even if an investigation is conducted under Part 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.”
This new clause would enable a qualified informant such as a relative of the deceased to provide information to register the death after a major incident.
New clause 16—Functions and powers of the independent public advocate—
“(1) The advocate may provide such support to victims of a major incident as the advocate considers appropriate in relation to—
(a) the aftermath of the incident;
(b) an investigation by a public authority into the incident;
(c) an inquest under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 into a death the incident may have caused or contributed to;
(d) an inquiry into the incident under the Inquiries Act 2005;
(e) an independent panel to establish the truth of what happened.
(2) The support provided under subsection (1) may include, for example—
(a) helping victims understand the actions of public authorities in relation to the incident, and how the views of victims may be taken into account;
(b) informing victims about other sources of support and advice, and services, ‘ that may be available in connection with the incident;
(c) communicating with public authorities on behalf of victims in relation to the incident;
(d) assisting victims to access documents or other information in relation to an investigation, inquest or inquiry referred to in subsection (1);
(e) establishing an independent panel in consultation with victims to establish the truth of what happened.
(3) The independent public advocate must report to victims or to such persons as the advocate considers represent one or more victims during any police or other authority’s investigation into the incident regarding—
(a) the progress of the investigation, and
(b) if there are no lawyers representing the families, the implications of engaging lawyers at that stage.
(4) The independent public advocate must report to Parliament—
(a) on an annual basis, summarising their work;
(b) at the conclusion of support relating to a particular event; and
(c) at any other time they identify a need so to do;
and the first such report must be laid before Parliament before the end of 2024.
(5) Following a further request to the independent public advocate by fifty percent plus one or more of the representatives of those deceased due to the event, the independent public advocate must set up a panel which must register as a data controller under the Data Protection Act 2018 and review all documentation relating to the event, the deceased and the representatives and report thereon.
(6) In establishing the panel under subsection (5), the independent public advocate must consult the representatives of those deceased due to the event about the composition of the panel.
(7) Subject to section [disclosure of information to the independent advocate’s panel], all relevant public authorities and other relevant organisations must provide documentation under subsection (5) to an independent advocate’s panel on request from the panel.
(8) An independent advocate’s panel must publish a report into its review of the documentation.”
New clause 17—Disclosure of information to the independent public advocate’s panel—
“(1) Nothing in this section detracts from the duty upon relevant public authorities to provide relevant information to an independent public advocate’s panel on request from the panel.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
“relevant information” includes all information which may reasonably be considered to be related to the cause of the event, the event, and actions taken after the event due to it;
“public authority” has the same meaning as in the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
(3) A public authority may only decline to provide information to the panel if disclosure of that information to the panel—
(a) is not possible for reasons of safeguarding national security;
(b) would, or would be likely to, prejudice the defence of the United Kingdom or of any Crown dependency or overseas territory, or the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces of the Crown;
(c) is prohibited by or under any enactment, or would constitute or be punishable as a contempt of court;
(4) A public authority may request that the panel provides an assurance that information provided to the panel will be secured to the same data security standard as used by that authority, and the panel may provide such assurance and use its best endeavours to maintain that standard.
(5) If information is withheld from the panel under subsection (3), the panel must be informed of the subject of the matter being withheld and the reason for that exemption.
(6) Upon receiving a notification that information is being withheld, the panel may apply to the Information Commissioner for a decision whether the public authority has assessed correctly that disclosure is not possible under subsection (3).
(7) Upon receiving an application from a panel under subsection (6), the Information Commissioner must consider the application and issue a decision notice to the panel and to the relevant public authority stating either—
(a) that the public authority has correctly assessed that the information should be withheld; or
(b) that all or some of the information should not be withheld, the steps that the public authority must take to provide the information and the period within which they must be taken.
(8) A decision notice issued by the Information Commissioner under subsection (7) may be appealed by the panel or the relevant public authority to the Tribunal.
(9) If on an appeal under subsection (8) the Tribunal considers—
(a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or
(b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he or she ought to have exercised his or her discretion differently,
the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.
(10) On such an appeal, the Tribunal—
(a) may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based; and
(b) shall notify the Lord Chancellor of its decision.
(11) An independent public advocate and any office or officials supporting the work of the independent public advocate are not a public authority for the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
(12) In this section, “Tribunal” has the meaning given by section 84 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.”
Edward Argar
I will speak to clauses 27 and 28, and will return to the new clauses in this grouping once they have been spoken to by the Members who tabled them. Clause 27 sets out that the support an advocate may provide spans from the immediate aftermath of the major incident through to any subsequent investigations, inquests and inquiries, including non-statutory inquiries.
Clause 27 provides an indicative and non-exhaustive list of functions that an advocate may undertake in supporting victims. Those functions include helping victims to understand the processes that follow a major incident and how they can engage with them. They also include: signposting victims to available sources of support and advice; communicating with public authorities on behalf of victims; and ensuring that victims can access the documents and information to which they are entitled. Advocates will act as a conduit between victims and public authorities so that we may know what victims actually need, rather than what we may assume they need.
In setting out the functions of the IPA, it is right not to be overly prescriptive. All incidents will be different, and the needs of victims will be diverse. That is why we have ensured that the clause provides the flexibility necessary to allow an advocate to provide any other support that they consider appropriate. There are only a few exceptions, which are set out in the clause.
Clause 27 prohibits advocates from giving any legal advice or assistance, providing financial support or providing healthcare. The purpose of the IPA is to be a supportive function; it is not intended to duplicate the work of existing bodies, nor to replace support or professional expertise that is already available elsewhere. Advocates will not be expected to be qualified lawyers or healthcare professionals, but they will be able to inform victims about accessing such support.
The IPA will work with investigative bodies to ensure that the views and needs of the victims are known and taken into account, but it will not be an investigative body. I have touched on that before, and I suspect we will return to where that balance should lie. To make it so would risk undermining or duplicating the work of existing bodies. The functions of the IPA as set out in clause 27 are consistent with the approach the Government consulted on in 2018. They provide for the IPA to effectively deliver its aims of advocating for victims with public authorities and allow it to fulfil its intent of supporting victims through the processes that follow a major incident.
Turning to who the IPA will support, clause 27 makes provision for advocates to support victims through a representative—for example, where a victim or a group of victims cannot speak English, or an injured victim is not able to engage directly. The clause prohibits the IPA from directly supporting people under the age of 18. We believe it is appropriate for advocates to work with a child’s parent or guardian, who ordinarily will be best placed to provide information and support in a manner that best suits the child. Clause 27 enables the IPA to support people under the age of 18 through a representative. That ensures that those under the age of 18 are not excluded. Once the individual in question reaches the age of 18, they can then receive the support directly.
Clause 28 amends section 47(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to allow an advocate to be an interested person in relation to an inquest into a death caused by a major incident. That will help the advocate to effectively carry out their support functions for the bereaved and to access information relating to the inquest to which they are entitled. Many people will have never had any interaction with the inquest process, and it will be unfamiliar and possibly daunting at a particularly vulnerable time. In order to help the IPA to signpost victims, to amplify their voices, and to ensure that they have access to information to which they are entitled, we believe it is important to amend the 2009 Act to allow an advocate to be an interested person. In practical terms, that will aid the IPA in helping the bereaved to get answers to their questions and to fully participate at inquests on their behalf. I commend clauses 27 and 28 to the Committee.
Anna McMorrin
I will speak to clauses 27 and 28 before moving on to new clause 1. Although the list of functions in clause 27 is welcome, I would like the Minister to assure me that the functions listed are non-exhaustive, and to ensure that the list is not designed to be applied in a rigid way.
I appreciate that clause 28 is designed to make the independent public advocate party to relevant information in relation to inquests. However, I would like the Minister to clarify that the independent public advocate will be allowed to participate properly in an inquest where the family involved want that to happen.
It is a privilege to speak to new clause 1, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mrs Lewell-Buck). She and her staff have campaigned tirelessly on this issue, and her strong advocacy in this place for bereaved families has brought them a lot of comfort. Some of the constituents of my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood also tragically died in the same attack, and she has been heavily involved in the campaign, so I look forward to hearing her comments shortly.
