Defence
John Spellar Excerpts(2 days, 10 hours ago)
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Grant Shapps
I will not for the moment, because this point has been discussed ad infinitum. In any case, we are offering another £75 billion in cash terms, which I note that the Labour party has yet to do because the funding requires a determination, in our case, to get the civil service back to pre-covid levels and to help pay for the expansion of our defence. It requires sound economic management and, above all, an understanding that an investment in deterrence today is wiser and less painful than paying to fight a war tomorrow.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
Has the Secretary of State not just confirmed that the amount of money in the budget designated for the British armed forces has, in fact, gone down?
John Spellar
Can we be clear that, as was kindly referenced by the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), that situation was the result of a failure of political judgment and will by David Cameron? He could have said to the Liberal Democrats, “This is a matter of strategic national interest. If you don’t like it, you can give up your jobs and walk out of the Government.” They would have bottled it. The fact was that we lost six years and a huge amount of money, and we are putting CASD at real risk with enormously elongated tours of duty for our tremendous submariners.
Grant Shapps
The right hon. Gentleman wants to relitigate the past, but I think we all agree that we cannot do anything about it. I want to talk about the future, and the future is that those on his own side have yet to commit to the 2.5% that is required to ensure that our nuclear deterrent can deliver on time. In March the Prime Minister and I published the defence nuclear enterprise Command Paper, setting out our long-held and unshakeable commitment to our own independent nuclear deterrent.
Grant Shapps
I am a little concerned about not giving others an opportunity to contribute, but I will allow the right hon. Gentleman one last intervention.
John Spellar
Was the Secretary of State not a member of the Government, and indeed chairman of the Conservative party, during the period we are discussing when the Government did not renew Trident?
Grant Shapps
I think the right hon. Gentleman will now understand why I was so pleased to trounce the Liberal Democrats when it came to that election—to squeeze them out of government and ensure that we could get on with Trident as we always wanted to. I encourage his party to join us in that commitment, backed up with money—not just photo-opportunities in Barrow, but money to deliver the nuclear deterrent.
I now want to make some progress. I want to talk about Putin’s war, and the way in which it has underlined the vital role of conventional forces. From the Red sea to the skies over Iraq, our armed forces are already doing incredible work globally in protecting and advancing our interests every day. In the ongoing Exercise Steadfast Defender, they are currently making up 20% of this year’s NATO exercise, itself the largest since the cold war. I have been to visit some of them in Poland.
We are investing £8.6 billion in Army equipment during this decade to make our ground forces more integrated, agile and lethal. That includes the new Boxer and the long-awaited Ajax armoured fighting vehicles, as well as the new Challenger 3 tanks, of which I saw the second prototype come off the production line in Telford just last month—the first British-made tank for 22 years.
Our United Kingdom is at its strongest when we stand shoulder to shoulder with our allies, and therefore our commitment to NATO will only ever increase. That is why it is so important that we have been prepared to set out how to get to 2.5%. At the 2014 NATO summit at Newport in Wales, we set a target of 2% to be reached by this year; we are now extending that to 2.5%, and we invite other countries to join us.
NATO has become stronger because of Putin’s actions in Ukraine. It has added members: two new members have joined us, and we therefore outgun Putin on every single metric. We have three times as many submarines and fighter jets, four times as many tanks, helicopters and artillery pieces, four and a half times as many warships, six times as many armed vehicles, eight times as many transport carriers and 16 times as many aircraft carriers. But it is important that NATO works together and sticks together. It is also important that we send a signal to NATO that the second biggest spender in absolute terms intends to increase that expenditure—that has been widely welcomed by other NATO members that I have spoken to in the past couple of weeks.
The importance of that iron-clad alliance is the third lesson of Putin’s war. Since 2022, we have worked hard with our NATO partners to enlarge the alliance and bolster its eastern flank. We have also worked hard with our closest partners on a range of top-end procurement programmes, from sixth-generation combat jets with Italy and Japan to cutting-edge nuclear-powered submarines with Australia and the United States.
The fourth lesson of Putin’s war is that the battle in Ukraine has needed ever more innovation—new tech, new drones. As we ramp up our defence spending to 2.5%, we will put high-tech innovation right at the heart of our plans. I recently visited the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, and we agreed to ringfence 5% of the defence budget for research and development over the next year, and to improve our strategic defence research.
John Spellar
Is it also the case that these aircraft have considerable aircraft life left in them? It is not as though they are approaching redundancy.
