Foreign Affairs Committee
Tuesday 14th July 2026
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14:02
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
The Foreign Secretary. Um, last time we saw you before the committee was in December last year. The Foreign Secretary, um, last time we saw you before the committee was in December last year. And we're pleased to see you again. Um, to cover a wide range of issues that are currently on your desk. And we're also really pleased to see Nick Dyer um, for your first appearances, interim permanent Under-Secretary. Um, we know that your time is tight.
And so, um, we'd be grateful. We have a large number of questions. We'd be grateful if you could keep your answers as concise as possible. And I will encourage the committee to do the same with questions. Um, what I wanted really to start with was, was the last time we saw you, as I say, was December the 16th. And at that time you were working to the priorities of the, of the former um Secretary of State. Um, but, but in March this year, you wrote to us setting out your priorities.
Um, and they were security growth and resilience, migration, development and climate, women and girls and agile alliances. Um, and then, uh, and then in the house in March, when you were discussing the Oda cuts, you said that your priorities would be Ukraine, Sudan, Palestine and Lebanon. And so I looked with interest at your, um, Chatham House essay, and the Guardian said about it that it was the clearest, one of the clearest and most comprehensive pictures of the Foreign Secretary's worldview, where she thinks her department should devote its attention in the in the coming years.
Is that right?Um, so, uh, in the Guardian article, I think that in the interview you said, I think AI is going to end up being the dominant foreign policy issue that we deal with over the next two years. Um, and I wondered, um, I mean, do you acknowledge that there's been a change of emphasis and priorities over that time, foreign policy issue that we deal with over the next two years?Um, and I wondered, um, I mean, do you acknowledge that there's been a change of emphasis and priorities over that time?And so, I mean, I've got a member of my staff do the annoying thing of putting the 3200 foreign policy issue that we deal with over the next two years.
But obviously, that wasn't mentioned in the six points in March. Um, and I wondered, um, I mean, do you acknowledge that there's been a change of emphasis and priorities over that time?And so, I mean, I've got a member of my staff do the annoying thing of putting the 3200 words into the computer. And, and if you have a look at the, the essay, AI comes up 12 times and NATO comes up nine times, Europe comes up 13, defence comes up eight and the word nuclear comes up.
Seven. So, I mean, it does seem as though there's been a change because if you look at the the the issue of development, there's only two sentences on it. And and if you look up Gaza, there's only two sentences on it. And and Lebanon, where we where we visited recently didn't come up at all. It's as if foreign policy has kind of lined up behind hard power much more. Would you mind explaining?Yeah. So thank you very much, chair.
Thank you to the committee for having me. Uh, just give a sense of the overview and where all of the, these things fit in. I think what I was trying to set out in the essay was very much the backdrop. So the priorities we set out set out. These are the things that the Fcdo is focusing on. Part of what I was trying to do with the the Chatham House essay was really to set out what is the backdrop that we are dealing with, and what is it that the UK has to respond to?That is an increasingly dangerous world and a much more unstable world.
So the reality is, in response to that, we are having to focus more heavily on security and on building Britain's strength and resilience. In response to that. In fact, that security issue was very much reflected in the priorities that I set out. But alongside it, as well as talking about our security and how we respond to the dangerous world or the unstable world that we face. I did also say we have to be more agile in our alliances and use that effectively.
Convening power, the soft power, as well as the hard power in how we respond to a more dangerous world because we need to shape the world, not simply be trying to shelter from the storm. And I was also clear about our humanitarian priorities, our values, and the need for us to be confident in upholding those values. So the, um, actually our focus around development on humanitarian ism and on women and girls are very much reflections of those values. So the, the overarching thing was the context, the threats that we face as a country, the turbulence in the world, and then how we respond on the building, our strength and resilience, developing our alliances and upholding our values.
If you retrofit that to what were the priorities that I set out for the Foreign Office earlier on in the year?First of all, was national security continuing with that priority for national security?That obviously is completely in line with the essay. Secondly, on economic growth, I've changed the focus so that it's not just about economic growth, it's actually about growth and resilience. And that is very much in response to the instability in the world. If you look at something like the Strait of Hormuz, actually our strongest economic policy at the moment is seeking to get the Strait of Hormuz reopened and also strengthening our border security.
So our migration focus was both about our border security, but also about how we build our democratic resilience and how we work internationally to tackle issues of migration. But then on the the alliances, building alliances, again, that is a clear priority set out earlier on in the year. And then finally, the women and girls and the development, development and climate priorities are very much about the reflections of our values. So for me, those priorities, the six thematic priorities that I set out earlier in the year, were very much actually in line with that broader essay, which sets out the context.
