(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThe Opposition accept the independence of the Bank of England, unlike some Government Members, but frankly that was a fairly shameless attempt by the hon. Member to distance herself from what the Government did to the economy last year in their disastrous mini-Budget. The British people will not forget, as they are still paying the price.
My hon. Friend is making some important points. Does he agree that, if it is the decisions of the Bank of England that have halved inflation, as the Opposition think, the Government cannot go around claiming credit for it?
As always, my right hon. Friend makes an important point. The Government are trying to have it both ways. When inflation goes up, it is someone else’s fault. When it comes down, they claim the credit. I think that we can trust the British people to see through whatever way they try to distort the truth.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve in Committee with you as Chair, Mr Stringer.
The acquisition of certain properties by registered social landlords is exempt from stamp duty, provided that the purchase is funded with the assistance of public subsidy. As the Minister set out, in December last year the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities announced an additional £500 million in funding for local authorities to secure additional housing stock for those fleeing conflict, including those from Ukraine and Afghanistan. We understand that that additional funding was allocated under section 31 of the Local Government Act, and the clause will add that section to the list of public subsidies that enable a purchase to qualify for the stamp duty exemption. For the purposes of the stamp duty exemption, we understand that local authorities that intend to register with the Regulator of Social Housing are treated as not-for-profit registered providers of social housing.
The explanatory notes state that £500 million was announced for the local authority housing fund in December 2022, and I welcome the Minister’s assurance that the additional £250 million announced since will also be covered by this clause. We will not oppose the clause, as any support it offers to local authorities that buy homes to provide social housing is welcome.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. This is not the first time that I have been on a Committee with you in the Chair.
Will the Minister give a view about how many extra homes this change to stamp duty land tax will enable local authorities to fund? Has any analysis been done? There will obviously be a positive effect, but how large will it be? Many Afghans are still in hotels and are unable to put down roots so that they can begin to establish themselves in this country and flourish. For large families living in hotels, this is a difficult time, so I would have thought that Members from both sides of the House are anxious to see this scheme work. Knowing the Treasury, it will have done some analysis of the positive benefit of the proposal, so will the Minister share it with the Committee?
How long does the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities expect these extra moneys to last? Will the Minister come back to Parliament to extend this exemption further, or will that happen in a spending review?
As we have heard, the clause introduces rules for VAT accounting for deposit return schemes. As the Minister set out, it means that when making sales within the scope of the relevant deposit scheme, no VAT will be charged in relation to the deposit amount. However, VAT on unreturned deposit amounts will be paid by the first seller of a deposit scheme product.
We recognise that, under existing legislation, deposit return schemes may be introduced across the UK, and we recognise that the clause helps to facilitate the operation of such schemes by introducing VAT accounting rules. The clause ensures that no VAT will be charged at any point in the supply chain in relation to the deposit element of the price for a deposit scheme product. There will only be a requirement to account for VAT where suppliers make the first sale of standard-rated deposit scheme products that include a deposit amount.
More widely, we have been disappointed by the delays in the introduction of a deposit return scheme. It was only after multiple consultations that the Government finally announced in January 2023 that they would introduce a deposit return scheme for plastic and cans, but not for glass, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland from 2025. We will not oppose the clause. Indeed, we want to see a deposit return scheme introduced as soon as possible, so I would be grateful if the Minister could use this opportunity to confirm whether the Government are still committed to introducing one in England, Wales and Northern Ireland by 2025.
Obviously, the VAT rules account for some of the most complex parts of the duties and excise that the Minister has to wrestle with on a day-to-day basis. When one talks to businesses of all sizes, often one of the biggest complaints is about the complexity of the VAT rules. Given how much revenue VAT brings in and how all-encompassing it is, perhaps that is not surprising, but I wonder whether the Minister is happy with increased complexity that the changes bring. Perhaps she could give us a flavour of her thoughts and considerations in dealing with the issue of deposit schemes and the complexity of the VAT rules.
Given that VAT will be levied only on the first seller, the Minister has clearly tried to make the rules as simple as possible. But how much complexity does she think the clause will introduce, given that it will be applicable to plastic and cans—presumably aluminium—both of which are easily recyclable, but not to glass? I assume that she is not introducing glass straight away because of the sheer number of glass bottles and the size of the task. Again, perhaps she could give us a flavour of the thinking behind excluding glass, and tell us whether the intention is to include it at a later stage. How complex does she think doing that might be?
I am old enough, as I am sure—I am going to put this politely—you are, Mr Stringer, to remember when we had deposit return schemes for glass, long before anyone thought about digitally scanning anything or any of the computer-based structures that I assume will facilitate the VAT inspectors’ task. Perhaps the Minister could give us some indication of that. Again, how much revenue does she think will have to be forgone?
What assumptions have His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the tax inspectors made about the actual cost of schemes such as this in revenue forgone? Clearly, the idea—to incentivise good behaviour that will assist in increasing recycling—is one we would all support. We all want that to work, but if it is not done properly, it could be an enormous fiddling thing that does not really have much effect at all. All of us would applaud the decision not to impact the customer and, clearly, we want to see the containers for recycling brought back.
