European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Rachel Maclean Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Alex Chalk]

It is a pleasure to be able to say a few words this evening. May I say what a pleasure it has been to listen to this debate, which has been a paradigmatic example of what a Committee debate should be? It is not about the principles of whether we supported leave or remain; it is about ensuring that the legislation is in the best possible shape, because that is our job.

I want to confine my remarks to two areas. First, I will talk about amendments 139 and 302, tabled by the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) respectively, regarding the right to seek Francovich damages post-Brexit; and then I will turn to the charter. On the first issue, it is axiomatic that, if the acts of the state that caused loss took place at a time when a remedy was available, it would be wrong for that remedy to be ripped away unilaterally. It is a principle of British law that past acts or omissions must be considered in the context of the law as it applied at the time. I have heard gratefully the Solicitor General’s suggestion that he might be looking again at the matter. I respectfully suggest that that would be warmly welcomed across the House.

I turn to the charter. I want to explain why I think—despite the fact that I supported remain and I do not resile from a single argument that I made—that the Government are right not to seek to retain the charter, and why to do so would create inconsistency and confusion. I speak as someone who values human rights and who has argued forcefully in favour of remaining part of the European convention on human rights. Indeed, I have said that to leave that would be a catastrophic mistake, and I am delighted that doing so has been taken off the table.

So why do I speak as I do? Before I explain that, I will set out why we must accept that the charter does add rights and it would be wrong to consider it inconsequential, although that is not dispositive. The right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) suggested that it was of no more legal effect than The Beano. That is not correct. Although it is true that there is some duplication, as compared with the ECHR, there are four ways in which the charter adds rights.

First, the charter creates some substantive new rights, which some have referred to as third category rights, including the right to dignity, the right to protection of personal data, the right to conscientious objection and guarantees on bioethics and independence for disabled people. Secondly, the charter widens the scope of existing rights in English law. One example is the right to a fair trial, which exists under article 6. The charter extends that right beyond the mere determination of civil rights and obligations and criminal charges to cover, for example, immigration cases, such as the ZZ case. Thirdly, it creates a new right to invoke the charter in respect of anyone with an interest. That is, of course, far broader than the convention. Fourthly, and most importantly, whereas breaches of the ECHR can lead only to a declaration of incompatibility, action in the case of a breach of the charter is far more muscular, because it allows the charter to take precedence over UK law and, effectively, disapply it.

Having set out all that, why am I not arguing in favour of retaining the charter? The simple reason can be summed up in one word: inconsistency. There is already an inconsistency in the law. A litigant in a case involving the implementation of EU law—that is, of course, the only category of litigation to which the charter applies—is armed with a powerful legal sword, which he can use to strike down the law. But when it comes to UK-derived law, no such legal sword exists, so the scope for absurdity becomes clear. Suppose the state were to pass a law that was a clear affront to human rights. Suppose it wanted to detain suspects without charge for six months or bring back the stocks, in breach of article 4 on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or article 3 on slavery. In those circumstances, all the litigant could do would be to try to persuade the court to make a declaration of incompatibility; the law could not be struck down. Yet if the UK sought to enforce a law regarding personal data, it could be disapplied. Would that not create a bizarre inconsistency? Such an inconsistency already exists, by the way, but I suggest that it would become more egregious and more difficult to sustain post Brexit.

[Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)]

I am following my hon. Friend’s arguments very carefully, and I am very pleased to hear him setting out why the rights he is talking about will be protected after we leave the EU. Does he agree that such inconsistencies will only further the interests of lawyers, rather than our constituents, after we leave the EU?