Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 17th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Victoria Atkins]

I join the hon. Lady in paying tribute to Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt, whose lives were tragically cut short in a horrific manner in Fishmongers’ Hall. I am really pleased that these clauses meet with the approval of both the Government and the Opposition parties, so that we are able to make some very substantial changes, as recommended by Jonathan Hall, QC. He examined the legislation with great care and attention following the commission from the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor.

The hon. Lady asked me a few questions. If I may, I will write to her on the point about the statistics; I do not have the statistics to hand, I am afraid, but I will write to her with them. She asked about the ability under clause 159 for officers to apply for a multiple entry ability warrant. The reason for that ability is that we anticipate that there will be a very small number of cases in which counter-terrorism police officers believe that a warrant permitting multiple entry is required. An application by the police will only be made following cross-agency work, including discussion with probation services on the justification for a warrant and its appropriate scope. Ultimately, of course, it would be for the court to decide, and clause 159 is clear that the court should issue the warrant only if it is satisfied that such authorisation is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.

To reassure colleagues, Parliament has previously agreed to the creation of premises search powers that permit multiple entries. For example, the search power under section 56A of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 provides for that, and it was inserted by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. I hope that as we felt able to do that in that legislation, we will feel able to do the same in the Bill, given all the safeguards.

The hon. Lady asked about the purpose of a search. The personal search will provide the police with the means of conducting assurance checks. We envisage that in the majority of cases, they will be checks on whether a relevant terrorist offender is in possession of something that could be used to harm or threaten a person—a weapon or a fake suicide belt, for example—but there may be other limited scenarios in which a personal search for something that appears innocuous may be necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism. An example would be a personal search to check whether the offender was in possession of a mobile phone in violation of their licence conditions.

This provision gives a better means of monitoring risk, because a contraband phone would be unlikely to meet any definition of something that could be used to threaten or harm, but depending on the offender’s background, it might embolden them to make contact with their previous terrorist network, enable them to access materials useful in preparing an act of terrorism, or provide a route for them to radicalise others. I hope that I have addressed the hon. Lady’s concerns.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 157 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 158 to 161 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 18 agreed to.

Clause 162 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 163

Rehabilitation of offenders

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

I beg to move amendment 134, in clause 163, page 180, line 23, at end insert—

“(A1) The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, as it forms part of the law of England and Wales, is amended as follows.”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 143.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 135 to 143.

[Chris Philp]

It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe, and an equal pleasure to follow the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle.

Amendment 142 relates to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, which sets out a rehabilitation period for orders on conviction that impose prohibitions and other penalties. The rehabilitation period is equal to the duration of the period for which the order is specified to have effect. The amendment seeks to put beyond doubt that where the court imposes any provisions in an order, that attracts a rehabilitation period and requires disclosure in a way that is similar to when orders impose prohibitions and penalties. A provision may say, for example, that a person should, or should not, engage in a particular activity. Any provision, of whatever nature, triggers the disclosure requirement until such time as the provision ends. Amendment 142 makes that clear.

Amendment 138 is in a somewhat similar spirit. It relates to orders that set out that they have effect until the occurrence of a specified event. The court may make provision for some orders to have effect indefinitely, or until a further order is made in respect of the subject. Those orders might include disqualifications, restraining orders, sexual harm prevention orders and criminal behaviour orders. The amendment is intended to put beyond doubt that where such provision is made in the order, the rehabilitation period and the accompanying disclosure requirement end only when the order ceases to have effect, so once again, it is clarifying. The rest of the amendments in this group—134 to 137, 139 to 141, and 143—are technical amendments that make corrects to various cross-references.

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[The Chair]

No, I think it would be better to stick to the sequence on the selection list.

[Chris Philp]

Given your direction, Mr McCabe, I will not speak to clause 163 substantively just yet—or, indeed, to amendment 165—but will speak narrowly and specifically to amendment 9.

I understand the spirit of the shadow Minister’s amendment, but I observe that it is not often that the Opposition propose conferring on Government regulation-making powers that they have not asked for. It is usually the other way around, is it not?

The Government take the view that schedule 18 of the sentencing code sets out the list of most serious offences. They are the same offences used to assess dangerousness. Using schedule 18 ensures simplicity and consistency between assessing dangerousness and requiring longer disclosure. We think it is more straightforward and transparent for those people subject to disclosure requirements to know that that is not a moving target; they know the list is fixed and will not change.

The power that the shadow Minister generously proposes conferring on the Government might lead to unpredictable changes for the people affected. For those two reasons—predictability and consistency—we prefer to set things out in statute, as is currently proposed, via schedule 18 of the sentencing code.

I will briefly answer one question that the shadow Minister posed—I might address some other questions later—on research on whether these are the right lengths of time, or whether more can be done in future. Yes, I confirm that we will continue to look at this, and to conduct research as appropriate to ensure that the balance is struck between rehabilitation and protecting the public.

[Alex Cunningham]

The fact that the Government have missed the point about the narrow application of the measure and how very few people will be caught by it is lamentable. I will not press the amendment to a vote at this stage, but we may well revisit the matter in future. It is great to have such provisions, but they affect only a minority of people in the criminal justice system, when they could benefit so many more. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 137, in clause 163, page 181, line 27, at end insert—

“(3A) In subsection (2) (rehabilitation periods), in the words before paragraph (a), for ‘(3) and’ substitute ‘(2A) to’.”

This amendment and Amendments 138 to 140 make provision about the rehabilitation period that applies to a person who is subject to a relevant order where the last day on which the order is to have effect is not provided for by or under the order.

Amendment 138, in clause 163, page 182, line 8, at end insert—

“(4A) After subsection (2) (and after the table in subsection (2)(b)) insert—

‘(2A) Subsection (2B) applies where provision is made by or under a relevant order for the order to have effect—

(a) until further order,

(b) until the occurrence of a specified event, or

(c) otherwise for an indefinite period.

(2B) The rehabilitation period for the order is the period—

(a) beginning with the date of the conviction in respect of which the order is imposed, and

(b) ending when the order ceases to have effect.’”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 137.

Amendment 139, in clause 163, page 182, line 9, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) For subsection (3) (rehabilitation period for community etc order which does not provide for the last day on which the order has effect) substitute—

‘(3) The rehabilitation period for a relevant order which is not otherwise dealt with in the Table or under subsections (2A) and (2B) is the period of 24 months beginning with the date of conviction.’”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 137.

Amendment 140, in clause 163, page 182, line 11, at end insert—

“(5A) In subsection (4)(b) (rehabilitation period for other sentences), for ‘subsection (3)’ substitute ‘any of subsections (2A) to (3)’.”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 137.

Amendment 141, in clause 163, page 182, line 29, after “order” insert “—(a)”.

This amendment and Amendment 142 make provision about the rehabilitation period that applies to a person who is subject to an order which imposes requirements or restrictions on the person or is otherwise intended to regulate the person’s behaviour.

Amendment 142, in clause 163, page 182, line 31, at end insert “, and

(b) for paragraph (g) substitute—

‘(g) any order which—

(i) imposes a disqualification, disability, prohibition, penalty, requirement or restriction, or

(ii) is otherwise intended to regulate the behaviour of the person convicted,

and is not otherwise dealt with in the Table,’.”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 141.

Amendment 143, in clause 163, page 182, line 31, at end insert—

“(8A) In section 6(5) (the rehabilitation period applicable to a conviction), for the words from ‘by virtue of’ to ‘or other penalty’ substitute ‘to an order within paragraph (g) of the definition of “relevant order” in section 5(8) above’.

(8B) In section 7(1)(d) (limitations on rehabilitation under the Act), for ‘or other penalty’ substitute ‘, penalty, requirement, restriction or other regulation of the person’s behaviour’.

(8C) In paragraph 5(b) of Schedule 2 (protection for spent cautions), after ‘prohibition’ insert ‘, requirement’.”—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment makes amendments to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 that are consequential on or otherwise related to the amendments to that Act made by Amendment 142.

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I am sure that the Government do not want their widely celebrated efforts to be undermined by that oversight, so I hope that they will join us in supporting the amendment.

[Chris Philp]

As the shadow Minister said, the amendment would change the current rehabilitation period for endorsements that are imposed in respect of motoring convictions from five years to nil.  Unless another disposal is given for the same motoring conviction that attracts a separate rehabilitation period, the amendment would result in some motoring convictions being spent immediately and having no rehabilitation period. 

It is worth saying that the Department for Transport leads on the rehabilitation periods for motoring penalties. It is a complex area with a combination of fines, driving bans and penalty points, as well as community and prison sentences, which are an important part of the system to reduce dangerous and careless behaviour on our roads.  That includes the way in which the provisions interact with the insurance system, as the shadow Minister said.

Clearly, if someone gets speeding points and that has consequences for their insurance premium for some time, it is a disincentive to drive dangerously. There is also a reasonable link between someone who drives carelessly or dangerously and the risk they pose, which leads to higher insurance premiums. There is therefore a certain justice to that link.

The range of penalties and the current penalty points system has been developed to prevent low standards of driving behaviour, which have the potential to cause serious harm to other road users and, in the worst cases, death. That approach has been successful over the past few decades, under Governments of both colours, because road deaths have, mercifully, been decreasing.

Given the complexity of the subject, we do not propose to make the change that the shadow Minister suggests just now, but I can commit to conducting further research and investigation into the matter. The shadow Minister made the point about a longer disclosure period for driving causing other matters to be disclosed for a longer period than would otherwise be the case, with the consequent impact on employability. We will conduct further research into this area to ensure that we get the balance right and continue the positive direction of travel on safer roads, while at the same time ensuring that we facilitate rehabilitation.

[Alex Cunningham]

That is a helpful response from the Minister and I welcome the things that he had to say, particularly in relation to reviewing the issue in future. I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. I understand that there is considerable cross-party support elsewhere for this approach to ironing out the anomaly, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

The shadow Minister has already touched on the substance of the clause, so I do not want to repeat what he so eloquently laid out for the Committee a little earlier. In substance, the clause amends the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to enable an individual’s conviction to be spent earlier than would otherwise be the case. The reason for doing that is to enable people to rehabilitate and get back into work sooner than would otherwise be the case. However, we recognise that for the most serious offences, we want the conviction never to be spent—hence the exclusion defined by offences covered by schedule 18 of the sentencing code, which we discussed a couple of minute ago. For other offences, both for adults and for people under 18, the spending periods are reduced.

The shadow Minister asked earlier how we arrived at those particular times. We have looked at the data on reoffending, engaged widely with stakeholders and various groups in the sector that have an interest in this issue, and we have arrived at the reductions that we have. We think the reductions strike a balance between providing an earlier opportunity for rehabilitation on the one hand, and providing additional public protection and protection for employers on the other.

Of course, no Government or Ministers have a monopoly on wisdom—except, of course, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle—but we think this is a good starting point and a step in the right direction, as the shadow Minister has said already. However, we will continue to research in this area and will keep it under scrutiny, to ensure that the balance struck is the right one. I am pleased that stakeholders generally, and the shadow Minister, welcome this move.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 163, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 164

British Sign Language interpreters for deaf jurors

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 164, page 183, line 10, after “interpreter” insert

“or language and communication service professional”.

This amendment would expand the provision of the clause to include other language and communication service professionals such as interpreters for Deafblind People, lipspeakers, notetakers, Sign Language interpreters, Sign Language Translators, and Speech to Text Reporters.

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The decision lies with the judge; the amendment will just give them a wider choice. I hope that the Government will support the amendment to provide judges with wider discretion to allow deaf people to engage with jury proceedings, which is surely just realising the full intention of the original clause.

[Chris Philp]

I thank the shadow Minister for his speech. Interestingly, it pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, he quoted the Bar Council’s concerns about whether the jury principle might be undermined, but then he moved a series of amendments that would considerably increase the scope of the clause. Those two points clearly pull in opposite directions, perhaps suggesting that the clause as drafted is about in the right place.

As the shadow Minister eloquently laid out, once again, clause 164 permits a stranger—a so-called 13th member—to enter the jury room where that person is a British sign language interpreter, to assist a deaf juror in participating in the proceedings. Both sides of the House have agreed that that is a good idea. The shadow Minister read out a quote from the Bar Council that raised some concerns about the sanctity of the jury room being infringed. That is of course an important principle in law. I sat as a juror at Croydon Crown court during the summer recess a couple of years ago, so I know that that is something that the system protects fiercely, and rightly so.

I assure the shadow Minister and the Bar Council that several safeguards are in place to ensure the BSL interpreter cannot unduly influence proceedings. They have to sign an agreement that includes confidentiality and other provisions, and undertake not to engage in any behaviour that might be of concern. They swear an oath to the same effect, and breaking it would be a criminal offence. Only BSL interpreters on the proper register can be used, so someone cannot be picked off the street and wander in; it has to be somebody who is on the approved register to start with.

The shadow Minister asked about the possibility of error. I believe that the intention is to have two BSL interpreters present just in case one makes a mistake or loses attention for a moment, so there is a safeguard there. Of course, if any member of the jury witnesses behaviour that concerns them, it is always open to them to report the matter to the trial judge. I hope that the safeguards that I have just outlined address the points that the shadow Minister and the Bar Council raised.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

If jurors break their oaths and say things outside or reveal things that they should not, there can be contempt proceedings and punishments. Will the same punishments apply to the interpreters? The Minister has set out a number of contractual arrangements, which are all well and good, but will the same obligations lie upon the interpreters as lie upon jurors?

[Chris Philp]

Yes, I believe—in fact, I know, because it is written down in front of me; that is not quite the same thing, but let us assume it is for these purposes—that the provisions create a new offence where a BSL interpreter intentionally interferes in or influences the deliberations of the jury in the proceedings before a court. Yes, there are now criminal provisions being introduced by the clause.

I understand the spirit in which amendments 147 to 161were moved by the shadow Minister, and he mentioned that the hon. Member for Nottingham South assisted in their development. I understand that widening the type of people who might be able to assist could help a wider range of jurors, but there are some concerns about going too far, too quickly.

As the shadow Minister pointed out, this is a significant step. It is a significant departure from centuries of established practice. Allowing a 13th person into the jury room has never been done before. There is a feeling among the stakeholders we consulted—the judiciary, the Bar and so on—that we should take this one step at a time. Let us start with British sign language interpreters and see how that goes. If it is made to work successfully, as we hope it will be, we can look in due course at widening the range of people who might be accommodated.

There are also, I should add, potential capacity constraints. For example, I am told that there are 150 registered BSL interpreters, but only 32 speech-to-text reporters, so one might have issues with the number of available people. This is an important step. Let us take this one step first and then review it on an ongoing basis to see whether we need to go further.

[Alex Cunningham]

I accept the Minister’s explanation as far as the sanctity of the jury room is concerned, so I can leave that to one side. However, in his last few sentences he illustrated why there should be wider provision in this area: so few people are available to provide the services for the particular way he wants to take this clause forward and serve deaf people. I think there is a real opportunity to involve far more deaf people in the system. For that reason, I will press the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

This is a quick and simple clause. The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, which has been drafting this Bill, spotted a stray reference in an old piece of legislation to offences punishable by death in the context of jury sizes. It goes back to the concept of small war-time juries being unable to try certain offences where the penalty was death. We no longer have the death penalty, so the OPC thought it was a good idea to tidy up the statute book by removing the reference.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 165 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 166

Remote observation and recording of court and tribunal proceedings

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 166, page 185, line 41, at end insert—

“(8A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (8) unless the advice of the Senior Data Governance Panel (or similar committee established for this purpose) has first been sought on the provision which they would make.”

This amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to seek the advice of the Senior Data Governance Panel before making regulations governing the broadcast of court hearings.

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The Minister will be familiar with the Senior Data Governance Panel, but for the benefit of Committee members who might not be, it was specifically established to enable the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice to access advice from external experts on changes to the way in which information about court proceedings is made public. Given that the panel already exists and currently plays a central role in setting the approach for how decisions are made on matters relating to privacy, it seems sensible to us that the Lord Chancellor consults with the panel in making any regulations under the proposed new subsection. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Chris Philp]

Clauses 166 and 167 put on to a permanent and sounder footing many of the measures that have been used during the coronavirus pandemic to, first, enable remote hearings to take place and, secondly, where proper, to allow transmission of those hearings. It is important to stress that at all times the judge retains control of the proceedings and it is ultimately for the judge in any particular hearing or trial to decide what is appropriate. Nothing in the provisions fetters that important judicial discretion and safeguard over the management of any individual hearing or proceeding.

On clause 166, over the past year, our courts and tribunals have successfully and rapidly moved the bulk of their proceedings online during the pandemic. Such hearings have been vital in our court recovery.

It should be noted that in the civil and family jurisdictions, and in tribunals, the ability to hold proceedings using audio and video technology is not governed by legislation, but is permissible under the court or tribunal’s inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, no legislation is needed to enable remote hearings for those jurisdictions, in contrast to the criminal jurisdiction, for which clause 168, which we will consider shortly, makes provision.

Legislation is required to make sure that suitable safeguards are in place to protect those taking part in a hearing and ensure the proper administration of justice. Clause 166 replicates some of the temporary powers introduced during the coronavirus pandemic for that purpose, future-proofs them and brings several new jurisdictions into the regulatory framework. The clause also allows courts and tribunals to provide transmissions of proceedings either to individuals who have identified themselves and requested access, or to specifically designated locations.

As I have already pointed out, judges, magistrates and anyone presiding over a tribunal panel retain the ultimate discretion. Regulations made by the Lord Chancellor, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, will govern much of this area and will enable the regulations to be refined for particular circumstances or applications.

Clause 167 makes several further safeguards in relation to this matter permanent, with a few minor refinements. For example, the clause prohibits the recording or transmission of anyone remotely attending proceedings in a list of major courts and tribunals, unless authorised by the court or tribunal or the Lord Chancellor. It also provides clarity by defining this offence as summary-only as well as contempt, while making new provisions to preclude double jeopardy. It enshrines some of those important safeguards.

On amendment 72, which was moved by the shadow Minister and would compel the Lord Chancellor to seek the advice of the Senior Data Governance Panel, we say that that is not necessary in legislation as set out here. Of course the Government do not make the relevant regulations in isolation. That is why secondary legislation can be brought forward only with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor—a member of the Government—and of the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Justice’s concurrence is a very important safeguard.

Of course, in the formulation of regulations of this nature, informal consultation will take place with a number of bodies, including the SDGP, the judiciary, court practitioners, Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and other interested parties. The SDGP does of course advise, but it is worth pointing out that the SDGP itself is not on a statutory footing and therefore perhaps it is not appropriate to give it the sort of status that the amendment proposes. That might also risk interfering with the notion of judicial independence. Therefore, although informal consultation with various stakeholders and experts is of course important, we think that the statutory obligation contemplated by amendment 72 goes a little too far.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am content with the Minister’s explanation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 166 and 167 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 168

Expansion of use of video and audio links in criminal proceedings

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The safety of trials for vulnerable and child defendants is a matter of grave importance, so I hope that the Minister can understand our anxiety to get this right and will support the amendments so we can put these safeguards in primary legislation.

[Chris Philp]

We have heard extensively from the shadow Minister on the clause, so I do not think I need to repeat too much of what he said about its purpose, save to say in summary that it enshrines the expansion of the use of, or enables the use of, video and audio links in criminal proceedings beyond that introduced last year in the Coronavirus Act 2020, which, as we have already discussed, has enabled a great deal of court recovery.

Clause 168 builds on that progress by moving the barriers, restrictions and inconsistencies in the current legislation, which limits the potential use of live links in criminal proceedings. It is vital to stress that nothing in the clause makes remote technology in any way compulsory or inevitable. It is always a matter for choice by the court, which may choose it for reasons of health, as we have during the pandemic, or have some other reason for thinking it is a good idea. The point is, we are creating a discretion and a power for the court to use. Indeed, some participants, including defendants, may want to exercise their own choice and say to the court—for a particular reason, perhaps the inconvenience of travelling—that they want to participate remotely. It might be easier for a witness to participate remotely, for example, rather than travel all the way to a court that might be a great distance away.

The flexibility that the clause enshrines could be useful in a wide range of circumstances. Those principles have been widely debated in previous clauses and are, broadly speaking, agreed.

The proposed amendments to the clause in essence seek to introduce a range of very specific safeguards to circumscribe or control the way in which the measures may be used by a judge. The Government view, however, is that the safeguards already built into clause 168 and its associated provisions do that already. Let me enumerate what those safeguards are, which I hope will assure the shadow Minister and anyone else listening.

First, the court—the judge—must decide whether it is in the interests of justice for a live link to be used. That is a critical test. In doing that, the court is required to consider

“any guidance given by the Lord Chief Justice, and…all the circumstances of the case”—

I stress, “all the circumstances”.

The amendments have tried to pick out various different, specific circumstances. Inevitably, that list will not be exhaustive—they might forget something—so by saying “all the circumstances”, we give the judge a wide range of discretion. Those circumstances expressly include “the views” of the person who might be invited to attend by live link, so if someone has a particular problem or objection, they may table it and say to the judge why they think it is not right for them to appear remotely, if they are invited to do so. Equally, of course, they might say to a judge, “I would rather participate remotely”, for some reason of logistics or something else.

[Alex Cunningham]

Will the Minister give way?

[Chris Philp]

I am conscious of time and the shadow Minister made a long speech, but on this one occasion, I will give way.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am keen for the Minister to understand that not all defendants who are offered the facility would be legally represented. They might not have appropriate advice about the benefits of appearing in person.

[Chris Philp]

Where someone appears without representation, obviously a whole number of issues are raised, of which this is just one small one. In those circumstances, the judge himself or herself will—and does—carefully talk the defendant through the implications. When someone is unrepresented, the issues are to do not only with live hearings, but all kinds of elements of the proceedings where ordinarily a barrister or solicitor would assist the defendant. In the absence of that, the judge has to lead them, ask them questions and ensure that their interests are properly accounted for by the court in a manner that is impartial and fair.

Another question under clause 168 and its associated provisions that the judge must consider is whether the person concerned could participate effectively in the proceedings. A number of the amendments talk about disability and so on. It is therefore worth enumerating again in more detail the circumstances that must be considered: the nature of the proceedings; whether the person can participate effectively by live link; the suitability of the live-link facilities; and the arrangements that could be put in place for the public to observe the proceedings. There are a lot of things there that the judge is already obliged to take into account to ensure that the interests of justice are served—that the defendant gets a fair trial, or that the witness or victim may participate properly.

On children, the courts already have a statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of children. It is important to acknowledge that there may be situations in which it is beneficial for a child, whether as a witness or a defendant, to appear by live link. It is important that the court can take a balanced judgment, rather than a presumption one way or the other. Critically, however, there is already a statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of the child.

I hope that I have demonstrated, or illustrated, with that long list of considerations that the matters of concern that the shadow Minister has properly raised already have to be taken into account. Ultimately, however, I do not think that it is appropriate for us to seek to legislate for everything in detail, as some of the amendments seek to do. Instead, I have set out the principles to rely on—the good offices and the sober judgment of the judge presiding over the case—to make sure that justice has been done. I have a great deal of confidence in our judiciary to ensure that the right balance is struck, as has been done throughout the pandemic. No one has suggested that, during the pandemic, any particular defendant or witness has been especially badly served. I have confidence in the judiciary to get these balances right, and I believe that the statutory basis of clause 168 is the right one.

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Question proposed, That the schedule be the Nineteenth schedule to the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

Briefly, this schedule is consequential to the previous clauses. Part 1 of the schedule enables non-parties to observe proceedings remotely; part 2 prohibits unauthorised recordings; and part 3 sets out various supplementary procedural matters around the giving, variation and rescinding of live-link directions in criminal proceedings, as provided for in clause 168.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 19 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 169

Repeal of temporary provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

Very simply, clause 169 essentially repeals some of the temporary measures in the Coronavirus Act 2020, which are superseded by the clauses and schedule that we have just debated.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 169 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 170

Financial provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: clause 171 stand part.

That schedule 20 be the Twentieth schedule to the Bill.

Clauses 172 to 174 stand part.

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[Chris Philp]

We are entering the final straight of the main section of the Bill and cantering towards the finish line.

In brief, clause 170 contains standard provisions around financial authority. Clause 171 introduces schedule 20, making a number of technical amendments to the Sentencing Act 2020. Clause 172 is a standard clause conferring powers on the Secretary of State to make any consequential amendments. Clause 173 gives the Secretary of State power to amend the sentencing code to incorporate changes to its provisions that are made by this Bill—nothing untoward there—and clause 174 is a standard clause setting out the territorial extent of the provisions in this Bill that we have debated for the last few weeks.

[Alex Cunningham]

Over the days of our debate, Opposition Members have pointed out areas where the Government’s resource assessments seem to be well out of step with the Government’s expectations of the Bill’s impact.

One particular area of concern is the impact on prison places. The Government’s impact assessment has come up with a total increase in the adult prison population of around 700 offenders in steady state by 2028-29. After the hours of debate that we have had on changes to provisions that will extend the custodial period for many sentences and increase sentences for some road traffic offences, I find that number completely implausible. To put my mind at ease, perhaps the Minister could share with the Committee the arithmetic that conjured that number up.

Incarceration is extremely expensive, so if the Government have underestimated the impact, I worry that prison budgets will be stretched even further when they are already at breaking point. If rehabilitation and support for the cycle of offending are to work, they must be properly resourced.

There are areas of the Bill where the Government have not even been able to make an assessment of the cost impact. For instance, in the impact assessment for the changes to detention and training orders, the Government say:

“There will be some individuals that spend longer on supervision in the community under this option, which would incur additional youth offending team costs. It has not proved possible to quantify these additional costs.”

Youth offending teams are so stretched that we have even had to table an amendment to ensure that the current provision of intensive surveillance and supervision is adequately funded across the country; otherwise, the range of appropriate sentencing options for children will be limited. I hope that the Minister can commit to ensuring that additional costs will be robustly monitored so that these services, which save the justice system in the long run by turning people away from offending, are provided with sufficient resource to do their jobs properly.

[Chris Philp]

I simply draw attention to the calculation set out in the extremely extensive impact assessment, which I am holding in my hand, and to the additional 10,000 prison places that are being constructed and the extra probation service personnel who are being recruited.

[The Chair]

I think you had me cantering with you, Mr Philp, because I almost missed out Mr Cunningham altogether.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 170 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 171 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 20 agreed to.

Clauses 172 to 174 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 175

Commencement

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman thinks that we have rushed into this. There was a period of some nine months, I think, between the White Paper and the introduction of the Bill and Second Reading. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South, and I have been very careful throughout the scrutiny of this Bill to make it clear where there is extra work to be done. The timeframes, as far as we are able to do so, have been provided.

We very much look forward to continuing to scrutinise the Bill, as the processes of this place and the other place continue in the time-honoured fashion. I am told that we have published impact assessments. Indeed, a great deal of work has gone into the Bill, and into the preparation of documents associated with it. I hope we will be able to continue the positive trends that have emerged during parts of the scrutiny of this Bill into next week. These are important measures and the Government want to pass them as quickly as possible to continue protecting the people we have been so keen to discuss in this Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 175, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 176

Short title

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

rose—

[Victoria Atkins]

I was going to talk for hours on this, but I see that my hon. Friend wants to beat me to it. This is the short title of the Bill, and we ask that it be cited as the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 176 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Tuesday 15th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

[Chris Philp]

[The Chair]

[Chris Philp]

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

[Chris Philp]

[Sarah Champion]

[Sarah Champion]

[Chris Philp]

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

--- Later in debate ---

We have to be aware that, under successive Tory Governments, youth services budgets have been cut by 73%, which is nearly a £1 billion since 2010, and we have to consider the impact that is having, particularly in my area of Rotherham, where the early interventions that could put children on the right path to a successful future are just not there any more. Now, rather than preventing the crime, we are looking at heavy-handed ways to punish it. I urge the Minister to speak to us and consider what his Government are doing to address those early intervention gaps to make sure that the measures in this legislation apply only in exceptional circumstances.

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

[The Chair]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Chris Philp]

[The Chair]

--- Later in debate ---

I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Chris Philp]

The clause sets out the functionality for piloting the new electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement and the changes to YROs with ISS to ensure that they are robust and effective before being rolled out nationally. The clause also enables us to restrict the use of the requirements, for example, by age or offender profile, in the light of evidence uncovered in the trial and in practice.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

[Chris Philp]

[The Chair]

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

[Chris Philp]

[The Chair]

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 15th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

That was a very generous and lovely apology.

Clause 106

Increase in requisite custodial period for certain violent or sexual offenders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

Good morning, Sir Charles. It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. Clause 106 is an extremely important clause of the Bill, because it forms a critical part of the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the most serious offenders spend more time in prison, properly reflecting the gravity of their offences, protecting the public and building confidence in our sentencing regime. It does that by abolishing the automatic halfway release point for certain serious violent or sexual offenders and instead requiring them to serve two thirds of their sentence in prison.

