Immigration Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I also put my name to the amendment at Report. I have listened with great care to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said. It seems that his remarks, if they are adopted by the Government, indicate that the shift in the Government’s position is substantial. If they are not adopted by the Government, they amount to a demolition of the substance of this shift. I see the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, nodding at that. I, for one, shall be listening extremely carefully to the Minister’s response to the six points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

I want to remind the House why it is important that the Government acknowledge those points. The Home Secretary’s reasonable belief that a man or a woman may avail themselves of the nationality of another country will not assist a citizen in whose case that belief turns out to be ill-founded. He or she will be deprived, in Hannah Arendt’s phrase, of the “right to have rights” and locked out of any mechanism at all for achieving those rights for ever, until another state decides to take this individual on. If that is the position that the Government’s shift leaves us in, as a potential result of decision-making in the Home Office, then this shift does not go far enough.

For my part, I remain of the view that the United Kingdom should not embrace a policy where one of its potential results is statelessness, associated with so many of the degenerate states of the 20th century, and where the outcome, if it is statelessness, is so hostile to human dignity in its most basic form. This is particularly so where that policy is also bound to strike against the international accord that is so central to the maintenance of security both between and within states. In the long run, we cannot and will not make the United Kingdom a safer place by dumping our security threats abroad, sometimes into states where the capacity for dealing with them is completely debased, so that they simply grow. I agree with Professor Goodwin-Gill that a rule-of-law country accepting a United Kingdom citizen on the basis of his passport, lawfully certified and issued by the United Kingdom Government, will be perfectly entitled to respond to our unilateral withdrawal of that passport by insisting that the United Kingdom take this individual back. Which of your Lordships can doubt that if the tables were reversed we would take precisely the same approach?

I will conclude by speaking frankly. The history of this matter is that it appears to have been conjured up to serve an entirely party-political purpose in the midst of a debate in the other place. It is illiberal, it is an affront to civilised international relations, it will not improve our security and, in all likelihood, it threatens a legal and diplomatic quagmire, to no useful purpose and to the detriment of the reputation of the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, who made a very powerful speech. I welcome the fact that there has been movement on the part of the Government in these amendments, and I very much welcome the helpful questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who has played such a role in getting us to where we are now. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, acknowledged, some people may still be made stateless as a result of the clause. Therefore, I am not as happy as some other noble Lords appear to be—or perhaps content is the word—and I support Motion B1.

In the Commons, some of the most pertinent questioning came from the Government’s own Back Benches. Sir Richard Shepherd asked,

“how the people of Britain will know that the action has been taken in a rational and reasonable way, when it is obscured from public view”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/5/14; col. 194.]

Dr Julian Huppert asked:

“What will happen if somebody in the UK goes through the process, the Home Secretary believes that they are able to get citizenship from another country and they make a bona fide application for that citizenship, but it is turned down?”.

In effect, this was also the question posed today by my noble friend. When pressed—and he had to be pressed—the Minister, James Brokenshire, responded that they could be given,

“limited restricted leave to remain”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/5/14; col. 196.]

But that is not a satisfactory substitute for citizenship and the rights that go with it.

My noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and others have expressed very grave concerns that the Government may well be waiting for someone to be out of the country to deprive them of citizenship. One concern of the Joint Committee on Human Rights was how often that has happened under the current powers. I very much welcome the fact that the Minister said he has responded to the Joint Committee’s latest letter about that and that he will make that information available to whoever is given responsibility for the review. I thank him for that.

In the Commons, James Brokenshire prayed in aid the fact that the matter had been considered by the Joint Committee on Human Rights as well as in another place—that is, here—to argue that,

“it is not correct to say that it has not been subject to careful consideration”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/5/14; col. 213.]

Indeed, the Minister made the same point earlier. But the Joint Committee on Human Rights was very critical of the speed with which this measure was introduced and we—I am a member of the committee—made it very clear that we believed that a public consultation,

“would have made for better informed parliamentary scrutiny of the Government’s proposal”,

and that the Joint Committee that was proposed would allow for just that kind of proper scrutiny.

Your Lordships’ House made it very clear that it did not consider that there had been sufficient scrutiny by passing the amendment with such a significant majority. The only thing that has happened since then is that the House of Commons has debated for only 90 minutes something of such grave constitutional and moral importance. I really think that the case for a Joint Committee still stands. Indeed, the Home Affairs Select Committee, which published its report on counterterrorism after the debate in the Commons, has supported Lords Amendment 18, which underlines the point made by a number of organisations outside this House that the measure does not guarantee security against terrorism in any way.

I, too, have read the legal debate between the Government and Professor Goodwin-Gill. As a non-lawyer, I am not in a position to be able to judge that debate. Surely, however, the fact that there is such disagreement reinforces the case for a Joint Committee to tease out these very serious legal matters. The Floor of the House is not the place to do that. As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, has already made clear, so much is at stake. I quoted earlier the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who is now in his place, because what he said was so important. He said:

“Statelessness is one of the most terrible things that can befall anyone”.—[Official Report, 19/3/14; col. 212.]

The Minister spoke of the evil of statelessness. Another expert in this area said that statelessness was a recipe for exclusion, precariousness and dispossession.

We have not completely averted the danger that we will make somebody stateless as a result of the amendment, welcome as it is. I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will stand firm and support Motion B1 because the amendment does not provide a cast-iron guarantee against the evil of statelessness.

Immigration Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I accept that there are some people in the class that my noble friend describes.

My noble friend Lady Williams talked about supporting a family on £5 a day—I cannot recall exactly what she said—but the payment levels for asylum seekers with children are much higher. A family with two children receives approximately £170 per week. Accommodation is also provided, with utilities—electricity and gas—provided free.

Amendment 72 would make the support given to failed asylum seekers and persons on bail, known as Section 4 support, the same as the support given to asylum seekers—Section 95 support. This is inappropriate, as the types of assistance are different and serve different purposes.

The support that we provide to asylum seekers enables us to meet international obligations. However, there are no obligations routinely to assist failed asylum seekers, the vast majority of whom can reasonably be expected to avoid the consequences of destitution by returning to their own countries—although I am mindful of my exchange with my noble friend Lord Avebury. Exceptions are made only where there is an unavoidable obstacle preventing the person’s immediate departure; for example, if they are too sick to travel, need time to obtain a necessary travel document or have made further submissions relating to their asylum claim. These arrangements ensure that the individuals do not suffer inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as a result of being left homeless or without support.

We also use Section 4 to provide accommodation to persons released from immigration detention on bail. The provision of accommodation in this instance is solely to avoid the person being unnecessarily detained through lack of a suitable bail address. Section 4 cases are provided with a weekly allowance to cover their essential living needs provided they move into accommodation supplied by the Home Office. Existing legislation explicitly prevents the allowance being provided in cash.