On 22 May 2017, 22 people were murdered in the Manchester Arena terror attack. Two constituents of my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields were among them: Chloe Ann Rutherford, aged 17, and Liam Thomas Allen Curry, aged 19. Both were just teenagers. It is every parent’s worst nightmare, but after sitting through agonising hours of the public inquiry, the families were told that the registration of their precious children’s deaths would not be done by them, but by a stranger. That is what began the campaign. Chloe’s and Liam’s parents understandably feel that they have been denied this final act for their children, stripping them of a vital step in the grieving process.
Under the Births and Deaths Registration Acts 1926 and 1953, which lie with the Home Office, and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which lies with the Ministry of Justice, it is standard practice for a coroner to register deaths involving an inquest or inquiry. For the past year, the families have been campaigning to amend the legislation to allow grieving relatives the choice to register the death of a loved one. This issue was first raised in the main Chamber on 1 March 2022—a year and four months ago. The Government had ample time to make the relevant changes to the legislation before the death registrations for those killed in the Manchester Arena attack needed to take place, but as usual they have been too slow to react, despite the previous Justice Minister, the hon. Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove), making promises to look
“at this issue with the utmost priority”.—[Official Report, 25 May 2022; Vol. 715, c. 396.]
Since March last year, my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields has had several meetings with many different Ministers due to the constant chaos and churn of the Government. First, it was the hon. Member for Corby, and then the hon. Member for Clwyd South (Simon Baynes). Then it was back to the hon. Member for Corby, and now the Justice Minister, the hon. Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer), is dealing with this issue. There was also a month in which my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields was faced with complete radio silence from all Ministers involved because of the constant conveyor belt of new Ministers coming in and out, with no listed responsibilities. To top it off, the main responsibility for this matter was moved from the Home Office to the Ministry of Justice and no one informed any of those involved. I am sure that the Minister agrees that this oversight is not acceptable, especially when dealing with such a tragic and sensitive case. I hope he will take a co-operative approach to new clause 1 and finally resolve the issue for the sake of the families involved.
On Wednesday 22 February 2023, both my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields and my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood met the Home Office Minister, Lord Murray of Blidworth, and the Justice Minister, the hon. Member for Finchley and Golders Green, alongside the bereaved families. During that meeting, however, both the Members and the victims’ families were told that no legislative change would be explored, despite the Government expressing their commitment to
“look at options to change the law in the longer term”
in a letter just one month earlier. The families had waited almost a year for answers. They had travelled to Westminster at their own expense to meet Ministers, only to find the Government had changed their mind. They felt misled, patronised and let down, and they still do to this day. Ministers stated that the changes would be against public policy and would make the framework less effective. However, the changes could be narrow and targeted towards only a small set of circumstances, such as after a mass casualty event, as outlined in new clause 1.
As the inquiry has now drawn to a close with the final report complete, it is with great sadness that I can confirm those two children’s deaths were registered just last week. Their parents travelled to Manchester to be present at the death registration, but current legislation prevented them from doing it themselves. The heartbreaking reality for those families is that time simply ran out for them as they fought the Government on this minor legislative change.
A cruel and unfair two-tier system for death registration is in place. If a child dies in a common circumstance, such as due to a health condition, their parent can personally register their death. However, if they die in a major incident, their parents are denied that last official act. We understand that not all relatives would want to register the death of a loved one, as in most cases an interim death certificate is given soon after the incident for funeral arrangements, but we advocate giving families the choice.
The Government stated in letters to my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields that it may be too distressing for relatives to register the deaths, but in normal circumstances a relative has no choice but to personally register the death. Now that the deaths of Chloe and Liam are officially registered, the families must request a copy of the death certificates from the registry office in Manchester. If the Government were genuinely concerned about causing distress to families, that step would not be in place either.
In the latest correspondence from the Government to the hon. Member on this matter in March, which I have a copy of here, Lord Murray set out what happens when the coroner records the death after an inquest has taken place. He said,
“This ensures that the inquest and registration details fully align, while also removing exposure to any risk of outside interference or alteration.”
That is heartless and an insult to those families who have lost loved ones. Bereaved families have no intention or wish to alter the findings of the inquest and the coroner. They simply wish to state their personal details on their child’s death certificate as a final step in their grief and to officially register them as dead. I am sure the Minister will understand that and what it means for parents to record the deaths of their loved ones, and I hope he will agree to the new clause. The Government prolonged Chloe’s and Liam’s parents’ grief; all those parents want is for their children’s legacy to be that no other family goes through what they did ever again.
Maria Eagle
I wish to say something about new clauses 16 and 17, but also new clause 1 because I have had an involvement in this matter. I have constituents who lost their 15-year-old daughter, Megan Hurley, in the Manchester Arena bombing. They were similarly upset to discover they would not be allowed to register the death of their daughter. As Megan’s mum said to me, “We were able to register her birth. This is the last thing we can do for her, but we’re not allowed.”
These parents caught up in the disaster have had to go through six years of this process. It has been an improved process because the inquest and the public inquiry went hand in hand and were led by the same judge—instead of being consecutive and thus doubling the length of time these things take and forcing families to listen to it all twice, they have happened in tandem—but although the overall timescale has been shortened, it has still been years. It simply adds to the feeling of powerlessness, and of something being done to them, that the Hurley family have been unable even to register the death of their daughter because they are barred from doing so by statute.
Edward Argar
I thank the hon. Member for Cardiff North and the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood for tabling their new clauses.
New clause 1 seeks to provide families bereaved by a major incident with a role in registering the death of their loved one. I pay tribute to the work of the hon. Member for South Shields, with whom I have spoken on a number of occasions. She is passionate in her advocacy on behalf of her constituents and for change in this area.
This is an important and sensitive but none the less complex issue. I pay tribute to the commitment of the families bereaved by the Manchester Arena attack in their campaign to secure a role for bereaved families in the registration of their loved one’s death following an inquest. I am very much aware that any action would come too late for them, as their children’s deaths have now been registered, following the conclusion of the inquiry and inquests.
The Government are committed to ensuring that bereaved people remain at the heart of the inquest process and are able to fully participate in it. It is also important that we uphold the integrity of that process. A death that is reported to the coroner cannot be registered until any inquest has been completed. That is where all the facts, including the personal details of the deceased, are established. The legislation requires the coroner to provide that information directly to the registrar. All death registrations, whoever reports them, are formally completed by the registrar.
May I gently correct one point made by the hon. Member for Cardiff North, who asked why it was only the victims of major incidents who are in this position? It is not: it is anyone whose death is considered by a coroner or an inquest. Coroners and inquests do not just look at these issues; they look at unexplained deaths in a number of other circumstances. We have to be a little bit careful about that.
The reason I mention that point is that the hon. Member made a point about a two-tier approach. We have to be conscious that there would potentially still be a different approach, depending on whether someone was the victim of a major incident, if this approach were adopted, or whether it was another unexplained death, where the coroner would still be the person reporting that to the registrar. I make that point for context, not necessarily with prejudice to what I am about to say.
The Government understand the seriousness of this matter. The Home Office has set out that it is committed to seeing what can be done via non-legislative means. The General Register Office has also offered the families bereaved by the Manchester Arena attack the option of being present at the registration of their loved one’s death. I appreciate that that does not go as far as they would wish and does not resolve the fundamental concerns, or go as far as the new clause would.
My concern, however, is that the new clause would not achieve its objective, because although it disapplies part of the complex framework provided for by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, it does not provide for an alternative new legal mechanism to achieve that objective—it removes the challenge but does not provide a new mechanism. It would also assign to a qualified informant the actual duty of registration itself. That goes well beyond the role of a coroner in an inquest death or of a qualified informant in a non-inquest death. Regardless of the context, the statutory responsibility for registration is, and must remain, the registrar’s alone. We are debating who it is that should give the registrar the information to complete the legal process.
The new clause is explicitly limited to those bereaved by a major incident. The trauma of losing a loved one in that way is unimaginable, but thankfully only a tiny proportion of inquest deaths occur in such circumstances. We would need to reflect carefully on the fact that the change that the new clause seeks to introduce would be unavailable to the vast majority of families whose loved one’s death is subject to an inquest. That is not to gainsay what the hon. Member for Cardiff North is trying to do, but it is important to highlight that there would still be a difference in approach.