This builds on changes made throughout 2020. First, in February of last year, we changed the release provisions for terrorists and terrorist-connected offenders receiving a standard determinate sentence in order to ensure that they serve at least two thirds of their sentence in custody and thereafter are released only when the Parole Board is satisfied that it is safe to release them. Colleagues will recall the Bill that became the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which we passed in a day in February of last year to prevent repeats of the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham attacks. In fact, the first terrorist who might otherwise have been released early was kept in prison just a few weeks after we passed that Bill. The measure was tested in the High Court last summer and found to be lawful when measured against the European convention on human rights. I thought that the Committee might appreciate an update on that.

Then, in April of last year, we laid before the House a statutory instrument—the Release of Prisoners (Alteration of Relevant Proportion of Sentence) Order 2020. I will explain what that did. For the most serious sexual or violent offenders with a standard determinate sentence of more than seven years, the automatic release point was moved from half to two thirds, ensuring that those serious offenders spend longer in prison. This clause puts the provisions of that order—a statutory instrument—into primary legislation. Critically, however, it goes further and says that serious sexual offenders and certain violent offenders receiving a standard determinate sentence not just of more than seven years but of between four and seven years will also automatically spend two thirds of their sentence in custody, rather than being automatically released at the halfway point; the release at the two-thirds point will still be automatic. It applies to any sexual offence carrying a maximum life sentence, including rape. I know that rape and related sexual offences are rightly of concern to the Committee, so it is worth stressing that this clause will ensure that rapists spend longer in prison.

[Hywel Williams (Arfon) (PC)]

What assessment has the Minister made of the effect on the prison population, particularly in Wales, which already has the highest rate of imprisonment in western Europe with 154 prisoners per 100,000 of the population of Wales, compared with 141 per 100,000 in England? Given the possible effects of inflation on the length of sentences, what provision will he make specifically for Welsh prisons to cope with that?

[Chris Philp]

We have indeed made such an assessment. We have done it for the whole jurisdiction, and the steady-state impact on the prison population is 255 prisoners. I do not have a breakdown for Wales, but I estimate—this is simply my off-the-cuff estimate—that the portion of that 255 that applies to Wales might be in the range of 10 to 20 prisoners in Wales. That is just my off-the-cuff estimate, not an official figure, so it carries quite an important health warning.

On the prison population impact and prison capacity more generally, the hon. Gentleman will be aware that the Government are committed to building an extra 10,000 prison places to make sure we can cater to increased demands in the Prison Service as we make sure dangerous criminals spend longer incarcerated.

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

Building an extra 10,000 prison cells is very costly. Does the Minister agree that investing more in rehabilitation and preventive programmes might be a better use of the money?

[Chris Philp]

Of course, we do believe in rehabilitation and prevention, and a lot of work is going on in that area, but we are talking about people who have been convicted of offences such as rape and murder. On Second Reading, Members made the point about making sure that particularly sexual offenders, including rapists, spend longer in prison. There were different views on how that could be achieved, but there seemed to be broad unanimity across the House that such offenders should spend longer in prison, and the clause does exactly that. However, it in no way detracts from the importance of prevention and rehabilitation that the hon. Lady mentioned a second ago.

I should say that caught in this clause are not just sexual offenders who commit offences, including rape, with a life sentence, but also the most serious violent offenders, which includes those who commit manslaughter, attempted murder, soliciting murder, and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, so I think our constituents up and down the country will welcome the fact that these serious offenders will spend two thirds of their sentence in prison and not just a half.

Provision is also made in this clause for the two-thirds release requirement to apply to those under the age of 18 who were given a youth standard determinate sentence of seven years or more for a sexual offence with a maximum penalty of life, and for the other very serious violent offences just referred to. The changes are made by inserting new section 244ZA into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to make the necessary provisions. The measures will ensure that the proportion of the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence committed, and are intended to address long-held concerns, both in Parliament and among the public, about the automatic halfway release for serious offenders.

The two-thirds point also aligns with the release point for offenders found to be dangerous and therefore serving an extended determinate sentence, whose eligibility for release by the Parole Board commences from the two-thirds point, so it introduces consistency and coherence into the sentencing regime as well. On that basis, I commend this very important clause to the Committee.

[Alex Cunningham]

Clause 106, as we have heard, follows the Release of Prisoners (Alteration of Relevant Proportion of Sentence) Order 2020, which altered the automatic release point for offenders who have committed a specific sexual or violent offence. As the Minister said, the effect of the release of prisoners order was to move the automatic release point from halfway to two thirds of an eligible prisoner’s sentence, and would apply to those found guilty of specific sexual or violent offences for which the penalty is life, and who were sentenced to seven years or more in prison.

Clause 106 implements the proposal in the “A Smarter Approach to Sentencing” White Paper to extend these changes to include sentences of between four and seven years for any of the sexual offences already specified, but only to some of the specified violent offences. That raises a point of concern for the Opposition. Why does the clause apply to all the sexual offences covered by the release of prisoners order, but only some of the violent offences?

Clause 106 will apply only to manslaughter, soliciting murder, attempted murder, and wounding causing grievous bodily harm with intent. This is precisely the point that the Opposition are trying to make. First, the release of prisoners order fundamentally changed the sentencing and release regime. Now the Government propose to extend the regime, but only to some of the original offences, with the other offences remaining the same. How on earth can that do anything but confuse an already notoriously confused system? I have asked before, what is the point of the remarkable work of the Law Commission on producing a much simplified sentencing code if the Government continue to tinker with sentencing and release provisions?

It is not only the Opposition who are concerned by the direction of travel the Government are taking on sentencing complexity. After considering clause 106, the Sentencing Academy agreed that its inclusion,

“unquestionably makes sentencing more complex and less intelligible to the public. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the judiciary are already struggling in discharging their statutory duty to explain the effect of the sentence as a result of the SI 2020/158 change. This proposal will make this task more difficult and result in a greater number of errors.”

The academy goes on to express its concerns in full:

“We expressed concerns about the reforms last year and this provision exacerbates our concern. Proportionate sentencing is not well-served by a system in which identical sentence lengths have a significantly diverging impact in practice: two nine year sentences should carry the same penal weight; it should not mean six years in custody for one offence and four-and-a-half years in custody for another. The decision to exclude some violent offences from this proposal makes the system yet more perplexing: how can a seven year sentence for kidnapping justify four years and eight months in prison when a six year sentence for the same offence merits three years?”

I wonder if the Minister could explain that point to the Committee.

Let me be clear: Labour supports moves to ensure that the most serious and violent criminals receive longer sentences when there is evidence that their sentences do not match the severity of their crimes. That is why the Opposition supported the Government’s moves to introduce clause 101 to extend whole-life orders for the premeditated murder of a child; clause 102 to extend whole-life orders to those who are 18 to 20 and have committed particularly heinous crimes; and clause 103 to increase the starting points for murder committed as a child. However, we cannot support a series of yet more changes to sentencing and release, which will only further confuse the system and make the task of members of the judiciary even more difficult, resulting in a greater number of sentencing errors.

The Prison Reform Trust makes a good point on the Government’s proposed changes to sentencing and release when it says,

“that only serves to demonstrate the complexity of sentencing law in this area, and the extent to which the government adds to that complexity every time it responds to an individual crime by promising a change in sentencing law.”

If the Government want to ensure that serious violent and sex offenders spend longer in prison, they can easily do so simply by increasing the maximum sentence length for the relevant offences. Taking that route rather than what the Sentencing Academy describes as,

“sentence inflation via the back door”

would not lead to judges being confused and making sentencing errors. Moreover, it would not lead to the public being confused and losing faith in our sentencing system. Taking that route would also mean that prisoners spend longer in jail without having to lose out on the rehabilitative properties of spending half their sentence in the community.

That brings me to another fundamental concern that the Opposition have with clause 106. By requiring an offender to spend additional time in prison, the amount of time that they would spend in the community under supervision would decrease significantly. As the Howard League notes, we know that reducing

“the amount of time which people who have committed serious offences spend under the supervision of probation services in the community…is likely to undermine public safety rather than helping to keep victims and the public safe. Though there is no single model of probation supervision, a rapid evidence review across jurisdictions and models suggests that community supervision in itself reduces reoffending—unlike time in prison, which increases reoffending rates.”

To sum up, the Opposition agree with the Government that where evidence exists that sentences do not properly reflect the severity of the crimes committed, sentencing reform should absolutely be an option. None the less, sentencing reform should be properly considered and guided by the principles set out by the Lord Chancellor in his foreword to the White Paper. Sentences should make sense to victims, members of the judiciary and legal practitioners. More importantly, sentences should make sense to the general public. Only when the general public and victims of crime understand our sentencing regime will they have full faith in it. We believe clause 106 goes against those principles, and for that reason we cannot support it.

[The Chair]

Are there any colleagues who would like to participate before I call the Minister? If not, I call the Minister.

[Chris Philp]

I feel bound to reply to some of the points that the shadow Minister has just made. First, he said that the provisions make sentencing more complicated and that it will be harder for the judiciary to understand. I will pass over the implied slight on the judiciary’s ability to absorb complicated sentencing, but the measures relate exclusively to release provisions; they make no changes to the way that sentencing works. As such, this does not change anything a judge will do in passing sentence. The release decisions, and the administration of that, are obviously done by the Prison Service and the National Probation Service down the track. The release provisions have nothing at all to do with sentencing, so let me assure the shadow Minister on that point.

Secondly, the shadow Minister said that if we want people to spend longer in prison, we should increase the maximum sentence. By definition, the way that the provisions are constructed mean that they relate only to offences where the maximum sentence is life. It is not possible to increase a sentence beyond life—life already is the maximum. The only way to increase the sentencing is for the Sentencing Council to change its guidelines, and as the shadow Minister knows, the Sentencing Council is independent of Government and is chaired by Lord Justice Holroyde. However, I note in passing that average sentence lengths passed down by judges for serious offences have been increasing. Since 2010—a date that I choose arbitrarily—the average sentence for rape has gone up by about two and a half years, so judges have chosen to increase sentence lengths in the past 10 years.

The shadow Minister asked why the selection of violent offences with sentences between four and seven years is narrower than those above seven years. To be completely clear, the list of sexual offences is the same: between four and seven years, and seven-plus. I think the shadow Minister did say that, but I repeat it for clarity. The reason is that we are trying to calibrate the provisions in order to target the most serious offences, which include all serious violent and sexual offences where the sentence is more than seven years, and all serious sexual offences where the sentence is between four and seven years, but just that smaller selection of violent offences, such as manslaughter and so on, which we talked about earlier. We are attempting to calibrate this to the most serious offences.

Finally, the shadow Minister asked about public perception. Over the past 10 or 20 years, the public have been both confused and angered that a court hands down a sentence to a very serious offender—we are talking about sentences that carry a maximum of life, such as manslaughter and rape—and the offender then walks out halfway through a sentence, or less than halfway when time on remand in taken into account. The public are angered by that. In fact, as a Minister in the Ministry of Justice, I get quite a lot of correspondence from members of the public who are angry about serious offenders getting released inappropriately early, as they see it. I agree, which is why we will ensure that the most serious offenders spend longer in prison. If the Opposition vote against this measure, as it would appear they are about to do, they are voting to say that they do not think those serious offenders should spend longer in prison. They are voting for people who have committed manslaughter or rape to be released from prison earlier than would be the case if the clause were passed. I think the public expect us to do something different, and I ask the Opposition to think again—particularly given that, on Second Reading, both sides of the House seemed to be arguing that people who commit very serious offences, including rape, should spend longer in prison. The clause does exactly that. On that basis, I commend it to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

Clause 107 makes some changes to SOPC—sentences for offenders of particular concern—essentially to tidy up an anomaly that arose from the changes made last year. As Members will recall, under the changes we made last year to terrorism sentencing, when a terrorist offender had a SOPC sentence the release point was moved to two thirds, at which point they became eligible for consideration for release by the Parole Board. However, two child sexual offences also carry a mandatory SOPC sentence where there are different release provisions.

In this clause, we are simply making a change to make the release provisions for those two child sex offences in relation to the SOPC sentence the same as those for the terrorist sentence—that is to say, they will serve two thirds, following which they will be eligible for consideration for release by the Parole Board. That makes the sentence the same as for the other terrorism SOPC offences and the same as the extended determinate sentences. In his last speech, the shadow Minister spoke in a spirit of simplification and consistency, and this change is consistent with that principle. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister likes to have his little digs; I think he quite enjoys them. I assure the Committee and everybody else that I have full confidence in the judiciary. If the Minister had as much confidence as I do, perhaps he would not be mucking about so much with the system and would leave the judiciary to sentence within the regime that exists.

As we have heard, as with clause 106 the purpose of clause 107 is to increase the proportion of the time certain offenders spend their sentence in jail. In this case, we are talking about offenders of particular concern, meaning those who have been convicted of one or two child sexual offences or certain terrorist offences. As set out by the Minister, as things currently stand different release arrangements apply to offenders of particular concern convicted of terror offences and those convicted of child sexual offences.

Clause 107 would change that by ensuring that all offenders of particular concern would serve two thirds rather than one half of their sentence in prison, before applying to the Parole Board to be released. Given that I have spoken extensively on the same matter, or very similar matters, in clauses 105 and 106, this speech will be very short. For the reasons I set out in relation to those clauses, we cannot support clause 107. Although the Opposition agree that those who have committed the most serious violent and sexual offences should spend longer in prison, we do not believe that the method set out in clauses 105 to 107 is the best vehicle to meet this policy objective.

The Opposition cannot support more changes to the sentencing and release regimes. Contrary to what the Minister says, that will further complicate our sentencing system and risk victims of crime and members of the public losing faith in it. If the Government want to ensure that offenders spend longer in prison, where the evidence base suggests they should, we believe there are better ways of achieving that goal.

[Chris Philp]

I have nothing to add, except one point that I should have made in my earlier speech. If someone with a SOPC serves their entire sentence in custody, they get a year on licence after release. That is an important point to add to my previous remarks, but I have nothing further to add to my speech on clause 106: the same points apply.

-Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Will the Minister rise?

[Chris Philp]

Sorry, Sir Charles; I was momentarily moved to speechlessness by the fact that the Opposition have just voted to let child rapists out of jail earlier than the clause proposes.

[Alex Cunningham]

No, we did not.

[Chris Philp]

Let us move on to clause 108, which relates to a new power for the Secretary of State to prevent the automatic release of offenders serving a standard determinate sentence, where release is ordinarily automatic, and instead refer them to the Parole Board in certain, very limited circumstances.

With a standard determinate sentence at the moment, there is automatic release at either the halfway point or, for more serious offences, at the two-thirds point, as per clauses 105 and 106. Clause 108 creates a new power to allow the Secretary of State to refer a prisoner who is in custody and assessed as dangerous to the Parole Board, to decide whether or not they are safe to release. Prisoners who are serving a standard determinate sentence, for any offence, who have become dangerous or who are identified as being dangerous while they are in prison get this referral.

To be clear, we are not creating a new kind of indeterminate sentence like the old imprisonment for public protection sentences, created in 2003, in which the sentence could carry on forever if someone were considered to be dangerous. The maximum sentence originally passed by the court on conviction and sentencing still applies.

We are not overriding the sentence of the court, but we are saying that if an offender is identified as dangerous they may continue to serve their determinate sentence until its end, unless and until the Parole Board, after the release point, decides that they are safe to release. It means that if someone becomes dangerous, they do not automatically get released early.

[Sarah Champion]

The Minister will see from an upcoming amendment that I am interested in this clause. Can he give some clarification? Will he define “dangerous”? I assume that is within the prison context, as opposed to the crime being served for.

Will the Minister give some details on when and why the Secretary of State might intervene? At the moment, depending on the Parole Board’s decision, the Secretary of State already has 21 days to intervene. Will he explain what the clause will bring to the table?

[Chris Philp]

I am happy to answer all those questions, which are good questions. The 21-days provision that allows the Parole Board to think again has nothing to do with this; it is completely separate. It is a live issue in the terrible Pitchfork case, which Members will be aware of.

The provision in which the Parole Board takes a decision to release and the Secretary of State may ask it to think again, within 21 days, applies to any Parole Board release and is a matter currently being considered. That is wholly separate from this provision. It relates to any Parole Board release decision and was prompted by the awful Worboys case two or three years ago.

Here we are talking about where a prisoner is serving a standard determinate sentence and would ordinarily be released automatically without any Parole Board involvement at all, and the Secretary of State says, “Well, I think actually they are now dangerous”—I will come on to what that means in a minute—“and instead of automatic release, can the Parole Board look at the case and decide whether they are suitable for release, once their release point is passed?” That is different from the 21-days reconsideration.

The hon. Member for Rotherham asked for the definition of becoming dangerous and whether it means dangerous in a prison context. The answer is no. It does not mean dangerous in a prison context; it means dangerous to the public. One might ask what “dangerous to the public” means. The definition of “dangerous” in this context has a high threshold—we anticipate this provision will be used extremely rarely; it is not going to be a commonly used provision. It is that an offender is at “significant risk” of causing “serious harm” to the public by committing murder or one of the serious offences listed in schedule 18 of the Sentencing Act 2020, such as manslaughter, rape or terrorist offences, and that the risk cannot be sufficiently managed through the use of licence conditions.

If a referral is made, the Parole Board will consider it. It may say, “We will release them anyway” or, “We think there is a danger; we are going to keep them inside.” It can only keep them inside prison until the end of the original sentence that the court handed down.

I will give an example not caught by our new provisions. To take the example the shadow Minister used, let us say there is a six-year sentence for kidnapping. Currently, there would ordinarily be automatic release after three years. If for some reason there is evidence that the person who has been committed for kidnap might commit a terrorist offence or might kill someone, the Secretary of State can refer and the Parole Board will then consider, “Are they dangerous? Can we release them?” If it decides to keep them in prison, they can be kept in prison up to the six years of the original sentence, but no later. During the final three-year period in my example, the Parole Board will look at the case periodically.

If, after reference to the Parole Board, the prisoner thinks there has been an unreasonable delay—“I should have been released after three years, but it is now three years and six months and no one has looked at it; this is unreasonable”—they can refer the matter to the High Court to get it sorted out. There is a safety mechanism so that there cannot be an unreasonable delay.

[Alex Cunningham]

Will the Minister confirm something? In the event of a dangerous person—a radicalised person—being required to serve their full sentence, will they be released into the community without any supervision or licence conditions when they get to the end of the sentence?

[Chris Philp]

The shadow Minister is correct.

[Alex Cunningham]

Why?

[Chris Philp]

That already happens, of course, with extended determinate sentences, where it is possible that the person will spend all their sentence in prison. If the Parole Board does that, there is no subsequent period on licence—unlike the SOPC that we just talked about, where there is a minimum of one year on licence afterwards.

Of course, when the Parole Board makes decisions about whether to release in the final half or third of a sentence, it will be aware of the point that the shadow Minister made. If it thinks that public safety is best served by releasing a little bit before the end of the sentence to allow that one year, or whatever it may be, on licence at the end, it is within its power to consider and do that—so instead of the individual serving all the sentence inside, there would be a bit of release on licence at the end. The Parole Board can think about that at the end if it chooses to.

[Alex Cunningham]

But surely the point remains that this person, who is said to be a danger to the public although there may not be sufficient evidence to convict him of another charge, will be released into the community at the end of their sentence—after six years, 10 years or whatever—and will still be the same dangerous person he was thought to be by the Lord Chancellor, through the Parole Board, when he was in prison.

[Chris Philp]

Under ECHR and common-law provisions, we cannot extend a sentence beyond what was handed down by the court. Of course, that was the big problem with the old IPP sentences, where people could stay in prison forever; indeed, there are still people in prison under IPP sentences.

We have to work within the envelope—within the maximum sentence handed down by the court originally for the offence originally committed. The judgment is essentially to be exercised by the Parole Board on how best to protect the public, by striking a balance. Do we leave people in prison for the whole time or do we release them a bit early with a period on licence? That is a judgment that the Parole Board has to make to best protect the public. In some cases, if it thinks that the risk is very high, it may consider that the whole term in prison is the best way.

Take the example of the six years. The Parole Board may say, “Well, six years in prison is better than five years in prison followed by one year on licence”. It is a judgment that the Parole Board must make. We cannot reasonably go beyond that six years, because that would be potentially unjust: we would be punishing someone and imposing a sentence that was longer than that originally handed down by the court for the offence of which they were convicted. That would be contrary to natural justice, common law and ECHR provisions.

That is why the measure is designed as it is, and I hope that makes sense.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

The old IPP sentences had their problems; they were much too widely used and were not originally intended to be that widely used. There was an issue about them, certainly. However, would not that kind of sentence—one that was indeterminate but able to be cut short when the individual concerned could demonstrate that they were no longer dangerous—be the answer in some of the kinds of tangents that the Minister is talking about?

The Minister seems to be tying himself in knots, to say, “Well, it’s going to be either three years or six years, but we all know that the person is coming out at the end”. Originally, IPP sentences were legislated for to deal with this very issue, but of course they ended up being too widely used. Is there not a better way of reintroducing some kind of IPP sentences that would enable greater safety but be much more narrowly used?

[Chris Philp]

Can I clarify whether the hon. Member is talking about potentially indeterminate sentences?

[Maria Eagle]

Yes.

[Chris Philp]

She is. Okay.

We debated this issue internally, when we were designing the clause. Clearly, one of the options considered was reintroducing some form of IPP sentence, which is, as the hon. Lady said, indeterminate, meaning that it could go on forever. That was not done because there is potentially an inherent injustice. We have been using the example of kidnap, so let us keep using it. If someone commits that offence and the judge decides that six years is the right sentence, to then say that that person, having been given a fixed sentence, could spend the rest of their life in prison because of a risk that they might offend later—they had not committed a more serious offence; it is just that they might—struck us as being inherently unjust.

Do hon. Members remember the film “Minority Report”, where people were incarcerated because it was judged that they might commit an offence in the future? If we get into the territory of imposing a penalty, which could be imprisonment forever, because someone might commit an offence rather than because they actually have committed an offence, we are straying into potentially slightly dangerous territory.

[Maria Eagle]

I was not suggesting that; I was not suggesting that people who have been given determinate sentences should then arbitrarily suddenly find themselves with an indeterminate sentence. What I was suggesting was that perhaps there are a small number of cases for which it would be appropriate to reintroduce the possibility for judges to give indeterminate sentences again. The problem with the IPP was that it was much too widely used; I think the wording was too broad and it was much too widely used by sentencers. But the purpose of it was to deal with just these cases that the Minister is talking about.

I am not suggesting that somebody who has been given a determinate sentence should then arbitrarily be given an indeterminate sentence. However, if an indeterminate sentence for public protection was available in very narrow circumstances to judges, would that not fill this gap in a more coherent way than the way in which the Minister is trying to do it?

[Chris Philp]

Clearly, if the original offence for which the offender is sentenced is one of the more serious ones that we have been talking about—for example, even offences that we consider to be moderately serious, such as committing grievous bodily harm with intent, have life sentences—the judge can, if he or she chooses, impose a life sentence and set a tariff for consideration for release, so there is flexibility. We are talking about cases where the original offence is not one of those very serious ones that has a life sentence, but one that has a fixed determinate sentence. I think the hon. Member is asking if we can give the judge the power to say that, even though the original offence has a fixed maximum sentence of, for example, only five years, they will override that and say, “Actually, for some reason that is not to do with the original offence, but is just to do with some other assessment of public risk, I will give you an indeterminate sentence.” I think that is the question.

[Maria Eagle]

indicated dissent.

[Chris Philp]

No, it is not.

[Maria Eagle]

Not quite. I was suggesting that perhaps the Minister should legislate for indeterminate sentences in particular circumstances and give the judge that discretion, but in a much narrower band of offences than those that ended up getting indeterminate sentences in the past. Indeterminate sentences have all been abolished now—they cannot be used. If I might say so, it seems that the Minister is trying to deal with the very issue that they were introduced to deal with in a very convoluted manner.

[Chris Philp]

No, we are trying to do deal with the issue of prisoners who become dangerous, or who clearly pose a danger to the public, while they are in prison, but without doing what IPPs did. IPPs were abolished for a reason in 2012: people who committed a particular offence with a fixed sentence of, say, five years could end up in prison forever. As I have said, for more serious offenders the judge has the option of a life sentence, but we do not think it is right that someone could commit an offence with a fixed sentence, such as five years, and end up in prison for life, not for an offence they have committed, but for one that they might commit in the future.

This is the best way of balancing that public protection consideration against natural justice—that the punishment should fit the crime—and avoid a “Minority report”-type situation where someone is incarcerated for a crime that they may commit in the future, but have not yet committed. This strikes the right balance. We stay within the envelope of the sentence handed down by the judge. The judge has the option in serious cases to hand down a life sentence already, but we have just changed the release provisions.

We have debated the clause relatively extensively, Sir Charles. It strikes the right balance between natural justice and protecting the public. On that basis, I commend it to the Committee.

[Alex Cunningham]

As we have heard, clause 108 would create a new power to allow the Lord Chancellor to refer a prisoner to the Parole Board who would otherwise be eligible for automatic release, if he believes that they have become a significant danger to the public while in prison. Rather than being freed at the halfway or two-thirds point of a sentence, they would be released only if the Parole Board thought it was safe. If the Parole Board did not believe it was safe, they would continue to serve the rest of their sentence in prison, unless the Parole Board consequently changed its mind. As the Minister has confirmed, if they served the whole of their sentence in prison, they would then be released into the community without any licence conditions or supervision.

It is safe to say that the Opposition have several serious concerns with clause 108, and largely agree with the Prison Reform Trust in believing that

“this clause creates a constitutional and legal mess”.

Let us start with the basics. As is set out in the explanatory notes to the Bill, this is a brand new power, the beneficiary of whom is the Lord Chancellor.

[Chris Philp]

I say with great respect to the shadow Minister that the beneficiary of this clause is not the Lord Chancellor, but the general public, who might be protected from dangerous offenders who would otherwise be released.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Lord Chancellor is the beneficiary, because he is given a new power to change things and refer.

The effect of the clause is that, for the first time for these types of prisoners, the Lord Chancellor will have the power effectively to refer a prisoner to have their sentence conditions varied, should the Parole Board agree. We all understand that. For example, if a prisoner is sentenced to five years for shoplifting, under current legislation they would become eligible to be automatically released on licence at the halfway point of their sentence. Under the new provision, if the Lord Chancellor believes that the shoplifter had become radicalised in prison, he could refer the prisoner to the Parole Board, which could prevent his automatic release. That would, of course, be without the prisoner ever having been charged or found guilty of any further offence while in prison.

That raises two fundamental questions. First, is it right or proper for the Lord Chancellor to be involved in the management of individual prisoners? How will he make the decision to refer somebody to the Parole Board? What criteria will be used for the Lord Chancellor to make such a referral decision? Secondly, is this not a case of punishment without due process, and therefore unlawful?

On the first point, I note the remarks of the Sentencing Academy on clause 108:

“giving the Secretary of State for Justice the power to intervene in the management of an individual offender’s sentence gives rise to concern about undue political interference in the sentences of individual offenders.”

I accept that the final decision rests with the Parole Board. That raises the all-important question of whether the Secretary of State for Justice, who is after all a member of the Government, is really the right person to decide who should be referred to the Parole Board in a prison that could be hundreds of miles away.

That is by no means the only question provoked by clause 108, as currently drafted. The questions go on and on. Perhaps the Minister will be good enough to provide clarity on at least the following points today. What evidential tests will have to be satisfied for the Secretary of State to make a referral to the Parole Board, and who will be responsible for collecting that evidence? What standard of proof will the Secretary of State use when deciding to make a referral or not? Will he have to be satisfied that someone has become a significant danger on the balance of probabilities, or beyond reasonable doubt? If the Secretary of State is so concerned that someone has become radicalised or poses a serious threat, why not simply take that person to court and allow a judge to consider the evidence? Are the Government simply trying to avoid the inconvenience of having to provide evidence and have it tested in open court? Is it not a dangerous precedent for the Secretary of State to become involved in determinations made about individual cases?

That brings me to my next concern. What happens to a prisoner who, after being referred by the Secretary of State to the Parole Board, is refused their automatic release? As I understand it, if the offender is denied automatic release, he or she could spend the rest of their custodial sentence in prison, rather than some of it on licence in the community. Those prisoners will be released before the end of their sentence only if and when the Parole Board authorises it.

