Draft Online Safety Bill Report

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Thursday 13th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Joint Committee on an excellent report, consisting of 191 pages of well-researched, balanced, temperate and intelligent analysis and recommendations. It is rare to find such qualities when it comes to subjects as important as online harms and, indeed, technology in the society of today. I will not go through the report’s recommendations in detail because I do not have the time, but also because I support and welcome just about all of them. I will mention, for example, the design for safety recommendation, which I think is excellent, but it is one among many excellent recommendations. Instead, I will focus my remarks on why this report needs to be implemented as quickly as possible and what else needs to happen.

I want to start by speaking in praise of technology. I count myself as a tech evangelist. We have to think how many lives have been saved by remote medicine, how many marriages have been saved by not having to argue about the best way to get directions to an event, how much joy has been shared through cat memes or whatever, and how many businesses have been started on such platforms. Technology can and should be a force for good. That is why I went into engineering—to make the world work better for everyone—and my final year project at Imperial College was on a remote alarm to support people who need care in their own homes.

Engineering should be a force for good, but as the report sets out, that is no longer how it is seen. Many of my constituents, for example, feel they are being tracked, monitored, surveilled and analysed, and they feel undermined because they do not want to have to go online to do what they want to do without feeling safe and secure. Self-regulation is broken, as the report says, and it did not need to be this way. Some of us may remember concerns, back when the web started out, that if it was used for commercial purposes, people would be flamed with emails and condemned for trying to advertise or do direct marketing on the web. Somehow, however, the web was captured by those on what I can only describe as the libertarian right, who sought to maintain the lie that technology and the internet were nothing to do with Government, while building monopolistic platforms with more money and more power than most Governments. Their attitude to regulation and Government, as I remember from my days at Ofcom, was often that if they ignored them, regulation and Government would go away.

Now, of course, the tech giants use their immense riches to wield immense power over Governments—whether in opposing workers’ rights in Silicon valley or in delaying and minimising regulation here. In that, they have been all too successful, and I have to say that it was with the support of a series of Conservative Governments who wanted to leave this to the market and believed that the state was too slow or too stupid to regulate to keep people safe, while actively cutting the part of the state designed to do so. That is why, in my view, this Online Safety Bill is a decade too late. These measures cannot be in place for another year—and that is if the Government act in double quick time, which they seem unable to do—which means that it will be 2023 before we have online safety regulation.

[Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)]

I too want to say how important this work is, and I urge that this Bill is desperately needed. Refuge has found that one in three women have at some time in their life experienced abuse online. I would say that Muslim women in particular experience a triple whammy of race, faith and gender, and Tell MAMA has told us of the 40% increase in abuse against Muslim women during the lockdown. I hope my hon. Friend agrees that the social media companies must be held to account for their repeated failures.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention because he is absolutely right: women in particular have been subjected to harm online, and that is one of the reasons why more women and more people from ethnic minorities need to take part in designing and developing the web and platforms in the future.

I think it is really important to recognise that the last Labour Government put in place forward-looking regulation in the Communications Act 2003, which set out the landscape for regulating growing tech companies for the next decade. Given that a series of Conservative Governments have put in place no regulation, that the Bill cannot be in place for another year is a real indictment of them and shows a level of negligence that it is difficult to recover from.

In my last minute, let me just say what we need to be looking towards for the future. The Bill and the report do not reflect the development around web 3.0. We are looking to more decentralisation of the web, which is being reflected in the use of blockchain as part of the future architecture of the web. For some, blockchain is a way of avoiding government. If someone has blockchain, they do not need government. It is that kind of libertarian, right-wing approach to digital, and any Government need to be constantly looking forward to see what regulation will be required. We also need to have more emphasis on people’s rights, on access to algorithms and on their regulation. I look forward to this Bill being in place as soon as possible.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 8th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Julia Lopez]

I appreciate my right hon. Friend’s comments. The amendment would require us to do something that has been part of the legislation from the outset. We believe that our existing approach is the right way to continually consider the decisions of our international allies and partners, whether or not they are part of Five Eyes. That brings me to the second objection to the amendment, which is that it is unnecessary because we regularly engage with our Five Eyes partners and are committed to a close and enduring partnership with them. We agree with the other place that where possible, the UK Government should consider the actions of other countries when developing our own policies, and that is exactly what we do already. It is what we have been doing before and during the passage of this legislation.

The intelligence and security agencies across Five Eyes retain close co-operation, which includes frequent dialogue between the National Cyber Security Centre and its international partners. This dialogue includes the sharing of technical expertise on the security of telecoms networks and managing the risks posed by high-risk vendors. There are mechanisms in place for the NCSC to share this and wider information with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.

Collaboration with our Five Eyes partners forms an intrinsic part of our national security work. The alliance was not created through legislation and it has not required legislation for us to develop and strengthen that relationship, and the amendment would set an unhelpful precedent. We do not need the amendment to compel us to work with our Five Eyes partners.

That takes me to our third reason for resisting the amendment, which is that the UK needs to have the flexibility to develop and encourage international relationships in addition to Five Eyes. Naming individual countries in this way would set an unhelpful precedent for national security legislation in future. As I have acknowledged, it is important that we consider the policies of our Five Eyes partners, namely New Zealand, Canada, Australia and the US, when developing our own policies, but we also need to consider the policies of a wide range of other countries, including those of our European neighbours, such as France and Germany, and those of other nations, such as Japan, South Korea and India. Stipulating in primary legislation the countries whose policies the UK Government should consider when developing our own national security policies, whether Five Eyes or other countries, would be unhelpful, given the wide-ranging nature of our international collaboration. It would be highly unusual to refer to specific countries in legislation in this way, and this Bill is not the right place to create such a precedent.

The fourth reason for resisting the amendment is that it is impractical because of the many different ways in which other countries operate their national security decision making. The amendment would require us to act whenever a ban takes place in another Five Eyes country, but it may not be immediately clear when a country has taken a decision to ban a vendor, particularly if they have relied on sensitive intelligence to make that decision.

It may not always be apparent why a particular country has banned a particular vendor. There could be any number of reasons why a foreign Government would choose to restrict a company’s ability to operate within that country. Those reasons may not be based purely on national security grounds. I welcome the intention behind the amendment, but we cannot accept it because we feel that it is duplicative, impractical, restrictive and, ultimately, unnecessary.

In summary, the House is presented with a strengthened Bill as Lords amendments 1, 2 and 3 will increase the chances of parliamentary scrutiny of the telecoms security framework. As I have set out, however, it would be inappropriate to agree to Lords amendments 4 and 5. I thank the other place for its scrutiny of the Bill. I commend Lords amendments 1, 2 and 3 to the House and ask that the House disagrees with Lords amendments 4 and 5.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I thank colleagues in the other place who have worked hard to improve the Bill. National security is the first duty of any Government and Labour will always put our country’s security first.

The pandemic has shown how important telecommunications networks are. I declare an interest as a former telecoms engineer, but I am sure I speak for the whole House in thanking all those who have kept our networks going during the pandemic. We have been dependent on them to work from home or to keep in touch with family and friends. This House could continue its important work thanks to telecommunications networks, as well as the hard work of House staff and the Speaker’s support.

A secure network is of the utmost importance. Labour welcomes the Bill’s intention while recognising its limitations. I am pleased that the Lords amendments that we are discussing reflect issues that Labour has been raising.

Lords amendment 1 seeks to improve transparency in the use of the Secretary of State’s powers to issue codes of practice to communications providers through the negative procedure. It reflects amendments that we tabled in Committee in response to the sweeping powers that the Bill gives to the Secretary of State and Ofcom. As the Comms Council UK said,

“the Minister will be able to unilaterally make decisions that impact the technical operation and direction of technology companies, with little or no oversight or accountability.”

The House has a duty to ensure that those powers are proportionate and accountable, so we are happy that the Government have bowed to pressure from Labour to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny, even if, in our view, it does not go far enough. Two consequential amendments to Lords amendment 1 set out the conditions for the 40-day scrutiny period and ensure that that time cannot be disrupted by recess or Prorogation so that this House and the other place have sufficient time to scrutinise the code.

Lords amendment 5 is cross party and designed to ensure that the Government review a vendor that is banned in a Five Eyes country. We support the amendment and find the Government’s opposition concerning, as we believe it could threaten our national security.

I find the Minister’s arguments against the amendment somewhat confused. She claims that the amendment is unnecessary because we already monitor Five Eyes countries and would always respond to the actions of our closest intelligence partners, but if that is true, why not formalise it? We are stronger together, specifically with our Five Eyes allies. Instead of putting forward further arguments, I turn to the eloquent explanation of Conservative peer Lord Blencathra:

“All it asks the Government to do…is to review the security arrangements with a telecoms provider if one of our vital, strategic Five Eyes partners bans its equipment. We are not calling for a similar immediate ban, or an eventual ban, we are just saying let us review it and come to a conclusion.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 19 October 2021; Vol. 815, c. 99.]

We will support the amendment.

Lords amendment 4 requires the Secretary of State to report on the diversification strategy’s impact on the security of telecommunications networks. It would also allow for a debate in this House on the report to further strengthen parliamentary scrutiny. Labour supports the removal of high-risk vendors from our telecoms networks, and given the grave situation into which successive Conservative Governments have allowed our networks to fall, it is essential that the Government have the powers to remove Huawei at speed. However, we are left with only two providers, and as we heard repeatedly at every stage of this Bill’s progression, two providers is not diverse, is not resilient and is not secure.