I just come back to the AI issue as a final point in a second. But then you also referred to what's the geographic priorities?And it's always a challenge when trying to write a sort of broad, overarching foreign policy essay. Do you start from the geography and move around the world, or do you try and address the broad themes, which means that you will highlight geography from time to time as part of highlighting the themes?So of course, Ukraine, central to our security, the issues around the Middle East, including, um, Israel Palestine, that is about both our security and our values.
So too is Sudan. So too is the Lebanon that they cut across both the issues around our security and our values. So I think those are very much in line. The area where I would agree with you that I think things are moving on at a pace is around AI. And look, that is just a sense of the pace at which I think everybody is grappling with the the speed at which technology is changing. That creates huge opportunities, but also creates huge challenges and threats.
And I was very struck as part of a visit that I did to China, where I went to see some of the work that they are doing on AI and robotics. Really the pace at which things are moving. We've also seen a lot of the debates with the US around anthropic and so on. That's also, again, about the pace at which those things are moving. So I do agree that actually that was not highlighted in the priorities in February. That is a reflection of the pace at which this is moving.
And this is me looking forward and thinking this is going to shape everything that we do. I think over the next 18 months to two years, it's going to influence all of our foreign policy debates. And that means we in the Foreign Office have to adapt.
And so, um, we'd be grateful. We have a large number of questions. We'd be grateful if you could keep your answers as concise as possible. And I will encourage the committee to do the same with questions. Um, what I wanted really to start with was, was the last time we saw you, as I say, was December the 16th. And at that time you were working to the priorities of the, of the former um Secretary of State. Um, but, but in March this year, you wrote to us setting out your priorities.
Um, and they were security growth and resilience, migration, development and climate, women and girls and agile alliances. Um, and then, uh, and then in the house in March, when you were discussing the Oda cuts, you said that your priorities would be Ukraine, Sudan, Palestine and Lebanon. And so I looked with interest at your, um, Chatham House essay, and the Guardian said about it that it was the clearest, one of the clearest and most comprehensive pictures of the Foreign Secretary's worldview, where she thinks her department should devote its attention in the in the coming years.
Is that right?Um, so, uh, in the Guardian article, I think that in the interview you said, I think AI is going to end up being the dominant foreign policy issue that we deal with over the next two years. Um, and I wondered, um, I mean, do you acknowledge that there's been a change of emphasis and priorities over that time, foreign policy issue that we deal with over the next two years?Um, and I wondered, um, I mean, do you acknowledge that there's been a change of emphasis and priorities over that time?And so, I mean, I've got a member of my staff do the annoying thing of putting the 3200 foreign policy issue that we deal with over the next two years.
But obviously, that wasn't mentioned in the six points in March. Um, and I wondered, um, I mean, do you acknowledge that there's been a change of emphasis and priorities over that time?And so, I mean, I've got a member of my staff do the annoying thing of putting the 3200 words into the computer. And, and if you have a look at the, the essay, AI comes up 12 times and NATO comes up nine times, Europe comes up 13, defence comes up eight and the word nuclear comes up.
Seven. So, I mean, it does seem as though there's been a change because if you look at the the the issue of development, there's only two sentences on it. And and if you look up Gaza, there's only two sentences on it. And and Lebanon, where we where we visited recently didn't come up at all. It's as if foreign policy has kind of lined up behind hard power much more. Would you mind explaining?Yeah. So thank you very much, chair.
Thank you to the committee for having me. Uh, just give a sense of the overview and where all of the, these things fit in. I think what I was trying to set out in the essay was very much the backdrop. So the priorities we set out set out. These are the things that the Fcdo is focusing on. Part of what I was trying to do with the the Chatham House essay was really to set out what is the backdrop that we are dealing with, and what is it that the UK has to respond to?That is an increasingly dangerous world and a much more unstable world.
So the reality is, in response to that, we are having to focus more heavily on security and on building Britain's strength and resilience. In response to that. In fact, that security issue was very much reflected in the priorities that I set out. But alongside it, as well as talking about our security and how we respond to the dangerous world or the unstable world that we face. I did also say we have to be more agile in our alliances and use that effectively.
Convening power, the soft power, as well as the hard power in how we respond to a more dangerous world because we need to shape the world, not simply be trying to shelter from the storm. And I was also clear about our humanitarian priorities, our values, and the need for us to be confident in upholding those values. So the, um, actually our focus around development on humanitarian ism and on women and girls are very much reflections of those values. So the, the overarching thing was the context, the threats that we face as a country, the turbulence in the world, and then how we respond on the building, our strength and resilience, developing our alliances and upholding our values.