That raises two further concerns. First, it would create what Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has described as a “cliff-edge effect”, which is where an offender who has specifically been identified as being a significant danger to the public while in prison spends their entire sentence in custody and is released into the community without any licence or monitoring conditions. Let us think about a possible scenario. A prisoner has been convicted for non-terrorist or non-violent crime and is sentenced in court to, say, five years. They are specifically told by the court that they can expect to be automatically released from prison at the halfway point of their sentence—in that case, two and a half years. Instead, they receive the news that the Secretary of State has reason to believe that they have become a danger to society while in prison. The Parole Board agrees, and their sentence is retrospectively changed so that they can spend the whole sentence in prison.

I am sure the Minister will agree that that offender would have some right to be angry with the criminal justice system and society at large. They would then be released, harbouring that anger, without any licence conditions or supervision. Does the Minister not see what the consequences of that could be? Would it not be better simply to collect any evidence and allow a court to come to a determination? Surely, if the evidence of what is effectively an offence exists, the person should be charged and sentenced for that offence.

During the evidence session on 18 May, the Minister tried to convince the Committee that clause 108 would not create that cliff-edge effect by indicating that if the authorities were particularly concerned about an individual offender, the Home Secretary could impose a terrorism prevention and investigation measure on them. However, that excuse simply does not stack up. As Jonathan Hall, QC, pointed out, TPIMs are extremely resource-intensive and very rarely used, especially in these circumstances. As the Minister will be aware, for each of the three-month periods between 1 December 2018 and 30 November 2019, only three to five TPIMs were in place nationally.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hywel Williams]

I want to raise one particular point. Is the Minister aware of the Welsh Government’s recently published race equality action plan, which states its commitment to developing a race equality delivery plan that will address the over-representation of black, Asian and minority ethnic people in the criminal justice system? Indeed, in Wales, more black and minority ethnic people are in prison than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Does he share my concern that this and other clauses might militate against the policy of the Senedd in Cardiff, a legislative public body that has been democratically elected?

[Chris Philp]

I will try briefly to respond to some of the points raised by Opposition Members in relation to clause 108.

First, on whether the clause somehow infringes natural justice or the ECHR, or imposes a penalty without due process, as the shadow Minister put it, I can categorically say that it does not, because under no circumstances can anyone spend a longer period in prison than the original sentence handed down by the judge. The clause relates to the administration of the release provisions. It is a long-established legal principle that the administration of a sentence—whether it is spent inside or outside prison, for example—is a matter that can be varied in the course of the sentence being served.

This matter was tested in the courts relatively recently when we passed the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020. The very first person who was effectively kept in prison longer than they ordinarily would have been, because their release point was basically moved by that Act, went to the High Court and tried to make the case that that was an infringement of their rights because they thought they were going to get released automatically at two thirds, but were instead referred to the Parole Board, which did not let them out. Because of TORA, that has been tested in the High Court and found to be lawful—that is to say, the administration of the sentence can be varied.

The reason we have gone no further than that and have said that someone cannot be kept in prison for longer than the original sentence—the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood was probing on this in her interventions—was that we think that would infringe the principle of natural justice. The shadow Minister questions whether we have gone too far and the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood thinks we have not gone far enough, which might suggest that we have landed in around the right place.

There was then the question from the shadow Minister on the cliff edge issue: if someone serves all of their sentence in prison, they then spend no time on licence, by definition. That does, of course, apply to any of the existing extended determinate sentences if the Parole Board decide to keep the prisoner inside prison for the whole of their sentence. The potential for the cliff edge does exist, but when deciding whether to release early the Parole Board can, of course, take into account whether the public are better served by the whole sentence being spent in prison, or most of it in prison and a bit of licence at the end. In no sense are the public any less safe if the prisoner spends all of the sentence in prison, given that the sentence is a maximum. The prisoner is in prison, clearly, and cannot commit an offence during that period.

On rehabilitation, it can of course take place, it does take place, and it should take place in prison as much as in the community. Significant resources are being invested in that rehabilitation process in prison, led by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk).

On the matter of the propriety of the Lord Chancellor making the referral, as raised by the shadow Minister and by the hon. Member for Rotherham, the power is the power of referral. The Secretary of State for Justice, the Lord Chancellor, is not making any final decision himself or herself about release, and is simply referring a prisoner to the Parole Board to make that determination and that decision. That does not constitute undue political interference in the process.

[Alex Cunningham]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Chris Philp]

I am anxious to make progress, but I will take an intervention.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. For me, the issue is the basis on which the Lord Chancellor makes the decision to refer. What evidence test is used and who gathers that particular evidence?

[Chris Philp]

Most likely, as a matter of practice, that would be the prison governor or prison authorities who see behaviour of concern, and might draw the matter to the attention of the Ministry of Justice and the Secretary of State.

The shadow minister asked what test was applied. The test is whether there is a significant risk of serious harm to the public by the offender potentially committing a serious offence, such as murder, in the future, as listed in section 18 of the Sentencing Act 2020, and that the risk cannot be sufficiently managed through the use of licence conditions. That is the test that will be applied by those making decisions, but ultimately the decision is for the Parole Board.

The concept of the Parole Board making a discretionary decision about whether to release already exists, and has done for years. Currently it exists in the contest of extended determinate sentences, and in the past it existed—in theory at least—for every single sentence passed. It already happens for thousands and thousands of extended determinate sentences, so what is proposed here is not a radical departure from current practice for extended determinate sentences, nor indeed for people on a life sentence with a tariff. The referral process can add to the criteria taken into account for those offenders. We would expect that to involve small numbers.

In answer to the issue relating to Wales raised by the hon. Member for Arfon, we are expecting the numbers to be extremely low. It will not have a significant impact on overall numbers. It is, mercifully, pretty rare for that sort of evidence to come to light. If the evidence is at the level that it merits prosecution—planning, preparing or inciting an offence, which was asked about—obviously prosecution is the first option. Prosecution for the offence will always be the first option, but if we cannot establish that an offence has been committed to the required criminal standard, a Parole Board referral is the next best thing up to the maximum sentence, but no further. I hope that address the questions—

[Alex Cunningham]

I asked the Minister to address the issue of the number of TPIMs likely to be applied in the event of somebody considered to be dangerous when leaving prison.

[Chris Philp]

I cannot speculate on what may happen in the future. The shadow Minister pointed out that the number of TPIMs in use is pretty small and that is most certainly true. Equally, the number of people likely to be referred in that way will be small, albeit likely to be larger than the number of TPIMs. As I said, there is the option for the Parole Board not to have the person serve the full sentence but to have a little bit at the end served on licence. There is that option, as well as the TPIM, plus the option for the police and security services to keep people under observation more generally, if they are concerned. I hope that answers the point.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister has given a full response to some of the issues I raised but not a sufficient one. I am worried about the evidential test in relation to this matter. The Minister said if there is sufficient evidence for a prosecution while the person remains in prison, there will be a prosecution, but if that evidence does not meet a criminal test, there can be no prosecution and this legislation will be relied on to retain the person in prison following a referral to the Parole Board. We remain very concerned about that and about the standard of proof, which we also talked about.

Ultimately, this issue is about how prisoners are managed in the longer term and their rehabilitation. The fact remains that someone who is considered dangerous, though not dangerous enough to be prosecuted, can be released into the community at the end of their sentence without any supervision or conditions. I accept that the Minister says the security services or police might keep an eye on them. That is insufficient if somebody is considered to be so dangerous. On that basis, we still oppose the clause.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

In contrast, Labour has a full victims Bill published and ready to go. It would, among other things, put on a statutory footing key victim rights, including the right of victims to be read their rights at the point of reporting or as soon as possible; the right of victims to access regular information about their case; the right to make a personal statement to be read out in court; and the right to access to special measures at court, for example video links, where appropriate. Again, I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham will agree with me that adopting Labour’s victims Bill would add to the good work that she has done and show that the Government were serious about putting victims first, but as we wait for the Government to act comprehensively in this space, they could take a step forward and demonstrate their good intent by accepting my hon. Friend’s amendment.

[Chris Philp]

I thank the hon. Member for Rotherham for moving her amendment and for her remarks, the spirit of which I certainly completely agree with. Amendment 145 covers only moves to open prisons rather than Parole Board release decisions more generally. I think it is worth making it clear to the Committee that the victim’s rights to participate in the parole process are clearly enshrined already in the victims’ code, published again recently. Under the Parole Board’s existing rules, there is a requirement for the Secretary of State to provide the board with a current victim personal statement if one has been prepared, and that must be taken into account by the panel considering the case. The statement sets out the impact that the offence has had on the victim and their family and any concerns that the victim and their family may have about the potential release. Victims are, as part of that, entitled to request that specific licence conditions, including exclusion zones and non-contact requirements, be imposed on the offender. The victims’ code enshrines a number of entitlements relating to parole, including the right to present a victim personal statement in the way that has just been described. A root-and-branch review of the parole system is going on to try to improve these different things further.

As I said, this amendment relates only and specifically to open prison transfers. But I think that the general point that the hon. Member for Rotherham has raised is important. It is important that we do more to ensure that the victim’s voice is heard in these Parole Board decisions, for all the reasons that the hon. Member eloquently laid out. I will suggest that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, who has the responsibility for this area, meet with the hon. Member for Rotherham to discuss these important issues. The matter is obviously in the rules already: it is in the victims’ code; it is in the Parole Board rules. But clearly, what is written down needs then to translate into action, and the hon. Member has raised a couple of cases in which that did not seem to happen in the way it ought to have done. She has clearly had correspondence with the previous Minister with responsibility for prisons and probation. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham took over that portfolio only three or four months ago. I know he will want to meet her to discuss these important issues and make sure that it is happening in practice as it should do, so I make that commitment on his behalf.

Government amendment 132 to clause 109 makes some simple provisions and creates a mechanism for the Parole Board to change a decision where there has manifestly been an error. This follows a recent court case.

[The Chair]

Minister, can we deal with that when we get to it?

[Chris Philp]

I am sorry; I thought that was part of the same group.

[The Chair]

You have been very generous, so do not regard that as an admonishment. Just temper your keenness to canter on.

[Chris Philp]

I will take that as a check on the reins. I have nothing further to say on amendment 145, Sir Charles.

[Sarah Champion]

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments. I have worked extensively with the Government’s victims team and it is fantastic. The victims code is great, but only if it is implemented. The problem we find is that people are not notified when the offender is coming up for parole consideration, so their rights are not activated because they do not know that that situation is occurring.

I accept his generous offer of meeting the hon. Member for Cheltenham, which I will take up. With that reassurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Chris Philp]

I beg to move amendment 132, in clause 109, page 99, line 11, leave out

“resulted from a clear mistake”

and insert

“it would not have given or made but for an error”.

This amendment ensures that the language used in the new provision about when the Parole Board can set aside decisions aligns with a recent High Court judgment which ruled on the circumstances when a Parole Board decision can be revisited and makes a drafting clarification.

I am sorry to have spoiled the anticipation by jumping early. May I speak to clause 109 as well?

[The Chair]

Yes, that is perfectly fine.

[Chris Philp]

Very briefly, clause 109 makes provision for manifest errors in Parole Board release decisions to be corrected. Government amendment 132 implements a recent court judgment where the language was changed and says that reconsideration will happen where there has been

“a clear mistake of law or fact”.

It makes that change following the High Court judgment in the case of Dickins, with which I am sure the Committee is familiar.

[The Chair]

I call the shadow Minister.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 111 to 114 stand part.

[Chris Philp]

I have relatively little to say on these clauses, which are technical in nature. Clause 110 covers responsibility for setting licence conditions for fixed-term prisoners. Clause 111 repeals some uncommenced provisions dating back many years that have never been used, and simply removes them from the statute book because they have never been commenced. Clause 112 covers the release at the direction of the Parole Board after recall for fixed-term prisoners. Clause 113 is about changing the release test for the release of fixed-term prisoners following recall. Clause 114 covers release at the direction of the Parole Board in relation to timing.

They are technical changes, and I do not propose to add anything beyond these brief remarks, Sir Charles.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 110 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 111 to 114 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 115

Extension of driving disqualification where custodial sentence imposed: England and Wales

[Chris Philp]

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 115, page 104, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) The amendments made by subsection (2)(a)(i) do not have effect in relation to an offender who—

(a) is sentenced before the coming into force of section 107 (increase in requisite custodial period for certain offenders of particular concern), and

(b) on being sentenced, will be a prisoner to whom section 244A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (release on licence of prisoners serving sentence under 278 of the Sentencing Code etc) applies.”.

This amendment ensures that the amendments made by clause 115(2)(a)(i) do not apply to a person who is sentenced between the passing of the Bill (when clause 115 comes into force) and the coming into force of clause 107 two months later and who will be a person to whom section 244A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 applies.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 115 to 118 stand part.

[Chris Philp]

Amendment 68 is a technical amendment that introduces a transitional provision that has been identified as necessary to address a short two-month gap before different, but inter-connected, provisions in the Bill come into force. Sir Charles, will I briefly speak to clauses 115 to 118?

[The Chair]

It is absolutely up to you.

[Chris Philp]

Okay. I will not refer to them again, so I will do so.

Clause 115 relates to England and Wales and makes some changes to the driving disqualification provisions where we have changed the automatic release points. Colleagues will recall that we have moved the release point from a half to two thirds for certain offences, including in changes made last year. We want to make sure that, where a driving disqualification is imposed, it takes account of the change in release point. The clause makes simple consequential amendments to those release points.

Clauses 116 and 117 do similar things to make sure that driving disqualifications properly intermesh with the changes to release provisions. Clause 118 does similar things in relation to Scotland.

[Alex Cunningham]

The House briefing paper on the Bill explains that when a driver receives a driving disqualification alongside a custodial sentence, the court must also impose an extension period to ensure that the disqualification period is not entirely spent during the time the offender is in prison. The explanatory notes explain that clause 115 would change the law so that the length of the extension period reflects a succession of other changes made by the Government to the release points for certain offenders.

The notes refer to changes made by the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, the Release of Prisoners (Alteration of Relevant Proportion of Sentence) Order 2020, changes in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 and further changes proposed by this Bill. These pieces of legislation all change the point at which an offender is automatically released or becomes eligible to be released if the Parole Board agrees they are no longer a danger to the public. Rather than being at the halfway point of the sentence, that release point will now move to the two-thirds point.

As I explained at some length in the debate on clause 106, the Opposition cannot wholeheartedly support changes to the release point of certain offenders. Not only do the changes make a notoriously complicated sentencing regime even more complicated but they also substantially limit the amount of time an offender spends on licence in the community, significantly increasing their chances of reoffending.

The Opposition do not support the Government’s logic in adapting other pieces of legislation, in this case driving offences, to reflect those changes. For that reason, we are opposed to clauses 115 to 118 and urge the Government to use caution before committing to any further changes that would further complicate an already overcomplicated sentencing system. That said, I do not intend to press the clauses to a vote, but let the record show that we are opposed to the provisions.

[The Chair]

Minister, would you like to respond?

[Chris Philp]

No.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 115, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 116 to 118 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 119

Calculation of period before release or parole board referral where multiple sentences being served

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to debate clauses 120 to 123 stand part.

[Chris Philp]

I will speak extremely briefly to clauses 119 to 123. They simply set out minor amendments to existing legislation that part 7, chapter 1 of the Bill makes. In brief, clause 119 provides clarification on when a prisoner must be automatically released and when referral to the Parole Board is required in cases where concurrent or consecutive sentences are being served, so it provides clarification around how those sentences interact with one another.

Clause 120 addresses the application of release provisions to repatriated prisoners, reflecting some recent alterations that have been made domestically, which we have talked about already—making sure that works with repatriated prisoners.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

Let me start with clause 124, which would give responsible officers the power to compel offenders to attend an appointment at any point in a community order or during the supervision period of a suspended sentence, in exceptional circumstances.

The responsible officer is the statutory term for the probation practitioner who is overseeing the order. Section 198 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires the responsible officer to make any arrangements that are necessary in connection with the requirements imposed by the order, and to promote the offender’s compliance with those requirements.

In some cases, the responsible officer might be delivering those requirements directly. In other cases, they might be working with the offender to develop a sentence plan and monitor their progress against it, but referring them to colleagues or to other organisations to deliver particular requirements, for example, educational or treatment requirements.

The current legislation lacks clarity on the extent of a responsible officer’s power to compel an offender, who is subject to a community or suspended sentence order, to attend supervision appointments—meetings, essentially. Offenders serving community sentences have a duty to keep in touch with their responsible officer, and responsible officers also have the power to make any arrangements that are necessary in connection with the requirements imposed by the Order. But it is not currently clear what powers probation officers have if they are concerned about a new or escalated risk that an offender presents, which is not necessarily related to the delivery of what the court has ordered. Hence this measure, which enables the responsible officer to require the offender to participate in a meeting. It simply clarifies that that can happen. I think we all agree that contact between the responsible officer, for example, the probation officer, and the offender is a good thing to make sure that that relationship is being properly managed.

Clause 125 is one of a number of measures in the Bill that seek to strengthen community sentences. In the Sentencing White Paper last September, we set out a new vision for community supervision combining robust punishment and management of risk with a new focus on addressing rehabilitation needs to break the cycle of reoffending. Clause 125 therefore increases the maximum length of time a curfew can be imposed to make it potentially more effective and increases the maximum number of hours that a curfew could be imposed in any given 24-hour period. At the moment, a curfew can be imposed for a maximum of 12 months and we will increase this to up to two years, to give the court a little more flexibility and, we hope, encourage the use of community sentences more often.

The clause will also increase the potential of a curfew to support rehabilitation by providing a longer period during which some of the positive effects of the curfew can be established. It can, for example, reduce interaction with criminal associates. Again, that will hopefully enable the courts to use those sentences more as an alternative to short custodial sentences, which we are all keen to avoid where possible.

At the moment, a community order or suspended sentence order may specify a maximum of 16 hours of curfew per day, which provides in practice a weekly maximum of 112 hours. The clause will increase the daily maximum to 20 hours, but we will not move the seven-day maximum of 112. The number of curfew hours per day can be moved around if, for example, somebody gets a job, or something like that, and that needs to be taken into account, but the weekly maximum does not change. It is important to make the point that we are not altering that.

Clause 126 will give greater powers to the responsible officer to vary electronically monitored curfews on community sentences. Again, we think that will be helpful. To be clear, the responsible officer will not be able to change the number of curfew hours. That is an important point to emphasise.

Clause 127 removes senior attendance centres from the menu of options available. They are not very widely used, and in fact in some parts of the country they are not used at all. These days, there are various other means that are used to provide rehabilitation and so on, rather than senior attendance centres. Schedule 12 contains further amendments relating to the removal of the attendance centre requirements, as I have just described.

Clause 128 simply introduces schedule 13, which makes provision for courts to have powers to review community and suspended sentence orders and commit an offender to custody for breach. Without this clause, schedule 13 would not form part of the Bill. Part 1 of schedule 13 contains provisions relating to the review, which is a crucial element of the problem-solving court approach. As Members know, we are keen to run pilots of problem-solving courts. We think they have an important role to play where offenders have a drug, alcohol or mental health problem, and where the judge can have repeated interaction with the person concerned. We think that could hopefully contribute to the addiction or mental health problem being dealt with. They were piloted in the past—I think they were piloted in Liverpool a few years ago—and they were perhaps not as effective as we had hoped. This pilot is therefore important to try to get the model right. If we can get the model right, we will obviously look to roll it out.

Clause 129 introduces schedule 14. Schedule 14 itself provides the legislative changes required for the problem-solving court pilot that I have just described. We think that problem-solving courts are really important, so the pilots will be important as we have to get the model right. There are lots of different ways of running problem-solving courts. The Americans and the Australians do them differently. We want to get this right. As I say, if we can find a way of tackling the root cause of offending behaviour, whether it is drug addiction, alcohol addiction or mental health, that will help everybody—the community, society and the offender—so I am really pleased that these schedules are in this Bill, laying the groundwork for the things that I have described. I commend these clauses and schedules to the Committee.

[Alex Cunningham]

As the Minister set out, clause 124 provides legal clarity about what a probation officer or responsible officer can instruct an offender who has been released from custody to do. Specifically, it will give probation officers the legal power to compel offenders serving a community or suspended sentence order to attend supervision appointments. Those appointments can be either for the purpose of ensuring the offender complies with rehabilitative requirements or where there are public protection concerns. If an offender refuses to comply with directions made under clause 124, they can be found to be in breach of their licence conditions and punished accordingly.

On the whole, this is a clause that the Opposition can support. If there is legislative uncertainty about what a probation officer can and cannot do, it is important, for the benefit of probation officers and offenders themselves, that it is ironed out. We accept that. The Opposition also accept the importance of offenders attending the appointments they need to rehabilitate and reform in the community. I have spoken at length about how Labour fully appreciates the importance of time spent in the community when it comes to reforming an offender and reducing the risk of reoffending. We are also keen to support amendments that will make the life of probation officers easier by providing legislative clarity.

However, although we are supportive of clause 124, we have some concerns, which I hope the Minister can respond to today. First, given that failing to attend appointments under the clause could result in an offender being found to be in breach of their licence and possibly recalled to prison, can the Minister set out the procedure that offenders can use to challenge orders made under clause 124?

Secondly, we must also consider the impact that the powers in clause 124 could have on offenders who have learning disabilities or are neurodivergent. As the Prison Reform Trust explains:

“People with learning disabilities can find it particularly difficult to comply with measures such as additional appointments or reporting requirements, and so special attention will need to be given to ensuring they are not unfairly disadvantaged by these provisions.”

In addition to addressing the system for offenders to challenge orders under the clause, will Minister set out what safeguards will exist to ensure that no offender is unfairly disadvantaged by clause 124 due to circumstances beyond their control?

I now turn to clause 125, the effect of which is similar to 124. Clause 124 gives probation officers greater powers to compel offenders to attend appointments in the community, and clause 125 gives probation officers greater powers with regard to curfews. Under current legislation, offenders subject to a community order or suspended sentence order can be subject to a curfew for up to 16 hours a day for a maximum of 12 months. Clause 125 would increase the daily curfew to 20 hours and increase the total period over which curfews can be imposed from one year to two years.

The Government set out in the explanatory notes that this change will increase the punitive weight of a curfew requirement, but also has the potential to support rehabilitation by providing a longer period during which some of the positive effects of curfew could be established. As with clause 124, the Opposition are keen to give our hard-working probation officers the tools, powers and legal clarity they need to do their job properly. We are satisfied that clause 125 is a proportionate means of achieving that goal, particularly as the Government have chosen to retain the maximum number of curfew hours that can be imposed per week.

None the less, as with clause 124, we seek some assurances from the Minister about how these extended powers will be used in practice. As with clause 124, our main concern is about the potential of clause 125 to increase the number of offenders found to be in breach of their licence due to circumstances they cannot control, or because of technical breaches. I will discuss one aspect of this in more detail when we come to amendment 122, but we know that offenders are wrongly accused of breaching their licence conditions, including those relating to curfews, due to electronic tags malfunctioning. What assurances can the Minister give that extending the powers of probation officers in this area will not lead to more offenders accused of being in breach due to malfunctioning tags?

I also repeat my concern in relation to clause 124 about how this power could impact offenders who suffer from learning difficulties or are neurodivergent. What steps will the Minister take to ensure that these offenders are not unfairly disadvantaged by clause 125? Will probation officers be given additional discretionary powers to ensure that these offenders are not punished for a breach that they did not intend to make?

Finally, how does the Minister respond to concerns expressed by the Howard League that allowing probation officers to place strict restrictions on leisure days could prevent people on licence from building the positive social relationships that would help them to desist from crime?

Let us move to clause 126, which, like clause 125, extends the power of probation officers in relation to curfews. As the Government explanatory notes point out, currently, changes to a curfew cannot take place unless they have been authorised by a court. Clause 126 would amend the sentencing code by enabling probation officers to vary a curfew requirement made on a community order or suspended sentence order. Specifically, the clause would allow the probation officer or responsible person to change the curfew requirement in one of two ways: changing the time a curfew starts or ends over the course of 24 hours, or changing the residence of the offender as set out in the order.

The explanatory notes suggest that these additional changes will be beneficial not only for probation officers but for Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and offenders:

“This legislative change seeks to reduce the burden on the courts, freeing up time for other matters and saving probation resource by reducing the volumes of papers prepared for court and court visits. There will also be advantages for offenders, allowing for variations where typically there are alterations to work hours or location that make compliance impossible, or where an offender’s curfew residence address needs to be changed in a timely way.”

While the Opposition stand firmly behind any proposal to reduce the horrendous burden currently on our courts, I am somewhat perplexed that the Government’s first thought in this area is to give probation officers the power to vary curfew requirements.

As the Minister will no doubt be aware, the backlog in the Crown court is at record levels, sitting at almost 40,000 cases before the pandemic even began. As we said before, victims of rape and other serious offences face a wait of up to four years for their day in court. While it is true that the backlog has been exacerbated by the pandemic, it was created by the Conservatives closing half of all courts in England and Wales between 2010 and 2019, and allowing 27,000 fewer sitting days than in 2016. If the Government were serious about reducing the burden on our courts, they would have adopted Labour’s package of emergency measures during the pandemic, including mass testing in courts, the extension of Nightingale courts and reduced juries until restrictions are lifted, but they did not, and the result is the catastrophe we see today.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 15th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 125 to 127 stand part.

That schedule 12 be the Twelfth schedule to the Bill.

Clause 128 stand part.

That schedule 13 be the Thirteenth schedule to the Bill.

Clause 129 stand part.

That schedule 14 be the Fourteenth schedule to the Bill.

Before we adjourned, the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Stockton North, gave a lengthy speech, which we were all grateful to hear. We paused to allow the Minister to prepare himself. I believe he is now prepared, so I call the Minister.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

Thank you, Sir Charles. I trust everyone has had a refreshing and congenial break for lunch. Prior to the break, the shadow Minister raised a number of questions relating to clauses 124 to 128 and to schedules 12 to 14. I will endeavour to answer as many of those questions as I can. He asked what procedure offenders could use to challenge orders made under clauses 124 and 125, particularly to ensure that they were not unduly penalised if they then breached the conditions that had been imposed. If a breach does occur and some serious consequence follows, it is always open to the offender to make a representation when attending their hearing at court to either make the case that the breach was technical or minor in nature, or that the condition itself was not varied in a reasonable way. A significant penalty can never be imposed without the intervention of the court.

Questions were asked about circumstances beyond the control of the offender. We heard about the possibility of a device malfunctioning and about particular circumstances relating to disability that might disadvantage certain people. We envisage the power laid out in section 124 being used only in rare circumstances, certainly not routinely.

I confirm that it is the intention to provide clear advice to probation staff, setting out the rare circumstances in which additional supervision may be warranted, to ensure, for example, that disabled offenders are not unfairly or unduly disadvantaged, and to avoid the purpose of these supervision appointments going beyond the very specific purposes that the order has been imposed by the sentencing court.

The same applies to people with learning difficulties. Courts sentence on a case-by-case basis and, where electronic monitoring has been imposed as one element of that sentence, the officer supervising the offender is already able to review notifications of apparent violations and take a reasonable view, on a case-by-case basis. If someone has been genuinely unable to understand how to operate the equipment or had a genuine technical problem, we would expect probation officers to exercise reasonable discretion.

As I said at the very beginning, if a breach did follow and the court was invited to impose some penalty, it would be open to the offender to make a representation at that point to explain the mitigating circumstances. My expectation is that it would never get that far, because I would expect the supervising officer to be reasonable in the meantime.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

I recognise what the Minister is saying. I raised the point that people should be able to make representations after their hearings, but some of the people we are talking about have particular challenges in life and special needs. How will the Minister ensure that their problem—their malfunctioning equipment or otherwise—is properly communicated to a court to ensure that they are not penalised?

[Chris Philp]

Clearly, in the first instance we would expect the responsible officer to exercise these powers in a reasonable way and to exercise discretion. Hopefully, as I said a few minutes ago, these cases would not get as far as court because the probation officer would act in a reasonable and proportionate way in the first place. The guidance will reflect that. If someone does get to court, there is the possibility of their being represented in proceedings. However, I also would expect the judge to ask a reasonable question of the person appearing before the court, such as whether there were any mitigating circumstances or technical problems or whether they had failed to understand how to operate the equipment. If there is a vulnerability, the pre-sentence report written prior to the original sentencing would be expected to pick up those issues.

The shadow Minister asked whether the powers in clause 126 were too wide and gave the responsible officer excessive latitude and leeway to vary curfew requirements that a court had previously imposed—to dispense summary justice without proper reference to the courts. To be clear, clause 126 is very limited in the powers that it provides probation officers, and they will be able to amend the requirement in only two limited ways, and only if those changes do not undermine the weight or purpose of the requirement imposed by the court. The power in clause 126 is restricted to two areas: a shift in the start and/or end times of the curfew periods—but no change to the total number of hours imposed—and a change to the offender’s curfew address, where the address was not part of the order in the first place. So they are very limited powers to vary, which I hope provides the reassurance asked for.

