National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Monday 13th July 2026
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16:23
16:23
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Sign. We need to do anything to make this work. You're all right. Uh, Jen Easterly. Pleased to be here. I'm currently the CEO of RSA, which is the largest global cybersecurity and AI security platform. But I was the director of the US Cyber Defense Agency, Cisa, and I'm currently a visiting fellow at Blavatnik at Oxford.
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Right. Uh, thank you very much for joining us. So, uh, unfortunately, just to forewarn, uh. Witnesses joining us that we are expecting votes in the House of Lords. Uh, we expecting three of them. And maybe a vote might come sooner than we're anticipating. So apologies in advance. Uh, we do realize that we want to try and get through this, uh, by 5:00. Uh, but please recognize that there might be some disruption and, and therefore to keep responses, uh, reasonably brief.
Thank you. Can I just start with you, Lieutenant general, what was your outtake, really of last week's summit?Was it was it successful?
Thank you. Can I just start with you, Lieutenant general, what was your outtake, really of last week's summit?Was it was it successful?
16:26
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Three things, sir. Number one, uh, the unity, which is always the main objective coming out of every summit, even though my president started off by complaining about allies and even brought up the subject of Greenland again, by the time it was over, it was about where it should be. So that was a positive. The second thing, of course, was the was a major display of European countries investing, uh, in, in defense, uh, as well as, as Canada. That was to me that was very positive.
And then the third thing was a positive endorsement of, uh, of Ukraine, not by the alliance. I, I'm very skeptical that we're actually are going to get to the point where Ukraine can make their own patriots. Um, although I wish that were true.
And then the third thing was a positive endorsement of, uh, of Ukraine, not by the alliance. I, I'm very skeptical that we're actually are going to get to the point where Ukraine can make their own patriots. Um, although I wish that were true.
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Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I mean, I would align myself with, uh, with Ben on this. I would say what I was hoping to see last week actually manifested today, uh, which was the action taken by the UK and the EU to specifically call out Russian aggression, aggressive hybrid activity to include, uh, activity that affects elections, the interference in elections in Armenia and Moldova, the attacks against the Polish, uh, cyber, uh, electric grid. Attacks that manifested in extensive espionage. And so I was hoping to actually see some sort of a statement, uh, that would call out specific Russian hybrid and cyber activity in particular.
But I was very pleased to see the actions taken today to include the exposure of the Russian activity and specifically the sanction entities against 24 individuals. And so that's the kind of activity that I think NATO and the UK and our colleagues should be calling out on a more regular basis.
But I was very pleased to see the actions taken today to include the exposure of the Russian activity and specifically the sanction entities against 24 individuals. And so that's the kind of activity that I think NATO and the UK and our colleagues should be calling out on a more regular basis.
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Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Well, I think, uh, specifically when you're talking about dealing with deterring Russian hybrid and specifically in my field cyber activity. I think the conversation needs to be much more active with respect to how do you effectively deny this activity through things like resilience?Um, and by jointly hardening infrastructure. Some of that is how do we use the right regulatory regime, uh, to include some of the recent things done to hold cloud providers accountable. Uh, how do we expose in a joint and rapid way Russian cyber activity, as happened today?Uh, how do we actually impose costs?I think there's a denial by deterrence, but I think there has to be a very active conversation about how do you use offensive authorities and cyber power to hold Russian, uh, critical infrastructure itself at risk.
And then I think there needs to be an important conversation about denial, deterrence by resilience. How do you preserve alliance decision making and continued support for Ukraine?By continuing to be resilient in the face of this nefarious activity.
And then I think there needs to be an important conversation about denial, deterrence by resilience. How do you preserve alliance decision making and continued support for Ukraine?By continuing to be resilient in the face of this nefarious activity.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Well, I, I agree that unity was the, uh, the theme of the, the outcome. Um, I think it's worth quoting from the summit declaration where they say that the leaders reaffirmed their ironclad commitment to collective defense under article five of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond. That's all very good. I was slightly surprised that they referred to Russia as a long term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. And I think that all of this has to be read alongside statements and articles by senior American officials talking about NATO 3.0.
And I think a lot of people have seen the summit as being the launching of NATO 3.0, which some see as code for the Europeans taking on the role of the conventional defense of of Europe.
And I think a lot of people have seen the summit as being the launching of NATO 3.0, which some see as code for the Europeans taking on the role of the conventional defense of of Europe.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Well, it's hard to imagine, uh, not having a British officer as the de secure, uh, given the importance of, uh, intelligence sharing, uh, and having a, especially if the United States at some point, may, may relinquish the secure position, uh, which has been discussed having a British officer there, I think, uh, is an important contribution and role for, for UK. And it should not be measured against, you know, who has the biggest, uh, budget or something like that, but a strategic role. And I, I think it's appropriate.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Well, sir, I think, uh, first of all, it's it's almost inevitable that that's it's going that way based on what this administration does. And, and even some other administrations. And I do think that we are going to regret it, uh, one day, uh, lost relevance and influence in Europe. Um, as the administration tries to encourage or cajole, uh, Europe and Canada to take on more of a leading role. But I, it's not something that I would fear. It's just something that I would regret.
Uh, if that happens to us, the key for me will always be the collective defense, uh, the commitment of all of us to each other. Uh, the intelligence sharing not only at Five Eyes, but across the alliance that intelligence sharing is so important for the United States. And then, of course, uh, we cannot defend America from North Carolina or Texas. We, we have to have forward bases and forward friends and forward access. So, um, I think I would certainly hope that, uh, even as the alliance becomes more European centric in your, in European lead, that we would still have those things.
Uh, if that happens to us, the key for me will always be the collective defense, uh, the commitment of all of us to each other. Uh, the intelligence sharing not only at Five Eyes, but across the alliance that intelligence sharing is so important for the United States. And then, of course, uh, we cannot defend America from North Carolina or Texas. We, we have to have forward bases and forward friends and forward access. So, um, I think I would certainly hope that, uh, even as the alliance becomes more European centric in your, in European lead, that we would still have those things.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
I think the sort of the the various headquarters won't look that much different. I mean, you've got European officers and Canadians as well as Americans that every one of the several different headquarters and all the different levels, uh, with European officers actually in command of, of many of these. So that won't look so different. Um, I think the command systems that the United States has provided the backbone for much of the command and control sort of digital systems that everybody uses. I now, that doesn't mean that that can't remain in place, but that would be something that would be of concern.
Uh, of course, uh, the nuclear deterrent. Um, I would expect that the United States would, would continue to provide that along with UK and France, because it's in our interest. Um, although I think a nuclear deterrent only, um, is not actually going to be sufficient. Um and then I think the uh. The intelligence systems, um, are a part of that, but, but again, I don't, I don't, I don't see a more European NATO means less U.S. intelligence commitment of, of assets because again, this is, this is all in our interest.
Uh, of course, uh, the nuclear deterrent. Um, I would expect that the United States would, would continue to provide that along with UK and France, because it's in our interest. Um, although I think a nuclear deterrent only, um, is not actually going to be sufficient. Um and then I think the uh. The intelligence systems, um, are a part of that, but, but again, I don't, I don't, I don't see a more European NATO means less U.S. intelligence commitment of, of assets because again, this is, this is all in our interest.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
I would think so. Because everybody, um, has has gone along with this because of the, frankly, the, the quality of it. If for some reason that was no longer going to be the case, then you've got, you know, 31 other nations trying to agree on whose, uh, system is going to be used. I, I think that would not be a good problem to have to deal with.
16:34
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
No, no, that doesn't sound like a good problem at all. Um, and perhaps a question to, to, to you, general and Tom as well. What role do you think the UK should play as part of this transition. And how should we approach the transition at the political level?Because obviously this is going to be quite a complex and challenging task. Perhaps, general, if I could ask you to comment first and then Tom.
16:34
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
So let me speak from a land power perspective. The expectation that the US Army has always had of our British Army allies was a corps headquarters, a three star headquarters. And of course, you've always provided arc, uh, which is exceptional headquarters, a warfighting division headquarters, uh, and then to meet requirements as part of NATO's forward presence, um, in Estonia, Poland. Uh, and such. Those are the things that I always look for that the US Army always looks for and that I hope.
And, and so when I see the size of the army shrinking, uh, I worry about that.
And, and so when I see the size of the army shrinking, uh, I worry about that.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Well, it seems to me that, uh, we've begun to address the question of hard capabilities, although we're only taking the first steps down a road, which, um, is going to take some time to, um. To reach the end of um, but there remain, as your question implies, I think are quite a number of big questions that remain unanswered. The overall leadership within a European NATO, if that's what we call it. Um, and the, the best role, I think that a UK government can play is to work both with the US government, because this is if this is a transition, better it be a managed transition than a than a rush for the exits and, but also critically with France and Germany in the so-called E3 and possibly the E5, including Poland and Italy.
And let's not forget Turkey. So I, I think we're at the very early stages of figuring out how all of this will work in practice.
