International Relations and Defence Committee
Wednesday 8th July 2026
Skip to latest contribution
This debate has concluded
(began 2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Watch LiveSkip to latest contribution
This debate has concluded
14:01
Speaker 1
-
Speaker 1
Well, good afternoon. And Ambassador Bolton very much. Welcome you to the International Relations and Defense Committee of the House of Lords. Thank you for making the time, and we will be going straight into questions from various members of the committee. We've already sort of allocated specific questions. On a personal note, um, you may not recall me. I certainly recall you having served under both Prime Minister Johnson and Prime Minister May in terms of engagements during that time, but also in, uh, transparency as well.
Um, relevant interest need to be declared at the start. Um, whilst I as minister in the previous government, but relevant interests now I chair an advisory board on the international Communities organisation. And if I just remind all members, when you address the committee and ask Ambassador Bolton your first question, if there are any relevant interests to declare them at that time. Um, welcome. Once again, this is Ambassador Bolton, the sixth evidence session, uh, for our inquiry, which is looking at the role of multilateralism.
But today we very much welcome your perspective on the US role and the future role in the multilateral system that the US. From your perspective, is playing and should be playing?Um, we've been taking evidence from various people in this regard. And I would also add at this juncture, we're of course particularly interested in the UK's role in terms of practical terms going forward. So welcome your own insights and perspectives in that regard. Just to share with you that this session is being live streamed on our parliamentary website and a transcript of the session will be taken.
And once available, there will be a copy sent of the transcript, uh, where small corrections, if needed, can be made. Um, I've already reminded members of declaring interest, so thank you once again. And, uh, if I may say, Mr. Bolton, we're going to go straight into the questions, but feel free. I think we have an hour or so. If there is time in your schedule after, it, we'll certainly be pleased to continue for a small period thereafter, but also please see it as an opportunity beyond the sort of formal questions.
If there's other areas you want to provide insight on would certainly welcome that. So as the chair of this particular committee today, in the absence of Lord Robertson, who I'm sure you know, um and I'm glad we've been joined by other members. Uh, we have one member, Lord Bruce, who's joining us virtually. And we welcome back, uh, our dear friend, Lord Grocott, uh, physically, as you, it's always good to see you again in person, Bruce, as well. And apologies, Jen. We've got no formal.
Just the chairman. Okay. The first question really is, uh, post the. Second World War, the United States was responsible for building and maintaining the post-war multilateral system. Ambassador Bolton, in your view, here we are in 2026. Will it continue to play that role?And how do you see that role developing in terms of its nuances in years to come?
Um, relevant interest need to be declared at the start. Um, whilst I as minister in the previous government, but relevant interests now I chair an advisory board on the international Communities organisation. And if I just remind all members, when you address the committee and ask Ambassador Bolton your first question, if there are any relevant interests to declare them at that time. Um, welcome. Once again, this is Ambassador Bolton, the sixth evidence session, uh, for our inquiry, which is looking at the role of multilateralism.
But today we very much welcome your perspective on the US role and the future role in the multilateral system that the US. From your perspective, is playing and should be playing?Um, we've been taking evidence from various people in this regard. And I would also add at this juncture, we're of course particularly interested in the UK's role in terms of practical terms going forward. So welcome your own insights and perspectives in that regard. Just to share with you that this session is being live streamed on our parliamentary website and a transcript of the session will be taken.
And once available, there will be a copy sent of the transcript, uh, where small corrections, if needed, can be made. Um, I've already reminded members of declaring interest, so thank you once again. And, uh, if I may say, Mr. Bolton, we're going to go straight into the questions, but feel free. I think we have an hour or so. If there is time in your schedule after, it, we'll certainly be pleased to continue for a small period thereafter, but also please see it as an opportunity beyond the sort of formal questions.
If there's other areas you want to provide insight on would certainly welcome that. So as the chair of this particular committee today, in the absence of Lord Robertson, who I'm sure you know, um and I'm glad we've been joined by other members. Uh, we have one member, Lord Bruce, who's joining us virtually. And we welcome back, uh, our dear friend, Lord Grocott, uh, physically, as you, it's always good to see you again in person, Bruce, as well. And apologies, Jen. We've got no formal.
Just the chairman. Okay. The first question really is, uh, post the. Second World War, the United States was responsible for building and maintaining the post-war multilateral system. Ambassador Bolton, in your view, here we are in 2026. Will it continue to play that role?And how do you see that role developing in terms of its nuances in years to come?
14:05
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Thank you. And thank you again for the chance to provide testimony before your committee, uh, you know, in the U.S., not totally, but typically we we divide, uh, discussions of international organizations into, uh, or the multilateral system into organizations which are part of the UN system or close to it, like the world Bank and the IMF, which are technically part of the UN system, the multilateral development banks, the international judicial institutions, and call them multilateral organizations, as opposed to, uh, alliances for. For collective defense like NATO, which we don't typically call international organizations.
Uh, that's not uniformly followed, but it's a distinction that I think it's important because collective defense organizations are certainly nothing new in human history. They go back before recorded human history. I have no doubt the system of international organizations that's developed more recently, uh, is, uh, is I think it's better to treat on its own. And in terms of the system that came, uh. After World War two, it's obviously under stress from a variety of, uh, different, uh, directions. Certainly it's under stress from Donald Trump at the moment.
But to try and make this a broader picture, and I hope, give you some feel for U.S. opinion generally. And of course, I have my own opinions as well. Uh, I'll try not to make that a focus. Uh, you know, it's, uh, a. Lot has changed in the world since the United Nations was created in 1945. The UN itself has grown dramatically. Uh, and, and there are problems that exist with the UN today that have been growing over the years.
And I think are more and more evident and more difficult of solutions. Uh, I'd like to split the UN system even further, if I may. And first talk very briefly about the specialized and technical agencies, the World Health Organization, uh, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the world, the World Meteorological Organization, the International Maritime Organization headquartered in London. There are dozens of these specialized agencies. They don't tend to get as much attention as the UN as itself, but they do considerable important work.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, is quite likely the most the most famous of them. All these agencies have well-defined mandates. When they stick within their mandates, don't get involved in broader political issues. I think they perform important, useful functions when they when they get distracted by political issues or find themselves involved in such issues. Sometimes that causes difficulty. But but the the effectiveness of each of those agencies can be judged on its own merits. Is it achieving the objectives that the founders intended and have modified over time?But to switch to what most people think of when they they characterize the United Nations, and that would be the New York institutions, uh, the the Security Council, the General Assembly, and some others, uh, the Human Rights Council in particular, many of these agencies, many of these bodies, frankly, are broken.
The Security Council was gridlocked during the Cold War. It did very little. It had some significant achievements. Uh, security Council resolution two for two and three, three, nine respecting the Middle East. But by and large, uh, after the Cold War, dimensions were set, uh, almost nothing productive came out of it. We thought in the early 1990s as the Soviet Union broke up, that there might be a chance for the council to work in a new and more effective fashion.
So, for example, in 19. 90, uh, when after the, uh, Iraqi. Regime of Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1989, the Security Council adopted resolution 678, which authorized the use of force in aid of Kuwait as an exercise in collective self-defense. That was the first authorization of the use of force by the Council since 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea. So there was a time in the in the late 1980s, early 1990s that people thought the council could, uh, kind of spring back into life.
Um, but I think what we've seen in the roughly 35 years since then is that it's gridlocked again. And, uh, although the circumstances have changed from the Cold War, we still have Russia and China on one side, generally speaking, and the UK, France and the US on the other side, among the permanent members, generally speaking, uh, and having served at the UN on behalf of the United States in 2005 and 2006, I can I could attest to that at great length, how that dynamic works, which makes it very hard to accomplish much.
Uh, and I don't, I don't see that changing. And I will leave aside perhaps others will want to ask about the ongoing discussion, whether the five permanent members who, who created the UN and became permanent members, really in 1945, are the right five permanent members. Should the structure of the Security Council be changed?This is an ongoing debate. I've seen it for over 40 years now. I don't I don't think it's going to end anytime soon, but it's, uh, it's, it's a, it's part of the context in which the council operates, the General Assembly, I have to say, has I'm hard pressed to find a time when it ever really performed well, um, and it was, uh, I think one of those things you can say seemed like a good idea at the time, but its resolutions are uniformly ignored.