Mr Francois
The right hon. Gentleman, a former Armed Forces Minister like me, is absolutely right. Many of them still have half their so-called airframe life remaining. As I have said, they are more than capable of intercepting and shooting down the threat aircraft that they would have to match. That is all the more reason to keep them against a rainy day, rather than flogging them off or breaking them up for parts. Crucially, creating such a war reserve would demonstrate a sign of intent to any potential aggressor that after many years of doing the opposite, the UK is now preparing to fight a sustained conflict with a peer enemy, should that become necessary. Hopefully, in so doing, we will make that eventuality far less likely.
Linked to the vulnerability of our radar stations and the shortage of fighter aircraft are the extremely worrisome delays in airborne early warning. The Royal Navy’s early warning aircraft, Crowsnest, is many years late. It has only recently entered service for the air defence of the fleet. For the Royal Air Force, the Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft were withdrawn shortly after the integrated review was published in 2021, leaving us without a mainstream airborne early warning aircraft. The E-3 was meant to be replaced shortly thereafter by the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail, but the programme has been subject to multiple chronic delays and is still not in service.
The RAF is clearly embarrassed by this and is attempting to deploy chaff between in-service dates, when the aircraft could take off the runway, and an initial operating capability, when the aircraft might actually be ready to fight. The latest information I have is that the ISD could now be in autumn 2025, whereas the IOC could be in the first or even the second quarter of 2026, which is still two years away. That leaves a critical gap in our air defence capability for which the MOD, and Boeing in particular, must be held robustly to account. Moreover, the initial buy of five Wedgetail aircraft was inexplicably cut to three several years ago by ministerial fiat, even though we were contractually obliged to buy all five radars, which themselves were very expensive.
In short, the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail is rapidly becoming the RAF’s equivalent of the Army’s Ajax programme—a procurement disaster that has gone on year after year at vast expense to the taxpayer, without actually entering operational service, as Ajax still has not. The Defence Committee, alarmed by that, has invited the head of Boeing Defence, Space and Security, Mr Ted Colbert, to appear before the Committee at Westminster to provide an explanation, although we are still attempting to finalise a precise date for his personal appearance.
Boeing is an organisation in crisis after the sad deaths of more than 300 people caused by the two crashes of its 737 MAX aircraft. We have seen further serious safety incidents, most recently in January when a door flew off an Alaska Boeing 737 MAX 9 in mid-flight. That incident was followed by a number of so-called whistleblowers, involved either at Boeing or in its supply chain, coming forward with very serious allegations about failures in the way the company builds its aircraft. No doubt partly as a result, Mr Dave Calhoun announced that he will step down as chief executive at the end of the year. In the first quarter of this year, Boeing reported a net loss of more than $350 million, and it is still experiencing serious production problems across a range of aircraft, both civilian and military, of which the UK Wedgetail is but one example. The US Air Force also has numerous issues with Boeing, not least in its much-troubled KC-46 air tanker programme.
For many years, Boeing as a company has done extremely well in winning major multibillion dollar procurement orders from the MOD, in return for which it has placed very limited amounts of work on those programmes with the defence industry in the UK. To give specific examples, according to the MOD’s recent figures, on the E-7 Wedgetail, the estimated UK content is around 10%; for the AH-64 Apache, it is only 7%; for the P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft, it is barely 4%; and for the original CH-47 Chinook helicopters, it was just 2%. According to the answer to a written parliamentary question I tabled, the UK content for the new order of CH-47 extended-range Chinooks for our special forces will generate a UK workshare of about 8%. Taken together with the purchase of the Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic reconnaissance aircraft, for which no workshare figure is publicly available, that represents some $10 billion of business for Boeing from the UK MOD for which the UK workshare has been 10% at best and 2% at worst. Boeing has done incredibly well out of the UK MOD, while UK industry has done incredibly badly out of Boeing.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
I am mindful of your dictum, Mr Deputy Speaker.
May I start by following up on the comments of the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) about Boeing, because it is about not just getting the contract right in the first place, but enforcing it afterwards? Even when Boeing and other companies have given assurances and agreements, they have not been held to account for them. I fear that the MOD will find a similar problem relating to the hack of the accounts of our personnel, in that the Treasury adamantly, stubbornly refuses to take past performance into account when assessing future contracts. That has to change. For heaven’s sake, I thought that one of the supposed advantages of Brexit was that we could take back control. By the way, our European competitors have been able to do that within the confines of the EU, but we have an ideological battle within the civil service, and Ministers have to take it on across Departments.
