Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sharkey
Main Page: Lord Sharkey (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Sharkey's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, for the purposes of the Committee stage of this Bill, I declare my interest as in the register as a director of the London Stock Exchange plc.
This Bill, as was elaborated at Second Reading, is intended to provide a way to land so-called in-flight legislation. However, as many noble Lords also observed during Second Reading, the scope for amendment of that legislation is wide and not limited to the type of onshoring provisions of the withdrawal Act. Indeed, there is no promise of onshoring at all. This point is noted by the Delegated Powers Committee in paragraph 17 of its report on this Bill. The fact is that there is just a wide power to make legislation related to any of the provisions in any of the legislation in subsection (2) or specified in the list in the Schedule. There are no provisions defining how close it must be to that legislation, and the power is not anchored only to withdrawal from the EU.
We should not lose sight of the fact that the mechanism is an alternative to primary legislation. Although the power is time-limited, I do not consider that that is sufficient control to replace primary legislation entirely. It cannot be left open for the Government to cherry pick, to diminish, to add or to do things that depart from expectation, in terms both of the policy in the EU instruments that the power covers and the policy that has been laid out by government with regard to relations with the EU after Brexit.
The doubt starts right at the opening words, which state:
“The Treasury may by regulations make provision … corresponding, or similar, to … any of the provisions, of any specified EU financial services legislation”.
The use of “or” clearly implies that the regulation may make provisions that are corresponding but not similar. A simple suggestion may be to make a penalty for a failure in a corresponding position, but not the same penalty. So, too, could it be the other way round: a provision may be similar but not corresponding. A penalty may be moved to somewhere else or attached to a different provision. We often talk in particular about criminal penalties, when we are equalising them out between different types of provisions.
Amendment 1 would replace “or” with “and” so that it said “corresponding and similar”, thus making the objective clear: it corresponds to a particular EU provision and it is in similar terms. That seems to be a good and clear start to the Bill rather than the imprecise start that it currently has.
On its own, the amendment would not solve all the problems, including the Government’s plea for some flexibility. In other amendments in later groups, I probe how that might be done. Other noble Lords have amendments in this group which suggest further limitations on power. As it has fallen to me to speak first, I shall briefly comment on them
Amendment 3, tabled by my noble friend Lord Sharkey, makes a good point about not changing the primary purpose of the EU legislation, and it could sit alongside my Amendment 1 as well as standing alone. Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, and others, would limit the provisions to the circumstances of withdrawal from the EU. I am interested in the debate around that point. How far would the Government intend to stretch the term,
“adjustments in connection with the withdrawal”?
What other form of amendment not connected to withdrawal might they be contemplating?
Amendment 7, by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, progresses the limitation to reflecting the UK position outside the EU. In later groups, I have put forward some probing amendments that would limit the scope of amendment in other ways but which are a little more permissive, so, for now, I reserve my own position on Amendments 5 and 7 save to say that, if it is not feasible to construct suitably restrained flexibility, limitations of the kind set out in Amendments 5 and 7 would have to become the default position. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 3. At Second Reading, there was much discussion of the wide powers that the Bill gives to the Treasury via secondary legislation. All the amendments in this group deal with that issue.
Clause 1 contains clear Henry VIII powers. It allows the Treasury to make policy and new laws entirely by means of statutory instrument. It even allows such new laws to be wholly unrelated to the UK’s exit from the EU. Unusually, it allows these new laws on to the statute book without any parent primary legislation. There will be no parent Acts for these new laws: no context, no detailed parliamentary discussion and no effective parliamentary scrutiny.
We will have the debate under the future group of amendments on equivalence. We are not setting here the test or the bar as one of equivalence. We are simply talking about the specific directives and regulations before us and mentioned in the Bill: the 15 here; the four already agreed, which are mentioned on page 1 of the Bill; and the further 11 mentioned in the Schedule accompanying it, which have not yet been agreed. Because they have not been agreed and may be under debate or amendment without the UK at the negotiating table, we are simply adding in that greater level of power to say that the UK, in the event of leaving without a deal, would need to look after the interests of the UK financial and industry sector and could not give a blank cheque in the opposite direction to the EU to pass whatever regulation that we would automatically implement because of adherence to a notion of equivalence. That cannot be right for UK financial services. We need to look at what comes to us, then act within the interests of the UK financial services sector at that time.