Nobody covers them in the press in the United States anymore. Um, and I just, I has trouble, uh, uh, effectively. Working on the UN's budget itself as, as we've seen with many reform efforts that have failed and the Human Rights Council, which the U.S. voted against, uh, recreating in 2006, uh, we have joined and rejoined, joined and left and joined and left again. Uh, I don't, I don't propose to spend much time on it, but I don't think it's doing all that much with respect to human rights.
So these basic elements of the U.N. system are in real trouble, I think, with respect to the IMF and the world Bank. Uh, there are similar debates you can have about them and the regional development banks. Uh, are they continuing to be effective?Do we need them so much anymore?Are they the IMF was created in a world of fixed exchange rates that disappeared in the 1970s. Uh, should it be repurposed in some regard?Uh, you know, I think these are issues that are going to be debated over time as well.
And last, I'll come to the World Trade Organization, which I favor the idea of the World Trade Organization. I am a free trader, uh, and have been for a long time. I do not agree with the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization. I do not think that the mandatory dispute resolution by panels of arbitrators is correct. I think it's a it's a derogation of certainly American sovereignty. I think you resolve trade disputes between nations in the traditional way.
And I think that's a real problem, uh, for the WTO. And I think that's a problem in both Republican and Democratic administrations here. Um, uh, I'll just take a second on NATO. I think NATO has overwhelming support in the United States on a bipartisan basis in Congress and in the general public. That's not the position of the Trump administration. And we're seeing it unfold in front of us, uh, in Ankara as the NATO summit unfolds. Uh, again, I'll withhold any extensive comment on that.
If the members want to talk about it. Uh, I'm happy to respond, but I do want to underline, uh, that, that the position of the current administration on NATO is nowhere close to a majority of opinion in Congress or, I think, in the general public. I hope the United States, going forward maintains a strong international position. International organizations, fixing them where they can be fixed, uh, creating new ones where, where that might be appropriate. Uh, and in some cases, leaving ones that have simply failed.
I think, I think death comes to all things in the natural world. They may even come to agencies of government and international organizations. That's not a bad thing.
Uh, that's not uniformly followed, but it's a distinction that I think it's important because collective defense organizations are certainly nothing new in human history. They go back before recorded human history. I have no doubt the system of international organizations that's developed more recently, uh, is, uh, is I think it's better to treat on its own. And in terms of the system that came, uh. After World War two, it's obviously under stress from a variety of, uh, different, uh, directions. Certainly it's under stress from Donald Trump at the moment.
But to try and make this a broader picture, and I hope, give you some feel for U.S. opinion generally. And of course, I have my own opinions as well. Uh, I'll try not to make that a focus. Uh, you know, it's, uh, a. Lot has changed in the world since the United Nations was created in 1945. The UN itself has grown dramatically. Uh, and, and there are problems that exist with the UN today that have been growing over the years.
And I think are more and more evident and more difficult of solutions. Uh, I'd like to split the UN system even further, if I may. And first talk very briefly about the specialized and technical agencies, the World Health Organization, uh, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the world, the World Meteorological Organization, the International Maritime Organization headquartered in London. There are dozens of these specialized agencies. They don't tend to get as much attention as the UN as itself, but they do considerable important work.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, is quite likely the most the most famous of them. All these agencies have well-defined mandates. When they stick within their mandates, don't get involved in broader political issues. I think they perform important, useful functions when they when they get distracted by political issues or find themselves involved in such issues. Sometimes that causes difficulty. But but the the effectiveness of each of those agencies can be judged on its own merits. Is it achieving the objectives that the founders intended and have modified over time?But to switch to what most people think of when they they characterize the United Nations, and that would be the New York institutions, uh, the the Security Council, the General Assembly, and some others, uh, the Human Rights Council in particular, many of these agencies, many of these bodies, frankly, are broken.
The Security Council was gridlocked during the Cold War. It did very little. It had some significant achievements. Uh, security Council resolution two for two and three, three, nine respecting the Middle East. But by and large, uh, after the Cold War, dimensions were set, uh, almost nothing productive came out of it. We thought in the early 1990s as the Soviet Union broke up, that there might be a chance for the council to work in a new and more effective fashion.
So, for example, in 19. 90, uh, when after the, uh, Iraqi. Regime of Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1989, the Security Council adopted resolution 678, which authorized the use of force in aid of Kuwait as an exercise in collective self-defense. That was the first authorization of the use of force by the Council since 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea. So there was a time in the in the late 1980s, early 1990s that people thought the council could, uh, kind of spring back into life.
Um, but I think what we've seen in the roughly 35 years since then is that it's gridlocked again. And, uh, although the circumstances have changed from the Cold War, we still have Russia and China on one side, generally speaking, and the UK, France and the US on the other side, among the permanent members, generally speaking, uh, and having served at the UN on behalf of the United States in 2005 and 2006, I can I could attest to that at great length, how that dynamic works, which makes it very hard to accomplish much.
Uh, and I don't, I don't see that changing. And I will leave aside perhaps others will want to ask about the ongoing discussion, whether the five permanent members who, who created the UN and became permanent members, really in 1945, are the right five permanent members. Should the structure of the Security Council be changed?This is an ongoing debate. I've seen it for over 40 years now. I don't I don't think it's going to end anytime soon, but it's, uh, it's, it's a, it's part of the context in which the council operates, the General Assembly, I have to say, has I'm hard pressed to find a time when it ever really performed well, um, and it was, uh, I think one of those things you can say seemed like a good idea at the time, but its resolutions are uniformly ignored.
Nobody covers them in the press in the United States anymore. Um, and I just, I has trouble, uh, uh, effectively. Working on the UN's budget itself as, as we've seen with many reform efforts that have failed and the Human Rights Council, which the U.S. voted against, uh, recreating in 2006, uh, we have joined and rejoined, joined and left and joined and left again. Uh, I don't, I don't propose to spend much time on it, but I don't think it's doing all that much with respect to human rights.
So these basic elements of the U.N. system are in real trouble, I think, with respect to the IMF and the world Bank. Uh, there are similar debates you can have about them and the regional development banks. Uh, are they continuing to be effective?Do we need them so much anymore?Are they the IMF was created in a world of fixed exchange rates that disappeared in the 1970s. Uh, should it be repurposed in some regard?Uh, you know, I think these are issues that are going to be debated over time as well.
And last, I'll come to the World Trade Organization, which I favor the idea of the World Trade Organization. I am a free trader, uh, and have been for a long time. I do not agree with the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization. I do not think that the mandatory dispute resolution by panels of arbitrators is correct. I think it's a it's a derogation of certainly American sovereignty. I think you resolve trade disputes between nations in the traditional way.
And I think that's a real problem, uh, for the WTO. And I think that's a problem in both Republican and Democratic administrations here. Um, uh, I'll just take a second on NATO. I think NATO has overwhelming support in the United States on a bipartisan basis in Congress and in the general public. That's not the position of the Trump administration. And we're seeing it unfold in front of us, uh, in Ankara as the NATO summit unfolds. Uh, again, I'll withhold any extensive comment on that.
If the members want to talk about it. Uh, I'm happy to respond, but I do want to underline, uh, that, that the position of the current administration on NATO is nowhere close to a majority of opinion in Congress or, I think, in the general public. I hope the United States, going forward maintains a strong international position. International organizations, fixing them where they can be fixed, uh, creating new ones where, where that might be appropriate. Uh, and in some cases, leaving ones that have simply failed.
I think, I think death comes to all things in the natural world. They may even come to agencies of government and international organizations. That's not a bad thing.
14:14
Speaker 1
-
Speaker 1
Thank you, Ambassador Bolton. I'm we will be coming on to the WTO and indeed, I'm sure we'll return to NATO in a moment. Just one quick Subquestion do you think after what you've said, that um, appreciate, uh, the insights of both as ambassador in your different roles?The UN, when we look at conflicts around the world today, um, is. Not to be seen around the table. Um, where do you see in the coming months, we've got live conflicts on, on our continent, in Europe, of course, with Ukraine, we see the continuing situation, not just in between Israel and Palestine.