Anna McMorrin
I understand the points that the Minister is making about the legal wording, but this is such a deeply rooted issue. He refers to a small number of families, but the impact goes far wider. I wonder whether he could seek to find a form of legal language that would allow the change to take place, or whether we could work together on the new clause to ensure that it takes place, so that the families can register the deaths.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the hon. Lady; I was about to come to this point. A number of issues would need to be considered here, including whether a dual approach would be created for those bereaved whose circumstances are considered by an inquest such that a major incident qualifies for one route and others do not. We would need to reflect on that.
For the reasons that I have set out—drafting and the other factors that I have highlighted—the Government cannot support the new clause, but I am sympathetic to its underlying intent and the issues behind it. I recognise that the issue crosses over Ministry of Justice and Home Office ministerial responsibilities, so I commit to reconsidering, with ministerial colleagues across Government, whether there is more that can be done—and if so, how—with a view to seeing whether progress can be made prior to Report.
I do not want to raise expectations beyond saying that I will reconsider the position on this matter. As the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood said, we have time over the summer to do so and to reflect on the issues with the new clause that I have highlighted. I commit to working with her and the hon. Member for South Shields and having another look at this.
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood for tabling new clause 16, which relates to the functions and powers of the independent public advocate. In our view, clause 27 already covers the majority of new clause 16(1) and (2). Subsection (1)(e) refers to the power to establish
“an independent panel to establish the truth of what happened.”
Subsection (5) would require the panel to then register as a data controller.
The new clause, along with many of the amendments that we have debated today, whose intent I entirely understand, would move the focus of the IPA away from a support function and towards more of an investigatory function. In seeking to do that, the right hon. Lady has been dextrous in the drafting of her amendments. As I have set out, it is not something that the Government will support, because our focus is more on the support function, but I suspect that we will return to the matter. I also restate that the Hillsborough Independent Panel, which is what the new clause’s independent panel is modelled on, did not have data-compelling powers.
Subsection (6) stipulates that the families must be involved in deciding the composition of the independent panel. Subsection (7) would require all relevant public authorities and other relevant organisations to provide documentation to the independent panel. Subsection (8) would require advocates to publish a report on their review of the documentation.
Those measures do not clarify the role of the advocate in relation to the panel. If they build a close relationship with the families, would they be considered impartial enough to sit on or even lead an independent panel? I am not prejudging the answer to that question, but I pose it because it highlights some of the challenges around clarifying how this would work. For example, are there any parameters on when an advocate can publish a report? What if the material or timing would potentially prejudice an ongoing investigation or trial? Those are all matters that would require careful consideration to avoid unintended consequences.
On subsection (3), the policy intention is already for advocates to keep victims informed about any investigations, but it is only right that this is done in a manner and at a point that will not prejudice any such investigation.
On subsection (4), the Bill already includes provision on the IPA’s reporting function and duties in clause 29. I note that subsection (4) is duplicated in the right hon. Lady’s amendment 78 to clause 29, so it is perhaps more appropriate if I address it, along with the IPA’s reporting functions as a whole, when we discuss that clause.
In summary, many of the measures in new clause 16 are, in our view, already covered by the Bill. The subsections that refer to an independent panel and data controller powers change the purpose of the IPA. That is a matter for debate between both sides of this Committee, although I suspect it will be between the right hon. Lady and me in the first instance.
Maria Eagle
I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 29, page 21, line 38, leave out from beginning to the first “the” on line 39.
This amendment removes the requirement for the Secretary of State to instruct the Independent Public Advocate to issue a report.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 77, in clause 29, page 21, line 39, leave out “the Secretary of State” and insert “Parliament”.
This amendment ensures that the Independent Public Advocate reports to Parliament.
Amendment 78, in clause 29, page 22, line 1, leave out from beginning to end of line 10 and insert—
“(2) The Independent Public Advocate must report to Parliament —
(a) on an annual basis, summarising their work;
(b) at the conclusion of support relating to a particular event; and
(c) at any other time they identify a need so to do;
and the first such report must be laid before Parliament before the end of 2024.”
This amendment ensures that the Independent Public Advocate reports to Parliament rather than the Secretary of State at least annually in respect of each major incident.
Amendment 79, in clause 29, page 22, line 13, leave out from beginning to end of line 23.
This amendment ensures that the Independent Public Advocate reports to Parliament rather than the Secretary of State at least annually in respect of each major incident.
Maria Eagle
I am sure hon. Members will be glad to note that this is my last group of amendments on today’s selection list. I do not intend to detain the Committee for too much longer.
Amendments 76 to 79 would ensure that the public advocate reports to Parliament, rather than to the Secretary of State, and that he does so on a regular rather than on an ad hoc basis. There is always a great deal of public interest in the aftermath of disasters, and there are usually MPs who have constituents with a particular interest in getting as much information as possible about what is happening in the months and years following any such disaster. They, and those affected, have an overwhelming interest in getting to the truth and having, as soon as possible, a clear exposition of what has gone wrong.
Clause 29, as currently drafted, requires the advocate to report to the Secretary of State only if he is sent a notice to do so by the Secretary of State. What is in the report is specified by the Secretary of State, although there is an arrangement under clause 29(4) for the advocate to include in his report other matters that he considers relevant. However, although the Secretary of State must publish the report, he must do so only
“as the Secretary of State thinks fit”—
and presumably when he thinks fit. There are also to be redactions for data protection and the catch-all public interest exemption, which means that any report that is published may well have worrying and suspicious omissions or black lines through its text.
I can be very clear with the Committee that publications dealt with in that way—with redactions by the Secretary of State, and published only via the Secretary of State when he gets around to it—will do nothing other than fuel controversy about cover-ups. They are the very antithesis of the kind of reporting and transparency envisaged under the Bill that Lord Wills and I have brought forward. It would inspire more confidence if the public advocate reported on a regular basis to Parliament, so that it was clear that there had been no interference. It would be much better, if at all possible, to ensure there were no redactions.
The Government’s current proposals really will not do the job. I can see any such arrangements being viewed by bereaved families and victims not as something they can rely on and have confidence in, but as yet another part of the state machinery conspiring to keep them from the truth of what has happened to their loved ones, and to protect the state agencies in the line of fire. Whether or not that is true, that is what it will look like to those affected by the disaster.
I urge the Minister to let go of the control freak tendencies that appear to have been prevalent when civil servants were given policy decisions and thereafter gave some instructions to parliamentary counsel. I recognise that he may have inherited them from predecessors or even had them passed down from the predecessor of the current Lord Chancellor, who I hope has more sense than to think of the current drafting as a good idea. I hope he will change the way in which this report-writing clause is legislated for. The Minister cannot go wrong if he arranges for the report—unredacted, please—to be made to Parliament, when there will be significant public interest following any disaster. What could be more transparent than that?
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood for her amendments 76 to 79. As they would all amend clause 29, which focuses on the reporting function of the independent public advocate, I will address them together.
Collectively, the amendments would remove the requirement for the Secretary of State to instruct the IPA to issue a report; would require the IPA to report to Parliament rather than the Secretary of State, and to do so either periodically or at specified time periods; would remove the Secretary of State’s discretion over how to publish the advocates’ report; and would remove the ability for the Secretary of State to omit material if they consider it to be contrary to the public interest or to contravene data protection legislation.
Before I take each of those points in turn, providing clarity on our intention behind the drafting, I want to reiterate that I fully endorse the underlying principle of transparency and the ability of the IPA to highlight the experience of victims, call out issues and make recommendations that hold public authorities to the proper standard. I wholeheartedly believe in the importance and value of reports produced by those in a position to speak with authority on the experiences of victims, because they are a tool not only for getting to the truth, but for learning and for seeking to avoid the repetition of particular events or experiences. That is clearly illustrated in Bishop James Jones’s report.
I turn to amendment 76. The intention behind clause 29(1) is to provide an oversight role for the Secretary of State whereby reports are issued once requested, so the Secretary of State can ensure that the advocates produce reports only during periods when there are no active criminal investigations into the incident or ongoing inquiry proceedings. If the advocates issued a report during those periods, there is a risk that the content of the report would prejudice or undermine the conclusions of any legal investigatory processes.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
I think Parliament has pretty well-defined ways to ensure that things are not discussed in Parliament or called for in Parliament when they could create a problem of sub judice. That exists already, so I suggest that that concern is not a founded one.