I will deal with some of the specific points raised. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, talked about the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I pay tribute to the work it did on this and the quick turnaround and punchy conclusions it arrived at. We are considering its recommendations, which the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, asked us to look at. I will be happy to meet with noble Lords ahead of Report to discuss where we stand. I thank the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its work and recognise that it raised some very pertinent issues. We want to look at them in greater detail, and I would be happy to discuss that with noble Lords ahead of Report.
I hope I have gone some way to addressing noble Lords’ points at this stage. We will come to a number of the other points in future debates and groups.
It seems the Minister has relied heavily in his responses on Clause 1(1)(a) by using this to demonstrate that there is really a tight restriction on what kind of things can be done by Clause 1. But he has not at all mentioned Clause 1(1)(b), which in many ways is the root of the problem because it contains the word “adjustments” and the phrase “consider appropriate”. To many of us, that seems to extend without limit the reach of the Treasury’s powers. That was the underlying purpose behind almost all the amendments in the first group. Could the Minister speak to Clause 1(1)(b)?
I am happy to do that. As the negotiations on these files continue, further amendments may be agreed, proposed or dropped that the Government will wish to domesticate or remove using the powers under this Bill. As the final outcome on many of these files is still unclear, we need to make sure that we can bring them into UK law in a way that works best for UK markets. This might, for example, include areas where the final parts of legislation could, if unchanged in a no-deal scenario, present inconsistencies with the UK regulatory framework, with global standards or with the UK’s position as an open global financial market. It is important therefore that we have the power to adjust these inconsistencies when bringing them into UK law. I acknowledge that this is a—
My Lords, given the debate so far I can be very brief. If the Bill proceeds as currently drafted, it will enable the Treasury to create a new set of laws and policies for our financial services industry, all via secondary legislation. These new laws and policies will not have been exposed to proper parliamentary scrutiny and will not have been amendable. This stands in extreme contrast to the careful, detailed and very lengthy scrutiny given to all previous changes in the laws and policies for our financial services industry—scrutiny which has frequently resulted in very significant amendments. This is an entirely unsatisfactory state of affairs, and I know we will come back to this on Report.
But if we are to have legal and policy changes introduced by SI, then we should at the very least have the opportunity to review them after the fact. That is what my amendment proposes. The Bill as it stands contains a sunset provision for the powers in Clause 1. My amendment proposes a sunset provision for the regulations created by the powers in Clause 1. The sunset provision for the powers extends for two years after we leave the EU. My amendment proposes that the new regulations expire two years after that.
This would have two effects. It would give time to assess how the new regulations were working in practice. It would also mean introducing primary legislation to reinstate and/or modify or add to new regulations. This would guarantee what we do not have in this Bill: a means of proper, full parliamentary scrutiny of new laws governing a critical part of our national and economic life. My amendment would restore to Parliament the ability to debate and amend these new laws in the proper context of primary legislation. I beg to move.
I want to make one very quick comment to add to those of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. There is a real danger that the pattern within this Bill becomes a precedent, and that for future financial legislation we in effect see this process of Treasury decision enacted through statutory instrument. This sunset clause would make that impossible. It would make sure that this was, in effect, a one-off, and that there was a return to normal practice following the end of four years.
There speaks the voice of experience. From his time speaking from this side of the Chamber, the noble Lord has perhaps pre-empted some of the concerns that we would have about this proposal, but let me put them on the record.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving us an opportunity to debate this important area. In implementing files under the Bill, it will be necessary to amend existing legislation to reflect updates to the regime. Should all powers under the Bill lapse at a stroke, without replacement, the legal effect on amended legislation would be unclear.
At a time when we should be seeking to provide industry with clarity and certainty, I am afraid that the amendment would have the unfortunate and unintended effect of providing just the opposite. Rather than minimising the cliff-edge risks, it would create a new series of cliff-edge challenges to be faced in the coming years. The potential for this legislation to lapse without replacement does not provide certainty to firms. Compliance with new regulatory regimes can be costly, and it would have a negative effect on firms’ confidence in the Government’s ability to set effective and proportionate regulation should we implement vital legislative reform only for it to drop away after a given period.