There's the situation ongoing with Iran. Again this morning. There were developments. Do you see now that countries, as we've been seeing that because of what you've said, are now just doing their own thing in the sense that there is a big power, the United States, which is then able to convene others. And we've seen Middle Eastern countries, for example, come in and play the kind of brokerage role which traditionally we would have expected the UN to do so.
There's the situation ongoing with Iran. Again this morning. There were developments. Do you see now that countries, as we've been seeing that because of what you've said, are now just doing their own thing in the sense that there is a big power, the United States, which is then able to convene others. And we've seen Middle Eastern countries, for example, come in and play the kind of brokerage role which traditionally we would have expected the UN to do so.
14:15
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, the trouble with the UN's involvement, whether it's in the form of the secretary general or envoys that he appoints or the Security Council directly, is that to see something in the current international environment that really gives the U.N. a chance to play a major role, you have to find a conflict where the five permanent members don't have any real interest, or where their interests don't conflict. And I'd be hard pressed sitting before you today to come up with, with a case that that meets those criteria. Uh, again, this is not the Cold War, but the gridlock that enveloped the Security Council during the Cold War was, was not dissimilar to what we see here.
14:15
14:15
Speaker 3
-
Speaker 3
Thank you. Um, Ambassador Bolton, picking up what you said at the end of your initial presentation, which was that you hope that the USA would continue to be involved in international in the international world and its organizations. And can I ask you what you think will actually happen?That's your hope. Um, but do you think that the withdrawal by the Trump leadership during the second Trump administration from a number of, um, multilateral. Relations is likely to continue. And so that un Bretton Woods organizations, for example, or indeed the WTO are going to be targeted next.
Not necessarily just by the Trump administration, but by any administration that follows. So there's a continuing withdrawal by the US from taking a front line part in these bodies.
Not necessarily just by the Trump administration, but by any administration that follows. So there's a continuing withdrawal by the US from taking a front line part in these bodies.
14:16
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, certainly I can't speak for the Trump administration, but I don't I don't sense any, uh, any, any great enthusiasm left. Uh, you know, the, uh. President has a short attention span and he may have exhausted it on the UN already. Uh, but I think from the perspective broadly of U.S. national interest, that it's, uh, entirely, uh, appropriate. For us to hold, uh, international organizations to the highest standards we can and, uh, and to fight about budgets and what they're being spent on and whether they're being spent well, and whether the organization is effective.
And frankly, uh, whether before joining it or at any, at any point, whether we continue to find it in the interest of the United States, you know, in the early 1980s, the US, the United Kingdom and Singapore withdrew from Unesco. Uh, I thought that was the right thing to do. Then, uh, we've, uh, Britain and Singapore have gone back in the U.S. has gone in, come out, gone in, come out. I would not rejoin Unesco to this day. And, uh, that's, that's my personal opinion.
Uh, but but it also comes from long involvement in international organizations. And I don't I don't think the subject generally is, is, uh, really central to the public political debate in the, at this point.
And frankly, uh, whether before joining it or at any, at any point, whether we continue to find it in the interest of the United States, you know, in the early 1980s, the US, the United Kingdom and Singapore withdrew from Unesco. Uh, I thought that was the right thing to do. Then, uh, we've, uh, Britain and Singapore have gone back in the U.S. has gone in, come out, gone in, come out. I would not rejoin Unesco to this day. And, uh, that's, that's my personal opinion.
Uh, but but it also comes from long involvement in international organizations. And I don't I don't think the subject generally is, is, uh, really central to the public political debate in the, at this point.
14:18
14:18
14:18
Speaker 5
-
Speaker 5
Good afternoon, ambassador. Um, I wonder what do you see as the key factors contributing to the U. S backlash against multilateral institutions under President Trump?And do you think this goes back a long way historically?To what extent do you consider it is justified?The administration's skepticism?Is this a phenomenon that we're going to see as a permanent phenomenon in American politics?
14:19
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, again, I think it's important here to distinguish between the international organizations like the UN, IMF, and WTO, on the one hand, versus NATO on the other. I think there are different, uh, subjects at stake. And I do I do believe one of the issues that has led to skepticism in the United States really going back to the to the treaty of. Versailles at the end of World War One was the question of what some call supranationalism or what others call derogation of sovereignty.
Uh, the, the, the principal opposition to the League of Nations in the Senate. Uh, after after the Versailles negotiations concluded was the opinion of some that the treaty automatically required the United States to engage in military activity when the league's council had decided to do it. Now, there were those who said they didn't read the treaty that way. There were others who proposed an amendment or a reservation that would make it clear the U.S. didn't consider itself bound by a decision by the league council.
Uh, but because of Woodrow Wilson's unwillingness to tolerate any reservations, no solution was found in the U.S., rejected the league that has continued to, uh. To that feeling has continued to exist in American policy ever since. And so when you come, not to institutions like the United Nations itself, but let's say, to the International Criminal Court, which I strongly opposed personally, uh, that is that is a the Rome Statute is a treaty that purports to give this court jurisdiction over individual American citizens without regard to the government of the United States.
And for that and many, many other reasons, I consider it unacceptable. Um, I don't think the International Criminal Court is much debated in, in, in U.S. politics either. Probably never will be. We've never joined the law of the Sea Treaty. I don't think we ever will. Um, but I also think that this push toward super supranationalism or continued minimization of national sovereignty, uh, is not burning as brightly today as it did perhaps 25 years ago. And, uh, that the push toward it has receded.
So the real question is, are existing international organizations doing what they should be doing?Are they effective or are they not?Uh, and I think in the U.S., it's probably fair to say there's a lot more skepticism of how effective many of these organizations are, and that may have something to do with in the U.N. typically, our assessed contribution is a little bit over 20%. And, uh, and that still makes us the biggest contributor. Uh, I think it's healthy to be skeptical. Uh, and I think it's, it's appropriate that we, that we push to make organizations do what they say they're supposed to do.
Uh, let me take the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA is a good example. I think it's a very important organization. Uh, but it's not as effective as it could be. And, and so the question is, how can we make it stronger that that arouses a lot of debate, a lot of opposition by countries that don't want the IAEA to be more effective, like Iran and North Korea, which withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. So I think it's a it's a question you have to look at each organization, but as a broad matter, I think it's in American interest to be involved and to have our position known.
And if. If we ultimately find ourselves unable to prevail. And over a period of time, we see an organization acting contrary to our interests, then it's equally appropriate to withdraw from it.
Uh, the, the, the principal opposition to the League of Nations in the Senate. Uh, after after the Versailles negotiations concluded was the opinion of some that the treaty automatically required the United States to engage in military activity when the league's council had decided to do it. Now, there were those who said they didn't read the treaty that way. There were others who proposed an amendment or a reservation that would make it clear the U.S. didn't consider itself bound by a decision by the league council.
Uh, but because of Woodrow Wilson's unwillingness to tolerate any reservations, no solution was found in the U.S., rejected the league that has continued to, uh. To that feeling has continued to exist in American policy ever since. And so when you come, not to institutions like the United Nations itself, but let's say, to the International Criminal Court, which I strongly opposed personally, uh, that is that is a the Rome Statute is a treaty that purports to give this court jurisdiction over individual American citizens without regard to the government of the United States.
And for that and many, many other reasons, I consider it unacceptable. Um, I don't think the International Criminal Court is much debated in, in, in U.S. politics either. Probably never will be. We've never joined the law of the Sea Treaty. I don't think we ever will. Um, but I also think that this push toward super supranationalism or continued minimization of national sovereignty, uh, is not burning as brightly today as it did perhaps 25 years ago. And, uh, that the push toward it has receded.
So the real question is, are existing international organizations doing what they should be doing?Are they effective or are they not?Uh, and I think in the U.S., it's probably fair to say there's a lot more skepticism of how effective many of these organizations are, and that may have something to do with in the U.N. typically, our assessed contribution is a little bit over 20%. And, uh, and that still makes us the biggest contributor. Uh, I think it's healthy to be skeptical. Uh, and I think it's, it's appropriate that we, that we push to make organizations do what they say they're supposed to do.