The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, who unfortunately is not in her place, referred to the problem-solving courts in Liverpool. I understand that the results from that have been a little mixed, but we are committed on both sides of the House to the principle of problem-solving courts, and I noted the shadow Minister’s recitation of the history of these going back as far as 1999. Both sides recognise the important role that problem-solving courts can play. Other jurisdictions have used them, with the United States being an obvious example. We are starting on a pilot basis rather than a big-bang roll-out because the details of how the model operates is important. The details make a big difference, and the design of the way it works—when the reviews takes place, what they are reviewing and what actions are taken—make a difference to whether the thing is successful or not.

While across the House we are committed to the principle of problem-solving courts to tackle the underlying causes of offending, we have to make sure that they work in practice and the details are right before rolling them out. To answer another of the shadow Minister’s questions, I am sure we will be coming back to Parliament and reporting on the progress of these problem-solving courts. My hope is that we find a way quickly to make these work in practice and can then roll them out. I am committed to community sentence treatment requirements, which are a form of disposal that provides for mental health, alcohol and drug addiction treatment. Quite a lot of money has gone into that recently—£80 million for drug addiction earlier this year. Problem-solving courts are a critical way of supporting the delivery of treatment under community sentence treatment requirements. It is something I want to push, and I am glad that there is agreement across the House on that.

The final question that the shadow Minister asked was whether a guilty plea was needed to qualify for an appearance before a problem-solving court. Problem-solving courts do not require a guilty plea, and this Bill does not stipulate that as a prerequisite, but a willingness to engage with the court and comply with the community interventions will be an important factor. The problem-solving courts working group in 2016 considered making a guilty plea a key factor in creating the engagement necessary, but we recognised the number of complexities across the cohorts targeted, and did not think it was necessarily required. People who plead not guilty, and are then convicted, would be eligible for the problem-solving court, and I hope they can be helped as much as anyone else. On that basis, I commend these provisions to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 124 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 125 to 127 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 agreed to.

Clause 128 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 13 agreed to.

Clause 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 14 agreed to.

Clause 130

Duty to consult on unpaid work requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

Would you like to say a few words on this, Minister?

[Chris Philp]

I will follow your direction, Sir Charles, by saying just a few words on this clause, which is relatively straightforward and, I think, pretty inoffensive.

Clause 130 simply creates a requirement for probation officials to consult key local and regional stakeholders on the delivery of unpaid work. Unpaid work—or community payback, as it is sometimes known—combines the sentencing purposes of punishment with reparation to communities. We believe that, where possible, unpaid work requirements should benefit the local communities in which they are carried out. Nominated local projects are already popular with sentencers and the public, but there is currently no requirement for probation officials to consult stakeholders on the design or delivery of unpaid work, so members of communities and organisations within particular local areas that are best placed to understand the impact of crime and what might be useful in the local area do not necessarily have their say.

Clause 130 simply seeks to address the gap by ensuring that key local stakeholders are consulted, so that they can suggest to the probation service what kind of unpaid work might be useful in their local area. We hope that local community groups and stakeholders come up with some good ideas that the probation service can then respond to. That seems to be a pretty sensible idea. The probation service in some areas may do it already. This clause simply creates a proper duty, or a requirement, for the probation service to do it. Of course, if we understand the needs of local communities and their thoughts, we can improve the way unpaid work placements operate to support rehabilitation and also help the local community. If the local community can visibly see offenders doing unpaid work in their local area, whether it is cleaning off graffiti, cleaning the place up or whatever else it may be, that will, we hope, demonstrate that the programme is giving back to and improving the local community, but delivering a punitive element as well.

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Chris Philp]

I was about to conclude, but of course I will take the intervention.

[Sarah Champion]

When I used to run a children’s hospice, we had offenders under probation supervision come in. They were meant to be doing gardening at the children’s hospice, but instead they sat around smoking cigarettes. We kept on raising that with the probation worker, because we had invited the offenders there to give them a second chance, to help with their rehabilitation, to enable them to contribute to the community and so on. But the probation officer said, “What do you want me to do? I can’t beat them; I can’t make them work, but they have to come on these schemes.” Could the Minister give some examples of how the probation service will have the resources and the influence to ensure that people who are out in their local community are actually—

[Sarah Champion]

I apologise, Sir Charles.

[Chris Philp]

The hon. Lady makes a very good point. First, I am extremely disappointed and somewhat shocked to hear that people who were supposed to be doing work at a hospice in Rotherham in fact sat around smoking cigarettes. That is obviously shocking and not what the orders are supposed to be about. The hon. Lady says that the probation officer shrugged their shoulders and said, “Well, what can I do about it?” Of course, if the person, the offender, was not doing the work that they were supposed to be doing, that would amount to a breach of the unpaid work requirement, and they could be taken back to court to account for their breach, so I am extremely disappointed by the attitude of the probation officer that the hon. Lady just described.

The hon. Lady asked about resources. Extra resources are going into the probation service for it to supervise exactly these kinds of activities, and I would expect them to be supervised and policed properly. I will certainly pass on her concern to the relevant Minister. I have already made contact about fixing a meeting for the hon. Lady and the Prisons Minister that we talked about in this morning’s session, in relation to victims being consulted about probable decisions. The same Minister, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, is responsible for the probation service as well—I am just adding to his workload. I will raise it with him, but I would certainly urge the hon. Member for Rotherham to raise this issue in the same meeting, because I know that the account she just gave will concern my hon. Friend as much as it concerns me.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

I echo the points made by the hon. Member for Rotherham in that there is a variation in the enthusiasm that some of those who conduct this work display, on both sides. I was told, for example, that a lad who came from a farming family had thrown his back into it very strongly and was encouraging others to join him. I would add that we do consult with the local community, and many of the jobs that are done in my constituency are at the behest of either a local authority or other local groups.

[Chris Philp]

Wonderful. We would like to see the kind of consultation that already takes place in Scarborough and Whitby take place across the country as a whole, and that is precisely the intention behind clause 130. Where Scarborough has led, the rest of the nation, thanks to this clause, will follow.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 131

Youth Remand

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move amendment 128, in clause 131, page 122, line 12, at end insert—

“(ba) after subsection (5) insert—

(5A) For the purposes of subsections (5) and (6) “recent” is defined as having occurred in the previous six weeks.””

[Alex Cunningham]

I am pleased to speak to amendments 128, 129 and 130 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham and myself. However, before I do that, if the Minister could give me a list of where he has influence, perhaps he could fix a few meetings with Ministers for me as well.

[Chris Philp]

Any time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I thank the Minister very much for that—it will, of course, be on the record, which I am very pleased to note. Before I get into my speech, I would like to thank Transform Justice and the Alliance for Youth Justice for the extremely helpful work they have done on this part of the Bill. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hove (Peter Kyle), the former shadow Justice Minister, who worked extremely hard on these particular issues. I am grateful to him.

Clause 131 amends the legislative threshold for remanding a child to custody. It will mean that remand to youth detention accommodation can be imposed only in the most serious cases, where a custodial sentence is the only option and the risk posed by the child cannot be safely managed within the community. It will introduce a statutory duty which states that courts must consider the interests and welfare of the child before deciding whether to remand them to youth detention. It also imposes a statutory requirement for the courts to record the reasons for the decision.

First, let me say that we are pleased with the direction of travel that this clause indicates, and we are keen for the Government’s work in this area to succeed. We are in complete agreement with the Government that custodial remand should be used only as a last resort for children. However, we do think that there is scope for these proposals to go further in tightening the threshold for remanding a child into custody. I will speak more on that when we discuss our amendments.

The current youth remand provisions were introduced in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and I well remember the Public Bill Committee, where I had the privilege of serving as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sadiq Khan, now our excellent Mayor of London, and also my good friend. By 2019, the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse noted a significant increase in the use of custodial remand for children. The Opposition warmly welcomes measures which aim to reduce the number of children remanded into custody, especially in light of the fact that in 2018/19 only a third of children remanded to custody or local authority accommodation later received a custodial sentence.

Our concerns about the use of custodial remands for children are compounded by the extreme racial disproportionality on remand, and the record proportion of children in custody who have not yet been tried in court.

Against the backdrop of the record court backlog and the waiting times for trial, there could not be a more opportune moment to address these issues. We particularly welcome the introduction of the statutory duty to consider the welfare and best interests of the child. We believe that, while these proposals can go further—I know that the Minister will listen carefully to our proposals shortly—these changes will help to reduce the number of children who are unnecessarily remanded to custody, so we are pleased to support them.



However, there are a couple of points on which I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts. Has he any further information to share with the Committee on his Department’s considerations of the impact that police remand has on custodial remand? Are there any plans to address that? Research by Transform Justice shows that police remand, where the child is detained by the police until court either in a police cell or in a local authority PACE bed—under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—is a driver of custodial remand. Transform Justice explains that point:

“This is because any child remanded by the police has to be presented in court within 24 hours, meaning Youth Offending Team staff often don’t have enough time to develop a bail package that will satisfy the court. Children who appear from police custody also usually appear in the secure dock, which can bias courts to view the child as more ‘dangerous’ and therefore more suitable for custodial remand.”

The criteria for police remand are spelled out in section 38 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and are very different from those used by the court for remand. In fact, the criteria for police remand of children are almost identical to those for adults, unlike the child-first approach taken in so many other areas of the justice system.

We know that the police remand more children than the courts. Of the 4,500 children who appeared in court from police custody in 2019, only 12% went on to be remanded by the court. Some 31% of those remanded by the police went on to be discharged, dismissed or have their case withdrawn, while 37% went on to get a fine or community sentence. The figures illustrate that police use of remand is seriously out of synch with the courts already. This clause may further widen that gap.

Is the Minister not concerned that the police may continue to overuse post-charge detention, undermining the positive efforts of the clause to reduce unnecessary custodial remand for children? Will the Government consider updating the police remand criteria, so they are in line with the new court remand criteria, to ensure consistent decision making across the whole criminal justice system?

I am greatly supportive of the provision in the clause that requires courts to record their reasons for remanding a child, not least because it will provide valuable data on the use of remand, which will enable us to continue to make improvements in this area. For that to be most effective in informing future policy decisions, we would need to have some sort of centralised monitoring system. Will we have such a system? It would mean that the need to record reasons would not only focus the mind of the court in a specific case; it would also benefit the system as a whole, as each case can inform our ongoing learning process about the use of remand and its effectiveness. Has the Minister considered the possibility of such a centralised monitoring system?

It has been suggested that the obligation on the court to record reasons would be most effective if courts had to specify why non-custodial alternatives were deemed unsuitable and how each of the custodial remand conditions has been met. Is that the kind of detail that the Minister envisages the obligation should entail? I am sure we all agree that it would be helpful for that level of information to be provided, so I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.

Turning to the amendments, as I said earlier, the reforms to the threshold for remanding a child in custody are welcome, but there are a couple of areas where we believe they should go further. The Opposition amendments, if adopted, would get us closer to the goal of custodial remand being used only as a truly last resort.

Amendment 128 seeks to tighten the history test by defining a recent history of breaching bail or offending while on bail as having been committed within the last six weeks. The clause currently makes provision to amend the history condition so that the previous instances of breach or offending while on bail must be “significant”, “relevant” and “recent”. In order to reduce the number of children held unnecessarily on remand, it would be helpful to amend the clause so that there is a clear definition of “recent”.

In defining recent, we have to be mindful of what that means to a child. As the Alliance for Youth Justice notes:

“If we are to take a child-centred approach, we must consider how children experience time, and recognise the well-established principle that children change and develop in a shorter time than adults.”

The Youth Justice Board for England and Wales has recommended that “recent” be no longer than within a six-week period. I hope that the Minister will agree that clarity on that point would be of great assistance to the courts. I would be interested to hear from him what discussions his Ministry of Justice colleagues have had regarding defining a time limit for this condition.

Amendment 129 is a straightforward amendment to the necessity condition that would again help achieve the aim of using custodial remand for children only as a last resort. Although we welcome the strengthened wording of the necessity condition included in the Bill, which would require remand to be used only when the risk posed by a child cannot be safely managed in the community, we share the concerns of the sector that the benefits arising from this change may be undermined by its drafting. The amendment would therefore tighten and strengthen the wording. Transform Justice says that these benefits of the current proposed change to the necessity condition

“will be undermined by the loose wording of one of the other necessity conditions: that remand to YDA is necessary to prevent further imprisonable offences. This condition is highly subjective and casts a wide net, which may be widened further by youth sentencing provisions elsewhere in the bill.”

We share the concern expressed by the Alliance for Youth Justice that

“the latter part of the condition (to prevent the commission of an imprisonable offence) sets such a low threshold for meeting the Condition as to render the first threshold (to protect the public from death or serious personal injury) somewhat redundant.”

The amendment would tighten the latter part of the condition by ensuring that it applies only to serious imprisonable offences, which we think better reflects the intention of the clause.

Finally, amendment 130 would compel the court to record the age, gender and ethnicity of a child remanded in custody in order to provide better data on remand, particularly on disproportionality. We believe that this could be a helpful tool in addressing the deeply concerning and increasing levels of disproportionality at this point in our justice system. The numbers beggar belief. Nine out of 10 London children who are remanded are from black, Asian and minority ethnic communities. A deeply comprehensive report that was published by the Youth Justice Board in January shows that race alone is a factor in remand outcomes for children. The researchers gathered data on thousands of English and Welsh cases, and information provided in practitioner assessments. Even when other related factors were controlled for mixed ethnicity black children, they were, as the Youth Justice Board notes,

“still more likely to be remanded in custody and, if not remanded, more likely to be subject to restrictions on bail.”

This is a serious injustice in our system that needs to be urgently addressed. More needs to be done than this amendment makes provision for, but it would be a helpful tool in breaking down the disproportionate outcomes that we are seeing. The amendment would at the very least provide accurate data to help understand this disparity, in line with the “explain or reform” principle outlined in the Lammy review, which I think is an eminently sensible step in the right direction. I hope that the Minister agrees and look forward to hearing his thoughts. I would also be grateful if he could share with the Committee any other initiatives his Department is working on to address this flagrant disproportionality in youth remand.

--- Later in debate ---

We have to be aware that, under successive Tory Governments, youth services budgets have been cut by 73%, which is nearly a £1 billion since 2010, and we have to consider the impact that is having, particularly in my area of Rotherham, where the early interventions that could put children on the right path to a successful future are just not there any more. Now, rather than preventing the crime, we are looking at heavy-handed ways to punish it. I urge the Minister to speak to us and consider what his Government are doing to address those early intervention gaps to make sure that the measures in this legislation apply only in exceptional circumstances.

[Chris Philp]

As the shadow Minister said, clause 131 aims to ensure that children are remanded into youth detention accommodation only where absolutely necessary and as a last resort. As the hon. Member for Rotherham and the shadow Minister said, that is something that we can all agree on. We do not want to remand children into custody prior to conviction unless it is absolutely necessary.

The hon. Member for Rotherham said that prevention was important, and of course we agree, although it is outside the scope of these clauses. Money is being invested, significantly, in serious violence reduction units that aim to prevent, but also to divert young people who might otherwise get into serious crime on to a better path.

We are mindful that over a third of children in custody are on remand and that, of those, only around a third go on to receive a custodial sentence. While custodial remand is perfectly justified in some cases, the threshold for confining an unconvicted child to a secure environment must, rightly, be set very high indeed. It sounds like we broadly agree on these principles, and that is why we are amending the provisions of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which sets out the test that the courts must satisfy when deciding whether to remand a child into custody. I think everyone agrees with the aim of the clause, which is to make sure that remand custody for a child is an absolute last resort. The shadow Minister welcomed this direction of travel and the steps that are being taken.

The clause introduces a statutory duty for the court to consider the welfare and best interests of the child when making remand decisions and a statutory requirement for the court to record its reasons for imposing custodial remand to ensure that the welfare of the child is at the forefront of the court’s mind and promote a child-first approach to decision making. We are also strengthening the sentencing condition to ensure that the mere possibility of a custodial sentence would not on its own necessarily warrant custodial remand. Similarly, a relatively minor or fairly recent breach should not, on its own, justify remand. We are reinforcing the history condition so that only a recent, significant and relevant history of breaching while on bail should be taken into account to justify custodial remand. The current tests already require the court to satisfy itself that a child can be remanded to custody only where it is necessary to protect the public from death or serious harm. We are reinforcing that necessity condition by making it clear that it means when the risk posed by the child cannot be managed safely in the community. These measures, taken together, significantly elevate and strengthen the test for child remand to custody.

[Alex Cunningham]

Will the Minister confirm whether there is likely to be some form of time limit relating to the recent history of the child?

[Chris Philp]

The shadow Minister leads me to his amendment 128, to which I was going to speak in a moment, but I shall address it now as he has raised it. There will not be a hard or specific time limit in the way that his amendment specifies six weeks. We think that a hard-edged limit of six weeks specified so precisely would unduly fetter judicial discretion. The judge should be able to make a judgment in the round, taking into account all the considerations. A hard cut-off of six weeks is too binary. It is made clear that the judge needs only to look at circumstances where there is a history of breach or offending while on bail that is recent, significant and relevant. That is quite a high test, but we do not propose to go as far as amendment 128 does in specifying six weeks. We do not support the amendment for that reason, although, in spirit, our clause as drafted is pushing in a very similar direction. We just think that six weeks is too precise and that the judge should have some residual discretion.

Before moving to amendments 129 and 130, I would like to touch on a question that the shadow Minister raised about whether police remand almost inevitably and inappropriately leads to custodial remand. He said that could be because there is not enough time to consider bail arrangements and that it could create a sense of bias because, if the judge sees the person in the dock, it may lead them to believe that they are a more serious offender. I do not accept either argument. The statistics that he himself gave a minute or two later support that. He said that only 12% of children going into police remand end up in custodial remand. That demonstrates that 88% of children on police remand do not go into custodial remand, which suggests that there is not a strong linkage in the way that he feared there might be.

[Alex Cunningham]

We need some clarity around the 12% and the 88%. My point is that the police are remanding into custody a very high proportion of children who do not then go on to receive a custodial sentence. That is the problem, not the other way round.

[Chris Philp]

I think that the shadow Minister also pointed out to the Committee that there is a 24-hour time limit on police remand for children, so it is an extremely short period of time. For that very short window before the court appearance, it ensures that the police do not lose control of the person in their care. Clearly, if that was going on for days or weeks, it would be a matter of concern, but it is a very short time window, as he said.

The shadow Minister’s amendment 129, on the necessity condition, proposes the insertion of the single word “serious”. I contend that any imprisonable offence is in itself serious but, more broadly, we are again relying on judicial discretion. We do not want to unduly fetter the judge’s discretion. The provisions in clause 131 as drafted will send a fairly clear signal to the judiciary that this is something that should be taken very seriously in making these decisions and that Parliament does not want children remanded to custody lightly or inappropriately. The clause as drafted makes that pretty clear. It also makes it clear that not only do the conditions that we have talked about have to be met but, in the opinion of the court, the risk posed cannot be managed safely in the community. Clause 131 as drafted sends a very clear message that custodial remand should indeed be a last resort.

Amendment 130, proposed by the shadow Minister, would require the court to state in open court the age, sex and ethnicity of a child remanded to custody. In all honesty, we believe that the amendment is unnecessary because the data is already collected and published, so the information is there already. The important point about the new record being created is that the reasons for custodial remand have to be spelt out expressly to ensure that the court is properly considering those things. We can then be absolutely assured that the court has to consider those matters and record them so that they are there to look at subsequently and be reviewed, not forgotten in the rush of a court appearance. The substance is captured already by the requirements in clause 131. It seems that both sides of the Committee broadly agree on this, so I do not think that amendments 128 to 130 are particularly necessary, although I do understand the spirit in which they are moved.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I am prepared to withdraw amendment 128, given his explanation, but I ask that he look seriously at time limits, whether in some form of guidance from the Department or otherwise.

On police remand, I am still very concerned that the police are far, far more likely to remand a child in custody than a court is. I ask that the Minister think again and review the advice given to police officers to try to reduce the number of children who are automatically remanded to custody. I am content with the Minister’s explanation on amendment 129 and I will not press it.

When it comes to data, as the Minister will know because I assume that he signs them all off, I get lots of answers to written parliamentary questions saying that the information cannot be provided because it is not available or it can be provided only at disproportionate cost. If we do not gather the data, I will get more of those answers from the Minister, so I intend to press amendment 130. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 130, in clause 131, page 123, line 3, at end insert—

“(aa) after subsection (4)(b) insert—

“(c) state in open court the age, gender and ethnicity of the child.””––[Alex Cunningham.]

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

We want a youth justice system that recognises the unique needs of children, tackles the underlying reasons why children offend and intervenes early to provide support and divert them where possible. There is a distinct and separate sentencing framework for children aged 10 to 17, which recognises that children have their own specific needs that require a different and tailored approach.

The clauses and schedule amend existing legislation to enable us to make the necessary changes to the most common youth custodial sentence, the detention and training order, or DTO. The changes are to make the DTO more flexible, fairer and more in line with other youth custodial sentences.

In that spirit, clause 132 amends the sentencing code to remove the fixed lengths of the DTO, meaning that any length of DTO between four months and 12 months can be given. The court can pass the right sentence instead of being constrained to give only sentences of DTOs of four, six, eight, 10, 12, 18 or 24 months. Removing those very fixed lengths does not change the maximum or minimum sentence but just means that any length of sentence can be given between the limits of four and 24 months. Removing the fixed lengths also means that the reductions made for time spent on remand that we have just been talking about, or bail, which is subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition, and for a guilty plea, will be more accurate. At the moment, there is not always a DTO length that directly fits once remand, bail or guilty pleas have been considered, and the court must instead refer the sentence to one of the fixed lengths of four, six, eight, 10, 12, 18 or 24 months. With the proposed changes, the court may go between those sentence lengths, if it needs to, to fit in with the reductions for time spent on remand and so on. It is a fairly straightforward change, which makes a great deal of sense.

Clause 133 amends the sentencing code and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to fix a current inconsistency in relation to early release. That inconsistency means that different lengths of early release are available for offenders sentenced consecutively to a DTO and another sentence, depending on the order in which they receive those sentences. The change means that where an offender is serving a DTO and another sentence consecutively, the offender may benefit from the same amount of early release, regardless of the order in which sentences are given. I think that is a fairly innocuous and sensible technical change to the 2003 Act.

Clause 134 introduces schedule 15, and that schedule amends the 2003 Act and the sentencing code, so that time spent on remand and bail, where that bail is subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition—a tag—is counted as time served and credited accurately against the custodial part of the DTO. That is a change to the current approach, where time on remand or bail is taken into account when determining the length of the DTO, rather than being credited as time served. The schedule also makes further amendments where an offender is given two or more sentences, of which one is a DTO. Those sentences are treated as being a single term for the purposes of crediting the days spent on remand or bail. The schedule also makes changes to the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make sure that there is consistency.

Those are relatively technical and, I hope, relatively straightforward changes.

[Alex Cunningham]

We all recognise that DTOs are the most common custodial sentence for children. Between 2010 and 2019, 20,000 offenders under the age of 18 were sentenced to a DTO. It is important that we get this right. We are tentatively supportive of the proposals in the clauses, and I look forward to the Minister’s response, which will I hope will be able to allay some of our concerns.

As the Minister has outlined, DTOs currently have to be of a fixed length. I have some sympathy with the Government’s view that having such fixed periods restricts the courts in deciding the most appropriate length of sentences. Clause 132 will address that by removing the fixed length and providing that a DTO must be for at least four months and no longer than 24 months. We agree with the Government that is important that the minimum period for a DTO is retained to ensure that extremely short, unhelpful and, indeed, counterproductive custodial terms are not given out.

I do wonder, however, whether four months is still too short, and I question the real benefits of such a short sentence. Clause 133 provides that where an offender is given two or more sentences, one of which is a DTO, those sentences are to be treated as a single term for the purposes of crediting days spent in custody, or in qualifying for bail. The explanatory notes state that this clause is intended to

“fix an existing discrepancy in relation to early release which meant that different lengths of early release were available for offenders sentenced to a DTO and another sentence consecutively, depending on the order in which they received those sentences.”

The clause aims to ensure that

“where an offender is serving a DTO and another sentence consecutively, the offender is able to benefit from the same amount of early release regardless of the order in which the sentences are given.”

Clause 134 and schedule 15 provide that time spent on remand or bail subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition is counted as time served and credited against the custodial part of the DTO.

Taken together, the clauses increase the flexibility in the system for sentencers and should mean that the sentence length can accurately account for remand episodes already served, electronically monitored bail or a guilty plea, rather than nearest permissible length based on the fixed tariffs that currently exist.

I note that the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales broadly welcomes these proposals as well. It notes that the changes may help to solve the issue whereby the fixed lengths of the DTO sentences held the potential to create a barrier to resettlement—for example, where a fixed sentence length would mean that a child would be released just after September and therefore miss out on the intake of a new school or college year. In this instance, the fixed terms would push children out of education for longer than necessary. The more flexible approach proposed here by the Government can help to address such issues.

On the face of it, these reforms seem sensible, and like something we would support. However, the impact assessment contains some concerning projections, on which I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts. The impact assessment notes an unfortunate adverse impact of removing the fixed-term nature of DTOs, in that individuals who receive early guilty plea discounts under the current system may receive longer sentences than they currently do. While there will be no additional children sentenced to DTOs under this option, the Youth Justice Board has said that it anticipates that the increase in average sentence length may lead to a steady-state increase in the youth custody population of around 30 to 50 places, costing around £5.3 million to £8.5 million per year. It has said that there would also be an equivalent uplift in the number of children supervised in the community at any one time at a cost of around £0.4 million to £0.6 million a year.

The Government’s impact assessment predicts that the proposals will increase the steady-state number of children in custody by up to 50 children by 2023-24, costing the youth custody service between £38.6 million and £61.4 million. That is of very serious concern to the Opposition. We share the Government’s stated vision of reducing the number of children in custody, and there has been great progress in that area over the past decade. The number of children in custody has decreased by about 75%, for which the Government ought to be applauded. It would be a terrible shame if we were to roll back any of the progress that has been made in this area, especially as I know how proud the Justice Secretary is of the work that has been done.

I would be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on how these proposals can be introduced without increasing the number of children in custody. Let us remember that it is the Youth Justice Board that is saying this will happen. Does the Department intend to introduce any safeguards in this area? The Opposition would like safeguards to be put in place to help to avoid the possibility of children spending longer than necessary in custody, which could also mean an increase in the number of children in a secure establishment at any one time.

I would also welcome a reassurance from the Minister on a further point raised by the Youth Justice Board in its briefing. It notes that the impact assessment states:

“Time spent on remand will be taken away from time to serve in custody as opposed to from the overall sentence length. There will be some individuals that spend longer on supervision in the community under this option, which would incur additional YOT costs. It has not proved possible to quantify these additional costs.”

We recognise that it might be beneficial for children to spend longer with the support of the youth offending team as opposed to being in custody, but there is of course an attendant impact on youth offending team budgets, which are already stretched. The Youth Justice Board says:

“Some children may spend longer on the community part of the order which gives youth offending teams more time to work with them but there is no evidence to support this as a benefit.”

The Youth Justice Board also notes that a cost-benefit analysis of these proposals, in terms of the additional spend for youth offending teams, would be helpful. Will the Minister provide such a cost-benefit analysis? Will he also confirm whether youth offending teams will be provided with appropriate further resource to handle any increased workload as a result of these proposals?

[Chris Philp]

I am glad that the shadow Minister welcomes the broad thrust of these changes. That is very welcome indeed. In response to his questions about the impact assessment, it is important to say that it makes it clear on the second page that

“there will be no additional children sentenced to DTOs”.

The question therefore arises: why, then, will there be this very slight increase in the population, of between 30 and 50 places? The reason, as far as I can see, is that where the DTO sentence length falls between the two fixed points, at the moment it gets rounded down to the lower of the two, whereas under these proposals it can be calculated precisely. No additional people will be subject to a DTO; however, we will no longer have this rounding-down effect. In a sense, when we account for the time served and so on, and particularly the early plea discount, at the moment there is an inappropriate rounding down, because of the fixed points, which will now be eliminated. The time served will therefore better reflect the law and the court’s intention, and that will lead to a very slight increase in the number of people subject to these orders at any given point. However, the total number receiving the order will not change.

[Alex Cunningham]

I accept that the total number receiving the orders will not change, but does the Minister not accept, and regret, that these proposals will lead to some children—it might only be a handful—being subjected to more time in custody than they would be under the current system? If he does accept that, what will he do to try to change it?

[Chris Philp]

It is more that, owing to an anomaly in the current system that is a consequence of the fixed points, people are being let out slightly early. This change really means, among other things, that the law as written can be fully implemented, rather than this little rounding anomaly occurring. However, I stress that the effect is very slight.