And let's not forget Turkey. So I, I think we're at the very early stages of figuring out how all of this will work in practice.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Should I start?Well, I mean, I think that my main concern about the defence investment plan is that it doesn't come with a clear statement of future force structures, um, and therefore how the different capabilities that are described will, will fit together and how they will fit together with, uh, with NATO's plans. So, um, I think we must welcome the fact that we've got at least some description of the, the government's capability plans, but I think that some of the vacuum round about it needs to be, um, needs to be fleshed out.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Um, so, you know, I always try to think in terms of requirements and capabilities. Uh, not so much, you know, platforms or, or that sort of thing. And so, uh, of course, when we look at what warfare or what we imagine warfare is going to be for the next 20, 30, 40 years, um, air and missile defence is going to be, uh, at the top of everybody's list to be able to protect your critical infrastructure, your civilian populations, not just from drones, but obviously from ballistic missiles, the kind of thing that's happening in Ukraine every night that's going to happen in UK or Germany.
If the Russians ever do make the terrible decision to attack a NATO country, because they know NATO's deterrence and defence depends on rapid reinforcement. So everybody's seaports and airports are absolutely going to get hammered as well as, um. With cyber. The other the other thing of course, is long range precision strike. That's that's what all of us are trying to get now. Um, not not a better tank, but long range precision where you can hit targets out a thousand, 1500km, 2000km, uh, for, uh, obvious.
Reasons of achieving effect, but also minimizing your own casualties. I didn't, I didn't see enough of that specifically. And I'm sure the first sea Lord would not want me commenting on what type of ships?Royal Navy, uh, needs, but I do see, uh, the US Navy increasingly investing in unmanned maritime systems. Um, and what we're seeing Ukraine achieve in enclosed bodies of water like the Black Sea and Azov Sea. Uh, unmanned systems, whether they're aerial or maritime, I think are going to become increasingly increasingly important.
If the Russians ever do make the terrible decision to attack a NATO country, because they know NATO's deterrence and defence depends on rapid reinforcement. So everybody's seaports and airports are absolutely going to get hammered as well as, um. With cyber. The other the other thing of course, is long range precision strike. That's that's what all of us are trying to get now. Um, not not a better tank, but long range precision where you can hit targets out a thousand, 1500km, 2000km, uh, for, uh, obvious.
Reasons of achieving effect, but also minimizing your own casualties. I didn't, I didn't see enough of that specifically. And I'm sure the first sea Lord would not want me commenting on what type of ships?Royal Navy, uh, needs, but I do see, uh, the US Navy increasingly investing in unmanned maritime systems. Um, and what we're seeing Ukraine achieve in enclosed bodies of water like the Black Sea and Azov Sea. Uh, unmanned systems, whether they're aerial or maritime, I think are going to become increasingly increasingly important.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Yeah, absolutely. Not. Everybody I talked to that deals with this is frustrated that there is still not a sense of urgency that somehow that, you know what Ukrainians are having to do, that there's no way that we would actually have to, to do that. And so, uh, not because these people are, are bad or, or stupid. It's just institutionally, it usually takes a real catastrophe to force us all to, uh, to get off the, the track that we were already on.
And I think, uh, of course you the next war for all of us is not necessarily going to be what Ukraine is doing right now. So you don't want to learn the wrong lessons or, uh, do away with armored vehicles or other type of platforms. I'm just saying that, um, the way. That information has become, uh, the, the weapon now, the ability to all your different sensors and shooters and decision making, getting that squeezed into a few seconds instead of a few hours or days.
That is the capability that we have got to, uh, I think get more than anything else.
And I think, uh, of course you the next war for all of us is not necessarily going to be what Ukraine is doing right now. So you don't want to learn the wrong lessons or, uh, do away with armored vehicles or other type of platforms. I'm just saying that, um, the way. That information has become, uh, the, the weapon now, the ability to all your different sensors and shooters and decision making, getting that squeezed into a few seconds instead of a few hours or days.
That is the capability that we have got to, uh, I think get more than anything else.
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Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I just briefly add, during my experience as the director of Cisa, we worked very, very closely with the Ukraine cyber forces and those who were responsible for critical infrastructure. And I would say that we did a lot to learn from them as they were learning from us in terms of how to defend both their civilian and military infrastructure from the onslaught of Russian cyber attacks and how to actually continue to be able to use civilian critical infrastructure to provide for their populations. And so that was a very good relationship of information sharing and continuous learning that I hope continues, although it's not clear to me that that is ongoing.
16:42
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I thought that one of the positive things one could take from the defense investment plan was that there was a, an acknowledgement that we are going to have to fight with many of the platforms that we either already have or are already on contract to have. And the trick is going to be how one makes them more effective by using the latest technology. And in that sense, learning lessons from from Ukraine.
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Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Um, so I think the good news is that the UK has been prioritizing cyber capabilities and resilience. We obviously had a very close working relationship between Cisa and the National Cyber Security Centre, and we shared a lot of what we were doing strategically, and particularly the work around secure by design technology, which is holding technology vendors accountable for what they are building, whether it's software or, more importantly, the frontier AI labs that they are actually designing and deploying these new capabilities with security as the top priority. And it may sound pretty obvious, but frankly, it's the decades of misaligned economic incentives and a lack of tech regulation and a lack of a software liability regime that has led to the multibillion dollar cyber security aftermarket.
So the Secure by Design initiative that's been carried through at NCS and by the broader UK critical infrastructure community. I would also say the importance of using purchasing power. That is something that I know the UK is very focused on, as well as holding things like the cloud providers, the hyperscalers and the recent announcement around third party regulation against the cloud companies. I think both of those are incredibly important. And then there's the whole nexus between cyber security and AI. Obviously, over the last three months, we have seen the release of the most powerful cyber tools to be used for exposure and finding and fixing of cyber capabilities.
The UK obviously just released Cyber Shield, which is about how to use agents both defensively and offensively to reduce risk to both civilian and military infrastructure. So that's the kind of activity that is ongoing now that, I think is where the leading edge of how to defend infrastructure needs to be.
So the Secure by Design initiative that's been carried through at NCS and by the broader UK critical infrastructure community. I would also say the importance of using purchasing power. That is something that I know the UK is very focused on, as well as holding things like the cloud providers, the hyperscalers and the recent announcement around third party regulation against the cloud companies. I think both of those are incredibly important. And then there's the whole nexus between cyber security and AI. Obviously, over the last three months, we have seen the release of the most powerful cyber tools to be used for exposure and finding and fixing of cyber capabilities.
The UK obviously just released Cyber Shield, which is about how to use agents both defensively and offensively to reduce risk to both civilian and military infrastructure. So that's the kind of activity that is ongoing now that, I think is where the leading edge of how to defend infrastructure needs to be.
16:44
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
I'm very pleased that that you're so enthusiastic about the accountability measures that have been put in place. Um, do you think it's realistic though?I'm just thinking we've been trying to close the door on many protection measures on sort of social media and other platforms. Why should we believe the accountability is going to be in place and robust when it comes to cyber security?
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Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I mean, I'll say from a US perspective, it never has existed for 40 years. We've allowed technology vendors to build and deploy capabilities that prioritize speed to market and features and convenience and cost all over security. We have allowed that to happen. Um, now that real actions are being taken with legal consequences, a software liability regime, whether it's what's happening in the UK or whether it's what's happening in Europe with Cyber Resilience Act, which I think if I had a magic wand and could do one thing, it would be a software liability regime to hold vendors accountable for the quality of their products.
Like we hold car makers accountable for exploding airbags or planes that create crashes. And so it has to be a change in mindset. I think the good news is these powerful cyber capabilities, if we are able to, uh, put a, a burden on those companies of ensuring security, they can actually shift the advantage to defenders by creating much more secure software. That is the optimistic view, of course, but it's predicated on a lot of work to successfully hold vendors accountable.
Like we hold car makers accountable for exploding airbags or planes that create crashes. And so it has to be a change in mindset. I think the good news is these powerful cyber capabilities, if we are able to, uh, put a, a burden on those companies of ensuring security, they can actually shift the advantage to defenders by creating much more secure software. That is the optimistic view, of course, but it's predicated on a lot of work to successfully hold vendors accountable.
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Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Well, certainly in terms of the offensive cyber capabilities. You know, I started in this space helping to build US. Cyber Command, worked very closely with Gchq at that time, and we modeled a lot of what we were doing off their capabilities. And I think we have now built capability and capacity that is commensurate. Um, but I do think that it's important to continue to exercise in a very muscular way, the ability to impose costs and hold adversaries accountable for and really to hold their, both their civilian and military infrastructure at risk in the way that they hold allied nations at risk.
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Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I think there's a certain. There's a certain value in ambiguity, uh, frankly. Because as soon as you're very clear with something, the line gets crossed. So there is virtue and ambiguity. I do think that it is important to be much more aggressive and rapid in terms of making attributions and calling them out again. I wish it had happened earlier, but I was very pleased to see the statement that held Russia accountable for going after Poland's, uh, power grid in the dead of winter and almost taking down power for 500, 000 people.
That's something that needs to happen much more quickly and frankly, needs to have costs associated with it, whether it's cost that we can see, uh, or costs that happen in sanctions or indictment or disruption law, law enforcement activity or diplomatic consequences.
That's something that needs to happen much more quickly and frankly, needs to have costs associated with it, whether it's cost that we can see, uh, or costs that happen in sanctions or indictment or disruption law, law enforcement activity or diplomatic consequences.