We cannot ensure national security without a diverse supply chain, but I fear that the Government still just do not get it. Let me just take two of the Minister’s arguments. The first argument seems to be, as far as I could comprehend it, that requiring reporting would be “restrictive and premature”, but surely if the Government’s intention is to diversify the supply chain—and we have heard that we cannot have a secure network without a diversified supply chain—the only way a reporting requirement would be limiting is if the Government have no actual intention of doing anything about diversifying it.

The Minister’s second argument seems to be that this is too technologically specific. Lords amendment 4 says:

“The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the impact of progress of the diversification of the telecommunications supply chain on the security of public electronic communication networks and services.”

Would the Minister tell me what in that is specific as to the technology? Indeed, the only specific aspect of technology is a requirement to include future technologies that may be used as a platform, such as cloud computing. I find the Minister’s reasons for not supporting this amendment concerning. I fear that the Government are just not serious about diversifying our supply chain, and that they do not really have a plan for it.

The Minister mentioned asking parliamentary questions. Just last week, I asked her what funding was available for 5G diversification, and she talked about

“a Future RAN Competition (FRANC) and opening the doors of the SmartRAN Open Network Interoperability Centre (SONIC Labs).”

I want to know how diversification is being achieved and how local sovereign UK capability is being built, not an acronym soup that is ad hoc, hard to digest and dangerously complacent.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is an expert in so far as she was, I understand, a communications engineer. As far as I understand it, there are three suppliers, but one of them we do not particularly want to use, and that leaves two. What other diversification can we do if we only have two? Can we try to build up something very fast, and is that what the hon. Lady is suggesting?

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, and I promise not to take advantage of it to set out at length what we could be doing to diversify. I would just say to the hon. Gentleman and the House that we only have two suppliers for 5G now, but the technology is evolving and there are new technologies for the next generation of networks—6G. As he will well remember, we have gone through generations of technology at quite a pace over the last 20 years.

Right now, we should be investing in great UK technologies from companies and start-ups that are working in the field of open RAN and other technologies. Rather than having just one vendor supplying a whole network, as has been the case with Huawei and others, we would have a diverse mix of vendors at every stage of the network—the core and so on—which would enable much greater resilience. We could be doing that. The technologies are there now, and with the support of a forward-looking Government, we could ensure that leaders in those technologies were UK companies. We would therefore have not only a resilient network, but a network with local capability, because I remind the hon. Gentleman that there is no UK capability or UK vendor in this area right now. That is what I hope to see from the Government. Network diversification should be a fantastic opportunity to support innovative start-ups around the country.

[Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree it is a pity that the Government got rid of the industrial strategy group that helped to advise on these expert issues?

[Chi Onwurah]

As always, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point, and as a telecoms engineer, it has been sad to see the lack of an industrial strategy for our telecommunications capability, which strengthens our UK capability. We have excellent engineers and excellent research. We should be leading in future telecommunications capability, and an industrial strategy would ensure that was the case. It would also help collaboration with our allies. For example, the US does not have a vendor that can provide our 5G networks at the moment, and collaboration with our allies and an industrial strategy or plan could make such a difference globally and locally to our security and economic strength.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Is the main point in all of this that this was not a market failure? Although an industrial strategy is important, in reality this is a national security failure. Huawei has undercut the market progressively for nearly 15 years through its subsidies, breaking every rule and driving every company out of business. The single biggest problem we face is having a proper functioning market that requires those involved in it to obey the rules. China does not, and everyone has paid lip service to that. Is that the real problem?

[Chi Onwurah]

I both agree and disagree with the right hon. Gentleman. I agree totally that national security is not a function of the market, and the fact that we have a network that is not secure is not a market failure but a failure of government and foresight. China had an industrial strategy. That is why it has a vendor in all the networks across the world—

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

To break the rules—

[Chi Onwurah]

Not to break the rules, but to work with other nations whose values we share, and in the long term to develop and support companies in this area.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does my hon. Friend also agree that this did not come as a great shock to the Government? It was all laid out in the 2013 Intelligence and Security Committee report on critical national infrastructure, but nothing has been done since then.

[Chi Onwurah]

My right hon. Friend, as always, makes a really good point. That is where an industrial strategy would have come in. It was predicted and we had time to build up alternatives. To go from having Huawei as one vendor among others that had small parts of our network, to our network being so dependent on it, took time. We could have used that time better to secure our networks and our own capability. The Government are bodging this. They are leaving it to the market when national security is not a market function. Labour has consistently welcomed the Bill, but it is only a small step towards achieving a truly secure and robust telecommunications network. In 2010 the Tories inherited a secure, competitive and world-leading network. It is now insecure, uncompetitive and bumping along the bottom. The Government have wasted 11 years, with huge delays in the second and third-generation fixed broadband roll-out, pushing us down the bottom of the OECD tables. Telecommunications are essential to our national security and economy, and we hope the Government will take this opportunity to recognise that.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Tackling the Digital Divide

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2021 Westminster Hall

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Ali. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) for having secured this debate with the support of the APPG. He has long been an exceptional champion for digital inclusion.

I welcome the Minister to her position: this is the first time we have met on this brief, as it were. I hope that when addressing this critical issue, she will show similar passion to that of my right hon. Friend, and indeed the other Members who have contributed to today’s interesting and well-reasoned debate. From the hon. Members for North Devon (Selaine Saxby) and for West Bromwich West (Shaun Bailey) and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), we heard what I can only describe as damning examples of the digital divide in their constituencies, about which they feel very strongly, and rightly so.

The Labour party believes that technology can change lives for the better, and it already has. Families separated by geography are now connected online, and a world of experiences, advice and memes are available to everybody from their smartphone. In 2020, the pandemic placed technology firmly at the heart of our working and social lives: last year, the average UK adult spent about a quarter of their working life online. We are all digital citizens now, but that is a truth that cuts two ways, given the digital inequalities that so many face.

I start from the position that access to the internet should be a right, not a privilege, and I ask the Minister directly to tell us whether she believes that as well. Ensuring that access is a right and not a privilege means providing people with the skills and confidence to use the internet, as well as the necessary infrastructure, and ensuring that no one is priced out of important digital products and services. Unfortunately, digital skills, digital confidence and digital infrastructure are exactly what the Government have been getting wrong for the past 10 years, overturning the world-leading position they inherited from the last Labour Government.

Let me take each in turn. On digital skills, all I need to say is that the Government’s last digital inclusion strategy was published in 2014. That included a target of 90% online, which has largely been achieved. Is the Minister’s position then “job done”? Is it okay that 10 million people still lack the basic digital skills needed to function in today’s digital world, according to the Good Things Foundation? Is it acceptable that families have to choose between food and mobile data, and saw their children left without access to education every time there was a covid case at their school? Is it fine and dandy if small businesses cannot compete online? Will the Minister say when we will have a digital inclusion strategy?

A lack of digital skills can have wide-ranging implications, as we heard during this debate. Professor Arpana Verma found that digital inequalities have been increased by the digital revolution, and has noted an inextricable link between health literacy, digital literacy and financial literacy. Digital illiteracy also leaves people excluded from employment, and lower-income households are one of the groups most likely to face digital exclusion. I agreed with the Scottish National party’s spokeswoman, the hon. Member for Motherwell and Wishaw (Marion Fellows), when she said that we have to think about the people behind these statistics and examples. The cost to society and individuals could not be greater, but the Government’s investment in digital inclusion is ad hoc and limited. Also, digital inclusion must include businesses, who must be able to do business in digital markets.

During the pandemic, many small businesses could survive only if they moved online. Grainger Market in my constituency—a historic and iconic covered market with many stallholders, none of whom were online when lockdown started in March 2020—moved online within three weeks, offering all kinds of produce and services to my constituents across the city, but it did not follow from that that they had the necessary digital skills, cyber-skills in particular, to maintain a sustainable and secure business. Yet the Government’s flagship Help to Grow digital scheme provides only £8.30 for each UK small and medium-sized enterprise. That is a missed opportunity to empower small businesses and workers to succeed in the digital age.

My right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham mentioned the call for greater help in the community, and closing and reducing the opening hours of so many libraries has not helped there. Will the Minister say whether we will have a digital strategy for small business inclusion as well?

Digital skills and confidence are related, but are not quite the same thing. As a chartered engineer, I have been deeply disturbed by the way in which so many of my constituents are now fearful of technology. They are forced to claim benefits online when they cannot afford broadband, and required to sit on hold for hours as an algorithm determines their future. They see their children bullied online and their favourite footballers trolled online. They see public figures, particularly women in the public eye, attacked and often threatened online. They see their phone used as an instrument of surveillance by their employers and their employment cancelled by text message.

Ensuring digital confidence means supporting and empowering our digital citizens. It means introducing legislation that protects people online, but for 11 years that is exactly what successive Tory Governments have failed to do. Even now, four years after they finally promised legislation, we have the online safety Bill only in draft form, and that is inadequate on so many levels.

The Nominet Digital Youth Index, published today for the first time, highlights that nearly three in five young people in the LGBTQ+ community have experienced hate speech online. Nearly half of young people feel isolated, and one third of 17 to 19-year-olds say the internet has a negative impact on their mental health, but the online safety Bill does not prioritise action against racism, misogyny or homophobia. The draft Bill also manages to shift—this is quite an achievement—more power to the tech platforms, allowing them to mark their own homework without giving their executives any legal liability. It does give plenty of power to Ministers, but does not give the regulator the resources or powers necessary to guard against tomorrow’s future harms such as algorithmic control—a harm that is very much here, but is growing is scale.

Finally, I come to digital infrastructure. As we have heard, we have had another wasted decade. Internet access is an essential utility but, again, many households in this country do not have reliable broadband. The Prime Minister promised full fibre for everyone—I hope the Minister will tell us what happened to that promise—and then in 2019 that was downgraded to nationwide gigabit broadband coverage by 2025. Two years on, we now have a target of 85% gigabit broadband by 2025, but the actual plan shows that the Government will spend only £1.2 billion of the promised £5 billion to achieve that. No doubt the Minister will mention the rural broadband scheme, but the number of times it has been announced is, I think, greater than its number of users.