My noble friend Lord Roberts referred to the limitation as to the retailers involved. In my personal experience, supermarkets provide better value for money than many corner shops. The value and flexibility of the allowance is rightly less than the allowances provided under Section 95. Section 4 support is a temporary fix for people who are not asylum seekers and in nearly all cases need to make arrangements to go home.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to the situation in other European countries. She will be aware that these countries have different legal systems and that this country is a very attractive destination.

In answer to my noble friend Lady Williams, I fear that I will be unable to recommend to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State that she change the policy, for reasons that I have given. In light of these points, I hope that my noble friend Lord Roberts will agree not to press his amendments.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, will he respond directly to the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that the purpose of the present policy is to make life in the United Kingdom so unattractive for these vulnerable people that they leave?

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, no. The purpose of the current policy is to deter economic migration, because people would be able to come here, claim asylum and after a while be able to work. With this policy, we can deter economic migration through the asylum route and therefore properly determine the genuine cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Roberts of Llandudno]

My Lords, I will refer to Amendments 75 to 78 from the noble Lord, Lord Lester. They touch upon important points, including one made in the context of Clause 14 by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and myself.

The Government have an obligation to take into account the best interests of any child affected by their decisions. I accept that Amendment 77 must be understood in the light of the reply of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, to amendments tabled to Clause 14. He stated:

“We believe that the children’s best interests must be a primary consideration. … However, it is simply not the case that a child’s best interests will outweigh every other possible countervailing factor, including illegal immigration and serious criminality”.—[Official Report, 5/3/14; col. 1384.]

Amendment 77 seeks to put on the face of the Bill that the child’s best interests should be considered, no matter what the crimes of the parents might be. This remains true.

I support also Amendment 75, which seeks to limit the dangerously broad and vague power that the Home Secretary asks for. The lack of clarity was outlined to me in a Written Answer from the Minister, Lord Taylor, on 10 February, in which he stated:

“The Government does not wish to be overly prescriptive about the meaning of ‘seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom’, as the circumstances of each case will be different. However we intend it to cover those involved in terrorism or espionage or those who take up arms against British or allied forces”.—[Official Report, 10/2/14; col. WA 103.]

He cited terrorism, espionage and taking up arms against British or allied forces as possible specific examples. I hope that all here will wholeheartedly agree that the Home Secretary should be obliged to consider whether the deprivation of citizenship is both a necessary and a proportionate response.

Ultimately, this debate will focus on the finer details of this clause, but we must also take a moment to consider whether the deprivation of citizenship is an appropriate response to alleged criminality or threats to security, given its considerable implications for international law. For this reason, I have put my name to the call made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to oppose the clause in its entirety.

Although I have previously stated that I am not one who understands the law to any measurable extent, I remain a concerned citizen. I am deeply troubled that this provision could allow for the citizenship of millions to be removed, with slim chances of appealing.

Let us not forget the judgment of Chief Justice Warren ruling in the United States Supreme Court case of Trop v Dulles in 1958. He said that,

“use of denationalization as a punishment”,

means,

“the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture”.

I hope that the Minister will take these comments to heart in replying to the Committee.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, if Clause 60 operates in accordance with the Government’s intentions, it is bound to increase statelessness in the world. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has already reminded the Committee of the words spoken by Hannah Arendt many years ago, that statelessness deprives people of the “right to have rights”. It brings about a bleak, hopeless status, or rather a complete lack of status, that the British Government should have no role in encouraging, first, because of the positively terminal impact that the imposition of statelessness is bound to have on the ability of the rightless to function in a way that is even remotely human in the modern world and, secondly, because it is clear that such an imposition as a policy measure can have no sensible part in a co-ordinated international effort to combat security threats. In fact, it appears to be the antithesis of such an effort, even in circumstances where it is precisely co-ordinated international effort that we need.

In fact, the unilateral imposition of statelessness is very likely to be directly unhelpful to those efforts because it carries with it the very real risk of breaching the United Kingdom’s international obligations to a country which has admitted a person on the strength of their lawful possession of a United Kingdom passport. Of course, such a country would absolutely have the right to return an individual directly to the United Kingdom, and what then? As the JCHR has observed, the United Kingdom would appear to have no absolute right under international law to require other states to accept its outcasts. In my view, therefore, this proposal is not only ugly in the sense identified so many years ago by Hannah Arendt; it not only associates the United Kingdom with a policy beloved of the world’s worst regimes during the 20th century; but it threatens illegal and procedural quagmire hardly compatible with the comity of nations, still less with solidarity between free countries in the face of terrorism.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, have a fundamental problem with this clause. It has been suggested that it was added late to the Bill and designed to overcome the Government’s defeat in Al-Jedda, which was decided by the Supreme Court just last October, but in fact Clause 60 goes substantially further than merely reversing that decision.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of Reprieve, an NGO campaigning against the death penalty and secret prisons around the world. It was involved in the Binyam Mohamed case. I start by acknowledging two things. First, the Bill is a significant improvement on the Green Paper that preceded it, and a very welcome improvement. Secondly, there may be a very limited category and number of civil cases in which closed proceedings may be necessary to ensure that justice can be done in circumstances where, if there were no closed proceedings, material critical to the fair resolution of an issue would be excluded from the court’s consideration. This, of course, could include fair resolution in favour of the claimant as well as in favour of the defendant. I would expect this to be a very small—exceedingly small—number of cases.

My question for the House is whether the Bill as currently drafted achieves an appropriate balance between delivering justice in that very small category of cases and the wider public interest in enjoying a justice system that is open and public. Will the Bill deliver that very small—exceedingly small—number of cases, or might it deliver rather more; indeed, too many? My view is that, despite the obvious improvements, there is still a way to go. I want to focus on two areas: public interest immunity and the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction.

Public interest immunity has served us very well over many years and judges are very experienced in the exercise of this jurisdiction. It enables a party to the proceedings to invite a judge to conclude that any given material, while relevant to an issue in the case, should be withheld from that case on public interest grounds. Naturally, those public interest grounds can include national security grounds. In conducting this exercise, the judge is required to balance the public interest in protecting sensitive material from disclosure against the private litigant’s legitimate interest in seeing material that may assist his case or undermine the case of his opponent.

I am not aware that it has ever credibly been suggested that judges in our courts are inclined to get this balance wrong. My own experience over many years, including during the five years that I served as Director of Public Prosecutions, is that our judges do not get this balance wrong, despite what American intelligence agencies may quite erroneously believe. Some aspects of the Bill appear to have been included because of what almost everybody accepts is a misapprehension on the part of a foreign intelligence agency.