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Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Thank you very much. Thank you. Chair. Um, questions to General Hodges and Mr. McCain primarily. Um and this is about the nuclear deterrent. Um, I'll come in with a few detailed, uh, points in a moment, but just let's start with the credibility, the overall credibility of the NATO nuclear deterrent, um, including the US and then the European, um, pillar of that deterrent in view of Russia's repeated, um, nuclear. Related threats since the full scale invasion of Ukraine, perhaps starting with Mr.
McCain.
McCain.
16:48
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um. I think, uh, by way of prelude, it's worth reminding ourselves that, um, the Russian government has, in effect, lowered the threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons. If you compare their, uh, 2020, um, statement on their deterrence policy with their 2024 statement. Uh, they have changed it in a number of small ways that add significantly to the, the circumstances in which they would consider the use of nuclear weapons to be justified. So we need to be concerned about that. Um, we need to be concerned about the, the very large number of Russian substrategic nuclear weapons, which completely outweighs, uh, the, the numbers that the NATO alliance can rely on.
Um, and I think that is a weakness. General Hodges referred to the need to invest in long range precision conventional strike. That is certainly true. But the big question, I think, is, is that enough in the current circumstances?
Um, and I think that is a weakness. General Hodges referred to the need to invest in long range precision conventional strike. That is certainly true. But the big question, I think, is, is that enough in the current circumstances?
16:49
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
So just let me come to General Hodges in a moment. But let's just pursue that point. If if if we may. I mean, what you what you seem to be suggesting, um, is that in the absence of a flexible response, escalatory ladder in the modern era, horizontal as well as vertical, including cyber, for example, that undermines the credibility of the of the NATO nuclear deterrent. And that, of course, does have tactical nuclear weapons in it. At a point along that ladder before we get to the strategic.
Is that would that be a fair summary?
Is that would that be a fair summary?
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think that's a fair summary. But and there are two aspects to this. Of course. One is the relatively small size of the the US inventory of substrategic weapons in Europe. But secondly, uh, against the, the backdrop of some of the strains that have appeared in the transatlantic relationship, the absence of any sovereign capability on the European part in that space. The French, of course, do have air delivered nuclear weapons, but they regard those as strategic. And although the UK has.
UK government has said that we will join the NATO dual capable aircraft mission. Um, it would be wrong, entirely wrong to imagine that that increased our sovereign capability, given that the weapons are U.S. controlled.
UK government has said that we will join the NATO dual capable aircraft mission. Um, it would be wrong, entirely wrong to imagine that that increased our sovereign capability, given that the weapons are U.S. controlled.
16:51
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Thank you. We might come back in a moment. Um, to the question of the European pillar of the nuclear deterrent were, for example, the Americans not to be engaged, but I. So I'll come back to that point, if I may, a General Hodges, anything you wish to add to Mr. Perkins points?Very good to see you as well.
16:51
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Same here, sir. Well, first of all, um. You know, a nuclear deterrent doesn't have to be nuclear. In other words, if, uh, if the Russians believe that we have the capability even using non-nuclear weapons to, uh, eliminate Kaliningrad or, uh. Their submarine bases up on the Kola Peninsula or other targets like that. Um, then that's a nuclear deterrent. Um, and you don't have to match the Russians, as you know, on warhead for warhead. Uh, the fact that France has, I think somewhere between 5 and 600 warheads and UK somewhere in that general, uh, category, we don't need the 5 or 6000 to match what Russia has.
So I think how we how we look at the nuclear deterrent, um, should, should, uh, reflect that. And of course, deterrence is all about capability and, and demonstrating the will to use the capability. They have to believe that we would actually do this. Um, so that they don't. Now, I would say that, uh, I think there's Russia has been threatening the use of nuclear weapons for a long time, ever since it was first proposed that we give a stinger, uh, air defense system to Ukraine.
And people were like, oh my God, they might escalate. And so the Russians can can see how effective their threats are and how we stop, when in fact, I think there's almost zero chance they would use any nuclear weapons in and around Ukraine because there's no benefit for them to do that. I mean, President XI has told them not to. Prime Minister Modi has told them not to do it. There's no benefit for Russia to use a a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine.
Their real benefit for them comes from the just the threat of it. And they see how we, I think, frankly, overreact to it.
So I think how we how we look at the nuclear deterrent, um, should, should, uh, reflect that. And of course, deterrence is all about capability and, and demonstrating the will to use the capability. They have to believe that we would actually do this. Um, so that they don't. Now, I would say that, uh, I think there's Russia has been threatening the use of nuclear weapons for a long time, ever since it was first proposed that we give a stinger, uh, air defense system to Ukraine.
And people were like, oh my God, they might escalate. And so the Russians can can see how effective their threats are and how we stop, when in fact, I think there's almost zero chance they would use any nuclear weapons in and around Ukraine because there's no benefit for them to do that. I mean, President XI has told them not to. Prime Minister Modi has told them not to do it. There's no benefit for Russia to use a a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine.
Their real benefit for them comes from the just the threat of it. And they see how we, I think, frankly, overreact to it.
16:53
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Well, thank you. That self deterrence point, um, is a, is a whole different topic that that it is just worth registering. Um, but probably we don't have time to pursue in detail. It's a, it's a point very well made. Can I come on then to this question of UK and French nuclear collaboration and the, uh, the 2025 Northwood Declaration. Um, again, perhaps starting with you, Tom. Um, how meaningful do you see that in strategic versus symbolic terms, recognizing these are these are somewhat blurred.
Strategic communications is a big part of deterrence. And it isn't just about nuclear capability, as General Hodges has suggested. But where do you where do you see that?And, and in terms of progress since that declaration?
Strategic communications is a big part of deterrence. And it isn't just about nuclear capability, as General Hodges has suggested. But where do you where do you see that?And, and in terms of progress since that declaration?
16:54
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Well, I do think it is significant. The UK and French governments had ever since the mid 1990s said that um. They would regard anything that was a threat to the vital national interests of one as threatening the vital national interests of the other. And of course, the in the Northwood declaration, they went a step further and said that they couldn't um. And I'm not quoting here, but they said they couldn't envisage a threat to the vital national interests of anywhere in Europe as not affecting them, and would require them to respond.
The question as to whether. Their capability is sufficient to deter Russia, as General Hodges has said, I think is very much a question of what is the. What is the the mind inside the Kremlin?What do they think?Um, but we have to remember that the UK governments, successive UK governments, ever since the 19, uh, 60s, have believed that their own strategic deterrent, their sovereign capability, um, would be sufficient in extremis to deter Russia. So, uh. One has to assume that the same applies today.
And the UK and the French do not rely, unlike the Americans, on a counterforce doctrine. Um, and so when you put their forces together, um they could represent a. Threat that the Kremlin would have to take extremely seriously. Uh, the question is how far the French and British governments are going to coordinate the way that their deterrent forces operate. Um, clearly, two boats at sea at the same time, or perhaps 3 or 4 represents a much bigger, um, force. And a bigger deterrent force than a single boat.
Um, but the British and French governments have been extremely tight lipped about progress that has been made over the last year. I mean, I personally believe that it would be sending a good deterrent message if our government were to say more about how the decision to join the DC, a mission, how the decision to, uh, to deepen collaboration with the French, uh, added to our deterrent messaging.
The question as to whether. Their capability is sufficient to deter Russia, as General Hodges has said, I think is very much a question of what is the. What is the the mind inside the Kremlin?What do they think?Um, but we have to remember that the UK governments, successive UK governments, ever since the 19, uh, 60s, have believed that their own strategic deterrent, their sovereign capability, um, would be sufficient in extremis to deter Russia. So, uh. One has to assume that the same applies today.
And the UK and the French do not rely, unlike the Americans, on a counterforce doctrine. Um, and so when you put their forces together, um they could represent a. Threat that the Kremlin would have to take extremely seriously. Uh, the question is how far the French and British governments are going to coordinate the way that their deterrent forces operate. Um, clearly, two boats at sea at the same time, or perhaps 3 or 4 represents a much bigger, um, force. And a bigger deterrent force than a single boat.
Um, but the British and French governments have been extremely tight lipped about progress that has been made over the last year. I mean, I personally believe that it would be sending a good deterrent message if our government were to say more about how the decision to join the DC, a mission, how the decision to, uh, to deepen collaboration with the French, uh, added to our deterrent messaging.
16:57
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Thank you. Yeah, I agree with that. And your point about, um, the Kremlin's, um, uh, attitude to this was well made by Lord Robertson just recently when he commented about how many times he'd been in the Kremlin and the extent to which the nuclear deterrent was something that was on the mind of, of, uh, of President Putin. Again, just worth registering. That was really helpful. Thank you, General Hodges.
16:57
16:57
16:58
16:58
16:58
16:58
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Okay. Um, uh, so. Question two. All three of you then final final point, uh, to all three of you. Um, if one thinks of the panoply of deterrents, as General Hodges said earlier, one doesn't necessarily need nukes to deter nukes. Um, there are other elements to this. Um, and that includes cyber, uh, etc.. Um, how well postured is NATO Europe now?Were the United States not to be engaged either through choice or necessity in a potential confrontation with Russia, perhaps starting with General Hodges.