Uh, let me take the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA is a good example. I think it's a very important organization. Uh, but it's not as effective as it could be. And, and so the question is, how can we make it stronger that that arouses a lot of debate, a lot of opposition by countries that don't want the IAEA to be more effective, like Iran and North Korea, which withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. So I think it's a it's a question you have to look at each organization, but as a broad matter, I think it's in American interest to be involved and to have our position known.
And if. If we ultimately find ourselves unable to prevail. And over a period of time, we see an organization acting contrary to our interests, then it's equally appropriate to withdraw from it.
14:22
Speaker 5
-
Speaker 5
But I'll just go back to your remarks earlier about the UN Security Council. Is it really fair or appropriate to judge it by the same criteria by which you're judging other UN institutions?Doesn't the Security Council have value in itself, just as being a sounding board, just as being a place where. Different powers, or the two main blocs in the world, or in the time of the Cold War, the two blocs could come together, discuss and argue publicly, and that this in itself has a value or certainly some value compared with if the Security Council didn't exist, it always was gridlocked during the Cold War.
But as you say, sometimes outside Cold War situations, it might have played a role as, for example, in the 1960s it did with the Belgian Congo and Katanga. You know, that was outside the Cold War, and it could play a role. But doesn't it have a value just as a sounding board?Uh, I mean, even during the Cuban crisis, that was a value that the two sides argued rather than just pursued competition against each other outside the UN.
But as you say, sometimes outside Cold War situations, it might have played a role as, for example, in the 1960s it did with the Belgian Congo and Katanga. You know, that was outside the Cold War, and it could play a role. But doesn't it have a value just as a sounding board?Uh, I mean, even during the Cuban crisis, that was a value that the two sides argued rather than just pursued competition against each other outside the UN.
14:23
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
There are certainly certain things the Security Council can do. I'm not in favor of withdrawing from it or the UN as a whole, I think I think you have to, uh, to keep in. In mind that there are opportunities. There are some. It's just on the great questions of international affairs. It's it's unlikely the council can be that effective. And I think I think there is a tendency for. Perhaps to, to, uh, to think that it should pronounce itself on everything.
I don't I don't necessarily agree with that.
I don't I don't necessarily agree with that.
14:24
14:24
14:24
Speaker 4
-
Speaker 4
Yes. Uh, ambassador, I wonder if you can give us a couple of insights on this issue we're looking at. I.E. engagement in multilateral institutions and how that sort of plays out in US politics. I mean, if one thinks of it in terms of a spectrum from, you know, like total isolation, isolationism at one end and total engagement at the other. Um, are there significant differences between the two parties or two main parties or, or. Do, does the position that you hold on that spectrum, not you personally, but people hold on that spectrum.
Um, uh, divide parties as well as, uh, within them as. As well as in their relationship to their competitors.
Um, uh, divide parties as well as, uh, within them as. As well as in their relationship to their competitors.
14:25
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Yeah. I think there's a streak of isolationism in both the Democratic and the Republican Party. They, they manifest themselves in different ways. But, but there's no doubt that it's there. And I think there's a higher level of isolationism today than in, than in, let's say, ten years ago. I think the other dividing principle, uh, is, is the difference between unilateralism and multilateralism. Uh, both imply a presence in the world. The question is, uh.
One typically favor one approach over another approach. And just speaking as someone who's often been accused of being a unilateralist, all I have to say is I never, in all the various roles I've had in government, never got up in the morning and say, well, what unilateralist havoc can I wreak today?It's the question is, what's what's the most effective instrument in a given in a given circumstance?What's the best way to advance American interests?It's like saying, do you prefer a knife to a fork over a spoon?Well, for what purpose?You know, for eating soup.
A knife isn't a great idea, but for cutting steak, a spoon isn't a great idea. That doesn't mean you don't use both of them.
One typically favor one approach over another approach. And just speaking as someone who's often been accused of being a unilateralist, all I have to say is I never, in all the various roles I've had in government, never got up in the morning and say, well, what unilateralist havoc can I wreak today?It's the question is, what's what's the most effective instrument in a given in a given circumstance?What's the best way to advance American interests?It's like saying, do you prefer a knife to a fork over a spoon?Well, for what purpose?You know, for eating soup.
A knife isn't a great idea, but for cutting steak, a spoon isn't a great idea. That doesn't mean you don't use both of them.
14:27
14:27
14:27
Speaker 4
-
Speaker 4
Can you give us a feel about what drives policy towards multilateralism in America in the round?I mean, is there a any sort of perception of U.S. public opinion when it comes to engagement in multilateral organizations?Does Congress hold some sort of a unifying view on it, or is it very much down to the administration of the day, given the circumstances of the moment?
14:27
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, I think the latter is the case. I don't think at the moment there's a lot of discussion in United States politics about the multilateral system. And, uh, that may be well or ill, but I think that is the reality. And certainly the sense in our system of separated powers, it's the executive branch that carries the, uh, the most. Voice in international affairs. Uh, it's, I would say overwhelmingly depends on who the president is and what circumstances he confronts in the world.
14:28
14:28
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, there are partisan disagreements on on everything as as is fairly typical. And we're in a in a very bitterly divided partisan environment right now and have been for some years, which is unfortunate. But when when typically when Congress is controlled or one of the houses of Congress is controlled by a party different from that holding the white House, then you see the separation of powers and in full view. And, and that that may occur after our November elections. So I'd be in a position, a better position to answer that after we see what happens in November, perhaps.
14:28
14:28
14:29
14:29
Speaker 7
-
Speaker 7
This is a question about the the UN system rather than NATO. Um it can be argued, it is being argued by some that President Trump's withdrawal backing away from the international multilateral system. I think he's withdrawn America from something like 60, 60 organizations, mostly mostly UN is opening up a big opportunity for China to adopt more of an international leadership role, particularly in relation to the to the global South. Share that that concern, that assessment. And if you were were still in government, what would you be advising the administration and indeed Western allies to do about this?
14:29
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, I think the administration's pattern of withdrawal is is sort of hard to define what the reasons were. And they withdrew, in some cases from bits and pieces of organizations, bits and pieces of the Secretariat. It's a it was, uh. Not entirely coherent in, in, in my view, but I think, uh, the issue of whether China or any other adversary of the United States gains advantage, uh, that would be harmful to the US is a factor that should be considered in the question of whether we withdraw whatever the organization is.
I mean, that is part of an overall, uh, review that I think, uh, even, even in, in saying that it's important to withdraw that we've taken all the factors into account. And in some cases, I think, uh. The, the, that, that has not been carefully considered, but, uh, the. The efforts by China to extend its influence are certainly found across the board in a wide range of things hardly confined to international organizations. Uh, and I think it's in the, in the broader picture, in the Politico military Affairs and Economic affairs and how China behaves in the international economic system that are of much greater significance than what happens in, uh, in the UN.
I don't I don't think that there's a case to be made for withdrawing, uh, kind of precipitously, uh, in, within. The UN system, I think each case is different. I mentioned Unesco before. That's a particular, uh, pet rock for. Me, I just think the organization lost its moorings, uh, and has never found them again. Uh, other organizations you have to look at and weigh the costs and benefits. Uh, and in some cases, it may be that even in a close case, you'd decide to stay in Jeane Kirkpatrick, obviously, one of my predecessors is UN ambassador, was once asked if we should withdraw from the United Nations as a whole.
And she paused for a minute and said, no, it's not worth the trouble.
I mean, that is part of an overall, uh, review that I think, uh, even, even in, in saying that it's important to withdraw that we've taken all the factors into account. And in some cases, I think, uh. The, the, that, that has not been carefully considered, but, uh, the. The efforts by China to extend its influence are certainly found across the board in a wide range of things hardly confined to international organizations. Uh, and I think it's in the, in the broader picture, in the Politico military Affairs and Economic affairs and how China behaves in the international economic system that are of much greater significance than what happens in, uh, in the UN.