If you retrofit that to what were the priorities that I set out for the Foreign Office earlier on in the year?First of all, was national security continuing with that priority for national security?That obviously is completely in line with the essay. Secondly, on economic growth, I've changed the focus so that it's not just about economic growth, it's actually about growth and resilience. And that is very much in response to the instability in the world. If you look at something like the Strait of Hormuz, actually our strongest economic policy at the moment is seeking to get the Strait of Hormuz reopened and also strengthening our border security.
So our migration focus was both about our border security, but also about how we build our democratic resilience and how we work internationally to tackle issues of migration. But then on the the alliances, building alliances, again, that is a clear priority set out earlier on in the year. And then finally, the women and girls and the development, development and climate priorities are very much about the reflections of our values. So for me, those priorities, the six thematic priorities that I set out earlier in the year, were very much actually in line with that broader essay, which sets out the context.
I just come back to the AI issue as a final point in a second. But then you also referred to what's the geographic priorities?And it's always a challenge when trying to write a sort of broad, overarching foreign policy essay. Do you start from the geography and move around the world, or do you try and address the broad themes, which means that you will highlight geography from time to time as part of highlighting the themes?So of course, Ukraine, central to our security, the issues around the Middle East, including, um, Israel Palestine, that is about both our security and our values.
So too is Sudan. So too is the Lebanon that they cut across both the issues around our security and our values. So I think those are very much in line. The area where I would agree with you that I think things are moving on at a pace is around AI. And look, that is just a sense of the pace at which I think everybody is grappling with the the speed at which technology is changing. That creates huge opportunities, but also creates huge challenges and threats.
And I was very struck as part of a visit that I did to China, where I went to see some of the work that they are doing on AI and robotics. Really the pace at which things are moving. We've also seen a lot of the debates with the US around anthropic and so on. That's also, again, about the pace at which those things are moving. So I do agree that actually that was not highlighted in the priorities in February. That is a reflection of the pace at which this is moving.
And this is me looking forward and thinking this is going to shape everything that we do. I think over the next 18 months to two years, it's going to influence all of our foreign policy debates. And that means we in the Foreign Office have to adapt.
14:10
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Obviously, the world is changing very fast and it's and it's difficult to to keep up with it. And, and it's been a very challenging period of time. Um, but I think that my concern is that all of these changes are happening, the changes to priorities are happening at a time when the Foreign Office itself is, is being restructured. And we're going to come back to that later. Um, as to whether or not the Foreign Office is restructuring in line with your priorities and whether it will be in a position to be able to restructure if those priorities needed to change.
Again, um, can I take you to what happened yesterday?Um, which with Donald Trump, I mean, so obviously you said that Iran's closure of the Straits of Hormuz is a direct threat to global prosperity, that Iran is trying to hold the global economy hostage. Um, and it's imperative that international law is respected. And obviously, yesterday we had Donald Trump saying that he was going to be the guardian of the Straits of Hormuz and that he was going to charge ships 20% for the privilege of his being the Guardian.
I mean, what is Britain's reaction to this?How are we going to deal with such a challenge?
Again, um, can I take you to what happened yesterday?Um, which with Donald Trump, I mean, so obviously you said that Iran's closure of the Straits of Hormuz is a direct threat to global prosperity, that Iran is trying to hold the global economy hostage. Um, and it's imperative that international law is respected. And obviously, yesterday we had Donald Trump saying that he was going to be the guardian of the Straits of Hormuz and that he was going to charge ships 20% for the privilege of his being the Guardian.
I mean, what is Britain's reaction to this?How are we going to deal with such a challenge?
14:11
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, our position remains that we want to see the Strait of Hormuz fully reopened. This is about an international shipping lane, and it's about the law of the sea. So therefore, no country and can do what Iran has been seeking to do. And they have been deliberately trying to weaponize the strait to hijack the global economy effectively. And what we saw happening is that there's currently three three shipping routes at the moment, the northern route that goes through Iranian waters, the central route that's been the traditional IMO endorsed route, which we believe is significantly mined at the moment.
And then a new southern route, only in Omani waters. The central and the southern roots are in Omani waters. And despite signing the Memorandum of Understanding, Iran decided to attack commercial shipping in that southern route in Omani waters. That's a violation not just of their own memorandum of understanding. It's a violation of Oman's sovereignty, and it's a violation of freedom of navigation and the law of the sea. So I think Iran has hugely overreached in. They decided to claim that the memorandum of understanding gave them the ability to do this.
Of course, it doesn't totally undermines the law of the sea. And so now what we have is an increasing of pressure on all sides. We've got to refer the increase in the return to conflict. What we want to see is obviously to ensure that we can get the strait reopened. And that means reaching again a ceasefire and going back to the talks process. But Iran has to on that basis, halt the attacks on commercial shipping. And I don't think that can be allowed to continue.