Can the Minister say a little about whether she has considered how the scheme might interact with the packaging regulations? Again, they are a moveable feast, given that we have left the EU and they have had to be changed as well, but there is clearly a direct connection between the two. We must make certain that the way the packaging regulations work increases, if possible, the incentive for the recycling to work.
There is also the landfill tax, which might have an impact on behaviour. I am sure that the Minister has had a towel on her head thinking all that through to try to make certain that it works as intended. It is currently due to come into effect in 2025. Given the complexity, is she confident that that will happen, given that there have already been delays and the scheme itself is now smaller than most people want it to be, because it excludes glass?
Given the complexity of VAT—when it must be done, when the returns must be made and how difficult that can be for businesses—does the Minister think that moving on without a set timescale, and the uncertainty created by that, give the best background for a successful introduction? The delivery of the scheme in Scotland seems to have run into trouble. I do not know whether the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife has insights that he can share with us—it is almost as late as a TransPennine Express train.
I am interested in what the Minister has to say about some of my questions. The scheme might seem to be a fiddling little thing, but it fiddles with a very complex tax and interacts with many other things. A bit more insight into the Minister’s thinking and her confidence about whether the scheme can be delivered on time would be really welcome.
As we heard from the Minister, clause 316 introduces schedules 19 and 20, which relate to the Trade Remedies Authority. When the UK left the EU, the UK Government established their own UK Trade Remedies Authority to undertake work on trade remedies previously carried out by the EU. The organisation was established in June 2021 to carry out investigations and recommend remedies related to dumping, foreign subsidies and safeguards for internationally traded goods.
The explanatory notes to the Bill explain that schedule 19 is intended to allow the Secretary of State to exercise a great deal of flexibility when making decisions on trade remedy cases. The notes also explain that schedule 20 extends the TRA’s remit to include bilateral safeguards in some of the UK free trade agreements. It also seeks to enable Ministers to request that the TRA open an investigation to determine whether the criteria to apply a measure has been met and what form a potential measure should take. It further provides Ministers with the power to apply a measure to ask the TRA to reassess its determination and recommendation, and to enable Ministers to take a different decision from the TRA’s recommendation.
It seems clear that the schedules represent a significant increase in the power of Ministers over the Trade Remedies Authority, which was established just two years ago. Despite its short life, the Trade Remedies Authority found itself at the heart of a political storm in Downing Street last year. Right hon. and hon. Members might recall that in June 2022 Lord Geidt resigned from his position as the ethics adviser for the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson) when he was Prime Minister. In his resignation letter Lord Geidt wrote:
“I was tasked to offer a view about the Government’s intention to consider measures which risk a deliberate and purposeful breach of the Ministerial Code. This request has placed me in an impossible and odious position.”
In his response, the then Prime Minister confirmed what the dispute concerned. He wrote to Lord Geidt:
“You say that you were put in an impossible position regarding my seeking your advice on potential future decisions related to the Trade Remedies Authority.”
Despite that brush with the former Prime Minister, the Trade Remedies Authority has continued to exist. The measures being introduced by the two schedules that we are discussing will have a significant impact on its relationship with Ministers. This is a fair amount of change for an organisation that has existed for less than two years.
To help members of the Committee put the proposals in context, will the Minister explain the Government’s reasoning behind the initial arrangements for the Trade Remedies Authority two years ago, and how the changes to the arrangements that we are considering today were decided? Will she explain whether there has been any international benchmarking of similar authorities in other countries? What are their levels of independence and their relevant relations with politician?
Clause 316 would allow customers to apply to HMRC for advance valuation ruling decisions. Advance rulings provide traders with a legally binding decision from customs authorities in advance of a shipment, which gives them certainty about how their goods are treated with implications for duty levied. The UK currently issues advance rulings in respect of tariff classification and origin of goods but has not provided advance rulings on customs valuation. That is because customs valuation rulings were not provided for in the EU. However, as the Minister said, they are widely offered by customs authorities worldwide.
We understand that the measures would allow HMRC to provide businesses with more certainty when they are deciding on the most appropriate method of customs valuation for valuing their goods for import. Anything that gives businesses greater certainty is to be welcomed, so we will not be opposing the clause. On a specific point of clarity, however, I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that the clause’s advanced rulings provision is required as a condition of the UK’s accession to the comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans-Pacific partnership.
Finally, clause 317 updates legislation to permit HMRC to require financial guarantees to be given for duty amounts payable on imported goods and ensure that decisions to require such guarantees will be subject to review and appeal rights. Since January 2021, section 119 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 has been used to require a financial guarantee from importers as a condition of releasing imported goods from the control of an HMRC officer where the amount of customs duty due for the goods is unclear. However, there has been no statutory right for an importer to request a review of, or an appeal against, such a guarantee requirement. Those appeal and review rights were inadvertently omitted when EU legislation was transposed into domestic legislation, which seems to have been an oversight by the Government. We will not oppose the clause, which seeks to remedy the Government’s mistake, but will the Minister explain what impact that mistake has had? Specifically, how many appeal and review requests by importers have been lodged but denied consideration since January 2021, and what steps are being taken to rectify any individual grievances that have arisen as a result?