I don't I don't think that there's a case to be made for withdrawing, uh, kind of precipitously, uh, in, within. The UN system, I think each case is different. I mentioned Unesco before. That's a particular, uh, pet rock for. Me, I just think the organization lost its moorings, uh, and has never found them again. Uh, other organizations you have to look at and weigh the costs and benefits. Uh, and in some cases, it may be that even in a close case, you'd decide to stay in Jeane Kirkpatrick, obviously, one of my predecessors is UN ambassador, was once asked if we should withdraw from the United Nations as a whole.
And she paused for a minute and said, no, it's not worth the trouble.
14:31
Speaker 1
-
Speaker 1
Interesting. Just sort of subquestion to with. The US has withdrawn and I've probably lived the experience as well. So you mentioned the ICC, which us, not members of Human Rights Council. We have joined, withdrawn, joined. What do you see the UK always, in my experience, acted as a conduit, a sort of connection to those institutions. Do you think that kind of relationship will continue?
14:32
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, I think I think that will certainly depend on on what the government of the day in the UK thinks. I mean, I tried as UN ambassador to have a overall rethink of all of the various mandates that had been given to the United Nations by the Security Council and General Assembly and others over the years. And to say, you know, in uh, I was there roughly 50 years after the founding of the UN. You know, maybe some of these mandates can be repealed and maybe they're not necessary anymore.
We didn't repeal any of them. We didn't repeal any of them. And, uh, I think that's a, that's a, that's a very, uh, telling. Fact in trying to explain why the UN has so much difficulty accomplishing even what seemed to be core tasks is it's distracted and it has allowed itself or its members have basically pushed it into so many different things that it's lost the ability to focus on the important ones.
We didn't repeal any of them. We didn't repeal any of them. And, uh, I think that's a, that's a, that's a very, uh, telling. Fact in trying to explain why the UN has so much difficulty accomplishing even what seemed to be core tasks is it's distracted and it has allowed itself or its members have basically pushed it into so many different things that it's lost the ability to focus on the important ones.
14:32
14:33
Speaker 8
-
Speaker 8
Thank you, Ambassador Bolton. You rightly say that each case is different. And I'd like to ask you which institutions, therefore, within the system do you believe are of use to the United States?Um you hope that the United States can help fix those that need fixing. Um, and you've mentioned that there's, you know, there is a greater desire to, to look at budgets and, and value for money and making sure that public funding is an, institutions are doing what they're set out to do.
But, um, are there any specific areas where within US policy that can only be achieved through the multilateral system?And is the US either in the short term or the longer term, interested in reforming any of these?
But, um, are there any specific areas where within US policy that can only be achieved through the multilateral system?And is the US either in the short term or the longer term, interested in reforming any of these?
14:33
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, I didn't bring my UN handbook with me, so I can't go down the entire list of specialized and technical agencies. I think the Trump administration withdrew from the Universal Postal Union. I have to say, I would not have withdrawn from the Universal Postal Union. We we have our difficulties with it on what are called terminal rates. This is adjusting postage rates. When, uh, a letter or parcel goes from one country to another. Because we, we have, we have so much that goes by private carrier that we tend to feel being discriminated against by countries that only have national postal services.
Uh, it's, it's been a subject of debate and to my knowledge, for over 35 years. Uh, and, you know, we, we, we were never terribly happy with the result, but I wouldn't have withdrawn from the UPU. Just to give you one example, I mentioned earlier, the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, I think is very important in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Uh, I think that, uh, there are. Uh. A variety of, of the specialized and technical agencies programs of the UN, Unicef, the World Food Programme, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Food and Agricultural Organization.
I think I mentioned the World Health Organization before the World Intellectual Property Organization. Uh, the UN High Commissioner for refugees. I mean, I'm thinking of the buildings in Geneva where they're all headquartered and so on. But but the International Maritime Organization in London, the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, uh. So there's a lot that I think, uh, in, certainly in certain areas of providing humanitarian assistance and, uh, UNHCR for providing protection and assistance to refugees, I think these are the International Organization for migration, which has become a member of the UN over time.
It wasn't originally. So there are a lot out there. I'm not uh. You know, that's why I think sweeping generalizations are a mistake. Here is what's the problem with the UN today is less in the social economic area than it is in the political area. It's the political bodies of the UN that are fundamentally in trouble.
Uh, it's, it's been a subject of debate and to my knowledge, for over 35 years. Uh, and, you know, we, we, we were never terribly happy with the result, but I wouldn't have withdrawn from the UPU. Just to give you one example, I mentioned earlier, the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, I think is very important in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Uh, I think that, uh, there are. Uh. A variety of, of the specialized and technical agencies programs of the UN, Unicef, the World Food Programme, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Food and Agricultural Organization.
I think I mentioned the World Health Organization before the World Intellectual Property Organization. Uh, the UN High Commissioner for refugees. I mean, I'm thinking of the buildings in Geneva where they're all headquartered and so on. But but the International Maritime Organization in London, the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, uh. So there's a lot that I think, uh, in, certainly in certain areas of providing humanitarian assistance and, uh, UNHCR for providing protection and assistance to refugees, I think these are the International Organization for migration, which has become a member of the UN over time.
It wasn't originally. So there are a lot out there. I'm not uh. You know, that's why I think sweeping generalizations are a mistake. Here is what's the problem with the UN today is less in the social economic area than it is in the political area. It's the political bodies of the UN that are fundamentally in trouble.
14:36
14:36
14:36
14:36
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, I think it would be a catastrophe for the United States and all the allies. Uh, I think NATO is, uh, probably the world's most successful political military alliance in history. Uh, we've spent decades building up the capability, uh, that, uh, even in peacetime, provides a basis for action that's never been, never been done before. And, uh, uh, I think the, the approach of the Trump administration is nothing but destructive. Uh, I have, I have a lot of, uh. Uh, things that I would do to improve NATO.
And I've been one of many Americans who have served in diplomatic positions for decades that have pleaded with other members of NATO to spend more on defense. Uh, but let's face it, the West as a whole made a mistake in the early 1990s when the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union disintegrated to say we had reached the end of history. You know, there weren't any threats anymore. Uh, we could enjoy the peace dividend and everybody cut their defense budgets. And it turned out to be a huge mistake.
Uh, you can look at it today. None of us are spending enough on defense. And that includes the US we have for years failed to, uh, to estimate what the demands on our arsenals might be. And we can see now they're under strain with, let's face it, what our only two medium sized conflicts, we're not in world wars now. We have two medium sized conflicts going on. Uh, and, uh, and we're strained at being able to have the capacity to deal with both simultaneously.
This is a long way, even from the standard for the U.S. in the 1990s, when, when our budgets were set to defend two medium sized regional contingencies simultaneously. And those were considered war in the Middle East and war on the Korean Peninsula. We couldn't do that today. It's a huge mistake all the way around. But but having said that, it's, uh, we've always been able to work those disagreements out within NATO. Uh, when I was in college in, in the 60s, uh, I was assigned a book by a then little known Harvard professor, uh, called.
NATO, The Troubled Partnership. Uh, so this is a book written in the early 60s by that little known Harvard professor, Henry Kissinger. You know, uh, we've always had troubles in NATO, and we work them out. That's the success of the alliance. And, uh, I think that, uh, the damage that's been done by any number of things that have been said is incalculable. I think it can all be repaired. And I think the most important thing for NATO, both in the US, where, as I said, support is very strong.
But in other NATO partners don't assume that what we've seen in the past, uh. Year and a half, roughly, uh, is going to be the policy of the US forever. It's not. And if you draw overbroad conclusions from the concerns that have been raised, you're going to take decisions that are going to be mistaken and that could weaken the alliance further. You know, it was a core Soviet objective during the Cold War to split the Atlantic Alliance. And one reason among many that the Soviets lost the Cold War was that they failed to do that.
So the last thing we should do is do it for them.
And I've been one of many Americans who have served in diplomatic positions for decades that have pleaded with other members of NATO to spend more on defense. Uh, but let's face it, the West as a whole made a mistake in the early 1990s when the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union disintegrated to say we had reached the end of history. You know, there weren't any threats anymore. Uh, we could enjoy the peace dividend and everybody cut their defense budgets. And it turned out to be a huge mistake.