Edward Argar
I gently say to the shadow Minister that while those processes exist, they are—as we have seen from admonitions from Mr Speaker—not always adhered to by right hon. and hon. Members, who on occasion are called to order for straying into sub judice matters on the Floor of the House. Although a process exists by which the Speaker can rule and can admonish, it is not universally the case that all right hon. and hon. Members will fully adhere to that without having to be called up by the Speaker. We need a degree of caution with respect to legal proceedings, particularly as we are seeking not only transparency but justice for victims and survivors. I would be very wary of anything that could even potentially prejudice that.
The Secretary of State can ensure that IPA reporting occurs only during appropriate periods in the aftermath of an incident. I reassure the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood that if the advocates wish to produce a report when it has not been requested, they can still contact the secretariat and consult with the Secretary of State. Of course, any such requests will be properly and fully considered. Although I understand and appreciate the desire for advocate agency in the reporting function of the IPA, I believe that the current drafting of subsection (1) will ensure that that is balanced against the need to consider the wider context of any report’s content.
Turning to amendment 77, I reassure hon. Members that under the clause, the Secretary of State must publish any report that they receive from the advocates. It is our intention that those reports be published as swiftly as possible, notwithstanding previous comments. When it is most appropriate for the reports to be laid before Parliament or referred to the relevant Committee, I reassure hon. Members that they will be.
However, as was alluded to just now, there may be instances when it is more appropriate for the report to be published through other means, especially if it is an interim progress report. Having the advocates report to the Secretary of State ensures that discretion can applied in deciding on the most appropriate method, whether that is laying a report before Parliament or publishing it on the IPA or gov.uk website. Again, that depends on the report’s content and nature, and other proceedings. If the report is published on a website, it will be publicly available, and can still be discussed in Parliament in a debate secured by the usual means.
I want to clarify that our clauses do not prohibit reporting at any of the points set out in amendment 78, or indeed sooner, if the Secretary of State makes a request. It is likely that while an incident is active, the Secretary of State will request an annual report from the IPA, and a report after the conclusion of an incident.
Maria Eagle
It sounds to me as though the Minister is accepting the amendment.
Edward Argar
I gently ask the right hon. Lady to let me make a bit more progress. She may not be so confident when I have finished; we will see. As I previously stated, if the advocates wish to report when they have not been requested to, they can raise that with the secretariat, which will then consult the Secretary of State, who will consider any requests carefully. The inclusion of provision giving the Secretary of State discretion allows for the required flexibility when it comes to the frequency of reports.
Jess Phillips
As I rise to my feet, news is emerging that the courts have forced the Government to give in to Lady Hallett on the covid report, and to reveal something that they went to court to try to hide. One can understand concerns about what may get hidden. Also, during this Committee, we have debated an amendment on sex offenders changing their names. There is a Government report on that issue that has never been allowed in public or in front of Parliament. Even Committee members who are seeking to debate it have not seen it. I am sure the Minister understands that the discretion of Government Departments is not something that we—certainly not I or the public—feel we can always rely on.
Edward Argar
I will make a couple of points. First, in my view there needs to be a degree of discretion, as there always has been under Governments of both the hon. Lady’s party and ours. That has generally always been the approach. Secondly, I want to gently clarify a point about what the Paymaster General said. That court case was not about hiding anything; it was about clarifying the lines and the boundaries of the inquiry, what is and is not admissible material, and getting a definitive court judgment, which we now have. I gently correct her point.
Edward Argar
She may take a different view, as of course she is entitled to, as a matter of debate.
Edward Argar
Amendment 79 would remove the Secretary of State’s discretion over how to publish the advocates’ reports.
Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)
The Minister may recall that during an evidence session, I asked Lord Wills whether he thought it was acceptable that the Bill requires the Secretary of State to publish a copy of the report made by the independent public advocate in whatever manner they considered appropriate. He replied that it was an example of the Bill giving the Secretary of State “too much unfettered discretion”, as one of my hon. Friends has said. Could the Minister respond to that?
Edward Argar
Although I have a huge amount of respect for the noble Lord Wills, I disagree with him on that point, hence the approach that the Government are taking in this legislation. If the hon. Lady allows me to make a little more progress, I might give her a little encouragement—maybe more than a little—in that respect.
I have already set out that where it is most appropriate for the reports to be laid before Parliament or referred to the relevant Committee, they will be. Amendment 79 would also remove the Secretary of State’s ability to omit material from the report that would be contrary to the public interest or contravene data protection legislation. Although I am sympathetic to the intention behind these amendments, I believe that the public interest and data protection legislation are important. The purpose of the public interest test is to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to sensitive information, such as matters that relate to national security. That is consistent with the approach taken in the Inquiries Act 2005, and ensures that there are no unintended negative consequences as a result of disclosing information that could impact national security.
Maria Eagle
I am slightly disappointed by the Minister’s response on what seemed to me a straightforward set of amendments that would simply increase transparency. I heard what he said about further work. I am slightly worried that he is saying that there will not be any reports from the IPA until after every possible kind of legal action has ended. That worries me, because we are then talking years. That will not inspire confidence in families affected by disasters. However, given that the Minister has tried to be constructive, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Anna McMorrin
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 29, page 22, line 15, at end insert—
“(5A) An advocate must provide periodic reports, at least annually, to the Secretary of State, regarding relevant events and occurrences.
(5B) In any case where an advocate is of the opinion that the duty under section [major incidents: duty of candour] has not been discharged, and the matter has not been effectively resolved, a report shall be sent to the Secretary of State as soon as possible.
(5C) The Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament any reports received under (1) and (2) within 14 days of receipt, and where appropriate, refer the content to relevant Parliamentary committees.”
This amendment would require a public advocate to provide reports to the Secretary of State about relevant events and to report if, in their opinion, public authorities or public servants have not complied with the duty of candour in NC3.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 3—Major incidents: duty of candour—
“(1) In discharging their duties in relation to a major incident, public authorities and public servants and officials must at all times act within their powers—
(a) in the public interest, and
(b) with transparency, candour and frankness.
(2) If a major incident results in a court proceeding, official inquiry or investigation, public authorities and public servants and officials have a duty to assist—
(a) relating to their own activities, or
(b) where their acts or omissions may be relevant.
(3) In discharging the duty under subsection (2), public authorities and public servants and officials shall—
(a) act with proper expedition;
(b) act with transparency, candour and frankness,
(c) act without favour to their own position,
(d) make full disclosure of relevant documents, material and facts,
(e) set out their position on the relevant matters at the outset of the proceedings, inquiry or investigation, and
(f) provide further information and clarification as ordered by a court or inquiry.
(4) In discharging their duty under subsection (2), public authorities and public servants and officials shall have regard to the pleadings, allegations, terms of reference and parameters of the relevant proceedings, inquiry or investigation but shall not be limited by them, in particular where they hold information which might change the ambit of the said proceedings, inquiry or investigation.
(5) The duties in subsections (1) and (2) shall—
(a) be read subject to existing laws relating to privacy, data protection and national security,
(b) apply in a qualified way with respect to private law and non-public functions as set out in subsection (6), and
(c) not be limited by any issue of insurance indemnity.
(6) The duties in subsections (1) and (2) shall be enforceable by application to the relevant court or inquiry chairperson by any person affected by the alleged breach, or the court or inquiry may act of its own motion. Where there are no extant court or inquiry proceedings, the duties may be enforced by judicial review proceedings in the High Court.”
This new clause would require public authorities and public servants and officials to act in the public interest and with transparency, candour and frankness when carrying out their duties in relation to major incidents.
Anna McMorrin
Again, I want to mention INQUEST, Hillsborough Law Now and Justice, the organisations working with me on these provisions. There is an urgent need to introduce a duty of candour for those from across the public services, such as policing, health, social care, and housing, when a major incident occurs. A duty of candour would place a legal requirement on organisations to approach public scrutiny, including inquiries and inquests into state-related deaths, in a candid and transparent manner. The duty would enable public servants and others delivering state services to carry out their role diligently, while also empowering them to flag dangerous practices that risk lives.
Institutional defensiveness has been found to be a pervasive issue in inquests and public inquiries; we heard about that today. It causes additional suffering to bereaved persons, creates undue delay to inquests and inquiries, undermines public trust and confidence in the police, and undermines a fundamental purpose of inquests and inquiries, which is to understand what happened and to prevent recurrence. Establishing a statutory duty of candour when major incidents occur would go some way to addressing those issues.
