International Agreements Committee
Tuesday 23rd June 2026
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14:03
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Good afternoon and welcome to the International Agreements Committee in the House of Lords. I formally welcome to the meeting of our Select Committee, Justina got Kowalska. Sorry, got my apologies. Everyone pronounces my surname incorrectly so I know a dark mark because I didn't get yours right. First time round. Justina is deputy director of the centre for Eastern Studies and is on working virtually with us in person. We have Ed Arnold, Senior advisor, defence at the D Group, and Kevin Craven, chief executive officer of ads Group.
Uh, this is our first evidence session for our scrutiny of the UK, Poland Security and Defence Partnership. There will be one more next week, but this is our first contribution to the work. The agreement was published by the government on the government website on the 27th of May this year, and today it was formally laid before Parliament. And I'm going to ask the opening question, which is always very broad, but I'm then going to turn to my colleagues who will ask more focused questions.
And my colleagues, of course, may also wish to ask Supplementaries. My question is, in fact, to Justine and Ed, other questions will be either for all three or mentioned individually. But Justine and Ed, what do you consider to be the main security and defence challenges and threats faced by both the UK and Poland currently, and to what extent does the treaty address those challenges and threats?May I start with Justine on this occasion?
Uh, this is our first evidence session for our scrutiny of the UK, Poland Security and Defence Partnership. There will be one more next week, but this is our first contribution to the work. The agreement was published by the government on the government website on the 27th of May this year, and today it was formally laid before Parliament. And I'm going to ask the opening question, which is always very broad, but I'm then going to turn to my colleagues who will ask more focused questions.
And my colleagues, of course, may also wish to ask Supplementaries. My question is, in fact, to Justine and Ed, other questions will be either for all three or mentioned individually. But Justine and Ed, what do you consider to be the main security and defence challenges and threats faced by both the UK and Poland currently, and to what extent does the treaty address those challenges and threats?May I start with Justine on this occasion?
14:05
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yes. First of all, thank you very much for the invitation. I'm honoured to be able to speak before you on the um. Treaty between the UK and Poland on Security and defence partnership. With regard to your question on security and defence and defence challenges and threats faced by Poland and the UK, speaking from a Polish perspective. But I'm sure that also applies to a large extent to the UK. Poland is faced with a huge challenge coming from Russia.
Uh, that, uh, is, uh, in practice, uh, right now, uh, narrowed down to hybrid activities that Russia is, has been conducting against us, uh, for, uh, since, uh, basically, uh, 2022 and earlier with the intensification of these challenges in the past years, uh, it has started, uh, in the preparation, uh, of the full scale invasion on Ukraine. And already in autumn 2021, uh, Poland has faced, uh, huge wave of, uh, illegal migration steered from Russia and in cooperation with Belarus. Uh, that was meant to focus the Polish attention, Polish resources, uh, on Polish-belarusian border on the issue of illegal migration to steer the focus away from Ukraine and from the Russian military buildup.
Uh, this, uh, challenge, uh, has been persistent, uh, over the past years. It is still there. And it requires a lot of Polish attention, uh, Polish resources to secure the Polish-belarusian border in order to prevent illegal migrants coming not from Belarus and not from Russia, but from the Middle East, uh, from Africa to come to Poland and to the EU in general. And over the past few years, we have had help also. And support have been supported, uh, by the UK in dealing with, with, uh, challenge, uh, but this is only one element in the plethora of, uh, Russian hybrid actions against Poland and against, uh, Europe.
UK included. Uh, other ones are disinformation and the social media aimed at, uh, heating up, um, social mood against Ukraine, uh, for Russia against US European cooperation. Uh, we have dealt with intensified cyber attacks, um, on a variety of levels, uh, against public institution government institutions and private firms against critical infrastructure. We had, uh, have had physical attacks on critical infrastructure, uh, energy system, water plants, and others. Uh, we have had, uh, also example of arson. Uh, that, uh, was meant to intimidate society to show that it's not worth to stand up to Russia, uh, and to support Ukraine to, and it's better to, um, uh, to find a way of, um, some kind of negotiated peace and, uh, modus vivendi, uh, in relations with Russia.
We have had also military incidents. Uh, the recent one was in September 2025, the most, um, uh, visible and most concerning one, the intrusion of Russian drones into the deep into the Polish territory. Uh, which again, sent the same message. Uh, you are not able to defend yourself or was to send the same message. You are not able to defend yourself. And it's, uh, it's better to end the war on the terms that are favorable to Russia. And it's better to find a way of how to shape security and defence policy relations with Russia, what Poland is afraid that is that, uh, these hybrid actions are just a preparation.
Um, for possibly a conventional measures against Poland, against NATO eastern flank and which also the, um, other NATO allies, uh, due to the commitments, um, within the, within NATO, uh, would, uh, participate, uh, Russia has clearly stated its goals with regard to European security in December 2021. Uh, Russia wants to subordinate Ukraine. Russia wants to have a buffer zone neutralised zone of privileged interest in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia wants to change European security architecture to have different relations with European, uh, major European countries.
And it would like also to push the US out of Europe. Uh, these are the clear Russian goals. And, uh, for the time being, Russia is in the stage one, uh, dealing, uh, conducting, uh, war against Ukraine and also conducting hybrid operation against Poland, against UK, against Germany, France, major European countries, uh, to, uh, in order to, um, change the. Social mood, uh, with. Regard to support for Ukraine with regard to shaping differently relations with Russia to influence influence political elites.
Uh, and, uh, to achieve its goal in a more peaceful manner without needing to resort to military means. But if, uh, that will not work. Russia, after ending the war, after the end of war in Ukraine, if that would be a favorable end from Russian perspective, would be ready after a military buildup also to, uh, possibly attack, um, NATO countries, Poland, Baltic states conventionally and, uh, through this, uh, try to achieve its strategic goals of changing European security architecture and relations with European countries. Uh, so, uh, this, uh, we are in a, in a phase of intense hybrid, uh, operations against Poland.
Uh, but also against major European countries, um, UK included. And we need to prepare also for the worst meaning, uh, uh, defend defense of, uh, of NATO territory, especially on the northeastern flank. Thank you.
Uh, that, uh, is, uh, in practice, uh, right now, uh, narrowed down to hybrid activities that Russia is, has been conducting against us, uh, for, uh, since, uh, basically, uh, 2022 and earlier with the intensification of these challenges in the past years, uh, it has started, uh, in the preparation, uh, of the full scale invasion on Ukraine. And already in autumn 2021, uh, Poland has faced, uh, huge wave of, uh, illegal migration steered from Russia and in cooperation with Belarus. Uh, that was meant to focus the Polish attention, Polish resources, uh, on Polish-belarusian border on the issue of illegal migration to steer the focus away from Ukraine and from the Russian military buildup.
Uh, this, uh, challenge, uh, has been persistent, uh, over the past years. It is still there. And it requires a lot of Polish attention, uh, Polish resources to secure the Polish-belarusian border in order to prevent illegal migrants coming not from Belarus and not from Russia, but from the Middle East, uh, from Africa to come to Poland and to the EU in general. And over the past few years, we have had help also. And support have been supported, uh, by the UK in dealing with, with, uh, challenge, uh, but this is only one element in the plethora of, uh, Russian hybrid actions against Poland and against, uh, Europe.
UK included. Uh, other ones are disinformation and the social media aimed at, uh, heating up, um, social mood against Ukraine, uh, for Russia against US European cooperation. Uh, we have dealt with intensified cyber attacks, um, on a variety of levels, uh, against public institution government institutions and private firms against critical infrastructure. We had, uh, have had physical attacks on critical infrastructure, uh, energy system, water plants, and others. Uh, we have had, uh, also example of arson. Uh, that, uh, was meant to intimidate society to show that it's not worth to stand up to Russia, uh, and to support Ukraine to, and it's better to, um, uh, to find a way of, um, some kind of negotiated peace and, uh, modus vivendi, uh, in relations with Russia.
