Exiting the European Union (Sanctions) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateNigel Evans
Main Page: Nigel Evans (Conservative - Ribble Valley)Department Debates - View all Nigel Evans's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That the Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 608), dated 18 June 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 22 June, be approved.
With this we will take the following motions:
That the Burundi (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 1142), dated 18 July 2019, a copy of which was laid before this House on 19 July 2019, in the last Parliament, be approved.
That the Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 597), dated 15 June 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 17 June, be approved.
That the Guinea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 1145), dated 18 July 2019, a copy of which was laid before this House on 19 July 2019, in the last Parliament, be approved.
That the Misappropriation (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 1468), dated 7 December 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 9 December, be approved.
That the Nicaragua (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 610), dated 18 June 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 22 June, be approved.
That the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 590), dated 11 June 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 15 June, be approved.
That the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 951), dated 3 September 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8 September, be approved.
That the Unauthorised Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 1474), dated 7 December 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 11 December, be approved.
The nine instruments before us were laid between July 2019 and December 2020 under powers provided by the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, also known as the sanctions Act. As the House will be aware, on 31 December 2020, the UK took control of its sanctions policy and we now have a full suite of sanctions regimes at our disposal under the sanctions Act. This provides the legal framework within which the UK may impose, update and lift sanctions, whether autonomously or in line with our UN obligations now that we have left the European Union.
I will come to that point in due course. The right hon. Gentleman has made some important points, and he knows that those concerns are shared across the House, particularly with regard to the Uyghur minority and the shocking revelations that are coming out.
As a member of the European Union, the UK played a leading role in designating individuals and entities for targeted sanctions. We hope that, in seeking to maintain a close friendship with the European Union and our partners now that we have left, the Government will work closely with them as well as other like-minded countries and global institutions. We also hope that the Government will do more with the powers that we now have at our disposal through the Magnitsky sanctions regime, expanding their scope and usage, as well as increasing the transparency to the House, including about the processes by which decisions are made on designations for sanctions. I hope that the rolling over of these sanctions is a sign of the Government’s intention to maintain a collaborative and friendly approach with our friends in the EU.
Before turning to the individual countries and thematic sanctions that the Minister has outlined, I want to ask him a question. The transition period ended on 31 December last year. What has been in place in the interim weeks? Have these sanctions continued to apply? It is obviously very important that there have not been loopholes in the last few weeks, before these measures were brought before us.
First, on Burundi, we are fully supportive of rolling over the sanctions. The EU extended the sanction regime last year to last until 31 December this year. The last five years have unfortunately seen significant problems in respect of democracy and human rights. We hope that the new Government will seek to reverse many of the dangerous steps that the previous President and Government took. We saw the police, the National Intelligence Service and the ruling party’s youth wing carrying out extensive human rights violations, with allegations of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and torture. In October 2019, four members of the Imbonerakure were convicted for killing a member of the opposition party, the National Congress for Freedom.
We believe that the Burundi Government must seek to release human rights defenders and journalists arrested under a crackdown on opposition. That includes Germain Rukuki, a former employee of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture, human rights defender Nestor Nibitanga and four journalists from the Iwacu press group who were arrested in October 2019, whose names I can provide to the Minister. We very much hope that Burundi will follow a process of re-engagement with international bodies on human rights, including allowing the UN human rights office to be reopened in the country and engaging with commissions from the UN Human Rights Council, which the UK has a key sea-t on.
On Guinea, we agree with the Government on rolling over these sanctions, which relate back to the significant violence we saw in 2009, in which 150 people were brutally killed in a stadium in the capital, Conakry, and hundreds more were wounded, with women being victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence. It was a deeply distressing time for the people of Guinea, and there was widespread condemnation from the international community. There was some progress in 2014, and some sanctions were released. Could the Minister say a little bit about what progress there has been since then and whether these sanctions have had the impact that we want to see?
On Bosnia, I visited Srebrenica with the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart)—I believe you were on that trip, Mr Deputy Speaker—and we saw for ourselves the legacy of that terrible conflict in our own continent. I agree with the Government: it is vital that we continue to make clear our intent to stand against any of those who would undermine the security and peace that was so hard won by the general framework agreement for peace—the Dayton agreement—in 1995. That allowed for much progress, but significant tensions and concerns remain. Could the Minister clarify whether individuals have been or would be designated under this framework, or are we saying that the framework is in place to underpin the Dayton agreement and that we would not hesitate to use it with others to ensure peace and stability in that country, which is crucial for not only the people of Bosnia but the wider Balkan region?
On Nicaragua, the explanatory notes set out clearly some of the very serious allegations that have been made about the descent into repression and violence there, so it is right that we roll over these sanctions. The social security reforms announced in April 2018 triggered ongoing protests that have continued for nearly three years. The allegations are that by the end of 2019, at least 328 people had been killed, primarily by state security forces and pro-Government armed groups, and more than 2,000 others injured. There have been truly shocking allegations regarding mass graves, clandestine facilities, detention of political prisoners and attacks on members of the Catholic Church. The Government have also apparently banned the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from the country and rejected the report of Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. That is deeply concerning, and we welcome these measures.
