British Sovereignty Protection (Chagos Islands) Bill [HL]
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Lord Weir of Ballyholme
That the Bill be now read a second time.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, the purpose of this Bill is to cut through the fog of uncertainty that now hangs over the Chagos Islands to provide a fairer, clearer and more principled way forward for not simply the Chagos Islands themselves but, perhaps more importantly, the Chagossians—and I am delighted that many of them are able to join us here today.
Like many in this Chamber, I was, and remain, highly critical of the previous government Bill on this issue. Without rehearsing all the arguments that were used in connection with that Bill, which sought to implement the Government’s deal with Mauritius, I believe that that Bill would have, in effect, handed over sovereign territory that had been British for more than 200 years to a Government who had never held control or ownership of the islands. Indeed, it did not simply give away the Chagos Islands but presented Mauritius with a large dowry—a very handsome reward—for taking the islands off our hands, without even a compensatory automatic right of resettlement for the Chagossians.
That Bill gave no agency to the Chagossian people themselves, and for many Chagossians that is all too familiar. At times, in our most benign interpretations as a Parliament and as Governments, we have perhaps pretended that we are doing things for the Chagossian people, but far too often we have done things to the Chagossian people—most notably in the 1960s, when they were forcibly removed from the islands. What we have not done—this is what we need to change—is do things with the Chagossian people, respecting their choice and their control over their destiny.
The criticism that has been made of the previous Bill has not been confined to this House. As we have seen recently, even the new Defence Secretary, Wes Streeting, has questioned whether the previous Bill was good enough, given the position of the Americans. The current Prime Minister, who, to be fair to him, played no part in the previous arrangements, has indicated that there needs to be a review of the overall Bill. We know that the progress of the previous Bill was stopped by the position of the American Administration. I appreciate that, at times, many of us in this Chamber see a level of volatility within the American Administration and their foreign policy. However, they have been consistent over the last period of time in their concern that this is not the right way forward. Given the direct interest of the American Administration, through the military base at Diego Garcia, this is not simply an opinion from across the Atlantic but something that is critical to the way forward for the Chagos Islands.
As a result, the issue has been left in a form of limbo. The Government, it would appear, have not resiled from their previous position and potentially remain committed to the Bill, despite the review. But, by the same token, they were not able to bring forward that Bill to progress it whenever it was going through the Lords. Indeed, in the last King’s Speech, there was no mention of the situation as regards the Chagos Islands. In particular, this has left the Chagossians in a form of political purgatory. They have been left with a level of uncertainty. The one thing that we owe above all else to the Chagossian people is certainty and control for the future. That is the purpose of my Bill.
I will outline the contents of the Bill. Although it is relatively short, it has five main components. First, crucially, it provides what might be described as a triple lock on sovereignty—either the transfer of sovereignty or the leasing out of the islands. Before that can happen, for any deal three hurdles have to be overcome. First, it would have to be done by way of an Act of Parliament. Secondly, if there is a representative Government of the Chagossian people, it would have to have their approval. Most crucially, in enshrining the principle of self-determination of the Chagossian people, it would have to be approved by a referendum of the Chagossian people, with the electorate clearly defined in Clause 4, which highlights that British Indian Ocean Territory citizens would have the right to vote in that referendum. This would put the destiny of the Chagos Island and the Chagossian people in their own hands, which is the right thing to do.
Secondly, one of the major concerns in relation to the Chagos Islands has clearly been the military base at Diego Garcia, which is the overriding concern of the Americans and is strategically very important to us. The Bill clearly and explicitly indicates that, whatever rulings may happen in the future, the base itself remains sovereign British territory. It gives a clear sign of certainty about the position of Parliament and the sovereign position.
Thirdly, the Bill enshrines transparency in any future arrangements. Clause 2 deals with the fact that, if there is any proposal to hand over to Mauritius or anyone else, any financial arrangements, both with the Mauritian Government and with agencies or any companies connected with them, are clearly outlined to Parliament. There has been a level of disagreement, shall we say, over the extent of the financial aid that was being given over to Mauritius within that.
Fourthly and importantly, there is the role of the Chagossian people. Although it is critical that we enshrine the rights of self-determination, simply giving the Chagossians a yes or no on any final package is not in and of itself sufficient. So the Bill looks at what other pertinent rights we can give the Chagossian people. It deals with permits to work on the Diego Garcia base and, in particular, with a critical issue for the Chagossians: resettlement. They were torn from their country in the 1960s, and the Bill explicitly gives a right to resettle permanently on Île du Coin and Île Boddam—I apologise to the Chagossians if my pronunciation is not up to scratch—as well as on Diego Garcia itself if at any stage the base there is in some way abandoned.
Allied to and part of that resettlement, the Government would be compelled to discuss with and consult the Chagossian people on a range of issues—from an economic partnership to a partnership on skills, health and education; marine conservation and biodiversity; and the protection of Chagossian culture. So it will be part of putting the Chagossian people at the heart of any level of discussion, because too often in the past they have been regarded as an afterthought, brought in at best to be told what has happened after it has happened. I do not believe that that is an acceptable way forward.
Fifthly, there are specific protections in the Bill for the economic position of the Chagos Islands, security arrangements, and measures to protect the natural environment and biodiversity, along with a range of steps in Clauses 5 and 6 that the Government will have to bring forward. That package of measures offers the best way forward for the Chagos Islands and the Chagossian people.