We have had also military incidents. Uh, the recent one was in September 2025, the most, um, uh, visible and most concerning one, the intrusion of Russian drones into the deep into the Polish territory. Uh, which again, sent the same message. Uh, you are not able to defend yourself or was to send the same message. You are not able to defend yourself. And it's, uh, it's better to end the war on the terms that are favorable to Russia. And it's better to find a way of how to shape security and defence policy relations with Russia, what Poland is afraid that is that, uh, these hybrid actions are just a preparation.
Um, for possibly a conventional measures against Poland, against NATO eastern flank and which also the, um, other NATO allies, uh, due to the commitments, um, within the, within NATO, uh, would, uh, participate, uh, Russia has clearly stated its goals with regard to European security in December 2021. Uh, Russia wants to subordinate Ukraine. Russia wants to have a buffer zone neutralised zone of privileged interest in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia wants to change European security architecture to have different relations with European, uh, major European countries.
And it would like also to push the US out of Europe. Uh, these are the clear Russian goals. And, uh, for the time being, Russia is in the stage one, uh, dealing, uh, conducting, uh, war against Ukraine and also conducting hybrid operation against Poland, against UK, against Germany, France, major European countries, uh, to, uh, in order to, um, change the. Social mood, uh, with. Regard to support for Ukraine with regard to shaping differently relations with Russia to influence influence political elites.
Uh, and, uh, to achieve its goal in a more peaceful manner without needing to resort to military means. But if, uh, that will not work. Russia, after ending the war, after the end of war in Ukraine, if that would be a favorable end from Russian perspective, would be ready after a military buildup also to, uh, possibly attack, um, NATO countries, Poland, Baltic states conventionally and, uh, through this, uh, try to achieve its strategic goals of changing European security architecture and relations with European countries. Uh, so, uh, this, uh, we are in a, in a phase of intense hybrid, uh, operations against Poland.
Uh, but also against major European countries, um, UK included. And we need to prepare also for the worst meaning, uh, uh, defend defense of, uh, of NATO territory, especially on the northeastern flank. Thank you.
14:12
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Thank you set out very clearly the threats, the dangers that face us both and across Europe. I'm going to go to Ed next to seek his view as well. But just in a perhaps I'll come back to you then, because there's also part of the question that is, do you think the trade, the treaty that's been signed will actually do something that's resistance. But can I go to Ed next, please?
14:12
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Of course. And I mean, I agree with Justina. I think she's covered the the hybrid threats very well. And I think there's a growing realization, not just in the UK, Poland, but Europe, that this is effectively what we see now is business as usual. It's the penalty of having Russia as a neighbor. And the issue for the Russians is that they are so heavily, conventionally committed in Ukraine and have been for a number of years. So to try and achieve that.
Objectives within Europe, they are leaning on the hybrid lever more. That is not to say that they will not potentially look towards the. The conventional lever. And I think in terms of the threat we face a very similar threat. I think the language in the Northolt treaty is far stronger. On describing the Russian threat, but also the potential solutions, not just in terms of bilateral engagement between the UK and Poland, but also critically in terms of support to Ukraine.
But I think the main differences in how we see the sort of the character of the threat is that Poland saw this for geographical and historical reasons, far earlier than we did in terms of the Komorowski Doctrine from the 20 tens, which is very much focused on territorial defence, whereas in the same period of time, the UK, principally in terms of an expeditionary mindset in the military, which we're still transitioning towards, um, more in terms of homeland defense and sort of NATO article five. And you see that also within the spending profiles from 2014 up until now, the UK met 2% then, which was only one of three members, including Greece and the UK.
And now when you look at Poland, I mean, last year, when this new 5% agreement was made at NATO, I mean, Poland was the only ally that didn't really, you know, it was between 3 and 5%. And they said, well, we didn't we don't really matter because we're already at five. So really the focus on territorial defence, both in terms of article three, national defence plans and article five, Poland is far stronger than the UK currently.
Objectives within Europe, they are leaning on the hybrid lever more. That is not to say that they will not potentially look towards the. The conventional lever. And I think in terms of the threat we face a very similar threat. I think the language in the Northolt treaty is far stronger. On describing the Russian threat, but also the potential solutions, not just in terms of bilateral engagement between the UK and Poland, but also critically in terms of support to Ukraine.
But I think the main differences in how we see the sort of the character of the threat is that Poland saw this for geographical and historical reasons, far earlier than we did in terms of the Komorowski Doctrine from the 20 tens, which is very much focused on territorial defence, whereas in the same period of time, the UK, principally in terms of an expeditionary mindset in the military, which we're still transitioning towards, um, more in terms of homeland defense and sort of NATO article five. And you see that also within the spending profiles from 2014 up until now, the UK met 2% then, which was only one of three members, including Greece and the UK.
And now when you look at Poland, I mean, last year, when this new 5% agreement was made at NATO, I mean, Poland was the only ally that didn't really, you know, it was between 3 and 5%. And they said, well, we didn't we don't really matter because we're already at five. So really the focus on territorial defence, both in terms of article three, national defence plans and article five, Poland is far stronger than the UK currently.
14:14
14:15
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I do think so, because the treaty covers the two areas I was talking about. Um, uh, countering, uh, Russian Belarusian hybrid activities against Poland, against the UK, against Europe, and, uh, preparing, uh, or enhancing deterrence and defence capabilities. Uh, with regard to, uh, to hybrid or to hybrid Russian activities, um, due to the provisions of the treaty. Um, say that Poland and the UK, um, will. Uh, cooperate to a large extent on countering hybrid threats, uh, will cooperate to a large extent on countering foreign information manipulation and interference.
Uh, and, uh, will cooperate as well on, um, on, uh, countering cyber attacks. Um, there is a joint action plan on irregular migration. This is an important topic for Poland, for the UK as well. Um, so we see that, uh, um, both countries are willing to enhance the cooperation and the key areas, um, where we see the challenges and threats coming from Russia. And this is a good thing. And I think that this cooperation has been existing in the past years.
And, uh, this treaty gives us, uh, gives or regulates it or, uh, puts that, uh, in writing, gives it a written form. Uh, and, uh, I think it's, um, it's good that it was formulated. So, um, in the document, um, on the other hand, uh, we see, um, also, um, uh, provisions regarding military cooperation, especially underlining the centrality of NATO. Um, both, both for Poland and for the UK, uh, which is very important.
Uh, and, uh, will cooperate as well on, um, on, uh, countering cyber attacks. Um, there is a joint action plan on irregular migration. This is an important topic for Poland, for the UK as well. Um, so we see that, uh, um, both countries are willing to enhance the cooperation and the key areas, um, where we see the challenges and threats coming from Russia. And this is a good thing. And I think that this cooperation has been existing in the past years.
And, uh, this treaty gives us, uh, gives or regulates it or, uh, puts that, uh, in writing, gives it a written form. Uh, and, uh, I think it's, um, it's good that it was formulated. So, um, in the document, um, on the other hand, uh, we see, um, also, um, uh, provisions regarding military cooperation, especially underlining the centrality of NATO. Um, both, both for Poland and for the UK, uh, which is very important.
14:17
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
May I just stop you there?I do know that one of my colleagues later on, as a question later on, where he's going to raise specific issues about NATO and particularly about Jeff. And I'm going to later on, I'm going to ask Lord Anderson if he might probe a little bit more on that with you, if I may. So I'm now going to turn to Baroness Bonham-Carter for the next question. Thank you.