At present, the Bill requires the Secretary of State merely to consider public interest immunity and presumably to reject it as a suitable mechanism before going on to apply for a close material procedure. This is not enough. I urge the Government to take the opportunity represented by this legislation to strengthen, rather than undermine, our PII jurisdiction. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights has said, it should be placed on a statutory footing to strengthen confidence and to increase clarity. Such a reform could include, among other things, the test to be applied when national security material is the subject of a PII application.

I also believe that it would strengthen the integrity of any CMP were it to be invoked only following a full PII process. In other words, the judge would be invited to rule, in accordance with traditional PII principles, that the relevant material sought to be withheld could properly be withheld on public interest grounds. Having made that ruling, the court would then go on to consider, again on conventional PII principles, the extent to which a redacted form of the material, or a summary, could safely be disclosed consistent with the public interest.

Finally, if at the conclusion of this conventional PII process a party wished to go on to apply that the court should go into closed session to hear any remaining material permitted to be withheld under PII, only then would the court be empowered to accede to that application to the extent that it felt a fair trial would be impossible in the absence of factoring that material into its consideration of the issues in the case.

The scheme would be: first, consider the relevance of the material to issues in the case—normal PII; secondly, consider the extent to which its disclosure might damage national security—normal PII; thirdly, consider the extent to which redaction or summary can cure the problem—normal PII; fourthly, in appropriate cases after that process, rule that the material may be withheld on grounds of public interest; and only then, fifthly, upon an application by one of the parties, rule that the material withheld can be considered by a court in closed session because, in the view of the court, a failure to do so would render the proceedings as a whole unfair. It would be a strong PII system as we understand it today, with the possibility in a small number of cases, once that process had been exhausted, for the court to go into closed session. Such a scheme would encourage a focus throughout the process on the important principles to be decided. It would very strongly discourage abuse or inappropriate, overhasty recourse to the CMP procedure, which is, I fear, a real danger under the current proposals.

I turn to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction and Clauses 13 and 14. These are far too widely drawn for the following reasons. Clause l3 relates to “sensitive material”. The listing of this category of material as deserving of special protection is an unfortunate throwback to the excesses of the Green Paper. Worse, whole swathes of material are deemed to warrant, without any further consideration, the tag of “sensitive”, so that they are automatically and absolutely excluded from disclosure. This includes any material emanating from the intelligence services in the widest sense.

Of course, some material emanating from the intelligence services, though certainly not all of it, may be “sensitive”, but that is the wrong test. It has been abandoned in the rest of the Bill and it should be absent from Clause 13. The test should be the extent to which a disclosure would be damaging to national security, as it is elsewhere. Even then, there should be no automatic carve-out. The power to withhold this material should be subject to a judge’s ruling on the merits, as it is in the case of an application for a CMP. It should be the same test.

Even worse, Clause 13(3)(e) allows the Secretary of State to specify that any other material may be excluded if its disclosure in his judgment could damage national security or damage the interests of our international relations. The exercise of this exceedingly broad executive power is reviewable by a judge, but not on its merits and only on JR principles; that is, the judge can reject the Secretary of State’s certification only if he finds its exercise to have been “irrational”. This test does not provide adequate supervision over such a sensitive exercise of ministerial power, undermining, as it must be, of important principles of open justice.

The Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction can sound a dry and technical subject, but, as my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill has pointed out, it exists in cases where a great deal may be at stake, including the very life of the complainant who may, for example, be residing in a foreign prison and potentially facing sentence of death, as was the case with a number of Guantanamo Bay inmates. As things stand, the courts will make a Norwich Pharmacal order only where the party against whom it is sought has become mixed up in wrongdoing and where the interests of justice require it. Are we now to say that, however mixed up in wrongdoing the party against whom disclosure is sought may have been, and however strongly the interests of justice may demand disclosure, the behaviour of the wrongdoer, if it is an intelligence agency, shall be afforded total and automatic protection in all third-party applications of this sort? I do not believe that we should say that and this proposal goes too far. It causes deep offence to conventional legal principles because it ousts the effective supervisory role of the court in a way that is almost calculated to lead to injustice, even on a heroic scale.

I accept that, in cases in which national security issues are genuinely engaged, some adjustment to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction may be appropriate, but the solution is emphatically not entirely to exclude certain bodies from its range. The solution may be, as I think the JCHR indicated, a presumption against disclosure in national security cases in the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction, overturnable by the judge if, in his or her view, serious injustice is likely to occur in the event of non-disclosure.

Even in the field of national security, I do not believe that it is in the broader public interest to move to a scheme where the interests of justice are entirely exiled from the equation so that they cease to exist as a check against the abuse of state power.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I associate myself with the comments of my noble friend Lord Dear and the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. Certain things can go wrong all too easily. DNA is not a straight yes/no; at the end of the day, if something is done in a laboratory, you are talking about an analogue match that is reduced to certain points. We have seen sometimes the misinterpretation of fingerprints. When a computer has reduced it to X points, it is not necessarily a true match. There have been miscarriages of justice as a result. People have refused to admit mistakes later because of the tendency of the system to try to cover up its mistakes for the greater good, in order not to discredit something that is widely accepted as evidence.

I am also worried that, if DNA exists and is associated with a case, you use it to try to prove some guilt. You do not know how it got there. I might have tried on a jersey in a department store and left a couple of hairs on it. It might later have been bought by someone else and the knife that went into the person might have carried one of my hairs inside the wound. With our DNA techniques, it could be deduced that I was the person who was at the place in question—you do not know

The trouble is that, because we have an adversarial system, we do not seek to find the truth in our courts; we see who has got the best lawyers to discredit the evidence on the other side. That can be dangerous sometimes with things such as DNA, which is fairly new. We have widely different quoted figures for what an exact match is and for the probability of a match that do not take into account laboratory accuracy. We need to think about exactly how accurate it really is. You also get criminal seeding of sites, which has been going on for a long time—taking ashtrays from pubs and leaving DNA evidence elsewhere to sow false things.

What worries me, finally, is what we saw happen with RIPA—that is, function creep. This will start off in the serious crime arena and then get extended, because it is an easy way to find who was where when or who handled what. We have to be very careful about making sure that that does not happen if we are going to retain DNA as evidence. That is why I approve of the Government’s stand and of what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said.

