Home Office
The first duty of the government is to keep citizens safe and the country secure. The Home Office has been at the front line of this endeavour since 1782. As such, the Home Office plays a fundamental role in the security and economic prosperity of the United Kingdom.
Junior Shadow Ministers / Deputy Spokesperson
Conservative
Lord Davies of Gower (Con - Life peer)Shadow Minister (Home Office)
Junior Shadow Ministers / Deputy Spokesperson
Conservative
Alicia Kearns (Con - Rutland and Stamford)Shadow Parliamentary Under Secretary (Home Office)
Ministers of State
Dan Jarvis (Lab - Barnsley North)Minister of State (Home Office)
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab - Life peer)
Minister of State (Home Office)
Sarah Jones (Lab - Croydon West)
Minister of State (Home Office)
Alex Norris (LAB - Nottingham North and Kimberley)
Minister of State (Home Office)
Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State
Jess Phillips (Lab - Birmingham Yardley)Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Mike Tapp (Lab - Dover and Deal)
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
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The impacts of serious and organised crime (SOC) in local communities can make residents feel unsafe and affect confidence in …
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what action is the Home Secretary taking to implement the …
These Regulations restate, revoke and replace assimilated law relating to animals used in scientific research, maintaining the current legislative framework …
A Bill to Make provision about the effect, during an appeal, of an order under section 40 of the British …
11:41
Home Office Commons Appearances
Oral Answers to Questions is a regularly scheduled appearance where the Secretary of State and junior minister will answer at the Dispatch Box questions from backbench MPs
Other Commons Chamber appearances can be:- Urgent Questions where the Speaker has selected a question to which a Minister must reply that day
- Adjornment Debates a 30 minute debate attended by a Minister that concludes the day in Parliament.
- Oral Statements informing the Commons of a significant development, where backbench MP's can then question the Minister making the statement.
Westminster Hall debates are performed in response to backbench MPs or e-petitions asking for a Minister to address a detailed issue
Written Statements are made when a current event is not sufficiently significant to require an Oral Statement, but the House is required to be informed.
Bills currently before Parliament
Home Office does not have Bills currently before Parliament
Acts of Parliament created in the 2024 Parliament
A Bill to make provision about border security; to make provision about immigration and asylum; to make provision about sharing customs data and trailer registration data; to make provision about articles for use in serious crime; to make provision about serious crime prevention orders; to make provision about fees paid in connection with the recognition, comparability or assessment of qualifications; and for connected purposes.
This Bill received Royal Assent on 2nd December 2025 and was enacted into law.
A Bill to Make provision about the effect, during an appeal, of an order under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981.
This Bill received Royal Assent on 27th October 2025 and was enacted into law.
A Bill to require persons with control of certain premises or events to take steps to reduce the vulnerability of the premises or event to, and the risk of physical harm to individuals arising from, acts of terrorism; to confer related functions on the Security Industry Authority; to limit the disclosure of information about licensed premises that is likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism; and for connected purposes.
This Bill received Royal Assent on 3rd April 2025 and was enacted into law.
Home Office - Secondary Legislation
Petitions
e-Petitions are administered by Parliament and allow members of the public to express support for a particular issue.
If an e-petition reaches 10,000 signatures the Government will issue a written response.
If an e-petition reaches 100,000 signatures the petition becomes eligible for a Parliamentary debate (usually Monday 4.30pm in Westminster Hall).
(8,046 in the last 7 days)
(867 in the last 7 days)
(779 in the last 7 days)
(706 in the last 7 days)
(605 in the last 7 days)
(867 in the last 7 days)
(56 in the last 7 days)
(779 in the last 7 days)
(229 in the last 7 days)
(466 in the last 7 days)
Petition Closed
closed 3 months, 1 week ago
We demand that the UK Government immediately commits to not introducing a digital ID cards. There are reports that this is being looked at.
Petition Closed
Stop financial and other support for asylum seekers
Gov Responded - 23 Jun 2025 Debated on - 20 Oct 2025closed 8 months, 4 weeks ago
This petition is to advocate a cessation of financial and other support provided to asylum seekers by the Government. This support currently includes shelter, food, medical care (including optical and dental), and cash support.
Petition Closed
Ban immediately the use of dogs in scientific and regulatory procedures
Gov Responded - 5 Mar 2025 Debated on - 28 Apr 2025closed 8 months ago
As a first step to end animal testing, we want an immediate ban for dogs. They are commercially bred in what we see as bleak and inhumane factory-like conditions. We believe there is evidence suggesting that dogs are left being unattended for extended periods in a Government-licenced establishment.
Departmental Select Committee
Home Affairs Committee
Commons Select Committees are a formally established cross-party group of backbench MPs tasked with holding a Government department to account.