14:17
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Thank you. Um, and I'm going to expand a bit on what the chair has been asking. Maybe start with, um, Kevin Craven as we haven't heard you yet. Um one of the key projects of the treaty is the manufacture and development of the next generation of missiles, which we have seen through Ukraine is. Well, and indeed the Middle East is, is the the speed with which warfare is changing. Um now there appears to be little detail, um how this will be implemented in practice.
How do you foresee the collaboration happening and are there obstacles to it. Sorry. Big question.
How do you foresee the collaboration happening and are there obstacles to it. Sorry. Big question.
14:18
14:18
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Um so firstly, for those of you who don't know, Aids is the trade association for aerospace defense, space and security. And our relevance in this area is both a number of our members are involved in the programmes we're talking about today. And we also run trade missions in country and support business. Missions over there. Um, so to to answer your question, I mean, in practice, this really is um. The third stage of an industrial relationship that has grown over time.
Uh, and, you know, there are a number of elements of that industrial relationship, but, um, what's pleasing to see is the deepening and increasing strength of those relationships, which will allow the right conditions for success. Um, and, you know, uh, you've mentioned the missiles, the common anti-air modular missile, but also, uh, the, um, combat. Information systems produced by Telus, UK and the Arrowhead frigates that Babcock is designing. But Mbda leading on complex weapons is been a significant milestone in. In terms of doing that, I think to suggest that there is devil in the detail is right.
Um, I guess what's interesting is that for the first time, uh, there is the concept of a shared production base rather than a pure export from the UK to production to Poland. And therefore, you know that, uh. How we work up the split of work where the components produced, where does the IP and the technology transfer work, you know, and what does sovereign capability look like in the case where both of us would be going to market on a global stage, you know, we're actually one of the things that is very interesting at the moment is defence spending growing, growing globally by 7% annually.
Europe 12%. There is a big market out there and the UK and Poland going to market together. You know, once the national programs are. Up and running is very interesting indeed. So huge amounts to build on and what we would like to see perhaps is also a little bit of work on the next tier down, where the supply chain that will support the major primes in their programs and this government to government framework.
Uh, and, you know, there are a number of elements of that industrial relationship, but, um, what's pleasing to see is the deepening and increasing strength of those relationships, which will allow the right conditions for success. Um, and, you know, uh, you've mentioned the missiles, the common anti-air modular missile, but also, uh, the, um, combat. Information systems produced by Telus, UK and the Arrowhead frigates that Babcock is designing. But Mbda leading on complex weapons is been a significant milestone in. In terms of doing that, I think to suggest that there is devil in the detail is right.
Um, I guess what's interesting is that for the first time, uh, there is the concept of a shared production base rather than a pure export from the UK to production to Poland. And therefore, you know that, uh. How we work up the split of work where the components produced, where does the IP and the technology transfer work, you know, and what does sovereign capability look like in the case where both of us would be going to market on a global stage, you know, we're actually one of the things that is very interesting at the moment is defence spending growing, growing globally by 7% annually.
Europe 12%. There is a big market out there and the UK and Poland going to market together. You know, once the national programs are. Up and running is very interesting indeed. So huge amounts to build on and what we would like to see perhaps is also a little bit of work on the next tier down, where the supply chain that will support the major primes in their programs and this government to government framework.
14:21
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Can I go to Justine next?Because, um, as I understand it, and I think that's what you were saying, Kevin, is that, um, we already have a structured and. Substantive, um, missile development cooperation, but if you can, can you expand on, on what more, um, you would like to, to be, to see being done in this treaty through this treaty.
14:21
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think, uh, the, um. Uh, provisions of. The treaty, uh, so the development of the next generation of missiles, uh, I was, um, trying to get more information about that. And I suppose that relates to what has been said. Meaning, uh, cooperation with regard to the development of the, uh, air defence system, uh, nADPh, uh, where Polish and UK firms, uh, British Mbda closely cooperate, uh, Poland, uh, co-producers, um, the, the um extended range missile and uh, as I understand, uh, both partners within this project have agreed to, um, develop next generation effector for the, this defence system of short range air defense system, uh, common missile.
Um. Uh, so I suppose that is, uh. What was meant by jointly developing next generation of missiles. And, uh, here, uh, this, uh, project, common project, uh, is, um. Assessed in Poland as quite successful. The UK is perceived as a partner, industrial partner, and firms from the UK are perceived as a very good industrial partners, uh, willing to engage in coproduction co-development. Uh, so Poland, uh, right now, uh, as far as I understand, uh, has three major, um, industrial projects, uh, that it develops or develops in cooperation with the, with the firms from the UK.
First, it's this narrow short range air defence system. Uh, the second one is, uh, the. Frigate, uh, program where Babcock is engaged. And the third one is the production of artillery. 155 ammunition, uh, in cooperation with BAE systems. Uh, and hence, I think the UK is largely perceived as, as a partner that is willing, um, in um, to engage in meaningful industrial cooperation with Poland, I suppose also, uh, with benefits for um arms companies in the UK.
Um. Uh, so I suppose that is, uh. What was meant by jointly developing next generation of missiles. And, uh, here, uh, this, uh, project, common project, uh, is, um. Assessed in Poland as quite successful. The UK is perceived as a partner, industrial partner, and firms from the UK are perceived as a very good industrial partners, uh, willing to engage in coproduction co-development. Uh, so Poland, uh, right now, uh, as far as I understand, uh, has three major, um, industrial projects, uh, that it develops or develops in cooperation with the, with the firms from the UK.
First, it's this narrow short range air defence system. Uh, the second one is, uh, the. Frigate, uh, program where Babcock is engaged. And the third one is the production of artillery. 155 ammunition, uh, in cooperation with BAE systems. Uh, and hence, I think the UK is largely perceived as, as a partner that is willing, um, in um, to engage in meaningful industrial cooperation with Poland, I suppose also, uh, with benefits for um arms companies in the UK.
14:24
14:24
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Up, I'd just like to ask Mr. Craven a supplementary question, and perhaps also you've seen a. What?Um, I you mentioned the joint ventures you're talking about entering. Export markets, I'm sure you're aware. Perhaps you may be involved in cases where such joint ventures do run up against a situation where one of the parties doesn't want to sell to a particular third party, and the other does, and everything then gets wonderfully stuck. There have been cases in Saudi Arabia, but I won't go into them all.
Uh, where that has happened. What sort of, um. Uh, safeguards have you built into this industrial cooperation?I'm not saying which make it impossible for such a disagreement to arise, because you can't make it impossible. But you can can ensure that the parties consult at a very early stage about joint projects. And once they're into a joint project, which they want to sell to a country A, B or C, they don't pull out halfway through just because they have a row with that country or whatever it is.
What sort of safeguards are there in that?
Uh, where that has happened. What sort of, um. Uh, safeguards have you built into this industrial cooperation?I'm not saying which make it impossible for such a disagreement to arise, because you can't make it impossible. But you can can ensure that the parties consult at a very early stage about joint projects. And once they're into a joint project, which they want to sell to a country A, B or C, they don't pull out halfway through just because they have a row with that country or whatever it is.
What sort of safeguards are there in that?
14:25
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Well, the short answer is there is no detail about any safeguards that might be built in, and they're actually quite difficult to build in because of the flexible and volatile nature of geopolitical relationships and alignments in today's world. So, uh, it is something that's really complex to do, but I do think it's possible to be aligned on export opportunities, uh, which generally require government to government arrangements. Uh, and therefore, you know, it's possible to foresee some of those obstacles fairly early in the campaigns and perhaps escalate them to the right levels before they happen is the strong advice I would give.
Um, I think, you know, it's an increasingly competitive market globally. And most of the firms that we are talking about, both Polish and UK firms are already, uh, players. In global markets. So again, not starting from scratch, but the UK is probably peculiar in Europe in that it is excellent at JVs. There are numerous examples. Mbda probably being the strongest example where um, some of these complex um. Challenges to overcome have been and will continue to be so, so in that sense, it's a useful entree to and a foundation layer to an EU, UK security pact, which we all hope might take on a bit more substance going forward.