Uh, you can look at it today. None of us are spending enough on defense. And that includes the US we have for years failed to, uh, to estimate what the demands on our arsenals might be. And we can see now they're under strain with, let's face it, what our only two medium sized conflicts, we're not in world wars now. We have two medium sized conflicts going on. Uh, and, uh, and we're strained at being able to have the capacity to deal with both simultaneously.
This is a long way, even from the standard for the U.S. in the 1990s, when, when our budgets were set to defend two medium sized regional contingencies simultaneously. And those were considered war in the Middle East and war on the Korean Peninsula. We couldn't do that today. It's a huge mistake all the way around. But but having said that, it's, uh, we've always been able to work those disagreements out within NATO. Uh, when I was in college in, in the 60s, uh, I was assigned a book by a then little known Harvard professor, uh, called.
NATO, The Troubled Partnership. Uh, so this is a book written in the early 60s by that little known Harvard professor, Henry Kissinger. You know, uh, we've always had troubles in NATO, and we work them out. That's the success of the alliance. And, uh, I think that, uh, the damage that's been done by any number of things that have been said is incalculable. I think it can all be repaired. And I think the most important thing for NATO, both in the US, where, as I said, support is very strong.
But in other NATO partners don't assume that what we've seen in the past, uh. Year and a half, roughly, uh, is going to be the policy of the US forever. It's not. And if you draw overbroad conclusions from the concerns that have been raised, you're going to take decisions that are going to be mistaken and that could weaken the alliance further. You know, it was a core Soviet objective during the Cold War to split the Atlantic Alliance. And one reason among many that the Soviets lost the Cold War was that they failed to do that.
So the last thing we should do is do it for them.
14:40
14:40
Speaker 4
-
Speaker 4
Chairman, could I come in on. Of course. I mean, you've been so critical of America and the Trump administration on a form of destructiveness towards NATO. But do you think that the United Kingdom is involved in a different form of destructiveness, at least weakening because of the relative sloth in our own ability to generate, uh, the amount of funding into NATO, the percentage of GDP that NATO has demanded of it. Are we also a part of a weakening?
14:40
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, look, I think the West as a whole went went into dream world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And, uh, remember, globalization would solve everything. Economics were the only issues that mattered anymore. And it turned out that at least we were awakened somewhat by nine over 11. But I think, uh, I thought for some time, quite, quite apart from Trump, that the U.S. defense budget should approach levels that we had during the Reagan administration, which were five, six, 7% of GDP.
And I think the West as a whole ought to be at that standard. And we've that's that just helps us catch up from where where we should have been. And, uh, I know your chairman is not here today, but he recently had some things in the report that he did on that subject for Britain. And I'd say, uh, really, we, we, uh, we have always considered Britain, uh, a leader in NATO. It's always held the number two command position, or at least since 1951, as, uh, as I recall.
And I would hope that, uh, when dealing with some of our friends, uh, on the continent, that, that Britain would have a leading role too, and, and could, could, uh, could participate as we are doing, I think very effectively in the Aukus submarine program, UK, Australia and the US. I think it's a great program. I think it's an excellent thing for the UK to have done. I'd like to see a lot more of it. I'd like to see a lot more UK involvement dealing with China on a global basis.
And I think the West as a whole ought to be at that standard. And we've that's that just helps us catch up from where where we should have been. And, uh, I know your chairman is not here today, but he recently had some things in the report that he did on that subject for Britain. And I'd say, uh, really, we, we, uh, we have always considered Britain, uh, a leader in NATO. It's always held the number two command position, or at least since 1951, as, uh, as I recall.
And I would hope that, uh, when dealing with some of our friends, uh, on the continent, that, that Britain would have a leading role too, and, and could, could, uh, could participate as we are doing, I think very effectively in the Aukus submarine program, UK, Australia and the US. I think it's a great program. I think it's an excellent thing for the UK to have done. I'd like to see a lot more of it. I'd like to see a lot more UK involvement dealing with China on a global basis.
14:42
Speaker 1
-
Speaker 1
Thank you. And of course ambassador, you'll know our chairman not being here, but he was quite forthright in what needs to happen in terms of funding. And on your final point there, of course, you know, the United Kingdom also has started collaboration, for example, with the Italian, Italy and Japan in terms of fighter planes as well. Uh, with that, if I can go to Baroness Crawley.
14:42
Speaker 10
-
Speaker 10
Thank you, chair and chair. I better declare an interest in that. I really enjoyed, uh, Ambassador Bolton's book, The Room Where it Happened. So that's my interest out of the way. Um. Ambassador Bolton, uh, President Trump's predecessors, even the most hawkish of them, uh, all worked within a network of treaties and institutions within the multilateral system. Um, and that to some extent, uh. Shaped, uh, the way that the US exercises its power in the world.
Um, do you think from now on, uh, that. The US will pivot towards establishing new international architecture, such as the Board of Peace. Circumvent existing institutions. And what would be the implications of this, do you think?
Um, do you think from now on, uh, that. The US will pivot towards establishing new international architecture, such as the Board of Peace. Circumvent existing institutions. And what would be the implications of this, do you think?
14:43
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, I think there are certain circumstances where we need to do it, but just just to start with the Board of Peace. Uh, I mean, frankly, it's a joke. It's not going to exist after after the Trump administration leaves office. Uh, I don't think people should get too upset about it. I think its chances of survival are about as great as the chances of making the Gaza Strip into the Riviera of the eastern Mediterranean. It's just not going to happen.
Um, I do think on a more serious note, uh, in dealing with China, there are a range of things that we have to consider, uh, in, in the Indo-Pacific. And I think it's a mistake for the Trump administration to have changed back the name of the Indo-Pacific command back to the Pacific Command. Indo-Pacific was a decision he made in the first term. It was the right decision. Uh, but how you how you deal with Chinese efforts to establish hegemony along its periphery, uh, do require new institutions.
So there have been a number that have been have been mentioned. Aukus is really one of them. Uh, Shinzo Abe, the now deceased prime minister of Japan, pushed very hard ten years ago to expand the role of what's called the Asian Security quad. India, Japan, Australia and the US. It hasn't had much favor in this administration, but it's important. I think it's important to have increased, uh, trilateral, military cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the US. And steps have been taken in that regard.
I mean, people may find this hard to believe, but for years there were no trilateral exercises. Now we're going to have some no, no, that was a barrier because of historic tensions between Korea and Japan. I think the leaders of both countries now are working to, to, to try and, uh. Move past those divisions like NATO was able to move past divisions in Europe after it was created. In other words, there's a lot of architecture that's necessary to deal with the Chinese threat.
And I'm not suggesting that there's an Asian NATO out there waiting to be developed. I think this is going to be very hard to do, and it's going to be laborious and take a fair amount of time. But but I do think those kinds of things are, uh, are up for consideration. And I do recall as well, uh, Jose Maria Aznar suggestion, former prime minister of Spain in 2005 to make NATO a global institution, he said, bring in countries like Japan, Singapore, Australia, Israel.
I think that's something that NATO should think about. I think I think the threat that the West as a whole faces, it's not a geographic denomination, it's a it's a it's a global issue for all of us now.
Um, I do think on a more serious note, uh, in dealing with China, there are a range of things that we have to consider, uh, in, in the Indo-Pacific. And I think it's a mistake for the Trump administration to have changed back the name of the Indo-Pacific command back to the Pacific Command. Indo-Pacific was a decision he made in the first term. It was the right decision. Uh, but how you how you deal with Chinese efforts to establish hegemony along its periphery, uh, do require new institutions.
So there have been a number that have been have been mentioned. Aukus is really one of them. Uh, Shinzo Abe, the now deceased prime minister of Japan, pushed very hard ten years ago to expand the role of what's called the Asian Security quad. India, Japan, Australia and the US. It hasn't had much favor in this administration, but it's important. I think it's important to have increased, uh, trilateral, military cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the US. And steps have been taken in that regard.
I mean, people may find this hard to believe, but for years there were no trilateral exercises. Now we're going to have some no, no, that was a barrier because of historic tensions between Korea and Japan. I think the leaders of both countries now are working to, to, to try and, uh. Move past those divisions like NATO was able to move past divisions in Europe after it was created. In other words, there's a lot of architecture that's necessary to deal with the Chinese threat.