May I also apologise for—as is quite obvious—having a cold? It was acquired in good service, as the results in the west midlands last week showed, which colleagues will have noticed. I was hoping that the Minister for Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Aldershot (Leo Docherty) would respond to the debate and that he would at least acknowledge, if not welcome, that the council for the home of the British Army is now run by the Labour party, with its excellent leader, Keith Dibble. There is a lesson in that for us. Keith Dibble has been on the moderate side of the Labour party—pro-defence, pro-good sense—for many years and has built up a Labour group that can actually relate to the good people of Aldershot and Farnborough. That is also true in the wider sense for the Labour party. At certain stages in our history, Labour in opposition has been less sound on defence. That is not just a correlation, but a causal factor. Indeed, when Labour is sound on defence, as we always have been in government, the British people have confidence.
This year, we are celebrating the 75th anniversary of NATO—an organisation set up by the Attlee-Bevin Government, who also developed Britain’s nuclear capability. Throughout the changes of Government over that period, we have had a continuous at-sea deterrent. I have to say that Conservative performance has quite often not matched up to their rhetoric—we heard quite a lot of rhetoric from the Front Bench today.
At the end of the cold war, we had “Options for Change”: taking the peace dividend, cutting recruitment, running down equipment, and withdrawing our forces and armour from Germany. It looks as though we are going to have to remedy that at great cost.
We spoke earlier about the nuclear submarine renewal. In March 2007, under the Labour Government, this Parliament agreed to a motion moved by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby South (Dame Margaret Beckett) on the principle of the renewal of the nuclear deterrent submarine programme, with the gateway stage to be further decided between 2012 to 2014. At that stage, David Cameron declined to do that, having allowed himself to be blackmailed—I say he allowed himself, because I do not think the Conservatives would have broken up the Government and given up their jobs, as California was not beckoning at that stage. We have therefore suffered considerable extra cost. Workforce teams have been broken up, the rhythm of submarine manufacture up in Barrow has been lost, and there has been an effect on the crews and our equipment. That is a real worry.
I also have a worry about our current submarine programme. I absolutely agree with the principle of the nuclear national endeavour, but I am very concerned about some of the detail. On the nuclear skills taskforce, the Government say:
“we are investing to increase our intake of nuclear sector graduates to around 2,000 in the next four years”.
When I posed a question to the Department for Education, I was told that there are 65 undergraduate enrolments in nuclear and particle physics courses and 190 postgraduate enrolments—a total of 255. I do not think they will all go into the defence industry, and I have found it hard to get data about how many of them are actually British citizens. Given the security requirements—if those who issue security clearance can get their act together—the Government are seriously underestimating the need to expand those courses and prioritise British students in our nuclear national endeavour programme.
On expenditure, I know from previous debates and from the Defence Committee that many Government Back Benchers agree with the critique and recognise that the dead hand of the deadbeat Treasury—not just recently but over the past 100 years or so—has seriously undermined Britain’s defence capability time and again. In the inter-war period, there was the infamous 10-year rule—defence expenditure was based on the assumption that there would not be a war for 10 years—and in 1915 there was the shell crisis.
It concerns me that, while history may not repeat itself, it certainly rhymes. Back in July 2021, the Defence Committee had General Hodges, the head of the United States Army Europe, giving evidence. He reported on the 3rd Division participating in an American warfighting exercise in Texas. The British Army ran out of every bit of important ammunition in about eight days of exercises. Nothing was done about it.
That was known, yet, when the Ukraine war started in 2022 and it became clear very early on that it was going to be very much an artillery war—there are newer drones and missiles and so on, but artillery plays a crucial role—it took from early 2022 through to July 2033 for the MOD to sign an agreement with BAE to produce the extra shells. There is not that sense of drive and urgency, especially when we are dealing with a country such as Russia that has put its whole economy on a war footing. Even now, we have only two artillery shell plants: Durham and Glascoed. Glascoed recently had demonstrations outside it by people trying to close it; why they are trying to stop them producing shells for Ukraine is another matter, and I certainly hope the union representing those workers will be taking up the case.
The United States has recognised that it cannot have single points of failure. In Glascoed there was recently an explosion; if it had been more serious, what would that have done to our capacity? The United States is building new, Government-owned, company-operated sites. It is not worried by the complaints about nationalisation; indeed, the powers given to the president to command industry are considerable. Yet we are still going through the same old, same old, relying on the companies putting in their cases. We do not have the luxury of that time.
I have been critical of Ministers and senior civil servants, but the senior military must bear responsibility for the situation as well. Year on year, they have focused on platforms rather than munitions or accommodation, and the costs of that are being seen in report after report from our Committee and indeed in the media. We must recognise that we now have a shortage not just of matériel, but of industrial capacity, plant, supply chain, skilled and production personnel, and any capacity to surge. We also have numerous single points of failure. I have mentioned the United States. France is commissioning a new explosive plant costing half a billion pounds, again recognising the shortfalls and the critical weaknesses in the system.