Um, I think, you know, it's an increasingly competitive market globally. And most of the firms that we are talking about, both Polish and UK firms are already, uh, players. In global markets. So again, not starting from scratch, but the UK is probably peculiar in Europe in that it is excellent at JVs. There are numerous examples. Mbda probably being the strongest example where um, some of these complex um. Challenges to overcome have been and will continue to be so, so in that sense, it's a useful entree to and a foundation layer to an EU, UK security pact, which we all hope might take on a bit more substance going forward.
14:27
14:27
14:27
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Noting in terms of the, the evolution that Kevin was talking about in terms of 2017, I mean, that that treaty set out some sort of structural and broad. Aspects of cooperation, but there were 23 areas for potential cooperation that was narrowed down to focus on. 7 in 23. And now what I actually think is the difference between the Northolt treaty and the other is that it actually looks at potential frictions to try and minimize them. You're not going to get rid of them, but you can mitigate and minimize.
So it talks about joint procurement, research and development, removing regulatory barriers, barriers in a UK, EU context, export control supply chains and enabling capacity. So quite often with, you know, agreements like this, it starts from a capability perspective and you're looking at the blueprints, etcetera, and developing it like that. And you just don't really have the capacity or foresight to look at some of the issues that you raise. So I think that is that is definitely a change. What I would like to say, just because I think it sets the context of what we might discuss later in terms of the constraints, I think that there's two that are absolutely critical.
One is prioritisation, both within the Northolt treaty because it expands to other areas. We've covered migration. You know, how do you continue to develop what is actually a very good relationship on defence and security and insulate it from other political issues such as UK, France, migration can quite often see the relationship to work on other things. And then also in terms of prioritisation with other countries, both Poland and the UK, we have got a lot of bilaterals. Bilateral relationships like this have increased, and if you talk about it, for example, on long range strike capability, you know, we are tied in to a number of initiatives with a variety of companies.
How do we make sure that that actually produces capability?Um, and then I think the other aspect is delivery. This is just the treaty that has been signed. It needs a lot of political support. And I note on article 12 entry into force, the treaty shall enter force 30 days after, you know, it's been pushed before Parliament today. And since the UK Prime Minister, Defence Secretary and armed Forces minister has resigned. So when you're talking about delivery, when you're talking about momentum, when you're talking about political capital behind these relationships and prioritisation, if you were Poland and you were looking at that from an agreement perspective, I think you'd be fairly concerned.
So it talks about joint procurement, research and development, removing regulatory barriers, barriers in a UK, EU context, export control supply chains and enabling capacity. So quite often with, you know, agreements like this, it starts from a capability perspective and you're looking at the blueprints, etcetera, and developing it like that. And you just don't really have the capacity or foresight to look at some of the issues that you raise. So I think that is that is definitely a change. What I would like to say, just because I think it sets the context of what we might discuss later in terms of the constraints, I think that there's two that are absolutely critical.
One is prioritisation, both within the Northolt treaty because it expands to other areas. We've covered migration. You know, how do you continue to develop what is actually a very good relationship on defence and security and insulate it from other political issues such as UK, France, migration can quite often see the relationship to work on other things. And then also in terms of prioritisation with other countries, both Poland and the UK, we have got a lot of bilaterals. Bilateral relationships like this have increased, and if you talk about it, for example, on long range strike capability, you know, we are tied in to a number of initiatives with a variety of companies.
How do we make sure that that actually produces capability?Um, and then I think the other aspect is delivery. This is just the treaty that has been signed. It needs a lot of political support. And I note on article 12 entry into force, the treaty shall enter force 30 days after, you know, it's been pushed before Parliament today. And since the UK Prime Minister, Defence Secretary and armed Forces minister has resigned. So when you're talking about delivery, when you're talking about momentum, when you're talking about political capital behind these relationships and prioritisation, if you were Poland and you were looking at that from an agreement perspective, I think you'd be fairly concerned.
14:29
14:30
14:30
14:31
14:32
14:32
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Yes. So in this growing and evolving relationship, you know, committing the two countries to align their sort of defence industrial bases and export strategies is incredibly helpful. And actually, I believe is a very good model for other bilateral relationships that we might look at as well. Um, so that ability to pursue joint procurement, um, sort of maintain those interchangeable capabilities. And as has already been mentioned, the ability to minimise the regulatory barriers to, um, maximise the outputs and effect of these programmes.
I mean, so the, the impact is already direct and visible, you know, since 2017, the um relationships have. Been growing. Uh, you can see that both in terms of the support for UK jobs and factories. Uh, and you can see it in terms of the increased numbers of business traffic between the countries, uh, at key points like exhibitions and trade missions and the like. So we're already seeing that. Um, and it is useful further in terms of strengthening ties with Europe more generally.
So we have, um, other bilateral treaties like Trinity House with Germany, uh, and that, you know, is possible to evolve further in this type of way. Um, so I think it's a very good pragmatic model, uh, in, with a country that is on the eastern flank and faces a direct threat, uh, that, uh, speeds up the innovation cycle, speeds up the procurement cycle. And there are things that I think are generally helpful for the UK industrial base, uh, as well.
I mean, so the, the impact is already direct and visible, you know, since 2017, the um relationships have. Been growing. Uh, you can see that both in terms of the support for UK jobs and factories. Uh, and you can see it in terms of the increased numbers of business traffic between the countries, uh, at key points like exhibitions and trade missions and the like. So we're already seeing that. Um, and it is useful further in terms of strengthening ties with Europe more generally.
So we have, um, other bilateral treaties like Trinity House with Germany, uh, and that, you know, is possible to evolve further in this type of way. Um, so I think it's a very good pragmatic model, uh, in, with a country that is on the eastern flank and faces a direct threat, uh, that, uh, speeds up the innovation cycle, speeds up the procurement cycle. And there are things that I think are generally helpful for the UK industrial base, uh, as well.
14:35
14:35
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I mean, in terms of UK, Poland specifically, I mean, I like the simplicity of it. It's effectively a defence and long range strike, you know, as NATO calls the sword and the shield. Why is that important?Well, in terms of long range strike, it is the one thing that the Russians have absolutely no answer for, both in terms of on the battlefield in Ukraine with their rail lines, for example, logistics, command and control being struck. And then now we're seeing that the Ukrainians are actually going after other, um, capabilities, oil refineries, etc., effectively the sort of the means of production for the Russian war machine.
So the Russians are really vulnerable and we are building a variety of things. And in terms of the missile, I mean, it's modular. So it can be used in a variety of ways. And I think there's a naval and land element to it. And then on air defence, I think this is one of the biggest changes for European militaries that over the past sort of say 30 years, I mean, air defence was deprioritized and where there were countries that had a prioritisation, it was generally to protect the force in the field rather than the civilian population.
So on a political sort of prioritisation, it goes really quite far up. When you look at other air defence and security relationships that the UK has, they're a bit confused and it's very difficult to sort of progress in certain areas. You know, there's a nuclear element to some that can sort of complicate it. So the fact that it's air defence and its long range strike, and it's not just bilateral, although some of the work will be done bilaterally. It's also in conjunction with our main European allies, particularly France and Germany.
As Kevin mentioned.
So the Russians are really vulnerable and we are building a variety of things. And in terms of the missile, I mean, it's modular. So it can be used in a variety of ways. And I think there's a naval and land element to it. And then on air defence, I think this is one of the biggest changes for European militaries that over the past sort of say 30 years, I mean, air defence was deprioritized and where there were countries that had a prioritisation, it was generally to protect the force in the field rather than the civilian population.