We need infrastructure to be affordable. A third of adults who are not online cite cost as a reason, according to research carried out by Lloyds. Two million households struggle to afford their internet bills. We have also heard that the universal service obligation is an obligation to provide service at whatever ridiculously high price it may be calculated at. To deliver a high-skilled, high-wage economy, all corners of the UK need to be able to access world-class digital infrastructure at affordable rates. Without it, we are pricing out a significant proportion of the population from the digital world.

As we have also heard today, charities and some businesses are working to address data and device poverty. The Good Things Foundation has built a national data bank to provide free mobile data for people on low incomes who need it, working with local community partners and mobile network operators. However, I hope that the Minister will appreciate what I mean when I say that it should not be up to charities to ensure digital equity, and I think the hon. Member for West Bromwich West highlighted that.

Labour decided, because of the lack of action from this Government, to take matters into our own hands. After months of consultation with a wide range of stakeholders— including businesses, platforms, individuals, charities, citizen organisations, trade unions and other groups—we published our report, “Our Digital Future”, in the summer. It set out the ways in which we can beef up digital skills, confidence and infrastructure, and improve digital public services to ensure digital inclusion.

Labour wants Britain to be the best place to grow up in, to work in, to raise children in and to grow old in. We want empowered citizens who do not merely have access to the internet as passive consumers but who are equipped with the skills and tools to make the most of technology, and who are protected from those who use technology to cause harm. To achieve this aim, we support a robust regulatory framework that protects users, and enhances individual and national security. Labour will consider whether we need a Minister whose portfolio is entirely focused on digital inclusion, to ensure proper digital access and bring everyone online. That is what closing the digital divide requires.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julia Lopez]

It is all part of the Treasury gating process. The money is available, but there needs to be confidence of success. We will have to iron out some difficulties in the way that we procure contracts, and learn some of the lessons that my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon referred to in relation to the superfast roll-out and other parts of the gigabit coverage. There will be a bit of testing to see what works best before the Treasury is confident to release the next funds. However, the funds are available. I am happy to explore that further with the right hon. Gentleman if he would like more details.

Since 2018, we have provided gigabit coverage to more than 600,000 rural premises, so that the same commercial and other opportunities reliant on connectivity can be provided for those living in the countryside as those living in towns.

[Chi Onwurah]

On the point raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) about the holding factors in rolling out superfast broadband, the Minister mentioned skills. I understand that the skills necessary to dig up so many roles may be limited at the moment. What is she doing to increase the number of skilled engineers needed for the roll-out?

[Julia Lopez]

That is one of the issues that we are talking to the DWP about. We are also working very closely with the likes of Openreach and others to try and get that skills pipeline going, because it will be critical to the success of the roll-out.

Those 600,000 rural premises are just the start. In Devon and Somerset, 66,000 further premises now have gigabit coverage through the gigabit-capable delivery as part of the superfast broadband programme. I have been pressing officials on some of the previous challenges of that programme further to discussions that I have had in the Lobby with my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon.

We have a number of interventions to address the part of the build that we think the market will not cover, including broadband vouchers. We are funding full-fibre networks at 1,084 schools that were previously stuck in the digital slow lane, and we want to connect 6,800 public buildings by the end of the year, including hospitals, GP surgeries and fire stations. That was another important point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon.

We are also bringing forward procurements to provide coverage to as many of the remaining premises as possible. My hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich West raised some incredibly important points about some of the issues that the Public Accounts Committee looked at in relation to procurement, which are very much on my mind. I want to make sure we get this right, but there will be challenges.

The first procurement for Cumbria got under way last month, and further procurements will begin shortly for areas including Cambridgeshire, Durham, Northumberland and parts of Dorset. We will then continue with the pipeline of procurements to cover the rest of the UK as quickly as possible. I note the points raised by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) about Scotland. I am exploring BDUK’s relationship with the Scottish Government and what more we can do to help people in the devolved nations. I am talking to my officials about that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julia Lopez]

Yes, we certainly would. I appreciate the point that the right hon. Gentleman is making.

Since the launch of the broadband universal service obligation, which has been raised by a number of Members, BT has already delivered USO connections covering more than 3,700 homes, and it is in the process of building more than 2,500 more. Ofcom now estimates that just 134,000 premises—or 0.4%—do not have access to a decent broadband service and they may therefore be eligible for a USO connection. However, to address the right hon. Gentleman’s concerns, we know that some premises have received very high quotes and may therefore be very hard to reach, potentially requiring a different approach to deliver cost-effective upgrades. That is why, in March, we published a call for evidence on delivering improved broadband to very hard-to-reach premises.

In addition, Ofcom announced in July that as a result of its investigation, BT has provided assurances that it would use Ofcom’s approach to calculating excess cost quotes. I therefore encourage anybody who had previously been given a universal service obligation quote to speak to BT, if they have not already been contacted.

The progress that we are making with gigabit builds on the earlier success of our superfast broadband programme. The final independent evaluation of superfast by Ipsos MORI concluded that the programme met its objectives to reduce the digital divide and have significant local economic impact, including through the creation of 17,000 jobs and an increase in the annual turnover of local businesses by approximately £1.9 billion, which underlines the importance of connectivity.

My hon. Friend the Member for North Devon mentioned the telecom industry’s plans to look at a landline upgrade by 2025. I appreciate the importance of landlines, particularly to older people. I want to be clear that nobody is having their landline taken away or removed. The way that landlines work in the UK is changing. Providers are moving from the old public switched telephone network to the new voice over internet protocol technology.

The PSTN is a privately-owned telecoms network and the decision to upgrade it was taken by the telecoms industry. What people often miss about the issue is that the industry’s decision to upgrade the PSTN is due to necessity, because that network is increasingly unreliable and prone to failure, with some telecoms companies finding it very hard to source certain replacements or spare parts to maintain or repair connections. That makes it very unreliable for consumers long into the future.

The VOIP technology is expected to offer consumers clearer and better-quality phone calls, but I assure hon. Members that we are working extensively with Ofcom, the emergency services and others to ensure that all consumers and sectors are fully prepared for the migration in 2025.

[Chi Onwurah]

Will the Minister give way?

[Julia Lopez]

Happily.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for giving way and making such efforts to communicate with us. With regard to her comments about the public switched telephone network, while it is true that they will not be ripping the lines out of people’s homes, as I hope she knows well one of the features of the PSTN is that it carries power down the lines, which is not a feature of VOIP. People will find that some aspects of the reliability of their telephones will change—if there is a power outage, for example. What proportion of people are aware that the PSTN will be switched off?

[Julia Lopez]

I will be looking closely at that issue. I am fairly new to my brief, so I have not explored it in as much detail as I would like, but I will take away the hon. Lady’s points and get back to her. She is a telecoms engineer herself, so her expertise far outweighs mine in that field.

We have an ambition to look at 5G signal and ensure that the majority of the population have access to it by 2017, because that can also help with bridging the digital divide and dealing with some of the issues of connectivity for those who are slightly behind on the gigabit roll-out. I am pleased that all four network providers have now launched 5G services and that 5G service availability has risen tenfold since December 2019; but there is still a long way to go.

While the vast majority of investment in the roll-out is being made by the private sector, my Department has launched the £200 million 5G testbeds and trials programme to prove that demand for 5G service is a reality. Once we have established the demand, we need to move into the next phase, which is driving the roll-out and adoption of 5G to level up and boost the economy across the Union.

A number of hon. Members have raised the shared rural network, which is incredibly important and tries to deal with the issue of notspots. The agreement on the shared rural network will see the Government and industry jointly invest over £1 billion to increase 4G mobile coverage throughout the UK, to 95% geographic coverage by the end of the programme.

The electronic communications code plays an integral part in delivering our digital networks, and we reformed it in 2017 to make the roll-out faster and more cost-efficient, but we recognise that further changes need to be made. We are looking at some reforms, which we will be bringing forward shortly.

Before I finish, I want to talk about some of the digital skills inclusion issues that have been discussed today. DCMS works closely with the rest of Government to ensure that all Departments are considering the needs of digitally-excluded people when making policy. I talked earlier about the nascent one log-in for Government project and the funding for that. When I was in the Cabinet Office, we made sure that included digitising the Home Office’s births, deaths and marriages register, so that people with a smaller footprint do not find themselves digitally excluded as more and more services move online. I want to apply some of the principles of the work that I did in the Cabinet Office to my new role, particularly when it comes to digital identity and ensuring that people are not excluded as digital identity becomes more of an everyday part of their lives.

The pandemic has highlighted the importance of digital access and digital capability for connecting with family and accessing vital services online. Digital skills are required across all sectors of the economy, but are now more important than ever. Our tech industry is also continuing to grow and create a vast amount of jobs, so we do not want people to be excluded from those.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for giving way again. I hope that she will not finish without addressing my question about a digital inclusion strategy. The vast majority of her speech has been on infrastructure but, as we know very well, skills and confidence are going to drive the take-up of digital services and digital inclusion.

[Julia Lopez]

As I said, I am working with Ministers in DWP and DFE to look at some of those issues of digital inclusion, but I will take away the hon. Lady’s specific point.