At any time there will be number of ongoing investigations into the work of the Department, or issues which fall within the oversight of the Department. Witnesses can be summoned from within the Government and outside to assist in these inquiries.
Select Committee findings are reported to the Commons, printed, and published on the Parliament website. The government then usually has 60 days to reply to the committee's recommendations.
11 Members of the Home Affairs Committee
Home Affairs Committee Member since 11th September 2024
Home Affairs Committee Member since 21st October 2024
Home Affairs Committee Member since 21st October 2024
Home Affairs Committee Member since 21st October 2024
Home Affairs Committee Member since 21st October 2024
Home Affairs Committee Member since 21st October 2024
Home Affairs Committee Member since 28th October 2024
Home Affairs Committee Member since 28th October 2024
Home Affairs Committee Member since 27th October 2025
Home Affairs Committee Member since 27th October 2025
Home Affairs Committee Member since 27th October 2025
Home Affairs Committee: Upcoming Events
The impact of serious and organised crime on local neighbourhoods
20 Apr 2026, 4:30 p.m.
View calendar - Save to Calendar
Home Affairs Committee: 10 Current Inquiries
Home Affairs Committee: Previous Inquiries
50 most recent Written Questions
(View all written questions)Information on illegal working civil penalty statistics has been published since 2016 as part of the Home Office Immigration Enforcement Transparency Data. This can be found at immigration-enforcement-data-oct-dec-2025 on tab CP02.
This publication covers the period up to 31 December 2025 and includes both limited companies and sole traders.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The family reunion route was suspended to ease the pressures that local authorities and public services have been placed under due to the recent significant increase in people arriving under this route in recent years. Other family routes remain available including Appendix FM, and cases lodged before the suspension continue to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Currently, Iranian nationals who wish to come to the UK can do so via the existing range of routes available. Any application for a UK visa will be assessed against the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
Immediate family members of British citizens and those settled in the UK who wish to come and live in the UK can apply under one of the existing family visa routes.
There are also routes available for dependents of those who are in the UK on most work routes or certain postgraduate student routes.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The Home Office publishes data on asylum in the ‘Immigration System Statistics Quarterly Release’. Data on the number of people claiming asylum by nationality is published in table Asy_D01 of the ‘Asylum claims and initial decisions datasets’, while data on the number of people claiming asylum in the UK by route of entry to the UK, and by latest category of leave prior to claim for those who entered on a visa or with other leave, is published in table Asy_D01a.
The requested information on asylum claims from individuals who entered the UK under the Gaza medical evacuation scheme is not available from published statistics.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The loss of life from the fatal incident of 23/24 November 2021 was an appalling tragedy, and our thoughts remain with the survivors, the victims and loved ones who suffered as a result.
The response to the Cranston Inquiry report is being led by the Department for Transport (DfT). The Home Office is engaging with the DfT on the response to those recommendations which are pertinent to its area of policy.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The Home Office accepted all eight of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) age assessment recommendations which were designed to improve training, guidance, assurance, resources and communication.
Initial age decisions were a primary focus of the report and, to date, the Home Office has:
- Implemented minimum quality standards and clear operating procedures to ensure a consistent and fair approach at first encounter
- Published updated guidance on the age admit process so individuals are informed of what they are being asked to sign, the implications of doing so, and how this information may be used
- Completed the first part of an evaluation into initial age decision training to ensure it is meeting requirements
- Started work to improve the overall process and experience through assurance frameworks and feedback mechanisms
The National Age Assessment Board (NAAB) was also a key focus of the inspection and improvements have been made to assurance frameworks to further ensure age assessments are conducted consistently, robustly and in line with both legislative requirements and best practice.
We have also focused on improving our use of technology. The NAAB online referral portal will also be going live in the next few months which will improve access for local authorities by providing a new, streamlined route for referring age assessment cases to the NAAB. This new technology will deliver operational efficiencies and enable referrals to be made more easily and quickly.
The Home Office has improved the quality of age assessment data. To strengthen transparency, the publication of age assessment official statistics will resume as part of the Immigration Statistical Release scheduled for 21 May 2026. This release will include new disaggregated data on the outcomes of age disputes. Over time, this will provide a more complete national picture, make clearer distinctions between stages of the process and allow improved monitoring.
We continue to develop proposals on how we can share more information with local authorities, where appropriate to support effective planning and safeguarding. We are also engaging directly with stakeholders on progress made against the recommendations to ensure they are delivered in a way that continues to strengthen protections for children.