On cyber sanctions, clearly there is an increasing factor of threats to global security, our own national security, and our commercial security. Threats and attacks on our financial institutions, democracy and security have become very clear in recent years, and they will likely only increase. The EU’s first ever sanctions last year made this a vital defensive tool in our arsenal against cyber-attacks.
I understand that the targeted individuals include those from China working on Operation Cloud Hopper. They are alleged to have stolen intellectual property and sensitive commercial data over many years, targeting companies across six continents and sectors including banking, finance, government, aviation, space, satellite technology, manufacturing, medical, oil and gas, mining, communications, computer processing and defence. This is a huge range of measures that these hostile individuals are attempting to attack. I also understand that they target intelligence officers from the Russian general main intelligence directorate and, in April 2018, attempted to gain access to information systems of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It is absolutely crucial that we work with our EU allies, the United States, our NATO allies and, of course, the Five Eyes community to take the most robust actions against those individuals involved with the Chinese and Russian regimes to ensure that they do not threaten our security or that of the globe.
In the miscellaneous amendments regulations, a whole series of measures are set out to clarify sanctions relating to Iran, Venezuela, Belarus, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Syria, Russia, Guinea-Bissau, the chemical weapons convention and many other aspects. Will the Minister be clear about whether they simply ensure the applicability and effectiveness of these measures, or expand or alter them in any way? One challenge in scrutinising these measures—I hope the Minister refers to this matter—is that sanctions are often complex, and rightly so, and we need to ensure that we understand the full intent of what the Government are trying to achieve with them.
The second set of miscellaneous regulations deal with the issues relating to the overseas territories and Crown dependencies. I understand the Minister’s point that we do not want to see double prohibition and therefore a double licensing burden on individuals through those regulations. However, it is absolutely crucial that we ensure that there are no loopholes and no lack of oversight, so that individuals do not seek to exploit any gaps or administrative gaps. Will the Minister say a little bit more about what support is being provided to the overseas territories to ensure that they can apply the sanctions regimes, and that there is a commonality across the whole British family of the overseas territories to ensure that we have one approach? Unfortunately, we know that in the past regimes have been used, whether financially or otherwise, to escape scrutiny and transparency, not least in the light of the current investigations into governance in the British Virgin Islands. Indeed, I have supported the Government on their commission of inquiry there. It is absolutely crucial that we have assurances on that front.
On misappropriation, this applies mainly to individuals and entities related to Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and Ukraine in 2014. Can the Minister further comment on how effective those have been? Will he confirm that the two persons and four entities added to the EU sanctions list in October 2020, related to the construction of bridge and railway tracks linking Russia to the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula via the Kerch Strait, will be included? Will the Government seek to work with our allies to target individuals who further seek to isolate Crimea from Ukraine? That is obviously critical.
On the unauthorised drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean, again, we wholeheartedly support the rolling over of sanctions and welcome its extension by both the European Union and the UK Government. Unauthorised drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean are in direct contravention of the sovereign rights of Cyprus, within its territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, and they threaten the process of reaching a delimitation agreement and a bizonal, bicommunal political settlement for the whole of Cyprus. We hope that the UK Government will continue to work with the EU to maintain our full solidarity with the Government of Cyprus and work on restrictive measures to prevent further violations of the rules-based order that governs our seas and oceans. That is an absolutely crucial set of rules and guidance to which we are one of the key parties, and it is crucial that we ensure that they are applied in relation to Cyprus.
Finally, let me make some broader points in relation to these measures today. The sanctions before us show the benefit of a collaborative international approach to sanctions, and one that has support from all parts of this House. The question remains why, with such long-standing and overwhelming evidence growing of systemic human rights abuses on an industrial scale against the Muslim Uyghur people and other minorities in China, with the attacks on the democracy and freedom of the people of Hong Kong and with the United States Government having already barred members of the Communist party of China from the US, we have not seen further designations of Magnitsky-style sanctions against officials of the Communist party of China.
We have repeatedly called on the Government to impose sanctions against senior officials and entities directly responsible for appalling human rights abuses in Xinjiang. We have pressed for that for months but no action has been taken, so I hope the Minister can assure us that such sanctions are under consideration and explain what discussions we have had about them with our allies.
Similarly, the Labour Opposition have consistently urged the Government to go further in their sanctions on the Myanmar military, including by targeting its business interests. I know that some of these regulations relate to previous sanctions on Myanmar. The Government failed to follow the recommendation made last year by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock), the shadow Minister for Asia and the Pacific, on the basis that such sanctions could have a negative impact on foreign investment in the Myanmar economy. Not least given the events of the last few days, we believe that the Minister should move immediately to target military officials who are responsible for a brazen attack on the democratic rights of the Myanmar people, and support Magnitsky sanctions on individuals involved.