It is rare in politics, or in life, that we get an opportunity to start again. This is that second opportunity, and Parliament needs to grasp it. I look forward to the debate that lies ahead, and I beg to move.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, on tabling this Bill and on his brilliant introduction of it. It is a very good, comprehensive and comprehensible Bill. When a Bill is lucid, it is a symptom of the clarity and sensibility of the objectives enshrined in it.
This Bill should not be necessary, but it is, because the Foreign Office has, to put it mildly, failed to appreciate our obligations to the Chagossian people, the rights of the Chagossian people and the strength of our legal right to the Chagos Islands. It is not just that possession is nine-tenths of the law; the remaining tenth of international law puts us in a rock-solid position. It should not be necessary to repeat that legal position, but it is.
First, the ICJ ruling was advisory, not binding. Secondly, it was based on a General Assembly resolution, which is not binding. Thirdly, when we signed up to the ICJ, we excluded the disputes between ourselves and the Commonwealth from its jurisdiction. Fourthly—this has not often been mentioned—in 2012 the Cameron Government extended that exclusion to include disputes with former member states of the Commonwealth, so that, should Mauritius try to get round it by leaving the Commonwealth, that could not happen. The Foreign Office then believed that the exclusion was strong and valuable, and made it more solid still.
Fifthly, the Foreign Office subsequently invoked the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its tribunal. However, that tribunal cannot rule on sovereignty or on military matters—and nothing could be more military than the Diego Garcia base. Sixthly, the Foreign Office none the less said that if we fail to ratify the agreement with Mauritius, we could face a binding verdict within weeks. Well, quite a lot of weeks have passed. Seventhly, it then said that just waiting for a binding verdict would weaken our negotiating position. Indeed, the ultimate verdict might weaken our negotiating position, but since its case was based on the assertion that we have no sovereignty, it is hard to see how any verdict that ratified it would weaken our negotiating position at all.
Eighthly, the Government’s final claim is that a verdict might prompt other states to withhold supplies and services, which would render the base inoperable. When I have asked, “What supplies? What services? From what countries?”, they have refused to answer. They have also refused to acknowledge that if the base could be rendered inoperable by countries withholding supplies and services, that would be equally true after any transfer of sovereignty to Mauritius. If these unidentified other countries objected to the use being made of the base by us or by the Americans, they could presumably render it inoperable by withholding these unidentified supplies and services. Nor will the Government indicate whether they have pointed this out to the Americans.
The ninth and final weakness of the position of the Foreign Office was that it had overlooked our binding legal obligation to the Americans to secure their agreement to any transfer of sovereignty before signing the deal. It had gone ahead and signed the deal with Mauritius without getting a rock-solid agreement from the Americans.
All this ignores the crucial issue—which should not be ignored—of the Chagossians themselves. The General Assembly resolution—on which both the ICJ’s advisory ruling and the government position are based—says that in the process of decolonisation, territories cannot be split up. It is a moot point whether Chagos was ever part of the same territory as Mauritius. In any case, the UN allows for inhabitants to choose to separate if they are given a vote on the subject, as we did to the inhabitants of what were then the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, now Kiribati and Tuvalu. The inhabitants of Ellice Islands, now Tuvalu, voted overwhelmingly to separate—there were just 4,000 votes cast, but 92% of them were for separation and that separation was effected.
More recently, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has ruled—it is not binding, but it is a UN ruling—that we should delay the agreement with Mauritius to consult the Chagossians. The Government argue that there is no Chagossian population—or certainly there was not until recently—but we give expatriates from the UK a vote in our elections, even though they have voluntarily removed themselves from residence in this country for a period. Should we not, as this Bill does, give the Chagossian people, who were forcibly removed from their country, a vote on the future of their country? The only reason they have all been abroad until recently is because they were deported and because it was made very difficult for them to return. Some have done so, despite all the obstacles put in their way, and they have been there for some months. This Bill will allow permits to visit and reside in the Chagos Islands, except Diego Garcia, though hopefully the Americans would give priority for working on the base to Chagossians living in the islands or from elsewhere.
Resettlement was considered by the previous Government and thought to be practical but at a cost. However, that cost is a fraction of what it is proposed that we hand over annually to the Mauritians. Resettlement is feasible, it is less costly than the agreement with Mauritius and it is happening. That changes the whole legal, moral and economic position on which the Government’s approach to this problem is based.
I will end with some questions. First, do the Government accept that the proposed agreement with Mauritius does not give Chagossians a right of return? The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was, I am sure, speaking in good faith—I have the utmost respect for the noble Lord, who is a man of integrity—when, on 14 April, he said in this House, replying to my question:
“What is proposed in the treaty”
with Mauritius
“allows a right of return for Chagossians to islands other than Diego Garcia”.—[Official Report, 14/4/26; col. 269.]
Will the Minister confirm that that is not the case? It gives the Mauritians the power to allow return or settlement by Chagossians or others, but no obligation to do so or to ensure that it is for Chagossians.
Secondly, if the Chagossians do return in any number, will they automatically have the right of self-determination as is normally the case under UN rulings?
Thirdly, do the Government accept that the rights of Chagossians, both resident and forcibly removed, override the basis that they originally gave for reaching this agreement that they have concluded with Mauritius—and if not, why not? If not, we can only conclude that they are continuing where the negotiation began through sheer ignorance of the whole legal position of the British state—in the spirit of “University Challenge”, “I have started so I will finish”—or because the anti-colonial ideologues on their own Benches, combined with the FCO’s traditional determination to rid itself of all of our overseas territories is dominant in their thinking?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Weir, on advancing this eminently sensible and timely Bill before the House today. It is also a great privilege to follow my noble friend Lord Lilley and to inform the House that I am glad to say that he has given most of my speech, which means that I can greatly accelerate the remarks that I am going to make to the House today.