16:59
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Well, I think, um, this would be where the political will really comes to the fore. Um, if there is not a strong US or UK or French push to say we have to respond. Uh, even if it was unilaterally, but for the alliance, uh, I mean, there will be quite a few countries that would be much less, uh, perhaps forceful in doing something like that, unless there was such an obvious threat that everybody agreed they had to deal with. So I that would require some real leadership.
Another good reason to have a British desert here.
Another good reason to have a British desert here.
17:00
17:00
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Yeah. So, so on the integrated deterrence strategy that I mentioned at the outset, which is about deterrence by denial, exposing, uh, activity, imposing costs, whether that's through sanctions or indictments, diplomatic consequences, or offensive cyber operations. And then the last, which is really about resilience and persisting together as a collaborative, uh, non-fractured community, I think where the US comes into play. Most importantly, it's not necessarily on the military side, it's on, uh, as General Hodges mentioned earlier on the five eyes, on the intelligence sharing that is absolutely critical to continued understanding of attribution.
Um, and then to be able to call out and declare that activity in a way that, um, has resonance in terms of the declaratory policy with respect to the military piece, it's really about imposing costs. Do I think that NATO nations, the UK specifically can effectively impose costs without the US military, uh, involved?Yes. But I think they play the US military Cyber Command now plays a very important role. And so that would have to be accounted for. Uh, as we move forward on cost imposition and deterrence by punishment.
Um, and then to be able to call out and declare that activity in a way that, um, has resonance in terms of the declaratory policy with respect to the military piece, it's really about imposing costs. Do I think that NATO nations, the UK specifically can effectively impose costs without the US military, uh, involved?Yes. But I think they play the US military Cyber Command now plays a very important role. And so that would have to be accounted for. Uh, as we move forward on cost imposition and deterrence by punishment.
17:01
17:01
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think there are two aspects to this. One is capabilities. Uh, we are as Europeans, still desperately short of certain capabilities. Notably those strategic enabling capabilities that we rely on the US for at the moment. Um, I think there's a big question as to whether we're moving quickly enough to build up capability. That would be a big question about the defence investment plan in this country. Um, but there are also questions in a number of other European states, notably those to the south and the West.
And then the second issue is one of uh, is one of cohesion without US leadership, would the Europeans be able to decide, um, collectively to, um, to. Act effectively in their, in their own self-defense. And the biggest risk in that, uh, in that situation, I think is a, a fait accompli operation where the Russians seize a small part of Baltic territory. Um, and then sit on it waiting for the, uh, the European, NATO states to try to dislodge them.
And then the second issue is one of uh, is one of cohesion without US leadership, would the Europeans be able to decide, um, collectively to, um, to. Act effectively in their, in their own self-defense. And the biggest risk in that, uh, in that situation, I think is a, a fait accompli operation where the Russians seize a small part of Baltic territory. Um, and then sit on it waiting for the, uh, the European, NATO states to try to dislodge them.
17:02
17:03
17:03
17:03
17:03
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
Um, can I ask about credibility of NATO's deterrence?Is it dependent on all NATO countries making their contribution and their increased contribution?Um, what does Russia actually think of the fact that the NATO members are back loaded?A lot of that increased spending?And do we do you think that we are. We're doing all that we can on procurement to get value for money and to get cooperation between NATO members and to have a strategy for actually identifying what NATO needs to provide and how best to divide it.
17:04
17:04
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Sir. Well, first of all, the most important aspect of deterrence is the readiness of the forces that you have. And I you know, this, uh, the Air Force, the Navy, the land forces, everything or whatever state of modernization you're in. And all of us are constantly going through some part or some degree of modernization and reorganization constantly. But what you have, are they fully manned?Uh, how are they trained to, to carry out their tasks?Uh, and do you have the adequate ammunition and fuel and repair parts?So that's the absolute most important thing of, of deterrence.
And I think even though, uh, many nations are playing catch up on modernization, focusing on the level of readiness of what's there is what's, uh, going to would be in front of mine for me. And, and not everybody is where they need to be yet. But another aspect of this deterrence is I'm glad that Jen mentioned it earlier. I think, um, the, uh, gray zone operations where Russia is using hybrid tactics, constantly pushing the boundaries of what we're willing to tolerate, whether we're talking about drones, sabotage, assassination, uh, shadow fleet vessels moving through the Baltic Sea and the channel and the, and the Black Sea.
And then, of course, disinformation until we figure out how to inflict consequences on the Russians for those things where it's not easily attributable, attributable, attributable. But we know who's behind it if we don't figure out how to deal with that, then I think then they're going to continue to escalate this because it's designed to scare us, to stop supporting Ukraine. Uh, and then we kind of get into the scenario that, uh, Tom just mentioned of some sort of limited incursion into, say, Latvia or Estonia. So the deterrence is not only about equipment, it's about political will and the readiness of our forces.
And I think even though, uh, many nations are playing catch up on modernization, focusing on the level of readiness of what's there is what's, uh, going to would be in front of mine for me. And, and not everybody is where they need to be yet. But another aspect of this deterrence is I'm glad that Jen mentioned it earlier. I think, um, the, uh, gray zone operations where Russia is using hybrid tactics, constantly pushing the boundaries of what we're willing to tolerate, whether we're talking about drones, sabotage, assassination, uh, shadow fleet vessels moving through the Baltic Sea and the channel and the, and the Black Sea.
And then, of course, disinformation until we figure out how to inflict consequences on the Russians for those things where it's not easily attributable, attributable, attributable. But we know who's behind it if we don't figure out how to deal with that, then I think then they're going to continue to escalate this because it's designed to scare us, to stop supporting Ukraine. Uh, and then we kind of get into the scenario that, uh, Tom just mentioned of some sort of limited incursion into, say, Latvia or Estonia. So the deterrence is not only about equipment, it's about political will and the readiness of our forces.
17:05
17:06
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Well, I think, uh, I absolutely agree with the general that, uh, we mustn't end up, uh, terrifying ourselves over, over this situation. Um, we should focus on readiness. And actually, NATO has been conducting exercises in the Baltic states in order to both demonstrate its determination to defend them and also to learn lessons of operating in that environment. And on your second point about value for money, I think there's a very big question about whether we achieve value for money. Clearly, there are many, many projects one could point to where that is definitely not the case.
And I think my my main concern is that while I recognize and I understand the reasons why our government, um, talks constantly about, uh, spending defense money on British companies, we also have to try to find a way to maximize the impact of spend across the European NATO allies, which means finding ways to, to get a better. Bang for the buck by combining procurements and so on. Now, there were signs in Istanbul that there were some projects being announced that would answer that point, but we're still a long way from, uh, reaching, um, best practice.
And I think my my main concern is that while I recognize and I understand the reasons why our government, um, talks constantly about, uh, spending defense money on British companies, we also have to try to find a way to maximize the impact of spend across the European NATO allies, which means finding ways to, to get a better. Bang for the buck by combining procurements and so on. Now, there were signs in Istanbul that there were some projects being announced that would answer that point, but we're still a long way from, uh, reaching, um, best practice.
17:07
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
And the only thing I'd add is when it comes to cyber defence and offensive capabilities, I think it's critical to recognize that, you know, while we have five domains of warfare with air, land, sea and, and space and cyber, we really have a six domain. And that is the private sector that is very much affected by both defensive, whether it's below the threshold or above the threshold of activity, specific kinetic attacks against civilian or military infrastructure. Uh, because there's a civilian enabling component even to military infrastructure.
But certainly when you're looking at cost imposition, things like offensive cyber operations, there is a real impact on private sector businesses. So they have to be taken into account.
But certainly when you're looking at cost imposition, things like offensive cyber operations, there is a real impact on private sector businesses. So they have to be taken into account.
17:07
17:08
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hodges, I declare, I think I must declare an interest, having been your guest in Ukraine a decade ago. And I thank you for your hospitality back then. But just because you were one of the first people miles ahead of the curve on the whole subject of a Schengen zone, as I think you called it, for resupply of allies in the front line like Ukraine and indeed other nations, not least NATO countries such as Poland. I'd just be grateful for your latest assessment of the progress that's been made on Schengen zone within NATO.
For that reinforcement of allies in Eastern Europe.
For that reinforcement of allies in Eastern Europe.
17:08
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Sir, thank you, and thanks for reminding me of your visit with us, uh, to Ukraine when we had just delivered the Q 36 radar to them, the first thing before we were even providing, uh, lethal capabilities to the Ukrainians. And I was amazed how quickly they became, uh, well, I'll just say it this way. That radar was even better than I realized because they were so good at using it and getting the most out of it. Uh, the idea of a military Schengen, uh, it started because I was trying to impress on, uh, leaders, uh, how important it was that NATO forces can move as fast or faster than Russian forces across Europe.
Um, during peacetime conditions, uh, when we are, uh, trying to deter Russia from making a terrible, a terrible mistake. So they needed to see that we could assemble in Lithuania, for example, or Estonia or somewhere in Poland, uh, to tell them we see what you're doing. Don't make a terrible mistake. And, uh, I had discovered that, you know, crossing borders, infrastructure, rail capacity, all of these things were, were lacking. And, uh, but also an understanding of why it mattered was lacking.
I, I was talking to the wrong people. I kept talking to Ministry of Defense people and all these countries, and they have nothing to do with their borders, just like in the US. It was Minister of Interior and others I should have been talking to, so I thought I would be cool as an American, demonstrating how well I know Europe by using Schengen zone as a, as the, uh, the, uh. Garrison that said, we need a military Schengen where you can move across borders, uh, without, without any problem.