So on a political sort of prioritisation, it goes really quite far up. When you look at other air defence and security relationships that the UK has, they're a bit confused and it's very difficult to sort of progress in certain areas. You know, there's a nuclear element to some that can sort of complicate it. So the fact that it's air defence and its long range strike, and it's not just bilateral, although some of the work will be done bilaterally. It's also in conjunction with our main European allies, particularly France and Germany.
As Kevin mentioned.
14:38
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
If I may, one supplementary. Um, I probably should have mentioned that an interesting aspect of this is that the infrastructure for these missiles, uh, actually will be funded by the safe funds that the EU produced. And so the command and control cabins, the launch chassis. And the logistics chain that support the actual infrastructure to fire the missiles will be funded by safes. So in that sense, whilst we're not accessing safe funds directly, um, it does demonstrate that there is a very clear need for the UK's industrial capability to be accessed by Europe in this case.
Well, and in a more general case as well.
Well, and in a more general case as well.
14:40
14:40
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
Very much. Well, the next question concerns cyber security and cyber attacks and related information and hybrid threats. More generally. What I'd like to ask is how much work, um, are you doing and perhaps, um, Mr. Craven might like to pick this up and Mr. Arnold and then we might come because especially about how much work, um, has been done with NATO to tackle such attacks. And to what extent does the present um push in the, the treaty, um which is the provision for increased collaboration in cyber security capabilities and work and to work on new and disruptive technologies.
How far does that reflect, um, Poland's desire to keep NATO close?And does it, do you work as a collaborative project with NATO, or will this be a separate project?
How far does that reflect, um, Poland's desire to keep NATO close?And does it, do you work as a collaborative project with NATO, or will this be a separate project?
14:42
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Be clear. I think it will be a separate project from NATO. Yeah. And it is very significant. And I'll come on to that. Um, but I mean, NATO obviously sees this hybrid warfare area very, very, uh, with. Grave concern. Uh, and, you know, talking to some Ukrainian colleagues last night to sort of raise the question of both the, uh, cognitive, um, campaigns like interference in elections, propaganda, uh, social media, etc., as being a And social media, etc.
as being a major factor in downplaying. Brain's ability to react. That has been that type of approach, together with the more overt manifestations like cyber attacks, industrial espionage, and that as being something very significant for NATO to think about. Um, in terms of this particular treaty. Um, it really does sit at a dedicated counter hybrid cooperation agreement. Uh, and the formation of a working group specifically on cyber across both military and civilian agencies. Um, and there is, um, the concept of a joint task force to, to counter the use of drones, which, as we all know, is something that is already happening.
Um, I think from an industrial point of view, I think we see it as extremely significant because actually, if you think about hybrid warfare for the very first time, this is not the military forces of a country that are under attack. It is actually the private companies, uh, who are. Providing the means for warfare that are amongst the first targets. And depending on whether you are, uh, a very large scale military, uh. Producing, uh, war weapons producing company, or you're a small component supplier, 3 or 4 tiers down the supply chain, the level of readiness, understanding, and ability to counter these threats is, um, very different indeed.
So calling it out in this treaty, we think is a really, very important thing. And we would like to see, uh, considerable effort devoted to it. There is not actually sufficient detail at the moment, but nor would you expect it to be, to be honest. And so, um, it's an area we're going to pay close attention to, uh, and hope that the government does deliver on the intent.
as being a major factor in downplaying. Brain's ability to react. That has been that type of approach, together with the more overt manifestations like cyber attacks, industrial espionage, and that as being something very significant for NATO to think about. Um, in terms of this particular treaty. Um, it really does sit at a dedicated counter hybrid cooperation agreement. Uh, and the formation of a working group specifically on cyber across both military and civilian agencies. Um, and there is, um, the concept of a joint task force to, to counter the use of drones, which, as we all know, is something that is already happening.
Um, I think from an industrial point of view, I think we see it as extremely significant because actually, if you think about hybrid warfare for the very first time, this is not the military forces of a country that are under attack. It is actually the private companies, uh, who are. Providing the means for warfare that are amongst the first targets. And depending on whether you are, uh, a very large scale military, uh. Producing, uh, war weapons producing company, or you're a small component supplier, 3 or 4 tiers down the supply chain, the level of readiness, understanding, and ability to counter these threats is, um, very different indeed.
So calling it out in this treaty, we think is a really, very important thing. And we would like to see, uh, considerable effort devoted to it. There is not actually sufficient detail at the moment, but nor would you expect it to be, to be honest. And so, um, it's an area we're going to pay close attention to, uh, and hope that the government does deliver on the intent.
14:48
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Yeah. And can I just ask there?It's a very interesting answer. It reminds me of, um, some of the problems that arose in World War Two in the bombing of industrial targets, which were very important for both, both for the both Germany and the UK. And this seems to me to be a much more, um, a much more sophisticated problem that you will have to deal with in the defense capabilities industries.
14:49
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Yes. And if I may use a Ukrainian example, uh, literally this morning I was talking to one of the Ukrainian trade associations who are deeply concerned about a database that exists in the UK of, um, Ukrainian suppliers with UK subsidiaries, but that has led to, uh, they believe um, targeted drone attacks on some of their facilities inside Ukraine, you know, so that level of sophistication you're talking about, uh, something that might seem. Relatively simple and straightforward has become a problem where, you know, several Ukrainian firms have been attacked and have had to move production facilities.
Um, so I think that's the consequences of hybrid warfare are not well understood by the British public. And I genuinely believe that political leadership, uh, is needed to increase the level of awareness and understanding.
Um, so I think that's the consequences of hybrid warfare are not well understood by the British public. And I genuinely believe that political leadership, uh, is needed to increase the level of awareness and understanding.
14:51
14:51
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Thank you very much. Now, um, we are halfway through our list of questions and I have four colleagues yet to ask some very in-depth questions. I'm going to continue with that. But at the end, if we have time, I know that I have supplementaries supplementary questions waiting to be asked by Lords Haney and Anderson. So we'll see how we manage to motor on. May I now turn to Lord?Said Wilf. I beg your pardon, Lord Stevenson, aka Wilf.
14:52
Speaker 11
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Speaker 11
Thank you. Gentlemen. To and to Ed, perhaps starting with Ed um at first. Glance it's a bit surprising to see a treaty which basically is about defence having a commitment to deepen cooperation on energy and health security, law enforcement, and countering irregular migration. But you have touched on the reasons for that. Could you try and give us a sort of stand back and look at it in the round?But where does that where do these things fit in relation to what we've just been hearing about in terms of the defence industries themselves?Ed first perhaps.
14:54
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Um I mean, I think it's more in the construct of how these agreements come together. So quite often when you have had past agreements, you know, not just between the UK and other countries, but within Europe, if you don't mention certain policy areas, the question is, well, why not that policy area as an example, and because of the threats, as we covered in the first question, are so much more comprehensive in a variety of domains, then the agreements also need to reflect that. And I think that's why you get a lot of additional areas.
And again, what we've found, you know, principally after the 22 large scale invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, while that was a state on state conflict, it's covered other issues like energy security, food security. So it's just we need to look at it more. So I think that's why it is specifically written into the treaty. But again, back to my earlier point, these things all need a lot of effort and also momentum. And in previous treaties that where there's been a, for example, cyber working group, etc., you know, it's actually quite difficult to find out what they do.
And you may ask certain departments and say, well, what about this?That was in a treaty that's supposed to meet every six months. And, you know, when did we last last meet?So I think the issue is for each line item, you've got to have a programme of work, but you've also got to have momentum. And, you know, back to the previous point on cyber, one of the issues always been about European security, particularly from the American position, famously sort of Madeleine Albright's speech a very long time ago, is about duplication.