As shadow Minister for Africa, I welcome the targeted designations against senior individuals in the Zimbabwe Government who were involved in state-backed attacks on protesters in 2019 and violence in 2018. Will the Minister confirm that those sanctions are effective immediately? We are seeing significant violence and political repercussions elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, as I said in a Westminster Hall debate about the shocking events surrounding the #EndSARS movement and the massacres at the Lekki tollgate plaza and elsewhere. I hope that Ministers are giving serious consideration to the recommendation made in that debate of targeted measures against any individuals who were involved in such shocking attacks or repression of the Nigerian people, and I hope that Ministers are listening to the wealth of evidence out there from independent human rights organisations.
In Uganda in recent days, the presidential election has been marred by the continual arrests of Opposition Members and journalists, as well as by violence and human rights abuses. I have had some quite shocking evidence put to me. The Opposition leader was arrested multiple times and put under house arrest, with the military invading his home after the election, and there has been intimidation and attacks on journalists. It is alleged that the Uganda chief of police, Martin Okoth Ochola, stated:
“Yes, we shall beat you for your own sake to help you understand that you do not go there…I have no apology”.
What are the Government going to do to stand up for the rights and freedoms of the people of Uganda? What consideration has been given to targeted sanctions against any individual involved in the violations and repressions in Guinea and elsewhere, which are rightly being targeted? It is important that we have consistency.
We continue to see the horrific consequences of conflict in the Tigray region in Ethiopia. Hundreds have been killed, and thousands have fled to neighbouring Sudan. There is regional instability involving Eritrea and others, and a range of very serious allegations are being made about atrocities that have been committed. What assessment have the Government made of those atrocities and whether there are grounds for individual sanctions against any individual involved—from whatever side or whatever background in that conflict—who is responsible for violations of human rights or humanitarian law?
Finally, I hope that we will have an honest conversation about how a UK sanctions regime will work. The EU and the US work together co-operatively to secure strong applicability of measures, and the UK must be part of that process. Ultimately, as the Minister indicated, the strength of sanctions is dependent on a unified, agreed and consistently applied framework across multiple jurisdictions. If we veer from common positions—whether in Europe, across NATO or with our Atlantic allies—that will be of huge detriment. I hope the Government will give a firm commitment to acting in all these areas, and to ensuring consistency in the measures that the United Kingdom applies in our overseas territories and in working with our allies.
I call Alyn Smith. I understand that there may be some communication gremlins at work, Alyn, but if the link goes down we will go to audio.
I am genuinely grateful for the contributions that have been made from a number of corners of the House. I think it sends a very important international signal that although there are many subjects on which we have deeply felt and legitimate disagreements, right across the political spectrum here in the United Kingdom there is a real unanimity of voice when it comes to the importance of sanctions and the UK’s place in the world.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) for his thoughtful contributions and questions, which I will attempt to cover in this closing address. I also thank the hon. Members for Stirling (Alyn Smith) and for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) and, although he is no longer in his place, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) for their contributions.
As I said at the start of the debate, this year represents a crucial moment for the UK’s foreign policy. We now have in place a framework that can be used to act as a force for good in the world. The UK supported these sanctions when we were a member of the EU and we hope that, by carrying them over into UK domestic law, we have made a clear statement—which I believe has been reflected in the contributions of others in the House—that we choose to adopt them, not because we were coerced into them by our membership of the European Union, but because we absolutely believe that they are the right things to do.
I will permit Mr Shannon to join in, because I know he has been following the debate from outside the Chamber.
I thank the Minister; I have been watching the debate on TV.
My question is specifically about Northern Ireland. Does the Minister believe that the sanctions proposed in the statutory instruments will address Gaddafi and Libyan-sponsored terrorism? American victims of events on British soil are entitled to reparations, while our citizens languish for years without it. That is a very important issue for us in Northern Ireland, and the rest of the United Kingdom as well. How will the provisions address the extradition of terrorists such as al-Senussi, Gaddafi’s general, who has still not been made to face justice in Britain after supplying the IRA with Semtex that was used in 250 bombings? Will the Minister confirm that these regulations will prevent that failure from being repeated?
With the leave of the House, I will put the Questions on the remaining eight motions together.
Resolved,
That the Burundi (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 1142), dated 18 July 2019, a copy of which was laid before this House on 19 July 2019, in the last Parliament, be approved.
That the Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 597), dated 15 June 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 17 June, be approved.
That the Guinea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 1145), dated 18 July 2019, a copy of which was laid before this House on 19 July 2019, in the last Parliament, be approved.
That the Misappropriation (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 1468), dated 7 December 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 9 December, be approved.
That the Nicaragua (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 610), dated 18 June 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 22 June, be approved.
That the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 590), dated 11 June 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 15 June, be approved.
That the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 951), dated 3 September 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8 September, be approved.
That the Unauthorised Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I., 2020, No. 1474), dated 7 December 2020, a copy of which was laid before this House on 11 December, be approved.—(James Cleverly.)