And you could see people are like, oh, that makes sense until the, uh. One of the senior EU commissioners said, please stop saying Schengen because half of Europe hates it and the other half wishes they were in it. Uh, and so, uh, the next day, the Dutch minister of defense said, we need a military Schengen zone. So I, I was happy I didn't have to say it anymore. I would say, uh, we are way, way further down the road, pardon the pun, than we were when you and I first talked about it.
And I think, uh, regional approaches like what the Netherlands, Germany and Poland have done together, uh, was a good creating that mobility corridor. That was a good step towards achieving it rather than trying to get the whole thing all at once. Uh, but it has to be practiced, uh, because there's so many civilian agencies that are involved in civilian contractors, boats, trains, ferries, you name it. Um, it needs to be a part of all the exercises and of course, British Army does practice this quite a bit, but it's, it's something that requires constant effort.
Um, during peacetime conditions, uh, when we are, uh, trying to deter Russia from making a terrible, a terrible mistake. So they needed to see that we could assemble in Lithuania, for example, or Estonia or somewhere in Poland, uh, to tell them we see what you're doing. Don't make a terrible mistake. And, uh, I had discovered that, you know, crossing borders, infrastructure, rail capacity, all of these things were, were lacking. And, uh, but also an understanding of why it mattered was lacking.
I, I was talking to the wrong people. I kept talking to Ministry of Defense people and all these countries, and they have nothing to do with their borders, just like in the US. It was Minister of Interior and others I should have been talking to, so I thought I would be cool as an American, demonstrating how well I know Europe by using Schengen zone as a, as the, uh, the, uh. Garrison that said, we need a military Schengen where you can move across borders, uh, without, without any problem.
And you could see people are like, oh, that makes sense until the, uh. One of the senior EU commissioners said, please stop saying Schengen because half of Europe hates it and the other half wishes they were in it. Uh, and so, uh, the next day, the Dutch minister of defense said, we need a military Schengen zone. So I, I was happy I didn't have to say it anymore. I would say, uh, we are way, way further down the road, pardon the pun, than we were when you and I first talked about it.
And I think, uh, regional approaches like what the Netherlands, Germany and Poland have done together, uh, was a good creating that mobility corridor. That was a good step towards achieving it rather than trying to get the whole thing all at once. Uh, but it has to be practiced, uh, because there's so many civilian agencies that are involved in civilian contractors, boats, trains, ferries, you name it. Um, it needs to be a part of all the exercises and of course, British Army does practice this quite a bit, but it's, it's something that requires constant effort.
17:11
17:11
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Thank you. Uh, well that concludes our first witness panel session. Can I thank our guests today for joining us?Tom McCain and General Hodges, thank you so much for extending your time with us as well. Accommodating us. Uh, that concludes then our first session. Uh, we will now suspend briefly to change panels. We now return with our second panel of the day. The second panel that's on our session, our third, I think it's our second, third session on deterrence in an age of Russian aggression.
Uh, can I just invite our witnesses to introduce themselves?Perhaps I could start with you, Ahmed.
Uh, can I just invite our witnesses to introduce themselves?Perhaps I could start with you, Ahmed.
17:15
17:15
17:16
17:16
17:16
17:16
17:17
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Sure. I can kick off, although I'm very conscious that we've got a former UK ambassador to NATO here as well. Um. Thank you Baroness. Under normal circumstances, which I'll elaborate on in a minute, what I mean by that. NATO summits are hugely valuable. They are an opportunity for leaders to come together, hash out in private any potential issues that there might be um, make progress on big decisions. And some of the previous NATO summits we've seen really did that.
So the 2022 summit set the new strategic concept, major turning point for the for the Alliance. 23 hashed out the regional plans again, major turning point. And then 2025, um, the new defence spending pledge of spending 5% on, on GDP. So those were all significant summits. Um we can get into this in more detail later, but the difficulty of doing this in the current moment with a US administration who tends to flip flop, putting it mildly on their stance on European security, um, makes things a little bit more difficult because then these summits become about managing President Trump and managing the transatlantic relationship rather than actually making progress.
I'll leave it there.
So the 2022 summit set the new strategic concept, major turning point for the for the Alliance. 23 hashed out the regional plans again, major turning point. And then 2025, um, the new defence spending pledge of spending 5% on, on GDP. So those were all significant summits. Um we can get into this in more detail later, but the difficulty of doing this in the current moment with a US administration who tends to flip flop, putting it mildly on their stance on European security, um, makes things a little bit more difficult because then these summits become about managing President Trump and managing the transatlantic relationship rather than actually making progress.
I'll leave it there.
17:18
17:18
Speaker 11
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Speaker 11
Well, I would agree with that. I think when you look at the summit declaration, it's no accident that it ends with a rather vague statement that says, we look forward to our next meeting, but it does not say exactly when that will be. I think that's a a quiet attempt to get away from this new habit for the last 5 or 6 years of having annual summits. Uh, I agree with Ahmed that under normal circumstances, it can be a useful way to drive progress, because otherwise NATO is only meeting at the Minister of Defence or Minister of Foreign Affairs level.
You really need heads of state and government to be the ones signing up to things like the NATO plans, um, like a new strategic direction on Russia, like support for Ukraine, because that's the only way you can be sure that the implementation and the execution of those will happen across national governments. But the habit of annual summits, Trump administration aside, it just doesn't allow for the same type of preparation along the national delegations. And it becomes all about the optics and the politics and the so-called deliverables, rather than just doing the work that it takes to implement what was agreed.
You really need heads of state and government to be the ones signing up to things like the NATO plans, um, like a new strategic direction on Russia, like support for Ukraine, because that's the only way you can be sure that the implementation and the execution of those will happen across national governments. But the habit of annual summits, Trump administration aside, it just doesn't allow for the same type of preparation along the national delegations. And it becomes all about the optics and the politics and the so-called deliverables, rather than just doing the work that it takes to implement what was agreed.
17:19
17:19
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Yes. It's not just that a summit allows leaders to come together to do business and to put their stamp on, uh, NATO decisions. It is also a whole institutional process. The, uh, setting of. A date for a summit sets the rhythm of work for the alliance across its hundreds of committees. For that, the intervening period. And it's a forcing event. Uh, allies have to come to conclusions and agree language because their leaders are about to meet.
So summits are extremely important. And if we're not going to have them on a fairly regular basis because of US uncertainties, then we need to find some other mechanism to do that. That's not saying they have to be annual, but I think you need them at least triennial.
So summits are extremely important. And if we're not going to have them on a fairly regular basis because of US uncertainties, then we need to find some other mechanism to do that. That's not saying they have to be annual, but I think you need them at least triennial.
17:20
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
I'm not sure they can be much shorter. I think the Ankara, uh, business was actually conducted over no more than three hours compared with, uh, you know, three days in in the good times gone by. Uh, but I don't think they, I do not think they have to be annual. I do think that the focus on President Trump, uh, and the uncertainties about his commitment to the alliance are somewhat damaging, uh, and that it would be perfectly possible to skip it in 2027 and return in 2028.
17:21
17:21
Speaker 11
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Speaker 11
Just to agree with that?I think there's plenty of work that needs to be done. Again, in terms of implementation, whether it's on the defence industrial side, caring for it, a real strategy on Russia, laying out a plan to to help Ukraine become more integrated into the alliance. All of that behind the scenes work that Adam alluded to really takes a lot of energy. And if everybody's spending their energy preparing for that next annual summit, it doesn't allow the real grunt work to go on behind the scenes.
The political guidance that is due in 2027, in the first quarter, is going to take a lot of energy and effort, and I would rather have that energy and effort spent there.
The political guidance that is due in 2027, in the first quarter, is going to take a lot of energy and effort, and I would rather have that energy and effort spent there.
17:22
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Thank you. And just to add to that, um, there's some concern within NATO that if we now were to shift to biannual summits or even less frequent, that that would send a particular message to Russia that we can't hold these summits on an annual basis because there are displayed of disunity. However, I would argue that actually everyone can already see the optics of having to manage the political leaders at the moment. So you can ask yourself, which is worse, really?
17:22
17:22
17:22
Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
You are all expressing concerns about the uncertainties arising out of the current US administration. Is there a role is there any role for the UK with its purported special relationship to play in trying to heal or mend this?Uh, who would like to begin?Uh, I should I should have declared an interest as first as. Of the Telus UK Advisory panel, and second, as a member of the advisory board of RUSI. So Rachel, who would you like?
17:23
Speaker 11
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Speaker 11
Yes. Okay. The American will take the pain for the team. Well, you know, I appreciate the traditional role that the United Kingdom has played in, in trying to manage not just the United States, but also the European Union and sometimes even playing a bridging role between the two, for better or worse. Um, you know, you've seen President Trump get very fixated on certain ideas, whether that's the fact that Spain is not pulling its weight in the alliance. Um, whether that's, uh, you know, that the EU is, is, is a competitor to the US and taking away jobs, whether it's that he's got to have Greenland.
