National Minimum Wage

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Thursday 6th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, this has been looked at on a number of occasions and has always been rejected.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the thing that always strikes me about this debate is the theoretical level that it is held at. Very few of us could contemplate living on the minimum wage—I feel almost ashamed of my personal affluence when comparing it with the idea of living on £6 an hour—yet more than 5 million workers do so. The minimum wage is a good thing; it brings affluence to individuals, it improves the economy and it has not had any significant impact on employment. Will the Government join the Labour Party in our pledge to set an ambitious target to significantly increase the minimum wage to 58% of median average earnings, putting it on course to reach £8 before the end of the next Parliament?

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, the minimum wage may well reach £8 by the end of the next Parliament just through being uprated by inflation, so that is not a very ambitious target. The minimum wage is a very important floor but, for example, when I recently visited a textile factory in Leicester where the entire workforce consisted of Asian women, the managing director said to me when I asked him what the Government should do to support him: “Do not significantly increase the minimum wage, because if you do I will have to import products from eastern Europe and lay off all my workers”. Is that something that the Labour Party wants?

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Excluded Activities and Prohibitions) Order 2014

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 21st July 2014 Grand Committee

These orders thus complete the process of defining the location of the ring-fence. It is central to the Government’s radical programme of financial reform to ensure that there is no repeat of the crisis and bailouts of 2007-09. Making these orders is an important milestone towards meeting our commitment to have the ring-fence legislated in this Parliament. It is a big step towards finishing the job of financial reform, to give Britain a world-beating financial sector, while protecting consumers and taxpayers. I commend the orders to the Committee.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his presentation of these orders. The Opposition will not object to them. Indeed, in some ways they are unsurprising to the extent to which I sat through them with colleagues, facing the noble Lord, Lord Newby, through many hours of the parent Bills. As far as I can tell, most of the features appearing in these orders have already been mentioned in debates, notes and so on. They seem to do the job. I have just a couple of direct questions about the orders, and one or two wider questions that I hope the Minister will be able to respond to.

It is very interesting in terms of political process the extent to which we depend on the supporting material. It is conceivable to put in the 30-odd hours that are necessary to work from the Act through to the orders, through to whether the Explanatory Memorandum properly explains the legislation. I trust the Minister.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Well, I trust the Minister in this case then, on the Explanatory Memorandum. Let us not get carried away, although I do have a small point even on that. I am saying essentially that the Minister’s presentation and the Explanatory Memorandum, which I have studied in some depth, and the orders in as much as I was able to relate them to the Explanatory Memorandum, leave me with only a couple of direct questions.

First, the Minister spoke about the firms that are in the core. That was unexceptionable and exactly how the commission was talking. All the stuff I remember from the Explanatory Memorandum seems to fit with that. I found no surprises and the Minister has not pointed out any surprises to me. Therefore, my attention has concentrated on the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Excluded Activities and Prohibitions) Order 2014.

Looking at the Explanatory Memorandum for that order, as a result of the Minister’s speech, I first lighted on paragraph 7.4, which states:

“This Order provides that dealing in commodities (e.g. precious metals, oil, agricultural products) is an excluded activity”.

The Explanatory Memorandum refers to “agricultural products”, and I am sure that if I went into it in enough depth, I could find whether or not agricultural products are excluded. The Explanatory Memorandum says that they are, but the Minister’s speech did not. I ask that as a small technical question.

It is interesting that in the rest of the order virtually everything seems to be fairly black and white. This is in; this is not. This is excluded; this is not excluded. Paragraph 7.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum caught my eye, where it lists the key things that the order does. It states:

“Third, the Order creates an exception to permit ring-fenced bodies to sell a narrow range of simple derivatives to their customers”.

The Minister gave a perfectly satisfactory explanation of why that was useful. What was less clear to me—I have to admit that it may be deep in the order—is how one defines “simple”. Listening to the Minister, “simple” seems to be defined as small and what small businesses want, while “complex” is big and what complex businesses want. That did not seem to me a fundamentally correct definition of “simple”; it should have more depth in it if it is to be a serious limitation on what is inside and outside the ring-fence. I would value further explanation of what “simple” means.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for those questions, because they enable me to clear up, I hope, the points that he raised. He asked whether agricultural products were included in the definition of “commodity”. The answer is that, just like a metal, agricultural products —such as pork belly, or whatever, futures—are an excluded entity, along with all other commodities.

The noble Lord asked me about how to define “simple”. I am slightly inclined to say that of course it is not easy to define “simple” simply. However, the simple instruments that ring-fenced banks will be permitted to sell to their customers are defined in articles 10 and 11 of the excluded activities and prohibitions order, so there is quite a long list there. The definition or underlying concept of “simple”, is that we are primarily talking about derivatives that do not complicate the resolution of a failing bank. Why do we try to keep to simple products? We want to make it possible, relatively easily, to resolve a failing bank. Therefore simple derivatives are primarily ones that are straightforward to value; that is what makes them simple, or relatively simple.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Can the noble Lord repeat what he just said? I think he said something quite profound, although he said it quickly: that, by definition, they must be instruments that would not complicate the resolution.

[Lord Newby]

Yes; they are derivatives that would not complicate the resolution of a failing bank. They would not complicate it because they are relatively straightforward to value. As the noble Lord can imagine, some derivatives are extremely difficult to value. If I can just slightly elaborate on that, the excluded activities and prohibitions order limits ring-fenced banks to selling forwards and futures, plus a small range of options. They may only sell derivatives to hedge against three types of common business risk, namely currency, interest rate and commodity risk. Those are the most common business risks in which the market for derivatives is most liquid and, because it is liquid in those areas, it is easier to value them. To ensure that derivatives do not have any of the features that make them hard to value, the order requires that options contracts entered into must specify the amounts that may be bought or sold under the option, be at a specified price, and exercisable on a single specified day; or, in the case of interest caps or floors, interest rates must be based on a specified principle sum for a specified period.

The order also requires that ring-fenced banks may only sell derivatives that can be valued on the basis of observable market data or of a type traded on exchanges, and whose fair values are based on level 1 or 2 inputs under international financial reporting standards. Such instruments are more liquid and could be more easily valued in resolution. Article 12 of the order creates those safeguards, as well as placing caps on the net market risks of the derivatives portfolio, the gross size of the derivatives portfolio and the proportion of the portfolio that can be made up of simple options. I hope that that has gone some way to satisfy the noble Lord on that front.

The noble Lord asked about consultation. Consultation was issued in July last year, and the summary of responses was released in December of last year. We also consulted widely with stakeholders, including the Association of Corporate Treasurers, the CBI, non-financial companies, law firms and, of course, the banking industry itself. As a result of that consultation, we have made some changes to the legislation that are largely technical, but which will ensure that ring-fencing is fully compatible with the needs of UK businesses. For example, we made some small changes to the definition of “simple derivatives”, made it permissible for ring-fenced banks to have exposures to non-systemic insurers, made a series of technical changes to ensure that exemptions for payments and trade finance are operable, and removed the caps on payments and trade finance exposures. We also prohibited ring-fencing banks from having branches in the Crown dependencies. Therefore that is relatively technical stuff, but it has improved the legislation and has been a good exercise.