I am very pleased that although there has been a lot of focus on the nuclear pillar 1 in the discussions about AUKUS, in pillar 2 there is a lot of work on creating industrial capacity. I credit the Government with the work they are doing there on creating industrial capacity, but I stress that that cannot just be focused on the high-tech end. In many cases, our munitions and platforms depend on industrial skills and basic engineering, which are crucial to ensuring that they are maintained and that they work. We must recognise that we need that industrial base.
As the allies showed in world war two, we can shift domestic industry, plant and personnel to war production; Russia is demonstrating that today. Short-term cost-cutting, identified by the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford, will not do. Companies need workflows to create the workforce and the cash flow and to provide training opportunities for the workforce of the future. The Barrow submarine yard demonstrates the perils of running down the workforce. However, this is also about a pool of labour. For example, in the context of submarines there has been a great deal of talk about ensuring that people are trained in welding, but if other industries in other sectors are not also training welders, then—particularly if there is any drop in the workforce—they will go off and work in the oil and gas industry. Indeed, that is exactly what has happened, and incidentally it has also happened to parts of the United States shipbuilding industry.
We need a much more holistic approach across Government, because if people are being trained in one industry, it is impossible to control the flow out if there are opportunities elsewhere: there must be pressure on other companies to train as well. I have to say to the Minister that that is why the decision to offshore the commissioning of the fleet solid support ships is so incomprehensible. Given the need to maintain a workforce in certain yards and hence to maintain the skill base, shipping that out to Spain is scandalous. Furthermore, no other country, inside or outside the European Union, behaves in this way. The dead hand of the Treasury is dictating a policy that runs down our industry and ends up being much more costly in the long term.
The Ukrainian crisis has also revealed the need for effective collaboration. As the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford pointed out, we used to negotiate proper contracts of shared benefit, but going for “cheapest is best”—allegedly—has driven that into the ground. We need to work with other countries, which will include, as we have seen in the provision of munitions for Ukraine, working with European companies and European Parliaments. There will be no necessity to create new structures, but work will need to be done, and I suspect that there will be some willing partners in a number of the major European industrial countries, and that will mean a need for more real rather than financial engineers.
Finally—for I accept your strictures, Mr Deputy Speaker —I want to touch briefly on the subject of hybrid warfare and the so-called grey zone, on which our Defence Committee is conducting an inquiry. I do not want to pre-empt its findings, but I do want to urge the Ministry of Defence and the wider Government to take a broader, societal approach. The opponents we are facing, in Russia, China and North Korea, have the Soviet, Leninist methodology and ideology, across government and society. We have shown our ability to counteract that in previous conflicts, both hot and cold, but I think particularly of the Political Warfare Executive and the actions of the United Kingdom and the United States during the cold war. Sometimes the debate becomes a bit too focused on technology and techniques without an understanding of the political and ideological underpinning of conflict.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
One of the points that we have made previously in the Defence Committee concerns support for the Russian military archive, which was eventually moved to Shrivenham. Is it not about time the MOD took that archive far more seriously, given that it provides all the benefit of what the right hon. Gentleman is talking about?
John Spellar
What the hon. Gentleman refers to was just a manifestation of the running down of our Russia-watching capacity, in that context but also much more broadly within the system. I think there has been an attempt to repair it, but this should be a salutary lesson.
The present transformed security landscape requires money, manpower, mindset and matériel. We have to move further, and we have to move faster.
Oral Answers to Questions
John Spellar Excerpts(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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James Heappey
That will go soon, but not yet. Colleagues on both sides of the House will note that whenever I have been invited to respond to such a question, like all good Defence Ministers, I have never missed the opportunity to say yes, but the reality is that our armed forces remain fit. Yes, it is the job of this House and particularly my hon. Friend’s Committee to scrutinise our readiness, as the Committee has done—and I commend the report to colleagues who have not already read it—but reinvestment is needed to sustain our armed forces at warfighting level. That is no scandal; that is the consequence of a peace dividend that rightly allowed successive Governments to disinvest in the resilience that kept our cold war force credible. However, as the Secretary of State so rightly said in his speech the other week, we are now in a “pre-war era”, so it is the responsibility of this Government and those who follow to reinvest in the necessary warfighting capability.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
The Minister rightly points to the ability to sustain fighting. He knows that an exercise conducted with the Americans showed that the British Army would run out of munitions within 10 days. Battles in Ukraine showed very early on that this would be an artillery war. Why—I have asked this question of several Ministers, so I hope that he has the answer—did it take from March or April 2022 to July 2023 to place the orders for new munitions? We cannot afford this sort of delay in the Ministry of Defence.