Justice’s report, “When Things Go Wrong: the response of the justice system”, found that in both inquests and inquiries,
“lack of candour and institutional defensiveness on the part of State and corporate interested persons and core participants are invariably cited as a cause of further suffering and a barrier to accountability”.
In his Government-commissioned report on the experiences of the Hillsborough families, the Right Rev. James Jones concluded that South Yorkshire police’s
“repeated failure to fully and unequivocally accept the findings of independent inquiries and reviews has undoubtedly caused pain to the bereaved families”.
During the evidence sessions, when asked if a duty of candour should be extended to include public servants, the Right Rev. James Jones answered:
“Yes, I think that there should be a duty of candour on all public officials. Anybody who accepts public office should bind themselves according to their own conscience to speak with candour and not to dissemble when called upon to give the truth and an account of what has happened.” ––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 90, Q173.]
Janet Daby
Does my hon. Friend agree that duty of candour is a serious issue? It is so serious that I cannot think of anybody who, during the evidence sessions, did not agree that duty of candour should be extended to include public servants.
Anna McMorrin
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. A lack of candour frustrates the fundamental purpose of inquests and inquiries, as we heard in the evidence sessions. Candour is essential if we are to reach the truth and learn from mistakes, so that similar tragedies do not occur in the future.
Public bodies such as the police have consistently approached inquests and inquiries as though they were litigation. They have failed to make admissions, and often failed to fully disclose the extent of their knowledge surrounding fatal events. For example, South Yorkshire police have been repeatedly criticised for their institutional defensiveness in respect of the awful Hillsborough tragedy in 1989. A 1989 briefing to the Prime Minister’s office on the interim Taylor report on the Hillsborough disaster noted that
“senior officers involved sought to duck all responsibility when giving evidence to the Inquiry”.
It went on to say:
“The defensive—and at times close to deceitful—behaviour by the senior officers in South Yorkshire sounds depressingly familiar. Too many senior policemen seem to lack the capacity or character to perceive and admit faults in their organisation.”
A statutory duty of candour would compel co-operation, and so enable major incident inquests and inquiries to fulfil their function of reaching the truth, so that they can make pertinent recommendations that address what went wrong and identify learning for the future.
Failure to make full disclosure and act transparently can lead to lengthy delays as the investigation or inquiry grapples with identifying and resolving the issues in dispute, at a cost to public funds and public safety. A recent example is the Daniel Morgan independent panel, which was refused proper access to HOLMES, the Home Office large major enquiry system, by the Metropolitan Police Service over seven years. The panel needed access to HOLMES to review the investigations of Daniel Morgan’s murder, but the lengthy negotiations on the panel’s access led to major delays to its work. The delays added to the panel’s costs and caused unnecessary distress to Daniel Morgan’s family, and the panel concluded that the MPS was
“determined not to permit access to the HOLMES system”.
A statutory duty of candour would significantly enhance participation in inquiries by bereaved people and survivors, as it would ensure that a public body’s position was clear from the outset, and so limit the possibility of evasiveness. The duty would also direct the investigation to the most important matters at an early stage, which would strengthen the ability of the inquiry or investigation to reach the truth without undue delay. By requiring openness and transparency, a statutory duty of candour would assist in bringing about a culture change in how state bodies approach inquests and inquiries. It would give confidence to members of an organisation who wanted to fully assist proceedings, inquiries and investigations, but who experienced pressure from their colleagues not to do so. It would compel co-operation with proceedings, inquiries and investigations, dismantling the culture of colleague protection—for example, in the police service.
I am sure the Minister is aware that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) has committed a Labour Government to introducing a Hillsborough law. That would place a duty of candour on all public bodies, and those delivering state services, going through inquests or investigations. I am sure the Minister will understand the compelling reason for strengthening the Bill, and will voice his support for the amendment and new clause.
Maria Eagle
I rise very briefly to support my hon. Friend’s amendment. A statutory duty of candour is an essential part of giving confidence to families caught up in public disasters. The Hillsborough law, proposed by the Right Rev. James Jones in his 2017 report to the Government, “The Patronising Disposition of Unaccountable Power”, said as much. It is extraordinary that all these years later, we still do not have a Government response to that report, even though the report was delayed while criminal prosecutions were ongoing. They ended two years ago, and we still have not had the final response from the Government. We were promised it in spring this year. It is now summer. I was promised it by December 2021 in a debate on the Floor of the House, and it has not happened.
I really do not see what is holding up the response. I hope it is not that the Government do not want to implement its findings and points of learning, one of which was that the statutory duty of candour ought to be legislated for. I hope that the Minister can tell us when the response to that report will be published, because spring is long gone. The response is long overdue. The Hillsborough Law Now campaign would be pleased to hear from the Minister on whether the statutory duty of candour, the equality of arms at inquest and the other recommendations of Bishop James Jones will be accepted.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cardiff North for amendment 25 and new clause 3. I reassure her that Parliament will be kept up to date and made aware of any findings of the IPA. It would perhaps be helpful if I explained a little further the intention behind the measures. I addressed the effect of proposed new subsections (5A) and (5C) of amendment 25 when responding to amendments 77 and 78 tabled by the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood. As I said then, the Bill does not prohibit annual reporting, and it is likely that while the IPA is active, an annual report will be requested. Additionally, it is our intention that any reports will be published as soon as possible, and when it is most appropriate to do so, they will be laid before Parliament or referred to the relevant Committee.
Proposed new subsection (5B) in amendment 25 and new clause 3 both relate to the duty of candour. I reiterate to the Committee that I fully understand that at no point is candour and transparency more important than in the aftermath of a major incident. The bereaved families and friends of the victims have an absolute right to understand what happened to their loved ones, and to understand what went wrong so that lessons can be learned. The Hillsborough families were denied that right in the months and years following the awful events of April 1989. Specifically, Lord Justice Taylor commented on the defensiveness and evasiveness of South Yorkshire police, but in truth, the families experienced obfuscation from a wide range of public bodies and agencies. It took decades of campaigning before it was established by fresh inquests that the 97 victims were unlawfully killed. I pay tribute to the Hillsborough families’ strength and tenacity in their prolonged campaign to ensure that other bereaved families do not suffer as they have.
The landscape in relation to duties and obligations on public servants has changed significantly since 1989. Most notably, the Inquiries Act 2005 places legal duties on participants, and there are sanctions for failure to comply. More recently, following the publication of Bishop James Jones’s report on the Hillsborough families’ experiences, the Home Office legislated for a duty of co-operation, which means that all police officers now have an individual responsibility to give appropriate co-operation during investigations, inquiries and formal proceedings, and to participate openly and professionally, in line with the expectations that we have for police officers, when identified as a witness. As I have said, a failure to co-operate is a breach of the statutory standards of professional behaviour by which all officers must abide, and could result in disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal.
We recognise that there is more to be done to ensure that public authorities are clear on the requirements on them in the aftermath of a major disaster. My right hon. and learned Friends the Lord Chancellor and Home Secretary recently met with some of the Hillsborough families to talk to them about the work done to address the failures identified by Bishop Jones, and to talk through the forthcoming Government response to the bishop’s report. That response will set out the Government’s position on the bishop’s points of learning on candour, and on the Hillsborough law and next steps. Ahead of that, it would not be right to impose a duty on advocates to report on the discharge of the duty. I will disappoint the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, but I cannot give her a date. However, I am reassured by ministerial colleagues that the report and response will be published shortly.
I am happy to return to this topic on Report, once that report and response can be read in the round. The right hon. Lady is always constructive, but I appreciate her disappointment. She would, at the least, like a date. I apologise, but I cannot give her that; I can say that it is due to be published shortly. In the light of that, I encourage the hon. Member for Cardiff North not to press the amendment. I have no doubt that we will return to the issue on Report.
Anna McMorrin
I am disappointed by the response on the amendment, new clause 3 and the request of my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood for a response to the report that was published in 2017—more than six years have gone by since then. I hope that the Minister can guarantee that response before the end of the Committee; that gives him an extra week.
Anna McMorrin
Although I am disappointed, I will not press the amendment to a vote. I hope that we will continue discussion of the importance of the duty of candour, and ensure that it is a core element of the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Anna McMorrin
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 29, page 22, line 18, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to omit material in the advocate’s report if they believe it is contrary to the public interest.