And the issue is that of all of these issues that are in Northolt, I mean, they are seen by a variety of countries. So it's not just about the bilateral. It's about bringing others in. And generally speaking, uh, sharing best practice.
And again, what we've found, you know, principally after the 22 large scale invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine, while that was a state on state conflict, it's covered other issues like energy security, food security. So it's just we need to look at it more. So I think that's why it is specifically written into the treaty. But again, back to my earlier point, these things all need a lot of effort and also momentum. And in previous treaties that where there's been a, for example, cyber working group, etc., you know, it's actually quite difficult to find out what they do.
And you may ask certain departments and say, well, what about this?That was in a treaty that's supposed to meet every six months. And, you know, when did we last last meet?So I think the issue is for each line item, you've got to have a programme of work, but you've also got to have momentum. And, you know, back to the previous point on cyber, one of the issues always been about European security, particularly from the American position, famously sort of Madeleine Albright's speech a very long time ago, is about duplication.
And the issue is that of all of these issues that are in Northolt, I mean, they are seen by a variety of countries. So it's not just about the bilateral. It's about bringing others in. And generally speaking, uh, sharing best practice.
14:57
14:57
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, well, I think this treaty is also about comprehensive security. And hence you have the national security cooperation included, uh, countering, uh, irregular migration or how to increase resilience in and of energy security. And I understand, uh, the majority of the other provisions of the treaty in this context, uh, if you read the article three on National Security cooperation, uh, it, uh, it is about, uh, countering, uh, hybrid threats. Uh, Femi um, uh, coordinating on counterterrorism, uh, but also on how to combat, um, criminal, um, organizations, uh, which is often, often, uh, you, which are often used by, uh, by hostile actors, uh, Russia included, uh, with regard to energy, uh, security cooperation, uh, and economic cooperation.
I think, uh, it has, it is time to broaden the scope of the cooperation between the Poland and the UK, uh, also to non strictly defense and security topics. And, uh, this is the opportunity. And, uh, I would really look, I'm looking forward on, um, the work on implementation of these provisions, uh, in real life beyond security and defence, which would broaden the scope of the, of the Polish, um, British relations.
I think, uh, it has, it is time to broaden the scope of the cooperation between the Poland and the UK, uh, also to non strictly defense and security topics. And, uh, this is the opportunity. And, uh, I would really look, I'm looking forward on, um, the work on implementation of these provisions, uh, in real life beyond security and defence, which would broaden the scope of the, of the Polish, um, British relations.
14:59
15:00
15:00
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Yes, I wonder if all three of you could help us a little bit by telling identifying ways in which this treaty. One we're looking at now differs or builds on or separate from the 2017 UK Poland Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation and the 2023 UK Poland. 2030 Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration on Foreign Policy, Security and Defence. Rather a lengthy title, much loved by diplomats. But um, could you say in what ways the. There is a difference here in this treaty and it changes.
And if I could add on a supplementary to save time, but it's not on this particular subject. Throughout the Cold War, the British Foreign Office was very active in dealing with disinformation and attempts by the Soviet bloc, but above all by the Soviet Union to infiltrate international organisations. Uh, cultural events and so on. To what extent do you have the impression that the present British government and the present Fcdo are organised to deal with that sort of thing, which I have no doubt whatsoever, from all the reporting we see emanates from Russia now and attempts to undermine, support political support in particular, and support public support for agreements like the ones we're discussing.
And if I could add on a supplementary to save time, but it's not on this particular subject. Throughout the Cold War, the British Foreign Office was very active in dealing with disinformation and attempts by the Soviet bloc, but above all by the Soviet Union to infiltrate international organisations. Uh, cultural events and so on. To what extent do you have the impression that the present British government and the present Fcdo are organised to deal with that sort of thing, which I have no doubt whatsoever, from all the reporting we see emanates from Russia now and attempts to undermine, support political support in particular, and support public support for agreements like the ones we're discussing.
15:04
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Well, certainly in terms of the this treaty is different in that it is legally binding, really important, and also provides an explicit commitment to assist each other in the event of an armed attack. Alongside NATO's article five, and very explicitly alongside that. So it does actually move from cooperation towards sort of very genuine co-development and co-production, uh, which, as we've mentioned before, aligned industrial and export strategies. So there are significant differences, but in the interest of time, leave it at that. Um, it also goes broader than that into other areas as we've discussed, um, on your supplementary, difficult question to answer.
They, they are aware they are doing an enormous amount to mitigate and prevent the types of attacks. Is it sufficient is probably the question that one has to ask. And I simply don't know the answer. It is the resources that foreign state actors are dedicating to this area is significantly greater than we are putting towards defending. Those activities. So, you know, it's an area where I think all Western governments are having to rethink how they prioritise this.
They, they are aware they are doing an enormous amount to mitigate and prevent the types of attacks. Is it sufficient is probably the question that one has to ask. And I simply don't know the answer. It is the resources that foreign state actors are dedicating to this area is significantly greater than we are putting towards defending. Those activities. So, you know, it's an area where I think all Western governments are having to rethink how they prioritise this.
15:06
15:07
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Your first question, I think in terms of the difference, apart from just, just what's been said, I mean, I think it's significant that this is a treaty after there was a treaty signed in 2017. That's obviously a political choice. It could have just been a supplementary or sort of, you know, a refreshed, um, 23 document in terms of the vision to 2030. So I think there's an element within European security that if you have a treaty based relationship with someone independent of NATO, that it's kind of it's a priority level.
So when there's a crisis, you know, in the UK government, you know, who do you pick up the phone first to?Well, it's probably going to be France, Germany and Poland. And they are three states that we have bilateral defense agreements. So I think there's an element of prioritization. The risk there obviously again is if the delivery is not as quick as expectations or there's a problem within delivery, well, the risk is that you're then not delivering on an additional treaty. On the second point, I don't think it's a comparison you can really make with the Cold War, just because it's effectively technology enabled disinformation.
So really quick example, you know, Russian intelligence agencies in the Cold War, I mean, they had to do manual pitches. I mean, they had to do physical pitches, research, etc. nowadays, they can just go on LinkedIn and refine a massive target list of, you know, thousands down to five to then make very structured pitches. It's a lack of capacity on the Foreign Office and other departments side. And that's very, very difficult to counter. And it's just the sheer volume of disinformation, misinformation that is very, very difficult to counter that.
I don't think you can quite make, um, a comparison with how it's dealt with in the Cold War.
So when there's a crisis, you know, in the UK government, you know, who do you pick up the phone first to?Well, it's probably going to be France, Germany and Poland. And they are three states that we have bilateral defense agreements. So I think there's an element of prioritization. The risk there obviously again is if the delivery is not as quick as expectations or there's a problem within delivery, well, the risk is that you're then not delivering on an additional treaty. On the second point, I don't think it's a comparison you can really make with the Cold War, just because it's effectively technology enabled disinformation.
So really quick example, you know, Russian intelligence agencies in the Cold War, I mean, they had to do manual pitches. I mean, they had to do physical pitches, research, etc. nowadays, they can just go on LinkedIn and refine a massive target list of, you know, thousands down to five to then make very structured pitches. It's a lack of capacity on the Foreign Office and other departments side. And that's very, very difficult to counter. And it's just the sheer volume of disinformation, misinformation that is very, very difficult to counter that.
I don't think you can quite make, um, a comparison with how it's dealt with in the Cold War.
15:10
15:10
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
If I may answer the question on why shall we sign a new treaty between Poland and the UK?I think that the 2017 treaty was focused very much on security and defence, and it did not go beyond that. The 2023 declaration was an update of that during, uh, the government, um, peace government, uh, that and that, that was the continuity. Uh, so this, uh, this, the 2026 treaty is broader than security and defence issues only. And I think this is a strength of this, of this treaty to put, um, to.