We seem to treat very lightly the fact that someone should be arrested. Actually, that goes on your record and it stays there even if you are never then prosecuted or a charge is not laid properly. The fact that you have been arrested will disbar you from all sorts of things. A simple example is the American visa waiver scheme. I am fairly certain that you cannot get a US visa waiver if you have been arrested. For some people, there is no smoke without fire. We have to be very careful before thinking that just an arrest is okay and that it is all forgotten in the wash—it is not.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, this is a difficult and sensitive issue, and I have great sympathy with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said a moment ago. When he was Attorney-General and I was Director of Public Prosecutions, we often saw the result of DNA evidence in successful prosecutions. Nobody for one moment would underestimate, in spite of what has been said recently, the importance and the potency of that evidence, particularly in cold-case reviews.

Nevertheless, I am driven to support the Government’s position on this amendment, largely because of the sentiment that was expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. The rational and honest conclusion of the previous Government’s policy was a national DNA database. The policy was discriminatory in a sense that has not been addressed so far in this debate. Everybody knows that more young black men than young white men are arrested on the streets of our cities by proportion of population, and therefore more are swabbed. Therefore, a database that was growing as that one was, uncontrolled by any process of anti-discrimination, was inherently dangerous.

The safe process, if the Government had wanted to go down that road, as was once explained very eloquently by Lord Justice Sedley on the “Today” programme, was to institute a national DNA database. That was the logical and only fair extension of the previous Government’s policy. I cannot support the concept of a national DNA database. It seems an inherently totalitarian concept. The idea that newborn babies would be separated from their mothers in our hospitals to be swabbed before being returned for suckling, or however the process is conducted, seems deeply totalitarian and unacceptable.

The Scots have got it about right. These are questions of balance. Of course the position of victims is critical, but we also have to develop a system which achieves a balance between justice for victims and justice for defendants in a free society in which the Government play an appropriate and not overly intrusive role in people’s lives.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, on this occasion I have not actually been tempted. I had hoped to come in anyway, although I was a little late getting here, and I apologise for that. I would like to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, that I much appreciate the remarks she has just made. I well remember the experience we had together and the hugely valuable contribution that she made to that committee. I can also say that I share her views on absolutely everything that she has said, so I will not speak at great length. I agree also with what I have heard since I came into the Chamber. The Minister ought to know—if he was in any doubt—that there was not complete unanimity on this point on the Benches immediately behind him, even though the voices so far have come from elsewhere.

The arguments adduced on the previous occasion in Committee to which the noble Baroness has referred were, frankly, unbelievably thin. I do not blame the Minister for that—I suspect that they are inherently thin, and unless they are a lot thicker this evening then I will find myself in some difficulty, and he needs to know that.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I support these amendments. I declare an interest as the independent reviewer of the counterterrorism review. I should also like to pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for the many hours that he has devoted to these issues over the years.

Why should it be the court rather than the Home Secretary? In my brief analysis, there are four reasons. First, on any analysis, the measures in this Bill are an exception to our normal rule-of-law principles for reasons set out very clearly by my noble friend Lord Goodhart. Secondly, they constitute a very serious potential stigmatisation of those subjected to them: a declaration of belief on the part of the state that the individual is involved in acts of terrorism. In my estimation it can hardly get much worse. Of course, the orders are anonymised, but family, friends and no doubt, the wider community, quickly become aware of the fact. Thirdly, our courts are very well used to adjudicating issues of national security, and they do it time and time again—for example, every time a question of public interest immunity arises, and in many other situations too. I am not aware of any credible argument that they do so incompetently. They may of course embarrass the Government and one or more of the agencies from time to time, but that is an entirely different point. Fourthly, and finally, our courts are independent, and they therefore bring the vigour of their independence to their decision making. In this area, that becomes a question of important public confidence.

My analysis is that it is the exceptionality of these measures, their severity, and the damage that they may do to their subject—who after all has heard no more than the gist of the case against him, quite exceptionally—that demands that they should be orders of the court rather than punitive and potentially damning directions of the Home Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I also support the Government’s position on these amendments. The counterterrorism review gathered a great deal of evidence about relocation, as well as other measures applicable under the control order regime. The evidence was considered extremely carefully, as far as I could see. After all, the review was conducted by no less a division of the Home Office than the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, which is to be found in the deepest bowels of that department of state. Its conclusion, which I thought was certainly in accordance with the evidence, was that relocation was disproportionate and unnecessary in the face of other measures available under the TPIM legislation and particularly in the light of the Government’s decision to increase the amount of funding for surveillance, which after all is the main technique used by countries like us around the world to deal with these sorts of issues. I agreed with the conclusions of the counterterrorism review, as I thought that they were clearly in line with the evidence, of which there is a great deal. I am sure that the Government’s position on these amendments is the right one.

[The Archbishop of York]

I, too, as someone who supported the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in his amendment, believe that it is the duty of the Home Secretary to make the application to the judge and the judge to determine. To bring back relocation would make the case worse—not because we lost the last Vote, but I generally feel that on this particular bit of the Bill the Government have got it right. So I hope that we do not have to go through the Lobby Doors again but that the amendment will be withdrawn. Nothing will cause me greater difficulty in my understanding of British justice than bringing back relocation. That actually causes more difficulty in our communities than anything else. If there is going to be relocation, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, should in his amendment have said that it should be done on the orders of a judge and not the Secretary of State.

I go with the Government on this, as I think they have got it right. Of course, we lost the last and most important amendment, but there we are.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I support the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It covers the same ground as my amendment, which would have amended Clause 6 by substituting civil standards of proof for “obviously flawed”. I agree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said.

The great advantage of the balance of probabilities as a test is that it is flexible. At the more serious end, it approaches the criminal standard. There could hardly be a more serious finding to make against an individual, as has been said often today, than that he has been engaged in terrorist activity. Therefore, the burden of proof in these cases ought to approach the criminal standard. There is not the slightest justification for a burden of proof which is less than the civil standard.

With one exception there is no precedent that I can find in English law for a serious finding, such as is involved here, being made on the basis of reasonable belief. In the earlier debate I referred to many instances of prevention orders being made by the civil courts, some in serious cases such as sexual harm and so on, and in every case the burden of proof has been the balance of probabilities, and so it should be here.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, Clause 4 of the Bill indicates that the finding which will be made in relation to a TPIM is that an individual has been involved in,

“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”;

or in,

“conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so”;

or in,

“conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or is intended to do so”;

or in,

“conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in”,

such conduct.