I think this is my last amendment; I am grateful to the Committee. The amendment, similarly to my previous amendments, seeks to ensure the independence of the independent public advocate. Again, I give my deep thanks to Ken Sutton, secretary to the Hillsborough Independent Panel, for his continued support and work on these issues. The fact that the independence of the independent public advocate is being debated should be a worry for us all. The clause relates to the reporting process for the advocate. This clause states that the Secretary of State can require the advocate to produce a report on the investigation processes, but that the report can be redacted by the Secretary of State on public interest grounds. The amendment seeks to rectify that.
Yet again, a provision of the Bill is undermining the independence and transparency of the IPA’s role. This is another example of the Government suggesting that they believe in an independent body, but then restricting it in a way that completely contradicts that notion. Redacting the work of the supposedly independent IPA is hopeless. We cannot subject someone’s work to redaction while claiming that they have independence.
Why does the Minister think that the public will trust the Government to redact the IPA’s work in a way that does not serve their own interests? We are going back to the whole question of trust. The responsibility to report to Parliament should, at the very least, encourage a feedback loop that ensures that Government conduct can, through the fact-finding process and in its aftermath, be properly scrutinised by the legislature and, more generally, the public. That will not happen if the clause is left unamended. During our evidence sessions, Lord Wills echoed my concerns and stated:
“As I understand the Government’s proposals, the independent public advocate will not have the right enjoyed by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, for example, to be an independent office that has the right to produce reports on its own initiative.”––[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2023; c. 91, Q176.]
The failure to address concerns expressed about the independence of the supposedly independent public advocate demonstrates that lessons are not being learned from Hillsborough. When the next major incident occurs—which, unfortunately, it will—we will be discussing not legal terminology, but human tragedy. I hope the Minister heeds our calls and ensures genuine independence for the independent public advocate.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for the amendment, which would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to omit material in the advocate’s report if they believe it is contrary to the public interest. I am conscious that amendment 23 is similar in nature to amendment 79, to which I spoke earlier. It may be helpful, however, if I briefly revisit why the Government thought it necessary to include in the Bill the ability for the Secretary of State to omit material that, if published, would be contrary to the public interest.
Although I sympathise with the intention behind the amendment, this ability for the Secretary of State is vital for national security and is not novel—parallel provisions were included by the previous Labour Government in the Inquiries Act 2005 for, I would assume, that reason. Removing a Secretary of State’s ability to omit material from the reports that the IPA produces would risk being contrary to the public interest and could contravene data protection legislation. This is a necessary measure to ensure that sensitive materials, such as those relating to national security or an ongoing investigation, are protected.
There is no question but that advocates will have valuable insights and I am committed to ensuring that the IPA can speak freely and that the substance of what they have to say is made public. I want to stress once again that the discretionary powers of the Secretary of State will be used only when and where absolutely necessary. We have an obligation to be transparent, but it is also important for us to keep all our citizens safe and ensure that information is shared responsibly. Clause 29 strikes the right balance in that regard. However, I am, as with previous clauses, always happy to reiterate my commitment to speaking further with hon. Members to get it right on the IPA’s reporting functions, as I know that has been the focus of many amendments reflecting broader concerns.
Anna McMorrin
I am disappointed because I think the amendment would really strengthen the Bill, as would amendment 79 tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood. The Government may not support this amendment, but why could they not instead subject the IPA to a protocol of disclosure similar to that of the Hillsborough Independent Panel? Can the Minister respond to that now?
Edward Argar
It would be premature for me to say anything like that at this point. I draw the hon. Lady’s attention, as I said, to this being replicative of the provisions put in place by the last Labour Government in the Inquiries Act 2005. I will reflect on what she says, but I cannot commit to going further than that.
Anna McMorrin
I thank the Minister for agreeing to reflect on the issue. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
Clause 29 allows the Secretary of State to request a report from an advocate while they are supporting victims of a major incident and at the conclusion of that support. The Secretary of State will have the discretion to specify the matters that the report must address and the timeframe within which the report is to be completed. The clause also provides advocates with the ability to include any points or topics that they think are relevant to the incident in respect of which they are appointed.
One of the main objectives of the IPA is to ensure that the voices of victims of a major incident are amplified and heard. An advocate will work with victims from the immediate aftermath of a major incident and help them to navigate the different state processes. A report may be on a specific issue to which attention should be drawn during the investigations, or the Secretary of State may request a report at the conclusion of all proceedings to share the victim experience and identify areas for improvement in future. We have seen the impact that such reports can have—perhaps none more powerful than the bishop’s report on the experience of the Hillsborough families. It is the Government’s intention that such reports may include recommendations, which would be valuable to inform wider public policy on support for victims of major incidents.
Clause 29 further places an obligation on the Secretary of State to publish any reports produced. That ensures transparency and accountability. As is standard, the clause makes clear that certain material related to the public interest and personal data may be omitted. I want to make clear, as I have during debates on previous amendments, that that exception is not designed to suppress uncomfortable truths but to protect important matters of national security or an individual’s personal data, for example. It mirrors provisions in the Inquiries Act 2005. We are committed to the IPA’s operational independence and will carefully consider the content of any reports produced, with the aim of being as transparent as possible.
Anna McMorrin
I simply say that I think the arguments that I set out in my amendments and new clauses still stand. The clause states that the Secretary of State can require the advocate to produce a report on the investigation processes, but that the report can be redacted by the Secretary of State on public interest grounds. Amendment 23 seeks to rectify that, while amendment 25 and new clause 3 seek to ensure the transparency and openness that the Minister speaks about. They would add not only that additional strength to the Bill but, most importantly, that trust.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her comments, and, with that, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Information sharing and data protection
Edward Argar
I beg to move amendment 35, in clause 30, page 23, line 1, leave out “a disclosure or” and insert “the”.
This amendment and Amendments 36 and 37 omit references to the disclosure of information. Processing, which here has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018, includes disclosure and other uses of information, so there is no need to refer separately to disclosure.
Edward Argar
This may be my briefest exposition yet. This is the final group of minor and technical amendments here, which we are putting forward to ensure that consistent terminology is used in relation to data protection. The changes are primarily for the purposes of clarifying the provisions and ensuring that they work as intended.
Anna McMorrin
Well, I won’t comment on that, Mr Hosie. I would just like to say, very briefly, that I would like the Minister to provide the assurance that the IPA will be granted the authority to be given all the information that they require relevant to their role, and, further to that, that they will be granted the necessary powers to ensure that none of the relevant information is destroyed. That is essential.
Edward Argar
As we have set out in previous debates on this matter, there are already provisions—around legal proceedings, for example—for the retention and preservation of information. However, we have already debated the powers, or otherwise, of the IPA as a data controller and I have set out, on behalf of the Government, our position on that matter. I appreciate that the Opposition Front Benchers take a different perspective, which of course they are entitled to do, but I believe that we have expounded on that already in the debates on this part of the Bill. With that, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendments made: 36, in clause 30, page 23, line 2, leave out ‘disclosure or’
See the explanatory statement to Amendment 35.
Amendment 37, in clause 30, page 23, line 3, leave out ‘a disclosure or processing’ and insert ‘it’”—(Edward Argar.)
See the explanatory statement to Amendment 35.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
In order to amplify the voices of victims and to signpost them to the right support service, advocates must have the ability to share information with public authorities and victims. Clause 30 creates an information-sharing gateway that gives an advocate the ability to share information. The clause permits them to share information with other advocates, the victims themselves, the Secretary of State, the IPA secretariat and other public authorities.
I want to make it absolutely clear that an advocate will not share personal data received in the exercise of their functions without the consent of the victim. I know that people will be wary about that issue, and I want to make our position crystal clear. Nothing in the clause permits the IPA to contravene existing data protection legislation.
I believe that the clause will allow the IPA to more effectively assist victims to solve problems in real time. The IPA may communicate with public authorities on behalf of victims, and the clause will allow them to share data, where appropriate, and do so effectively. The clause also helps to ensure that victims can access the information to which they are entitled from any investigation, inquest or inquiry.
Finally, the clause allows the Secretary of State to share information, where appropriate, with an advocate. It is envisioned that that will be information shared with the secretariat provided by the Ministry of Justice. With that, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Anna McMorrin
I have already made my points about this issue. I wish to ensure that the IPA is granted the authority to receive all the information they need. I hope the Minister will continue to work with us to get that right.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Guidance for independent public advocates
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
Clause 31 gives the Secretary of State the power to produce guidance to which an advocate must have regard when exercising their functions. The Secretary of State cannot, however, direct that guidance at any specific advocate or major incident. That is an important safeguard to ensure that, once appointed, the IPA is operationally independent and that the Secretary of State cannot use guidance to limit the role of a particular advocate or in a particular incident. Instead, guidance will help ensure consistency of support across different incidents.