The first point is that it is regrettable that we need to bring this Bill at all. It is perhaps a statement of the approach taken by the Government towards the support for the overseas territories that we have, sadly, to present this Bill in order to put a brake on the surrender of our own sovereign territory. But that is what it has come to.
My noble friend Lord Lilley addressed the various legal shibboleths that the treaty was premised upon; in particular, he dealt carefully with the fact that the advisory judgment of the ICJ and the powers of UNCLOS mean that there cannot be any international court which can rule upon our sovereignty over those islands.
There is one other legal issue that my noble friend did not touch on, and it is that which I ask directly to the Minister to answer. In the debates on the government Bill last Session, it was accepted by the Government that the state of Mauritius is a signatory to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which forbids the positioning of nuclear weapons on African soil. If the Chagos Islands become part of Mauritius, they will be covered by the operation of that treaty, and we know from many sources—not least from the speech given by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, during the debates on that Bill—that the Americans routinely position nuclear weapons in the Chagos Islands. Indeed, there is some media reporting that they are stored there.
On that basis, we have never had a satisfactory explanation from the Government, or indeed any explanation, as to how it is said that Mauritius under this agreement would agree to the continuance of the use of the base for the storage or transit of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it seems to me that our American allies are going to be very hostile to this surrender of sovereignty, and the Government have so far just ignored this point.
My question today to the Minister is: what do the Government say about Mauritius’s membership of the Treaty of Pelindaba in relation to the agreement that was reached? I very much hope that the Minister, being part of Mr Burnham’s Administration who have agreed to review the deal, will say that it does not matter because they are going to revise our view on this deal.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I would like to congratulate my noble friend Lord Weir of Ballyholme on introducing this Motion and on the manner in which he introduced it. It is very rare that we get second chances. Providence has provided us with one here, and I really hope that Ministers will look impartially at the opportunity before them.
I am going to canter over, very briefly, some of the history of how we got here. The islands were uninhabited until 1783, when they were taken by France, which populated them with an enslaved population brought mainly from east Africa. They were then taken from the French in the Napoleonic Wars in 1810—an episode fictionalised in the Aubrey/Maturin novels by Patrick O’Brian, where Jack Aubrey is given the wonderful line that it strikes him as absurd and unnatural that islands should not be British.
In 1814, the islands were then ceded as part of the general movement of territories following the Congress of Vienna, and there things stayed. Britain manumitted the slave population. The territory was administered from Mauritius only in the sense that it was too small to maintain an administrative seat and therefore had its administration in Mauritius in the same way that Aden had its administration in India. It would be a very strange and bizarre thing if that became the basis of sovereignty claims around the world.
Fast forward to 1965, when Britain is decolonising, there is some dispute within Mauritius about not wanting to be decolonised. One of the Mauritian political parties is arguing that Mauritius should instead have representation in another place and be an integral part of the UK in the same manner as the DOM-TOMs of France, but Britain pushes ahead with the decolonisation, maintaining sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory.
To put the issue beyond doubt, Mauritius trousers what was in those days a very large sum of money permanently to renounce any claim it might have to the sovereignty of the archipelago. The then Prime Minister was later asked in a Mauritian parliamentary committee whether he was pressured. He said no. He was very happy to take the money. He said this is a portion of our territory which is very far from here and which we have never visited. He might have added that it was historically and ethnically different—its population, as it were, broadly having come from the West rather than from the East. There was very little sense of awareness, let alone of claim, of this being a similar population.
There we can leave things until, perhaps with an approximation to China going on in the early 20th century, until Mauritius gets together a posse of third-worldist judges and on the basis of a non-binding resolution of the UN General Assembly, gets another non-binding ruling that somehow this territory belongs, in defiance of the wishes of its people, to a country that had never owned it and that had until then shown no interest beyond the pecuniary interests that it had.
So, once again, I am going to say to the Minister and to other Ministers: take the off ramp. There is no good in pursuing this process. It is senseless militarily. We are imperilling a key base that commands four of the seven naval choke points. We are inviting unfriendly powers to take up positions in the surrounding archipelago. It makes no sense ecologically. We are giving away the most pristine maritime conservation zone in the world to a nation with a very poor record on biodiversity. It makes no sense democratically because the overwhelming majority of Chagossian people, those born on the islands and their descendants, are clear that they do not want to be Mauritians and that they want, as they have made clear over and over again, to return to their islands as British overseas subjects. Of course, it makes no sense financially. Good luck to any political party going into an election saying, “We are raising your taxes here so that they can cut their taxes in Mauritius”, which is indeed the boast being made by some Mauritian politicians.
How have we ended up in this place? I can best describe it as something one sees often with the Foreign Office: “Bridge on the River Kwai” syndrome. If you take as your starting assumption the absolute supremacy of any international tribunal, even when it issues non-binding resolutions, and even when, for all the reasons that we just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, its jurisdiction in this case is expressly excluded because of the military nature of the facility and because disputes between Commonwealth or ex-Commonwealth members are excluded from its jurisdiction, if you none the less are tearing around the world in your Matrix Chambers/Doughty Street way, looking for international tribunals to which to surrender, and this is your priority, then within those terms, the leaseback agreement had a certain ingenuity. It had a certain neatness, and it could be justified when there was pressure from the then US Administration to do it, and when there was pressure internally because of the obsession of the previous Prime Minister and the previous Attorney-General with international law.