Over the past three years DCMS has supported the development of seven local digital skills partnerships, in Lancashire, the heart of the south-west, the west midlands, the south-east, Cornwall, the Isles of Scilly and, more recently, West Yorkshire. We are going to launch the eighth in Hull and East Yorkshire in mid-December. Those partnerships bring together large employers, regional academia, the local public sector and training providers from the region to collaborate and develop digital skills programmes that help build capability in the regions and reduce the digital divide. That was very evident in the early stages of the pandemic lockdown, when all seven regions worked with multiple stakeholders to ensure that the most vulnerable in our communities had access to the internet and were supported with relevant digital skills training to get online.

We have also funded the fast track digital workforce fund, a £3 million digital bootcamp based in Greater Manchester and Lancashire. The fund aims to move those in low-skilled and low-paid jobs into better-quality digital roles that meet the needs of the local economy.

In response to covid, and in partnership with social change charity the Good Things Foundation, we also launched the digital lifeline in February 2021. That is a £2.5 million fund that aims to reduce the digital exclusion of people with learning disabilities in particular, by providing free devices, data and digital support to over 5,000 people with learning difficulties who cannot afford to get online. In September, we also partnered with industry leaders to launch the digital inclusion impact group to tackle digital exclusion. One of the pilot programmes, Dell donate to educate, will support children with the right access to technology at school and at home. As I said, progress of all of those items will require a lot of cross-Government work with colleagues in other Departments.

Once again, I thank right hon. and hon. Members for securing the debate, and also the all-party parliamentary group on broadband and digital communication for its work. As everyone recognises, improving digital connectivity for everybody across the UK is a priority. We are working with energy to deliver fantastic digital infrastructure across the country. We are trying to design accessible online Government services. We are investing in digital skills. Those are big tasks, and we will of course encounter challenges along the way. The pandemic has made the online world ever more integrated with the offline one, and I hope that hon. Members will work with me to ensure that every citizen can be taken along on this journey, so that people from every part of our country and from all walks of life feel that technology is ultimately an empowering force.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

My hon. Friend is very kind; I hope that is not the kiss of death. He is right that, in areas such as Wales in particular, the power of levelling up through digital infrastructure is key. We have recently made positive announcements with the Welsh Government. We look forward to making more, and I know that Montgomeryshire will be a key part of delivering that mission.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Minister on retaining his position and welcome the new Secretary of State to hers. The Minister’s is a wide-ranging and critical role, not least because we need our broadband. Parliament, our businesses, our students, our economy and our social lives depend on it—but it is another broken promise. Full fibre by 2025 was the Prime Minister’s pledge, and the 2020 Budget set aside £5 billion to deliver it. Will the Minister confirm that only £1.2 billion of that £5 billion is planned to be spent by 2025 and that, far from full fibre, we will not even get affordable broadband? According to Ofcom, more than 2 million households find it hard to afford broadband, yet the Government are slashing broadband price controls, slashing the broadband budget, slashing universal credit support, and slashing gigabit targets. When will we get the broadband we need?

[Matt Warman]

I enjoyed the hon. Lady’s speech, Mr Speaker. The fact remains that this is a £5 billion commitment to—

Information Commissioner (Remuneration)

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Monday 7th June 2021 General Committees

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Hosie. I start by thanking Elizabeth Denham, who has served as Information Commissioner since 2016 and is now stepping down. The ICO is charged with the critical responsibility of upholding information rights in the public interest. Last year, it issued high-profile fines of £20 million and £18 million to British Airways and Marriott for data breaches that may have affected up to 339 million people across the world. Last week, I was pleased to see the ICO issue a fine of £10,000 to the Conservative party for breaching data laws during the 2019 general election campaign.

I thank the Minister for setting out what the motion will do. It brings the Information Commissioner’s remuneration up to £200,000 per year, an increase of up to £20,000 in this year of pandemic. That pay rise will see the commissioner’s total salary, including pension, rise above that of the CEOs of Ofqual and Ofgem, by £40,000 and £50,000 respectively. Furthermore, a 10% increase is significantly higher than the 1% pay rise that the Government have offered our frontline key workers in our NHS.

Changes to the commissioner’s remuneration come around only every few years and, as the Minister has set out, the salary has been frozen for more than three years now. The Opposition agree that a review is necessary to ensure that the salary is reflective of public service uprating protocols. However, we have some key questions that arise from a significant pay rise being gifted to any public servant, even in non-pandemic times.

First, we would like to know how much of the proposed increase is justifiably related to inflation, the cost of living and what the salary would have been uprated to had it been treated like any other public sector or public service job. We need to know what proportion of the pay rise is related to that and what is related directly to the additional responsibilities that the role is expected to see over the next few years, which the Minister summarised. Last time the commissioner’s pay was increased, it was because of the expansion of responsibilities introduced under GDPR.

The most recent job advert for the role of Information Commissioner shows that the successful candidate will play a key role in supporting the roll-out of the national data strategy. As the Minister emphasised, that strategy focuses on economic growth, rather than online safety or individual data rights. We still await details of the data strategy, but that highlights three new key responsibilities that the Information Commissioner will be taking on or assisting with.

We are not arguing against the need for those additional responsibilities. Indeed, the Opposition argue more that the Government have been slow to react to the changing digital landscape over the past decade, allowing our data to be used in nefarious ways, be that targeting vulnerable people with harmful messages or undermining democracy through misinformation and lies during election cycles. So little has been done and so much still needs to be done beyond the limited scope of the forthcoming Online Safety Bill—published only in draft form so far.

The Government must recognise that if we are to put people in control of their own data, the ICO must take greater action against those who act improperly with data. Existing law does not sufficiently cover the threats that people face, as the pandemic has emphasised, and new challenges are arising.

For example, at the start of this year I called for a review of data privacy protection to outlaw digital snooping after a YouGov survey found that 16% of companies installed remote tracking software in employees’ devices. The Government have since done nothing to address that and, in response my questions, they even appear to deny that it is an issue. The Information Commissioner, although appealed to, has yet to set out a regulatory framework on worker surveillance that will protect workers. Currently, the ICO offers limited guidance to employers.

We recognise the increase in responsibilities, but we are not sure that the Minister has fully set out the responsibilities as they need to be. In addition, he described the role as benefiting from Brexit, to ensure that our data regime evolves in a way that allows data to flow more easily, while not impacting on our highly prized and essential data adequacy requirements with the European Union. The next Information Commissioner will need to be something of a magician if they are to reflect both those requirements.

I must also ask specifically how the ICO as a whole will be resourced to reflect that increase in responsibilities, because increasing the pay of the commissioner will simply not address that. The Minister said that the ICO has 850 people, but my information from the Library is that it has 720 full-time members of staff. Ofcom has 937 and its CEO earns a salary of £315,000 per year. Ofgem has 920 staff and its CEO is paid £225,000 per year. Dividing total salary with pension by the number of staff, by my calculation—I will be happy to see the Minister’s—Ofcom’s CEO has pay per employee of £336, and for Ofgem the figure is £244. The Information Commissioner will have £365, which is significantly higher. Does the Minister feel that is proportionate? Will he assure us that the ICO will be resourced to protect us online? Will that involve taking on more staff, for example? Will he commit to bringing in robust and extensive regulations to protect us from evolving threats, such as artificial intelligence or surveillance?

The Minister talked about how the ICO handled nuisance call. I have to say that that seems a significant overestimate. When I raised the issue of online scams and fraud with the commissioner, she told me that the ICO

“are working closely with our partners, like Trading Standards and law enforcement, to continue to protect people, raise awareness and stop criminals during this challenging period.”

By no means is it taking on sole responsibility for online scams and fraud, and very few people believe that enough is being done.

Which?, the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute, UK Finance and the Carnegie Trust have all called on the Government to do more to prevent online scams and the data leaks that contribute to them. When my parliamentary account was targeted with sexually explicit spam emails, I contacted the ICO directly, but again there seemed to be confusion over where responsibility lay. There is also confusion about how to respond to scams, nuisance emails and calls. Will the Minister say in one sentence what a citizen who is so targeted should do? He is nodding at me, so I hope that means we will get the clarity that I have been looking for.

Over the past decade—I should declare an interest, as I previously worked for Ofcom—Ofcom has taken on significant new responsibilities: the BBC, the Post Office, national security for the entire telecoms network, and now the confused and contradictory online safety duties. I am concerned that new responsibilities plus the absence of a joined-up approach by Government to data breaches, data rights and scams might lead to the Information Commissioner being similarly overburdened. Apart from the salary increase, what plans does the Minister have to address that challenge? Furthermore, will he tell me whether he plans to raise the already extremely high salary of £315,000 per year for Ofcom’s CEO in line with its continued expansion of duties?

The Minister mentioned the job advert, and we agree that we want to attract the brightest and the best. In 2018, when the commissioner’s renumeration was last re-evaluated, the Government were clear that the wage rise was in part designed to increase competitiveness in the market and to attract world-class candidates. He said that it had fallen behind comparable roles. However, as he is well aware, that depends what roles we compare it with. For example, Canada’s information commissioner is paid £182,000 per year, and Ireland’s is paid £177,000 per year, as research by the House of Commons Library has indicated to me. I would expect that the Minister has access to comparable research, so can he give a bit more detail on what assessment has been done of the current jobs market for this role?

The advert closed on 28 March, and the Minister said that they had an excellent candidate. Can he tell us when we can expect an announcement of a successful candidate? I will also raise the point that in 2018 the Government cited an increase in freedom of information requests as another justification for the increase in salary. We recognised that as a valid concern back in 2018. However, the Government’s figures show that freedom of information requests across all monitored bodies have since fallen by 10%. Has the Minister taken that into account when considering the pay rise?

The ICO and its commissioner work to uphold information rights. We have seen the significant impact that the pandemic has had on our working lives and social lives over the past 15 months, and the role that our personal data plays in everything from global trade to local service provision is only going to increase. Personal data drives the business models of the digital economy and, increasingly, the artificial intelligence algorithms that take important decisions about how we live, study and work. We need to put people back in control of their data, and I hope the Minister would agree with that.

