Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate. We have already discussed at length the proportionality concerns about the minimum service level agreements being imposed per se, but now we get into the sanctions and consequences for trade unions in what will follow, but also for individuals. We must now talk not just about the vital human rights principle of proportionality that we discussed before but about the vital principle of non-discrimination.

This gives me the opportunity to reflect on an earlier exchange between the Minister and my noble friend Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway. There was a dissonance about this concept of victimisation. As I understand it, the Minister was saying, “For goodness’ sake. It’s not victimisation to say that there needs to be a minimum service level agreement to protect the public, and therefore there have to be work notices”. However, what perhaps the Minister did not hear or understand is that when you give employers the power to pick and choose between individual employees, we are opening up the Pandora’s box of abuse of power. When we legislate in your Lordships’ House, we have to guard against potential abuses of power.

If employers, scrupulous or otherwise, are allowed to pick and choose between individuals, some people will never be on the list but other people will be, and sometimes the people will be selected for that list on grounds that include their race, sex, sexuality and possibly even their role within trade union activity. I think that is the point my noble friend was trying to make to the Minister, and this is the power that is being handed to individual employers, in contrast with years of struggle for protection against discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of trade union activity as well as membership.

If, as I fear, the Minister will not pause the Bill or introduce greater parliamentary protection before the powers can be triggered in the first place, please will he look at the powers given to individual employers over groups and particular employees in the workplace, because it is invidious and, I think, very dangerous?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, it seems to me that the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Hendy, are finding yet another way to try to deprive the Bill of any effect. In their own ways, they are trying to make it entirely voluntary to take part in the provision of minimum service levels, if requested by an employer. That runs completely counter to the policy intent of the Bill.

If noble Lords think that the Bill needs to be modified in some way to reflect their concerns, it is incumbent on them to produce amendments which find a practical way through that. To simply, in effect, make compliance with a minimum service level work notice voluntary is unacceptable in the context of the Bill. Although I understand the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, makes, those issues are already covered by discrimination law. The concern she has about being selected on the grounds of sex, sexual orientation or race is already covered by discrimination law and does not need to be protected again in the Bill.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

Does the noble Baroness accept that in Committee, there are two sorts of amendments: there are amendments which are very practical and designed to be used as a template for changing the Bill, and there are probing amendments? I point out that I made it very clear that the latest two groups I was speaking to were probing amendments. On that basis, I think her criticism is invalid.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for engaging so specifically and constructively in the debate, but I do not think she appreciates just how difficult it is, even under the present law, for people to go to a tribunal, with or without the assistance of lawyers or their trade unions, to demonstrate that they were picked on for one of these reasons. Now, in this Bill, a specific protection against unfair dismissal is being removed. An employer will say, “No, no, X, Y or Z was picked for this other reason. They are essential to the service”. It just happens to be the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is essential to the service every time and not, for example, my noble friend Lord Hendy, who of course is the expert. If I am always essential to the service and he is not, it will be very difficult for me to demonstrate that it was discriminatory, when the whole purpose of the Bill is, as the noble Baroness said, to remove protection from unfair dismissal.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The purpose of the Bill is not to remove protection for unfair dismissal; the purpose of the Bill is to ensure that minimum service levels can be guaranteed for those who rely on the services, and we are trying to find practical ways through that. I was inviting noble Lords to find ways did not simply rip the heart out of the Bill.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

I just say to the noble Baroness that there is nothing wrong with conformity being voluntary. The whole basis of the ILO jurisprudence is that minimum service levels and requisitioning should be agreed voluntarily between the unions and the employers. In most of the countries of Europe where they have minimum service levels, volunteers are sought to provide the minimum service. That is also true in this country. We have been hearing for days about the local agreements that are reached in all the six sectors identified here.

That is done on a voluntary basis, and the people who do the work volunteer to do it. They speak to their union, and the union says, “Somebody has to do it; you’re going to do it”, and they say “Okay, fine if that is the price of having the industrial action and bringing pressure to bear to maintain our standard of living, that is the price I am prepared to pay”.

There is nothing wrong with voluntariness. It does not detract from the rest of the machinery of the Bill in setting minimum service levels and issuing work notices, if that is really what the Bill is intended to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, this group gives me the opportunity to speak to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. Earlier, she encouraged the Committee to be constructive when we debated whether an amendment was probing or constructive. Given the gestures from the Minister from a sedentary position, it is clear that, even if the Bill passes, there is room to specify these reasonable steps and new duties upon trade unions. That is my attempt to meet the noble Baroness half way and be constructive about a Bill that I think is hugely disproportionate.

With the greatest respect to my noble friend who just spoke, these amendments do not just expose a breach of Article 11, on freedom of association; they quite possibly expose a breach of Article 9, on freedom of conscience. I am afraid there are no right reverend Prelates here at the moment, but it is as if we were to say to the bishops, “We live in a modern, diverse democracy, even though we have an established Church, but it is now your obligation to actively encourage divorce and abortion.” Clearly, that would be ludicrous, and it is equally ludicrous to be saying to trade unions not only that, as indicated in Amendment 34, they should try to make their members aware of the legislation and of work notices, but that they should ensure compliance as well. The Government are making employers in relation to these public services the policeman for the Government, but it is a step too far to make unions the policeman for the Government as well—not least in the context of disputes which will continue to be lawful under this proposed legislation, but just some people will have to go to work.

Hence, I commend in particular Amendments 34, 34A and 35, which highlight that knowledge is one thing but ensuring compliance is another. They demonstrate at length that unions should not be disciplining their members for not going to work, and that picketing has to remain perfectly lawful, not least because most workers, we hope, or many workers, will still be entitled to go on strike, notwithstanding the minimum service levels and the specific work notices. The Bill needs to specify what is reasonable and what is required of trade unions.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Does the noble Baroness agree that “reasonable steps” is a formulation used in a number of legislative formats? It has not been defined further on those occasions when it has been used in order to provide the flexibility to allow for the situation to be judged on its individual circumstances and, indeed, to allow for technological developments. What would have been reasonable, for example, in communication with affected workers 10 years ago could be quite different now. If we take the example of the duty to prevent bribery, “reasonable steps” is not defined in law and that is a virtue of the law, because it allows the situation to be judged at the time. That is why the Bill takes this pragmatic approach.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I totally agree, by the way, with the noble Baroness that there are areas of our common law in particular, and some statutes, where the inclusion of the adjective “reasonable” by itself will do the trick. I disagree that it is appropriate here because we are asking unions to do something that is inherently counterintuitive to their raison d’etre, which is to organise workers, in extremis, to go on strike. If one is saying to the union, “You are now having to push against the grain of your whole existence, the existence of your organisation, and your freedom of conscience and your association, which you are entitled to under the convention and the ILO”, and if one is pushing them in the opposite direction, one has to be very specific and proportionate about the nature of that totally counterintuitive duty.