European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Goldsmith Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I am trying to clarify what the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, said. I think the issue is not “appropriate” versus “necessary” but “the Minister considers”. I believe the point the noble Baroness was making is that, if something has to be “necessary”, that leaves it open for a court to say whether or not it was necessary. If you say “the Minister considers it”, then the issue is whether the Minister genuinely considers it.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, and what is wrong with that?

In Committee, in a most powerful speech, the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, with his vast experience from inside the Civil Service, from knowing just what civil servants and Ministers would like to do, gave your Lordships the advice that,

“in this case, I think the scale of the powers proposed is so extensive that we should lean against giving Ministers plump cushions of legal protection”—

a very telling phrase. He continued:

“it should be the strict discipline of an objective test of what is necessary”.—[Official Report, 7/3/18; col. 1180.]

I respectfully completely agree with that. It is absolutely the case that, in circumstances where great powers are being given, one needs to be very clear where the discretion lies. Here it is not just Ministers but civil servants. We have been told that there are 109 Ministers, but under the Carltona principle—I have made this point several times and no one has yet contradicted it—many civil servants themselves in effect exercise these powers in the name of the Minister.

So Ministers and civil servants do what they think is appropriate. That is very different from things that are necessary in order to achieve the objectives set out in the clause. As a practising lawyer, I have no difficulty with the concept of what is necessary, but I believe—to use the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, in a different context—that there is a profound distinction between saying, “You can do what you as a Minister consider appropriate”, and saying, “You can do only what is necessary to achieve these objectives”. If this House has a responsibility, I respectfully suggest that it is to ensure that we do not give the Executive more power than is necessary in order to achieve their objectives. The amendment would achieve that. If the Government want to come back with further clarification on the meaning of “necessary”, although I do not believe that is necessary at all, they can do so.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I intervene to ask the Minister whether he agrees with this. Although —and I support the amendment—it is right to say that “necessary” involves a degree of objectivity, the clause would actually be applied in court on any challenge, and it would be a judicial review challenge to the making of regulation, on the basis that it is, in the reasonable opinion of the Minister, necessary. That is how the clause as amended would be applied on a challenge in court. Would he agree?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am delighted to be described as a Minister in that question—not a role that I am eager to take on—but it may be that the question was intended for the Minister himself when he comes to respond.

The important point, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made clear, as did other speakers, is that, as the Bill stands it is subjective and imposes a vague, low test. It is subjective because it is what the Minister considers, and it is a low test because it is what he considers appropriate.

As I told your Lordships previously—I will repeat it just this one last time—as someone who has spent a life as a practising lawyer, a court advocate, advising Ministers and being a Minister, I know that there is all the difference in the world between saying, “You can do this if you consider it appropriate”—nobody can second-guess that—and saying, “You can do this if it’s necessary”. It introduces an objective test, and that is what matters. This is what we invite the House to say to the Government is necessary in these circumstances. That is the only power they should take, and I hope that when the noble Lord presses the amendment to a vote, it will be supported by many Members of this House.

[The Minister of State, Department for Exiting the European Union (Lord Callanan) (Con)]

My Lords, I first thank all those who have contributed to today’s relatively brief debate, and the many noble Lords I have either spoken to or exchanged letters with between Committee and Report. The scope of the delegated powers in the Bill has, rightly, been one of the most intensively scrutinised areas, and I do not for one moment doubt the best intentions of many of those who have spoken against the Government’s position today. However, I hope noble Lords will listen to my remarks with an open mind, as I hope to offer some new content that we did not cover in Committee.

Let me start by addressing the specific proposition of the amendments on the Marshalled List—Amendments 31, 42, 86 and 87, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. As has been said, they would remove from the main powers in the Bill the discretion of ministerial judgment on appropriateness, and permit action only where it “is necessary” in the context of the specific power. This has been touted as a change from a subjective test to an objective one. But I hope to demonstrate that this is not the case, as I would question what exactly “necessary” means.

For example, in the context of Clause 7, would the course of action a Minister takes have to be no more than necessary to correct the deficiency? Or must it be necessary to correct a deficiency for the power to be engaged in the first place—and if so, necessary for what purpose? Let me address these different scenarios in turn. First let us say, hypothetically, that a court interprets the amendments to mean that a course of action taken by Ministers must be necessary to correct an identified deficiency. It might follow that Ministers could follow only the course of action that does no more than is strictly necessary to correct that deficiency, rather than the course of action that is most sensible.

I know the House likes concrete examples, so let me give an example of how I think this would lead to worse policy outcomes. Take, for example, Section 105B of the Communications Act 2003—with which I am sure all noble Lords are completely familiar. This includes an obligation for Ofcom to notify its regulatory counterparts in other member states, as well as the European network and information security agency, when Ofcom is made aware of a security breach that affects a public electronic communications network or service, and Ofcom thinks it appropriate to make such a notification. It could be argued that it is not strictly necessary to delete the obligation at all. Let us assume, however, that a court accepts that some action is needed in this scenario. A test of necessity could then be taken to mean that the Government should take the minimum action possible to address the deficiency. That might be simply to remove the requirement to share information.

However, the Government's preferred policy, which this House would surely support, is to change it into a discretion that makes it explicit that Ofcom may make notifications of this kind if it wishes. This is intended to support proportionate information-sharing about security matters after EU exit. That amendment is appropriate but arguably not strictly necessary, and might fall foul of the increased restriction offered by the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. I understand the notional appeal of permitting Ministers to act only where it is necessary. But here I agree with my distinguished predecessor, my noble friend Lord Bridges, the midwife, as he put it, to the Bill. It should not be the role of a Minister to be a statutory firefighter, dousing deficiencies in the statute book only where it is absolutely necessary. Instead, I would argue that a more proactive role is the only way that we can ensure the best possible outcome for the statute book.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

I wonder whether the Minister would kindly consider this question: is he saying that he would want Ministers—and indeed, civil servants—to have the discretion to make policy changes from EU retained law without reference to Parliament?

[Lord Callanan]

The powers in this Bill cannot be exercised by civil servants; it has to be Ministers who make the decisions. We have said on a number of occasions that defining a policy change is quite hard. A pure correction can involve a slight policy choice—for instance, whether to designate one agency or another. It can still be a technical correction but it is a policy choice about what to do. But we are clear that we are not trying to make substantive policy choices through this secondary legislation power.

I will refrain from making the full case for the government amendments as they are not on the Marshalled List today, but I will quote the Constitution Committee in justifying our position. It said that such amendments,

“will require explanations to be given for the use of the power which can be scrutinised by Parliament. It will also provide a meaningful benchmark against which use of the power may be tested judicially. In this way, the Government can secure the flexible delegated powers it requires while Parliament will have a proper explanation and justification of their use that it can scrutinise”.

That, to me, sounds like a sensible solution.

Before I finish, let me add the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who I am sorry to see is not in his place.