This is a very grave finding. As I suggested earlier, it is a finding which justifies a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities rather than reasonable belief. I support the amendment for the reasons that have already been set out.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. It was always a great source of regret and sorrow to me that during Labour’s years in government we saw an erosion of the standards of proof on many different fronts. I remember getting support from the Conservative Benches and agreement that erosions of the standard of proof were taking place. Therefore, this rather strange volte-face by the coalition Government has come as a surprise to me. I want the Government to think again about this erosion of the standard of proof. As noble Lords who have already spoken have said, the consequences are serious. This House should not contemplate having anything less than the balance of probabilities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I support the amendment for reasons already advanced. For my part, I have no desire at all to see this sort of scheme become a normal and conventional part of our legal arrangements; it is not, for all the reasons that noble Lords have repeatedly advanced this afternoon. It is an exceptional scheme, and it is important that it continues to be seen as such. The amendment lays it bare; it mandates appropriate and continuing scrutiny, engaging the regular attention of this House and providing reassurance that these measures will not continue for a moment longer than they are required or necessary. A strong part of providing that reassurance will be annual scrutiny by this House of the continued necessity for such a scheme as is undoubtedly going to pass into law.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. I am not going to take up the time of the House, because I think that the arguments are simple. It is about the exceptional nature of this shift, which requires us to keep it under scrutiny. I remember having conversations with colleagues when we were discussing control orders, and hearing repeated over and over again in this House how important it was that liberty is maintained and that requires eternal vigilance. That is why when you depart from the norms that are in our system you have to have them under review as often as yearly.

I know that the Minister speaks passionately about liberty—I have heard him do so. I remind him that that vigilance requires that we keep this constantly in front of us, and I think that once a year is not asking too much.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, some of us are even closer to the crossfire.

I start with a question which perhaps picks up where my noble friend Lord Carlile left off. It concerns the time limit on the measures. I had intended to ask it later under some amendments which I have down, but I shall ask it now. I found it quite hard to follow the Bill at the points where it begins to refer to revival, revocation, expiry, and so on. I needed a flow chart to understand just what was available in terms of imposition of measures. Are there any circumstances in which an individual can be subject to a TPIM or a series of TPIMs lasting more than two years, and, if there is one episode of new terrorism-related activity, which is defined, how long in all can a series of TPIMs last?

I should make it clear that I very much support the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and supported by others. I also support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On his Amendments 42 and 43, he quoted the conclusion today of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the issue of a full merits review. It is perhaps worth reading into the record as part of this debate the comments that the committee made in leading up to that conclusion. It said that the Government in replying to its previous report had argued that,

“there is no reason to doubt that courts will continue to apply intense scrutiny in TPIMs cases, as they have in control order cases, and that ‘continued reliance on case law’ is the best way to deliver that intense scrutiny”.

That became part of the conclusion. It seems to me that that does not amount to an argument for the principles of judicial review and that intense scrutiny is not excluded by the approach which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has advocated and which I support. I have checked the Government’s response to the previous report by the JCHR. Nothing significant has been left out of the paragraph that I have just quoted.

On the “balance of probabilities”, I added my name to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Can the Minister explain why under Clause 26, which introduces “enhanced” TPIMs, there is a higher standard of proof than for standard TPIMs? The same applies to the Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill which is to have pre-legislative scrutiny. The memorandum from the Home Office to the JCHR regarding the draft Bill with the enhanced TPIMs, which, in particular, would provide for relocation, said that the higher test is because of the more stringent measures allowed by the draft Bill. Clearly it would apply the same argument to Clause 26. So called standard TPIMs are fairly stringent but, even apart from that, I do not follow the logic. The standard of proof as to the facts which permit a step to be taken is a different matter from the steps which are available. I regard those as closely related but logically separate issues. I am lost as to why the higher standard of proof, which, as my noble friend Lord Carlile has encouraged the House to think, would not be a risk to the Government in this context, cannot be applied.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I support the amendments. I can do so relatively briefly because I can quite easily and simply adopt many of the arguments that have been made.

Terrorism is the gravest and most dangerous kind of crime and TPIMs are a properly grave response to that threat. A consideration of what the imposition of a TPIM represents gives some clue as to what the correct process should be. The imposition of a TPIM represents a public finding that an individual is involved in acts of terrorism. Of course, the individual’s name is not publicised, but surely his friends and his wider community are aware of it. It is a grave step and a grave potential stigmatising of an individual with an association with the gravest kind of crime. It is in those circumstances that one is driven to the conclusion that, if a TPIM is to be imposed, it should be imposed not by a member of the Executive but rather by a court. It is in those circumstances that I support the amendments to that effect.

I have not yet heard an argument why it is better for these measures to be imposed by a member of the Executive. I have heard arguments from my noble and learned friend, whose advocacy I have heard many times in courts up and down the land and which never ceases to impress me, as to why it is not necessarily constitutionally inappropriate but not as to why it is positively better than the alternative. The argument that has been made by a number of my noble friends and other noble Lords is that, given what a TPIM represents and the gravity of the measure, if it can be done by a court it should be done by a court unless there is a very good reason why it should not. I have heard no such reason.

The same applies to the burden of proof. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: the balance of probabilities is a test which is tailor made, perfectly made, for the process which the court needs to go through in this situation. It is not the criminal standard of proof because these are, in essence, civil penalties, but a civil standard of proof which, as he said, is flexible, realistic, well understood by the judiciary and does justice in civil cases up and down the land, including in other civil preventive measures.

Again, I do not understand what the argument against this is. If it is that it should be easier to impose a TPIM—that we cannot trust a judge to come to a safe conclusion about whether something is more likely than not—that is a false argument. It is, if you like, a somewhat cowardly argument. We can trust the judges to apply a balance of probabilities test in TPIMs in a way that is both just and entirely capable of protecting the public.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I, too, support the Government and I am very much with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. If my noble friend Lord Carlile succeeds in getting answers to his questions about evidence, I shall consider that there is a huge amount of favouritism going on. That is exactly the sort of thing that we have all asked for on many occasions, but inevitably we are not satisfied because we know that advice to the Government is advice to the Government, and we cannot read their heart as we are being asked to do.

I do not quite understand the distinction between politics and security. For all the reasons we have talked about and will continue to talk about, it is a much more nuanced and complicated—there is probably a geometric term for it that I do not know—picture than a simple polarisation as regards the impact of particular measures. Of course surveillance is going to be costly, but another balance that one must come to is where one puts one’s efforts and spends one’s money.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I, too, support the Government on this issue. It does not surprise me at all that if the Government presently have a power, they will seek to use it, and it does not surprise me at all that if the security services presently have a power, they will seek to retain it. But the question is, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said: what is a fair balance? Noble Lords will know that the counterterrorism review considered these issues very anxiously and received a great deal of evidence. It came to the conclusion that public safety could be protected in the absence of the power of relocation but in the presence of additional surveillance, for which funding was indicated, and with the sort of measures that have now been brought forward in the TPIM Bill. That was the considered conclusion of the review and appears to be the conclusion of the Government. I must say, having scrutinised the evidence which was supplied to the counterterrorism review, it was also my conclusion. I therefore support the Government on this question.