However, as with the bridge on the River Kwai, this treaty was never primarily in the British national interest. It was only a response to a very specific circumstance, and that circumstance has now changed. The US Government have made it very clear that they do not want to go ahead with this treaty, and, rather in the manner of Alec Guinness in the movie, we still have officials trying to stick to the thing in which they had invested so much of their time and ingenuity. I hope that, even now, one of them will fall on the plunger and undo the folly because, in doing so, we would restore our relations with our closest ally, and we would save ourselves a great deal of money.
I have to say, not that it is any of my business, that the party opposite would be doing itself a great favour electorally. I cannot help noticing that at every stage, including today, the Labour Benches have been completely empty when we have been discussing this issue because Labour politicians, whether in this place or in another place, did not generally go into politics again to betray a poor, black, dispossessed population and hand a pristine maritime conservation zone to a country with a terrible record ecologically.
There is every reason to pull out while there is still time. Let me urge the Minister and all Ministers to take the win: take the off ramp.
Baroness Meyer (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, for introducing this very important Bill, which I support.
At the heart of this Bill lies the fundamental question: by what right can the British Government transfer sovereignty over the Chagos Islands to Mauritius without first obtaining the consent of the Chagossian people? We must remember that the Chagossians were forcibly removed from their homeland by Britain in the 1960s and 1970s to make way for the military base of Diego Garcia. It was a shameful chapter in our history. Now, more than half a century later, we propose to decide their future once again without even asking for their consent. Have we not learned anything from the past?
The treaty provides no guarantees of return to Diego Garcia, no binding resettlement plan for the Chagossian people as a whole and no requirement for their consent to transfer sovereignty. That is an extraordinary double standard. If an international court suggested that Britain should surrender the Falkland Islands or Gibraltar, would we simply disregard the wishes of their inhabitants? Of course not; we would insist that their right to self-determination was paramount. So why are the Chagossians treated differently? The Government appear to treat the absence of a resident Chagossian population as a reason for their consent not being required. But the only reason they no longer inhabit their homeland is that we forcibly removed them. To use their absence as a reason to deny them a voice in their future would compound the original injustice.
The principle of self-determination cannot be something we invoke selectively. Article 1 of the United Nations charter recognises the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The Chagossians have their own language, culture, traditions and distinct identity, which have endured despite their expulsion. A survey organised by the Chagossian campaigners, involving more than 3,500 respondents, reported that 99.22% favoured remaining under British sovereignty. Although this is not a formal referendum, it still demonstrates the strength of feeling among those who participated. To transfer their homeland to another country without obtaining their consent would be nothing short of a scandal.
There are also serious legal, financial and strategic objections to this treaty, as pointed out by noble Lords who spoke before me. The Government originally justified this agreement, warning that without an agreement, Britain faced an imminent legal decision that could render the Diego Garcia military base inoperable. But where is the evidence?
On 25 February 2019, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion, not a binding judgment, as my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out. Moreover, the court’s jurisdiction over disputes between Britain and Mauritius is restricted, and tribunals under the Convention on the Law of the Sea cannot simply determine questions of territorial sovereignty. Undoubtedly, there are legal and diplomatic difficulties, but they do not establish that surrendering sovereignty was the only possible solution. The decision to transfer sovereignty was a political choice, not a direct consequence of a binding court order. It was an extraordinary choice.
We now propose to surrender a British territory only to pay billions to lease back a military base that we already control. The Government estimated the cost at £3.4 billion in present-value terms, but the TaxPayers’ Alliance, taking into account inflation, has suggested that the payments over 99 years would reach £47 billion. At a time when our public finances and defence budgets are under such pressure, how can this expenditure be justified?
What about our national security? Diego Garcia is one of the most strategically important military bases in the world, yet we propose to surrender sovereignty over it, leaving it to Mauritius. The Government argue that the treaty secures the base for 99 years. What happens after that? What if Mauritius decides not to renew the lease? What if China outbids us? What about safeguarding the marine protected area? Why should Britain surrender sovereignty over a facility so vital to our own security, especially when our ally, the United States, does not agree that we should? Indeed, the treaty has been paused following renewed American opposition and the Government have acknowledged that they cannot proceed without US support. This is surely an opportunity to reconsider the entire agreement.
For a Government who champion human rights, denying Chagossians a meaningful say in the future of their homeland is an extraordinary moral contradiction. The Chagossians have already suffered grave injustice at British hands. We must not compound that with yet another injustice. That is why I support the Bill. Does the Minister not agree that the Government owe the Chagossian people more than an apology for the past? We owe them a voice for the future. I am pleased to see that many of them are here to listen to our debate. I am sure that they too would support the Bill.
As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, do we even need such a Bill? Does the Minister not agree that the best solution of all would be to bin this agreement, as the United States has suggested?
Lord Bellingham (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Meyer. Having been married to a former UK Ambassador to Washington, she understands what goes on in Washington. We should all listen carefully to what she said about the American Administration.
I support the Bill wholeheartedly and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Weir, not just on drafting it in a precise, accurate and impressive way, but also on his speech this morning. It encapsulates in very clear legal terms all the issues we have been talking about and are so concerned about. I will not go through all of them, but what the Bill says about sovereignty, the protection of the rights of the Chagossians, including their right to a referendum and, of course, the guarantees for the marine protected area are all incredibly important. But, as other noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, pointed out, the Bill, important though it is, should not be necessary, because the background, obviously, is the wholly discredited treaty: the Chagos surrender Bill.