The noble Lord asked how the supervisors would supervise. The PRA is the principal supervisory body. It is in day-to-day contact with the banks. If it feels that it is not getting adequate information from the banks, it has extensive powers to require further information from them if it has any specific concerns. If a generic problem were to arise, it would obviously be in a position to discuss with the Treasury whether any further changes were needed in terms of the secondary legislation or in any other respect.

As to the question of timing, as the noble Lord said, the end point for the final implementation of the ring-fence is 2019. The justification for that is so that we can get all the secondary legislation done by the end of this year, which we expect to be able to do. The PRA then has to produce very detailed rules to make sure that the system is clear and works in the way that we wish it to do. On the basis of both the primary and secondary legislation, we estimate that it could take up to two years for all those rules to be finally in place, and then a final two years for the banks to implement the rules. That does not mean that the banks will not do anything in the mean time, because making this change obviously involves them in a huge amount of effort, activity and cost, so they are beginning to think about how they are going to do it. We have always thought that this timetable is measured and proportionate. The very fact that the banks know that we are moving in this direction means that some activities that they might have undertaken in the past they will not undertake in the interim period because they know what the new rules will be and that they will abide by them.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I thank the Minister for giving way. Clearly, we would like to see this done more quickly, but I hear the Minister’s response. I presume that, alongside this, there will be a parallel activity by the banks to develop their own structure—the responsibility of directors and so on—and to be in a corporate shape for this structure. Are the Government, through the PRA, participating in or monitoring that development?

Banking Act 2009 (Banking Group Companies) Order 2014

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 30th June 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, I am also pleased to introduce the Banking Act 2009 (Exclusion of Investment Firms of a Specified Description) Order 2014, the Banking Act 2009 (Restriction of Partial Property Transfers) (Recognised Central Counterparties) Order 2014 and the Banking Act 2009 (Third Party Compensation Arrangements for Partial Property Transfers) (Amendment) Regulations 2014. I will refer to the statutory instruments respectively as the banking group companies order, investment firms order, partial property transfer order and third party compensation regulations.

The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 highlighted the need for the government to resolve failing systemic financial institutions in an orderly manner to protect UK financial stability and the economy. Moreover, resolution should be achieved without recourse to public funds. Since the financial crisis, a wide programme of financial sector reform has been under way at domestic, European and G20 levels. The reform has focused not only on banks but on investment firms and central counterparties, which also have the potential to cause major widespread disruption to the financial system.

Since 2009 a special resolution regime has been in place to deal with the failure of deposit-taking institutions such as banks and building societies. The regime gives the UK authorities a permanent framework, providing tools for dealing with failing banks and building societies. It gives the Bank of England a key role in implementing a resolution using the statutory resolution tools. The Financial Services Act 2012 widens the special resolution regime to include banking group companies, investment firms and central counterparties.

The powers provided for within the regime will enable the Bank of England, as resolution authority, to use the following tools to deal with the failure of investment firms and banking group companies: to transfer some or all of the securities or business of a firm or its parent undertaking to a commercial purchaser; and to transfer some or all of a firm or its parent undertaking to a bridge bank—that is, a company owned and controlled by the Bank of England.

The powers provided for within the regime will enable the Bank of England, as resolution authority, to use the following tools to deal with the failure of central counterparties: to transfer some or all of a firm or its parent undertaking to a bridge central counterparty—that is, a company owned and controlled by the Bank of England—or commercial purchaser, and to transfer ownership of a CCP to any person.

The Financial Services Act 2012 also extends the bank administration procedure to investment firms and banking group companies. The bank administration procedure is applicable when, during the resolution of a bank, a partial transfer of property takes place and the “residual bank”—ie, the part left behind—is insolvent. This procedure ensures that the residual bank continues to provide services and facilities required to enable the transferred business to be operated effectively. The same procedure will be available for the residual part of an investment firm or banking group company. The instruments that I present today are required to underpin and bring into force the widened scope of the special resolution regime and bank administration procedure.

The EU’s bank recovery and resolution directive requires there to be resolution tools in place for investment firms and banking group companies, and the instruments presented today are consistent with this directive. There is widespread support for putting in place a resolution regime for investment firms, central counterparties and banking group companies. We first consulted at the end of 2012 on broad policy options, and subsequently took powers through primary legislation. Then, following extensive work on regime design with firms, the Government published detailed proposals on the secondary legislation in September last year.

The statutory instruments I am introducing today take into account the feedback we received from a wide range of stakeholders during the consultation period. These instruments put into place the necessary safeguards and definitions required before the special resolution regime can be extended to investment firms, central counterparties and banking group companies.

The first of these orders—the banking group companies order—specifies conditions which must be met by an undertaking to be considered a “banking group company” for the purposes of the special resolution regime. The aim of using resolution tools in respect of banking group companies is to ensure that resolution over a failing bank in the same group as the company is effective, and in particular to ensure that any intra-group service provision to the failing bank—for example, the provision of IT services—remains in place while in resolution. Subject to exceptions, the banking group companies which may be resolved under the special resolution powers are the subsidiary and parent companies of a bank, investment firm or central counterparty in resolution, and other subsidiaries of its parent companies.

The investment firms order excludes small investment firms from the scope of special resolution regime and bank administration procedure. Specifically, this instrument narrows the scope to investment firms of a type that is required under the capital requirements directive to hold initial capital of €730,000. Over 2,000 investment firms operate in the UK, of which 250 have capital above that threshold. The activities those firms are permitted to undertake, such as trading on their own account and underwriting financial instruments, taken together with the value of assets held on their balance sheet, means that a failure by such a firm could threaten financial stability in a way which the failure of a smaller firm would not. This order reflects that reality.

The partial property order places restrictions on the making of partial property transfers made in respect of central counterparties. This order provides legislative safeguards for the benefit of direct and indirect users of clearing services provided by CCPs. Those safeguards will provide them with greater certainty as to how a partial property transfer might affect their contractual rights, and ensure that there are appropriate restrictions and limitations on the making of a partial property transfer.

Finally, the third party compensation regulations put in place third party compensation arrangements in the event that some but not all of an investment firm has been transferred during resolution. This statutory instrument ensures that creditors are no worse off as a result of resolution action taken by authorities with respect to a failing investment firm which results in the transfer of part of the failing entity than they would have been if the entire entity had entered resolution.

I hope that I have assured the Committee that these statutory instruments represent a necessary step forward in putting an effective resolution regime in place for investment banks, central counterparties and banking group companies.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the statutory instruments, all of which relate to the special resolution regime. I have spent an enjoyable weekend trying to understand them, but it is clear that enthusiasm for such an exercise has not been widespread. Nevertheless, my understanding of them is much as the Minister has described them. The first, on banking group companies, seems to fill a hole whereby service-giving subsidiaries may fall out of scope during the resolution process. The order makes sure that they remain in scope and that the resolution does not end up being tool-less in that area.

I admit that I failed on the second order. Its general intent to exclude small companies is pretty clear, but why it defines small companies as those with initial capital of less than €730,000 in one part and then uses €125,000 as the threshold in another I cannot understand. If the Minister could enlighten me, I would be delighted by the depth of his briefing, but in all probability I shall receive another letter.