Finally, I will just note that we must be careful and take stock when discussing very high rates of pay in the public sector. Many of our constituents are angry at the way the Government have treated the NHS and public sector key workers throughout the pandemic, compounded by a decade of cuts to public services and real-terms salary cuts to frontline staff. These are difficult times for families across the country, many of whom do not know whether they are going to have a job to return to once pandemic support is withdrawn.

However, we appreciate that the commissioner’s renumeration has been increased only once since 2008 and, as the Minister has stated, that it is vitally important that we attract the best candidate to the role. As such, I will not be asking my hon. Friends to vote against this increase, but I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s answers to the questions I have asked, and I hope that the Government will meet the calls for a pay rise for frontline public sector key workers with the same enthusiasm they have demonstrated today.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I thank the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central for the helpful way in which she has raised some perfectly valid questions, which I will do my best to address. I will begin by joining her in thanking the outgoing Information Commissioner, Elizabeth Denham, who I think I appointed in my previous capacity a few years ago.

It is worth reminding the Committee, which I did not do in my opening address, that Elizabeth Denham’s salary is £180,000, which was a single supplement at the time of her appointment. Without today’s motion, the salary of the incoming commissioner would fall back from £180,000 to £164,000. The hon. Lady’s questions about how it compares with the rate of inflation and with the pay of public sector workers are valid, but we need to set this in context. The proposed increase would take the current salary from £180,000 to £200,000, but without the motion it would come back down again.

Of course, we all understand that these are difficult times for many people. A lot of our constituents will look at these huge salaries and say, “That’s more than I could ever dream of getting; surely £164,000 is an awful lot of money.” But the truth is that we are operating in an incredibly globally competitive area, where the skills we need are in short supply, and where people who possess those skills can command huge salaries. We have had some very good applicants, and I suspect that whichever of them ends up getting the job will be getting a pay cut from what they are currently earning.

The hon. Lady made a number of comparisons. It is difficult to equate different regulators or international regimes, but the Italian Data Protection Authority pays its head €240,000, while the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner commands a salary of £272,000, so the amount we are paying is by no means at the top of the scale. The hon. Lady mentioned Ofcom, which pays about £330,000. Executives on the Financial Conduct Authority get between £380,000 and £550,000, and Network Rail’s chair gets £310,000. Although I fully recognise that we are asking the taxpayer to meet a considerable salary, it is by no means the highest, if we look at other regulators. It reflects the critical importance of data for our economic growth.

The hon. Lady referred to the national data strategy. We published the results of a consultation on the national data strategy at the same time the ICO published its data sharing code. We will be going on to consider what additional changes might be made to try to remove some of the barriers that I have spoken about. The ICO will play a critical part in this area.

There are new responsibilities that, as I said, did not exist before Britain ceased to be a member of the European Union. The hon. Lady rightly referred to the importance of data adequacy. I hope we will very shortly reach the final agreement that the UK will maintain data adequacy with the European Union. One of the new opportunities is to look at potentially signing new data adequacy agreements with third countries. That is something that, at the moment, the EU does, but very slowly. As a third country, we now have that ability. In the consideration of whether we can reach an agreement, the ICO will play an absolutely critical role.

The hon. Lady referred to nuisance calls. One needs to differentiate to some extent between what are termed nuisance calls—people ringing somebody up and trying to persuade them to make claims or whatever that they do not need—and scams that try to persuade people to put something on their computer that will allow some criminal to access all their personal financial information. The two are obviously closely related, but one is very firmly within the remit of the ICO and the other is, to some extent, within the remit of law enforcement and the Home Office. Obviously, they all need to work together very closely, and that is happening. At the moment, scams and fraud are probably causing more distress and anxiety, whereas a few years ago it was mortgage protection policy claims and other types of nuisance calls that we all experience. As I say, they are working together very closely on that. The Home Office, which leads on that, intends to say more about that very shortly.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I just want it to be clear that although he is right to say that it is possible, and indeed important, to distinguish between nuisance calls and scams, they both share the characteristic that somebody has got hold of a person’s data, phone number and something about them, so a nuisance call can lead to a scam, depending on how much personal data they have. All the mobile networks, for example, have one text number that people can text if they get a nuisance call. There is also Action Fraud. The ICO has a relevant page on one of its websites. I want to emphasise to the Minister the point that this is very complex and individual citizens do not know what to do in response to nuisance calls—there is not a sufficiently shared understanding of that—so to say that the ICO is addressing either of these is actually an overstatement.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I completely agree that more needs to be done, and I think action is being taken now. The hon. Lady is right that there is a lot of confusion about where to go to report receipt of a nuisance or scam call—I have done that myself. Although Ofcom monitors, it does not deal with individuals. The ICO has a reporting mechanism, but an individual does not necessarily know whether anything ever happens if they do report. Action Fraud is where they should go if it is a claim of fraud.

All I will say to the hon. Lady is that I am very aware that there is a lack of public confidence and that it needs to be addressed. As I have said, discussions are going on between the ICO, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Home Office and, as the hon. Lady rightly identifies, the telecoms companies. I think that there is almost certainly more that can be done there, and I believe that we will be saying more about that very shortly. This is another reason why the ICO plays a critically important role, both in supporting economic growth and technical innovation in our economy and in providing protection for citizens against the abuse of their data or, as in this case, what we recognise are highly distressing calls—either nuisance calls or, worse, scams.

I will end by repeating that the ICO is a very important office, and it is going to get more important over time. That means we need to have an outstanding person at the head of it. The hon. Lady asked when we will announce the person’s identity. I can say that we are very far advanced. I hope that we will be in a position to make that announcement very shortly. Of course, once we do, it will need to be confirmed by the relevant Select Committee. That process will already be in train. I am sure that the new Information Commissioner will also be delighted to discuss these things with the hon. Lady once he or she is in place.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the motion:

That, from 1 November 2021—

(1) the Information Commissioner shall be paid a salary of £200,000 per annum and pension benefits in accordance with the standard award for the civil service pension scheme;

(2) all previous resolutions relating to the salary and pension of the Information Commissioner shall cease to have effect.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Tuesday 25th May 2021 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Provision of information to the Intelligence and Security Committee—

“The Secretary of State must provide the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is reasonably practicable with a copy of—

(a) any direction or notice (or part thereof) that is withheld from publication by the Secretary of State in the interests of national security in accordance with section 105Z11(2) or (3) of the Communications Act 2003;

(b) any notification of contravention given by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 105Z18(1) of the Communications Act 2003;

(c) any confirmation decision given by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 105Z20(2)(a) of the Communications Act 2003;

(d) any reasons for making an urgent enforcement direction that are withheld by the Secretary of State in the interests of national security in the accordance with section 105Z22(5) of the Communications Act 2003; and

(e) any reasons for confirming or modifying an urgent enforcement direction that are withheld by the Secretary of State in the interests of national security in accordance with section 105Z23(6) of the Communications Act 2003.”

This new clause would ensure that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is provided with any information relating to a designated vendor direction, notification of contravention, urgent enforcement action or modifications to an enforcement direction made on grounds of national security.

New clause 3—Network diversification—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the impact of progress of the diversification of the telecommunications supply chain on the security of public electronic communication networks and services.

(2) The report required by subsection (1) must include an assessment of the effect on the security of those networks and services of—

(a) progress in network diversification set against the most recent telecommunications diversification strategy presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State;

(b) likely changes in ownership or trading position of existing market players;

(c) changes to the diversity of the supply chain for network equipment;

(d) new areas of market consolidation and diversification risk including the cloud computing sector;

(e) progress made in any aspects of the implementation of the diversification strategy not covered by subsection (a);

(f) the public funding which is available for diversification.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay the report before Parliament.

(4) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than two months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on the impact of the Government’s diversification strategy on the security of telecommunication networks and services, and allow for a debate in the House of Commons on the report.

Amendment 1, in clause 14, page 21, line 27, at end insert—

“(3) The Secretary of State must, in the process of carrying out reviews and drafting subsequent reports, consult the appropriate ministers from the devolved governments.”

[Chi Onwurah]

It is a great pleasure to speak in this debate on Report. As I may have mentioned before, I am a chartered electrical engineer; before I entered Parliament, I worked for 20 years helping to build out the networks—fixed wireless and mobile—that became the internet. I am proud of that work and of the immense contribution that the telecommunications sector makes to our society, our economy and our security.

I am very pleased that today we are dedicating parliamentary time to our telecommunications sector. I thank all Members across the House who served on the Bill Committee for our many hours of fruitful debate as we strove to secure improvements to the Bill. I also thank the officials of this House, particularly in the Public Bill Office and the Library, who have provided such excellent support.

I declare an interest: many provisions in the Bill deal with the regulator Ofcom, and my last telecommunications role was with Ofcom. I joined it in 2004 just a few weeks after it was born, when it was to be a light-touch regulator, small and nimble. As a consequence of my time in the sector, I have been calling for greater security, particularly for our mobile networks, since I first entered this place in 2010.

The Labour party and I welcome the intention behind the Bill, but a number of areas in it need to be addressed. We are here today because of the Huawei debacle of the Government’s making. The Government have been forced to require the removal of Huawei, at an estimated cost of £2 billion and a delay of two to three years to our 5G roll-out, after overseeing Huawei’s rapid rise to be the foremost supplier to the telecoms company that carries our country’s name and universal service obligation: British Telecom.