I had a Question in the House recently, on 13 October, and I put it to the Minister that, first, the opinion that was given by the ICJ was indeed advisory. I also pointed out to her that, under Article 36.2 of the statute of the ICJ, which we helped to draft—her own officials will give her background on that—there was that specific initial exclusion for sovereign disputes between the UK and Commonwealth countries. As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, that was reinforced at a later date.
Under the other case, the UNCLOS case, the then Defence Secretary John Healey said in the House last year—in the first Statement on the treaty, in fact—that there was an imminent and immediate threat to the UK under the UNCLOS tribunal. We have already established very clearly that UNCLOS cannot rule on issues regarding military bases. I asked the Minister, on 13 October, to explain to the House why the Government believe that there is a credible and viable threat to the UK in terms of a binding legal judgment. I would give way to her now if she thinks there is a threat, but it would be very helpful if she can say to the House, when she winds up, that there is no legal threat to the UK whatever. Let us be very clear on that, because I do not think anyone now believes that there is any form of threat whatever.
In her reply, the Minister repeated what she has said many times before: that the previous Conservative Administration went for 11 rounds of negotiations—or maybe 12; I cannot remember—and, somehow, that makes it all the more justifiable that the new Government came in and immediately signed along the treaty terms. I point out to the Minister that the very fact that there were 11 rounds of negotiations leads me to believe that the previous Government, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, in particular, believed that they could not sign the treaty with the terms that were on the table. The terms of that treaty were just not acceptable, so we did not sign it, which is why the negotiations went on and, indeed, why they were paused by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, before the last election.
We have also heard Ministers go on about the UK’s reputation in the global South. I have been privileged enough to have two separate stints at the FCO. I have never heard the phrase “global South” mentioned; I think it is the concoction of a number of NGOs. Presumably, it refers to those countries in sub-Saharan Africa south of the equator. There is an idea that, somehow, if the Minister and her colleagues are doing a trade negotiation with Mozambique, Malawi or Madagascar, they will arrive in Maputo, Lilongwe or Antananarivo to meet their counterparts to sign a treaty and their counterparts will say, “Well done Britain, you’ve signed this treaty with Mauritius; we’re really impressed”. I know those countries pretty well and they do not respect signs of weakness; they respect strength. Frankly, the argument about the global South that was rehearsed many times by the previous Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, does not stack up at all. I hope that the Minister, when she winds up, makes it very clear and reinforces to everyone that there is no legal, credible, viable threat.
A very important part of the Bill is on the whole issue of resettlement. Fairly recently this year, on 16 February, four Chagossians under Misley Mandarin landed on the Île du Coin in the Peros Banhos archipelago. Two days later, two more Chagossians joined them. As we know, the BIOT commissioner launched a case to evict them, but failed in that case. It has now gone to appeal. The Court of Appeal has reserved its judgment; we are awaiting it. Something very interesting has happened in the meantime, because the BIOT commission, based in Diego Garcia, has been supplying the six Chagossians on the Île de Coin. They have set aside, I gather—the Minister can confirm this—£6 million to go on supplying the Chagossians on that island. The Foreign Office started by saying that this was an irresponsible, illegal act, and it deplored it. Now, and I find this commendable, it is supplying them with key provisions to reinforce the supplies that those six Chagossians have. Of course, they have access to plentiful numbers of fish and local crops, such as breadfruit.
It is good news that the Government, in the form of the BIOT commission, are supplying them formally—I applaud that. I understand that there are 42 more Chagossians immediately ready to go to Île du Coin, and there are another 300 who have expressed interest in going. We are moving pretty quickly towards having a viable population on those outer islands that could form a British Overseas Territory. That is something that I think many of us would be extremely pleased to see.
When I was appointed the OTs Minister in 2010, I asked the FCO to commission a feasibility study to look at the resettlement of the outer islands. It commissioned KPMG to do a full report. It came out in 2015, by which stage I had been sacked from the department. The report was very comprehensive. KPMG looked at different scenarios: first, a settlement of 1,500 settlers and, then, another option of 500 or 150. It concluded that it certainly was possible and viable for a settlement to take place in a number of those outer islands. It flagged the cost, which was going to come in at between £10 million and £20 million a year. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, pointed out, that is a tiny amount of money compared with the amount that we have committed, in principle, to give to Mauritius—it is a small sum of money by comparison. Therefore, the whole cost argument goes out of the window.
The other point that KPMG made in its report—I certainly urge the Minister to find a copy of it; maybe a précis of it is in her folder—is that, if the Government puts up this money for supporting this resettlement, there may well be a flow of private sector money coming after it. If there were a sensible programme of restructuring the settlement and making sure that we had a viable, interesting commercial offer to the private sector, I suggest that a lot of private sector money would flow after the money put in by the Government.
Another point raised by KPMG touched on some of the strategic points that have been made already on defence. The report said that settlement on the outer islands could compromise the security of Diego Garcia. This was 15 or 16 years ago, and since then there has been a major reappraisal of the security of the base, because it is now in range of supersonic and hypersonic missiles. Indeed, Iran fired one at Diego Garcia—it fell short. That base is under threat of missile attack from the north, so the obvious place to put systems to counter potential missile strikes is on those islands to the north of Diego Garcia—Île du Coin and the other northern islands. What better way to secure those islands than to have them part of a settled British Overseas Territory?
China has launched a phase of activism in the Indian Ocean. I certainly would not trust Mauritius not to allow Chinese presence on those outer islands. Certainly, if there were any intrusion by a third party through settlements on those islands, that would do far more damage to the future security and safety of the base than anything else that might happen.