[Alex Cunningham]

One child is too many.

[Chris Philp]

By the way, I should take this opportunity to thank the shadow Minister for his earlier commendation of the Government’s record on reducing unnecessary child imprisonment.

In answer to the shadow Minister’s last question, which was about youth offending teams and longer time potentially being spent under their care, clearly it is our hope and expectation that youth offending teams will be effective—indeed, they are effective—in helping to divert young people on to a better path in life. We are generally increasing resources in this area, and I hope that that will have precisely that effect.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 132 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 133 and 134 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 15 agreed to.

Clause 135

Youth rehabilitation orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 122, in schedule 16, page 255, line 26, at end insert—

“(2A)After sub-paragraph 4(1) (Duty to give warning or lay information relating to breach of order), insert—

“4 (1A) For the purposes of this paragraph, a reasonable excuse for breach of an electronic compliance monitoring requirement shall include design faults in any necessary electronic apparatus, including (but not limited to) poor battery life; but shall not include intentional failure by the offender to charge necessary electronic apparatus.””

This amendment would introduce a safeguard to prevent children from being criminalised due to design faults, including poor battery life, on electronic monitoring devices.

Amendment 120, in schedule 16, page 258, line 34, at end insert—

“24(1) Paragraph 35 of Schedule 1 (Further provisions about youth rehabilitation orders) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follows.

(2) In sub-paragraph (1), for “The Secretary of State may by order” substitute “The Secretary of State must by order”.

(3) In sub-sub-paragraph (1)(a), omit “enable or”.”

This amendment would make panel reviews of youth rehabilitation orders routine by amending Paragraph 35, Schedule 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.

Amendment 121, in schedule 16, page 258, line 34, at end insert—

“24(1) Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 (Further provisions about youth rehabilitation orders) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follows.

(2) At end insert—

“(6) The Secretary of State shall take steps to ensure that there are sufficient resources in place to allow for a court to make a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance in all appropriate cases.””

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that intensive supervision and surveillance is available in all youth offending areas.

That schedule 16 be the Sixteenth schedule to the Bill.

I call the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Chris Philp]

As we have said previously, and as I think the Opposition would agree, we believe that, wherever possible, children who offend should be managed in the community, as it is better for their rehabilitation and therefore wider society, as it is less likely that they will reoffend. In that spirit, clause 135 introduces and refers to schedule 16, which makes amendments to YRO provisions set out in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and in the sentencing code, which we believe will give the courts and the public confidence in YROs as an alternative to custody. The amendments are listed in schedule 16 and include the introduction of a new electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement and changes to the YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance, ISS, a high-intensity alternative to custody, with mandatory extended activities, supervision and curfew requirements.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Before we move on, it has come to my attention, courtesy of the Whips, that there will be a vote in the House at 4.30 pm. I am sure that none of you want to come back afterwards. It is up to you if you do, but I thought I would bring the Whips’ discussion to a wider audience, so we know what their ambition is for the Committee.

Clause 136

Abolition of reparation orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

Given your suggestion, Sir Charles, I will place a premium on brevity. Clause 136 is straightforward. We believe that restorative justice is an important part of the justice system. However, the reparation order itself has been made redundant, having been overtaken by the evolution of the wider youth justice sentencing framework. Instead, referral orders and youth rehabilitation orders now provide a wider range of interventions, including elements of restorative justice, and are more flexible than a reparation order. They have essentially replaced reparation orders.

Also, reparation orders cannot be given in conjunction with a referral order or a youth rehabilitation order, which significantly reduces the circumstances in which they can be used. As a consequence, reparation orders have dropped out of usage—they dropped by 98% over the last decade because the other disposals have taken up the slack. Only 51 have been handed down in the year to March 2020. It is by far the least-used non-custodial disposal. Therefore, in the interests of clarity and simplicity, the clause abolishes the reparation order to enable those other forms of disposal to be used, as they are used anyway.

[Alex Cunningham]

As the Minister explained, the clause would abolish reparation orders, which require the child to make practical amends to the victim or other affected party. The Government White Paper noted that the orders are little used, probably as they have been replaced by some of the more widely used sentencing options, and so have become redundant.

Reparation orders are the least used orders in the children’s sentencing regime, too. Between 2010 and 2019, around 5,000 offenders under the age of 18 were sentenced to reparation orders. The number of reparation orders handed down fell in each year during that period. In 2019, 66 of those sentences were passed, compared with 2,400 in 2010. In the year ending March 2020, there were just under 16,900 occasions where children were sentenced at court; only 51 of these were reparation orders.

While it is not clear why the use of the order has fallen so sharply, it has been suggested that it is as a result of changes in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which removed restrictions on the use of cautions and conditional cautions, which means that children who may have proceeded to court are possibly now receiving out-of-court disposals, which is a good thing. Do the Government plan to do any research to confirm this suggestion? I think it could be helpful if they did so, since this is quite a significant change in sentencing patterns, and it would be helpful to better understand how restorative justice processes are now manifesting themselves, given that usage is low and that reparation can also be included in other sentences, such as the referral order and youth rehabilitation order.

We support the removal of reparation orders and support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 136 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 137

Temporary release from secure children’s homes

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

The vote might come at quarter past 4, although the Whips will be better informed of that than me, and the Whip cannot move the adjournment while someone is speaking, I just remind him of that.

[Chris Philp]

With that thought in mind, I will try to deal with the important points raised as quickly as I can.

We recognise that young people in detained accommodation or in custodial settings need a lot of support. Secure schools are being developed to do precisely this.

To support this, we think it is important that secure schools are provided by people who have a certain level of autonomy. Many charities have the necessary skills to do this. That is why, starting with clause 138, we are ensuring that providing a secure 16-to-19 academy can be counted as a charitable activity, enabling charitable secure school providers to improve outcomes in youth custody.

We always take changes to charities law seriously. We have to ensure that charities are properly regulated. The Ministry of Justice has worked closely with the Charity Commission and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to make sure that is done in a way that preserves the integrity of charity law.

Clause 137 ensures that there is a clear statutory power to enable providers to allow for temporary release where someone is sentenced to custody, which applies to secure schools as well. It is important that these children can be released into the community as part of the rehabilitation that we want to do with them. This clause puts that release provision on a statutory footing. We think that temporary release provisions are an essential tool in the rehabilitation journey, and this makes sure that can happen.

The Youth Custody Service and secure children’s homes that make temporary release decisions always do so subject to proper risk assessments. The YCS will develop formal guidance for SCH managers, outlining the necessary steps to be taken when making a balanced temporary release decision. Both these measures are helpful in ensuring that charities are able to come into this space to provide these services and that temporary release can be facilitated as part of the rehabilitation package, all of which is important.

Amendments 123 and 133 speak to the inspection regime. Like other academies and children’s homes, secure schools will be jointly inspected by Ofsted and the Care Quality Commission. They will also be inspected monthly, not annually, by independent visitors. As co-commissioners for secure schools, the Youth Custody Service and NHS England will be responsible for ensuring high standards of performance. The minimum frequency of inspection is also set out in the regulations.

As secure 16-to-19 academies will fall under the definition of a children’s home in the Care Standards Act 2000, they will be inspected on an annual basis in any case. The definition of children’s home in the Children’s Home (England) Regulations 2015 makes it clear that they will fall under the frequency of inspections regulations, so they will be annually inspected in any case, making amendment 123 unnecessary.

We have consulted HMCIP on the question of inviting it into the inspection regime, and it agrees with the Government’s position. Although secure schools are a secure environment, they are essentially schools and children’s homes, and so should be inspected by Ofsted and the CQC. Involving the prisons inspectorate in these institutions would run counter to the ethos we are trying to develop.

In speaking to amendment 146, the hon. Member for Rotherham made a compelling contribution on some of the failings that have occurred in the past, which we all agree we want to avoid. We are clearly talking about the new secure 16-to-19 academies. I want to speak to the concern about the profit motive, which amendment 146 addresses. As part of the existing academies legislation, an academy trust is, by definition, a not-for-profit charitable company, so I can confirm to the hon. Member and other members of the Committee that because academy trusts have to be not-for-profit by their nature, this new provision does not open up the possibility of introducing the profit motive into the provision of these secure schools.

I hope that my remarks achieve the twin objectives of giving commitment and assurance on these clauses, as well as avoiding a clashing with a vote that may be imminent.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Minister, are you willing to do that?

[Chris Philp]

Yes.

[The Chair]

Excellent.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 137 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendment proposed: 123, in clause 138, page 126, line 40, at end insert—

“(8) A secure 16 to 19 Academy will be subject to annual inspection by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons.”—(Alex Cunningham.)

This amendment would make secure 16 to 19 academies subject to annual inspection by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Napier Barracks Asylum Accommodation

Chris Philp Excerpts

Thursday 10th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if she will make a statement on the judicial review judgment on Napier barracks contingency asylum accommodation.

Happy birthday, Mr Speaker.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

Happy birthday from me as well, Mr Speaker. I made my maiden speech on your birthday when you were in the Chair as Deputy Speaker six years ago.

I am answering this question on behalf of the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who has sadly suffered a family bereavement and therefore cannot be here this morning.

Covid-19 has had a major and unprecedented impact on the asylum system. We make absolutely no apologies for doing everything in our power to provide shelter to those in need during these exceptional times.

Between March and October last year, nearly 12,000 extra people needed to be housed as a result of the pandemic, nearly 10,000 of whom ended up in hotels, at huge public expense. Every accommodation option had to be considered.

Those accommodated at Napier barracks are catered with three nutritious meals per day, with options for special dietary or religious requirements. There is a recreational building with a library. Prayer rooms are available and scheduled activities now include yoga, English conversation and art. There is a nurse on site and access to a GP. All asylum seekers housed at Napier have access to a 24/7 advice service, provided for the Home Office by Migrant Help.

Napier barracks has been happily used for many years by Army and police personnel. The army itself has continued to use barrack accommodation around the country during the pandemic, when needed. While we are disappointed by some of the judgment, the High Court found in the Home Office’s favour in a number of areas. It rejected the claim that conditions at Napier amounted to “inhuman or degrading treatment.” The judge declined to rule that dormitories or barrack accommodation could never provide “adequate accommodation” for asylum seekers, and the judge rejected the claim that the expectation that residents would be back on site by 10pm amounted to a curfew or unlawful imprisonment.

Furthermore, the judgment was based on conditions in the past, before several significant improvements. These include a stronger cleaning regime, reopening of communal areas with staggered access times, limiting the period of residency and using lateral flow tests three times a week. The overall capacity of the site has also been reduced. At all stages, the Home Office believed it was taking reasonable steps to respond to Public Health England suggestions on public health, where possible.

We have published the suitability criteria that we use for assessing who is suitable to be accommodated at Napier. If it becomes apparent that someone is resident but unsuitable, a transfer is then arranged.

Through our new plans for immigration and the upcoming sovereign borders Bill, this Government are taking action to increase the fairness and efficiency of our asylum system but also to fight illegal and unnecessary migration, such as that by small boats coming across the English Channel. I hope Members will support that Bill when it comes forward, as it is sorely needed to support reform of the system.

[Yvette Cooper]

In January, there was a major covid outbreak at the Home Office centre at Napier barracks. Some 200 people got covid, both residents and staff, impacting on the local community too. Last week’s damning court judgment said:

“The ‘bottom line’ is that the arrangements at the Barracks were contrary to the advice of PHE…The precautions which were taken were completely inadequate to prevent the spread of Covid-19 infection, and…the outbreak which occurred in mid-January 2021 was inevitable.”

The Home Office put people in dormitory blocks, with shared facilities for up to 28 people, at the height of a pandemic.

When the Home Affairs Committee asked the Home Secretary about this, she said that

“the use of the accommodation was all based on Public Health England advice, and…working in line with public health guidance…so we have been following guidance in every single way.”

The permanent secretary told the Committee

“we were following the guidance at every stage”.

But the court judgment and the evidence from PHE shows the opposite is true.

An internal Home Office email from 7 September records PHE advice as

“advice is that dormitories are not suitable”.

Public Health England told the Home Affairs Committee they

“don’t know how dormitories can be COVID compliant.”

They told the Home Office to follow youth hostel guidance—single rooms only and dormitories to be closed, except for household groups. They and Public Health Wales advised that if the Home Office were going ahead, they should at least limit the number of beds to six, keep people in bubbles with clear isolation facilities and have strong cleaning regimes. None of those things happened at Napier.

Instead, the independent inspectorate and local health officials found poor ventilation in dormitories, inadequate shared washing facilities, a deficient cleaning regime and no proper arrangements for self-isolation, with those testing positive and negative all kept in the same large dormitories. The Home Office was clearly not following public health advice in every way or at every stage. The Minister has an obligation to correct the record, so will he now admit that the Home Office did not follow public health advice and apologise for the inaccurate information given?

Will the Minister tell us what is happening now? Leading local health professionals have warned that the site still cannot be considered safe, and the Home Office’s own documents show local health professionals saying that another outbreak is inevitable. Charities have told me that there are still 12 to 14 people in a room and 28 people in shared blocks. Is that true, even after a damning inspectorate report and a damning court judgment, and even after 200 people caught covid on the site? The Home Office has a responsibility to keep people safe. Why has it been ignoring public health advice in the middle of a pandemic and putting public health at risk?

[Chris Philp]

First, the Select Committee Chair should take into account the context that pertained last September: 60,000 people needed to be accommodated in the middle of a pandemic—an increase of 12,000 people in just the space of a few months. With the best will in the world, it is operationally extremely difficult to accommodate 60,000 people in a pandemic—an extra 12,000 people at a matter of a few weeks or a few months’ notice.

The reality is that in the middle of a pandemic outbreaks in some places occur. We have had outbreaks in the hotels that have been used. In other parts of Government—in prisons and other places—there have been covid outbreaks. We have had covid going around Parliament as well. I have caught covid myself; in fact, 5 million people have tested positive for covid. The virus knows no boundaries, and it is very difficult to manage 60,000 people in those circumstances. The measures taken to combat covid on site included rigorous cleaning built into the contract, hand sanitisers, social distancing, personal cleaning equipment provided to service users, isolating and cohorting arrangements. They have now been enhanced further, with more cleaning, staggered access to communal areas and, three times a week, lateral flow testing. We have also reduced the numbers currently on the site.

Public Health England wrote to the Select Committee Chair on 1 June. I have the letter in front of me. In the second paragraph, it says:

“PHE has been in a positive ongoing dialogue and working collaboratively with Home Office (HO) colleagues on a range of COVID-19 related issues since spring 2020.”

Moreover, public health guidance published on gov.uk on 15 December 2020, which she will be aware of, said that ideally accommodation providers would

“identify single-rooms with en suite bathroom facilities”.

That is difficult to do for 60,000 people. However, it then said that

“if single occupancy accommodation is not available”—

thus acknowledging that that will not be possible in all cases—

“accommodation where cohorting is possible should be provided”.

We have maintained a close dialogue with Public Health England. Where possible we have followed its guidelines, and a number of improvements have been made in recent months.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

Whatever people’s view on the asylum situation in this country, people in Folkestone are united in their opposition to the use of Napier barracks in this way. It has been destructive to the community, not least because the barracks have been the focal point of protests—both people protesting about migrant crossings and people protesting about the use of the barracks. It has been a drain on other public services as well. Does the Home Office intend to renew its lease on Napier barracks, which expires in September?

[Chris Philp]

I thank my hon. Friend for his question and for the tireless work that he has done on behalf of his constituents, liaising with the Home Office, Kent County Council, Folkestone and Hythe District Council and others, and representing his constituents extremely effectively. Unfortunately, very often the local population is not terribly keen on accommodation centres of this kind, for the reasons that he outlined.

We are obviously working hard to mitigate those impacts. Kent police, for example, have received extra funding, and we are working closely with the local health service. The current arrangements on the site are due to run until September. No decision has been made beyond that, but I assure my hon. Friend that he will be closely engaged with at all stages as any further decision is taken.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

I, too, wish you a very happy birthday, Mr Speaker.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) on securing this urgent question. The recent High Court judgment was a further shameful indictment of the Government’s approach to asylum accommodation. My right hon. Friend highlighted the failure of the Home Office to listen to the public health advice about Napier barracks that led to the covid outbreak affecting 197 asylum seekers and staff and posing a danger to the wider community.

On 30 November, as a result of a fire safety inspection at Napier, the Crown premises fire safety inspectorate concluded that

“identified individuals or groups of people would be at risk in case of fire.”

In January, a fire broke out in Napier. The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration noted that the CPFSI’s concerns had not been addressed prior to the fire. Can the Minister tell me why the Home Office ignored the advice of Public Health England and the CPFSI? Can he give me a categorical assurance that the Home Office will now follow all future advice from PHE and CPFSI, and publish the advice it was given by PHE?

The Kent and Medway clinical commissioning group’s infection prevention report outlined that the site did not facilitate effective social distancing. Quite simply, how on earth did this happen in the middle of a global pandemic?

[Chris Philp]

I have said already that having to accommodate 60,000 people in the middle of a pandemic, and an increase of 12,000 in a few months, poses very substantial challenges. Where we were able to, we followed suggestions that were made. The hon. Gentleman asked about publishing PHE advice. I said in my first answer that it was published on gov.uk on 15 December last year. He said that a fire broke out. A fire did not break out; there was an act of deliberate arson by the people who were accommodated there, which was disgraceful, outrageous, unjustifiable and unconscionable. It did not break out; it was arson.

In relation to the points about public health, I have already listed, in answer to the Select Committee Chairman, the measures that have recently been taken to improve conditions at the Napier site.

[Scott Benton (Blackpool South) (Con)]

The residents of Blackpool South were absolutely appalled by the recent High Court judgment. Many of them have questioned why accommodation that was previously fit for our brave troops is somehow inadequate for those who are supposedly fleeing persecution around the globe. Indeed, some have asked why so many people want to remain in the UK at all if the accommodation is so bad. Does the Minister agree that the High Court judgment only highlights the need for urgent reform of our asylum system as a whole, and does he agree that we now need to look at processing asylum seekers outside the UK as part of this plan?

[Chris Philp]

The judgment, as I said earlier, did not find that the conditions were inhuman or degrading, and it did not find that using dormitory or barrack accommodation was inherently unsuitable, so I agree with the spirit of my hon. Friend’s question.

We certainly need to reform the system. The people who are coming across the English channel on small boats are making a journey that is not only dangerous and illegal, but unnecessary. France is a safe country, Germany is a safe country, Belgium is a safe country and Italy is a safe country. The right thing to do—the safe thing to do, and the legal thing to do—is to claim asylum in the first available place. In relation to his last question, yes, all options are being considered.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The utterly damning judgment said expressly that if the MOD had treated soldiers in this way, that, too, would have been unlawful. But let us just run with the idea that this was six soldiers instead of six asylum seekers, and they were put in conditions where a covid outbreak was inevitable, where the fire inspectorate highlighted serious or significant risk of harm, where self-harm and attempts at suicide were occurring because of the prison camp conditions, and where failed screening processes meant that that group of soldiers included those who were particularly vulnerable to covid or mental ill health. Imagine MPs were then told that use of the accommodation was all based on Public Health England advice, without us ever getting to see that advice, and then a court case established that the opposite was true. [Interruption.] Yes—only thanks to the court case.

Knowingly placing soldiers or anyone else into a covid trap and a fire trap would lead to outrage, resignations and sackings. Why are the consequences not exactly the same when it is six torture and trafficking survivors from Eritrea or Sudan? Will the Minister apologise for telling the House that conditions at Napier were good enough for the armed services? If he thinks that, it is insulting to the armed services. Will he accept that the conditions are not good enough for the Government to use the barracks for any cohort of people, and what does he think the Home Secretary can learn from the precedent of Amber Rudd’s resignation for inadvertently misleading the Home Affairs Committee?

[Chris Philp]

The hon. Gentleman talks about the publication of the public health guidance. It was published online. He said it was only published because of the court case. It was published on 15 December—long before the court case was registered.

The hon. Member said the people there were sick. There are screening criteria to make sure that people who should not go there do not go there. If they become vulnerable during the time of occupation, they get moved out. I should also add that the people accommodated there are all young single men, almost entirely aged between 18 and 40. On the number who got covid—along with 5 million, or more than 5 million, other people in this country—not a single person was hospitalised that I am aware of. That is why we are taking further steps to make sure the site is covid-secure. I have listed some of them already: lateral flow testing three times a week now, numbers being reduced and enhanced cleaning. Those are sensible steps in response to the pandemic and in response to the court judgment.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con) [V]]

A very happy birthday to you, Mr Speaker.

The Home Office has worked incredibly hard in very difficult circumstances to improve conditions, and covid security particularly, for the men temporarily housed at Napier barracks since the evidence informing the High Court ruling was submitted. However, I represent a large Army community that will be wondering why conditions considered fine for servicemen and women are considered not good enough for asylum seekers, including those who have made the illegal and perilous journey across the channel. How am I to advise my constituents?

[Chris Philp]

I think my right hon. Friend is raising an extremely good question. It is precisely because of that question that we will be introducing a Bill in the near future, announced in the Queen’s Speech, to reform our system to make sure that the asylum system is fair, as of course it should be, to those in genuine need, but that we deal with these claims quickly, effectively and fairly, and also prevent unnecessary illegal migration, which puts enormous pressure on the system of the kind we are discussing.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

The British Red Cross, which I think we would all acknowledge as the expert in the area of provision of accommodation of this sort, made a recommendation in its recent report that the Home Office

“should introduce a formal, independent inspection regime for asylum…accommodation with publicly available reports,”

in order to better

“monitor the quality and effectiveness of support provided and improve transparency and accountability”

for decisions. Surely, in the Home Office’s own interests, that would be preferable to a status quo where it is left to mark its own homework or to be called out by the courts.

[Chris Philp]

We do not mark our own homework; we are very widely inspected. In fact, there was an inspection by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration just a few months ago into Napier.

[Mary Kelly Foy (City of Durham) (Lab)]

Many happy returns, Mr Speaker.

One of the most shocking aspects of Napier barracks was the detention of vulnerable people who had already survived serious human rights abuses, including torture and trafficking. Given that people’s immigration cases can be resolved more humanely, efficiently and cost-effectively by supporting them in the community, why is the Home Office opening a new detention centre for vulnerable women in County Durham?

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

I am afraid to say that the hon. Lady is getting a little muddled up there. The Napier site is not for detention; it is an accommodation centre, and people are free to come and go, as the court case found. The centre up in Hassockfield in Durham is a detention centre prior to removal for people whose appeal rights are exhausted and who have no legal right to be in the country. They are two completely different things.

[Mr Peter Bone (Wellingborough) (Con)]

Would the Minister agree with me that the problem is not Napier barracks, but people crossing the channel illegally from France? Is not the simple solution that, when these people arrive in England, we put them on a Royal Navy boat and take them back to France, because France is a safe country and that is where asylum should be claimed? If we did that, it would stop the problem.

[Chris Philp]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that these channel crossings, which are now running at extremely and unacceptably high levels, are completely unnecessary because France is a safe country and people do not need to make the crossing. It is dangerous and it is also illegal, so I completely agree with those sentiments. In relation to the decisive action needed to stop these crossings completely, I can assure my hon. Friend that every single option is under very active consideration.

[Zarah Sultana (Coventry South) (Lab)]

The Home Secretary told the House in January that Napier barracks was

“in line with Public Health England guidelines.”—[Official Report, 26 January 2021; Vol. 688, c. 177.]

She reiterated that earlier this week when she told the House that her Department worked fully with PHE, but it is not true, as the High Court ruled last week, with the honourable Justice Linden writing that

“the arrangements at the Barracks were contrary to the advice of PHE”.

The ministerial code states that Ministers must give

“accurate and truthful information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest opportunity.”

So I ask the Minister, given this blatant discrepancy between the facts and what the Home Secretary said, why is she not here today to correct the record, or will she learn from her predecessor, who resigned as Home Secretary for inadvertently misleading MPs?

[Chris Philp]

I have already read the quote from the letter from Public Health England to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee dated 1 June in terms of the work we have been doing with them, and it says in the second paragraph:

“PHE has been in a positive ongoing dialogue and working collaboratively with Home Office…on a range of COVID-19 related issues since spring 2020.”

[Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con) [V]]

I wish you a long life and happiness of your birthday, Mr Speaker.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone) rightly said that the problem here is the illegal crossings from France. May I take this opportunity to thank the Minister and his colleagues for doing everything they can to reform the asylum system so that it helps those who actually are vulnerable and need it most? Can he confirm that under the new proposals we will be opening more safe routes to the UK while clamping down on the people smugglers who prey on the most vulnerable?

[Chris Philp]

My hon. Friend, as always, puts it exactly right. We intend to stand by those in genuine need with schemes like the resettlement scheme, which has taken vulnerable people directly from places of danger and resettled them, and has done so more than any other country in Europe, but when it comes to illegal migration we intend to clamp down hard.

[Marco Longhi (Dudley North) (Con)]

Happy birthday to you, Mr Speaker.

Yesterday, I was made aware of a serious matter that could revolutionise our equality laws. Professors gave evidence at the Women and Equalities Committee and said that buildings—not people—could be something akin to aggressive or threatening. So I think the illegal immigrants at Napier may perhaps have acted in self-defence when trashing and torching the barracks. We should all be aware of their vulnerabilities and sensibilities, so will the Minister agree to send a delegation from the Committee to assess this building aggression, in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson), whose sensibilities make him ideally suited to the job?

[Chris Philp]

I am not quite sure where to start. I certainly do not agree with the comments made about building aggression; they seem absurd. My hon. Friend makes a good point, and there is absolutely no excuse whatsoever for incidents such as the terrible act of arson we saw back in January.

[Kim Johnson (Liverpool, Riverside) (Lab) [V]]

A very happy birthday to you today, Mr Speaker.

The Minister’s description of Napier barracks sounds like a propaganda film—yoga, three meals a day, regular cleaning. However, in reality refugees and those seeking asylum are living in squalid accommodation, bitten alive by bedbugs and with inadequate health support. The Government’s accommodation policies are entrenched in controversy, so can the Minister explain how the £1 billion contracts are monitored, and does he agree with the High Court ruling that the use at Napier barracks was unlawful and shameful?

[Chris Philp]

I have explained that many aspects of the judgment found in favour of the Home Office, and I have also explained that improvements have been made subsequently. The contracts are monitored on an ongoing basis, but I repeat again that the challenges of managing 60,000 people in asylum accommodation in the middle of a pandemic are very considerable.

[Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)]

I see this issue about public health in a pandemic as a little bit of a distraction technique, frankly. Pandemic or no pandemic, I am pretty sure that most Labour Members would rather have these people, who are largely illegal immigrants, in elaborate hotel accommodation for as long as possible—potentially indefinitely. Does the Minister agree that if we are going to do what the elected Government were asked to do, which is take back control of our borders, it might be necessary in time to be open to looking at human rights law, because it seems that these judges, who are so often out of step with public opinion, are a blockage to us doing what we need to do?

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

I think the public do expect us to reform the system and to control our borders, which is why we are bringing forward a new Bill very shortly to do exactly that. On the question of human rights, which my hon. Friend rightly raises, there is a review going on currently into the operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 that will be reporting, I think, later this year.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP) [V]]

My hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) has reminded the House that quite recently a Home Secretary resigned for inadvertently misleading the Home Affairs Committee. Other hon. Members have asked the Minister whether the current Home Secretary misled the Home Affairs Committee in oral evidence on 24 February this year. In response to those questions, the Minister keeps referring to a Public Health England letter from June this year that talks about full co-operation from the Home Office since spring of this year.

Of course, when the Home Secretary gave evidence on 24 February, she was talking about what had happened before then, not what happened this spring. Evidence presented to the High Court suggests that what she said—that the Department had previously followed public health guidance regarding Napier barracks in “every single way”—was simply not factually correct. The High Court has said that the fact that that public health evidence was ignored meant that the covid outbreak was “inevitable”, so why is the Home Secretary not tendering her resignation, as Amber Rudd had the grace and decency to do?

[Chris Philp]

The hon. and learned Lady refers to the letter of 1 June and says that it post-dates the Home Affairs Committee appearance on 24 February, which it does. However, the paragraph that I quoted says that the positive ongoing dialogue and collaborative working had been ongoing “since spring 2020”.

[Alex Sobel (Leeds North West) (Lab/Co-op)]

Many happy returns of the day, Mr Speaker.

The High Court judgment was absolutely damning. The judge said:

“I do not accept that the accommodation there ensured a standard of living which was adequate for the health of the Claimants.”

The Government are housing people 14 to a room. As we have heard, more than 200 people contracted covid. What is the Minister going to do to ensure that people are protected from covid? How many people have been vaccinated at the barracks, and what are the future plans for housing asylum seekers in accommodation that is fit for human habitation?