As the Minister said, the third order relates to recognised central counterparties. As he well described, if there is a resolution process with a central counterparty, it is possible that some parts of the central counterparty will be an ongoing concern while others will not. There may be differential equity between creditors. The rules seek to make sure that creditors are treated fairly in that situation—I think that that is roughly what the order says. The fourth statutory instrument is on the general rule on partial transfers: creditors are no worse off than if there had been a full bankruptcy or administration. Faced with orders of such stunning reasonableness, I can say no other than that we have no objection to them and wish them luck.

However, learning from the Minister at our previous outing together, I shall stray into the general area of the special resolution regime, as he did into that of mutuals when we were discussing a stunningly small order that we together approved. This has been a very fruitful exercise, because the importance of the special resolution regime is totally misunderstood. The special resolution regime happens only in dire circumstances. If a major firm is failing—let us say, a large bank such as Barclays—and approaching being not viable, we have dire circumstances. The regime set up for such circumstances is illustrated in a document that I have from May 2011, but I believe that it remains just as applicable today. It sets out the extent to which, in a recovering regime, the PRA would seriously interfere with the way in which such a failing firm would work. It would demand changes in management and the composition of the board. It would talk about capital distribution and limiting planned business activities. There would have been a massive amount of activity from the PRA before one approached the situation where the special resolution regime was going to happen.

Essentially, with a large firm—one of the big six, eight or whatever banks—the PRA would have been devoting a large part of its resources to making sure this failure did not happen. We are now facing a situation, where, despite all that effort—the stress test, all the new rules and so on—a firm is either no longer viable or likely to become so, and is put into the special resolution regime. It is put into the special resolution regime— if I have read the supporting paperwork correctly—by the PRA. The PRA, in consultation with the Treasury and the rest of the Bank, takes the view that this failure mode is likely to happen.

The Treasury is involved because one of the ways out of the mess is the way out we used last time. I think Alistair Darling and his people did a brilliant job, frankly, because they were faced with a catastrophic situation, with—as far as one can say—no real prior thinking-through by the regulatory authorities of what the right mechanisms would be. Indeed, as we know from later analysis, there was not even a lot of thinking about who was responsible and so on. They did a brilliant job with a very crude tool— essentially they nationalised the banks. This has the significant downside that the taxpayer ended up footing the bill. The whole objective of the special resolution regime is to create a series of more complex tools which allows resolution to take place without the taxpayer picking up the bill. The most recent part of that has been the extension to central counterparties, which have clearly emerged in analysis, and the bailing provisions, which move the problem to the creditors—to the industry—as opposed to the taxpayers.

If the Treasury decides that it does not want to go down that route, the Bank—no longer the PRA—is in charge of the special resolution regime. Its objectives, as far as I can see, are to maintain all the key functions as going concerns. That does not mean keeping the business alive as a going concern—that was the PRA’s task. The Government are clear that it is not a no-failure situation—they want failure to occur if that is the proper thing to happen. Nevertheless, the resolution regime provides a way of taking the activities forward in such a way that the public, the trading communities and society in general carry on having the banking facilities they need to survive.

The more you think about it, and about our experience of the last crash, the more frightening this scenario is. This looks as though it is a 60-hour exercise—when we have got to this situation we are thinking about close-of-play Friday and having it sorted out by Monday morning. That is a pretty challenging world to live in. I may have called it wrong; it may be being thought of as a more gentle process. However, one has to remember that we are contemplating using this process only in a situation which, at the moment, we cannot contemplate. Broadly, we are trying to put right all the things that typically lead to bank failure—through various ratios, protections and so on. From having read other bits of this stuff, I think that the thing that mitigates this mess is the extent to which the PRA will have amassed a lot of previously unavailable information, including specific information to help the bank in the resolution situation. This will mean that the bank will start with some information. I accept that most of this is about central counterparties, but given banks’ behaviour and the irregularities we have seen, one fears that in such a catastrophic situation it would be even worse than expected; in other words, despite all that information, when you dig into it you have got a real crisis.

Failure would be catastrophic. The impact assessment that accompanies the orders quotes the banking commission as saying that a failure could have net present value of 63% of GDP. That is an enormous impact and would be one of the most catastrophic events that could hit the United Kingdom, short of war. It is difficult to think of anything worse than the financial services of this country in collapse.

Who is actually going to do this resolution exercise? The situation is better than previously because the Bank now has a series of tools, but it is more complex because of the complexity of the tools. The answer is: the Bank of England special resolution unit, headed by Andrew Gracie, who reports to a deputy governor, Sir Jon Cunliffe. I have looked briefly at the CVs of those two men and they are successful and respected public servants. But the questions I have for the Government are: how big is their support? How big is this unit? How prepared is it? How developed are its systems?

Looking through the reports, both of the PRA and of the Bank, it is difficult to see. We can see one or two favourable things and one or two slightly worrying things. The favourable thing is the point I raised more than two years ago about the quality of staff of the regulator and the Bank of England. Mark Carney has made a big point of making the development of people one of his key aims. I am really pleased to see that sense of the value of people, and great chunks of his report are about that resolution. What is less happy is the level of staff turnover. There is 8.1% staff turnover at the Bank and 11.6% at the PRA. The thing that worries me most in the reports is the relative lack of saliency about the special resolution regime and the resources needed to support it.

I have spent most of my career in environments where one faces catastrophic low-incidence events. I started as an aeroplane driver—getting that wrong can be pretty catastrophic—and moved into the rail industry, where, sadly, we did have catastrophic events that killed large numbers of people; I ended it in the nuclear industry. What you learn from those industries is that if you are facing a low-incidence high-consequence event, it is not natural to worry about it and therefore you have to put in place special regimes that focus on it; it has to become almost obsessive.

My questions for the Government are: how are they assuring themselves that the Bank is up to this massive challenge? How does the special resolution unit train and practise for this challenge? That is how other industries I have been involved in face up to these things; they specifically train for them. In 3,500 hours, one engine stopped and that was not very exciting; every simulator detail, engines were stopping all over the place. That is how you do it: you practise for the catastrophic. What exercises have been conducted to test the unit and its systems? You can learn an enormous amount from the conducting of exercises and simulations, which, instead of being a theoretical exercise, come much closer to reality as you play out the events in a real-time way.

What pan-government exercises have been conducted? One of the problems of high-level emergencies is that senior people in government are introduced into the emergency, usually with absolutely no understanding of the series of decisions that they are going to face. You can get into that situation if you do not have a system of pan-government exercises to ensure that everyone knows what they are doing.

Lastly, what mechanisms have been put in place to work with our US and European partners in such an emergency? I gave the Minister a brief overview of the questions that I would be working through but I do not expect detailed answers to all of them. Still, after he has given his general reassuring reply—that is what he is paid for, really, so I expect nothing less—I would value it if he read the report of this session, looked at the questions, talked to people in the Treasury and at the Bank and produced a more researched, thoughtful reply. I cannot stress enough that you have to put the systems in place to assure yourself that, in the unlikely event that a low-incidence high-consequence event actually happens, you will be prepared for it.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for having taken so much time to grapple with these extremely technical orders. On the difference between €730,000 of capital and the €125,000 of capital, the reference in the order to €730,000 refers to initial capital while the €125,000 is operating capital. However, the €730,000 figure is accepted across the EU as the slightly arbitrary point at which a firm is potentially significantly important. If I have got that wrong, I will write to him. He raised a bigger point, of course: how can we be sure that, if we are faced with a catastrophic event, we deal with it in a competent manner? One of the challenges here is that, slightly differently from when the noble Lord was an airline pilot or indeed running the Underground, the number of variables that can go wrong or interact with each other in a banking crisis is very high. It is not as though you can plan for 10 eventualities; there will be many more variables than that.