The telecoms supply chain review found that there were no incentives for our mobile network operators to provide secure networks. Moreover, successive Tory Governments have squandered the world-leading position on broadband infrastructure left to them by Labour in 2010, as the United Kingdom has fallen down the league table from 27th to 47th in the world for average internet speeds. This lack of sovereign capability and absence of an effective telecoms strategy has resulted in our dependency on high-risk vendors, which the Bill seeks to address.

I am sure that you will be pleased to know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I will not repeat the same arguments on Huawei that have dominated the debate over recent years. Given where we are now, we support the aims of the Bill. National security is the first duty of any Government, and Labour will always put national security first. Our telecoms infrastructure is clearly critical to our defence and security, as well as our economic prosperity.

We agree that, as the Bill sets out, the Secretary of State should have powers to designate vendors of concern and require mobile network operators to take appropriate action, and that Ofcom should have the power to monitor and enforce those directions. However, we wish to improve the Bill in three key areas, which our new clauses 1, 2 and 3 seek to address.

The first area is national security. Labour prioritises national security, and the sweeping powers that the Bill gives the Secretary of State must be used in the interests of securing our critical national infrastructure. Removing Huawei does not, in and of itself, make our networks secure now or protect them against future threats; that requires a number of additional measures, some of which are in the Bill and some of which are not. For a start, if our telecoms network is to be secure, there must be expert democratic oversight of the measures that make it secure—yet the Bill makes no provision for Parliament’s experts, the Intelligence and Security Committee, to be informed or consulted. We want to fix that.

Secondly, the security of our network depends on an effective plan to diversify the supply chain. We are very concerned that the Bill does not even mention diversification and thus risks short-changing our national security, our technological sovereignty and our telecoms infrastructure. We want to ensure that progress is made in diversification as a prerequisite for the security of the telecoms network and a UK sovereign capability should be a part of that.

Thirdly, the Bill gives many new responsibilities and powers to Ofcom. That follows a vast expansion of Ofcom’s remit over the past 10 years. We want to make sure that Ofcom is appropriately resourced to carry out its duties and to be forward looking, not simply looking back.

One of the great failings of the Bill is that the Government are so fixated on fighting the last battle—the Huawei battle—they are not looking to the future. That is, in part, because various Government Back-Bench Members have very real concerns about the rise of China and its influence on our infrastructure. But these concerns, however well justified, seem to be blinding the Government to threats that are not Chinese in origin. We want to fix that. We want Ofcom to have the resources and the will to monitor the evolution of our telecoms networks, so that future threats, wherever they come from, can be identified and we do not find ourselves forced, as we are now, to make a huge change to our networks, at a huge cost to our economy.

I turn to new clause 1. As I said in my opening remarks, I joined Ofcom in 2004 when it was in its infancy as a slimline regulator. I kept a copy of the Communications Act 2003 on my desk. Since then, that Act has already doubled in size as Ofcom has acquired responsibility for critical national infrastructure: the BBC; the Post Office; online harms—that Bill is coming down the road; and, in this Bill, parts of national security as well. This latest expansion of Ofcom duties will necessarily add a strain not only to its budget, but to its resources. In January, in response to my written question, the Government stated that Ofcom would have the resources that it needs to do the job, in which case the Minister should be keen to support new clause 1, which requires Ofcom to report on the adequacy of its resources in fulfilling its functions under the amendments made in the Bill.

Ofcom lacks experience in national security measures—this was discussed during the evidence stage—and the expansion of duties will require the recruitment of people with the required level of security clearance and experience. That is not going to be easy, as we heard during the evidence sessions. Emily Taylor of Oxford Information Labs said that Ofcom

“will have to acquire a very specific set of skills and capabilities and that will require substantial investment and learning as an organisation”.––[Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 19 January 2021; c. 72, Q84.]

These skills are rare. The memo from the Minister, for which I am grateful, sets out how Ofcom and the National Cyber Security Centre will work. While it is welcome that they will work together, it did not provide the reassurance that we need. Indeed, it suggests that Ofcom will be entirely dependent on the NCSC for cyber skills and therefore, presumably, unable to understand the advice that it receives from the organisation.

New clause 1 requires Ofcom to report annually on the adequacy of measures taken by network providers to comply with changes introduced in the Bill, empowering the Government to track the effectiveness of the legislation. However, new clause 1 does more than that. It ensures that Ofcom has the human and informational resources to be forward looking. As I said, we are concerned that the Bill is backward looking and does not look to future threats. New clause 1 requires Ofcom to provide an assessment of emerging or future security risks based on its interrogation of network providers’ asset registers.

I am pleased that the Government are taking steps—as I understand it from the Minister—to formalise existing best practice in the telecoms sector and ensure that national providers maintain asset registers. I can tell Members that that has not always been the case. As the Minister said during the Committee stage, asset registers are an

“important part of the existing landscape”––[Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 21 January 2021; c. 162.]

But I ask him: why does he not take this further? We need to ensure that we have a good understanding of our national assets and so can assess emerging threats. Doing so would have made Huawei’s dominance visible earlier and it would now enable warning signs of future concerns—and there are future concerns. Again, Emily Taylor said:

“I feel a little like we have been fetishising 5G and a single company for the last two years, perhaps at the expense of a more holistic awareness of systemic cyber-security risks… Healthcare systems probably would not have been top of the list two years ago, but now they are. The SolarWinds attack shows that the identity of the vendor is not always the key risk point. SolarWinds is a very trusted vendor from a like-minded, close ally country, and yet it turns out to be a critical single point of failure across key, very sensitive Government Departments, both in the US and the UK.––[Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 19 January 2021; c. 74, Q88.]

So I want the Minister to consider that in his response on this proposal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah [V]]

This has been a very well-informed debate. I am sorry if my own digital connectivity did not enable my contribution to be heard as perfectly as it should have been, but I hope we have corrected that.

There were many excellent contributions from both sides of the House. It is important to note that the House is in quite rare agreement on a number of questions regarding the Bill, particularly on the importance of national security. The representatives of each of the parties in the debate—the hon. Members for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn), for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon), and the Minister himself—shared support for the primacy of national security and recognition of the importance of our telecoms networks in our national security, and I was pleased to listen to their contributions. I thank the Minister for his response and for the tone in which the debate has been conducted.

However, I will say briefly, with regard to new clause 1, which seeks to ensure that Ofcom has the skills and expertise needed to undertake its new duties in the midst of all the other responsibilities that Parliament is asking, as well as reviewing future provision and threats to the network, that the Minister’s comments on the increase in the cap on Ofcom’s budget did not begin to address our concerns. We have, effectively, a snapshot of the financial resourcing available now. The new clause seeks to ensure that we have an understanding of the resourcing as it continues—as threats evolve in the future—and particularly that we are able to look forward to new and evolving threats on the basis of a thorough understanding of the assets in each network operator’s network.

Indeed, the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) emphasised the step change in the requirements of Ofcom that the Bill represents. The Minister implied that Ofcom would be able to do everything requested in the new clause when it comes to looking at asset registers, for example. I simply do not understand his reluctance to put that in the Bill, given the important role that Ofcom is to play in our telecoms security. I am afraid that I do not feel that he answered my points on new clause 1.

On new clause 2, members of the Intelligence and Security Committee—its Chair, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis); the right hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart); and the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings—eloquently articulated many of the arguments for why the ISC needs to be part of the scrutiny of this Bill. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Beckenham was particularly detailed in his description of the very room requirements for assessing national security issues. Having worked at Ofcom, I know its rooms very well, and I do not think that they meet the requirements that he set out.

It is worth noting that the ISC was one of the first parliamentary organisations to raise issues around Huawei, back in 2013. It seems very wrong that it should be excluded from involvement in scrutinising how the Bill is implemented, given that it is the only parliamentary grouping with the appropriate security clearance. Although I appreciate the Minister’s constructive tone, I do not think that he answered the questions raised or sufficiently justified the Government’s aversion to ensuring a process for ISC scrutiny, so I will press new clause 2 to a vote.

Finally, the most complex of our new clauses is new clause 3, which would ensure that the diversification of our telecoms networks was achieved as a prerequisite for their security. We heard from the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) about how telecoms markets have been constructed to enable the consolidation and monopoly power of particular players, and particularly Huawei. Unfortunately, he did not go on to say how in the Bill the Government would deliver on a UK sovereign capability, but he was absolutely right about how the market has effectively failed.

The hon. Member for Wealden (Ms Ghani) used her experience on NATO’s science and technology committee and on this Parliament’s Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee to encourage the Minister to truly examine our network resilience. New clause 3 is designed to ensure the ongoing ability to examine network diversification and resilience.

We heard from the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings about the impact of the unaccountable power of monopolies. Again, since the Bill does not mention a diversification plan or diversification strategy, we cannot see that it will do anything to address that issue. The hon. Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland) said that the Bill supports network diversification. I know that that is the intention, but without our new clause I cannot see how it will actually achieve it.

The Minister reiterated the diversification plans, which are not a plan—as I set out, they have no detail and no action. As for his attempt to explain why the Government have omitted from the Bill any reference to diversification, I have to say that I found it entirely incomprehensible. It was as if referring in the Bill to diversification would limit the meaning of diversification; if that were the case, we would be unable to refer in any Bill to many of its intentions or outcomes.

I remain convinced, and there is agreement on all sides of the House, that we need to ensure that diversification of our telecoms supply chain goes hand in hand with ripping out Huawei and reducing our dependence on the two remaining providers. It is very important that we take this opportunity to change the Bill so that the diversification of our telecoms networks is an integral part of Ofcom’s reporting on the progression of those networks, so I will also press new clause 3 to a vote.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

As I announced earlier, there will be three Divisions. As usual—if anything is usual these days—the first will take eight minutes and each subsequent Division will take five.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah [V]]

I thank the Minister for his statement and echo his remarks in thanking all the Clerks and officials of the House and the Department who worked on the Bill, as well as our security services for the protection they provide day and night and for the input of the NCSC and GCHQ to the Bill.