[Chris Philp]

Just to be clear, the court judgment found that there was no article 3 infringement. It did not find that the conditions amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment. Moreover, the judgment did not find, in relation to the requirement to be back at 10 o’clock, that a curfew had been imposed; nor did it find that the barracks or dormitory accommodation were inherently inadequate in the context of asylum accommodation. It is important that the House understands those important aspects of the judgment.

I have already outlined the measures that have been taken: an increased cleaning service, social distancing and lateral flow testing three times a week. All those measures are designed to ensure that users are safe. The hon. Member asked about vaccinations. The Government’s approach to vaccinations in general is that, outside of things like the NHS, vaccinations are done in the order that people are entitled to them based on age and clinical conditions, so the same rules that apply to the hon. Member, to me and to Mr Speaker will apply to people at Napier as well.

[Alexander Stafford (Rother Valley) (Con)]

I wish you many happy returns, Mr Speaker.

After the second world war, my grandfather, Paul, who fought alongside British forces, was settled in the UK in a refugee camp. A few years later, my mother was born in the same refugee camp. That refugee camp was at an old Army base. Yes, conditions were not great, but they were thankful that they were born in that, because, had my grandfather returned to the Soviet Union, he would have returned to a gulag or perhaps even worse. Why were those conditions good enough for a hero who fought against the Nazis and for my own mother, but not good enough for this current wave of migrants?

[Chris Philp]

My hon. Friend is making an extremely powerful point. The experience of his mother and his family illustrates the service that this country does in providing asylum to those who genuinely need it. It puts today’s debate rather in context.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]]

Happy birthday, Mr Speaker.

The High Court judgment showed that Napier was unsafe in terms of fire safety, covid security and mental wellbeing, whether for armed forces personnel or asylum seekers, but it is representative of a generalised callousness with regard to support for refugees which leaves many in Newcastle living in inadequate accommodation with inadequate support to keep themselves and their accommodation clean and covid secure. How is the Minister going to change that? Will he say whether Nationwide Accommodation Services, which ran Napier day to day, has other contracts with the Home Office?

[Chris Philp]

If the hon. Lady would like to raise that case in writing, I would be happy to look into it to find out the details and circumstances. We are accommodating 60,000 people across the country. The cost of running the asylum system now amounts to £1 billion a year, which is a staggering sum and makes the case for reform, for all the reasons that Conservative Members have been laying out.

[Lee Anderson (Ashfield) (Con)]

Happy birthday from the people of Ashfield, Mr Speaker.

After five years of living in the back of a lorry fighting for King and country during the second world war, my grandad Charlie returned to these shores, to live in poor housing, with no heating and no hot water, and he made do with an outside toilet and no access to free yoga lessons. He then went on to work for 40 years down the pit and not once did he ever complain about his life. So does the Minister agree that if illegal immigrants entering this country do not like the housing, which has much better facilities than in my grandad’s day, one solution would be to return to France, taking their leftie lawyers and the Opposition with them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

My hon. Friend, as always, makes a powerful point. There is serious question to answer about why people who are in safe countries, such as France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy and all these other European countries, are attempting these dangerous, illegal and unnecessary journeys. What I say to them is that they are in countries that have a fully functioning asylum system and they should claim asylum there.

[Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con) [V]]

Happy birthday, Mr Speaker.

The people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke cannot figure out what is wrong with an Army barracks that has provided free accommodation, food, sanitation and yoga to people who have entered this country illegally. Leftie lawyers have stuck their oar in and ensured that hard-earned UK taxpayers’ money is going to have to be splashed on expensive accommodation, such as hotels or buying properties, as seen in Stoke-on-Trent, adding further strain to local public services. Does the Minister agree that people entering illegally from safe places such as France should be returned immediately and that we should now look to Denmark and process asylum seekers outside the UK as part of our plan for immigration?

[Chris Philp]

I agree with the thrust of my hon. Friend’s point, which he makes powerfully. We have already changed our inadmissibility rules to enable the sort of thing that he is describing, and we are in discussions to help make those operational. He rightly says that people should not be entering the UK illegally and dangerously having come from a safe place where they could reasonably have claimed asylum, and that most certainly includes France.

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab) [V]]

The Home Office’s treatment of asylum seekers is appalling. Will the Minister address the latest scandal: the failure to provide new prepayment Aspen cards, which has left many individuals and families without any money at all for several weeks? In my constituency, many asylum seekers are reliant on a local charity, West London Welcome, for food and necessities, because the Minister’s Department cannot or will not do its job.

[Chris Philp]

There have been some delays with the new Aspen cards, which are in the process of being rapidly resolved. However, I categorically reject the allegation that the Home Office, the Government and the UK are not doing their reasonable bit to support asylum seekers. As I have said, the cost of providing asylum support to these 60,000 people now amounts to £1 billion a year, so any suggestion that there is a lack of generosity or there is a meanness of spirit is categorically and completely untrue.

[Mr Speaker]

I am now suspending the House to enable to necessary arrangements to be made for the next business.

EEA citizens and Right to Work and Rent Schemes

Chris Philp Excerpts

Thursday 10th June 2021 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

The UK has left the European Union (EU), and the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 ended free movement law in the UK on 31 December 2020. On 1 January 2021, a grace period of six-months began, during which time relevant aspects of free movement law have been saved to allow eligible EEA citizens and their family members resident in the UK by 31 December 2020 to apply to the EU settlement scheme. This period ends on 30 June 2021.

We have committed to providing parity between EEA and non-EEA citizens under the new immigration system. All migrants residing and coming to the UK will be required to obtain the correct immigration status, regardless of their nationality. From 1 July 2021, EEA citizens and their family members require UK immigration status to evidence their rights and entitlements in the UK, in the same way as other foreign nationals, such as their right to work or right to rent.

The right to work and right to rent schemes—the schemes—were introduced as part of a suite of measures designed to tackle and deter illegal immigration. They are intended to prevent individuals without lawful immigration status in the UK from taking up employment or accessing accommodation in the private rented sector; and to support efforts to tackle those who exploit vulnerable migrants, often in very poor conditions.

Employers and landlords are required to carry out simple checks, applicable to everyone, including British citizens, to ensure the individual has lawful status in the UK before they employ or let a property to an individual.

Today, I have laid before Parliament the Immigration (Restrictions on Employment and Residential Accommodation) (Prescribed Requirements and Codes of Practice) And Licencing Act 2003 (Personal and Premises Licences) (Forms) Order.

The order seeks to amend the schemes’ lists of acceptable documents which demonstrate a right to work or a right to rent, by removing EEA passports and national identity cards. It provides the following additions to the lists: an Irish passport or passport card, frontier worker permit, service provider of Switzerland visa, and documents issued by the Crown dependencies EU settlement schemes.

From 1 July, employers and landlords will undertake right to work and right to rent checks on EEA citizens, who have been issued with digital evidence of their UK immigration status using the Home Office online services. We have already begun this journey, with employers being able to use the online right to work service since January 2019. Since the launch of the optional online right to work service, there have been over 1.3 million views by individuals and over 390,000 views by employers carrying out right to work checks digitally. The online right to rent checking service went live in November 2020, and since then there have been over 36,000 profile views by individuals, and over 6,500 views by landlords carrying out right to rent checks digitally.

The online services make it simpler for employers and landlords to carry out the checks, as they do not need to see or check documents. The checks can be carried out by video call, as the individual’s immigration status information is provided in real time directly from Home Office systems. The service is secure and free to use.

However, we recognise that some individuals are anxious about navigating a digital system. Therefore, users will be supported to adapt through clear guidance, with direct support available for those who are less digitally confident, ensuring they are not disadvantaged due to any inability to access or use digital services, including where they have no access to a device or the internet.

The order also enables employers and landlords to confirm via the Home Office employer or landlord checking service a certificate of application or document issued by the UK, Bailiwick of Jersey or Bailiwick of Guernsey EU settlement schemes, which confirms an outstanding application made by the 30 June deadline. This will ensure that EEA citizens can continue to evidence their eligibility to work and rent until the application is finally determined.

The order also amends the Immigration (Residential Accommodation) (Prescribed Requirements and Codes of Practice) Order 2014 by extending the list of those granted status as a visitor who can prove their right to rent using the combination of a national passport, plus proof of their arrival within the last six months, for example a physical or electronic air/sea/rail ticket or boarding pass, to EEA citizens.

Finally, the order amends and updates the existing statutory codes of practice to reflect these important changes which will improve the operation of the schemes. It also makes consequential amendments to the Licensing Act 2003 (Personal licences) Regulations 2005 and the Licensing Act 2003 (Premises licences and club premises certificates) Regulations 2005, and the Illegal Working Compliance Order Regulations 2016, to align with the changes in this order in relation to right to work check.

[HCWS83]

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 10th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Do any other Members wish to speak before the Minister rises to his feet? I do not see you all jumping up and down, so I call the Minister.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles, and it is a pleasure, as always, to respond to the shadow Minister. Let me start by saying how glad I am to hear that he and the Opposition generally welcome the principles that lie behind the changes in these clauses. We intend to reduce the number of cautions from the current six to the two contemplated in the Bill, following, as he rightly said, the initial pilot with three police forces, which has now expanded to 14 or 15 police forces. The feedback that we received from those police forces is that they find the simpler structure of cautions much easier to follow and much more helpful. Broadly speaking, it sounds as though we are all on the same page—both sides of the House, and the police as well. I am glad that we are starting from a very similar place.

The shadow Minister asked a number of questions about the involvement of victims in the administration of cautions. Of course, victims should be at the heart of the criminal justice system—we all believe very strongly in that. On victims, I draw the Committee’s attention to paragraph 6.7 of the victims’ code, which says:

“Where the police or the Crown Prosecution Service are considering an out of court disposal you”—

the victim—

“have the Right to be asked for your views and to have these views taken into account when a decision is made.”

The police and CPS must make reasonable efforts to obtain the views of victims, and they must communicate with victims on the topic. As the shadow Minister rightly said, it is clear that victims need to be part of this endeavour, and paragraph 6.7 of the victims’ code ensures that.

The shadow Minister asked a second series of questions about the fact that both levels of caution—the diversionary caution and the community caution—have a requirement for conditions to be attached. He expressed some concern that that might impose additional bureaucracy on police forces. He also asked about the cost of the whole scheme more generally and mentioned the estimate that the whole of the criminal justice system cost might be in the order of £15 million a year.

On the conditions, it is important that the cautions have some effect. It is important that where someone has committed an offence and admitted guilt—I will come to the point about admission of guilt in a moment—there should be some sort of follow-up action to ensure remedial activity and that an appropriate step is taken. If we simply let someone go with no follow-up step, it undermines and diminishes the seriousness of the fact that they have committed an offence and admitted to it. It perhaps misses an opportunity to take a step that will reduce reoffending in future. In general, taking steps to stop people reoffending is a good thing. There are some opportunities that we are very keen to embrace via these conditions and sentences passed by the court. For example, if someone has a drug addiction, an alcohol addiction or a mental health problem, we want that to get treated. These cautions are an opportunity to impose a condition—seeking treatment, for example. Of course, in a court setting, there are community sentence treatment requirements, alternative dispute resolutions, mental health treatment requirements and so on. These cautions have an important role to play in ensuring that the underlying causes of offending get addressed.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Will the Minister give way?

[Chris Philp]

I will just finish the point, and then I will take the intervention in a moment.

There are opportunities to take a more calibrated approach if police officers or the Crown Prosecution Service think it is appropriate. First, in the code of practice that we will be tabling to accompany these new diversionary and community cautions, there will be significant latitude and quite a lot of flexibility for police officers and the CPS to set appropriate conditions. They could be quite low level. For a low-level offender, where it is not appropriate to impose an onerous condition, or where the police feel it would impose an unreasonable burden on police officers themselves, a much lower, light-touch condition could be applied. That would address the concern that the shadow Minister raised.

There is also the option of a community resolution, which the NPCC says it will retain. There will be the two cautions set out in statute, and there will be the community resolution option too. Although the community resolution comes with conditions, there is not an obligation for them to be followed up, so the administrative burden would not apply.

On the cost point, of course we should be aware that the police are generally receiving a great deal of extra funding as part of the recent police settlements in order to support the police uplift programme—the extra 23,000 police officers. It would be a good use of a bit of that time if it were spent on following up the conditions that have been imposed to try to prevent reoffending. We all agree that reoffending is too high; that is bad for the individual and society as a whole. That is a good use of a bit of the additional police resources.

[Alex Cunningham]

Will the Minister give way?

[Chris Philp]

Perhaps I should give way to the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate first, and then I will give way to the shadow Minister.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am grateful to the Minister. On the issue of addressing the root of the offending in the first place, I am chair of the all-party parliamentary group on attention deficit hyperactive disorder, and people with ADHD are disproportionally represented in the prison population. That is partly because of screening—they are not screened early enough and are sometimes not aware that they have ADHD. Has the Minister given any thought to whether some of the conditions could involve screening for people with ADHD if that is one of the roots of the offending?

[Chris Philp]

That is an extremely good point. That is the sort of issue that we should take up in the code of practice that accompanies the statutory framework. That is exactly the kind of thing that should be picked up. Where someone has a need for treatment of some kind, whether for drugs, mental health—ADHD in that example—or alcohol addiction, we need to try to get the underlying cause of the offending sorted out. That is something that we can and should pick up in the accompanying code of practice, and I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising it.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister is talking a lot of good sense, and I take issue with very little of what he has to say. I am keen to understand whether he is content that we are seeing lower numbers of out-of-court disposals. He talks about reoffending, which we all want to see reduced, but there is no evidence that this measure will contribute to that. Would he suggest otherwise?

[Chris Philp]

Clearly recent data, over the past 15 months or so, has been significantly distorted because of the effect of the pandemic on the criminal justice system, policing and everything else, so we need to be careful about post-dating data from February or March 2020.

The reoffending point links to the comments of the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate. We need to ensure that, in the code of practice, we are guiding police forces and the CPS to the follow-up activities and conditions that are most likely to deliver a reduction in reoffending. The shadow Minister is right that, although the police preferred the new system that we are introducing, there was not evidence of a reduction of reoffending in the pilots areas. We have an opportunity via the code of practice to ensure that the conditions are proposed and designed, like the one that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate just proposed, with the purpose of reducing reoffending. This is an opportunity that we should seize, along the lines just suggested.

--- Later in debate ---

[Allan Dorans]

Does the Minister agree that the regulatory framework of diversionary and community cautions will prevent many young people from entering the formal criminal justice system—including having their fingerprints and photographs taken—which could affect their life chances and employment chances in later years for a mistake that they made at a very young age; that these measures will be welcomed by the parents who see their children perhaps having a second opportunity to live a crime-free life; and that this will allow rehabilitation within the family and the community?

[Chris Philp]

I do agree. Of course, I know that the hon. Gentleman had a long and distinguished career with, I think, the Metropolitan police.

[Allan Dorans]

It was.

[Chris Philp]

Therefore the hon. Gentleman’s comments are based on that long experience of public service in the police force. It is clearly better if we can get people to stop their offending by way of early intervention such as this, rather than having them end up in a young offenders institution or somewhere similar, which often leads to a pretty bad outcome. We should take this opportunity to stop that pattern of behaviour developing and worsening. That is why these conditions are important —to ensure that that prevention and rehabilitation take place. I fear that otherwise we are missing an opportunity —an opportunity that the shadow Minister is poised to grasp.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am really interested in what the Minister said about working with ethnic minority and BME communities. We have seen a tremendous cut in services over the last 10 or 11 years, so does he see the potential of legislation such as this to increase even further the need for the Government to think again and invest more in organisations that can help people to understand what the Government are about and how young men in particular—it is young black men who tend to be affected most—can avoid the criminal justice system and move on with their lives?

[Chris Philp]

Exactly—avoid the criminal justice system by desisting from criminal behaviour.

Obviously, a lot of initiatives are under way, particularly via the funding for serious violence reduction units, which has increased a great deal in the last couple of years. The work of serious violence reduction units with those communities, talking about issues exactly like this, is the right way to do that. I will make sure that my colleague the Minister for Policing is appraised of our discussions this morning—this afternoon, now—so that he can ensure that that is reflected as he works with SVRUs and the police on issues such as this.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I am sure that he will excuse me for being parochial about this. In Cleveland, we have the third-highest rate of serious violent crime in the country, but the Cleveland Police force has been passed over in the past when it has come to funding for the initiatives he is talking about. Will he remind the Policing Minister of the particular issues that we face in Cleveland, and perhaps secure us some more funding?

[Chris Philp]

It sounds like I have been engaged to act as a lobbyist on behalf of Cleveland, but I will pass that on, and while I am at it, I will mention the needs of Croydon, my own borough.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)]

And Lincolnshire!

[Chris Philp]

I will not forget the fine county of Lincolnshire, represented by the Minister for Safeguarding.

[Alex Cunningham]

Because there is so much crime all over the place!

[Chris Philp]

Well, I am afraid that in the case of Croydon, there is quite a lot of crime. I will add Cleveland to my communication.

I turn to the large group of amendments starting with amendment 11, which the shadow Minister moved. He proposes replacing the word “diversionary” with the word “conditional”. I understand entirely what he is trying to do with that amendment, but unfortunately there are technical and legal reasons why that does not work. Essentially, the reason—as he touched on when moving the amendment—is that the concept of a conditional caution already exists in the current form of statutory out-of-court disposals for adults, which were enshrined in part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

We cannot change the name because there would be transitional provisions when the old cautions may still apply, and that may lead to confusion about which type of caution is being referred to, whether that be the old conditional caution, which may still apply in some cases—depending on the time of the offence—or the new conditional caution, which would be called a “conditional caution” if we adopted the amendment. It would lead to confusion about which caution was in force. As the new diversionary caution is different from the old conditional caution, we think that, both for legal reasons and for reasons of general confusion and clarity, the use of a different word—“diversionary”, in this case—is the right thing to do.

Amendments 46 and 48 are in the shadow Minister’s name but I do not think that he moved them. Should I defer replying to them?

[Alex Cunningham]

We are not debating them.

[Chris Philp]

In that case, I will not speak to those now—I will hold back for a subsequent opportunity—and I trust that I have answered the shadow Minister’s excellent questions.

[Alex Cunningham]

I appreciate the Minister’s response. As far as the amendment is concerned, I accept that we are perhaps all looking at different levels of confusion within the system. It is just a shame that we have to have any confusion at all. I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I repeat to the Minster what I said before: we need to address disproportionality across the whole justice system. There is no doubt that these particular measures will add to that, and it is important that the Government take measures to ensure that young people—and even older people—coming into the system have a full understanding of what they are getting into as a result of the Government’s proposed changes to the law. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

Smiling as always, Sir Charles. I thank the shadow Minister for his speech. I made a number of the points that I would make in response in my comments a few minutes ago, so I do not want to re-elaborate on them at too much length, lest I wear thin the patience of colleagues. I will just reiterate briefly the two or three key points in response to the shadow Minister.

First, the Government think that having some level of conditions is an inherently good thing because it means there is a mechanism by which follow-up can take place, and it provides an opportunity for rehabilitation. Secondly, in the code of practice, which we have discussed already, there will be considerable latitude over how the conditions are calibrated. It could therefore be possible to have quite light-touch conditions. What we will take away is that, in the code of practice that gets drafted, and subsequently tabled and approved by Parliament, there is a wide range of conditions, including some at the lower end that are not unduly onerous on the police to monitor and follow up. Thirdly, the community resolution is still an option available to the police, and although it has conditions, it does not require follow-up.

A combination of those three considerations makes the approach being taken the right one. The key point is that the code of practice is very important. We will no doubt debate it when it gets tabled and voted on in a Delegated Legislation Committee. I hear the shadow Minister’s point, and the code of practice will reflect that.

On the final point, about disproportionality, which the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate raised, we will certainly be mindful of disproportionality considerations. As the hon. Member for—help me out—

[The Chair]

Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock.

[Chris Philp]

Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock—

[The Chair]

There we go. Mr Dorans, are you happy with that description of your constituency?

[The Chair]

Excellent.

[Chris Philp]

As the hon. Gentleman said in his intervention, this is an opportunity to divert people from a path towards more serious crime and into a regular life. That is important for everyone, including some of these communities, which get themselves into more trouble than we would like. That point is well made.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 76, page 71, line 21, at end insert—

“(8) The Secretary of State must, within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, and every 12 months thereafter, lay before Parliament a report on the use of cautions in accordance with this Part.”

I will not keep the Committee long on this simple amendment, which would compel the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the use of cautions, as established under this clause. As I said earlier, in 2019 only about 192,000 out-of-court disposals were issued in England and Wales, which is the lowest number in a year since 1984. I bear in mind what the Minister said but, of course, those figures refer to 2019, not the time covered by the pandemic.

The use of out-of-court disposals has been in decline since 2008, after it peaked at 670,000 disposals in 2007. Their use has fallen nearly three quarters since then. In 2008, community resolutions were introduced, and they remain the only type of out-of-court disposal that has been used at a similar rate in each of the past five years. That has happened while recorded crime has increased by more than 1 million offences, from about 4.3 million in 2010 to about 6 million last year. I mentioned earlier that we have concerns that the new restrictions on using out-of-court disposals for certain offences are likely to have some impact on out-of-court disposal volumes, driving down their use further. I again ask the Minister to clarify whether he thinks there will be more or fewer out-of-court disposals in the future.

It is all the more important that we monitor the new system to ensure that the use of out-of-court disposals does not continue to decline significantly. Although I appreciate that there has been a pilot and evaluation done of a two-tier framework, this is the one that is already in use. There has not been such an assessment of this new proposed two-tier framework. I have already mentioned the reservations that we have about attaching conditions to all cautions and the potential impact that that will have on disproportionality. Again, these changes need to be monitored to ensure that they do not have unwanted, perverse consequences. We are all keen to see the use of effective out-of-court disposals increase, not decrease. They can allow police to deal quickly and proportionately with low-level, often first-time offending and help to keep people out of the formal criminal justice system, which in many cases is preferable for their communities and for the Government in the long run.

An annual report to Parliament would allow for the necessary scrutiny of the new system and help to stem the decline in the use of out-of-court disposals. I hope that the Minister agrees that that would be a useful exercise. It will be good to hear more generally from him about Government plans to monitor and scrutinise the new system.

[Chris Philp]

On the review of how out-of-court disposals are used and are going, they are, as the shadow Minister said, already recorded by all forces in England and Wales and reported to the Home Office and the MOJ for statistical purposes. The figures appear in criminal justice statistics, published quarterly, which include performance data tables for each individual police force, as well as trends in use—figures from which the shadow Minister was likely quoting a few minutes ago.

There is therefore already complete transparency on the numbers, which enable Parliament, the Opposition and the Departments—the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office—to look at them, take action, call parliamentary debates and so on. Those figures are all in the public domain.

In addition to that, however, all police forces are already required to have an out-of-court disposal scrutiny panel, led by an independent chairperson. Those panels are extremely important in holding the police to account and ensuring that disposals are being used appropriately, to provide assurances that difficult decisions are being made properly and to provide effective feedback to police officers and their forces.

Already, therefore, we have two levels of scrutiny: the data being reported, aggregated by police force and reported nationally to the Home Office and the MOJ, so we can debate it in Parliament; and, for each individual force area, a scrutiny panel. In addition, a standard review of legislation takes place after a Bill receives Royal Assent. I suggest to the Committee that those three mechanisms between them are sufficient.

The shadow Minister, however, is right to point to the figures. We in Parliament should be vigilant about them. If we, the Opposition or any Member of Parliament are concerned about how those quarterly figures look, there are a lot of ways to express those concerns in Parliament—by way of a Westminster Hall debate, an Opposition day debate or any of the usual mechanisms. I suggest that the existing mechanisms are adequate. I invite everyone in Government and in Parliament to use them.

[Alex Cunningham]

On this occasion, we are in a different place. I appreciate what the Minister said about the various methods through which information is available and about the opportunities to debate the issues, but I cannot understand why the Government are reluctant to have a formal report on the new system. We have discussed at some length the considerable reduction in the number of cautions used over the past 10 or 15 years. That decline is continuing. There is no evidence that the new system will result in any increase in the use of the cautions. For that matter, it is important for us to hold the Government particularly to account, so I will press for a vote on the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 78 to 85 stand part.

[Chris Philp]

Clauses 77 to 85 essentially provide for the statutory basis on which the diversionary caution—the higher of the two new cautions—will be introduced. We have already discussed at some length the principles that underpin the diversionary caution, and clauses 77 to 85 simply provide for the details necessary to facilitate their introduction. Given that we have already had a fairly extensive discussion on the principles, I will go through the clauses relatively quickly.

Clause 77 specifies the criteria for giving a diversionary caution, as introduced in clause 76, which we have just agreed. An authorised person may give a diversionary caution to a person over 18 years of age, subject to the specified conditions being met. The clause specifies key safeguards whereby an authorised person or prosecuting agency can authorise the use of this caution. They must establish that there is sufficient evidence to charge, that the recipient admits the offence and that the recipient signs and accepts the caution, along with understanding the effect of non-compliance. Those requirements mirror the provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that apply to existing conditional cautions. The requirements are important safeguards, given the consequences that can flow from the breach of a condition attached to a diversionary caution, as we have discussed.

Clause 78 establishes the types of conditions that may be attached to a diversionary caution. We will expand on that in the code of practice that we discussed. The provision is similar to the existing conditional caution. Again, as we have already discussed, it requires reasonable efforts to be made to ensure that the victim’s views are sought before the conditions are set out. We have talked about the importance of taking victims’ views into account.

Clause 79 provides for the rehabilitation and reparation conditions that may be attached to a diversionary caution. Further to the point made by the hon. Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock, we talked about the importance of rehabilitation as well as reparation. The clause specifies the sort of activities that may be undertaken. 

Clause 80 introduces a financial penalty condition. Clause 81 deals particularly with conditions that might attach when the offender is a foreign national. Clause 82 introduces a method whereby an authorised person or prosecution authority may, with the offender’s consent—should that be necessary subsequently—vary the conditions attached to a diversionary caution. 

Clause 83 deals with the effect of failure to comply with a condition attached to a diversionary caution. As I said earlier, criminal proceedings can be instituted against the offender for the index offence in the event of any breach. That is why a formal admission of guilt is so important.

Clause 84 grants a constable power to arrest the offender without a warrant where the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the offender has failed, without reasonable excuse, to comply with any condition attached to a diversionary caution. Clause 85 clarifies how the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 will be applied in the event that an offender is arrested under clause 84 if a breach has occurred. 

The clauses essentially implement the principles that we discussed when we considered clause 76 a few moments ago.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I am sure it is the Minister’s intention to be helpful. Does he want to respond to the shadow Minister in winding up this part of the debate?

[Chris Philp]

I have already made the points that I wanted to make, but I will respond to one or two of the shadow Minister’s questions.

Indictable-only offences are by definition extremely serious. They are the most serious offences, so there would be an expectation of proper prosecution in such cases.

The shadow Minister asked what the exceptional circumstances might comprise. I cannot give him speculative examples, but the meaning of the term “exceptional circumstances” is well understood in law, and it is a very high bar. It is not a test that would be met readily or easily.

On the fact that the limit on the fine may be specified by a statutory instrument, there is a desire to retain a certain measure of flexibility. I understand the shadow Minister’s concern that the fine may end up escalating to an unreasonably high level, but as he acknowledged in his questions, it is subject to a vote in Parliament. If Parliament feels that the level of fine is inappropriately high, it is open to Parliament to simply vote it down. Then the Government would have to think again and come back to the House with a fine at a more reasonable level. On that basis, I recommend that the clauses stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 77 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 78 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 86

Giving a community caution

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 87 to 93 stand part.

[Chris Philp]

Rather like the previous group of clauses, which implemented the diversionary cautions, clauses 86 to 93 lay out the details of the proposed scheme for community cautions, implementing the principles that we have already debated pursuant to clause 76. As I did a few minutes ago, I will go through each clause quickly.

Clause 86 specifies the criteria for giving a community caution. It must be given by an authorised person to someone over the age of 18. The clause specifies the key safeguards whereby an authorised person or prosecuting authority can authorise the use of the caution: establishing sufficient evidence to charge, and an admission of guilt from the offender, who signs and accepts the caution and understands the effect of non-compliance. That mirrors precisely the provisions of clause 77, which we discussed a few minutes ago.

Clause 87 establishes the type of conditions that can be attached, specifying that they should be rehabilitative or reparative—that is very important for the reasons that we have already discussed. It requires that reasonable efforts are made to ascertain victims’ views.

Clause 88 introduces the permissible rehabilitation and reparation conditions, which must have the objective of facilitating rehabilitation in those cases. The clause provides that such conditions may be restricted in some cases and contain unpaid work conditions or attendance conditions.