We have tried to put in place a legislative framework that gives us the powers we need; you cannot deal with these crises if you do not have the powers, and that is what the plethora of legislation over the past few years seeks to do. We think that we have an adequate infrastructure—or, rather, a superstructure—in place, with the PRA and the other changes at the Bank and the greater responsibilities that it now has. Secondly, we think that under the governor’s stewardship, as the noble Lord said, the quality of staff of the bank is very high.

The noble Lord pointed to the level of turnover. I think that that is a general concern in the public sector more generally, and has been in the Treasury as well as the Bank. It is fair to say that as far as the Treasury is concerned—I do not know about the Bank—the level of turnover has reduced somewhat over recent years, but it is still pretty high. In reality, that is in the nature of these institutions: there will be quite a lot of churn among people who are coming into and going out of the public and private sectors in the banking world. However, we think that we have a very high quality of staff.

Of course, one of the challenges which the noble Lord referred to is that although there is a special resolution unit, fewer people work in this area outside a crisis than when there is a crisis, otherwise you would have a huge number of people sitting around doing nothing for a very long time. Therefore the way the Bank and Treasury seek to deal with that problem is, of course, that other people in the institution would be brought in—just as they were at the time of the RBS and Lloyds crisis—to help on resolution.

There is a recent example of where it was not in the end necessary to have the full resolution procedure because the PRA and the Treasury—and in particular the Bank—had worked so closely with the relevant institution. That was the case with the Co-op, which last autumn faced quite severe problems. In the end, it was possible for those problems to be resolved by the Co-op without recourse to the provisions in the Banking Act or the Financial Services Act. However, that was possible in part because it was working with the Bank very closely over a period, and as a result of that it came up with an effective solution.

The noble Lord quite rightly referred to the fact that when you get to a crisis, sometimes you have to act very quickly, which is what happened with RBS. I hope that in future most cases such as that would be more analogous to the Co-op case than to RBS. In the Co-op case, it was clear for a while that there was a difficulty, and over a period of months—not a huge number, but over a period of weeks and a small number of months—options were identified and implemented. If the PRA is doing its work, it will not be taken completely by surprise in the way we were with the banking crisis. Of course, that does not mean that nothing will happen as a surprise. As the noble Lord pointed out, while we hope that the degree of information the PRA gets from the banks is always perfect, it will sometimes be less than perfect. One thinks of crises in the past that have occurred because the bank’s senior management and the compliance people did not know what a rogue member of staff was doing. As we know, that brought the bank down, for example, in the case of Barings. Therefore there will always be a risk.

The noble Lord asked specifically about training and practice exercises, and about how we work with our EU and American partners. There have been a number of training exercises to look at such situations. Scenario planning is obviously part of the role of the special resolution unit, and it does that. We work very closely with our American and European partners to see what lessons we can learn, and to have in place good working relationships and mechanisms to activate if we find that a bank is in real difficulty and that we might need to use the resolution procedures.

If I can say anything about that more formally, I will write to the noble Lord. However, both the Treasury and the Bank are acutely aware of the need to be able to use the powers they now have in an effective and timely way, and they are working very hard to make sure that they are up to snuff as regards doing that. As I said, the Government have considerable confidence that we have put a legislative process and structure in place that give the Treasury and the Bank the powers that they need and the people and structures internally to ensure that they are properly exercised. This is some way from the extremely important but rather technical amendments that we have been discussing today. I hope that all noble Lords in the Committee will feel that the statutory instruments are necessary and proportionate, and I commend them to the Committee.

Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions Act 2010 (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2014

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Tuesday 24th June 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Graham of Edmonton (Lab)]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to welcome this stage of the legislation and the changes. In looking at my research, I am reminded of the efforts of John Roper—the noble Lord, Lord Roper—who played a large part in getting credit unions on to the agenda. Since then, Ed Balls in his ministerial capacity welcomed the issue and moved it forward. Of course, the present Minister, who I am delighted to see in his place, and his colleague the noble Lord, Lord Freud, have played a major part in keeping the issue alive.

I go back not to 1844 but to 1852 and the first industrial and provident societies Act. One of my studies has been co-operative law, and from 1852—certainly to 1863 and then into the 1890s and beyond—there have been genuine attempts to improve the raison d’être of co-operation as an economic form. There has been no objection. I am a Newcastle upon Tyne co-op society man, and one of my jobs for a period was to pay out the dividend accrued. That was the way in which many members of what I am still proud to call the working class saw an opportunity to save for the rainy day; it was marvellous. They would keep and take out of the dividend what they wanted, but they knew it was safe, secure, guaranteed and that it was their own.

We come to governance and changes, and of course this is not the place to go wider than the topic that we have here. That is why I was delighted to notice in a document from ABCUL, the association of British credit unions, that the ministry has already earmarked £38 million to be available for leadership training. It has been a great sadness to see something go catastrophically wrong for an organisation of this kind—there are thousands of credit unions and more than a million individual members—but one discovers that it was not the principle that was wrong, but the manner in which it was led or monitored. As a consequence, there have been blemishes in the credit union movement; I will not say more or less. However, I am delighted that one aspect of the legislation is to continue the good work that has already been done to ensure that those who have the temerity and courage to start a credit union will have the backing in due time of an organisation and of leadership. There must be nothing more catastrophic or devastating for a group of people, be it small or large, who have put their faith in a savings bank or whatever one likes to call it only to find that they have been let down by a lack of oversight and tightness. Having followed the development of legislation, I am certain that, in time, credit will be given to all three main parties in the House and many people will be rewarded by organisations which are sustainable and guaranteed.

I have nothing specific to talk about, because, being associated with the Co-operative movement even now, I am certain that if there were matters to be raised I would have been asked to raise them, and I have not been. I am not looking for trouble these days, so I do not write to somebody asking whether there are any points they want to make. If a point wanted to be made, they would have made it to me and other Members who have a close association with the Co-operative movement. I simply say to the Minister who has carried this legislation through that he will get no trouble from me, because I understand that a great deal of consultation has been done with the Co-operative Credit Union, Co-operatives UK and ABCUL, which plays a vital part in providing leadership. I believe that this is as big a step forward as was taken in 1844, when the Rochdale Pioneers took a leap forward. They were not the first co-operative in the country, but they are looked on as the founders of the modern Co-operative movement. After 180 years, who is to blame anybody for accepting that something that was relevant in 1844 and 1852 requires an overhaul, which is what it has had with this legislation? There has been no malice or agitation. I think that it is generally accepted in the country that small businesspeople are just as competent to run the affairs of a body such as a credit union as anybody else, provided that they have sound principles, that there is oversight and that, from time to time when required, the members will be faced with the fact that they will have do something drastic. To the Minister and anyone who is listening I say, on behalf of myself and others in the Co-operative movement, “Well done”.

The best guarantee of an audience at the City Hall in Newcastle was when there was a fear that the dividend was in danger or that a general manager was going to be sacked. I was there on two occasions when those things were prospective. We have to avoid that situation. I speak as an ex-student of the Co-operative movement. There are a number of other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, who have a strong connection with it. I wish this legislation well and congratulate all three main parties on having done a very good job on behalf of millions of people.