I want to make it clear that the Labour party supports the Bill as a necessary step in protecting our telecoms national security. It is important that we legislate to ensure that Government have the power to act when faced with circumstances such as those presented by Huawei or, even better, to prevent dependency on high-risk vendors from arising in the first place. We will therefore not oppose the Bill on Third Reading. We recognise that national security is the first duty of every Government, and we support the measures to promote national security in the Bill.

At every stage of the Bill’s passage, we have seen an engaged and informed level of debate. As a chartered telecoms engineer, I particularly welcome the time that the House is spending on considering our telecoms infrastructure, even in these circumstances, which are to be regretted: we should not have got here. Parts of our debate have resembled a wake for the telecoms sector we could have had with a UK sovereign capability. The telecoms sector should have been subject to a more active, proactive interest for years now—or, shall I say, 10 years? We have lacked a telecoms industrial strategy and that, together with a focus on foreign investment over national security, is why we are here. Successive Conservative Governments have allowed the telecoms sector in the UK to be dominated by a high-risk vendor. Competition on price rather than security has become the rule for the telecoms operators. The market failed, but Ministers did not notice; they thought that security could be left to the market.

This is at a time when digital has become part of every part of our lives. We now spend a quarter of our waking hours on the internet. The UK telecoms industry contributes £32 billion to the economy and directly provides nearly a quarter of a million jobs. It has an impact on all our lives. As we are experiencing during the pandemic, it is an enabler of almost everything we do, and in the future—by which I mean in the next few years—it will bring about even more significant changes to how we live, work and engage with one another.

From driverless cars to advanced manufacturing, digital connectivity is essential. Indeed, we can argue that the pandemic has given us a taste of the future and moved the future closer. It has shown us how important good, fast, stable connectivity is, with millions still depending on it to work from home and stay in contact with friends and family. The pandemic has encouraged—indeed, required—a mass migration online, with businesses that were not digital-ready suddenly forced to operate online. It is salutary to recall that before covid there was a question of whether broadband was a vital utility. That was a matter of debate; it was debated as part of the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Act 2021. The pandemic has since proved beyond doubt that telecoms is an essential utility, but, although our telecoms infrastructure has held up during the pandemic—I congratulate telecoms operators on that—it could have been so much better. Many in rural areas or unable to afford decent broadband will not thank me for praising our telecoms networks.

When Labour left office, we had world-leading infrastructure. That is no longer the case. We are now 47th in the world for broadband speeds. I say that to emphasise the significance of the upheaval that the sector is facing after the Government’s decision to strip Huawei out of the network, at a cost of £2 billion and two to three years delay to 5G roll-out. It is a decision that we supported and continue to support, but we cannot let solving one problem give rise to numerous more. Unfortunately, the holes that remain in this Bill will do just that. Let me emphasise how important this Bill is in ensuring that we get regulation and investment right for a sector that contributes so much to our economy, as well as to our work and social lives.

We must make sure that we do not find ourselves in a similar position again, and that our telecoms network and supply chains are resilient and protected in future—even, critically, as the geopolitical environment evolves. Our telecoms infrastructure lacks security and resilience. The Government have taken no steps to maintain or develop a sovereign telecommunications capability, and their broadband strategy—if we can call it that—has far more U-turns, dither and delay than meaningful policies.

The Bill is passing to the other place with significant failings. The first is national security. Labour prioritises national security. The Secretary of State and the Minister both agreed during the proceedings that the Bill needed to include sweeping powers to address matters of national security, so we remain concerned that the Committee that provides parliamentary oversight on matters of national security is being excluded from oversight of the measures in the Bill.

Secondly, the security of our networks depends on an effective plan to diversify the supply chain. As our amendments have fallen, the Bill still does not even mention supply chain diversification or the diversification taskforce, even though we all agree that we cannot have a robust and secure network with only two service providers, which is the number that we will have left once Huawei is removed from our networks.

I am going to say this once more for the Minister: we need a diversified supply chain and that means a diversity of suppliers at different points of the supply chain. Britain has great start-ups that are just desperate to help address this issue. Where is the support for them? The future of telecoms networks is moving away from closed, proprietary boxes to open interfaces and innovation in the cloud. That provides a real opportunity for some of our innovative companies, but the Government have still not laid out how this is to be realised, as their own diversification taskforce report recently made clear. Is the UK going to benefit from the costly debacle of ripping out Huawei—an integrated supplier? Right now, the only beneficiaries would appear to be Ericsson, Nokia and lawyers. We put the Government on notice that we will be holding them to account on that.

Thirdly, the Bill gives sweeping new powers and responsibilities to Ofcom. This follows a vast and continuing expansion of Ofcom’s remit. Ofcom lacks experience in national security, and changes to its duties will require the recruitment of people with the required level of security clearance and experience. The Minister and the Government have sought to evade scrutiny on that. We will seek to hold them to account. As part of that, we are very concerned that the Bill in its current form is not forward thinking enough. It lacks the processes to provide the foresight needed to ensure that we are not in this same position again. Where is the horizon-scanning function to identify emerging threats and potential weaknesses in UK telecoms providers’ asset registers? If our networks became dependent on one cloud service provider, such as Amazon Web Services, how would we know?

To conclude, we support the Bill as a necessary measure to protect our telecoms national security interests, but we are concerned that the Government have allowed ideology to undermine effectiveness when it comes to this Bill, and we will continue to seek to improve it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Thursday 20th May 2021 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Dinenage]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right to highlight the fact that the pandemic has demonstrated how digital inclusion and accessibility have been fundamental to our ability to learn, work and meet our friends. Social tariffs are already available that offer low-cost landline and broadband services for those on certain means-tested benefits. However, the Government are now encouraging all fixed-broadband providers to introduce a social tariff.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]]

The Minister says that no one should be left behind, but 60% of over-50s with household earnings under £20,000 per year are not online; more than half of adults who are not online are disabled; 2 million households in the UK have been without internet access during lockdown; and there are up to 900,000 children without devices. Yet the Government’s digital inclusion strategy was last updated in 2014 and there is still no target for inclusion. Why will the Minister not tell us what proportion of the population she is happy to leave behind in this digital age?

[Caroline Dinenage]

I feel that that is a massive under-representation of the huge amount of work that has happened over the past year. The Government agreed a set of commitments with the UK’s major broadband and mobile operators to support vulnerable customers during the covid-19 period. A whole heap of extra laptops—1.3 million of them, on top of the 2.9 million that were already in schools—have been rolled out to young people. In February, to tackle the disproportionate impact of covid-19 on disabled people, the Department launched a £2.5 million digital lifeline fund to support 5,000 people with learning disabilities to access devices, connectivity and digital skills support.

Draft Audiovisual Media Services (Amendment) Regulations 2021

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Monday 19th April 2021 General Committees

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Elliott, and I welcome the rest of the Committee to this important statutory instrument. I thank the Minister for her opening remarks—here we are again, talking about audiovisual regulation without there being any online safety Bill in statute or in sight.

To begin with, I declare an interest: as the Minister is aware, before I entered Parliament I spent six years working for Ofcom as head of technology. As she mentioned, Ofcom has responsibility with regard to this SI. During my time there, it had responsibility for regulating broadcast audiovisual services and some responsibility for online audiovisual media services, which were beginning to grow in importance—although not always legally. Online audiovisual media services were nowhere near as widespread or important then as they have since become, and they have been especially critical during the pandemic. Video-sharing platforms, or VSPs, which are the core of the SI, have become a major presence in the lives of many people in this country—just look at TikTok or YouTube.

The SI follows on from two SIs of the same name that were laid in November and September 2020 and which put the UK’s obligations in line with the European Union’s audiovisual media services directive—AVMSD— in preparation for the end of the transition period at the end of last year. As the Minister said, the AVMSD introduced three key requirements for VSPs: to take measures to protect minors from content that is harmful to those under 18; to take appropriate measures to protect the general public from harmful and illegal content; and to introduce standards on advertising. It is notable that we are dependent on the directive for regulation because we do not have online harms legislation, and I want to emphasise that AVMSD should not be used as a replacement for robust UK online safety legislation.

As the Minister said, the SI makes technical changes to the definition of terms and to Ofcom’s duties as a regulator, and it could potentially impact on the UK-EU working relationship. The SI includes changes to the definition of “European works”. As part of the AVMSD’s attempt to strengthen the competitiveness of the European audiovisual industry and to promote cultural diversity and heritage in Europe—I am sure they are ambitions that we all support—the European Union identified “European works”. Such works are both linear and on-demand audiovisual media products. Under the AVMSD, 30% of on-demand programming services must be European works, so the SI laid in November brought that quota into UK law.

For a product to qualify as a European work, it must originate in a member state or third-party state, or have been co-produced within a framework of agreements between the EU and third countries. My understanding is that UK productions currently qualify as European works because the UK continues to be a signatory to the European convention on transfrontier television, and I hope the Minister will confirm that.

The changes made by the SI allow the definition of European works in UK law to adapt to and adopt unilateral changes to the definition of European works by the European Union. On the one hand, this allows flexibility and removes potential legislative barriers that may arise in the future, but on the other hand, it raises concerns over sovereignty, which I am sure the Minister remembers was a key issue in the Brexit debate. Should the European Union change the definition of European works to exclude audiovisual works created in third-party states and by signatories to the European convention on transfrontier television, I believe such a change would be automatically adopted into UK law, leaving UK audiovisual works outside the 30% quota. That could create a circumstance whereby UK audiovisual products are at a disadvantage and are not considered part of European works.