And I'm not suggesting that there's an Asian NATO out there waiting to be developed. I think this is going to be very hard to do, and it's going to be laborious and take a fair amount of time. But but I do think those kinds of things are, uh, are up for consideration. And I do recall as well, uh, Jose Maria Aznar suggestion, former prime minister of Spain in 2005 to make NATO a global institution, he said, bring in countries like Japan, Singapore, Australia, Israel.
I think that's something that NATO should think about. I think I think the threat that the West as a whole faces, it's not a geographic denomination, it's a it's a it's a global issue for all of us now.
14:46
14:46
14:46
Speaker 1
-
Speaker 1
And of course, ambassador, you know, in the post-Second World War and subsequently we did see sort of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, which then sort of saw its day, as you said, all institutions, everything comes to an end. Um, one quick question from me. Just this new kind of framework of security. We've seen Turkey, Egypt, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sort of come together in this rather loose, um, construct. Do you think that's an a signal to say that other countries are looking at new military alliances as well?
14:47
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, I think there's a lot of uncertainty that's been caused by Trump administration policies. And I think that, uh, I think that's another manifestation of the problem here. There are there are changes taking place really that have, uh, nothing to do with, with us. The, the decision, for example, by the United Arab Emirates to withdraw from OPEC. Um, which I certainly didn't see coming, I don't know, others perhaps did. Uh, there's a lot going on in the world.
To me, that's another reason to have a continued very forward presence by the United States, uh, to help try and keep, uh, the system of, uh, of security that we've had since World War two. Viable. I think when the U.S. withdraws from regions of the world, uh, the, the, the consequences either spreading anarchy or our adversaries moving in to fill the void.
To me, that's another reason to have a continued very forward presence by the United States, uh, to help try and keep, uh, the system of, uh, of security that we've had since World War two. Viable. I think when the U.S. withdraws from regions of the world, uh, the, the, the consequences either spreading anarchy or our adversaries moving in to fill the void.
14:47
14:48
14:48
Speaker 11
-
Speaker 11
Uh, ambassador, it keeps coming up in various inquiries that we've been involved in, which I'm sure must be of of great interest in its own way to a lot of people in the USA is the basic, very simple question is the second Trump administration, in particular, the one that may or may not emerge from November, the November elections?Is this a sort of an aberration in, uh, U.S. political stroke, international developments, or is it the shape of things to come?We just I'm sure no one can give a definitive answer on that.
But I'd like to hear your thoughts on it.
But I'd like to hear your thoughts on it.
14:48
Speaker 2
-
Speaker 2
Well, I think Trump is an aberration. And I think we'll see what happens in in November. And then in 2028, there's no way of predicting who his successor will be. But I think, uh, there will be a backlash against the Trump administration for a lot of reasons. Well, it's a subject of a long political discussion. But but, uh, it is a mistake to think that, uh, certainly in the national security space that Trump has a philosophy, he doesn't he doesn't have a grand strategy.
He doesn't even do policy the way most people, most people normally think of that term. So there's no sense, there's no philosophy or strategy. There's no real legacy for somebody to pick up and run with. It's one reason why his coalition is fragmenting even now. And there'll be there'll be a new alignment. And, uh, and. I think there'll be an intense debate in 2028 about a whole range of issues. It goes to the point I alluded to earlier.
I think, in looking for future policies in the UK or elsewhere in Europe, it is a mistake to project, uh, Trump's straightforward sort of forever as that's what the United States is going to do. Uh, Chancellor Merkel of Germany, for example, at one point said that Germany needed to be independent, uh, of, of the United States. Well, you know, good luck with that. I think that makes Germany weaker. It makes the United States weaker. To do is just grit our teeth and try and get through the next two and a half years with a minimum of damage.
Uh, and then specifically with respect to NATO, try and fix the damage that's been done.
He doesn't even do policy the way most people, most people normally think of that term. So there's no sense, there's no philosophy or strategy. There's no real legacy for somebody to pick up and run with. It's one reason why his coalition is fragmenting even now. And there'll be there'll be a new alignment. And, uh, and. I think there'll be an intense debate in 2028 about a whole range of issues. It goes to the point I alluded to earlier.
I think, in looking for future policies in the UK or elsewhere in Europe, it is a mistake to project, uh, Trump's straightforward sort of forever as that's what the United States is going to do. Uh, Chancellor Merkel of Germany, for example, at one point said that Germany needed to be independent, uh, of, of the United States. Well, you know, good luck with that. I think that makes Germany weaker. It makes the United States weaker. To do is just grit our teeth and try and get through the next two and a half years with a minimum of damage.
Uh, and then specifically with respect to NATO, try and fix the damage that's been done.
14:50
14:50
Speaker 12
-
Speaker 12
Yeah. Thank you very much. And thank you, ambassador, for your insights. Very interesting indeed. Can I just pick up you have said a number of occasions that America should make its decisions on its relation to international multilateral organizations on the basis of the American national interest, which is perfectly reasonable. But America is a very big power. And when those decisions appear to other countries to be against their national interest, to the extent that they start to think they've got to find other ways of doing things and other partners, how do you think the United States will react if it sees different alliances or different arrangements happening, partly because of the actions of the United States?And I take your point about the Trump administration, but our own evidence suggests there is an element of detachment in the United States, which cuts a lot longer than just the current administration.
So is there a. And from the UK's point of view, um, given that we've relied very heavily on the United States and we've now left the EU, although we're trying to reconnect in some ways, what is the right role for the UK to maintain the right relationship with the United States, whilst also building relationships elsewhere?Doesn't the dynamic require both of those things to happen?Right.
So is there a. And from the UK's point of view, um, given that we've relied very heavily on the United States and we've now left the EU, although we're trying to reconnect in some ways, what is the right role for the UK to maintain the right relationship with the United States, whilst also building relationships elsewhere?Doesn't the dynamic require both of those things to happen?Right.
14:51
14:52
Speaker 5
-
Speaker 5
Fit all the partners. Then, when there are disagreements within an alliance, or even even in disagreements among informal groupings, coalitions of the willing, uh, you try and accommodate the differences to continue to pursue the objectives that you've agreed on. And it's not just every day. let's have a new calculation about what America's national interest is. Part of the problem with Trump is that every day is a new day. And he says, well, what have you done for me lately that's not conducive to to any human institutions that are intended to last for a long time?Uh, I think in the shifting circumstances we're facing, uh, I certainly hope that whatever, whatever else the UK does, it's not, uh, it's not making a mistake that, uh, that some have of saying, well, if we don't like the United States so, well, maybe China is our alternative.
I mean, good luck with that. Really. Uh, I think it's, uh, it's just, it's difficult in, in the press of daily events, uh, to try and think about what happens after Trump. But I do think that's what's necessary. How do you how do you get through this period?Uh, with, with the minimal amount of damage so that then once we're past it, we can really focus on what we're concerned about. And Trump's lack of strategy, lack of forethought, lack of follow through, uh, mean that on any given day, what you think is the main problem with Trump may turn out to be irrelevant.
The day after.
I mean, good luck with that. Really. Uh, I think it's, uh, it's just, it's difficult in, in the press of daily events, uh, to try and think about what happens after Trump. But I do think that's what's necessary. How do you how do you get through this period?Uh, with, with the minimal amount of damage so that then once we're past it, we can really focus on what we're concerned about. And Trump's lack of strategy, lack of forethought, lack of follow through, uh, mean that on any given day, what you think is the main problem with Trump may turn out to be irrelevant.
The day after.
14:53
14:53
14:53
14:54
Speaker 5
-
Speaker 5
Well, look, I think, uh, from the U.S. perspective, uh, the one reason that the relationship with between the U.S. and the U.K. is so important is the fact that the U.K. does have many connections because of history and geography that are better than what the United States has. Uh, and it's been been almost the unfailing practice in, in basically every international related job I've had in the U.S. government in my career that when we're thinking of what we're going to do, uh, probably the first person you talk to, or if not the first one of the first, uh, is your counterpart in the United Kingdom.