I think the United Kingdom, unfortunately, at the political level, has been caught up in that, uh, it started with, um, I think Iran. Uh, and then it continued. Now with some of the delays around defense spending and technology where the UK, rightly so, has tried to diversify its relationships and grow closer to Europe and create more domestic and European options to counterbalance the tension in the relationship with the United States. So at a political level, I'm not sure that there's certainly not that space for the current Prime minister.
And I wonder if there's that space, um, for for a future prime minister or government where I do think the UK can play a very skillful and strong role in managing the US is behind the scenes. You have a lot of leverage. You have a lot of cards to play. You bring a lot to the table in terms of defense, industrial cooperation, including on the nuclear dimension. I mean, the US cannot get those Trident missiles out the door without the cooperation of the UK.
The price just goes up, the timelines go up. Uh, similarly, on the intelligence side, you bring a lot to the table. Uh, that is undervalued. Um, so I would recommend that that influence role is there, uh, but that it happened behind the scenes rather at the political level. Um, because we've just got a president who's very focused on, um, certain themes and certain, uh, victims to blame when things are not going his way.
I think the United Kingdom, unfortunately, at the political level, has been caught up in that, uh, it started with, um, I think Iran. Uh, and then it continued. Now with some of the delays around defense spending and technology where the UK, rightly so, has tried to diversify its relationships and grow closer to Europe and create more domestic and European options to counterbalance the tension in the relationship with the United States. So at a political level, I'm not sure that there's certainly not that space for the current Prime minister.
And I wonder if there's that space, um, for for a future prime minister or government where I do think the UK can play a very skillful and strong role in managing the US is behind the scenes. You have a lot of leverage. You have a lot of cards to play. You bring a lot to the table in terms of defense, industrial cooperation, including on the nuclear dimension. I mean, the US cannot get those Trident missiles out the door without the cooperation of the UK.
The price just goes up, the timelines go up. Uh, similarly, on the intelligence side, you bring a lot to the table. Uh, that is undervalued. Um, so I would recommend that that influence role is there, uh, but that it happened behind the scenes rather at the political level. Um, because we've just got a president who's very focused on, um, certain themes and certain, uh, victims to blame when things are not going his way.
17:25
17:25
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Thank you. So, so just to add to that, I think it's useful to think of the US as not just President Trump and his administration with all the different factions within the administration, but also the country as a whole. And this is a point about not just managing the next two years or two and a half years or whatever's left of this particular, um, administration, but also managing the relationship beyond that, because it is clear that the US is on the long term structural change of trajectory where Europe is less important to it in favor of the Indo-Pacific.
Although with this particular administration, that's perhaps a little bit less clear in, in actions. Um, so I would just like to make the suggestion that the UK could have and could play a much more significant role in trying to influence the US as a whole by not just going through the political system in DC, but actually, if we think about the midterms, for example, in November, there will be quite a significant turnover of congressmen and women coming in who will be a bit younger, likely will not necessarily have very good, um or well formed views on NATO, on the transatlantic relationship, on Europe.
So there's an early opportunity for the UK and other European governments to get in there early, to have those conversations with those new congressmen and women. The other point I'd like to make, that's through Congress. The other point I'd like to make, and I think the UK does this a little bit already, but doing but is to engage much more closely at a political level through US states and through the governors. Um, that way all of this is indirect influencing. It's not direct speaking into Trump's ear, I acknowledge that.
But that way we still spread the UK's web a little bit more broad than just going through DC and the administration.
Although with this particular administration, that's perhaps a little bit less clear in, in actions. Um, so I would just like to make the suggestion that the UK could have and could play a much more significant role in trying to influence the US as a whole by not just going through the political system in DC, but actually, if we think about the midterms, for example, in November, there will be quite a significant turnover of congressmen and women coming in who will be a bit younger, likely will not necessarily have very good, um or well formed views on NATO, on the transatlantic relationship, on Europe.
So there's an early opportunity for the UK and other European governments to get in there early, to have those conversations with those new congressmen and women. The other point I'd like to make, that's through Congress. The other point I'd like to make, and I think the UK does this a little bit already, but doing but is to engage much more closely at a political level through US states and through the governors. Um, that way all of this is indirect influencing. It's not direct speaking into Trump's ear, I acknowledge that.
But that way we still spread the UK's web a little bit more broad than just going through DC and the administration.
17:26
17:26
17:26
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
I'd like to build on both those comments. I agree that the UK is very unlikely to change her President Trump. So Rachel is right that there are roles for the UK behind the scenes. And I agree with Armida that the US is much more than just the president. But I do think that there is also a role for the UK in the diplomacy of European collective defence. The United States is national defence strategy has signalled clearly and this was in evidence at Ankara, too, that Europe is expected by the United States to take primary responsibility for at least the conventional defence of Europe.
I believe there's a role for the United Kingdom, working with major NATO allies, particularly Germany and France, in shaping what that actually means and what the future governance of European collective defence should look like. That works with the grain of US concerns, but it is also a really important political requirement for Europe.
I believe there's a role for the United Kingdom, working with major NATO allies, particularly Germany and France, in shaping what that actually means and what the future governance of European collective defence should look like. That works with the grain of US concerns, but it is also a really important political requirement for Europe.
17:27
17:27
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Um, my my other question, can I start with you, Adam?Uh, should the UK and European NATO countries generally be trying to ally ourselves more with United States policy goals?And if so, how would we do that in light of an absence of consultation and a proposal relating to Greenland that we might find rather difficult?
17:28
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
I think, uh, just stepping back for a second that, uh, UK and European policy makers have to assume that the problems they encounter with the United States are not particular to this administration, but a reflection of a longer term trend that is unlikely to change. Uh, it may get better at intervals, but toxic US political polarization is now infecting US foreign policy, including security policy, towards Europe for the long term. Uh, that says to me that, uh, the United Kingdom and other Europeans do need to be working, uh, with the present US aspiration to have Europeans take much greater responsibility for their own collective defence.
That cannot possibly, uh, safely happen in a rush. Uh, as you heard in the previous session and in previous sessions, uh, Europe is going to remain very reliant on us critical enablers for quite a long time to come. So, uh, any, uh, European, uh, approach on collective European defence needs to be done. Transatlantically. As far as that is possible. Uh, but I do think that there is scope for not just talking about greater European burden sharing and higher defence spending and a more coherent European defence industry and procurement, but also about the political dimensions of this.
Is Europe actually prepared to embrace the American desire that it should take primary responsibility for conventional defence?Probably the answer is yes. But in that case, uh, what are the next steps?What is the roadmap for that?And is long term US nuclear commitment to the alliance that nuclear umbrella really something that in their heart of hearts, European leaders, including British prime ministers, actually believe is going to be there in a crisis. I think Europeans do need to be starting a conversation, including with Washington, about a more, uh, European nuclear deterrence as well.
That cannot possibly, uh, safely happen in a rush. Uh, as you heard in the previous session and in previous sessions, uh, Europe is going to remain very reliant on us critical enablers for quite a long time to come. So, uh, any, uh, European, uh, approach on collective European defence needs to be done. Transatlantically. As far as that is possible. Uh, but I do think that there is scope for not just talking about greater European burden sharing and higher defence spending and a more coherent European defence industry and procurement, but also about the political dimensions of this.
Is Europe actually prepared to embrace the American desire that it should take primary responsibility for conventional defence?Probably the answer is yes. But in that case, uh, what are the next steps?What is the roadmap for that?And is long term US nuclear commitment to the alliance that nuclear umbrella really something that in their heart of hearts, European leaders, including British prime ministers, actually believe is going to be there in a crisis. I think Europeans do need to be starting a conversation, including with Washington, about a more, uh, European nuclear deterrence as well.
17:30
17:30
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yes. On that final question that Adam just posed, I'd like to flip it on its head, which is a question. Is the US comfortable with Europe developing its own defence industrial base?Um, because for decades we have received very mixed messages on that. Um and we continue to receive mixed messages on that from this administration as well. And part of the reason for that is because the US defence industrial base is dependent on foreign sales. So I think there you know, there's a possibility here to meet somewhere in the middle, which is that for the longer term, um, capabilities that will sorry for the capabilities that will take a longer term to develop.
We build those in Europe where we can, where we can already scale up production for things or systems that are more exquisite that we need on shorter time frames. We can continue to purchase from allies, including the US, but also South Korea and others. But we also need to acknowledge the industrial production challenges within the US itself where, um, you know, following the, the conflict in the Middle East, it will take a very long time to receive a number of key capabilities like Patriot missiles and others.
So, um, I don't think we need to make a decision of either or, but we do need to be very aware that there are constraints on all of, depending on any decision that we make.
We build those in Europe where we can, where we can already scale up production for things or systems that are more exquisite that we need on shorter time frames. We can continue to purchase from allies, including the US, but also South Korea and others. But we also need to acknowledge the industrial production challenges within the US itself where, um, you know, following the, the conflict in the Middle East, it will take a very long time to receive a number of key capabilities like Patriot missiles and others.
So, um, I don't think we need to make a decision of either or, but we do need to be very aware that there are constraints on all of, depending on any decision that we make.