James Heappey
The contract has now been placed, and it increases our supply of .155s significantly. I take issue with the point that the right hon. Gentleman makes: I am not aware of the exercise he referred to, but in exercises that I have seen, in which the UK has operated alongside the US, again and again the American senior commanders have held the UK force elements in the highest regard.
Armed Forces Readiness and Defence Equipment
John Spellar Excerpts(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
The debate encompasses a wide range of issues. My colleague on the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), outlined some of them. I will focus on one aspect: industrial capacity, by which I mean not only the big, well-known manufacturing plants, or the well-known prime companies that we often rightly hear from in the national media, but their extended supply chains and material suppliers, and equally their often under-remarked-on workforce—not just the engineers and craftsmen but the crucial production workers, who are vital for ramping up production and our ability to surge in a crisis. We have experienced difficulties with that in response to the war in Ukraine.
Many in that supply chain also sell to the civilian market, including the public sector. Many of the specialist engineering companies in the midlands supply Formula 1, civil aviation and premium vehicles, as well as defence. They need orders from defence and from public sector bodies to maintain their workload and employment, and to train the workforce of the future. That is why—this will be a theme throughout my contribution—a whole-of-Government approach is necessary. Underlying that is the question of whether we are in a new environment or just an oscillation. Basically, is there a war going on? The people of Ukraine certainly know that. The Baltic nations, Poland, Finland and Sweden know that. It does not mean that war is inevitable, but it certainly means that it is now possible, and failure to respond will actually make it more likely.
One has to question whether the commentariat and the British establishment understand that. The Government need to make clear their view on the state of international relations. Do they regard the invasion of Ukraine by Russia as an interlude—a very bloody one—after which the situation will return to something approximating normal, albeit not the status quo ante, or has there in fact been a tectonic shift, and are we at best back in the cold war, although with a hot war going on in Ukraine and the danger of extension elsewhere along the new iron curtain that is descending over Europe? That is clearly understood not just by the politicians and the defence establishment, but by the publics in Sweden and Finland, with a dramatic shift in opinion, after centuries of neutrality, and their historic decision to join NATO and become very active participants.
Even so, across NATO, there is not that sense of urgency, or a clear realisation of the crisis. Only this week, the boss of the Scandinavian ammunition company Nammo was in the press pointing out that societies were still in peacetime mode. He gave the example of its factory in Norway, which needs additional electricity supply capacity in order to expand. A new site for TikTok has been created nearby, but the factory cannot get enough electricity. He rightly pointed out that the defence of western Europe is slightly more important than cat videos on TikTok. He contrasted that with the Defence Production Act in the United States, which was the Truman-era response to the Korean war, based on the Franklin D. Roosevelt War Powers Act. It gives extensive powers to the US Government, and they are using them. That is why they are responding to the weaknesses in procurement and ramping up production capacity, including through several Government-owned and Government-constructed, company-operated plants. Will the Minister indicate whether our Government are looking at that as a possible mechanism?
Do the Government recognise the fragility of the supply situation? Recent crises such as covid, and the situation in the Red sea and Ukraine, have already shown how vulnerable our supply chains are, and many firms and customers are finding that the so-called cheapest option can end up being very expensive. To be fair, that applies not just to the United Kingdom; all around the world, companies are finding that extended supply lines and single points of failure at home or abroad can have very damaging consequences. The discussion has shifted, and now there is much talk about reshoring, near-shoring and friend-shoring. I am not sure how much of that has penetrated the calcified mindset of our Treasury and the senior civil service, but I hope that the Minister will be able to shed some light on that.
This is not a Eurocentric issue; we must also be aware of the increasing tension in the Gulf, particularly arising from the destabilising impact of Iran and its proxies across the middle east and north Africa, as well as the increasingly aggressive attitude of China, which is why deepening relations through AUKUS and with Japan is so necessary and welcome. I hope that the Minister can report on the success this week at the AUKMIN—Australia-UK ministerial consultations—and AUKUS conferences taking place in Australia. We fully understand why the Secretary of State is there today, rather than responding to this debate.