Some reference was made to numbers. I have some figures, too. There is great co-operative movement in Ireland. It is strong on credit unions. The same goes for the West Indies. A number of people have come from there and established their lives here. Across the world, the principle of co-operation as an economic and social force is well founded and I am proud to stand here and say on behalf of all those people, “Thank you very much”.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, it is the duty of Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition to oppose, so I have worked on these regulations to see what I could oppose. The answer, frankly, is nothing. It is good of the Minister to review the general primary legislation connected with this statutory instrument. I thought that in general this was the privilege of the Opposition, but never mind. I congratulate him, and the noble Lord, Lord Graham, for his complimentary speech. Together, their speeches are a gratifying review of this movement and the work that all parties have done to improve it. However, as I read these regulations, they do no more than change the name of “industrial or provident societies” to “co-operative or community benefit societies”. I hope that the Minister will reassure me that it does no more or less than that, because otherwise I have misread the paperwork.

The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to say that the change has been requested by the sector. Will the Minister outline how, because in the paragraph about consultation in the memorandum, it says it was carried out in 2007? I know this has been going on for a long time, but is the sector’s request to change the name more recent, and through what mechanism has that request been made? Finally, I think it is clear, but will the Minister confirm this? As I understand it, it is a matter of choice for societies that are already registered or who register before 1 August whether they change status. I am curious how they will exercise that choice. Will the FCA communicate with all industrial and provident societies to see if they want to change their former registration? With those really trivial questions, I indicate our support for this instrument.

Convergence Programme

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Wednesday 9th April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch (UKIP)]

My Lords, can the noble Lord remind the House of what exactly is the UK’s convergence programme? With what is the United Kingdom economy supposed to be converging, and why? As we are never going to join the euro, are we not wasting time? While I am at it, could the noble Lord remind us what is the European semester? But above all, why do we go on submitting the state of our economy to an institution which has not had its own accounts signed off, even by its own internal auditors, for the past 18 years? By its own estimation, at least £120 billion per annum goes walkabout and in each of its institutions the Mafia is rife and active.

In short, what is the point of this debate and, more generally, what is the point now of the European Union at all?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister will be pleased to know that I shall not be resisting the Motion. I am reassured by his assurance that there is no new information in the documentation being provided, but will just spend a few minutes commenting on that information and what it says.

We have been presented with a quite a glowing picture. In particular, if one did not listen too carefully, one could be left with the impression that the reduction in the deficit has been achieved as per the 2010 emergency Budget and the subsequent Autumn Statement. My recollection is that the intention was to have eliminated the deficit by now. The noble Lord can correct me if that is not the case.

We have heard that things are going well, but this is not how people up and down the country are feeling. They are facing a cost of living crisis. Working people are £1,600 a year worse off. The OBR has confirmed that people will be worse off in 2015 than they were in 2010. Energy bills are up almost £300 since the election, while childcare costs have spiralled since 2010. The number of young people out of work for 12 months or more has nearly doubled since this Government came into office. We have a record number of people who want to work full time but are being forced to work part time. Families will be £974 worse off by the next election as a result of tax and benefit changes. After three years of flatlining, it is good that we finally have some growth. However, for millions of people, this is no recovery at all. There is much more that could be done to help working people but the Budget was just another missed opportunity.

We should be getting young people back into work. Despite the Government’s rhetoric on full employment, there are no new policies to deliver this. The Work Programme is so unsuccessful that people are more likely to go back to the jobcentre than find work. Only 5% of disabled people on the Work Programme have found work through it. We need a compulsory jobs guarantee to ensure there is a paid job for every young person under 25 who has been out of work for a year.

We also need practical measures to tackle the cost of living crisis, such as tackling rising energy bills or helping families with childcare costs, within this Parliament. We would expand free childcare for working parents of three and four year-olds from 15 to 25 hours a week.

We should be cutting business rates for small and medium-sized enterprises. The Government are focusing their help on the 2%—the largest multinationals—and not doing enough for 98% of British businesses, the small and medium-sized enterprises. We need action from the Government to ensure a strong, sustained and balanced recovery. Manufacturing, construction and infrastructure investment are all down. Consumers are having to dip into their savings, and the OBR predicts that growth may well slow in the future when those savings run out. Indeed, the OBR sees households’ gross debt to income ratio rising from 124% in 2014, which was a 10-year low, to 165% in 2019, which is near to pre-crisis levels of indebtedness. Exports are falling, not rising. Nothing in the Budget tackles the productivity crisis that has emerged in recent years.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords who have spoken in today’s debate. In a short speech, the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, succeeded in asking very fundamental questions about Britain’s position in the EU. Without spending too much time on his final, semi-rhetorical question, I should like to respond to his earlier questions about the convergence programme and the European Semester.

The convergence programme stems from the Lisbon treaty, which requires the UK Government to report regularly to the European Commission on the economic situation and forecasts in the UK. The report is drawn from previously published material, as I said. It is part of a Europe-wide programme. Under the stability and growth pact, all member states are required to submit either stability programmes, for euro-area member states, or convergence programmes, for non-eurozone member states. The European Semester is a common timetable for the submission and consideration of fiscal policies via the stability or convergence programmes and macroeconomic policies via national reform programmes.

The noble Lord asked: what is the point of all this? As the crisis in much of Europe has shown, it is in everybody’s interests that member states do not run up excessive deficits, because if they do the consequences of putting those deficits right are not confined to those member states. The UK economy suffered very significantly because of the eurozone crisis. To pick up one of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, this is one of the reasons that the forecasts we made in 2010 were blown off-course. Given the very high proportion of trade we have with the eurozone countries, we are very much dependent on those countries prospering and therefore it is very much in our interests that they keep their public sector finances under control.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

It is a detail, but the Minister said that the requirement comes from the Lisbon treaty. I thought that it had come from the Maastricht treaty, which we put into law in 1993. Am I mistaken?

[Lord Newby]

The difference, I believe, is that the Lisbon treaty requires the convergence programme to be submitted to the Commission in the form that we are describing today, whereas the underpinning requirements about budget deficit and levels of growth were in the Maastricht treaty. What came out of Lisbon were the very specific mechanics of trying to co-ordinate via the submission of national plans every year which the Commission can then scrutinise and comment on.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I hope the Minister will forgive me, but I put a little bit of study into this. Article 103 of the Maastricht treaty—which may have been elaborated at Lisbon—states pretty bluntly:

“In order to ensure closer co-ordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic performances of the Member States, the Council shall, on the basis of reports submitted by the Commission, monitor economic developments in each of the Member States and in the Community as well as the consistency of economic policies with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2, and regularly carry out an overall assessment. For the purpose of this multilateral surveillance, Member States shall forward information to the Commission about important measures taken by them in the field of their economic policy and such other information as they deem necessary”.

I thought today that we were responding to that part of that treaty. I want to draw out the point that our being here this afternoon at this late hour is the fault of all Governments, not perhaps just one.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

Before the Minister replies, perhaps I may say that I support the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. He is of course right that the whole process in the Maastricht treaty was, I am afraid, waved through by the Conservative Government under Mr John Major when, if your Lordships remember, he was winning game, set and match. I am grateful to the Minister for his answer, but I would still like to press him on why the United Kingdom has to take part in this demeaning and absurd process. I understand that it might be useful for the countries which have unfortunately joined the extremely destructive process of the euro and everything that goes with that, but why should we, if indeed our economy is recovering in the way that the Government claim, have to go cap in hand to Brussels and discuss with them anything that we want to do, especially as we are, luckily, thanks to the Treasury, not in the euro?