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, having acknowledged on a number of occasions recently my capacity to fall to temptation whenever I am in the Chamber and make some remarks, I am even more tempted on this occasion because I am able to make a remark that, for most of the past six months, my noble friends on the Front Bench thought they would never hear: I support the Government.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 5th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, while like other noble Lords I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Henley, to his new role and send my best wishes to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, I also declare an interest as independent overseer of the Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers. That review was intended, of course, by the Government to achieve a rebalancing between security and freedom where that rebalancing could be achieved in a manner that was consistent with public safety. In many respects, as I suggested to the House upon its publication, I believe the review succeeded in that aim. If its recommendations are implemented, I believe we shall indeed achieve a better balance.

Among the more controversial and pressing topics considered by the review was the question of control orders. It is very well known that these instruments came about not as a result of a predetermined, purposive government policy, but rather in reaction to a number of adverse court decisions outlawing the then Government’s attempts to intern without trial in Belmarsh aliens who were thought to present a risk to national security. The Judicial Committee of this House was unequivocal in ruling this policy to be disproportionate and discriminatory. In relating this I do not seek to underestimate in any way the dilemmas that have faced successive Governments in security matters. I saw many of them very starkly during the five years that I was DPP.

The Government’s response to the Belmarsh case was to create the control order regime. This applied to Britons as well as foreigners, so that it was no longer discriminatory. It fell short of inflicting full imprisonment without charge, prosecution or conviction, contenting itself instead with varying forms of house arrest and other restrictions on travel and association, and bans on the use of communications equipment, such as phones and computers.

Nevertheless, the scheme remained highly controversial, and this was for a number of reasons. First, the regime appeared to permit the state to order sanctions that looked explicitly penal but in the absence of any criminal due process and certainly without any trial ever having taken place. Secondly, these apparently penal sanctions could be imposed without the controlee and his lawyers knowing any more than the gist of the evidence relied upon by the state, and this evidence could be presented in their absence to the court. This seemed obviously and crudely to offend against traditional British norms of justice, precious to so many citizens of the United Kingdom. Thirdly, it was by no means apparent that control orders were actually in any sense entirely protective of the public. Many controlees simply absconded and only one, I think, was ever prosecuted with a substantive terrorist offence. In circumstances where it had apparently been the belief of successive Home Secretaries that all these men were engaged in serious terrorist activity, this omission seemed to represent a grave and continuing failure of public policy. Put simply, if the Home Secretaries were right, as I am sure they were, terrorists were routinely and scandalously escaping justice.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

The main reason people could abscond during control orders was not as a result of what the Home Secretaries wanted, which was 24-hour-a-day confinement; it was that, under the Human Rights Act and European Convention on Human Rights, the Home Secretaries were not allowed to authorise such confinement, but had to leave people eight hours to go about their normal business, whatever that was. That was an open invitation to undermine the very essence of the confinement under control and surveillance that was the essential requirement for control orders. It may be right or it may be wrong, but it was the main factor that allowed those under control orders to abscond.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

I entirely accept what the noble Lord says, and I am sure he is right about that. Of course, if the controlees had been confined for 24 hours in Belmarsh or even in their homes, it would have been far more difficult for them to abscond, but the control order system that we had existed largely as a result of decisions made by the courts. My point is that this control order system, as it came to be, may not in a serious sense have been protective of the public because it was so easy to abscond and because so many controlees did just that. My more substantial point is that I think that only one was ever prosecuted with a substantive terrorist offence so if the Home Secretaries were right that these people had been involved in terrorist activity, that would appear to be a failure of public policy in that terrorists in those circumstances were escaping justice.

My view is that, given the nature of the control order regime, this was not surprising. One clear finding of the review, accepted by all sides so far as I could tell, was that the control order regime was inimical to prosecution. That resulted from the reality of control orders, which amounted to the warehousing of suspects under the aegis of the Security Service and the consequent destruction of the normal routes and possibilities of evidence gathering. This was not the intention of the control order regime but it was one of its effects, and it was absolutely clear to me from material that I examined during the review that the process of building prosecutions against controlees was weak and had low priority. In fact, it almost never occurred.

For very understandable reasons, when a man was put under a control order the police would simply move on to other cases, satisfied that that individual was adequately quarantined under watchful eyes. That low prioritisation of prosecutions will always be evident so long as the system of restrictions is positioned outside criminal justice. If I am right about that—I shall expand a little in a moment—it means that to situate TPIMs outside criminal justice is not only possibly offensive to principle; it is also, finally, offensive to public safety because it lets people get away with terrorism and escape justice.

Let me say straight away that TPIMs appear to represent an improvement on what went before. The most offensive features of the previous regime from my perspective—those closest to house arrest—have gone. Relocation and long curfews will be a thing of the past. Individuals will be permitted to use electronic communications, including computers and phones, and the orders themselves will be time-limited to two years. Yet in my view the Government have failed to grapple with the central issue: the nature of the orders themselves and the appropriate space for them to occupy within our constitutional arrangements. In my report on the review, presented to Parliament alongside the review, I called for TPIMs to be attached quite explicitly to criminal investigations. That would facilitate the prosecution of serious criminals and deal with the constitutional objections that have bedevilled control orders and will, I am sure, continue to bedevil TPIMs. This stance has since been supported by the JCHR and noted by the Constitution Committee of this House. It deserves more serious consideration than the Government have so far shown it.

I understand that it will not always suit the Security Service, for which I have the greatest respect, to have law enforcement authorities crawling all over suspects under its control. That no doubt explains in part the strong support that the Security Service has given to the control order regime but it is nothing to the point. The public interest is not always and inevitably to be equated with the policy of the Security Service. Sometimes, Governments need to stand back. It is patently absurd that individuals certified by the most senior figures in government to be active terrorists are not constantly and relentlessly under criminal investigation. I do not accept for one moment that because the material against an individual is presently inadmissible for one reason or another—many identified by my noble friend Lord Howard—the investigation should stop. On the contrary, it should be redoubled and have TPIM conditions attached to it for its duration. Let there be relentless investigation into people who are suspected of terrorist activity but let it be criminal investigation and let TPIMs be tied to that investigation—to facilitate and assist it so that no opportunity is lost to bring violent extremists to justice—in a manner consistent with our rule of law.