17:31
17:31
17:32
17:32
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Well, I'll just say there's a difference between over dependence and interdependence. And interdependence is actually quite healthy, not least because it builds resilience in our supply chains, in our economic, uh, infrastructure on certain capabilities that might be in short supply. And I, you know, Americans don't think about NATO every day. I think when you live in Europe, you are just so close to the challenge that you're you're seeing it on the news, you're really thinking about it. And the closer you are to the, to the, to the threat and to the eastern eastern front, you're you're really thinking about it on a daily basis.
So there's, there's almost a public relations job to do with the US public to explain the value of NATO, to explain the value of a strong Europe that takes primary responsibility for its own for its own continent and its own region. So the United States can focus elsewhere, whether that's on taking care of some of the problems of political fragmentation and economic inequality that exists there, or whether it's to allow the United States to focus more on the Indo-Pacific or, dare I say, the Middle East, which seems to have have taken up quite a bit of bandwidth.
But what we have to correct is that overdependence where there are no alternatives for Europe, and the minute that Starlink is turned off, you're left without any satellite. Um, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability. I was very reassured at the NATO summit, um, to see some very concrete steps to reduce that overdependence and to create more options. I think the one that's most striking to me is the decision by NATO allies to choose Saab's global eye surveillance system rather than Boeing. E-3 I mean, that's a strong signal that there are good, solid European options and that NATO as a whole is willing to diversify beyond US options.
So there's, there's almost a public relations job to do with the US public to explain the value of NATO, to explain the value of a strong Europe that takes primary responsibility for its own for its own continent and its own region. So the United States can focus elsewhere, whether that's on taking care of some of the problems of political fragmentation and economic inequality that exists there, or whether it's to allow the United States to focus more on the Indo-Pacific or, dare I say, the Middle East, which seems to have have taken up quite a bit of bandwidth.
But what we have to correct is that overdependence where there are no alternatives for Europe, and the minute that Starlink is turned off, you're left without any satellite. Um, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability. I was very reassured at the NATO summit, um, to see some very concrete steps to reduce that overdependence and to create more options. I think the one that's most striking to me is the decision by NATO allies to choose Saab's global eye surveillance system rather than Boeing. E-3 I mean, that's a strong signal that there are good, solid European options and that NATO as a whole is willing to diversify beyond US options.
17:33
17:33
17:34
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
You know, I've been actually really impressed by when you read that treaty, how you can really find what you need. It's like kind of like the US Constitution. There are little nuggets built in there. Uh, article three, for example, everybody really focuses on article five and that collective security guarantee of an attack on one is an attack on all. But article three talks about the fact that the first line of defence is national defence, and making sure that each individual ally is spending adequately and taking care of its its own home homeland and is ready in any sort of of front line scenario conflict.
So article three is very resilient. Um, there's even, I think, flexibility in the way article five is written. So we don't have to have it as a single point of failure. If all 32 allies, um, don't all. Want to come to the rescue of another ally in, in a scenario where there's an attack on one of them. So we already have examples of that or one example of that, which is in September 11th, when the United States was attacked.
Yes. We want the image of political solidarity of all 32 allies saying that ally was attacked. That's unacceptable. We stand by them. But in terms of the response, that was up to each individual ally. And when you read the treaty, there is that optionality to provide political support or to go beyond with military, political or economic support beyond beyond what NATO can agree at 32. I think that's important because we talk a lot about this tripwire scenario, where Russia tries to take a small bite out of one of the Baltic states or somewhere else, and then that's the single point of failure for article five, and it's the end of the NATO alliance.
I completely disagree with that because, you know, to your question, there's a lot of flexibility in that treaty whereby you can maintain political unity. Uh, that is needed. And then allow for a varied response.
So article three is very resilient. Um, there's even, I think, flexibility in the way article five is written. So we don't have to have it as a single point of failure. If all 32 allies, um, don't all. Want to come to the rescue of another ally in, in a scenario where there's an attack on one of them. So we already have examples of that or one example of that, which is in September 11th, when the United States was attacked.
Yes. We want the image of political solidarity of all 32 allies saying that ally was attacked. That's unacceptable. We stand by them. But in terms of the response, that was up to each individual ally. And when you read the treaty, there is that optionality to provide political support or to go beyond with military, political or economic support beyond beyond what NATO can agree at 32. I think that's important because we talk a lot about this tripwire scenario, where Russia tries to take a small bite out of one of the Baltic states or somewhere else, and then that's the single point of failure for article five, and it's the end of the NATO alliance.
I completely disagree with that because, you know, to your question, there's a lot of flexibility in that treaty whereby you can maintain political unity. Uh, that is needed. And then allow for a varied response.
17:36
17:36
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I think. Well, militarily in that particular scenario, the actual correct military response would be a frontline response. Now, right now, there are U.S. forces forward positioned in the Baltic states and Poland. And so I think they would be part of that regional response. But it's I think in any scenario you can imagine, it starts small and then it builds. And so at least initially, if there's an attack on one ally, we don't want all 32 rushing in. Um, you would get that regional response built up by reinforcements further down the line.
But we have to control our messaging because I think, um, in particular, I see a lot of press stories that suggest even one boot over a NATO border would, would cause the entire alliance to collapse. And we've seen that that's not the case.
But we have to control our messaging because I think, um, in particular, I see a lot of press stories that suggest even one boot over a NATO border would, would cause the entire alliance to collapse. And we've seen that that's not the case.
17:37
17:37
17:37
17:37
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Yeah. They may not have envisaged it all, but they left us with great flexibility, which is tremendously helpful. I think I, I can just underline Rachel's point by saying, comparing the 14 articles on roughly two sides of a piece of paper that are the Atlantic Charter for the North Atlantic Treaty. Uh, and the Treaty on European Union, where you get to the collective defence clause at article 42.7. Uh, it's a completely different creature than NATO treaty. Uh, and because it is so short and general, it does leave great flexibility for the alliance.
17:38
Speaker 16
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Speaker 16
And just once you are on. We've we've spoken quite a lot about europeanisation of NATO. Um, as America steps back, which has been trying to do since Obama's pivot to Asia. There's nothing new here. Um, there. Are a number of political obstacles, not least between, you know, different European allies. Is there a role that Britain can play to help that greater europeanisation of NATO to overcoming some of those political difficulties?
17:39
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, sure. I also just very briefly want to comment on the previous two question if that's okay. Um, so the point that Rachel made about reinforcements coming, I think is key because currently in the NATO plans, the assumption is that the reinforcements will come predominantly from the US. Right. And that's where then the question is, will those actually come. Big question mark. Um, I will just point to um Germany who is in the process of putting a brigade in Lithuania, which is exactly that point of essentially putting in a tripwire in a frontline state, but also therefore directly implicating Germany itself.
Should, you know, a little green man scenario or something like happen, um, which, um, which is quite an important signal to be sending as well as direct military capability on, um, the europeanisation of NATO. I mean, the UK's policy for quite some time has been NATO first, right?That's the entire premise of its defence policy, understandably so, especially since since Brexit. Um. The UK is and I say this as a Dutch Italian national who speaks regularly to European counterparts, the UK is very much look to as a military leader within Europe still.
Um and we see that also in Starmer's approach in terms of building the coalition of willing for Ukraine alongside France. Um, there's a question around how long some of those political leadership initiatives can last with, you know, potential political changes in some key European countries like France from 2027 onwards. Um, but I think there is a challenge around the UK's spending and actual military heft. Right. And you will know this better than I do, I'm sure, but by 2030, Germany will have spent more on defence spending than the UK and France combined, which really does shift the equation.
Now, spending does not equal strategic culture, nor does it equal readiness and capabilities.
Should, you know, a little green man scenario or something like happen, um, which, um, which is quite an important signal to be sending as well as direct military capability on, um, the europeanisation of NATO. I mean, the UK's policy for quite some time has been NATO first, right?That's the entire premise of its defence policy, understandably so, especially since since Brexit. Um. The UK is and I say this as a Dutch Italian national who speaks regularly to European counterparts, the UK is very much look to as a military leader within Europe still.
Um and we see that also in Starmer's approach in terms of building the coalition of willing for Ukraine alongside France. Um, there's a question around how long some of those political leadership initiatives can last with, you know, potential political changes in some key European countries like France from 2027 onwards. Um, but I think there is a challenge around the UK's spending and actual military heft. Right. And you will know this better than I do, I'm sure, but by 2030, Germany will have spent more on defence spending than the UK and France combined, which really does shift the equation.
Now, spending does not equal strategic culture, nor does it equal readiness and capabilities.
17:40
17:40
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Exactly, exactly. The risk taking, the appetite, all those things which I think would still come more from British leadership and French leadership. But we need to acknowledge that things are shifting. And so there's a real question for the UK government where does it want to be?And if it wants to lead, it needs to be able to put money where its mouth is, I.
17:41
17:41
17:41
17:41
17:42
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
It will be Britain. If it would happen tomorrow, it will be Britain. Because one the French are still outside the integrated military structure and well, it's coherence with the military. I'm sorry, with the nuclear side of things. And given the overlap between nuclear and conventional, you can't have a country that sits outside of the whole package running the operations. And it won't be Germany because they lack the strategic culture and the readiness. Um, they might be spending a lot, but, you know, for good historical reasons, they've embedded their entire defence planning system, uh, and their entire capability, uh, procurement choices around NATO.
And so they can't run NATO as they're still trying to build their own strategic culture. So it would be the UK if it happened tomorrow, but let's.