Tax Credits (Late Appeals) Order 2014

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to introduce the Tax Credits (Late Appeals) Order 2014. It makes a small but important change to Section 38 of the Tax Credits Act 2002 to reinstate HMRC’s ability to accept late tax credit appeals. It inserts provisions to allow HMRC to treat a late appeal as made in time—that is, an appeal made outside the statutory 30-day time limit but within a further 12 months may be accepted in exceptional circumstances.

If a claimant disagrees with a decision made by HMRC—say, on a tax credit award—they can lodge an appeal within 30 days of the date of the decision. Since tax credits were introduced in 2003, it has been the policy intent that claimants can also lodge a late appeal in exceptional circumstances—for example, where a dependant died or they suffered a serious illness—within a period of 12 months after the normal 30-day time limit. Allowing late tax credit appeals where there is good reason to do so is consistent with the policy relating to the treatment of other appeals received by HMRC.

If there are no exceptional circumstances for lateness, HMRC will not accept the appeal. Instead, it will be passed to the tribunal, which will then make a decision as to whether to treat the appeal as made in time. This will be based on the tribunal’s wider view on whether it is fair and just to accept the appeal.

The defect that we are remedying today also carries across to the tribunal rules, meaning that tribunals cannot hear appeals made after the 30-day time limit either. The Tribunal Procedure Committee will similarly be remedying its rules to ensure that the legislation works as intended.

The defective legislation arose from changes made in 2009 to legislation applying to appeals in Great Britain in the light of the establishment of new courts and enforcement tribunals. HMRC and the MoJ introduced changes to their appeals legislation as a consequence of the transfer of the functions of the former special and general tax appeal commissioners to the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal tax chambers. An unintended consequence of the interaction of these legislative changes led to the legislation allowing HMRC to accept late appeals to lapse.

I should like to reassure the Committee about what has been happening since the lapse was discovered. We did not want claimants to be adversely affected by this lack of legal power, so HMRC has been accepting late appeals through its care and management powers, and judges are still deciding on a case-by-case basis. However, neither can do so indefinitely without this legislative remedy.

I should also explain that there is to be a change to the appeals process from 6 April this year. HMRC is introducing a new stage called mandatory reconsideration. When claimants dispute decisions, they will have to ask HMRC to conduct a mandatory reconsideration of the decisions before they can appeal, which they will then have to do directly to the tribunal. This is called direct lodgement. HMRC is introducing mandatory reconsideration to align the tax credits process to that already introduced by the DWP. As tax credits are to be replaced by universal credit over a period of time, it will help to provide consistency between the two departments around appeals. However, appeals to HMRC against decisions made prior to 6 April 2014 will be dealt with under the current flawed system.

This order remedies the flaw in the current legislation and legally reinstates HMRC’s power to accept late tax credit appeals. I commend the order to the Committee.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, nobody could object to such a wholly rational and reasonable order. I shall just ask a couple of questions. When was the error discovered? I was going to go on and ask the Minister to set out the consequences of it, but I think that he said that there have been no consequences to individuals because the process rolled on and, in fact, the order merely legitimises the administrative process that is taking place. If so, that has obviously been handled in an intelligent way and my question as to when it was discovered is somewhat academic.

[Lord Newby]

Yes, my Lords, HMRC has been operating, as I said, under its care and management powers to accept late appeals as though there was no problem, as it were. The error was first discovered last May. There has been some discussion as to whether the change in the legislation was necessary, given that the whole system is changing from this April, but it was decided that it was, not least because late appeals in exceptional circumstances can be considered up to a year after the initial decision. So I can absolutely reassure the noble Lord that in the interim, since the problem was discovered, nobody has lost out. HMRC has been accepting late appeals through its care and management powers, and judges have still been deciding cases on that basis.

Guardian’s Allowance Up-rating Order 2014

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 17th March 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, as I begin, it is a requirement that I confirm that the provision contained in the three orders and regulations before the Committee today is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, and I so confirm.

The two orders that we are debating increase by CPI the rate of guardian’s allowance, the payment made to provide support to those who look after a child whose parents are deceased. The regulations increase the maximum rates of the disability elements of tax credits—that is, the disabled child and severely disabled child elements of child tax credit and the disabled worker and severely disabled worker elements of working tax credit—in line with CPI. This decision was taken to protect those benefits that help with the extra cost of disability. The regulations also increase the earnings threshold for those entitled to child tax credit only, after which payments begin to be tapered away.

The regulations and orders before the Committee today protect the most vulnerable by ensuring that the guardian’s allowance and the elements of working tax credits and child tax credits designed to assist with the extra costs of disability keep pace with the change in prices. This Government have ensured that these elements of financial support paid to low-income and vulnerable households have kept pace with inflation and will continue to do so until the end of this Parliament.

Alongside the broader steps that this Government are taking to support hard-working families with the costs of living, these regulations and orders make sure that support for the most vulnerable in the tax credit system is protected, even in the context of tough decisions elsewhere. The Government’s approach is helping to secure the recovery now and for the longer term. I commend these regulations and orders to the Committee.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I commend the Minister for not making the classic mini-Budget speech before introducing these orders, as has been done on previous anniversaries. I shall also put my mini-Budget speech to one side and save us all a great deal of time. The two orders reveal the difference between us on CPI and RPI and I will not rehearse that. The explanatory memorandum to the final instrument, the Tax Credits Up-rating Regulations 2014, says that they will go up 2.7%. I casually spoke to my computer about this and in Regulation 2, the amendment of the Child Tax Credit Regulations 2002, the figure of £5,735 goes up to £5,850. My computer says that this is 2%. The next figure, of £6,955, goes up to £7,105. Sheer curiosity demands that I ask why this is more like 2% than 2.7%. I am sure that there is a cunning answer.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I am sure that there is a cunning answer. I am equally sure that I do not know what it is, so I am afraid that I will have to write to the noble Lord with my cunning answer.

Social Security (Contributions) (Limits and Thresholds) (Amendment) Regulations 2014

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 3rd March 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to introduce to the Committee the Social Security (Contributions) (Limits and Thresholds) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 and the Social Security (Contributions) (Re-rating and National Insurance Funds Payments) Order 2014. As both the regulations and the order deal with national insurance contributions, it seems sensible that they should be debated together. As a matter of course, I can confirm that the provisions in the regulations and the order are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

The changes to the NICs rates and thresholds covered by these two instruments were announced as part of the Chancellor’s Autumn Statement on 5 December last year. It is worth confirming from the start that the basis of indexation that has been used to calculate the changes covered by these two instruments is the same as that used since the 2012-13 tax year.

In the Budget 2011, we announced that from the 2012-13 tax year the basis for indexation of most NICs rates limits and thresholds would be the consumer prices index, the CPI, instead of the retail prices index, RPI, rate of inflation. This is because the Government believe that the CPI is the most appropriate measure of the general level of prices. The exceptions to this are the secondary threshold and the upper earnings and upper profits limits.