Clause 89—again, mirroring the previous group—introduces the financial penalty condition. Clause 90 provides the framework for registering and enforcing financial penalties as part of this regime.

Clause 91 provides a framework for court proceedings arising from the enforcement of the financial penalty, essentially to ensure that it gets paid if someone does not pay it. Clause 92 introduces a method for an authorised person or prosecuting authority to vary the conditions, which, again, mirrors the previous group of clauses.

Clause 93 deals with the effect of community cautions where criminal proceedings may not be instituted against the offender for the offence. In particular, if the offender fails to comply with the condition under community caution without a reasonable excuse, the condition may be rescinded and a financial penalty order may be imposed instead, so the consequence of breach here is financial penalty rather than prosecution.

I hope that gives the Committee adequate oversight of the effect of clauses 86 to 93.

[Alex Cunningham]

Although we were on relatively familiar ground with the new diversionary cautions, the community cautions, on which clauses 86 to 93 set out the detail, are very different from the lower-tier out-of-court disposals currently in use. In fact, they are much more similar to the existing conditional cautions that the diversionary cautions are already designed to replace. There are lots of cautions here—cautions and cautions and cautions.

I spoke earlier about our concerns about the necessity of attaching conditions to the community cautions, so I will not tread the same ground again, but that is an important point. We very much support the simplification of the out-of-court disposal system and the introduction of the two-tier framework, but why are the Government introducing two tiers that are so similar? We should be able to get rid of the confusion of the current system of six out-of-court disposals without so severely restricting the choices of police officers who deal with such a wide range of low-level offending for which a range of penalties may be appropriate.

I understand that the community caution is intended to replace the community resolution. There are two major differences between the two. A community caution will be formally administered by the police, like other cautions, so it will appear on an offender’s criminal record in the same way that other cautions do. There will be a clear statutory rule about the conditions that can be attached to it. That is quite a jump from the community resolution. Community resolutions are voluntary agreements between the police and an accused person. They do not appear on an offender’s criminal record, and the actions agreed to are not legally enforceable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Cunningham]

My colleague is right to raise the issue of disproportionality in the system. Anything that increases that is not good for us as a country and is certainly not good for the young people involved. It is important that the Government bear that in mind as they bring the measure forward. More importantly, as I said, the Government can get into a situation where they recognise that communities—ethnic minority communities, call them what we will—need to have an understanding of the changes that the Government are proposing, so that we do not find more young people, young black men in particular, with criminal records when that is not necessary.

Secondly, the community cautions will now involve financial penalties. Officers will be able to attach a fine to a community caution as a punitive condition. Failure to meet any of the conditions, including a financial penalty condition, could result in a police-issued fine. Again, that would be quite a departure from the community resolution. Offenders might be asked to pay damages to their victims as part of a resolution, but community resolutions are not used to fine individuals.

Will the Minister tell me, therefore, whether the intention is to replace the community resolution entirely with community cautions? I ask, because Transform Justice has rightly called for some clarity in this area:

“The status of community resolutions under the proposed legislation is not clear. Clause 96 ‘Abolition of other cautions and out-of-court disposals’ states that ‘No caution other than a diversionary or community caution may be given to a person aged 18 or over who admits to having committed an offence’. We are unsure what this means for community resolutions, although we understand the intention is that they will remain available to police if they wish to use them.

Given the value of community resolutions, as an out of court disposal that does not require a formal admission of guilt, the legislation and accompanying regulation should make clear in Clause 96 that use of community resolutions will not be prohibited under the new framework.”

I have already discussed our concerns about the need for a formal admission of guilt for the community caution and the potential that has to deepen disproportionality in our criminal justice system. My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate just raised that issue. We all know that there are benefits to having a light-touch disposal to deal with low-level offending in some cases where appropriate. Keeping people out of the formal justice system at this level can help keep them out of it for good and so I wonder whether the Minister thinks that we might be losing a helpful method of disposal here. Finally, how does he anticipate that the low-level offences that benefited from community resolutions before will now be handled?

[Chris Philp]

I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and his questions. For clarity, in answer to his principal question, the community resolution will still be available to use. It will not be removed by the Bill. As he said, community resolutions have conditions attached to them, but they do not require the admission of guilt— they simply require someone to take responsibility—and, should the conditions not be adhered to, there is in essence no consequence to follow that.

That low-level entry provision will therefore still exist and be available to police officers to use. Because that will still exist, it is appropriate to pitch the community cautions—the ones we are debating—somewhere in between the community resolution, which will remain, and the diversionary caution that we just debated. That is why it is pitched where it is.

There are three principal differences between the diversionary caution and the community caution. The first is on disclosure. We will talk about this when we consider an amendment later, but the community caution is not disclosable in a criminal record check and so on from the moment that the condition ceases, whereas for the diversionary caution a spending period goes beyond that.

The second difference is that, as the shadow Minister said, the consequence of breaching the community caution is the imposition of a fine, whereas for the diversionary caution it can lead to substantive prosecution. Thirdly, the range of offences is somewhat different.

I hope that reassures the shadow Minister that the community resolution will remain—it is not being abolished—and therefore we have a sensible hierarchy of provisions available for the police to choose from. I hope that provides him with the reassurance that he was asking for.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 87 to 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 94

Code of practice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 95 and 96 stand part.

[Chris Philp]

The clauses in this group apply to both types of caution and provide an overarching framework in which the new cautions will sit. Each clause has a particular function, and I will address them in turn.

Clause 94 introduces a general code of practice and requires the Secretary of State to prepare it—we have talked about that already. It specifies the kind of matters that such a code will include, such as the circumstances within the clauses, the procedure, the conditions that may be imposed and the period of time. We talked about that earlier. It is very important that we get that right for the rehabilitative purposes that we have discussed and to cover issues such as the one that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate mentioned. That includes who may give the cautions, the manner in which they may be given, the places where they will be given, how the financial penalty should be paid, how we monitor compliance, the circumstances in which a power of arrest may arise, and so on. I should add that the code cannot be published or amended without the prior consent of the Attorney General. We need this clause to ensure the code can exist.

Clause 95 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations placing restrictions on the multiple use of diversionary and community cautions. They should have reference to the number of times a particular individual has received cautions previously. The regulations made under this clause will be laid in draft form before Parliament for scrutiny and will be subject to an approval resolution of both Houses. That provides a key safeguard and ensures that the out-of-court disposal framework is being used as intended and is not being used inappropriately—for example, where there is repeat offending that should be handled through more serious means, such as prosecution.

Clause 96 abolishes the previous caution regime, as the shadow Minister said, but does not abolish community resolutions. That obviously follows the widespread consultation that we had previously and lays the groundwork for the new system that we debated in the previous two groups.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 94 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 95 and 96 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 97

Consequential amendments relating to Part 6

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

Clause 97 introduces schedule 10, which makes various consequential amendments to existing legislation to ensure the proper operation of the new two-tier system, which we have just discussed, and the removal of the existing out-of-court disposals. Clause 97 and schedule 10 make those technical changes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10

Cautions: consequential amendments

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move amendment 117, page 228, line 15, in schedule 10, leave out sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) and insert—

‘(2) In paragraph 1(1)—

(a) for “—“ substitute “at the time the caution is given.”, and

(b) omit sub-sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).”

This amendment would remove the spending period for cautions.

We have discussed a number of important matters over the course of the morning, all of which impact on the lives of young people and older people. They have all been extremely important issues, but for me this amendment is particularly important, because it would make life a lot easier for a lot of people, and probably contribute more than some of the other things that we have discussed to keeping them out of the criminal justice system.

Amendment 117 would remove the spending period for cautions. It would revise the text of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to the following:

“For the purposes of this Schedule a caution shall be regarded as a spent caution at the time the caution is given.”

Currently the upper-tier disposal of a conditional caution has a spending period that is the earlier of three months or the completion of the caution, and the Bill will maintain that spending period for the diversionary caution. We believe that the spending period associated with diversionary cautions should be removed so that those who receive one are not forced to disclose this record to potential employers. The effect of the spending period attached to cautions is to increase the barriers to employment for those who are diverted from court.

Given the Government’s commitment to reform of rehabilitation periods elsewhere in the Bill—at part 11—we believe that this is a good opportunity to continue the direction of travel that the Government are on, make another positive change in this area and remove the rehabilitation period for cautions as well. The Government may believe that a three-month spending period is required for a diversionary caution in order to support public protection. However, there is strong evidence, of which I am sure the Minister is aware, that employment is one of the most important factors, if not the most important, in enabling people to cease offending. Research has also found that employers discriminate against people with criminal records and that many do not differentiate between a caution and a conviction.

A three-month rehabilitation period is short enough to have little impact on public protection, but its existence requires people in employment to declare the caution and so risk losing their job. It acts as a barrier to those seeking work, education, insurance and volunteering opportunities. It is also important to remember that criminal record disclosure in itself is not really a public protection measure: the general public cannot check a person’s record or require them to disclose it. In any event, under present guidance, if the police or CPS believe that someone is a legitimate risk to others, they would never meet the public interest test for caution instead of charge.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 10th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

I trust that everyone has returned from lunch re-energised and refreshed. I want to respond to one or two of the points made prior to lunch by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North. In moving the amendment, he argued that the diversionary caution should not have a rehabilitation period of three months from the date of the caution being given or, if earlier, the date on which the caution ceases to have effect because the conditions have been met.

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but none the less I respectfully disagree with him, for the following reasons. First, the offences for which a diversionary caution might be given include offences of a certain degree of gravity. They are offences where there was sufficient evidence available to prosecute, and had that prosecution proceeded, a far more serious penalty, including a longer spending period, would have been applicable. There is a balance to strike between a desire to let the offender move on with their lives and public protection, and the relatively short spending period—only three months, which is not very long—aims to strike that balance.

Secondly, it is important that we distinguish between the diversionary caution and the community caution. One of the ways in which we do so is the fact that the diversionary caution has a three-month spending period until rehabilitation, whereas the community caution does not. Were we to remove that, it would diminish the difference between those two forms of caution. That sort of hierarchy, as I put it before lunch, is important, and we should seek to preserve it, reflecting the fact that diversionary cautions are more serious that community cautions.

There is also a third reason, which occurred to me during the shadow Minister’s speech. Given that the caution can be extinguished, in terms of the need to disclose it, the offender has an incentive to meet the conditions early within the three months. The conditions might include the need to attend a particular training course or to commence a treatment programme if they have a drug or alcohol problem. Saying that the offender has been rehabilitated at the point at which they meet the condition creates an incentive for them to meet it sooner rather than later. We should bear that in mind. Although I understand where the shadow Minister is coming from, for all those reasons I urge the Opposition to withdraw the amendment.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

I am a little saddened and disappointed that, for all he has said, the Minister does not recognise the real impact that disclosure can have on people, perhaps preventing them from getting a job or even resulting in them losing their job. That is a great sadness. He says that three months is not a very long time, but a person has to report a caution to their employer on the day they receive it, and it could result in their dismissal. Similarly, anyone applying for a job would have to disclose it to the employer, which may well result in them losing that employment opportunity and the chance to turn their life around. Moreover, if an officer is content that a caution is appropriate, why on earth is the additional punishment of a disclosure period being sought? I intend to press the amendment to a Division, simply because I think it is in people’s best interests and represents for the individual given a caution the best chance to change for the better.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 99.

[Chris Philp]

These clauses essentially assist with the implementation of the measures we have debated. Clause 98 sets out that regulations under part 6 are to be made by statutory instrument and the parliamentary procedure applicable. It also provides that regulations may make different provisions for purposes and consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional and transitory provisions and savings. It would not be possible, or indeed appropriate, for all the detail to be set out in the Bill; there is simply too much, and doing so would entail a certain lack of flexibility, as we often discuss. The clause provides the appropriate parliamentary procedure to fill in those details as appropriate, which we will of course debate as they arise. However, the key principles are clearly set out in the Bill, as we have debated.

Clause 99 sets out certain definitions that are relevant for part 6 of the Bill—the out-of-court disposal provisions. The clause is essential to provide clarity in making sure that the new framework, which we spent this morning debating, is properly, accurately and precisely interpreted.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Minimum sentences for particular offences

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 11.

[Chris Philp]

Clause 100 amends the criteria applied for when a court may depart from imposing a minimum sentence. Minimum sentences are rare in this jurisdiction, and generally speaking, but not always, they apply to repeat offences. These minimum sentences are not, technically or legally speaking, mandatory or completely binding on the court, but it is mandatory that the court must consider passing that minimum sentence. The court may depart from imposing that minimum sentence only by having regard to the particular circumstances of the offender and the nature of the case, so an element of judicial discretion is retained.

However, given that Parliament has legislated to set out these minimum sentences, we think it right that the court should depart from the minimum sentences specified by Parliament not by having regard to the particular circumstances of the case but only in exceptional circumstances. In effect, the clause raises the bar for when a judge can depart from these minimum sentences; it tells the judge that circumstances must be exceptional before the minimum sentence is disregarded, to make sure that Parliament’s will in this area is better reflected by the sentences the court hands down.

Clause 100 will cover four offences: threatening a person with a weapon or bladed article, which carries a minimum sentence of four years; a third offence in relation to trafficking a class A drug, which carries a minimum sentence of seven years; a third domestic burglary offence, which carries a minimum sentence of three years; and a repeat offence—a second or higher offence—involving a weapon or bladed article. The clause strengthens the minimum sentences in those cases and makes it harder for the judge to depart from the minimum, or reduces the range of circumstances in which such a departure might occur. Three of the four offences are repeat offences; the fourth is a first-time offence. They are fairly clearly defined offences for drug trafficking or domestic burglary, where Parliament clearly decided in the past that there was less necessity for judicial discretion.

Schedule 11 makes consequential amendments to existing legislation as a result of clause 11, to give effect to what we have just discussed. The amendments are to section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and to the Armed Forces Act 2006.

These offences are serious. In the past, Parliament has taken a view that a minimum sentence is appropriate, particularly for repeat offences. It is therefore appropriate that we today make sure that the courts follow Parliament’s view as often as possible.

I asked for figures on how often judges depart from the minimum sentences. For the burglary offence, the data is a couple of years old, but it looks like the court departed from the minimum sentence in that year in about 37% of cases, so in quite a wide range of cases. It is on that basis—to tighten up the strength of minimum sentences—that we are introducing clause 100 and schedule 11 today.

[Alex Cunningham]

As the Minister said, clause 100 would change the law so that for certain offences a court is required to impose a custodial sentence of at least the statutory minimum term unless there are “exceptional” reasons not to. This is a change from allowing the court to impose a custodial sentence of at least the minimum unless there are “particular” reasons not to.

The offences and their statutory minimums are: a third-strike importation of class A drugs, with a seven-year minimum sentence; a third-strike domestic burglary, with a three-year minimum sentence; a second-strike possession of a knife or offensive weapon, with a six-month minimum; and threatening a person with a blade or offensive weapon in public, with a six-month minimum.

As the Minister has pointed out, the effect of clause 100 is relatively simple, although the Opposition are concerned that it will also be profound. The law currently allows for minimum custodial sentences to be handed down to those who repeatedly offend. As things stand, judges can depart from the minimum sentences when they are of the opinion that there are particular circumstances that would make it unjust not to do so.

Despite what the Minister says about judicial discretion, the proposition put forward by the Government seems to be that the Government are concerned that the judiciary has been too lenient when imposing minimum sentences, and therefore the law needs to be strengthened in this area. The Government’s solution is to change the law so that for certain repeat offences, a court is required to impose a minimum term unless there are exceptional circumstances not to. In a nutshell, clause 100 seeks to make it harder for judges to exercise their discretion and moves away from the statutory minimum sentence for a small number of offences.

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[Alex Cunningham]

I certainly agree with the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby, and I have given his constituency its full title—how on earth could I ever forget Whitby, when it is one of my favourite destinations for a day out? I am sure he will understand why that is the case. For me, this issue is about how we tackle the guys with the briefcases and not just the young men on the streets? How do we make sure that we deal with organised crime? We have seen some great results recently in my own constituency and across the Cleveland police area, where there have been raids on individual houses and the police found large amounts of drugs. However, those drugs are finding their way in through Teesport and through the Tyneside ports as well. We are failing to get to the people who are driving the entire trade and we need to do much, much more to do so.

With the National Crime Agency currently prioritising cyber-crime, child sexual exploitation and terrorism, and the Serious Violence Taskforce having been disbanded recently, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how anything in clause 100 will tackle serious organised criminality.

To conclude, the Opposition have deep concerns about the introduction of the power in clause 100. We worry that it has been introduced without an evidential basis, without consultation with impacted groups, and without a full equalities impact assessment. Even more importantly, we worry that it will further entrench the already shameful levels of racial disparity in our criminal justice system while failing to tackle the underlying causes of the crimes that we have been discussing. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, which I hope will address the issues that I have raised.

[Chris Philp]

Let me respond to some of the questions and points that the shadow Minister raised in his speech. First, I should be clear that in forming the proposals the Government have considered carefully, in accordance with the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, the impact that these changes in the law might have on people with protected characteristics, including race. The full equality impact assessment was published alongside the draft legislation, and I can confirm that it is publicly available should anybody want to scrutinise it.

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[Maria Eagle]

Does the Minister accept that despite the Government’s intentions, good as they may be, to reduce disparity, the reality is that it is not reducing and has not reduced since the report was published? Does he therefore accept that the Government need to do more?

[Chris Philp]

I have not seen the up-to-date data for the past year, but I accept that we need to pay continuous attention to these issues. We need to make sure that the justice system always behaves in a fair and even-handed manner. Clearly, we accept that we need to be eternally vigilant on that front.

To return to the topic of this clause, it is simply about making sure that the decisions taken by previous Parliaments are reflected in the way in which judges take their decisions. We also need to ensure that departing from what Parliament has specified happens only in exceptional cases. Believing as I do in parliamentary sovereignty, that seems reasonable to me.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I know you were. I just want everybody to be careful.

[Chris Philp]

The shadow Minister has given a comprehensive and thorough introduction to the topic of whole-life orders, which I had intended to give the Committee myself. As he has laid out the background, I do not propose to repeat it. He accurately described how they operate and the categories of offender to which they apply. As he said, a whole-life order is the most severe punishment that a court can hand down, ensuring that the person so sentenced never leaves prison under any circumstances.

The shadow Minister illustrated the gravity and seriousness of such sentences by listing some of the terrible cases from the past 30 or 40 years, or indeed the past 50 years, in which whole-life orders have been imposed. The clause proposes to add to the small list of offences that qualify for a whole-life order as a starting point the heinous case of premeditated child murder—a crime so awful and appalling that I think all hon. Members agree it should be added to the list.

The murder of a child is particularly appalling, and whether we are parents or not, we all feel deeply, particularly when there is a degree of premeditation—when it is not just in the moment, but planned and intended for some time—that the crime is truly terrible and enormous. That is why the Government propose to expand the whole-life order. I think there is unanimity on that point.

The shadow Minister raised the important question of violence against women and girls, both in general terms and in the context of a particular case, which Sir Charles has asked us to be careful about because it is subject to live legal proceedings. The matter is not concluded before the courts, so of course we should be a little careful. Let me start with the wider issue of violence against women and girls.

For many years, the Government have had an unshakable commitment to protecting women and girls from the completely unacceptable violence and harassment that they all too often suffer at the hands of men. My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle, the safeguarding Minister, has been at the forefront in recent years—introducing the Domestic Abuse Bill, which reached the statute book as the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 a short time ago, and leading and taking forward our work in this area. In the relatively near future—certainly in the next few months—we will publish a refreshed violence against women and girls strategy and a domestic abuse strategy, both of which will take further our work in this area.

A great deal of work has been done in the last five or 10 years, almost always with cross-party support. For example, banning upskirting started off as a private Member’s Bill and the measure was then passed by the Government. There are also recent measures on non-fatal strangulation, which are critical to protecting women, and work on the rough sex defence, which is part of the Domestic Abuse Act. We have introduced additional stalking offences over the last few years and increased sentences for such offences. A huge amount of work has been done, is being done and will be done to protect women and girls from attack. As the shadow Minister rightly said, women and girls have the right to walk the streets any time of day or night without fear. That is not the case at the moment, and we all need to make sure that changes.

In relation to the terrible crime of rape, it is worth mentioning, by way of context, that sentences have been increasing over the past few years. The average adult rape sentence rose from 79 months in 2010 to 109 months in 2020, an increase of approximately two and a half years—and quite right, too. However, it is not just the sentence that matters, but how long the offender spends in prison.

Via a statutory instrument that we introduced last year, and a clause that we will come to later in the Bill, we are ensuring that rapists spend longer in prison. Those sentenced to a standard determinate sentence of over seven years will now, for the first time, serve two thirds of their sentence in prison, not half, as was previously the case. It was wrong that rapists, when given a standard determinate sentence, served only half of it in prison. It is right that that is now two thirds, when the sentence is over seven years. The Bill goes further, moving the release back to two thirds of the sentence for those convicted of rape and given a standard determinate sentence of over four years, ensuring that rapists spend longer in prison.

I hope that gives the Committee a high level of assurance about the work that has been done already, is being done through the Bill and will be done in future in this critical area. We discussed that extensively in yesterday’s Opposition day debate, which the Lord Chancellor opened and I closed. Labour’s Front-Bench spokesman made the point, fairly and rightly, that rape conviction rates are too low and must get higher. The rape review, which I am told will be published in days not weeks, will propose decisive action to address that serious problem.

I hope that lays out the Government’s firm commitment on the issue and our track record historically—

[Alex Cunningham]

It sounds as though the Minister is about to wind up without addressing my specific points.

[Chris Philp]

No, I certainly was not planning to ignore the hon. Gentleman’s amendment. I was simply setting out the wider context and the work that the Government have done, are doing and will do.

I have a couple of things to say about the amendment. First, the offence it describes is obviously horrendous and very serious. It currently carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Where the murder involves sexual or sadistic conduct, the starting point for the tariff—the minimum term to be served in prison—is 30 years, so a very long time. It is important to note, however, that judges have the discretion to depart from that tariff where they see fit and, if necessary, increase it, including by giving a whole-life order. It is important to be clear that the law already allows for such an offence to receive a whole-life order where the judge thinks that appropriate.

Secondly, the amendment refers in particular to strangers. It would essentially move the tariff’s starting point from 30 years to a whole-life order, the maximum sentence being life in both cases—it would not change the maximum sentence—but it aims that change in minimum sentence only at cases where a stranger has perpetrated the abduction, sexual assault and murder. It strikes the Government as surprising that that distinction is drawn, because the crime described—abduction, sexual assault and murder—is as egregious and horrendous whether committed by a stranger or by someone known to the victim.

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[The Chair]

Minister, do you wish to come back? I saw you in discussions with another Minister, so I will give you the option. It is not normal to do this, but is there anything further that you would like to add in response?

[Chris Philp]

I will just say that we are always happy to talk to the Opposition about a matter of this sensitivity, but I remain of the view that we should not single out murders involving a stranger and exclude domestic cases from the Bill, because that would diminish those equally appalling offences in which the victim is known to the offender. It may even be a partner; it may even have happened in her house—yet that is not in the amendment. I ask that we think again about putting it to a vote. I am happy to sit down with the shadow Minister to talk about the issue and about the whole life order question, but I repeat the point that I made earlier.

[Alex Cunningham]

I appreciate that, but I still intend to divide the Committee on the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

Clause 102 relates to whole life orders, which we discussed fairly extensively a few moments ago. It will give judges the opportunity, in rare and exceptional cases, to use a whole life order on people who are convicted when they are aged between 18 and 20. At the moment, whole life orders can be imposed only on offenders aged 21 or over, but occasionally there are some very unusual cases in which offenders aged 18, 19 or 20 commit heinous offences and a whole life order might be appropriate. For example, an offence of murder, rape and abduction such as the shadow Minister described might be committed by someone aged 20. We think, as I hope the Opposition do, that the judge should be free to impose a whole life order; in fact, the shadow Minister himself made that case very compellingly a short while ago.

I will give an example in which a judge called for precisely that: the notorious, infamous case of Hashem Abedi, the brother of the Manchester Arena bomber. In sentencing him, the presiding judge, Mr Justice Baker, described the actions of the two bombers as

“atrocious crimes: large in their scale, deadly in their intent and appalling in their consequences.”

The judge said that he was satisfied that they had appeared to deliberately target the young audience in attendance at the arena’s Ariana Grande concert in order to heighten the risk of injury and death. He said in his sentencing remarks that

“If the defendant…had been aged 21 or over”

and if a whole life order had been available,

“the appropriate starting point…would have been a whole life order”,

given the seriousness of the crime.

I am sure that every member of the Committee, and indeed every Member of the House, will agree that for crimes as abhorrent as Hashem Abedi’s—murdering so many people in cold blood, many of them young—or in cases of the kind that the shadow Minister spoke about in our debate on clause 101, involving the murder, rape and abduction of a woman, where the offender is 19 or 20 years old, the whole life order should be available to the judge in those exceptional and thankfully rare circumstances.

I think that this extension to the whole life order regime is appropriate. On that basis, I urge that clause 102 stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am getting a little confused now with some of the things that the Minister has said in relation to the last debate and the imposition of whole life orders. I assume that he was referring to the fact that judges have that flexibility rather than being compelled to impose such a sentence.

[Chris Philp]

The shadow Minister is right. I was saying that, for the kind of offences that he described in the last debate, judges have the ability to impose a whole life order. For murders involving sexual assault and abduction, the starting point currently is a tariff of 30 years. However, the judge has the freedom to go up to a whole life order. But at the moment, the judge cannot do that if the offender is aged 18, 19 or 20. The clause will give judges that freedom.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification. As he said, clause 102 will allow judges to impose, in exceptional circumstances, a whole life order on offenders who were aged 18 to 20 when the offence was committed. Currently, a whole life order can be imposed only on offenders who were aged 21 or over when they committed the offence; we both recognise that. The court will be able to impose a whole life order

“only if it considers that the seriousness of the offence, or combination of offences, is exceptionally high even by the standard of offences”

that would normally attract a whole life order for an offender aged 21 or over.

I start by paying tribute to those who lost their lives on 22 May 2017 at the Manchester Arena. That evening was supposed to be one of fun. Instead, a truly wicked act claimed 22 innocent young lives and left many more lives shattered. As the Minister said, it is only right that Hashem Abedi received the longest sentence in history for his part in the atrocity that night. It is also right that he will spend the rest of his life in jail. Neither of those points has ever been in doubt.

Labour’s overarching commitment is to keeping the British public safe and to ensuring that horrific terrorist attacks such as the one at Manchester Arena cannot be repeated. For that reason, Labour will support the introduction of clause 102. We do, however, seek assurances that the Government will think carefully about their approach to young adults when making sentencing changes in the future.

As the Minister explained, since 2003 the law has provided that whole life orders can be handed down only to offenders who were aged 21 or over at the time of their offence. Clause 102 will make an exception to that rule, so that in exceptional circumstances whole life orders can be given to those who were aged 18 or over but under 21 at the time they committed their offence.

In its briefing on the Bill, the Sentencing Academy indicated that the inclusion of clause 102 seemed to be a response triggered by the trial of Hashem Abedi for his involvement in the Manchester Arena bombing. As many people will know, Hashem Abedi was the brother of Salman Ramadan Abedi and was found guilty of assisting his brother to order, stockpile and transport the deadly materials needed for the attack. In total, he was found guilty of 22 counts of murder, attempted murder and conspiring to cause explosions.

In his sentencing remarks, Mr Justice Jeremy Baker indicated that Hashem Abedi’s actions were so grave that if he had been aged 21 or over, he would have sentenced him to a whole life order. Given that Hashem was under the age of 21 at the time of his offences, the judge was precluded from sentencing him to a whole life order. Instead, he was sentenced to at least 55 years—the longest determinate sentence in British criminal history. Mr Justice Baker made it clear that Abedi would leave prison only if the Parole Board was convinced that he was no longer a risk to society. Even then, he would spend the remainder of his life on licence, with the risk of being recalled to prison. In all likelihood, he concluded, Abedi could expect to spend the rest of his life in prison.

This, to a certain extent, represents the first concern that the Opposition have about clause 102. If the current sentencing regime already allows courts to sentence someone to almost certainly spend the rest of their natural life behind bars, what does clause 102 actually add to the law? As Mr Justice Baker pointed out, the only way Hashem Abedi could conceivably be released from prison is if the Parole Board deemed him no longer to be a risk to society. I am sure that the Minister will agree that after committing such a heinous and fanatical crime, and while refusing to show any remorse for his actions, the chances of his being deemed safe to be released are close to zero. Moreover, given that he will be at least 78 years old before his minimum sentence comes to an end, the chances that he will die before appearing before the Parole Board are considerable.