[Lord Howard of Lympne]

What would happen under the regime that my noble friend is suggesting if the police and prosecuting authorities came to the conclusion that there was simply no evidence that would justify the continuation of the criminal investigation? Under his proposals, would that mean that the restrictions currently under discussion would inevitably fall?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

If my noble friend does not mind my saying so, I am not sure that the example that he posits is one that I recollect from my period as DPP. Let us imagine the situation that would exist here: presumably the police or the Security Service would have in their possession something like an intercept that could not be used—for example, a suspect having a conversation with another individual about a plan to place a bomb on the Tube. With respect, that is not the end of an investigation; it is the beginning of one. The investigation that then takes place is into that individual, into the plan as described in the phone call, into the individual he has spoken to and into the associates of all.

The noble Lord will know from his time as Home Secretary that the sorts of powers and abilities that the law enforcement authorities in this country have, which we will not go into here, are considerable and significant. I do not recognise a situation in which a law enforcement investigation stops simply because the deeply incriminating material that you have until that time is the only material that you have and you do not anticipate discovering more.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

But my noble friend Lord Howard did not suggest that. Does not my noble friend Lord Macdonald, from his distinguished period of service as Director of Public Prosecutions, not recollect that cases were brought to him in which at that time there was no further prospect of a successful investigation? That is the question that my noble friend Lord Howard is asking. If that is the case, perhaps my noble friend Lord Macdonald would just tell us that the consequence of his view is that, if a TPIM exists after that time, it should cease.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

Of course one recognises that if an investigation, using all the powers available to the investigating authorities, has continued for a period of time and turned up nothing, under this scheme the TPIM will come to an end—but TPIMs are intended to be time-limited in any event. Under the terms of the Bill, TPIMs will come to an end after two years, so we are not talking about an open-ended system of restrictions. My point is that a system of restrictions applied to criminal investigations is not only more likely to be constitutional and develop broader public support than the system that is currently proposed, but such a system would have attached to it conditions that actively encourage and assist investigation.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

The noble Lord talked about broader public support, but what evidence does he have of major public concern about the use of control orders? Is there not in fact a great deal of public confidence in them because they protect our security?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

If the noble Lord does not mind my saying so, that is a somewhat complacent view. There is wide public concern. Obviously there are different views around the country and in different communities, but it would be complacent for the noble Lord to come to the conclusion that there is and has been no broader public concern about control orders.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

Would the noble Lord give us one piece of evidence to substantiate that?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

The level of public debate and discussion is pretty clear evidence. The review itself contains evidence of public meetings and discussions with people who are concerned about the control order regime. I caution noble Lords from the view that there is no concern in the country outside these Houses about these arrangements; I believe that there is.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

May I help the noble Lord? I was a Member of Parliament for 23 years. I held a surgery at least once a month and sometimes four times a month. I never had one person come to me and make representations for or against a control order. There is published concern and there are certainly lobby groups, but public concern is entirely different. All the evidence is that the public feel reasonably comfortable with this system as a matter of ensuring their security.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

I respect the noble Lord’s experience. I am sure from my own experience, conversations and discussions with many people in different parts of the country and different communities when I was DPP that there is and was concern about the control order regime, as there was concern about the pre-charge detention regime. Frankly, noble Lords delude themselves if they seriously suggest that there was no broader concern about measures of this sort; I am sure that there was. Maybe we will not agree about this but, with great respect to noble Lords, I find that view somewhat complacent.

When this subject is debated, everybody agrees that the most important result of any investigation into terrorism is prosecution. If one is considering protecting the public, they are best protected by people being sent to prison for long terms. This is something that we became and are extremely good at in this jurisdiction. We have extremely skilled and able specialist counterterrorism police and prosecutors, and an outstanding record of putting people in prison.

[Lord Gilbert]

We all speak from our own experience; the noble Lord moves in his circles and I moved in mine. I have similar experience to my noble friend Lord Reid, having represented a Labour constituency for 27 years. The attitude there was one of concern over control orders; the noble Lord is absolutely right. The attitude was that they should be tightened up: “Lock them up and throw the key away”.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

The noble Lord has his experience and I am grateful to him for sharing it with us. I find it very helpful and thank him. Most of the people I spoke to during those years wanted to see these men and women in prison for long terms. That is the answer and the way to protect the public. Find the evidence, prosecute these people and lock them up. The gravest disadvantage of the control order regime was that it presented an obstacle to that in the cases of those individuals who were subject to control orders. That is the purpose of a scheme that would link restrictions to criminal investigations that are more likely to result in criminal prosecutions and convictions.

Sex Offenders Register

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Thursday 17th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the Government do not accept that the procedure being proposed is fatuous. Police officers concerned have a much better idea than many others about the nature of the conduct of the defendant, both in prison and later, and they are appropriate people to take a view on this. Moreover, they will do so in consultation with other agencies, as the MAPPA process, in which other specialists will be involved, will be taken into account.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

Does the Minister acknowledge that there is great disappointment on these Benches too at the tone of the Home Secretary’s Statement and that we had hoped that that sort of language had been left behind by the coalition Government. Can she explain how the Prime Minister’s statement in connection with the same case, that the Government would do the “minimum necessary” to comply with a judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, was calculated to encourage respect for the rule of law?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I think that the Government should be judged by their actions. In this instance, they have put forward a reasonable, proportionate and effective proposal to meet the judgment of the court.

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in Force of Sections 1 to 9) Order 2011

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the independent overseer of the review of counterterrorism and security powers. Like the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recently published report, I strongly welcome the Government’s conclusion that the current control order regime can and should be repealed, consistent with public safety. It is obviously essential that it is replaced with something that is very different in character and not simply a pale imitation. We shall have to look closely at the legislation that comes forward to ensure that that is not what the Government have in mind. The review has clearly shown that the present regime is inefficient, grants excessive power to the Government, and undermines traditional British norms and respect for the rule of law. This may not be surprising. It was introduced by accident, following a series of court judgments adverse to the last Government. It has been a bad mistake.

I also strongly welcome the Government’s renewed and strengthened commitment, expressed in their response to the review, to the absolute priority of criminal prosecution. Where people are involved in terrorism they must be detected with all the considerable power at the disposal of the state, then prosecuted and locked up. It is not just public confidence that demands this but also our traditional common-law attachment to the supremacy of due process in criminal justice and our courts. The fact is that the evidence gathered by the review has made it clear that the present control order regime acts as a fundamental impediment to prosecution. This is because the restrictions placed upon controlees forbid the very contact and activity that, under proper surveillance and investigation, lead to evidence fit for prosecution. It is also because far too many controlees are simply warehoused under the supervision of the security services, beyond the scrutiny of criminal investigation, and therefore beyond any real possibility of prosecution.