I will start with the Social Security (Contributions) (Limits and Thresholds) (Amendment) Regulations. These regulations are necessary to set the class 1 national insurance contributions lower earnings limit, primary and secondary thresholds and the upper earnings limit for the 2014-15 tax year. The class 1 lower earnings limit will be increased from £109 to £111 per week from 6 April 2014. The lower earnings limit is the level of earnings at which contributory benefit entitlement is secured. However, NICs do not need to be paid by the employee until earnings reach the primary threshold. The class 1 primary threshold will be increased from £149 per week to £153 per week from 6 April 2014. The secondary threshold is the point at which employers start to pay class 1 NICs. In line with the commitment in Budget 2011, this is being increased by RPI from £148 to £153 per week.

From this April, the income tax personal allowance for people born after 5 April 1948 will be increased above indexation by £560 from £9,440 to £10,000. The point at which higher rate tax is payable will be increased to £41,865 in the 2014-15 tax year. As I mentioned, the upper earnings limit is not subject to CPI indexation. This is to maintain the existing alignment of the upper earnings limit with the point at which higher rate tax is paid. The upper earnings limit will be increased from £797 to £805 per week from 6 April 2014. The regulations also set the prescribed equivalents of the primary and secondary thresholds for employees paid monthly or annually. There will be no changes to NIC rates in 2014-15. Employees will continue to pay 12% on earnings between the primary threshold and the upper earnings limit, and 2% on earnings above that. Employers will continue to pay contributions at 13.8% on all earnings above the secondary threshold.

I move on to the social security order. This order sets out the NICs rates and thresholds for the self-employed and those paying voluntary contributions as well as providing for a Treasury grant. The order raises the small earnings exception below which the self-employed may claim exemption from paying class 2 contributions. The exception will rise in April, from £5,725 to £5,885 a year. Many self-employed people choose to pay these contributions in order to protect their benefit entitlement even though they may claim exemption from paying class 2 contributions. The rate of class 2 contributions for the 2014-15 tax year will rise from £2.70 to £2.75 a week. The rate of voluntary class 3 contributions will also increase from £13.55 to £13.90 a week for the 2014-15 tax year.

Today’s order also sets the profit limits for class 4 contributions. The annual lower profits limit on which these contributions are due will increase from £7,755 to £7,956 in line with the increase to the class 1 primary threshold. At the other end of the scale, the annual upper profits limit will increase from £41,450 to £41,865 for the 2014-15 tax year. This is to maintain the alignment of the upper profits limit with the upper earnings limit for employees. The changes to the class 4 limits will ensure that the self-employed pay contributions at the main rate of 9% on a similar range of earnings as employees paying class 1 contributions at the main rate of 12%. Profits above the upper profits limit are subject to the additional rate of 2% in line with the 2% paid by employees on earnings above the upper earnings limit.

Finally, I need to ensure that the National Insurance Fund can maintain a prudent working balance throughout the coming year, which the Government Actuary recommends should be one-sixth or two months of benefit expenditure. The rerating order provides for a Treasury grant of 5% of benefit expenditure to be made available to the fund in the 2014-15 tax year. Similar provision will be made in respect of the Northern Ireland National Insurance Fund. I commend the regulations and order to the Committee.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I have studied the Explanatory Memorandum and these regulations with great care, and I have to confess that I am finding it very difficult to find any questions whatever to ask on them. The report of the general committee in the other place was equally bereft of any serious exchange. There were some technical questions asked but I will not repeat them, on the basis that I am sure that the Treasury machine would give precisely the same answers. There was an exchange on some thinking that we are developing about a different rate of benefit for people who have paid contributions over a number of years but that has to be developed further, to make sure that it is cost-neutral. The 5% that the Minister mentioned is, as I understand it, essentially a piece of book-keeping and does not represent any increase in overall public expenditure. I am not sure whether the Minister said that explicitly and I would value it if he were to confirm that but otherwise we have no comments to make on these regulations.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I can confirm that the provision of a 5% Treasury grant is indeed a piece of book-keeping and does not involve any additional expenditure.

Motion agreed.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, before we start the next business, due to the efficiency with which we have executed our previous business, we are rather scratching to find a spokesman. I wonder whether we might take a 10-minute break for the Opposition to find a spokesman for the next round.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

My Lords, yes, in due course but the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, is being a little previous.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I am so sorry.

Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions (Investigations) Regulations 2014

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 3rd March 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to introduce the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions (Investigations) Regulations 2014. With your permission, I will refer to them as the investigations regulations.

The current regulatory regime for co-operatives, community benefit societies and credit unions is in need of modernisation in order to deliver better outcomes for consumers and the sector in Great Britain, now and for the years to come. The Government are therefore taking forward a package of measures, following a public consultation last year. The investigations regulations are part of this package.

The other three measures in the package will increase the amount of withdrawable share capital an individual can invest in a society from £20,000 to £100,000; make insolvency rescue procedures available to industrial and provident societies; and simplify electronic registration for new societies.

These changes, alongside progressing the co-operative and community benefit societies consolidation Bill, demonstrate the Government’s commitment to promote mutual bodies and to foster diversity in the UK economy while preserving the unique features of the sector. There are around 7,600 societies and 380 credit unions registered in Great Britain. The sector continues to provide a popular and successful structure for mutually run businesses, with a growing membership of more than 15 million members in the UK.

Looking specifically at the investigations regulations, this statutory instrument gives the Financial Conduct Authority additional powers to investigate co-operatives, community benefit societies and credit unions where circumstances suggest their behaviour may be improper or unlawful. The FCA initially requested these changes to legislation to enhance its powers to investigate societies. The proposal was included in the Government’s July 2013 public consultation, Industrial and Provident Societies: Growth through Co-operation, and was well received by respondents from industrial trade bodies, individual societies, credit unions and consumer groups.

The investigations regulations aim to increase confidence in co-operatives, community benefit societies and credit unions by creating a level playing field with the requirements that companies face. Therefore, the additional powers for the FCA are in line with the current powers in the Companies Act 1985, appropriately modified for societies. The investigations regulations include a number of new powers, including the requirement for the FCA to appoint an inspector if a court instructs it to do so. They also give the FCA power to appoint an inspector to investigate the affairs of a society. The power is available in the same circumstances as for companies, for example where it appears to the FCA that the society’s business may have been conducted with an intention to defraud creditors or for unlawful purposes.

Other powers concern the expenses of an investigation and state that these would be payable in the first instance by the FCA, which would then have the power to recover them from the society investigated. The total cost of an investigation is expected to be no more than £100,000, since co-operatives, community benefit societies and credit unions are relatively simple business models compared with large companies, where much higher costs may be involved.

In practice, the FCA’s first intention would be to recover the costs of an investigation from the periodic fees paid by all societies; as a last resort the FCA may consider using its central budget before passing on any costs to a society. It is also worth noting that the FCA estimates, based on past experience, that it would only need to use the powers to investigate up to one society a year.

The measure also gives the FCA, or an authorised investigator, power to give directions to a society to produce documents and provide information. This is similar to the FCA’s existing powers but, in addition, the investigations regulations give the FCA or an authorised person the power to apply to a magistrate for a warrant of entry to premises of a society on the same grounds as those relating to companies.