I will look at two final points that have cropped up in our discussions this afternoon. One is around sovereignty and the right of Chagossians to have a referendum to decide their future, which is incredibly important. The other is around environmental protection. One of our most important marine protected areas was launched by the then Foreign Secretary David Miliband in 2009, and it is securing an incredibly important part of the UK’s biodiversity. In fact, David Miliband said at the time that 40% of the UK’s total biodiversity is around those islands.
There is also a chance now for this Government to right the wrongs of 1967. Under a previous Labour Government, the Chagossians were evicted; they were taken off those islands, and their dogs and other pets were gassed. I hope that, almost 60 years later, this Government will do two things: accept this Bill and then tear up this totally discredited treaty.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, this has been a great, if somewhat one-sided, debate. It is quite sad that nobody from the Labour Benches or the Liberal Democrat Back Benches, not even their Front-Bench spokesmen, have bothered to turn up and give us their opinion on this Bill. Nevertheless, we have benefited from some great speeches from the noble Lord, Lord Weir, in introducing it, and from my own Benches and the non-aligned Members.
I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, for introducing the Bill. He has a been a constant presence in our debates about the future of the BIOT. His work on the catastrophic Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill in the previous Session contributed in large part to the failure of the Government’s Chagos surrender. He is to be lauded for his commitment to our common cause, the continuation of British sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and the righting of historic wrongs perpetrated against the Chagossian people by the British state. It is a true pleasure to speak in support of his excellent Bill today.
As the noble Lord, Lord Weir, has explained, this Bill would protect British sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory and give the Chagossian people the voice that they deserve. If this Bill were to become law, the UK would be prevented from transferring the sovereignty of the islands, or leasing them to another state, unless three tests have been met. These tests are that, first, the approval of any lawful BIOT Government has been signified; secondly, a referendum of the Chagossian people approving the transfer has been held; and, thirdly, an Act of Parliament has been passed. All those steps seem eminently sensible and would give future Governments pause for thought before proceeding to agree another surrender treaty like the one signed by Keir Starmer’s failed Government.
I have no doubt that the Minister will oppose this. It is, after all, a triple lock, and we know how the Prime Minister feels about triple locks. We on these Benches are much more open to the Weir triple lock for the Chagos Islands, in light of the persistent efforts by the Mauritian Government to undermine British sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. The noble Lord’s Bill also puts Parliament in the driving seat when it comes to any planned expenditure connected to the transfer of sovereignty. For months, we were in dispute over the Government’s previous plan to spend £35 billion on their hopelessly unpopular treaty with Mauritius. Ministers denied that figure until the Government’s own response to an FoI request in fact confirmed that that figure was correct.
Giving away islands that are British by right, and then paying for the privilege, was always an unacceptable position, and there was widespread opposition to it in this House during our debates on the Government’s Bill. It is clear that this Government cannot be trusted to negotiate a good deal for the British people, and it is no wonder that the EU is so keen to talk about closer ties when it sees such negotiating weakness from the United Kingdom. It is only right that Parliament should have the final say on any Chagos-related expenditure. Perhaps that way, we will prevent Ministers from signing off on treaties that are tantamount to total capitulation.
That brings me to the legal status of the islands. Ministers have constantly parroted the line that the islands are subject to legal uncertainty as a result of judgments in the international courts, but they have been strangely reluctant to tell us which judgments. My noble friends Lord Lilley, Lord Bellingham and Lord Murray and others have roundly discredited that position, and we will see when the Minister responds whether she can do better than her colleagues when we were considering the previous Bill. My noble friends are right that this Bill explicitly reaffirms Britain’s unquestionable sovereignty over the islands in Clause 1(2), and we support that. We are clear that the islands are British and see no problem with Parliament making that plain in primary legislation. Indeed, as many of my noble friends have pointed out, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, the United Kingdom is already subject to the obligation to maintain sovereignty over the Chagos Islands under the famous 1967 exchange of notes with the United States. This Bill merely confirms in domestic law something that is already set out in international law, which the Government keep telling us that they are so obedient to.
Finally, I want to say a word on the Chagossians, who have been so appallingly treated by successive Governments. As my noble friend Lord Hannan has pointed out many times, their quiet dignity in the light of the great injustice done to them is truly humbling, and I am delighted to see so many of them sitting in our Public Gallery today. It is high time that the Government put their mind to the views and the future of the Chagossians who were so cruelly removed from those islands.
Now that the Government have confirmed their review of the UK-Mauritius Chagos agreement, will the Minister commit to a proper consultation of Chagossian people before confirming any future policy in this area? The Government have plenty of time to do that now; their previous argument that there was not enough time falls apart. The Government previously resisted a formal consultation for fear that a judicial review might be brought, delaying their planned transfer of the islands to Mauritius. Now there is no such urgency, can we please put the Chagossian people back in the picture on the future of their own homeland?
I know the Minister will tell us that the Government have established the Chagossian Contact Group. That is a good thing, but she knows that we feel it is not enough. Since I imagine she will mention the group, will she at least tell the House when this contact group last met?
I wish the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, every success as he takes this Bill forward, and I hope the Government will listen to his heartfelt calls for us to draw a line under this sorry saga and say, once and for all: the Chagos Islands are British, and British they shall remain.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Winterton of Doncaster) (Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Weir, on securing this Second Reading debate and bringing forward his Bill. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate for their contributions, which certainly reflect the deeply held views about this issue among noble Lords. I will try to address as many of the points raised as I can in my response.