The clause seems quite mild, but it seems to have many implications for the policing of import duties; the prevention of widespread dumping or misuse of products on our markets, which could destroy establishing domestic industries; and the regulation of free trade agreements that we make around the world. Will the Minister give us some indication of how the Trade Remedies Authority changes that are encompassed in clause 315 and schedules 19 and 20 will impact on its independence? From listening to the Minister, it seemed to me that that was one of the most important aspects of the changes, and the Committee needs to understand it as we continue to scrutinise the Bill.
Clearly, a trade remedies body must be independent of those it oversees, so that it is seen as an appropriate body to make decisions that might have serious economic consequences for one side or the other. It is, effectively, a trade judiciary; if it is to be effective, it has to be seen to be independent and widely respected for its independence. The changes made by the clause seem to eat away at some of that. The Minister was talking about different changes to the way in which the authority can pursue its job, including increases in different kinds of information and having to notify Ministers before initiating reviews. It is a quite a big step to put that in legislation, rather than have it as memorandum of understanding. Reading between the lines, that implies that Ministers are not happy with the way in which the Trade Remedies Authority is behaving. Why have the Government decided to put these changes in legislation, rather than in a memorandum of understanding, and why do they think that the Trade Remedies Authority needs to be constrained by law? Is it because there has been a breakdown in the relationship between Ministers and the people who run the authority? Is because there is a lack of trust, or is it simply because Ministers want more direct control over the way in which the authority behaves? That would have implications for the TRA’s independence, and it would certainly have implications for how its independence would be perceived by those wishing to approach it for a jurisdictional reason or for decision making.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAs we heard from the Minister, clause 321 will introduce a new domestic band for flights within the UK and a new ultra-long-haul band covering destinations with capitals located more than 5,500 miles from London. Until the end of March 2023, there were two destination rate bands for air passenger duty: band A included those countries whose capital city is less than 2,000 miles from London, with band B covering all other destinations. From 1 April, there have been four destination bands: the domestic band for flights within the UK; band A for non-domestic destinations whose capital is up to 2,000 miles from London; band B for destinations whose capital is between 2,001 and 5,500 miles from London; and band C for all other destinations.
As the Minister explained, clause 322 makes consequential amendments to the provisions that devolve to the Northern Ireland Assembly the power to set the direct long-haul rates of APD. I understand that the changes in the clause do not impinge on the devolved powers, and the devolved rates are not affected. Rather, it updates the provisions to reflect the introduction of clause 321 and the ultra-long-haul band.
Before I address our concerns about this measure, I would be grateful if the Minister could help the Committee to understand what the situation would be if the clause passed by confirming what rates of air passenger duty would apply in a few specific instances. First, if someone were to travel by helicopter around the UK—for instance, from London to Southampton—would that be subject to air passenger duty? Secondly, if someone travelled on a private jet around the UK—say, from London to Blackpool—that was, for argument’s sake, a Dassault Falcon 900LX, what rate of air passenger duty would apply? Finally, if someone lives in the UK but was travelling to another home of theirs—say, in Santa Monica, California—what rate of air passenger duty would apply? I would be grateful if the Minister could answer those three questions.
I turn to our concerns about the clause. As the Minister might know, when this measure was first announced at autumn Budget 2021, we raised our concerns about it during the debates on the subsequent Finance Bill. We pointed out then—it is even truer today—that it could not be right for the Government to prioritise a tax cut that would be of greatest benefit to people who are able to be frequent flyers in the UK at a time when working people across the country have been hit again and again by tax rises.
As well as being the wrong priority for public money, the Chancellor announced the cut in air passenger duty just days before COP26. What is more, as the Institute for Fiscal Studies pointed out at the time, the cut in air passenger duty would in fact flow through the UK emissions trading scheme and push up electricity prices for people at home. The Government have pointed out that the introduction of a reduced domestic rate of air passenger duty has been accompanied by the introduction of an ultra-long-haul rate. However, when taken together, all the changes in the clause are still set to cost the taxpayer an additional £35 million a year. We cannot support this as a priority for spending public money, so we will oppose the clause.
Will the Minister tell us how clause 322(4), which devolves these issues to the Northern Ireland Assembly, will work, given that the Assembly is not sitting at the moment? Does it mean that this will be decided centrally at Westminster? What arrangements are made for that, since, if there was no change in these areas, in the absence of the Assembly sitting, there would be a divergence between air passenger duty in one place and the other? How has the Treasury modelled that divergence, given that air passenger duty is a devolved issue, even though the devolution settlement is not working at the moment because the Assembly is not sitting?
Will the Minister update the Committee on where we are with the aviation treaties that zero-rate aviation fuel? It is an ongoing issue, given the nature of the environmental damage that is done—particularly by aviation fuel—in the higher atmosphere when airplanes fly at higher levels, which they normally do on long-haul flights. How will private jets be treated and affected, if at all, by the reduction in domestic air passenger duty, since we have a Prime Minister who seems to think that public transport is chartering a private jet for short-haul flights?