Public Order Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office
Lord Beith Portrait Lord Beith (LD)
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My Lords, this legislation is unnecessary, dangerous, largely unwanted, and futile. It is unnecessary because existing powers are so wide- spread—we have been told that so many times by the Home Secretaries who introduced them. It is dangerous because it contains, for example, search powers without reasonable grounds for suspicion which will be used discriminately and will create tension with innocent members of the community. My noble friend argued earlier how widely unwanted this legislation is among those who actually have to carry it out: serving police officers. It is futile because protesters will always look for new ways to get into the media, to get their head- line and to insist to society that something has to be done about what it is that they care about. Today it will be locking on but it will not be tomorrow; something else will be devised and we will be here again, trying to devise inappropriately specific legislation to try to stop protest, which is a natural part of society.

This legislation will be used by authoritarian regimes to validate their own oppressive legislation. From Belarus to North Korea, I can imagine the statements that will emerge. So why do we have it? It is a political gesture designed for headlines, not for effective policing in a free society.

I will look at some specific concerns about it, and here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that there is reason to question the advisability of giving the Home Secretary the power and the responsibility to seek injunctions against specific protests, which risks turning a local protest into a national issue and undermining the ability of those on the spot to deal with the situation effectively.

I question the provision of Clause 7(7) which allows the Secretary of State to add to the list of key national infrastructure by statutory instruments. This could create an enormously wide area of scope for the powers in the Bill. I question the powers given to the British Transport Police, a force that is not locally accountable. Clause 16 would allow the transport police to ban a demonstration or even a one-person protest in the station entrance. Even if it was a protest against the closure of the station, the power would be granted to them to do that.

It gets particularly serious when we look at the stop and search powers, which are truly alarming. If you live or work near a site where a protest might take place—note that it does not have to be taking place or to have taken place—do not, whatever you do, carry anything with you, because you may be the subject of a random search which could cover anything the officer believes might be used in pursuit of the process. If you are with a friend to whom this happens, do not, whatever you do, question the police officer about what he is doing, because then you will fall foul of Clause 14 and be regarded as obstructing the police officer. This clause appears to criminalise even the kind of questioning which was encouraged after the dreadful Sarah Everard case, when people were told in such situations to question whether the police officer had the authority to approach the person at all.

Other speakers have referred to the serious disruption orders or protest banning orders reversing the burden of proof. We should not be contemplating that. The legislation contains limited exemptions for actions taken

“in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”,

and there are good reasons for that. The right to strike and regulated picketing are fundamental rights, but if the law is capable of recognising that, why are the same principles not being applied to other equally legitimate protests? We rightly protect the right not to lose one’s job or be paid inadequately, but what about the right to warn that we are destroying the life chances of our descendants by our neglect of climate change and what is happening to the planet? These are major issues which have a similar justification and validity.

I turn to Clause 9, inserted in the Commons. I speak as someone who has always wanted the law to afford a degree of protection to the unborn child—I say that to explain where I am coming from—but I am not a supporter of some of the protest tactics which have taken place around clinics, particularly in the United States, but to some extent in this country. When I look at Clause 9, I see understandable references to intimidation, harassment and threatening behaviour, and I am prepared to consider whether the law needs to be strengthened to prevent those things.

However, I cannot support a clause which criminalises a person who “seeks to influence”, provides information or “expresses opinion.” This is the most profound restriction on free speech I have ever seen in any UK legislation, and I cannot support it if it remains in its present form. Indeed, I think it will be grasped as a precedent by the free-speech deniers, and the words and language will be applied in other areas when other legislation is brought forward. It is clearly incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Government cannot certify the Bill in its present form for that reason. A lot else in the Bill appears to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, and I believe it will give rise to more litigation than improvement in effective policing. Most police officers will tell you that their problem in dealing with these situations is not the state of the law, it is whether there are enough of them on the spot able to deal with it, properly commanded, advised and controlled. It is that which the Government should address, not this futile legislation.