We have to be clear that these problems did not come out of a clear blue sky. They were shown to us some years ago. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford identified the evidence that we had from an American general. When the Americans conducted an exercise with the British Army about an outbreak of conflict in Europe, we basically ran out of munitions in about 10 days, but nothing was done about it. Even once the conflict started in Ukraine in February 2022, and it soon became clear that artillery would play a major role in it, the Ministry of Defence did not place an order for new shells until July 2023. The Minister cannot complain that I have not given him notice of this issue; I have raised it several times in previous debates, and have never had a satisfactory answer about that delay. We cannot afford that degree of indecision going forward. It is not as though we have not had shell crises before; we had one in 1915, which brought down the Government. I am afraid that there does not seem to be much collective institutional memory in the civil service today.
Mr Francois
We are giving £2.5 billion in the next financial year to Ukraine, and it is money well spent, but we cannot spend the same pound twice, so does the right hon. Gentleman agree that if we rightly give that money to Ukraine, we cannot then spend it on Army salaries, British shells or submarine maintenance? In other words, it is for the Ukrainians; it is not part of the UK defence budget, is it?
John Spellar
Well, it is unfortunately scored as being in the UK defence budget, and in the claim that we are keeping up defence expenditure; that masks an actual cut in British domestic defence spending. It is absolutely right that we supply the Ukrainians—I think we should be supplying more—as they are on the frontline and are carrying the fight. We—not just us, but the rest of Europe, the United States and the free world—should be backing them up with matériel. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that trying to slip that into the defence budget, rather than it being part of our national commitment, is the wrong way of handling it.
Even with new production, I am still not clear—perhaps the Minister will clarify this—on what is happening with the increasing capacity for propellants and explosives. Across the western world, very few points—just two or three factories—are capable of making them, and they are stretched to capacity. I understand that difficulty, but I want to know what is being done to create new capacity. I know that the United States is doing it, but what are we doing here and in Europe? In that context, I commend the article from Iain Martin in The Daily Telegraph, in which he says that, whatever our differences with other European countries over the EU and Brexit, we should certainly be working much more closely on maintaining and creating new defence capacity—not just military but industrial as well.
Although I accept that the Government and this House must take the lead, others must follow. If we are, as I have been arguing, in a new defence environment, the City of London and the finance houses must accept their responsibilities. They must make it clear that not only is investment in defence a good investment as it leads part of British manufacturing, but it is their patriotic duty and part of the defence of the free world. However, getting that message across and changing the mindset needs a whole-of-Government approach, not just the involvement of the Ministry of Defence and those of us in the House who are interested in the subject.
As I said to union representatives in the evidence session, the unions have tens of thousands of members in the defence and aerospace sector. They should not stand idly by while mobs try to shut down their workplaces. Only this week, we had demonstrations outside GE Aerospace in Cheltenham, which was, for over a century, the Smiths factory. There have also been protests outside the Leonardo site in Edinburgh, which I presume is the old Ferranti site. I hope that unions are backing not just their members’ employment but the national interest, and will look at whether any funding is going to bodies that are organising to shut those places.
I fully acknowledge the issues facing our uniformed forces, as well as their expertise and commitment. I am pleased that others will highlight their contribution. I regret that the Government have taken their commitment for granted. In any conflict, supply and resupply are crucial. Conflicts are won not just on the battlefield, but—sometimes even more so—in our factories and those of our allies. That is why we need a rethink, a reset and a recovery of lost ground. Will the Government take up that challenge?
John Spellar
Another key feature of that era was the Treasury’s 10-year rule of basing defence expenditure on the assumption that there would not be a war in Europe within the next 10 years, which rather unravelled at the end of the 1930s.
Mr Jones
It is laughable, as my right hon. Friend says. We need to make sure that we actually invest, because this is about skills and about ensuring that we have the workforce.
We have seen the effects when we just pull out of such work. We cannot look at our skills base as a tap, which we turn on when we want it and turn off again when we do not. We cannot do so, because we have seen the costs of that—for example, on the Astute programme. To be political, it was again the Conservative Government who stopped building submarines, so we had a gap in skills, and it has taken all the effort recently to rebuild that skills base and ensure we get it back. We must have such a skills base continually, and that has to be done by working with our European allies. Whether the zealots of Brexit and the anti-Europeans like it or not, if we are talking about things such as stockpiles, we do have to work with allies and make sure that we can deliver them through the supply chain we have.