For good reasons, the instincts of the security services are protective rather than prosecutorial in nature but this practice, and the Security Service’s primacy within it, means that some serious terrorist activity remains completely unpunished by criminal law. This is a serious and continuing failure of public policy. Any new scheme introduced by the Government must not replicate this failure. To give reality to the primacy of prosecution, which is the Government’s stated aim, it should clearly become an intrinsic part of any new regime that restrictions placed upon individuals should be linked to a continuing criminal investigation. After all, if the Home Secretary, under the new regime, is to go to the High Court to assert her belief that an individual is involved in acts of terrorism so that she may obtain an order placing restrictions upon that person, it would be quite absurd for there to be no active criminal investigation into the individual in question attendant upon the Home Secretary’s application. Yet that is the position that we are in at the moment.

Of course, if there were always such an investigation in progress, court-approved restrictions mandated for the duration of that investigation, up to a maximum period of two years, would become much more constitutionally acceptable—a form of pre-charge bail. I have no doubt that such a reform would garner broad support for the Government’s new regime, including among those most bitterly critical of the current arrangements. This reform would encourage evidence gathering and therefore increase the likelihood of prosecution. It would bring the new regime much closer to criminal justice, which is an obvious good in itself with all the protections that criminal justice implies for suspects. The Government should urgently reconsider their preliminary view on this issue which, frankly, has been hostile.

Again frankly, any Security Service opposition to intense police activity around controlees should not be a trump card. The public interest is wider than the instincts of the Security Service. In fact, the trump card should always be found in locking up those people who want to wreak violence upon our communities and putting them in prison cells for long, long years. This is the true deterrent and it is also the process that truly protects the public in a way that control orders never have.

There is a separate issue. A further conclusion of the review was that relocation—the practice under which people were forced to move to other parts of the country away from home, family and friends—should be abolished, and that long curfews should go. These were among the most bitterly resented aspects of the old regime and for good reason. They were also the most offensive to our traditional norms, imposed as they were without prosecution let alone conviction, and without the controlees being told any more than the mere gist of the allegations against them. Whoever would have thought that in Britain we would have a form of internal exile without prosecution or conviction?

The Government have now agreed that these provisions are excessive, disproportionate and, unnecessary—and I would add offensive. We do not need them, as the Government have now determined. They intend to abolish relocation and long curfews under their new regime. In those circumstances, they should do so now. How can it be right for this House to be invited to extend powers that the Government themselves have conceded are wrong in principle and excessive in practice, particularly when those powers impact so vividly upon civil liberties? I invite my noble friend to consider a way to proceed that does not include renewal of these quite excessive and, as we now know, unnecessary intrusions. Those subjected to them should not have to labour under these oppressive measures any longer. There can be no conceivable public interest in obliging them to do so when the measures themselves are serving no useful purpose.

Finally, it will be critical for this House and the other place to examine with great care the legislative proposals that come forward. It is always tempting for the bad old stuff to slip back into a piece of draft legislation. We must not end up in the position of approving a system later this year or early next year which is a form, as some people have put it, of “control order light”. We need real reform in this area. If there are to be restrictions, they must be coterminous with criminal investigation. There must be no restrictions which destroy the ability of the state to obtain evidence against people who might have been involved in terrorism, which is precisely the effect of the present regime. It has failed and must stop.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I will be brief. First, I suspect I am one of few people in the House who has been involved in some of these cases in the courts. I have seen them at close quarters.

Many noble Lords will also remember that I was one of those on the Labour Benches who strongly opposed the Labour Government introducing control orders. I opposed them then and ever since. I welcomed the fact that noble Lords on the other side of the House, whose faces are familiar, all went through the Lobbies with me opposing control orders. Now they are sitting in government and I want to remind them of the principled stand that they all took on control orders. It is easy, once in government, to hear poured into their ears the position taken by the security services that somehow this is the only way forward. With regard to the issue of dealing with persons suspected of links with terrorism where it would be difficult to bring them to trial, I have always advocated that surveillance, the use of intercept and so on can be done, but without interfering with liberty in the excessive way that control orders have meant. I am saddened and disappointed that the siren voices of the security services have persuaded the Government that something not very different from control orders should be the way forward. I am sure that I will be one of the people who take part in the debates when the legislation is presented to this House, and I will rigorously test some of the suggestions that have been made.

I strongly support what has been said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald: given the principled position that the Government are going to do away with control orders, and even if the position is that something else will come in of a lesser order but somewhat similar, it is quite wrong at this moment to keep the thing that they have criticised for so long with regard to the eight people currently subject to the level of suspicion that we have heard about. It cannot be right to continue that until the end of this year. At the very least, the Government should be reducing the constraints upon liberty to the standard that they are intending to introduce, and then that can be revisited in December. However, it cannot be right for them to continue with control orders when they so bitterly opposed their existence once they had been introduced by new Labour in government. I ask that, in the spirit not just of decency but of appropriateness, the cases that we have spoken about and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, mentioned be revisited.

I reiterate what my noble friend Lord Judd has said: one of the jewels in our crown, one of the great limbs of our democracy, is the way in which we interpret the rule of law. I am a proud champion of the common law. We have always believed that due process was vital before we in any way encroached upon the liberty of human beings. That is a proud tradition here and it is a sort of ceding to the terrorists if you abandon those values, which are so precious in our society. I strongly urge that we do not go down the road of introducing something similar, because it is a poison in the system. It is a way of saying that it was not just a temporary measure; somehow we have bought into this idea, and an alternative to the things that we have always believed in can now be introduced. I urge that we think again about that.

I was interested to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said that there are alternatives, and I hope that in the months to come the Government will look again at what they are intending to do.

Sex Offenders Register

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Lord made his point several ways round. The Government are acting in conformity with the principle that they must be in conformity with the law, which is why they have brought in this amendment to the law. We perfectly well recognise that the courts interpret the law and are acting on that principle.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

Will my noble friend acknowledge that there is great disappointment on these Benches, too, at the tone of this Statement? Some of us had hoped that the days when these sorts of Statements would be made about the judges and the courts had gone with the new Government, and are very disappointed to see that, perhaps, they have not. Why do the Government appear to believe that, with regard to appeals against the inclusion on the sex register, the police are better placed to do justice than the Queen’s courts?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I think that I explained in response to an earlier question that it is very hard to judge the merits with these particular offences, particularly in relation to expectation about future conduct. Therefore, we feel that those closest to the individuals or offenders concerned, who have been monitoring their conduct, are best placed to take an informed view and come to an informed decision about the balance that needs to be struck thereafter between the freedoms that can be accorded to the individual and the rights of the public to safety. This is a very practical view of how to come to the best decision possible.