The clause also gives the Secretary of State the power to withdraw or revise the guidance from time to time. That will allow the guidance to be kept up to date, to evolve and to reflect lessons identified and learned from major incidents. We cannot predict what major incidents we may face in the future, nor in what form they might come. Any guidance issued needs to be able to be updated regularly to ensure that the IPA is flexible and can adapt.
Anna McMorrin
I thank the Minister for expanding on the guidance for an independent public advocate. My remaining concern with the clause is the potential for the Secretary of State to use the guidance to restrict the powers and remit of the IPA. Will the Minister assure me that that will not be the case?
Edward Argar
As I have set out, the clause is not designed in any way to restrict the powers of individual advocates, but to set guidance on the way a number of different advocates will conduct their roles in different circumstances to provide that consistency. Given that we are about to conclude part 2, I will take the opportunity to pay tribute to all those who have campaigned hard on these matters from both parties, but most importantly to those families of victims and the survivors of these horrific events.
I am pleased that we are making progress on this matter, and I will continue to work with the Opposition and particularly the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood over the coming months to see whether we can close any gaps. We are all determined to do our best to get the issue right, so I put on the record my gratitude to all those people and my officials, who have been working on this for some time. It is not an easy area of law to work in, and it is also a traumatic area to work in given the circumstances, which they and others will have read about. I put on the record my gratitude to them, the right hon. Lady, the families, the survivors and all those who have campaigned.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
I echo the Minister’s comments, particularly those referring to his officials and the traumatic incidents that have been involved. As I stated when we were taking evidence, I was at the University of Sheffield at the time of the Hillsborough disaster. A friend of mine died in that disaster, and another was seriously injured. I have chosen today on repeated occasions not to intervene, but I thank the Minister, the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood and the shadow Front Benchers for their tone and co-operation, which will be a comfort to anybody who has been involved in any way.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Given his personal experience and connection, this will not have been easy for him, and I am grateful for not only his words, but his service on the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Public protection decisions: life prisoners
Ellie Reeves (Lewisham West and Penge) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 96, in clause 32, page 24, line 25, at end insert—
“(fa) the nature and seriousness of any conduct by the prisoner which—
(i) is alleged,
(ii) is as yet unproven,
(iii) has not resulted in a conviction,
which may have implications for the risk posed by the prisoner.”
Ellie Reeves
This victims Bill is long-awaited. Although it is good to finally be on my feet, I should say that part 3 is a distraction to debating the real and serious issue of victims. Many of us share the view that it should never have made its way into the Bill.
Amendment 96 seeks to broaden the list of things that the Parole Board must take into account when making a release decision. I want to set the context by saying a few words about the new release test. No one wants to see dangerous criminals released from prison, and the release of John Worboys, Colin Pitchfork and Tracey Connelly rightly led to public outrage. Setting the test out in legislation and introducing a new threshold may help to give greater transparency and consistency. However, it is not clear whether it will make a difference to how the Parole Board already operates. In evidence to this Committee, the Parole Board chief executive stated that it currently assesses risk
“as to whether the prisoner’s continued detention remains necessary for the protection of the public. That means that public protection is always paramount in our decision making.”
He went on to say that
“what is on the face of the Bill, in reality, gives effect to what the Parole Board already says in its guidance that we should take into account. We think that the legislation should make no significant changes to our practice.”—[Official Report, Victims and Prisoners Public Bill Committee, 20 June 2023; c. 51, Q100.]
My concern is that setting out in legislation the list of factors that the Parole Board has to take into account could lead to the process becoming a tick-box exercise. Clauses 32 and 33 set out matters—such as the nature and seriousness of the offence and the risk of the prisoner failing to comply with their licence conditions on release or committing further offences—that the Parole Board rightly takes into account when making a public protection decision. Although the list is non-exhaustive, there is a risk that factors that are not on the list but that may be important in a particular case do not get the consideration that they deserve. That could lead to poorer decision making, leaving the public less safe, and that leads me to my amendment.
I am deeply concerned that the draft list of criteria does not include alleged but unproven offences. Let us take Worboys, for example. His release on parole in 2018 rightly caused outrage. He was originally charged with attacking 14 women and faced 23 charges, including rape, sexual assault and administering a substance with intent. He was convicted of 19 offences in 2009. In December 2019, he was handed two additional life sentences for attacks on four more women, as it was revealed that he had confessed to targeting 90 victims. The failings of the police in this case are widely acknowledged, but on his release in 2018, the dossier from the Ministry of Justice did not emphasise the other allegations against him. Therefore the panel did not consider the alleged offences that he had not been charged with but, on the balance of probabilities, he had committed. In 2019, the Parole Board guidance was changed so that alleged but unproven allegations could be taken into account.
Litigation on this point followed, in the case of Pearce. Mr Pearce was sentenced after three offences of sexual assault. After serving his minimum sentence, the Parole Board refused to direct his release and instead directed his transfer to open conditions. In accordance with the new guidance on allegations, the board, when assessing his risk, took into account multiple unproven allegations about other alleged sexual assaults carried out by Mr Pearce against women and girls. Although the Court of Appeal found that the decision in respect of Mr Pearce was lawful, it held that parts of the board’s guidance were unlawful, as in its view only proven allegations could fairly be taken into account in the risk assessment.
The Parole Board appealed to the Supreme Court, which concluded in April this year that the Parole Board’s guidance on the unproven allegations against a prisoner is lawful. Therefore, alleged but unproven offences may be taken into account in release decisions where the Parole Board decides that they are relevant to the question of a prisoner’s risk to the public.
Although that is a step forward for victims and public safety, the Government’s failure to include alleged but unproven allegations on the statutory list is a huge step backwards. That was the key lesson from the Worboys case, so the omission is startling. It risks not only diluting the list’s importance, but the exclusion by panels of such allegations from their decision making. If that happens, decision making will be of a worse quality, and that will put the public at greater risk. That is why these amendments are so important, and I urge the Government to support them.
Edward Argar
I welcome the hon. Member for Lewisham West and Penge not only to her seat but to her feet, to take on part 3 of the Bill. In answer to her opening comments, the reason that part 3 is included is that when we talk to victims, there are two key points at which they raise concerns and anxieties. The first is the initial stage, from the arrest to the charge, the court process and—hopefully—the conviction and sentencing of the perpetrator. The second, which has been raised with me, the Lord Chancellor and others, is when a perpetrator is coming up for release or parole. That is the thread that links part 1 and part 3 of the Bill.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her amendment, which would explicitly add unproven allegations to the list of matters that the Parole Board must take into account when deciding whether it is safe for a prisoner to be released. I appreciate the point that she made about specific cases; I am a Leicestershire MP, and the impact and trauma of Colin Pitchfork’s deeds are still very much there among communities, not just in the immediate area where it took place but across my constituency, because people remember them with horror. In this context, “unproven allegations” refers to allegations that the prisoner has committed offences in addition to those of which they were convicted. Those could be, for example, complaints recorded by the police or misconduct in prison.
I agree with the hon. Lady that unproven allegations are an important factor in risk assessment. I reassure her that they are already given the consideration they require by parole panels and that the Parole Board has specific guidance for its members on the matter. Members of the Committee may be aware that the Supreme Court recently handed down its judgment in the case of Pearce, to which the hon. Lady referred. The case considered the board’s guidance on unproven allegations, and the Court held that the Parole Board can have regard, where appropriate, to any unproven allegations regarding a prisoner and is free to give them due consideration as part of that release decision even where that material has not been established as a fact. The Parole Board has since updated its guidance in the light of the judgment and continues to consider unproven allegations in its decisions.
Given the potential importance of unproven allegations, we considered adding them to the list of mandatory criteria. However, this is a technical area of law and we fear that the amendment would potentially go further than the Pearce judgment, which would risk including baseless allegations that lack credibility and going beyond the parameters set by the Supreme Court judgment. In our view, the position agreed by the Supreme Court is clear and has been carefully considered. We are content that the developed jurisprudence gives sufficient clarity for the board to fairly consider allegations of this kind as it makes decisions.