UK Armed Forces
John Spellar Excerpts(1 month, 4 weeks ago)
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James Cartlidge
As I have said, we have just committed 40% of the land force personnel to the Steadfast Defender exercise. NATO is the key to the defence of this nation, and indeed the whole continent, in conventional terms. We should recognise the enormous contribution of our armed forces, and the fact that we have increased spending significantly. However, I hear what colleagues are saying, as does the Secretary of State. We have set out the case for 2.5%, but we want that 2.5% to be sustainable, so that the economy can afford it over the long term, and that will be possible through growth and sensible measures on fiscal policy.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
The Minister conceded earlier that funding for Ukraine and the escalating nuclear cost were at the expense of restoring the viability of our frontline readiness, but deterrence is a lot cheaper than war. Surely our support for Ukraine and the deterrent should be a charge on the general fund, rather than further hollowing out our conventional armed forces.
James Cartlidge
I do not believe I made that point about nuclear. The right hon. Gentleman has said that these factors are at the expense of the frontline, but nuclear is the frontline. We have had the continuous at-sea deterrent patrolling in defence of this country every year since 1969, as I recall. We have had it for a long time, and it is fundamental to our defence. The idea that that is not frontline spending is extraordinary.
Defence
John Spellar Excerpts(2 months ago)
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Grant Shapps
However, as this war drags into its third year, far from winning, Russia has been pushed back since those early days. Putin has achieved none of his strategic objectives, his invading force has suffered a staggering 356,000 casualties, and Ukraine has destroyed or damaged about 30% of the Russian Black sea fleet and retaken 50% of the territory that Russia stole from it.
[Official Report, 22 February 2024, Vol. 745, c. 886.]
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
The Defence Secretary was certainly in full Duracell bunny mode today, but it is clear that Britain and this Government have much to be proud of in our response to the Ukraine crisis. It was also clear, however, that right from the outset of the invasion it would be an industrial munitions war, harking back to the last century. While Russia has got itself on to a full war economy footing, our Government machine frankly seems to have failed to mobilise British industry in the same way. To highlight that, I will pose a simple question. Why did it take from February 2022 to July 2023 to place the vital order for additional, desperately needed artillery shells?
Grant Shapps
I do not entirely agree with the right hon. Member’s characterisation of the UK response in terms of deindustrialisation. I do agree that it is difficult overall to suddenly ramp up from whatever level we are producing at on a non-war footing, but it is heartening to know—I think this is right, but it is off the top of my head; I will correct the figures if I have got it wrong—that our munitions and missile production is now eight times the level it was before the war, so we have certainly stepped up.
[Official Report, 22 February 2024, Vol. 745, c. 893.]
Letter of correction from the Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for Welwyn Hatfield (Grant Shapps):
Errors have been identified in the statement I made on Ukraine and the response I gave to the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar).
The correct information should have been:
Ukraine: Military Equipment
John Spellar Excerpts(2 months, 1 week ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
James Cartlidge
It is a pleasure to take my first contribution from my right hon. Friend in the Chamber since he became Chairman of the Select Committee. I look forward to further discussion with him later this afternoon on other matters before the Committee. He is right to stress the importance of that contract—155 mm shells are one of the fundamental munitions we need to see both replenished for the UK armed forces and, where possible, provided into Ukraine, along with other key artillery classes. I can confirm that we signed that contract with BAE last July and it should lead to an eightfold increase in 155 mm production, initially in the Washington plant, but thereafter in south Wales. I am keen to see that get going as soon as possible.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
The MOD has clearly done a decent job of supporting Ukraine, but I still doubt that the Government as a whole are seized of the urgent critical nature of this crisis. I return to the question I asked the Secretary of State last week: why, when it was clear early in 2022 that this was going to be very much an artillery war dating back to the last century, did it take until mid-2023 to place the order for additional artillery shells? The Minister should have the answer by now.
James Cartlidge
I refer to the previous answer I gave, where I was clear that we placed that order last July, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly said; that is for our own armed forces and it is an eightfold increase. But we have provided 300,000 artillery shells into Ukraine. We have procured them, Sir. We have done that not just from this country; we have done it through rapid procurement, through Defence Equipment and Support. All I can say is that I pay tribute to that effort. We all know that we need to go further. The other point is that this is not just about what we have procured; this country has played a leading role in ensuring that other nations join us and provide more munitions. That is as much a key part of the role that we have played.
Ukraine
John Spellar Excerpts(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Grant Shapps
On his first point, my hon. Friend is right. It is a Thursday, and many Members will have returned to their constituencies, but the Russian viewership of the Chamber should not mistake the level of attendance with the level of interest. The reason that people have felt confident to return to their constituencies is that they know there is no dispute in this House, as we have heard from all sides, in our solid, iron resolve for Ukraine.