These regulations will help to improve the legislation for co-operatives, community benefit societies and credit unions by bringing it more into line with that for companies and giving members of these societies confidence that the regulator has adequate powers to act to investigate those societies suspected of wrongdoing. This will benefit the co-operatives sector as a whole by giving more confidence in the legal form, and it has been welcomed by the main trade body, Co-operatives UK. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, these regulations seem to be universally welcomed and they are certainly welcomed from these Benches. I studied the Explanatory Memorandum with some care and looked at the general Committee debate in another place. The only point that my eyes alighted upon was the powers mentioned in paragraph 7.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum. The other powers concern the expenses of the investigation. These will be payable in the first instance by the FCA but will be recovered from the society being investigated, which rather implies that they go through the FCA as a transaction. I note the response that the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made in another place, using more or less the same words that the Minister has used—that it would be unusual for such a charge to be passed through to the society being investigated. However, I would welcome an assurance that where the investigation reveals no malpractice, there will certainly be no passing through of the charge to the society concerned. With that, I am entirely content with the regulations and fully support them.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, in respect of the noble Lord’s question, the FCA has the option of either recouping its costs directly from the society in question or funding the costs from within its own overall budget. In the case of a society being felt to have committed no wrongdoing, the FCA may well decide that it is more appropriate to adopt the latter option. However, the decision will be for the FCA. I hope that that answers the noble Lord’s question.

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Consumer Credit) (Designated Activities) Order 2014

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts

Monday 10th February 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to both orders. The first takes up little more than a page, while the Explanatory Memorandum attached to it takes up 49 pages. The second order takes up 30 pages and the Explanatory Memorandum for that also takes up 49 pages, but is essentially the same text as the first one. That is not a complaint: the Explanatory Memorandum is a model of its kind—it is clear, thorough and indicates clearly areas of doubt or uncertainty.

There is one area of doubt or uncertainty arising: the effect on SMEs—not as providers of credit but as customers of credit providers. The impact assessment estimates the cost of the measures over 10 years at £336 billion and the benefit at £689 million—an estimated net benefit of £353 billion. However, the impact assessment does not say how this net benefit is distributed. That is my first question: are SMEs net beneficiaries or is all the benefit delivered elsewhere?

The impact assessment also makes it clear that it expects a shrinking of the credit market. It estimates that 9,000, or 20%, of credit organisations will exit the market. It is true that these organisations represent only a small percentage by volume of total credit, but is this lost lending concentrated in the SME sector? That is my second question to the Minister. We know that net lending to SMEs continues to decline. Can the Minister provide some general reassurance that the measures before us will not make the position worse?

The note in paragraph 53 on page 13 of the impact assessment makes the point that the FCA’s most effective regulatory tools and framework to be brought about by these orders will be,

“effective in tackling known consumer detriment occurring in the non-mainstream lending market such as: payday loans, credit brokerage, debt management and home collected credit”.

That is an important improvement and I welcome it, especially as it will apply to payday loans. However, at first reading there seem to be some areas missing from the list. The impact assessment notes in paragraph 25 on page 8, as a rationale for intervention,

“that the market is not functioning as well as it should and the regulatory regime cannot keep pace with the market”.

However, as far as I can detect, no explicit mention is made anywhere in the orders or the Explanatory Memorandums of crowdfunding or peer-to-peer lending. As the Minister knows, these are rapidly growing credit areas, and ones that offer additional opportunities for SME funding. Can the Minister confirm for the Committee that crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending will fall within the ambit of these orders? I think I heard the Minister say that that is the case for peer-to-peer lending, but I should like to know whether it is also the case for crowdfunding.

Before I conclude, I should like to ask the Minister a little more about the effects of these orders on payday lenders. The Minister has previously confirmed elsewhere that under the terms of the EU e-commerce directive, the UK has no power to cap the cost of payday loans extended by companies based in the EEA and trading only electronically in the UK. However, I notice in paragraph (5)(e) on page 16 of the second order that the authority has the power to prohibit the entry into credit agreements by an EEA authorised payment institution if that institution,

“engages in business practices appearing to the Authority to be deceitful or oppressive or otherwise unfair or improper (including practices that appear to the Authority to involve irresponsible lending)”.

Does this provision apply to payday lenders based in the EEA and operating only electronically here in the UK?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome these two orders. It is the duty of Her Majesty’s Opposition to study secondary legislation and then to oppose it where we find errors and faults, but I have to say that I have not been as successful as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, in finding questions to pose to the Minister, so at least my words will give him a little time to collect together his notes on those technical areas. While we welcome the orders, my honourable friend in another place did ask one or two questions which seemed to be answered satisfactorily. As far as I can tell, the orders do their job. With the permission of the Committee, I should like in a sense to celebrate these orders because they represent the last hurdles of effecting the transfer of responsibilities for consumer credit from the OFT to the FCA. Over the past many months, we have all been concerned about the consumer credit market, in particular its grey areas and payday lending.

I, too, have studied all 49 pages of the impact assessment, although I did not find the same inconsistencies as the noble Lord. I did pick up an implication that the resources to be devoted to the area seem to be tripling from around £10 million per annum to £30 million, and I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm the extent to which new resources are being made available for this new activity. What does this represent in terms of resources and people at the FCA devoted to the consumer credit market? Will it involve the transfer of people from the OFT? Will it involve new and perhaps more capable people working in this market? Will there be a change in attitude and culture on the part of those working in this area?

As has been pointed out, there are some detailed areas, but the really serious evil here is the loan sharks, the rogue lenders and the payday loans market. That market is pretty worrying at every level, from the one-person operator through to major organisations. It involves probably some of the most vulnerable consumers in the land, who are people making decisions in very difficult and stressful circumstances. If ever a market needed intelligent, proactive government regulation, it is this one, and I hope that what the Government have designed will do it.

I would be grateful if the Minister could say a few words about how the regulators will be more proactive. The documentation makes the point that the FCA can be forward-looking and create regulations quickly. I would be grateful if the Minister could expand on that and give me some reassurance—in response to a point made by a colleague—that the new unit will be able to strangle products at birth; in other words, will be sufficiently proactive to sweep the market for the emergence of new products and move quickly to kill them before they do the social harm that we know they can do.

One of the aspirations of these changes is to bring rogue firms under control, which I think we all welcome. The problem is that it might increase opportunities for illegal operations. I feel as though I am in a pantomime now and saying, “Look behind you”, because notes are at the Minister’s right hand. To what extent will the unit work with the police where it sees the early emergence of illegal operations and stamp them out before they can create the evil which we know happens in communities under stress?

[Lord Newby]

I am grateful to both noble Lords who have spoken. Even by the standards of statutory instruments, these are extremely opaque, but the powers they contain are important and, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said, tidy up and, one hopes, finalise the secondary legislation that is needed to effect their transfer.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked a number of questions about the extent to which SMEs could be adversely affected by the regulations. While there may be some impact on lending to SMEs by some non-bank lenders, we would expect it to be extremely small. The stock of lending to business that is consumer credit is estimated to be, at most, 5% of total lending to SMEs. If we are talking about a small proportion of that 5% disappearing, it is a very small impact. We believe that the Government’s wider initiatives, such as the Funding for Lending scheme, will over time far outweigh the negative impact of the transfer. It is worth bearing in mind that SMEs, like any other consumers, can enter into credit agreements that may drive them into unsustainable levels of debt. The enhanced consumer protection that we hope and expect will flow from this transfer will benefit SME debtors.