Minister of State (Home Office)
All members of the Department were required to complete a mandatory 'AI for all' learning package in 2025. All caseworkers were given comprehensive training on the use of APS before it was operationalised. Both ACS and APS underwent user acceptance testing and evaluation was conducted following pilots of both tools.
A specific inbox was set up for Decision Makers to feed back any issues found with the tool. All questions asked of the tool, have and will be logged, and are auditable. Subject Matter Expert (SME) testing continues after operationalisation, in conjunction with the CPIT (Country Policy & Information Team) for APS.
ACS has not yet been operationalised, but our Analysis and Insight team plan to conduct further follow up evaluations in due course.
Minister of State (Home Office)
Home Office officials keep the asylum accommodation estate under continual review. As part of this estate management, operational adjustments are made on an ongoing basis to ensure sufficient and suitable capacity is maintained to meet expected levels of demand.
As the department reduces its reliance on hotel accommodation, individuals and families, including women and children, are moved into more appropriate longer term forms of asylum accommodation within the existing estate. This includes dispersal accommodation and, where required, other contingency arrangements that meet the necessary standards for safety and suitability.
The Home Office is committed to ensuring that destitute asylum seekers are provided with safe, secure and appropriate accommodation, and that they are treated with dignity throughout the asylum process.
In line with the Allocation of Accommodation policy, accommodation is offered on a no choice basis across the United Kingdom. Where an individual has specific, acute needs that require them to be accommodated in a particular area, established processes supported by Migrant Help and asylum support casework teams are in place to consider such circumstances.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The Minister for Border Security & Asylum responded on 31 March 2026.
Minister of State (Home Office)
In the Restoring Order and Control policy statement, the Government committed to transforming its approach to safe and legal routes. This included the creation of a named sponsorship scheme to enable community groups to sponsor refugees and displaced persons.
Work is underway to deliver the named community sponsorship route.
Further details, including timeframes for the launch of the route, will be set out in due course.
Minister of State (Home Office)
In the Restoring Order and Control policy statement, the Government committed to transforming its approach to safe and legal routes. This included the creation of a named sponsorship scheme to enable community groups to sponsor refugees and displaced persons.
Work is underway to deliver the named community sponsorship route.
Further details, including timeframes for the launch of the route, will be set out in due course.
Minister of State (Home Office)
As of 6 March, 380 people have been transferred from France to the UK via the new safe, legal route and 377 people have been returned to France. It is not appropriate to provide a continual update on each phase of the operation, not least as it involves sensitive information that could prove valuable to the organised immigration crime gangs that are behind small boats crossings.
Minister of State (Home Office)
Since the Border Security Command was established in July 2024, we have brought together a wide range of partners to organised immigration crime (OIC) and reduce small boat crossings. We have already delivered a significant amount of activity; in 2025, there were 3,625 law enforcement disruptions of OIC, 37% more than in 2024 (2,648).
The Border Security Command has a monitoring and evaluation strategy in place which seeks to robustly assess the performance and impact of the Command against its priorities and outcome framework. As is required by the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025, the Border Security Commander will publish an annual report later this year reflecting on the system's performance for the previous financial year.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The Asylum Dispersal Grant supports local authorities with a contribution to the costs and pressures of accommodating asylum seekers across all eligible accommodation types in their area. The grant is not intended to meet full costs, but to provide a contribution towards costs incurred by councils, consistent with affordability, value for money and the Local Government Funding Doctrine.
The Home Office does not hold a single estimate of the total costs incurred by councils in delivering the services outlined in the Asylum Dispersal Grant Funding Instruction, as costs vary significantly by local authority. Each local authority is free to determine how best to utilise the funding but for monitoring and evaluation purposes must be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled the eligibility conditions in supporting Asylum Seekers in their area.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The Asylum Dispersal Grant supports local authorities with a contribution to the costs and pressures of accommodating asylum seekers across all eligible accommodation types in their area. The grant is not intended to meet full costs, but to provide a contribution towards costs incurred by councils, consistent with affordability, value for money and the Local Government Funding Doctrine.
The Home Office does not hold a single estimate of the total costs incurred by councils in delivering the services outlined in the Asylum Dispersal Grant Funding Instruction, as costs vary significantly by local authority. Each local authority is free to determine how best to utilise the funding but for monitoring and evaluation purposes must be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled the eligibility conditions in supporting Asylum Seekers in their area.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The Government has committed to a public consultation on shotgun controls and other firearms issues. This consultation will include consideration of measures to address the potential illegal use of forged firearms and shotgun certificates, including changes to certificate requirements. The consultation will be published in due course.
Minister of State (Home Office)
West Mercia Police will receive up to £1.6m in 2026-27 to support the force with the additional costs of Operation Lincoln. Total additional costs were forecast as up to £2.6m.
