European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 21st February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, although I voted in the referendum, I did not campaign in the run-up to it because despite believing, on balance, that we would be better off out, there were genuine and strong arguments on both sides. However, we are where we are, and we now need to get on with it. Before I go further, I must declare an interest as a beneficiary of payments under the common agricultural policy.

I listened carefully to the debate yesterday and this morning. Much of it has been fighting last year’s battle. I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I take the rather novel course of making a speech on the Second Reading of the Bill before us. Many issues have been raised and amendments have already been tabled that deal with all manner of matters, and I have no doubt that there will be more to come. I intend to address only three key areas that have been raised in another place and are covered by amendments that have already been tabled here.

The first is EU nationals living here and their right to continue to do so. That is something that many of us—if not all of us—would wish to see. The Government have said that they are prepared to give them that right and that it must be reciprocal, with our citizens living in EU countries being given the same right. There is pressure unilaterally to give EU citizens the right to continue to live here, but it is in the nature of negotiations that related and reciprocal matters are dealt with together. If one point is conceded, this risks losing the reciprocal point, so by definition, to do this would run the risk of British citizens currently living in another EU country losing the right to continue to reside in that country. That would be grossly unfair on them, and that is why I would resist any attempt to insist upon the unilateral approach.

The second issue I want to address is that of scrutiny by Parliament between the triggering of Article 50 and the completion of the process two years later. In this context, scrutiny means two principal things: the provision of information and allowing time to debate it. I have no problem with allowing plenty of time for debate. As regards the provision of information, the Government have said that they would provide Parliament with the same information that the EU Parliament receives. That seems fair and right, but as far as the provision of additional information is concerned, I look to my career as a negotiator. I negotiated a significant number of corporate acquisitions and disposals in Europe and the Far East during that career. One of the golden rules of negotiating is that information about your counter party’s position and the detail of what is important to them, is gold-dust. You learn everything you can about their backstop positions, what they will negotiate on and what they cannot, the intricate details of their financial position and things that might not seem important but might later prove to be. It is a forensic science, and it makes all the difference to the outcome. Any information about our position that comes into the possession of the large number of people and institutions that make up our counter party—the Commission, the Council, the Parliament and their various members—will be used against us. That is why I would resist the provision of additional information.

My third issue, impact assessments, is closely related. I have explained my reasons for strongly resisting the provision of information to this Parliament beyond that provided to the European Parliament. An impact assessment on Brexit, if it were to be of any value, would reveal information about our options and negotiating position which would be hugely valuable to our counterparty, the negotiating representatives of the EU. That information would, without a shadow of doubt, be used against us by them. I am afraid that confidentiality arrangements that allow limited access to documents have a habit of failing to prevent leaks, so I do not find that suggestion of any comfort. As such, I resist any proposal for impact assessments.

Those are my views on three key areas. Many other issues have been and will be raised, and I look forward to hearing the views of noble Lords still to speak, to the Minister’s response and to debates at subsequent stages.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 27th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I think the previous Prime Minister was a completely incompetent negotiator. The way to make progress in European affairs—it is extraordinary that after all these decades the Tory party has not learned this—is to adopt a communautaire approach and the language of one’s partners, to say that what one is seeking to do is in the interests of everybody and not purely in the selfish interests of this country, and certainly not just to get a good headline in the Daily Express or Daily Mail. We make it clear that we share the long-term objectives of our neighbours and partners for the future of western civilisation, as well as for prosperity, competitiveness and employment and these important economic but ultimately subsidiary objectives. Then we say pragmatically, as we have a reputation for being pragmatic, “Would it not be a good idea to do X, Y and Z which would strengthen our common purposes and take further forward our common ambitions?”. That is the way to make progress but it is the opposite of the confrontational approach the last Prime Minister adopted. It is not surprising that he did not get very far.

I am glad that my noble friend made this brief intervention because it enables me to say that I am extremely worried—I am not alone in this—that the Tory party has learned nothing at all from this experience or from any other experience over the last 40 years of the European Union and so will make the same mistake again. It will find itself not achieving what it ought to in the national interest in these negotiations. They will be a disaster, and a largely avoidable disaster, precisely because the Tory Government have not learned the obvious lessons of the past which my noble friend was kind enough to give me the opportunity to remind them of this afternoon.

If you have somebody negotiating on your behalf—a solicitor, an accountant or some representative, agent, trustee or whoever—and you watch carefully what they are doing, you are entitled to get worried should they do something that goes quite counter to normal human common sense. I pointed out three ways in which the Government are behaving in an extremely irrational fashion. I will repeat them so that the Minister can address them when he sums up. First, why are we pursuing this particular objective with the same kind of intensity and passion when we have acknowledged that the objective that we are trying to achieve—what we are trying to obtain in exchange for the high price of giving up our membership of the single market—is not anything like as great it was previously made out to be?