Before I do that, I will once again set out the vital importance of the base on Diego Garcia. As noble Lords have heard on many occasions, Diego Garcia is a key strategic military asset for both the UK and the US which has protected our shared security for nearly 60 years. The base enables the rapid deployment of operations and forces across the Middle East, east Africa and south Asia, helping the UK to combat some of the most challenging threats we face, including from terrorism and hostile states. Diego Garcia’s unique strategic location grants us real military advantage across the Indo-Pacific. Put simply, the base makes an essential and irreplaceable contribution to keeping the British people safe and protecting our global interests. Many noble Lords have raised the issue of the legal rationale and arguments behind that. I am sure noble Lords will accept that the base has been operating at increasing risk for decades: UK sovereignty has been challenged, and international courts have already made decisions that undermine our position.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
How can an advisory opinion by a court, which can under no circumstances lead to a binding judgment by a court, undermine the security of the base? I do not understand that.
Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Lab)
I will come on to address that issue. Let me first return to what I was setting out, which is that, because of the legal position—which, as I say, I will come back to—negotiations were started by the previous Conservative Government. There were 11 rounds of talks, conceding the principle of UK sovereignty and establishing the model of direct payment to Mauritius to lease back Diego Garcia.
When they came to power in 2024, the Labour Government inherited a draft treaty that was close to completion and a political context in which the risk to base operations had never been greater. Nevertheless, the Government were able to secure much stronger provisions in the treaty to protect the base well into the next century. I should say that in drawing this up, the UK and the US worked hand in glove in developing the treaty, and we continue to work together. When the Diego Garcia treaty was signed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer, we had US support. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, said, it is clear that the US, through President Trump, has taken a different view, so we will continue to work together, as has been made clear by both the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister. We need the support of both Mauritius and the US to find a solution that works for everyone.
The noble Lords, Lord Callanan, Lord Lilley, Lord Bellingham and Lord Hannan, asked why we are handing over sovereignty on the basis of a non-binding legal opinion. This is not just about a legal judgment; it is about the long-term safety and security of the UK. The only way to maintain the base safely in the long term is through this agreement. There is no alternative, whereby we just hang on to the base without an agreement. The previous Conservative Government tried to do that under Boris Johnson and when that failed, they started the negotiations.
I accept that there are those who argue that we should ignore the legal challenges, but there is no question that we can do that. Doing nothing is simply not an option and threatens the UK’s safety. Some argue that there are carve-outs and exemptions that the Government have missed. We have heard these arguments before, and I am afraid we have to reject them. On the ICJ exemption, although the 2017 amendment does indeed mean that the International Court of Justice cannot rule on disputes between the UK and Commonwealth countries, this is not the only viable route to a binding judgment and not the one we consider most likely.
With regard to the UNCLOS—
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Can the Minister identify what those other potential sources of judgments are, rather than just alluding to them?
Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Lab)
There is a misunderstanding of the legal position on Article 298 of UNCLOS. This does not create an exemption in respect of military bases, but in respect of disputes concerning military activities. As I say, there are other routes through international legal judgments that could be quickly translated into UK domestic proceedings.
Moving on to the issue of the Chagossians, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, and the noble Lords, Lord Hannan, Lord Weir and Lord Callanan, I share noble Lords’ strength of feeling about the Chagossian community and the injustices they have experienced, and we have heard some very powerful contributions on that during today’s debate. Let me say again: the Government deeply regret the way the Chagossians were removed from the islands, and we are committed to building a relationship with the Chagossian community that is based on respect and acknowledgement of past wrongdoings.
However, we have to accept and respect the fact that there is a diversity of opinion within the community. We continue to engage with the Chagossian groups. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asked when the contact group last met; it met last week. We will continue that process of consultation.
On the Bill and the call for a referendum, which the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, and others raised, I am afraid that we reject the Bill’s call for a referendum. The decision to enter into a treaty is a matter of national security, so we have to be very careful about how we approach that. That is why, while rejecting a referendum, we have taken concrete steps to help the Chagossians, including protecting British citizenship rights, increasing UK support and negotiating a treaty which would enable Mauritius to develop a programme of resettlement, which the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, referred to, on islands other than Diego Garcia.
The noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, mentioned the environment. Although national security was paramount in negotiating the treaty, we also secured a deal that would continue to protect the unique environment of the Chagos Archipelago. We agreed to work with Mauritius in establishing a new marine protected area with clear and credible commitments to ensure the Chagos marine environment will be effectively protected for generations. This includes a full ban on commercial fishing, high-level IUCN-aligned protection for the Great Chagos Bank and only tightly controlled artisanal fishing to support any future Chagossian resettlement.
I know that there is great interest in the financial side. The Bill proposes that Parliament assumes a formal approval function for any future payments related to the Chagos Archipelago. This is not new ground. We have discussed many similar suggestions previously, as explained clearly by both my noble friend Lady Chapman and the Minister for the Overseas Territories in the other place. A requirement for a vote before payments is not only contrary to the principle that treaty payments can be made under the royal prerogative but would create an unacceptable risk for the long-term sustainability of the base. Without certainty, the UK and US military would not be able to invest in viable capabilities, which would have major operational implications for the base.
I turn finally to the Pelindaba treaty, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Murray. He asked whether the US could be prevented from having nuclear weapons on Diego Garcia. This is completely untrue and we are confident that nothing in this treaty conflicts with our abilities to uphold international law and to continue to operate the base as we do today.