And so they can't run NATO as they're still trying to build their own strategic culture. So it would be the UK if it happened tomorrow, but let's.
17:42
17:43
17:43
17:43
Speaker 17
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Speaker 17
Uh, no, actually, no. I'm quite happy to take on the next question, if that's okay. Thank you very much. Um, miss, if I can come to your good self. Given the new US Trump administration's shifting of or considerable shifting of priorities towards homeland defense, the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific, there have been greater calls for more European leadership within NATO. So what more do you think the UK can do, particularly within the E3, to further advance and encourage European leadership of NATO?
17:44
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So I think, um, the E3 has been a very useful political forum. Um, and I think one of the, it would be good to see that connected much more closely to actual NATO ministerial forums. Well, I would also not dismiss the E5 because that brings together the key European defence industrial countries. Um, so doing more with the E5 rather than E3 and connecting those to political um decision making formats within NATO is a useful, um, useful mechanism. Um the other thing is, and I mean this is a little bit sensitive and, you know, it's, it's difficult to see this taking place within NATO at the moment, but within the NATO defence planning process, there will need to be a reassessment of, um, which countries take on which capabilities.
That process will start from 2027 onwards, I believe. Um, uh, the UK should be leading a conversation which takes a hard look and an honest assessment of what the US will actually provide, and perhaps even work on an assumption, on an assumption that beyond the critical enablers, the US may not provide anything beyond that. What the Europeans can be doing, and the UK can be leading that conversation within NATO.
That process will start from 2027 onwards, I believe. Um, uh, the UK should be leading a conversation which takes a hard look and an honest assessment of what the US will actually provide, and perhaps even work on an assumption, on an assumption that beyond the critical enablers, the US may not provide anything beyond that. What the Europeans can be doing, and the UK can be leading that conversation within NATO.
17:45
17:45
17:45
17:45
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Yes, I did. Uh, just a few more thoughts, uh, on UK leadership of Europeanisation in NATO. Uh, one thing you have discussed in the last session, uh, but I think is worth repeating is that the UK is one of only two European nuclear powers, and it's the only one that has committed nuclear weapons to its allies since 1962. Uh, it doesn't make enough of its nuclear role in Europe. And as doubts grow about the US nuclear umbrella over European collective defence, uh, I think the UK should be, uh, at least as.
Nave as President Macron in, uh, talking in fresh ways about what the UK's nuclear dimension can do for European allies. Uh, I also think that given our strong relations with Ukraine, there is a space for UK to provide leadership on the emerging debate inside the Alliance about European way of war and how you keep that interoperable with the United States, while doing things a bit differently from the US. Uh, and I have spoken previously about the importance of a a clearer European political leadership on how actually, uh, parliamentarians look their constituents in the eye and tell them that they still know how to deliver European collective defence.
When we now have doubts about us commitment.
Nave as President Macron in, uh, talking in fresh ways about what the UK's nuclear dimension can do for European allies. Uh, I also think that given our strong relations with Ukraine, there is a space for UK to provide leadership on the emerging debate inside the Alliance about European way of war and how you keep that interoperable with the United States, while doing things a bit differently from the US. Uh, and I have spoken previously about the importance of a a clearer European political leadership on how actually, uh, parliamentarians look their constituents in the eye and tell them that they still know how to deliver European collective defence.
When we now have doubts about us commitment.
17:46
17:46
17:46
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Well, I don't think there's much NATO can do to put pressure on Putin or Russia because, well, one, NATO has cut off. Uh, there's no longer the NATO-Russia Council. They're no longer direct communications between the alliance and Russia beyond some, you know, last ditch emergency communications, uh, lines at the. General's level, I think it would. And secondly, because they don't have the right tools other than deterrence. And I think what deterrence says signals to Russia and to Putin is don't go any further.
And that's NATO's job number one. Of course, helping Ukraine stay in the fight and helping Ukraine become very integrated into NATO, even short of membership is is something they can do that creates a deterrent effect. Uh, but in terms of bringing Putin to the negotiating table, I think that's more of a political and economic lever. Uh, and we have seen individual allies try to compel. Putin to come to the negotiating table through more precise sanctions. Uh, I think you had a hearing on that several weeks ago.
Um, to try to cut off some of the, uh. Capabilities and components that allow them Russia to allow, allow Russia to stay in the fight militarily. But NATO as a whole, I think individual allies are giving what they can, both in terms of direct military assistance. I think at the summit, we saw a commitment of of 70 billion for the next two years, which is not nothing. Um, combined with the U.S loan mechanism, that sends a very strong message to Putin that that the EU and NATO are here to stay by Ukraine's side for the near future.
But it's simply as an alliance, they simply don't have the political levers to create the conditions for a cease fire. Um, and to bring everyone to the negotiating table.
And that's NATO's job number one. Of course, helping Ukraine stay in the fight and helping Ukraine become very integrated into NATO, even short of membership is is something they can do that creates a deterrent effect. Uh, but in terms of bringing Putin to the negotiating table, I think that's more of a political and economic lever. Uh, and we have seen individual allies try to compel. Putin to come to the negotiating table through more precise sanctions. Uh, I think you had a hearing on that several weeks ago.
Um, to try to cut off some of the, uh. Capabilities and components that allow them Russia to allow, allow Russia to stay in the fight militarily. But NATO as a whole, I think individual allies are giving what they can, both in terms of direct military assistance. I think at the summit, we saw a commitment of of 70 billion for the next two years, which is not nothing. Um, combined with the U.S loan mechanism, that sends a very strong message to Putin that that the EU and NATO are here to stay by Ukraine's side for the near future.
But it's simply as an alliance, they simply don't have the political levers to create the conditions for a cease fire. Um, and to bring everyone to the negotiating table.
17:48
17:48
17:49
17:49
17:50
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Yeah, it's the diplomacy. Um, I, I think we need all the pressure we can in sanctions in other ways on Russia. But at the moment, there's not the incentives for Russia to come to the table, at least as Putin sees it. Uh, the war in Ukraine is at least as much about Russia's relationship with Europe and NATO as it is with Ukraine. The scope for British diplomacy, probably with the E3, uh, to, uh, make this more interesting for Putin.
17:50
17:50
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Just very briefly, I mean, I agree with Rachel that this is an economic discussion, um, more so perhaps than NATO discussion at this point. But there are things that we could be doing. Um, one of them is for European countries to stop buying gas altogether. Um, the other one is we're heading in, we're in tourist season taking a look at tourist visas for Russians who are still visiting Europe. Um, and then in terms of helping Ukraine, we should be doing much more to facilitate joint ventures between the UK and Ukraine, for example, by taking another look at banking regulations, which are currently making it very difficult to get loans in the UK, continues to be difficult for Ukrainians to get visas to be able to come to the UK for those business ventures.
So those are tangible things that could be done to support Ukraine.
So those are tangible things that could be done to support Ukraine.
17:51
Speaker 18
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Speaker 18
Okay, very quick question about, um peacekeeping forces. UK, as you know, is committed to deploying forces in the event of a cease fire to Ukraine. Other countries are as well the coalition of the willing and so on. How credible do you think that peacekeeping force is going to be without US capabilities like air cover or missile defence?
17:51
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I'd say not very credible. Um, and before I would send any countries forces into Ukraine, I'd want to understand what the rules of engagement were. What exactly were the terms of the agreement. Um, you know, we did have a period, I think about a year, almost a year ago where there was a, there was quite a lot of detail in terms of freezing the conflict along current battle lines, allowing for a buffer zone and then coming to some sort of an agreement with the Russians about exactly what would happen in terms of a consolidated response, including from the United States, if it went past those established rules of engagement and red lines.
But I don't think we're there. I think all of that's fallen by the wayside. So I don't think a peacekeeping force on the ground is is where we are now before we have a ceasefire and a political agreement.
But I don't think we're there. I think all of that's fallen by the wayside. So I don't think a peacekeeping force on the ground is is where we are now before we have a ceasefire and a political agreement.
17:52
17:52
17:52
17:52
17:53
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah, the Dutch are very far ahead. So one of the impetus for the Dutch was they hosted a NATO summit there last year in the run up to the NATO summit, the Dutch MFA, together with the now disbanded public diplomacy division of NATO, hosted a series. Um it was called NATO through the Netherlands. And essentially they hosted theatre shows in the equivalent of the Royal Albert Hall, not LSE or Kings, but cultural institutions with your ministers of defence, you know, high profile journalists. And they were sold out every single time.
And they went through the entire country. Um, I think we could do much better to engage a.
And they went through the entire country. Um, I think we could do much better to engage a.
17:53
17:53
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, engage cultural institutions to better tell the story of NATO. Um, use political figures. Sorry, not political figures. Use popular figures to mobilise some of the support around this. We've got the royal family running around who all have a role in the armed forces in this country. So we could use them much better. Um, we should be developing curricula in schools, not to scare people, but just to make them understand.
17:54
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, I would be most grateful if any of our witnesses wish to write to me or write to the committee, rather, on that, that topic. That would be greatly appreciated. Leads today's session. Can I thank the three witnesses for your time?Uh, as anticipated, there was going to be interruption, but I think we've avoided we've been through as much of the questions as we really needed to. So thank you so much for your for your time today. That concludes our second panel or.