Secondly, why have we not decided to negotiate on the basis of the available option, which we know exists, of our potential membership of the EEA and see if we can perhaps do a little better and achieve some additional concessions? We have not even tried to do this—why not? Thirdly, why are we proceeding in this negotiation by giving up options in advance, before we have even explored them and before we have even started the negotiations? It is a very extraordinary thing to do.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the Labour Party could find room for others in this debate. Even if the noble Lord, Lord Lea, were right that we did not have to go through a process of joining EFTA and the EEA—I do not think that he was, actually—being a member of the EEA means accepting EU laws, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth has said, without any political representation or influence over them. This would, of course, result in less control for the UK over its destiny, rather than more. That is not what people voted for in the referendum. I oppose this amendment for those reasons and because it is directly inconsistent with the White Paper.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, there are those who say that, since voting to leave the EU was the only question on the ballot paper, it is legitimate to argue that people did not vote to leave the single market or the customs union. They are wrong, but we will deal with that in the fourth group of amendments. Those same people also argue that we can join the EEA and benefit from it while still leaving the EU. I believe that that, too, is wrong and misguided. However, your Lordships should not take my word for it: I will quote from the EEA website. After it describes what the EEA is, who are the contracting parties and when it was agreed, it goes on to say in point 4:

“What is included in the EEA Agreement? The EEA Agreement provides for the inclusion of EU legislation in all policy areas of the Single Market. This covers the four freedoms, i.e. the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital, as well as competition and state aid rules, but also the following horizontal policies: consumer protection, company law, environment, social policy and statistics. In addition, the EEA Agreement provides for cooperation in several flanking policies such as research and technological development, education, training and youth, employment, tourism, culture, civil protection, enterprise, entrepreneurship and small and medium-sized companies. The EEA Agreement guarantees equal rights and obligations within the Single Market for citizens and economic operators in the EEA. Through Article 6 of the EEA Agreement, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is also of relevance to the EEA Agreement, as the provisions of the EEA Agreement shall be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court given prior to the date of signature, 2 May 1992”.


Therefore, if we join the EEA, we would, in effect, still be in the EU to all intents and purposes, with the exception of agriculture, fishing, justice and home affairs. All the rest of it we would have, lock, stock and barrel. We would not have control of our borders, our laws, our courts or much of our money. We would thus betray the people who voted to leave the EU, and that is why we should reject this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

A point that was made by the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Forsyth, was that an impact assessment that showed where we had strengths and weaknesses would undermine our negotiating position. The first rule of any negotiation is to respect the other side. The assumption that Mr Barnier, with all the resources of the EU behind him, is incapable of doing an impact assessment in as much detail as the British Government, or perhaps even greater detail, is a foolish one. The other side will know our strengths and weaknesses before we go into that negotiation, and that is something that our negotiators in turn should be very well aware of. It means that a level playing field is established very quickly in the negotiation.

[Lord De Mauley]

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, told us earlier of a specific example of where our impact assessment was completely different from that of the EU.

[Baroness Kramer]

You can have differences, but the point is that those differences become relevant in the process of negotiation. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, pointed out that by being clear about our impact assessment we gained strength and opportunity and were able to position ourselves far more effectively in the negotiation. As someone who has spent a lifetime in negotiation, one thing that bothers me is constantly hearing negotiation discussed as if it were some sort of poker game. It is not; it is a grown-up activity. Making sure that our negotiators fully understand where they stand and what the issues are, and that that is done best by transparency, is fundamental. I say to those who simply dismiss the idea that we need to deal with our weaknesses as well as our strengths that that strikes me as just an extraordinary situation. If we do not recognise, discuss and understand our weaknesses, I do not know how we will put together a negotiating position.

I am not going to continue because these are only probing amendments. I look very much to the Government to take on board the underlying message, which is that many parts of the country and many sectors feel disengaged. The Government have said that they have certain priorities. When I talk to those in the financial services industry, they say, “We’ve been guaranteed top priority. Others will be sacrificed for us”. If that is the message, it is one that leaves people genuinely, and appropriately, worried. That discussion has to take place; we need to know on what basis all this will move forward.

Impact assessments are a normal part of a normal process. Transparency around such assessments is also a normal part of that process. I hope that the Government will recognise that and not try to pretend that they are entering into a poker game rather than a mature negotiation.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st March 2017 Lords Chamber

The banking authority is different from the medicines agency, and this is a key point. Nearly all these institutions have different charters. Article 75 of the banking authority’s founding regulations provides for participation to be open to—

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Is he going to address the amendments?

[Lord Balfe]

I take the amendments as being about our negotiating stance and, as such, I consider that I am addressing them. Article 75 provides for third countries with concluded agreements to take part in the agencies. I would like to know from the Minister whether we are going to seek to be a third party. If we do, we can contribute to the budget but we will then have to be subject to the rules under which they operate, which, incidentally, are also basically the rules of the ECJ. The point I am making—I am coming near to the end—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord De Mauley]

If what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said earlier is correct, and I think it is, how does subsection (4) work?

[Lord Oates]

I am not quite clear to which point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, the noble Lord is referring.

[Lord De Mauley]

If at the end of the two-year period we are out anyway, what is the impact of the Minister’s decision on termination?

[Lord Oates]

The point of subsection (4) is that,

“No Minister … may agree to the termination”,


prior to that point. Clearly, that is the point of it.