I fully respect the strong views that noble Lords have on Diego Garcia and the future of the base. I hope that I have been able to answer most of the questions set out today. I have to say—I think this is not unexpected—that the Government cannot support the Bill because it seeks to tie their hands in protecting the base. It would subcontract the exercise of prerogative powers, which would set a dangerous precedent and be manifestly contrary to the national interest and security of the United Kingdom. I am afraid that we are not able to support the Bill, but I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate today. I am sure we will continue to discuss this issue in future.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, first, I want to place on the record my thanks to everyone who has spoken to this debate, including the Minister, who was given an unenviable, if unsurprising, position. The reality is that it was not only unsurprising but almost inevitable that the Bill before us today would be, given the juxtaposition, contrasted with what has gone before by way of the previous government Bill.
I want to pick out a few points that came up in the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, is absolutely right: we would all prefer to be in a position where this was not needed in the first place. As has been highlighted by a number of speakers, we were not facing something that was going to be internationally compelling against us to hand over the islands. The exemptions in the ICJ and UNCLOS have been mentioned. Therefore, a lot of the actions taken were utterly unnecessary.
Like most, if not all, Members of this House, I have a range of opinions. I will offer some as advice to the Government—those are advisable opinions—though I would be astonished if they agreed with some of my opinions, let alone felt themselves to be bound by them.
First, we are being brought to this position by, to a degree, a false premise. Secondly, as has been mentioned by a number of speakers, some people believe, almost benignly, that our actions in handing over this territory to Mauritius are in some way inspired by some noble concept of decolonisation. I sense exactly the reverse. The approach that was previously taken with Mauritius was to treat Chagos almost as a prize that could be handed over by a medieval monarch—at the end of some war, one side gets an additional county while the other loses it—and, beyond that, to treat the Chagossian people as some form of chattel as part of that overall position. If the inspiration is to decolonise, is there anything more anti-colonial than saying, as a country that has sovereign control of a territory, that we are going to give complete self-determination to the indigenous people? To my mind, that is the definition of anti-colonialism, and ultimately it is embraced in the Bill.
Thirdly, mention has been made by the Government that there is no alternative to the route that they have taken. Actually, we are in a position where moving forward on the deal put forward by the Government may be legally questionable, as some speakers have indicated, given the binding commitment with the US Government and whether it can move forward in their absence. It is certainly unimplementable without the support of the US Government. That is the position we are in. It is time that the Government faced up to reality, stopped flogging a dead horse and pursued a positive alternative course of action. That is what is outlined in this Bill.
Fourthly—this has been alluded to only slightly—we should realise that, although this matter holds a high level of significance in the Chagos Islands, it has implications for the wider world as well. If we take the opportunity to enshrine the right of self-determination and simply hand over territory under any level of international pressure, what sort of message does that send out to other territories? For example, in recent days, we have seen yet again sabre-rattling with President Milei in Argentina as regards the Falkland Islands. If we as a country send out a signal that we are not strong on these issues and are not prepared to embrace self-determination, it is inevitable that others will misinterpret our position.
Fifthly, the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, or perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, raised resettlement. Again, there is a contrast between what was contained in the previous Bill and this one. In the previous Bill, there was no automatic right of resettlement. Indeed, the only opportunity for resettlement was at the grace and favour of the Mauritian Government. If you behaved yourself and made the right noises towards them, there might be some possibility of resettlement. Otherwise, however strong your links with the Chagos Islands, you would not be able to resettle. This Bill explicitly guarantees that right of resettlement on two of the main islands within the Chagos Islands. Last night, I had the opportunity, at a meeting, to converse directly via satellite link with Misley. As has been indicated, this is not simply some theoretical or moot point. There are Chagossians now back on the Chagos Islands. They have taken those steps to resettle, and it is time that we faced up to the reality of this.
I will make one other point. The Minister has spoken about a diversity of opinion within the Chagossian community. That may well be true, yet she speaks of diversity of opinion but will not allow a referendum. She speaks about discussions with them on a range of issues but will not grant them power on the most important thing: the right of self-determination. It is time that we gave the Chagossians their place. On a positive note, I was encouraged by the number of speakers who placed at the heart of this the rights of the Chagossian people themselves—that was encouraging—and the acceptance of a need for greater protection of biodiversity. That is also in the Bill.
I mentioned in my introductory remarks that this is a second chance. Whatever disagreements I have with this Government or any other, I suspect that all Governments come in with the intention and desire to do the right thing, possibly with one eye on legacy. We have a situation in which the Prime Minister, unlike the previous one, does not have his fingerprints on the previous deal. So I ask him to look at this with a fresh pair of eyes, to embrace the opportunity for that second chance and to do the right things for the Chagossian people.
It was unsurprising that, in this debate and previous ones, there was inevitably—as is the case in Parliament—a level of ping-pong between different sides on where blame lies. But one thing that struck me very much from previous debates on the Chagos Islands was a spirit and an acknowledgment around the entire Chamber that our treatment of the Chagossian people, over many decades and many Governments, has been shameful—the most shameful aspect being the forced removal in 1967. But we cannot do anything about the past. I am always slightly dubious when Governments make a performative apology for something that happened many years ago in which they were not directly involved. We cannot do anything about the past, but we can do something about the present and the future, and for the rights and needs of the Chagossian people, which do not infringe the military security of the base—let us get rid of that misunderstanding or misappropriation of the legislation and put it in context. It is time that we as a Parliament took forward a fresh approach that puts the Chagossian people first and does the right thing for them.