I appreciate the noble Lord’s concern that regulations made using this power will have a lasting effect on the structure of the UK’s financial services regulatory framework. This is why the power can apply only to a limited set of important files, which have been set out on the face of the Bill. In a no-deal scenario, implementing those files could be crucial to avoid conceding a competitive advantage to businesses operating in EU-based markets or to remain compliant with the Basel rules and meet our G20 commitment to international standards.
The noble Lord is clearly right, however, in pointing out that this cannot be a long-term model for a regulatory framework. Beyond this temporary solution, once we have left the EU in a no-deal scenario, the Government recognise the clear need for an approach that balances parliamentary oversight of financial services legislation with maintaining the flexibility and competitiveness of our regime. To that end, we will take forward proposals for a sustainable, long-term model in due course.
It is perhaps worth pointing out also that the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 requires the inclusion of a statutory review clause in secondary legislation that regulates business if the legislation continues to have effect five years after its entry into force. When taking forward SIs under the Bill, the Government will therefore be under a duty to make provision to undertake a post-implementation review after five years or to publish a statement that it is not appropriate in the circumstances to do so. In this light, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw this amendment.
In the light of the Minister’s very informative response, for which I am very grateful, I am delighted to be able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, at Second Reading, I asked the Minister how the specified in-flight files contained in the Schedule were chosen. He replied:
“Those are the files that we believe will be the most important for market functioning and UK competitiveness in a no-deal scenario. Those in-flight files not listed on the face of the Bill include those that apply only to eurozone members, which we would never have implemented as a member state, those that the UK has opted out of, and those where there is not a critical need to implement the legislation in the narrow window of time covered in the Bill”.
I asked the question because I was curious about the Government’s thinking and because of the exclusion from the Schedule of two particular in-flight files.
Those files, which the amendment would add to the Schedule, were drawn to my attention by the UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association. Both of them have their origin in the work of the European Commission’s high-level working group on sustainable finance and its January 2018 report on the matter. The UK was heavily involved in that. We had seven of the 20 members of the expert group; France had four and Germany had two. The files are the Commission’s proposal of 24 May 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment and the Commission’s proposal of the same date for a regulation on disclosures relating to sustainable investments and sustainability risks.
My Lords, I hope I can oblige the noble Lord, Lord Davies, with a constructive response to end Committee. I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I understand that several Members have received representations from the sustainable finance industry. This amendment seeks to add to the Bill’s Schedule two EU files that complete the European Union sustainable finance package.
As I have mentioned already, the Government acknowledge that the power being sought in this Bill is broad. That is why it has been designed with a number of safeguards and limitations in place. One of these is for the power to be limited to a specified set of EU legislative proposals, named on the face of the Bill. In order to focus the power as narrowly as possible, the list of files in the Schedule to the Bill was determined through an assessment of the importance of files to the stability and competitiveness of the UK’s financial services sector. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, highlighted this as one of his concerns when moving his amendment. In short, these are the files that we believe will be the most important for market functioning and UK competitiveness in a no-deal scenario.
I will, of course, be very happy to meet the noble Lord, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on this issue. I think we are already going to be meeting quite a bit between now and next week. I have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of the merits of adding these files to the Schedule, and I undertake to reflect on the matter ahead of returning to it on Report. In the light of this, and of the discussions that will take place, I invite the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment at this stage.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the Minister’s answer and look forward to what may be several meetings between now and Report. As the last speaker tonight, I hope that the Committee will allow me to make a very quick, general observation. As I listened to the debates today, it seemed to me that there was a real, structural problem with the Bill. It sets out to do two things: first, to onshore approved, but not applied, EU legislation; and, secondly, to make possible the onshoring of specified in-flight legislation. The problems we are discussing tonight are largely because we are trying to do both of those things using the same mechanism. That is going to be very difficult.
It might be better to consider simply applying the strict rules of Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act—or Amendment 7—to all those approved, but not applied, pieces of legislation listed in Clause 1(2)(a) and (b); and, separately, to require primary legislation to deal with the in-flight legislation coming our way, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.
I thank the Minister again for his observations on Amendment 18 and beg leave to withdraw.