Can the Minister confirm whether any changes made by the EU to the definition of European works will be automatically transposed into UK law? If such a circumstance occurred, how quickly and by what means would the Government act to ensure that UK products are not placed at a disadvantage? It highlights the fact that, although we are still using European Union definitions, we have no say in how those definitions evolve. What guarantees has she received from the European Union that future changes to the definition of European works will not lead to the UK being excluded? What assessment has she made of the impact of such an exclusion, should it happen? Will unilateral changes by the European Union to the definition of European works be addressed in the forthcoming online safety Bill, which we have heard so much about even though we have yet to see even a draft?

I would hope that future negotiations between the European Union and the UK ensure ongoing agreement on this definition. However, it is clear from the draft regulations that the relationship with respect to the definition of European works is not reciprocal: the UK has adopted the European Union’s definition without the European Union being forced to reflect or adopt any changes that the UK could make; I am not sure that in this case it could make any.

Back in November, I raised jurisprudence issues. Under the current rules, a VSP will come under UK jurisdiction if it has a fixed establishment in the UK and the centre of its economic activity relating to the relevant service is based in the UK, not in an EU member state. If the VSP is not established in the UK and no EU member state has jurisdiction over it, it will come under UK jurisdiction if it has a group undertaking established in the UK. The draft regulations and the AVMSD fail to provide a level playing field for online and offline services: they do not protect UK citizens from harmful content, either specifically for VSPs that do not have a group undertaking in the UK or generally, whereas offline broadcast services in the UK are subject to UK regulation.

A significant gap has opened up in online safety legislation. UK citizens and consumers are not adequately protected from harms under the current jurisprudence and regulatory regime, and the draft regulations do nothing to address that. Analysis commissioned by the Government shows that under the current rules-of-origin approach to jurisprudence, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Dailymotion and Twitter are all outside the UK’s regulatory scope. What are the Government doing to build the regulatory framework that will protect UK citizens online? What role will the draft regulations play in that? I am sure that the Minister will refer to the online safety Bill; we look forward to more details on the timetable of its passage.

The Government may have left the UK without the regulatory framework that we need, but they have assigned it a regulator, as we heard from the Minister. We do not know how broad Ofcom’s regulatory responsibilities will be—presumably they will be fleshed out in the online safety Bill, which we have yet to see—but the draft regulations do tell us one thing: Ofcom will not have a duty to inform the European Union of breaches of the AVMSD, because its duty to inform has been scaled back to a power that it “may” exercise. I understand that that is because EU states are not mandated to inform Ofcom of a breach, so the Government have decided to remove Ofcom’s mandate to inform European Union states.

I think we can all agree that we would be safer if breaches were reported globally: one of the challenges of regulation in the online world is that it requires global co-operation and collaboration. The decision to stop Ofcom reporting breaches to the European Union has been made because we cannot obtain a reciprocal agreement. Did the Government seek to ensure reciprocity on the sharing of data breaches and of breach data? Have they assessed the impact of the decision on the flow of information between regulators? Failure to ensure that reciprocity is a failure of Government, and it could have implications for the UK’s online safety relationship with the European Union, making us more vulnerable. I am concerned in particular that it may affect the information our regulator receives from friends and partner agencies in Europe. Will the Minister say a little about the future working relationship between UK regulators—Ofcom and the Information Commissioner’s Office, for example—and European Union state regulators, particularly on reciprocity? Will she promise no regression in the sharing of information that may keep us safe online?

I have already touched on the reason why this is so important: the UK lacks any robust online harms legislation. The online safety Bill has been a decade in the making. It is startling to think that from 2010, starting with the coalition, the Government have presided over dramatic changes in the role of the internet, the web and the online world in our lives, but we have yet to see any online safety legislation. It took them nearly two years to issue a full response to their own consultation on the matter, despite huge increases in online threats because of the pandemic. I raised the threat of child abuse, online scams and misinformation in November, when I think we all agreed that legislation was way overdue. Six months later, we still have nothing beyond the promise of a reference in the Queen’s Speech. I hope that the regulations are not a further sticking plaster to hide the Government’s delaying on such a vital issue and that further delays will not materialise. The Minister’s Department has stated that the online safety Bill will supersede the regulations, but as that Bill will probably not become law for another year, we have another year of uncertainty. Has the Minister assessed the impact that such uncertainty is having on the audiovisual sector?

Labour will not oppose the regulations because we do not believe that the Government can legislate quickly enough to address threats to online safety and jurisdiction concerns. However, we are greatly concerned about the holes in the UK’s regulatory framework and the path that the Government are taking with our future relationship with the European Union, which should be one of collaboration and co-operation on the key subject of online safety. We need reassurance that the UK and the EU will work closely together without interruption or confusion, confirmation that the Government will prioritise the wellbeing of the UK audiovisual sector, and robust and substantial regulatory legislation to protect us online.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for her comments, which are enlightening. Were there discussions around maintaining a mutual reciprocal duty to co-operate on this issue?

[Caroline Dinenage]

I will drop the hon. Lady a line on that because I do not know for sure. She asked how long this will last and how it works in relation to the online safety Bill. As she knows, we are working at pace to prepare the legislation. It will be ready shortly and she will be able to cast her eyes over it in the near future. In the meantime, we are working closely with Ofcom and will continue to engage with parliamentarians as we prepare the legislation.

Of course, we recognise the importance of being online and the benefits that that brings, but we have seen most poignantly during the coronavirus period how online safety can be a major concern. There are serious risks that users, particularly children, currently face when they are online. It has been brought to a head over the past year, and the prevalence of illegal and harmful content and activity online is unacceptable and has become more so. We have made clear our intention to repeal the video-sharing platform regime in part 4B of the Communications Act 2003 once the more comprehensive online harms regime comes into force.

In the interim, through regulating and engaging with video-sharing platforms, Ofcom will have the unique opportunity to understand the potential challenges and opportunities to be harnessed with systems regulation. These vital learnings, combined with the scope to engage with UK-established video-sharing platforms, will no doubt strengthen the online harms regime once it comes into force.

This instrument ensures that the law remains clear and operable. It is required to remedy the failures of retained EU law arising from the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The instrument will allow Ofcom to progress the implementation of the video-sharing platform regime and provide protections for UK users, especially minors.

The UK and EU have similar objectives, and we continue to share similar values when it comes to protecting users online. Through the introduction of a power to co-operate, we are signalling our commitment to working with our European and international partners. This engagement will strengthen our ability to keep UK users protected from illegal and harmful material on video-sharing platforms not established in the UK ahead of the upcoming online safety legislation.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for her comments. I also asked about European works and whether the definition of European works could be changed to exclude the UK at a future date.

[Caroline Dinenage]

Again, I will drop the hon. Lady a line on that.

Question put and agreed to.

European Football Proposal

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Finance (No. 2) Bill: (Freeports (Stamp Duty Land Tax)) (Ways and Means) & Ways and Means resolution
Monday 19th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[Oliver Dowden]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to highlight that. It seems extraordinary, at a time when most stadiums remain completely empty and clubs are under tremendous financial pressure, that, rather than focusing on the rebuilding of the game and getting fans back into stadiums, these six clubs are distracted by something that is not in the interests of the game. It is right that we look at competition law. We need to look at the range of things that Government do to help games happen, to help clubs participate in the league, and say, “Why should we be doing this anymore for those six clubs?” That is precisely the work that we are undertaking.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]]

Newcastle United fans have long suffered from the greed and self-interest that drive premiership owners, but this attempt to turn our national game into the cash cow of a narrow elite shows just how morally bankrupt the premiership has become and how little Government care. There seem to be more rules to prevent the removal of a window frame in a listed building than the wholesale destruction of this jewel of working-class culture. Can the Secretary of State believe that the owners of these six clubs meet the fit and proper person test?

[Oliver Dowden]

The hon. Lady will have seen from my statement—I am happy to repeat it—that I completely agree with her. This is absolutely central to our heritage. These clubs are as much a part of our heritage as the great castles, stately homes, cathedrals and orchestras of England and the rest of the United Kingdom. We stand ready to do whatever it takes to support this. On the fit and proper person test, that is precisely why we have set up the fan-led group and it will be one of the things my hon. Friend will be looking at as we go forward. In the short term, we need to stop this in its tracks. We do that by working with the leagues—I gave the president of UEFA my 100% support for the measures that he outlined today, and similarly we will see measures coming forward from the Premier League—and then, if that does not work, the Government themselves stand ready to take steps to prevent this from happening.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Thursday 18th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

I know just how keen my hon. Friend is to tackle broadband roll-out in the rural parts of his constituency as well as in the urban. As I mentioned, Project Gigabit will lay out a nationwide plan and it will do so in a way that promotes competition so that we get the best that the whole of the market can offer, including Openreach, but also other providers.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]]

Our Parliament, our businesses, our students, our economy and our social lives all depend on broadband. In 2019, the Prime Minister promised full fibre for all by 2025, and the 2020 Budget set aside £5 billion for that. Can the Minister confirm that only £1.2 billion of that £5 billion is planned to be spent by 2025, and that today’s decision by Ofcom to remove pricing controls will deliver greater profits for BT while allowing Openreach to charge more in rural areas that are already broadband-poorer? When will the country as a whole get the broadband infrastructure we so desperately need?

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Lady knows that the Government will spend the £5 billion that has been committed as soon as possible and as quickly as the industry can get the cable into the ground. She also knows that the important balance to strike is between a competitive market that makes sure that we get everyone, from Openreach to Gigaclear to CityFibre, involved, and ensuring that those businesses can make a fair return. That is the balance that Ofcom has sought to strike today.