Uh, I think that's invaluable to the United States. I hope, I hope it helps the UK too. And I would, I would certainly encourage you to continue that, uh, you know, the, the history has given us a lot of, uh, different partners around the world. And, and I've always tried to take advantage of that. It's not, not unhelpful to have Australia being where it is. Uh, and it's not unhelpful that, uh, the, you know, the Five eyes countries share intelligence the way they do.
I would take advantage of all these things. And, uh, and I think they have been of advantage to the U.S. and hopefully to the others involved in it. So, uh, you know, just to come back to Aukus, I think the UK ought to have a larger role in the Pacific. Uh, and I think, I think this is, uh, it would be important for the U.S. it would be important for others. I think, uh, Japan, for example, and, uh, and other countries would, would welcome a larger UK role.
And, uh, you know, people say, well, we're all pressed for budgets and so on and so forth. There isn't any higher budget priority than national security. If you if you can't defend your national security, the rest of it's kind of kind of irrelevant, in my view.
Uh, I think that's invaluable to the United States. I hope, I hope it helps the UK too. And I would, I would certainly encourage you to continue that, uh, you know, the, the history has given us a lot of, uh, different partners around the world. And, and I've always tried to take advantage of that. It's not, not unhelpful to have Australia being where it is. Uh, and it's not unhelpful that, uh, the, you know, the Five eyes countries share intelligence the way they do.
I would take advantage of all these things. And, uh, and I think they have been of advantage to the U.S. and hopefully to the others involved in it. So, uh, you know, just to come back to Aukus, I think the UK ought to have a larger role in the Pacific. Uh, and I think, I think this is, uh, it would be important for the U.S. it would be important for others. I think, uh, Japan, for example, and, uh, and other countries would, would welcome a larger UK role.
And, uh, you know, people say, well, we're all pressed for budgets and so on and so forth. There isn't any higher budget priority than national security. If you if you can't defend your national security, the rest of it's kind of kind of irrelevant, in my view.
14:55
14:55
14:56
Speaker 13
-
Speaker 13
Thank you very much, ambassador Bolton. If USA moves away from being the steward of the multilateral system, what would it look like?And is there any potential for like minded, uh, uh, powers to come?Together to reinforce the multilateral system in the way suggested by Prime Minister Carney at Davos.
14:56
Speaker 5
-
Speaker 5
Well, I think, uh, again, because I believe Trump's aberrational, I don't really foresee a future where the U.S. walks away from from its role. It will differ depending on who's president and what what the party is. Uh, and I've followed Prime Minister Carney's remarks at Davos and some other things he said. And I have to say, uh, I don't I don't think there's much prospect for success in this kind of coalition of middle sized powers that he talks about. Uh, I don't think that's a likely route road ahead because I think the biggest element in common, the middle sized powers have is that they're middle sized, and that doesn't get you very far.
14:56
14:57
Speaker 8
-
Speaker 8
Ambassador, could I go back to your comments about the WTO?You said you were a free trader, and I assume that you believe in rules based trade. You had problems. You said with the dispute resolution mechanism. I don't know if that was just about China, but do you think it is possible to make changes to the WTO in a way that would be helpful and satisfactory for America to play a full role again, or do you think it's a lost cause?
14:57
Speaker 5
-
Speaker 5
No, I think if you went back to the to the approach of GATT, uh, which which allowed nations to resolve their trade disputes in their own ways, I think that is imperfect. But any, any mechanism is going to be imperfect. I think the problem with the the mandatory arbitration is that it is creating a supranational institution. And I just simply don't accept that. With China is an endemic problem. And, uh, you know, uh, with, without getting into a discussion of Trump's Liberation Day tariffs, he declared trade war on the rest of the world when what he should have done was gotten our friends and allies together and said what we all believed to be the case, that the biggest problem in international trade today is China, and that if we got together and put pressure on China, we'd be more likely at least to solve the problem than, uh, than not.
And yet we've gone in the opposite direction, which I think is, uh, is very unfortunate.
And yet we've gone in the opposite direction, which I think is, uh, is very unfortunate.
14:58
14:58
Speaker 10
-
Speaker 10
Ambassador, um, this is sort of existential question, I'm afraid, but you've been very eloquent about the the gridlock in the international system at political level, in particular, um, over the. Side of the, of the Atlantic. There's a lot of talk about the, not just the deadlock, but basically about the collapse of the international rules based order, the institutions and rules and, and processes that built up after World War two. Pretty much all under American leadership. Do you think I mean, are you an optimist about about the future of the international order, or do you think it is possible, even likely, as some people over this side of the Atlantic think, that we're heading for what they call a G2 world, which is basically America and China calling all the shots.
14:59
Speaker 5
-
Speaker 5
Well, I don't think that's the way it's going to work out. And I never believed there was a rules based international order. Uh, if there was, nobody gave the memo to Vladimir Putin and XI Jinping and Kim Jong un and, uh, and various leaders in, in Iran. And, uh, you know, they don't play by the rules. They don't care about the rules. Uh, maybe Donald Trump doesn't care about the rules either. But, but the, but the, but the, the order that was created after 1945, uh, ultimately rests on international power and the power that has kept international affairs relatively stable, I think has been, uh, a function of American power and its alliances.
Uh, and as I said earlier, when, when the U.S. begins to withdraw, you get more anarchy. It doesn't have anything to do with rules. It has to do with the distribution of power. And Trump said, uh, again this morning in, uh, in. In, uh, in Ankara that, uh, we don't really worry that much about the, about the war in Ukraine because there's an ocean between us. Well, that doesn't work like that anymore. Oceans are highways, not just barriers these days.
Uh, and, and it's, uh. The fact is, we benefit from the order that we help create. Now, there's a lot of dissatisfaction in the United States among people who don't think our partners bear their fair share. And there's a lot to be said for that. But I think the problem in the U.S. is that our political leaders, ever since the end of the Cold War, have not made the case effectively, that we're not doing this all around the world as an act of charity.
We're doing it because it's in our interest to do it. We benefit from the stability that our forward American presence provides, and that our alliances emphasize. A lot of other people benefit from it, too, and some of them don't pay their fair share of the burden. But that doesn't mean we should give it up because it hurts us to do it. I think I think actually, if Americans had a had a better sense of how much we benefit from the order we've helped create, there'd be a lot more support for it and a lot less attraction to somebody like Trump.
Uh, and as I said earlier, when, when the U.S. begins to withdraw, you get more anarchy. It doesn't have anything to do with rules. It has to do with the distribution of power. And Trump said, uh, again this morning in, uh, in. In, uh, in Ankara that, uh, we don't really worry that much about the, about the war in Ukraine because there's an ocean between us. Well, that doesn't work like that anymore. Oceans are highways, not just barriers these days.
Uh, and, and it's, uh. The fact is, we benefit from the order that we help create. Now, there's a lot of dissatisfaction in the United States among people who don't think our partners bear their fair share. And there's a lot to be said for that. But I think the problem in the U.S. is that our political leaders, ever since the end of the Cold War, have not made the case effectively, that we're not doing this all around the world as an act of charity.
We're doing it because it's in our interest to do it. We benefit from the stability that our forward American presence provides, and that our alliances emphasize. A lot of other people benefit from it, too, and some of them don't pay their fair share of the burden. But that doesn't mean we should give it up because it hurts us to do it. I think I think actually, if Americans had a had a better sense of how much we benefit from the order we've helped create, there'd be a lot more support for it and a lot less attraction to somebody like Trump.
15:01
15:01
15:02
Speaker 1
-
Speaker 1
We all live by that hope as well. In 250 years on, as we extend our best wishes, although that 250 years has perhaps a slightly different perspective from the UK. You know, Happy Independence Day. And, uh, long do we look at strengthening the UK, US Alliance. Ambassador Bolton, on behalf of all the committee, thank you so much for your time. It was extremely valuable. And in that regard, we we will be, again, in a formal way, be sending you a transcript of today's proceedings.
If there's any minor corrections, etc. that you feel necessary, please come back to the committee. But in that regard, thank you very much, and we hope to see you again soon. All the best. And the formal session closed.
If there's any minor corrections, etc. that you feel necessary, please come back to the committee. But in that regard, thank you very much, and we hope to see you again soon. All the best. And the formal session closed.