Have cooperation between Poland and the UK going beyond, uh, the. Usual, uh, security and defence issues. Uh, and, uh, hence, as I said before, I hope that there is a continuation and there is a, there is an implementation of this, uh, there will be implementation of these provisions, but that is a one way of looking at this treaty. The second one, uh, was mentioned, uh, we are facing, uh, or have, uh, have faced in recent years, um, the signing of bilateral treaties between the biggest three countries, uh, France, Germany and the UK.
Uh, and, uh, in this, uh, more uncertain international environment, uh, with NATO, um, being in transformation, these bilateral treaties give additional, um, uh, additional assurances, I would say, especially from, uh, from Polish perspective, even if they are put in the NATO framework and in the article five framework, we have had, uh, the UK signing a treaty with, with France, with Germany recently and Poland signing a treaty with France, uh, last year. Nancy treaty with the UK this year and a treaty that or a defence agreement that that is focused on, defence and security issues with Germany that has been signed this month.
And, uh, from a Polish perspective, this this, um, gives the signing of these treaties gives, um, a sort of more assurances that, uh, the party, um, will, uh, react if the situation, um, will not allow NATO, for example, to, uh, uh, for. To react jointly and.
Have cooperation between Poland and the UK going beyond, uh, the. Usual, uh, security and defence issues. Uh, and, uh, hence, as I said before, I hope that there is a continuation and there is a, there is an implementation of this, uh, there will be implementation of these provisions, but that is a one way of looking at this treaty. The second one, uh, was mentioned, uh, we are facing, uh, or have, uh, have faced in recent years, um, the signing of bilateral treaties between the biggest three countries, uh, France, Germany and the UK.
Uh, and, uh, in this, uh, more uncertain international environment, uh, with NATO, um, being in transformation, these bilateral treaties give additional, um, uh, additional assurances, I would say, especially from, uh, from Polish perspective, even if they are put in the NATO framework and in the article five framework, we have had, uh, the UK signing a treaty with, with France, with Germany recently and Poland signing a treaty with France, uh, last year. Nancy treaty with the UK this year and a treaty that or a defence agreement that that is focused on, defence and security issues with Germany that has been signed this month.
And, uh, from a Polish perspective, this this, um, gives the signing of these treaties gives, um, a sort of more assurances that, uh, the party, um, will, uh, react if the situation, um, will not allow NATO, for example, to, uh, uh, for. To react jointly and.
15:15
15:15
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, the UK has been the preferred ally for the current opposition. Uh, peace government has signed the 2017 Treaty on. Defence and Security Cooperation and has signed the 2023 um Strategic Partnership Joint Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership. So I, uh, do think that, uh, the current opposition is supporting the Polish, uh, UK treaty and its ratification in the Parliament, but, uh, the, we have, um, a cohabitation, uh, the president, which is, uh, which, who is coming from the opposition party and the current government and a strong polarization and the incoming parliamentary elections.
And, uh, these or many differences are being played out. Uh, and the president, um, has expressed his, um, not concerns, but dissatisfaction, how the government has cooperated with the Chancellery of the president on how this, uh, this treaty has been presented to the head of state and has expressed his concern, uh, publicly. But, uh, I'm of the opinion that the ratification, uh, both in the Parliament, uh, and by the president will be concluded because the UK is an important partner from the Polish perspective, there is a continuous cooperation on security and defence issue.
Regardless, the party, which is, uh, in government.
And, uh, these or many differences are being played out. Uh, and the president, um, has expressed his, um, not concerns, but dissatisfaction, how the government has cooperated with the Chancellery of the president on how this, uh, this treaty has been presented to the head of state and has expressed his concern, uh, publicly. But, uh, I'm of the opinion that the ratification, uh, both in the Parliament, uh, and by the president will be concluded because the UK is an important partner from the Polish perspective, there is a continuous cooperation on security and defence issue.
Regardless, the party, which is, uh, in government.
15:16
15:16
Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Lord Hannay has already asked about the added value of the treaty, and you have conceded that it is a bit Christmas tree like, and it's so it gives such a wide definition to security. My question really is about the Joint Expeditionary Force, founded in 2012 with UK as its head, which included almost from the start Finland and Sweden, not then NATO members. So Ukraine might possibly join. Why is Poland reluctant to join the JF?
15:16
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Well, uh, I have heard two explanation why Poland over the past years why Poland is not part of the JF Joint Expeditionary Force. And one explanation was that the UK does not want us in. And the second explanation is that Poland is not, is or has been reluctant to join. And um, overall, whatever the explanation is, I think that JF is a specific format of, of cooperation focused especially on the maritime area where the UK is the framework nation cooperating with smaller countries and, uh, Poland, uh, is, uh, um.
Larger country and the, in central, eastern Europe, central Europe and um, somehow does not fit, uh, both politically and military in the forum, especially politically, uh, not, uh, in the format. Uh, so this is from, from a political perspective, from a military perspective, uh, Jeff is focused very much on maritime domain on both on the Baltic Sea, but also on the northern Atlantic. And Poland is very much focused on the land domain. And, uh, for obvious reasons, uh, and hence, uh, prefer to shape maritime cooperation that is largely focused on the Baltic Sea.
And our preferred format is the, uh. Common task force, uh, Baltic. Uh, um, which, where we cooperate with Germany, with Sweden and which, uh, the, these, uh, common structures are coordinating, uh, allied efforts, uh, in the Baltic Sea, like the Baltic century. So this is our currently our preferred format of cooperation in the maritime domain. And Jeff has different political and military goals. Uh, I would say from, from the UK perspective and from the perspective of the, of the Nordic countries that are engaged in this format.
Larger country and the, in central, eastern Europe, central Europe and um, somehow does not fit, uh, both politically and military in the forum, especially politically, uh, not, uh, in the format. Uh, so this is from, from a political perspective, from a military perspective, uh, Jeff is focused very much on maritime domain on both on the Baltic Sea, but also on the northern Atlantic. And Poland is very much focused on the land domain. And, uh, for obvious reasons, uh, and hence, uh, prefer to shape maritime cooperation that is largely focused on the Baltic Sea.
And our preferred format is the, uh. Common task force, uh, Baltic. Uh, um, which, where we cooperate with Germany, with Sweden and which, uh, the, these, uh, common structures are coordinating, uh, allied efforts, uh, in the Baltic Sea, like the Baltic century. So this is our currently our preferred format of cooperation in the maritime domain. And Jeff has different political and military goals. Uh, I would say from, from the UK perspective and from the perspective of the, of the Nordic countries that are engaged in this format.
15:16
15:16
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I mean, it could expand, I think the issue of Jeff is, yes, it was, uh, conceived in 2012. It's a part of NATO framework agreements which were agreed at the Wales summit in 2014. So it's always had a defence dimension, very operational from 22 when the invasion, the first leaders meeting was held virtually the day after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And it started to develop a political dimension. Uh, that political dimension has stalled for a variety of reasons. And actually, there's now a view that actually, if the Jeff is going to develop, it's possibly not going to be in the political dimension, but back actually to a military framework, very much focused in on the North.
I think the issue specifically around Poland is that the Jeff is there to sort of cohere regionally like minded allies. Now, the UK has command of the Arctic and the high North in terms of NATO through Joint Force Command, Norfolk. And there's a rotating command through Germany and Poland in Brunson, which basically covers the eastern flank and predominantly in the land environment. So you have to kind of ask the question, where would the value add be for Poland?And I think Justin has just mentioned it there, you know, maritime capability cooperation led by Germany and the Baltic and now Baltic Sentry.