On the wider picture, Members will see the news. They understand that with Putin, he simply murders those who stand up to him. He will go to any lengths. He turns his entire economy on to a war footing, and he tries to work with others to further his means, whether that is Belarus at the beginning or more recently North Korea, Iran and other pariah states. I had better not go into the detailed intelligence on the Floor of the House, although I am sure more briefing can be announced. It simply adds to the overall need for us to stick together—not just in this House, but with the civilised countries of the world—and ensure that Putin understands that no matter how long he carries on, we will always be there to help defend Ukraine.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
The Defence Secretary was certainly in full Duracell bunny mode today, but it is clear that Britain and this Government have much to be proud of in our response to the Ukraine crisis. It was also clear, however, that right from the outset of the invasion it would be an industrial munitions war, harking back to the last century. While Russia has got itself on to a full war economy footing, our Government machine frankly seems to have failed to mobilise British industry in the same way. To highlight that, I will pose a simple question. Why did it take from February 2022 to July 2023 to place the vital order for additional, desperately needed artillery shells?
Grant Shapps
I do not entirely agree with the right hon. Member’s characterisation of the UK response in terms of deindustrialisation. I do agree that it is difficult overall to suddenly ramp up from whatever level we are producing at on a non-war footing, but it is heartening to know—I think this is right, but it is off the top of my head; I will correct the figures if I have got it wrong—that our munitions and missile production is now eight times the level it was before the war, so we have certainly stepped up.
In addition, we are carrying out rounds of procurement through the international fund for Ukraine, which we established and which is still receiving new contributions. I am delighted that Australia has just donated $50 million to that fund. I think—again, this is off the top of my head—there have been 27 rounds of contract procurement so far. I am not familiar with the particular case that the right hon. Member cited, so I will write back to him on the detail, but it is encouraging that we have been able to set up a mechanism so that other countries that have not had our scale of ambition and footprint on Ukraine can put in their own money, so that we can buy in coalition on their behalf. We will continue to do that.
Oral Answers to Questions
John Spellar Excerpts(4 months ago)
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John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
AUKUS has strong support from across the House, but although the time scales seem very long, in reality there is growing concern in the defence community that they may already be slipping, often because of bureaucratic inertia. What is being done to keep this vital project on track? How often is the Minister meeting his officials to monitor and chase progress?
James Cartlidge
I am not aware of any slippage. We meet frequently and discuss this incredibly important matter. I am pleased to hear his confidence that AUKUS has cross-party support. It is generating huge numbers of jobs for the future: an additional 1,700 jobs will be created in Raynesway to build the reactors for the UK and Australia. It is an incredibly exciting project and we are 100% committed to it.
Ukraine
John Spellar Excerpts(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
James Cartlidge
It is a pleasure to take a question from my right hon. Friend. He was an excellent Minister for Defence Procurement and an excellent Minister generally, and I always enjoyed the many Cobra meetings that were overseen by him, but he speaks with equal strength from the Back Benches, and his question is very important. When it comes to opportunities for future industrial production in Ukraine, I would like to see an opportunity for us to work together for our mutual benefit to create ordnance not just for Ukraine but for ourselves, because maximising that demand signal is the best way in which to secure the strongest possible military industrial base.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
I readily acknowledge the support that we have given to Ukraine to try and ensure that Putin cannot win. That is an objective shared in all parts of the House, but the scale of the conflict requires more, especially in the form of artillery and munitions. Why did it take the Government more than a year to sign the contract for new capacity for shell production, not only for Ukraine but to restock our own supplies?
James Cartlidge
The right hon. Gentleman is entirely right, and he speaks with experience as a former Defence Minister, but we have signed the contract on the 155 shell, as the Prime Minister announced last July. That contract sits alongside many others, including the lightweight multi-role missile and STARStreak contracts. This is, of course, for our own defence, but, as I have said, we recently delivered the 300,000th artillery shell to Ukraine, and we should be proud of that effort.
Oral Answers to Questions
John Spellar Excerpts(5 months, 3 weeks ago)
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The Minister for Defence People, Veterans and Service Families (Dr Andrew Murrison)
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for her question, and I reiterate once again my thanks for all the hard work she has done on behalf of women in defence. She is quite right: it is unacceptable. Today, the permanent secretary has written to the Department with an action plan on how to deal with the specific issue my hon. Friend has raised, in particular asking our non-executive directors to conduct a review, so that we can ensure that what we are doing stands up to muster against the norms in other large organisations.
John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)
James Cartlidge
The right hon. Gentleman talks about the fleet solid support ships being built in foreign yards. I can assure him that recently, I had the great pleasure of visiting Harland & Wolff at its Appledore yard in north Devon. That is in the UK, and it is where a significant part of the FSS contract will be made.