Minister of State (Home Office)
During the market engagement process for the HOELT, the Home Office engaged with a wide range of stakeholders, including existing Secure English Language Test (SELT) providers, assessment bodies, regulators such as Ofqual, and independent experts. Evidence submitted through this process included information on test security approaches, the risks and mitigations associated with different delivery models, technical controls and international comparisons. The Department took this evidence into account in developing the procurement specification, alongside its own internal analysis of security risks. The specification also considers not only the solutions available at the point of contract commencement, but the bidders’ approaches to innovating and improving security measures throughout the life of the contract to respond to new and emerging threats.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
The Home Office is designing the HOELT procurement to ensure resilience in test delivery. The specification includes requirements for contingency arrangements in the event that technical vulnerabilities are identified or exploited. The Department expects any appointed provider to have robust incident response procedures in place, including the ability to suspend affected testing where necessary, investigate and address vulnerabilities promptly, and maintain the integrity of results already issued. The Department will work with the provider and with Ofqual throughout the contract to monitor security and respond to emerging threats.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
The Home Office has considered the relative strengths of in-person supervision and digital security measures as part of its work to develop the HOELT. The Department acknowledges that both delivery models have strengths and limitations. In-person supervision at secure test centres provides a controlled environment that limits certain categories of risk. Digital security measures, when applied rigorously, can provide robust identity verification, real-time monitoring, and audit trails. The procurement specification requires any proposed solution to demonstrate that its security measures are fit for purpose for a high-stakes immigration test, and the evaluation will assess how bidders address these considerations.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Pursuant to answer of 16 January 2026 to UIN 104261
As set out in the answer of 16 January 2026, today's Secure English Language Testing concessions collect all applicants' fees with no return to the Department to cover the costs of managing and overseeing delivery. The new Home Office English Language Test service will deliver a net positive benefit to the public purse by changing that financial arrangement.
The Department has not made a separate published assessment of the net financial benefit of a model combining digital and in-person security measures compared to the model being tendered. The procurement specification sets out the security and integrity requirements that any delivery model must meet, and cost is assessed alongside those requirements as part of the evaluation process. The overall value for money assessment will be made in the context of the full evaluation.
A specific estimate of the net positive benefit has not been published, as the procurement process is ongoing and the financial arrangements will be determined at contract award.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
The Home Office is committed to ensuring the integrity of the Home Office English Language Test (HOELT). The procurement process requires any delivery model to meet appropriate integrity requirements. The Department is aware of the risks associated with remote testing and is working to ensure that robust safeguards are built into the specification. These include requirements for strong identity verification, AI-assisted monitoring, and other technical controls designed to detect and deter cheating. The Department continues to engage with experts and regulators, including Ofqual, as the programme develops.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
The Government fully supports the police to use all the powers available to them to prevent crimes occurring as a result of unlawful direct-action tactics, and to ensure those who do commit them face the full force of the law.
The National Police Coordination Centre has been working closely with the financial sector to understand the nature of the problem and is helping to co-ordinate a robust policing response.
I have also met representatives from the industry and a further meeting is scheduled with them and representatives from the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
Minister of State (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
James McMurdock
(Independent - South Basildon and East Thurrock)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
James McMurdock
(Independent - South Basildon and East Thurrock)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.
The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:
- the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;
- the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; or
- Border Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.
It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.
Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.
Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.
Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)
The White Paper “From Local to National: A New Model for Policing” sets out the Government’s proposals on the National Police Service. Further details will be set out in legislation when Parliamentary time allows.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The White Paper “From Local to National: A New Model for Policing” sets out the Government’s proposals on the National Police Service. Further details will be set out in legislation when Parliamentary time allows.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The right to peaceful protest is a vital part of our democracy, and people are free to gather and express their views, provided they do so within the law. The Public Order Act 1986 grants the police powers to manage protests by imposing conditions on public processions and assemblies to prevent serious disorder, disruption, or intimidation, while balancing the right to peaceful protest. It is for local police forces to determine whether to impose conditions.
The Home Office engages with policing partners and relevant stakeholders, including the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, on issues relating to public order and protest activity. The policing of protests, including any activity outside commercial premises, is an operational decision for the police who must balance the right to peaceful protest with the rights and safety of others.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.
It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.
It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.
It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.
It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.
Minister of State (Home Office)
The then Minister for Policing, Crime and fire met senior representatives of Cheshire Constabulary on 12 December 2024. The meeting covered the funding for Operation Hummingbird provided through the Police Special Grant, charging for special police services and foreign national offenders.
It is not customary to publish briefing papers prepared for, or notes of, Ministerial meetings, nor any follow up correspondence.
Minister of State (Home Office)