The other reason why we have concerns in this area was neatly summed up by the Sentencing Academy, which pointed out that, since the current sentencing regime for murder came into force in 2003, the issue of a sentencing judge being prohibited from imposing a whole life order on someone aged 18 to 20 arose for the first time only in 2020. For the avoidance of any doubt, the event referred to in 2020 is that trial of Hashem Abedi.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

I will be brief in my reply. On the need for the sentence, we have already discussed the Abedi case. We have seen that, in his case, it is conceivable that the whole-life order might have made a difference. He would be eligible for Parole Board consideration at the age of 78. In that circumstance, a whole-life order would make a difference because, under one, such a consideration would not take place.

The shadow Minister said that such cases are very rare because, by definition, people who are 18, 19 or 20 have many years of life ahead of them. None the less, they occasionally occur, and it is important that we give judges the ability to deal with that. The fact that we have whole-life orders illustrates that there are limited circumstances in which they are appropriate.

I thought that there was a slight inconsistency in the shadow Minister’s arguments. On the previous clause, he argued for the expansion of whole-life orders, and on this clause—I know he will support it, so I do not want to push this too hard—he raised doubts about the appropriateness of the expansion of whole-life orders. It struck me that there was a slight tension in those arguments.

[Alex Cunningham]

The Minister must not misunderstand or misinterpret what I was saying. We are fully supportive of what he is trying to achieve here, but we want to make sure the Government recognise that such orders should be used only in the most extreme cases, and maturity has to be an issue.

[Chris Philp]

We do recognise that. The orders are intended to be used in exceptional circumstances. The phrase “exceptional circumstances” is well established and well known by judges and in law.

On the shadow Minister’s point about accounting for maturity more generally, of course judges take it into account at the point of sentencing. At about this time last year, during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, we discussed extensively the use of pre-sentence reports when someone who is just over the age of maturity but still maturing is sentenced. The fact is that pre-sentence reports can comment on maturity, and judges can take that into account.

I can give the shadow Minister the assurance he asked for. First, the Government are mindful of the issue generally, and, secondly, we expect this to be rare and exceptional. I have a great deal of confidence that the judiciary will apply the flexibility that we are providing in a way that reflects that. As the shadow Minister said, I would not expect the power to be used in very many circumstances, but where terrible cases arise, such as the appalling Abedi case, or a case in which a 19 or 20-year-old abducts, rapes and murders a woman, the whole-life order might be appropriate. It is right that judges have them available to use. I am glad to have the shadow Minister’s support on this clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 103

Starting points for murder committed when under 18

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

We come now to the sentencing regime for children who commit murder. Thankfully, that is a very rare occurrence, but it does sadly happen. Clause 103 amends the sentencing code to replace the current 12-year tariff point for all children who commit murder, with a sliding scale of starting points. The sliding scale takes into account the age of the child and the seriousness of the offence. It means that the older the child and the more serious the murder, the higher the starting point.

Detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure is the mandatory life sentence for children who commit murder. Starting points are used by the judge to determine the minimum amount of time to be served in custody before the offender can be considered for release by the Parole Board. Judges can set a minimum term that is higher or lower than the starting point by taking into account aggravating or mitigating factors. Rather than having a flat 12-year starting point, as we have at the moment, which does not account for the age of the child—it could be 12 or 17—or the relative seriousness of the offence, instead we will have a sliding scale based on a more nuanced system.

The new starting points represent the approximate percentages of the equivalent sentence for an adult, which of course reflects the seriousness of the particular offence. If the child who has been convicted of murder is aged between 10 and 14, the tariff—the minimum amount to be served—will be set at half the adult equivalent. If they are 15 or 16 years old, it will be set at 66%, and if they are 17 years old—almost an adult but not quite—it will be set at 90%.

The introduction of this sliding scale recognises that children go through different stages of development and that a child of 17 is manifestly different from a child of 10. It seeks to reduce the gap in starting points between someone who is 17 versus someone who is 18, say, but increase it when the person is a lot younger. By linking it to the equivalent sentence for the same offence committed by an adult, it also seeks to reflect the different levels of seriousness that might apply.

This is a sensible and proportionate measure that reflects both age and seriousness. That is not currently reflected in the starting point, and we have to rely wholly on judicial discretion to correct that. This measure makes the provision a little more predictable and transparent, so that everyone can see how the system works.

[Alex Cunningham]

On 3 May 2019, Ellie Gould was murdered by her former boyfriend in the kitchen of her family home. She was strangled, and stabbed 13 times, in a brutal and frenzied attack. She was only 17 years old and was looking forward to university. Her whole life should have been ahead of her, but it was snatched away in the most horrendous way imaginable.

When Ellie’s former boyfriend was sentenced for his appalling crime, he received only 12 and a half years in prison, meaning he could be eligible for parole before his 30th birthday. If he had committed his crime a year later, after he had turned 18, he could have received a much longer sentence. As a dad and a grandad, I can only imagine the enormous life-changing pain of having a child taken away in such appalling circumstances, while knowing that the perpetrator will be released within a relatively short period.

On behalf of the Opposition and, I am sure, of the whole Committee, I praise the enormous fortitude and dignity that Carole Gould has shown amid such horrendous loss. It is thanks to her tireless campaigning for Ellie’s law that we are discussing the clause. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham made clear in the Chamber some time ago, there is no doubt that Thomas Griffiths received too short a sentence for the crime he committed, and Labour stands firmly behind the Gould family.

As the Minister pointed out, under the current sentencing framework, if a child commits murder before they turn 18, they are sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure, with a starting point of 12 years, as opposed to the starting point of life imprisonment for an adult found guilty of the same offence. As such, the way that starting points are currently calculated means that a 17-year-old who, like Thomas Griffiths, commits murder, can receive a much shorter tariff than someone who has just turned 18, even if the crime is more serious.

Clause 103 would rectify that by replacing the 12-year starting point with a sliding scale of different starting points based on the age of the child, as the Minister outlined. The aim is to ensure that sentences given to children who commit murder are closely aligned to the sentences handed down to adults who commit the same offence.

As I set out at some length during the debate on clause 102, the Opposition are naturally cautious when it comes to the age of maturity and increasing the sentencing regime that applies to children. As I have said, that concern is held not only by the Opposition, but by the Justice Committee, which set out unequivocally that:

“Both age and maturity should be taken into significantly greater account within the criminal justice system.”

None the less, as I have said in the past, the Opposition are also pragmatic and recognise that on some occasions, such as the death of Ellie Gould, the sentences that are currently available do not properly reflect the severity of the offence committed.

As Carole Gould has described so movingly, the families of victims of these atrocious crimes often feel that they have faced two gross injustices: first, when the act is carried out, and secondly, when the sentence is delivered. Labour agrees with the Government that in the darkest days of grief, it is deeply unfair that the families of victims feel that they have been cheated of justice when a perpetrator receives a far shorter sentence because of an age difference of a matter of weeks or months.

That is why we, along with the Gould family, were quite appalled when the sentencing White Paper was published with proposals that would have seen Thomas Griffiths receive an even lighter sentence of only 10 years. I am glad that the Government have now seen sense and corrected that point, but not before Labour brought the anomaly to the Government’s attention back in October last year. Labour will support the Government on clause 103 today, but we feel that much more could be done in this area.

As Carole Gould has pointed out, clause 103 deals with the issue of older children being sentenced in a way that is closer to young adults. Another important issue, however, remains to be resolved: the sentencing gap which exists between those who murder within the domestic home and those who murder a stranger in the street. The point made by Carole is a poignant one:

“Why should a life taken in the home by someone you know be valued less than a life taken by a stranger in the streets?”

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Cunningham]

I understand exactly what my hon. Friend is saying. However, I know from discussions with the Lord Chancellor that he is very shy about addressing the issue of people receiving an adult sentence for crimes committed under the age of 18 because their case did not get to court until after they had turned 18. He does not appear to have any sympathy for that. I hope that over time we can work with the Government on what happens to children who commit crimes. They should not be disadvantaged by not having their case heard until they become an adult.

The concept of basing minimum term reviews on age at sentencing, rather than on age at the time the crime was committed, has also been rejected by the courts as contrary to the purpose and rationale of the sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. As the great Lord Bingham set out in the case of Smith:

“The requirement to impose a sentence of HMP detention is based not on the age of the offender when sentenced but on the age of the offender when the murder was committed, and it reflects the humane principle that an offender deemed by statute to be not fully mature when committing his crime should not be punished as if he were. As he grows into maturity a more reliable judgment may be made, perhaps of what punishment he deserves and certainly of what period of detention will best promote his rehabilitation.”

With that in mind, what guarantees can the Minister provide that no child will be put at a disadvantage because of court delays caused by the huge backlog that has accrued on the Conservative Government’s watch? Similarly, does he agree that it would be hugely unfair for children to be worse off because of something completely out of their control?

The Opposition’s second concern with clause 104 is the cliff edge created by the offender turning 18. As I set out at some length during our discussion of clause 102, the Opposition are very mindful of the significant advances made during the past 20 years relating to the age of maturity. As the Minister is all too aware, it is now widely recognised that young adults are still developing their decision making and impulse control skills well into their mid-20s. As I have said before, that is acknowledged not just by the Opposition but by the Justice Committee, neuroscientists, criminologists and, until recently, this very Government. It is somewhat disappointing, then, that the Government have chosen to create a cliff edge whereby anyone who turns 18 suddenly loses the right to have the High Court review their sentence.

That concern is shared by the Sentencing Academy, which points out:

“The accompanying ‘factsheet’ justifies removing reviews from those aged 18 by the time of sentencing on the grounds that: ‘This is because their age and maturity will have been taken into account at their sentencing’. However, it is an accepted feature of sentencing law that the passing of an offender’s 18th birthday is not a cliff edge in terms of their emotional and developmental maturity.”

I must therefore ask the Minister why, when the Government have previously accepted that

“the system…should presume that up to the age of 25 young adults are typically still maturing”,

they have chosen to create this cliff edge at the age of 18. Not only does this seem unfair; it also seems counterproductive. By removing an offender’s right to a review of their sentence based on good behaviour, the Government are also removing any incentive for that offender to behave well in prison. As the Howard League points out, minimum term reviews are infrequent but important, as they

“offer a rare source of hope and can powerfully motivate young people to make and maintain positive change.”

The Sentencing Academy points out that since 2010 fewer than 10% of offenders serving detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure applied for a second review of their sentence. It says of the proposed change:

“this restriction will merely remove the opportunity of review from a small handful of cases in which exceptional progress has been achieved after the halfway point in the sentence”.

Is the Minister not worried that by removing the right to these reviews, he could be putting overworked prison staff at increased risk of harm?

Although we sympathise with the stated goal that the Government are seeking to achieve through clause 104—to prevent unnecessary distress to the families of victims of crime—in its present form we are unable to support it. Instead, we have tabled amendment 131, which we believe balances the need to protect the families of victims of crime from distress with preserving the rehabilitative benefits of being able to request a sentence review. The mechanics of the amendment are simple. Instead of ending the right to a sentence review at the age of 18, the amendment would make provision for minimum term reviews up to the age of 26, reflecting the widely held view that young adults are still developing in maturity well into their twenties, while also providing a powerful incentive to motivate young offenders to reform and rehabilitate while in custody.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Chris Philp]

Once again, the shadow Minister has helpfully laid out the context and the background to the clause. I will not irritate or detain the Committee—or perhaps both—by repeating the information that he has given.

These reviews provide an opportunity to look again at the minimum term handed down, but it is important to remember that we are talking about a cohort of people who have committed a very serious offence: murder. As the shadow Minister said, when sentence is first passed on a child, the judge passing the sentence will include in their consideration the maturity of the person at that point. There is an acceptance that further maturing may occur subsequently, which is why the review mechanism exists. Even with the reform proposed in clause 104 there can still be a single review once the individual is over 18; it is only subsequent reviews—a second, third or fourth review—that the clause would preclude. Given the likely length of sentences or of minimum terms, as well as the fact that most people receiving a first sentence will probably be in their mid or late teens, it is very likely that in almost all cases there will be one review after the age of 18. We are simply precluding those further reviews.

The shadow Minister says the clause might affect incentives. Once the minimum term has been reached, whether it has been reduced or not reduced, the Parole Board still has to consider whether release is appropriate, so even if the minimum term is not reduced, there is still an incentive to behave in prison and to engage in rehabilitation and so on, in the hope of getting the Parole Board release once the minimum term has been reached. So I do not accept the argument that the clause changes the incentives to behave well in prison.

On the point about people maturing beyond the age of 18, for first sentences, that is reflected in the sentence passed by the judge, informed by pre-sentencing reports. As I have said previously, the law as we propose to amend it will still allow—most likely in almost every case, or very many cases—a single review after the age of 18. That is analogous to the judge, when sentencing someone for the first time at the age of 20, 21 or 22, or even slightly older, taking into account maturity at the point of sentencing.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

The clause will increase the amount of time that an offender sentenced to a discretionary life sentence will be required to serve in custody before they can be considered for release. A discretionary life sentence can be imposed for any offence that has a maximum period of life where the court believes that the high seriousness of the offending is such that a life sentence should be imposed, rather than a lesser determinate sentence. Such offences include manslaughter, rape, and grievous bodily harm with intent.

When imposing such a sentence, the court must set a minimum term, or tariff, that must be served in full in custody before the prisoner can be considered for release by the Parole Board. At present, when setting a discretionary life tariff, the sentencing judge will identify a notional determinate sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offence as well as time spent in custody on remand and the early release provisions that apply to that notional determinate sentence in order to calculate the tariff. In practice, the standard approach applied by the court is to decide what the notional determinate sentence would be for the offence committed and then calculate the tariff based on half that notional determinate sentence, reflecting the release provision requiring automatic release at the halfway point for prisoners sentenced to a standard determinate sentence.

That is no longer fit for purpose, because the Government have legislated to remove automatic halfway release for serious sexual and violent offenders serving a standard determinate sentence of seven years or more. In fact the next clause, 106, will extend that principle further to many standard determinate sentences of four years or more. That means—anomalously—that the most serious offenders given a standard determinate sentence will serve longer in prison and be released only after serving two thirds of their sentence, but the people I have just described with a discretionary life sentence will not. The Government’s proposal will align the automatic release point for serious offenders serving standard determinate sentences with the earliest possible point at which the Parole Board may direct release for those serving sentences of particular concern or extended determinate sentences, namely two thirds of the custodial term of such sentences.

For the most serious terrorist offences, through the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 we brought in new provisions meaning that offenders must serve their custodial term in full. The clause will ensure that the approach to release for those serving determinate sentences for serious offences is reflected in the way in which minimum terms for those serving discretionary life sentences are calculated. They will be brought into alignment, avoiding any anomalies. Judges will, of course, retain discretion to depart from the starting point as they consider appropriate in the cases before them.

The clause will bring discretionary life sentences into line with the broader approach for dangerous offenders, so that the most serious offenders will serve longer in prison before they become eligible to be considered for release by the Parole Board, thereby ensuring that the punishment better reflects the severity of the crime. In effect, it introduces consistency between the discretionary life sentences release provisions and those we introduced in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act this year, which we are expanding in the Bill. It is a measure that brings consistency and keeps serious offenders in prison for longer. I therefore hope that the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.

[Alex Cunningham]

As the Minister said, the clause will change the way in which the minimum terms of discretionary life sentences are calculated. As the law currently stands, and has stood for quite some time, discretionary life sentences are calculated at one half of what the equivalent determinate sentence would be. The clause enacts a proposal in the sentencing White Paper to change the way in which life sentences are calculated, so that they are based on two thirds of the equivalent determinate sentence rather than one half.

The Government’s rationale is set out in the explanatory notes accompanying the Bill, which say:

“This change is necessary because most serious violent and sexual offenders who receive determinate sentences—including those who may receive an extended determinate sentence—are required to serve two-thirds of their custodial term before they may be released.”

That refers, of course, to other recent changes to release arrangements that mean that certain categories of offender must now serve two thirds of their sentence, rather than half, before they can be released.

Like the previous sentencing changes, the clause will make an already complicated sentencing regime even more complex by changing the way in which sentences have long been calculated. It is somewhat ironic that the Government on the one hand claim to want to make sentencing simpler, and on the other hand make a series of reforms that do the exact opposite. I will develop that point in more detail when we come to clause 106, but let me give a broad overview of what I mean.

In advance of the publication of the sentencing White Paper in September 2020, the Lord Chancellor set out in a column for The Times—sorry, for the The Sun on Sunday, which is quite a different paper—that

“Sentences are too complicated and often confusing to the public—the very people they are supposed to protect.”

The Lord Chancellor returns to this point in his foreword to the White Paper, stating that

“The system we have today can be complex and is too often ineffectual. Victims and the public often find it difficult to understand, and have little faith that sentences are imposed with their safety sufficiently in mind. The courts can find it cumbersome and difficult to navigate, with judges’ hands too often tied in passing sentences that seem to make little sense. The new Sentencing Code is a good start in tidying up the system, however we must be mindful not just of how sentences are handed down, but also how they are put into effect.”

The Opposition agree wholeheartedly with the Lord Chancellor’s sentiment, which is why we welcome the new sentencing code with open arms and why we are a bit puzzled by some of the measures in the Bill.

I am not from a legal background, so perhaps I am missing something here. Can the Minister explain in simple terms how the myriad changes to release arrangements for certain offences will make sentencing simpler, rather than more complicated? If the Government’s objective is to keep dangerous offenders in prison for longer, why do they not simply legislate for longer custodial sentences, rather than moving the date at which prisoners are either automatically released or released by the Parole Board? Not only would it be a simpler approach, but it would ensure that offenders still serve 50% of their sentence in the community, which we know will significantly reduce their risk of reoffending. Again, this a point that I will draw on further when discussing the next clause.

The other concern we have about clause 105 is that it fails to recognise the fundamental difference between discretionary life sentences and determinate sentences. As the Howard League sets out in its briefing:

“In contrast with the determinate serious sentences, a person serving a discretionary life sentence will be liable to detention until the day he or she dies and there is no automatic release date. The blanket increase in the punitive period therefore cannot be grounded in protecting the public as that is covered by the jurisdiction of the Parole Board: it is simply a hike in the punitiveness and there is no evidence to justify this in terms of reducing long-term harm or increasing public safety.”

In other words, the Government cannot rely on the rationale that clause 105 and the extension in the way discretionary life sentences are calculated is for the purposes of public protection.

When discretionary life sentences are handed down, the offender knows that he or she will be released from prison only if the Parole Board considers it safe to do so. This is a decision made by the Parole Board, regardless of whether it is taken at the halfway point or two-thirds point of a sentence. Instead, we are inclined to agree with the Sentencing Academy, which suggests the clause is all about

“solving a problem of the Government’s own making”

as a result of previous changes to the point of automatic early release.

To wrap up, the Opposition are concerned that the clause will make an already overcomplicated sentencing regime even more complicated, contrary to the Government’s desire for simpler system. It will also have no impact at all on the decisions made by the Parole Board, which remains the ultimate decision maker as to when somebody on a discretionary life sentence is safe to be released. For those reasons, we cannot support the clause.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Tenth sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Tuesday 8th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

[Chris Philp]

[Chris Philp]

[Alex Cunningham]

--- Later in debate ---

We know that, despite a building programme, many of our prisons remain unfit for the vast population of prisoners they now have to accommodate. We also know that increased violence—both prisoner on prisoner and prisoner on prison officer—and drugs remain a constant problem for our hard-working governors and prison officers to deal with. Given all the additional prisoners that the system will have to cope with in not just seven or eight years’ time but as early as next year, how will the Government ensure that our prisons do not become even more overcrowded and unsafe? While the Minister offers reassurance on that, will he also outline how the Government will ensure that prisons are properly equipped to carry out important rehabilitative work with offenders?

[Chris Philp]

[The Chair]

[Chris Philp]

[Victoria Atkins]

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Tenth sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th June 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

It is, as always, a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. The clause fulfils the Government’s long-standing commitment to increase the maximum penalty for the offences of, first, causing death by dangerous driving and, secondly, causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from, in both cases, the current maximum sentence of 14 years to life imprisonment.

As members of the Committee will know, in response to the consultation on driving offences and penalties some time ago, the Government proposed to take forward various changes in the law, including these, and all of them received overwhelming public support and support from other consultees. By enacting this clause we are delivering on the result of that consultation and on a long-standing commitment. That means that when sentencing people for these very serious offences, the courts can sentence up to life imprisonment if the judge sees fit.

Many hon. Members will have constituency cases where families have suffered the terrible trauma of a loved one being killed by a dangerous or careless driver who was driving when drunk. I have certainly encountered a number of such cases in the last six years as a constituency MP, as I am sure each and every Member here has. The criminal justice system can never adequately compensate for the grief caused by the loss of a loved one in such terrible circumstances, but these changes will mean that courts now have the power to make sure that the punishment truly fits the crime.

It is appropriate that the maximum sentences for causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence are increased from 14 years to life imprisonment. I commend these measures to the Committee.

[Alex Cunningham]

I am pleased to offer the Opposition’s enthusiastic support for clauses 64 to 66, and particularly for clause 64, which will increase the maximum penalties for the offences of causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from 14 years’ imprisonment to imprisonment for life.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock) and for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) for their committed work to increase the penalty for those guilty of causing death by dangerous driving to life imprisonment and for the Bill they have promoted and supported. My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East has worked alongside the family of Jaqueline Wileman, from Grimethorpe, who was 58 when she was struck and tragically killed by a stolen heavy goods vehicle in September 2018. I offer my sincerest thanks to the Wileman family for their tireless campaign for change, which they are now able to see become a reality.

Other families of victims of these awful crimes have also long campaigned to see these changes, such as the family of Violet-Grace, who died from injuries inflicted as a result of a car crash caused by individuals driving dangerously in March 2017. I hope that this change in the law, which they have fought to bring forward, will provide some small solace that dangerous drivers who kill will, in future, feel the full force of the law.

Work to address this important issue has been energetic on both sides of the House, and it was the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) who introduced the Death by Dangerous Driving (Sentencing) Bill in July 2020, as a private Member’s Bill co-sponsored by my hon. Friends the Members for Barnsley East and for Barnsley Central. We are therefore fully supportive of the Government’s proposal to provide the court with a wider range of penalties to ensure that sentences are proportionate and reflect the seriousness of the offending.

The urgent need for this change is illustrated by the fact that, in 2019, over 150 people were sentenced for causing death by dangerous driving. Of those offenders, around 95% received an immediate custodial sentence, of which over 15 received a sentence of more than 10 years. If 10% of offenders are already being sentenced near the maximum threshold, it seems the time is ripe to provide the court with wider sentencing powers for these offences so that offenders are dealt with consistently and fairly.

Although we are fully supportive of these changes, I note that there has been some delay in introducing them. The Government committed to changing the law on causing death by dangerous driving following a review in 2014—seven years ago. As the Minster said, it has been a long-standing commitment. There was also a consultation in 2016, which the Government responded to in 2017, committing to the legislative changes that are now in the Bill. The private Member’s Bill brought forward by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead last year was a real nudge along to the Government, following a perceived dropping of the ball. I would normally say, “Better late than never,” but for a measure as serious as this, and with hundreds of families losing loved ones to dangerous drivers in the intervening years, I wonder what held the Government up for so long.

Speaking of delays, Cycling UK said that, although it cautiously supports these proposals, it fears they will do very little to address the many serious problems with the framework of road traffic offences and penalties. I understand that the Government promised a full review of the framework back in 2014, but it has never happened. I would welcome an update from the Minister on the wider review, which could look at the utilisation of driving bans.

We fully support the proposals in clause 65, which introduces the new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving, and sets the maximum penalty for the offence on indictment at two years’ imprisonment.

[Alex Cunningham]

In that case, I will sit down and address that point later.

[Chris Philp]

I have nothing further to add to my earlier answers. We keep these matters under continual review. There are no plans to make changes just at the moment, but we do of course keep an eye on these matters.

[Alex Cunningham]

A review was promised in 2014. Is that review likely to be held soon?

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

I am afraid that I have no specific information on that, other than to say that we keep an eye on these matters on an ongoing basis.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 64 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65

Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving

[Chris Philp]

This clause has a very similar intention to the previous clause, in that it introduces a new section 2C offence into the Road Traffic Act 1988 to fill a lacuna in the existing legislation. It does that by introducing a new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving. There is currently no offence that covers this, so we are filling a gap that exists in the current legislation.

The new offence created by the clause is committed if a person causes serious injury by driving a car or another mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or public place without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other road users and, while doing so, causes serious injury.

The maximum custodial penalty for the offence on indictment will be two years’ imprisonment or a fine. The maximum custodial penalty on summary conviction will be 12 months or a fine. Until such time as section 224 of the sentencing code is commenced, the maximum penalty on summary conviction in England and Wales will be read as six months.

This is an important clause, which fills a gap in the current law and ensures that, where serious injury is caused by someone who is driving carelessly or inconsiderately, there will be an offence that can be prosecuted with an appropriate penalty—in this case, a maximum of two years if tried on indictment. I hope the Committee will agree that this is a sensible measure and will support the clause.

[Alex Cunningham]

As I prematurely said some minutes ago, we fully support the proposals in clause 65, which introduces the new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving and sets the maximum penalty for the offence on indictment, as the Minister said, at two years’ imprisonment.

The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 made provision for new offences for dangerous and disqualified driving, but left the gap the Minister referred to in the law, relating to careless driving that results in serious injury. As I said before, we welcome the sensible proposal in clause 65, which fills that gap and will allow for a penalty that recognises the high level of harm caused by these incidents. As a result, the Opposition support clause 66 and schedule 7, which make minor consequential amendments as a result of clauses 64 and 65.

--- Later in debate ---

We know that, despite a building programme, many of our prisons remain unfit for the vast population of prisoners they now have to accommodate. We also know that increased violence—both prisoner on prisoner and prisoner on prison officer—and drugs remain a constant problem for our hard-working governors and prison officers to deal with. Given all the additional prisoners that the system will have to cope with in not just seven or eight years’ time but as early as next year, how will the Government ensure that our prisons do not become even more overcrowded and unsafe? While the Minister offers reassurance on that, will he also outline how the Government will ensure that prisons are properly equipped to carry out important rehabilitative work with offenders?

[Chris Philp]

Debates about conditions in prisons are probably somewhat outside the scope of our discussion, save to say that the Prisons Minister works on a daily basis to ensure that our prisons provide the right sort of environment, including for rehabilitative purposes.

The shadow Minister asked about the prison population and drew attention to the overall impact assessment for the Bill. As he said, the impact assessment, in which these measures are listed as measures A to C for driving offences, estimates that 1,300 offenders may be affected. The impact on prison places obviously depends on how judges sentence the new offence—measure C in the impact assessment—and how sentences vary under clause 64, which we discussed previously, given that the maximum is being increased from 14 years to life. However, that is all included in the overall figure of 700 places that covers the entire Bill.

The shadow Minister asked about the availability of prison places in the light of the pandemic. That again is more a matter for the Prisons Minister, but the overall prison population today is materially lower than prior to the pandemic—I speak from memory, but I think it is 5,000 or 6,000 lower—for a variety of reasons that I am sure the shadow Minister is aware of. Therefore, the pressures on the prison population coming out of the pandemic may be a little less severe than one might have feared.

I repeat my support for the clause, which fills an important gap in the law.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66

Road traffic offences: minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

Clause 66 and schedule 7 introduce a number of minor consequential amendments to be made to other Acts as a result of the offence we discussed in the previous clause. The consequential amendments to proposed new section 2C to the Road Traffic Act 1988 —causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving—are among those. It inserts a new section 3ZB and 3ZC into that Act, and tidies up various other anomalies. In essence, they are minor, inconsequential amendments that follow the previous clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7 agreed to.

Clause 67

Courses offered as alternative to prosecution: fees etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Victoria Atkins]

Clause 67 provides a specific statutory power for the current charging arrangements for education courses offered for minor driving offences as an alternative to a fixed penalty or prosecution. Those courses help to improve road safety and reduce the burden on the criminal justice system. The provisions in this clause will not change the way in which courses are offered, administered or run, but will provide greater transparency over the way that fees are set. A local policing body may charge a fee to cover the cost of the approved course, but also include an uplift as a contribution towards the cost of promoting road safety, including road safety partnerships and speed cameras.

The clause will also allow the Home Secretary to prescribe in secondary legislation the types of courses in which motorists may be charged, the maximum amount that may be charged and the way that the charge can be used. It will allow provision to be made to prevent courses from being offered to repeat offenders. That means that any potential repeat offenders will face the deterrent of fixed penalty fines and penalty points on their licence. Equivalent provisions are made for Northern Ireland, and there are allowances for corresponding or similar provision for Scotland, following consultation with the Lord Advocate.