Uh, in terms of the NATO mission. So actually you're seeing a slight delineation. I'm not entirely sure that the, you know, it's a good fit militarily or politically at the moment that can change. And I think the, the catalyst for change would be a demonstrable change of opinion from the US within NATO and people looking at a potential plan B, the Jeff is a very good option because it has intelligence, it has operations, it has logistics plans and vitally communications. There's not many sub NATO formats that have that.
But that would have to be a very political decision of the UK to actually expand. Jeff, to try and encapsulate and keep NATO functioning, or in a sort of regional area as close to it currently does. But that would, again, be something that you'd have to look at in terms of the US change of position.
I think the issue specifically around Poland is that the Jeff is there to sort of cohere regionally like minded allies. Now, the UK has command of the Arctic and the high North in terms of NATO through Joint Force Command, Norfolk. And there's a rotating command through Germany and Poland in Brunson, which basically covers the eastern flank and predominantly in the land environment. So you have to kind of ask the question, where would the value add be for Poland?And I think Justin has just mentioned it there, you know, maritime capability cooperation led by Germany and the Baltic and now Baltic Sentry.
Uh, in terms of the NATO mission. So actually you're seeing a slight delineation. I'm not entirely sure that the, you know, it's a good fit militarily or politically at the moment that can change. And I think the, the catalyst for change would be a demonstrable change of opinion from the US within NATO and people looking at a potential plan B, the Jeff is a very good option because it has intelligence, it has operations, it has logistics plans and vitally communications. There's not many sub NATO formats that have that.
But that would have to be a very political decision of the UK to actually expand. Jeff, to try and encapsulate and keep NATO functioning, or in a sort of regional area as close to it currently does. But that would, again, be something that you'd have to look at in terms of the US change of position.
15:16
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Thank you very much. Very challenging. I'd say throughout that makes an all very thoughtful. And our last question is going to be asked by Lord MacDonald. I appreciate we have now hit the magic time of one hour. May I just check that all three of our contributors are able to stay a little bit longer to answer?Thank you very much indeed. Very grateful. Lord MacDonald, over to you, please.
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15:16
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
I'm happy to go first. And my answer might be equally brief. Um, I think one of the challenges that has already been mentioned is that, uh. The UK's credibility as a customer in this process, um, you know, uh, I didn't really want to mention the defence investment plan, but, uh, inevitably, uh, the delays or sending a mixed signal to our allies, uh, just as we are committing to joint programmes, um, slightly less controversially than perhaps the, uh, the benefits of this treaty, you know, if we're using the Christmas tree analogy, I might use the twinkles in the Christmas tree, might be the SMEs in the supply chain.
That would help our major crimes in Poland be a UK. Mbda uh, in uh, building. These industrial relationships that are both long lasting and multi-decade.
That would help our major crimes in Poland be a UK. Mbda uh, in uh, building. These industrial relationships that are both long lasting and multi-decade.
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Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Yeah. I mean credibility I think is critical covered. Uh, prioritization is a point I've made previously, not just in terms of the bilateral, but everything else that is going on in Europe, bearing in mind that that is, is very much a changing position. But I think also governance for this particularly. So the UK Poland relationship generally meets through the two plus two format, which is defence secretaries and foreign secretaries. That's pretty good. There's got to be a judgment call of if you look at all of these areas that now covers, I mean, you could potentially have 12 ministers and I mean, you know, just diaries permitting that wouldn't sort of help.
So I think on the governance, you have to have it at the very top. So from the UK position, that needs to be the Prime Minister to drive this. In terms of the prioritisation. And I think you probably need it jointly led by the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, but with the Home Secretary sort of joining as and when. And then I think also, if you were going to have, say, a three plus three meeting where you can clear diaries and get the discussions going, that actually that's where you'd see that prioritisation and that strategic sort of view from a UK and Poland view be realised.
This can't just be bilaterally between the defence secretaries, the foreign secretaries and just better departments and departmental working. It has to be elevated, I think.
So I think on the governance, you have to have it at the very top. So from the UK position, that needs to be the Prime Minister to drive this. In terms of the prioritisation. And I think you probably need it jointly led by the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, but with the Home Secretary sort of joining as and when. And then I think also, if you were going to have, say, a three plus three meeting where you can clear diaries and get the discussions going, that actually that's where you'd see that prioritisation and that strategic sort of view from a UK and Poland view be realised.
This can't just be bilaterally between the defence secretaries, the foreign secretaries and just better departments and departmental working. It has to be elevated, I think.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I'm not sure I agree with the metaphor of a Christmas tree. I see this treaty as, uh, building up on the core of cooperation that focused for years on security and defence that has been updated, um, through this treaty and expanded a little bit on the issues concerning national security cooperation hybrid, which on the other hand, have been a field for joint projects. Um, especially. In Eastern Europe. Uh, from what I have, I know, uh, um, how British polish-british cooperation look like in the past we have had project of cooperation on how to counter fimi uh, how to counter a hybrid hybrid threats in countries like Ukraine and Moldova.
And these were very successful. Uh, and then this treaty expands, uh, the, uh. Areas of cooperation, which reflects also, uh, I think how Poland, uh, has changed and how the Polish, uh, British relations have changed in the past year. So Poland is not only one dimensional cooperation, one dimension cooperation partner regarding security and defence, but once, uh, to, uh, broaden this cooperation to a larger areas like economy, health, and, uh, uh, and, uh, energy. And hence, for me, that's the challenge, how to implement that.
Uh, and, uh, on security and defence, uh, I think we are, uh, looking with concern what is happening in the UK with regard of defence investments in the British armed forces, and to what extent the UK will be able to meet its commitments within NATO. And this is very important for us, uh, in the situation where the US is coming up with with the concept of NATO three zero and the europeanisation of the alliance, where in order to keep and maintain deterrence, the European allies need to do much, much more and meet their commitments and quickly.
And, uh, for me, uh, this is and I think from a Polish perspective, the battle over financing of the British armed Forces, uh, is, uh, as a question mark.
And these were very successful. Uh, and then this treaty expands, uh, the, uh. Areas of cooperation, which reflects also, uh, I think how Poland, uh, has changed and how the Polish, uh, British relations have changed in the past year. So Poland is not only one dimensional cooperation, one dimension cooperation partner regarding security and defence, but once, uh, to, uh, broaden this cooperation to a larger areas like economy, health, and, uh, uh, and, uh, energy. And hence, for me, that's the challenge, how to implement that.
Uh, and, uh, on security and defence, uh, I think we are, uh, looking with concern what is happening in the UK with regard of defence investments in the British armed forces, and to what extent the UK will be able to meet its commitments within NATO. And this is very important for us, uh, in the situation where the US is coming up with with the concept of NATO three zero and the europeanisation of the alliance, where in order to keep and maintain deterrence, the European allies need to do much, much more and meet their commitments and quickly.
And, uh, for me, uh, this is and I think from a Polish perspective, the battle over financing of the British armed Forces, uh, is, uh, as a question mark.
15:16
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Thank you very much indeed for your contributions today. So this is our, our first session on scrutinising the treaty itself. Thank you for giving us a very detailed background about the threats, the real threats, every single day, every single second against both the UK, Europe and Poland because of the instability that we face, the threats from Russia. But thank you too, for the reality of the people who have to deliver what really happens. And that is producing the support for those who are going to take part in the producing the material, producing the weaponry that can actually keep us safe.
And I think really, what has come down through your very practical contributions is that the treaty has legality. It's up to governments to make sure that there is. And I wrote down a programme of work and momentum, and it's our job to make sure that governments, whatever their composition may be, do just that. Thank you very much indeed. I thereby close this meeting formally.
And I think really, what has come down through your very practical contributions is that the treaty has legality. It's up to governments to make sure that there is. And I wrote down a programme of work and momentum, and it's our job to make sure that governments, whatever their composition may be, do just that. Thank you very much indeed. I thereby close this meeting formally.