Clauses 32 and 33 both contain a list of factors that the Parole Board must take into account when making a public protection decision about a prisoner. The list is explicitly not exhaustive. The list includes the conduct of the prisoner while serving their sentence as well as the risk that the prisoner would commit a further offence if no longer confined. In our view, unproven allegations already fall within the scope of these mandatory considerations. Members of the Parole Board are experts in the field and will consider all relevant and available information in line with the guidance regardless. On the basis that unproven allegations already fall within the wording and scope of both these mandatory considerations, that unproven allegations are therefore already an important part of the decision-making process, and that clear guidelines have been handed down by the Supreme Court, we consider the amendment unnecessary.
Ellie Reeves
I thank the Minister for those comments. I note his point about the drafting of the amendment perhaps going further than the judgment in Pearce. Given the importance of getting this right, might we look at a way that alleged but unproven allegations could be incorporated into the list between now and Report?
Edward Argar
In the nicest way, I would not wish to leave the hon. Lady out of the multiple conversations that I am likely to have over the summer with her right hon. and hon. Friends about different aspects of the Bill. I hope that it has come across in Committee that I am always happy to work constructively with the Opposition on this. We may not always reach the same conclusion or end up in the same place, but I am always happy to have those conversations with the hon. Lady.
Ellie Reeves
I am grateful for those assurances about working together on this. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 33 stand part.
That the schedule be the schedule to the Bill.
Edward Argar
Clause 32 will amend chapter II of part II of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, which relates to the release of prisoners serving life sentences. Clause 33 will amend chapter 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which relates to the release of prisoners serving determinate sentences. When a life sentence prisoner reaches the end of their minimum term or tariff—that is, the minimum period set by the independent courts that an offender must spend in custody—they will be referred to the Parole Board. The Parole Board will apply the release test set out in legislation: whether it is
“no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined”.
The board’s sole consideration in that decision is public protection.
Jess Phillips
In the accounting of whether there is a risk, is there anything that would ensure that, for example, evidence is taken by the Parole Board from the family courts? There is a problem in that the family courts do not speak to the criminal courts—it happens all the time. A finding that somebody had committed rape could be found in the family court but not in the criminal court. I worry; for example, with children’s services—if there were children involved, would that be taken into account by the Parole Board? I do not think it is in any way a fair to say that an assessment of the risks posed—of any minimal threat to anyone, when we are considering domestic and sexual violence—could only come from the police, because so few women come forward.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for the point she makes, and I understand that she is getting at how widely one draws out what is relevant and useful information pertinent to decision making. I appreciate the point she makes about some factors not currently being explicitly taken into consideration under the provision. On that specific point of law, I hope she will allow me either to write to her or revert to her before the Committee concludes.
With subsection (5)(c), the requirement is then to consider the prisoner’s behaviour, even in prison or on licence, while serving the sentence. The decision maker must review the available evidence—for example, from probation officers—as to whether the prisoner has complied with all the demands made of them. There is a link to subsection (5)(f), which considers the impact of any rehabilitative interventions, such as therapeutic treatment or engagement in education, and their effectiveness in reducing the prisoner’s risk to the public.
I have already mentioned subsection (5)(d). Subsection (5)(e) covers the assessment the decision maker must make in respect of what licence conditions might be imposed if the prisoner is suitable for release, and what the likelihood of the prisoner complying with them is. Subsection (5)(g) requires the decision maker to take account of any submission made on behalf of the prisoner as to their suitability for release. An account must also be taken of any submission from the Secretary of State, which may include their view on the risks posed by the prisoner.
As we have discussed at length, it is vital that we put victims at the heart of the criminal justice system. For that crucial reason, subsection (6) says that when assessing the level of risk that the prisoner may pose to the public in general
“the decision-maker must in particular have regard to the protection of any victim of the prisoner.”
In that context, my interpretation of the requirement on the board to take all relevant evidence into account—as I said, I will write to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley if I have misinterpreted this—is that if relevant material is held by another authority, it can still be obtained on behalf of the Secretary of State and considered. I hope that she will allow me to confirm that to her in writing.
The criteria set out in subsections (5) and (6) are comprehensive and undoubtedly assist the decision maker in assessing risk; however, it is not an exhaustive list of criteria. That is confirmed by subsection (9), which clarifies that the decision maker is not limited in the matters to be taken into account when assessing a prisoner’s risk. The Government consider it necessary to be transparent and clear when it comes to making very important public protection decisions that have significant consequences for the public, victims and prisoners. The high threshold for release and the criteria by which risk is assessed must therefore be there for everyone to see and understand. We are satisfied that the clause codifies the release test used by the Parole Board, and the board advises that it could be a welcome clarification for it of the factors that its members already take into consideration.
Ellie Reeves
I thank the Minister for setting out the clauses comprehensively. They are broadly welcome, in that they introduce a new public threshold in legislation. Although putting the release test in legislation and introducing the new threshold may help to give greater transparency and consistency, there remains a question mark about whether it is necessary. The Chair of the Justice Committee observed on Second Reading that
“there is an element in this part of the Bill of trying to solve a problem that does not exist and therefore a risk of over-engineering the system, which we might not need…There is nothing wrong with changing it, and perhaps nothing wrong with expanding it, but are we sure that we are getting this right?”—[Official Report, 15 May 2023; Vol. 732, c. 602-603.]
Although it was helpful to hear from the Minister today some of the thinking behind the clauses, I notes that the Justice Committee wrote to the Lord Chancellor stating that the changes could have a positive effect on consistency and transparency of Parole Board decision making, but also outlined that the changes are not strictly necessary. Again, there is a question mark about whether parliamentary time could be better spent focusing on victims rather than some of these changes.
Let me return to the concerns I raised previously about the non-exhaustive list of factors for the Parole Board to take into account. There is a risk that the Parole Board may end up giving more weight to those things that are on the list rather than to other factors that may be relevant. I have already spoken about alleged but unproven allegations. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley gave the example of findings that might be made in the family court, particularly in relation to rape and domestic abuse. My worry is that an unintended consequence of specifying a list of things that have to be taken into account might be a failure to take into account issues that are also extremely relevant to risk. Although we broadly we support the clauses, we think those points need a little further reflection.
Edward Argar
I am always conscious that the hon. Lady is an extremely able lawyer, so I listen carefully to everything she says and will reflect carefully on her points. I am also conscious that both Lewisham East and Lewisham West are represented on this Committee; Lewisham is well represented. With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule agreed to.
Clause 34
Amendment of power to change test for release on licence of certain prisoners
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Edward Argar
The clause is an amendment to an existing power in section 128 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The power allows the Secretary of State to be responsive to the risk posed by certain cohorts of offenders by allowing changes to the release test applied by the Parole Board by secondary legislation. For example, if the release test was found to no longer be suitable for assessing the risk posed by a particular cohort, the power would allow the Secretary of State to swiftly rectify that by amending the release test to safeguard protection.
The clause simply amends the pre-existing power to ensure it remains operable with the introduction of the Bill. First, it brings the new release test in clauses 32 and 33, which we have just discussed, into this power, so that the Secretary of State can amend it if necessary. Secondly, it ensures that the power also works with the new ministerial second check introduced in the Bill, which we will debate in due course. In the event that the Secretary of State decides to call in a case to remake a decision, he or she will apply the same release test as the Parole Board. Likewise, if a prisoner decides to appeal a decision made by the Secretary of State to the upper tribunal, they will also apply the same release test.
The power is used to change the release test applied by the Parole Board. The release tests applied subsequently by the Secretary of State and the upper tribunal must also be changed, which this clause facilitates. The clause is not new policy, but simply ensures that the pre-existing legislation continues to operate consistently and effectively. I commend it to the Committee.
Ellie Reeves
We welcome clause 34, which will allow future changes in the release test to be made by affirmative statutory instrument. The Worboys case demonstrated inadequacies with Parole Board processes, and changes were needed that until then had not been anticipated. It strikes me that in future we may find that changes are needed in ways that we cannot foresee today, but there must be scrutiny of any changes, so I am pleased that the Government have recognised this is a matter for which an affirmative as opposed to a negative statutory instrument is required. We welcome this measured approach.
Edward Argar
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her support and for her words. I hope clause 34 can stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Fay Jones.)