And then a new southern route, only in Omani waters. The central and the southern roots are in Omani waters. And despite signing the Memorandum of Understanding, Iran decided to attack commercial shipping in that southern route in Omani waters. That's a violation not just of their own memorandum of understanding. It's a violation of Oman's sovereignty, and it's a violation of freedom of navigation and the law of the sea. So I think Iran has hugely overreached in. They decided to claim that the memorandum of understanding gave them the ability to do this.
Of course, it doesn't totally undermines the law of the sea. And so now what we have is an increasing of pressure on all sides. We've got to refer the increase in the return to conflict. What we want to see is obviously to ensure that we can get the strait reopened. And that means reaching again a ceasefire and going back to the talks process. But Iran has to on that basis, halt the attacks on commercial shipping. And I don't think that can be allowed to continue.
14:13
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
May I cut across to you because, I mean, it's a very clear critique and analysis of what Iran is doing. But, having members of the public watching today will have heard Donald Trump saying that he's going to close the Straits of Hormuz, and he's going to charge ships 20%, and he's going to be the guardian of the Straits of Hormuz. Now, you know, obviously we're allies of America, but are we just going to just do nothing about that?
14:13
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, we continue to oppose tolls and charges. And in fact, that's the discussion that I had with American colleagues last week while we were at NATO. We were talking about that we could not end up with tolls and with a system on the Strait of Hormuz that would undermine the freedom of navigation and the law of the sea. I think what we're seeing happening at the moment is the escalation of rhetoric around the conflict itself and the putting on of pressure. But our position remains the same.
We support freedom of navigation. We are opposed to tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, just as we are everywhere else. I have pointed out to some of our international colleagues that the Straits of Dover is busier than the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal put together. We, the UK, do not support tolls in the Straits of Dover and so, we argue, make the same arguments everywhere else in the world, anywhere where there are those restricted routes. Where there are international shipping routes need to be free from tolls and open for freedom of navigation.
We support freedom of navigation. We are opposed to tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, just as we are everywhere else. I have pointed out to some of our international colleagues that the Straits of Dover is busier than the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal put together. We, the UK, do not support tolls in the Straits of Dover and so, we argue, make the same arguments everywhere else in the world, anywhere where there are those restricted routes. Where there are international shipping routes need to be free from tolls and open for freedom of navigation.
14:14
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Can I take you on to another blockade?Because we had the ambassador for Cuba come in to see us last week. And and I think this is also a question really. And you were talking about values, you know, about what what was happening, the suffering of the Cubans that she talked about was really shocking. You know, the the, the death toll amongst children has doubled since 2019. They have rolling blackouts. They they can't get anything in.
Um, I mean, we. One gets the impression that Britain is avoiding being involved in relation to Cuba. Is that would that be fair?
Um, I mean, we. One gets the impression that Britain is avoiding being involved in relation to Cuba. Is that would that be fair?
14:15
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So it's true. It's an area of the world we are not heavily involved in. And what is exactly happening in Cuba. But we did support holding the UN debate on Cuba and the proposal to have emergency debate on that, because we do think it is important. We have raised concerns. We obviously have the support through our embassy there, but if it is true to say that we are more heavily involved, obviously, in what is happening in Europe and what is happening in the Middle East, than we are in what is happening in Cuba.
14:16
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I mean, they've obviously flights used to go into Cuba. Lots of Brits used to go to Cuba on holiday. Um, and so it's a, it's a country that kind of people hold close to their hearts if they visited it. Um, but I mean, when the, when Hurricane Melissa hit the Caribbean, um Britain sent aid to Jamaica but didn't send aid to Cuba. I mean, it just, it seems to be kind of part of a part of a pattern. And I think the direct challenge that we were given by the ambassador, which is a question, I think, which is important to have an understanding of, is there was when we were in Europe, we had an agreement with the Cubans, um, which when we left because of Brexit, we had to have a rollover agreement, which is called the pdCA, which has been um, which has been signed, but it hasn't.
And it was signed in 23, but it hasn't been ratified. Is there a reason why we can't ratify the agreement with Cuba.
And it was signed in 23, but it hasn't been ratified. Is there a reason why we can't ratify the agreement with Cuba.
14:16
14:17
14:17
14:17
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
And I think, look, some of the issues that are shared right across the areas, including where we have the British overseas territories, and also where we have the countries that we have a strong historic relationships with, including members of the Commonwealth and so on. So, of course, there's an interrelation, and that is it can be around refugees. It can also be around the sort of wider economic and trade relations. And also, crucially, the security arrangements and relationships as well. So where you end up with whenever there is a void and whether there is instability and insecurity, you can also have organised crime and organised criminal gangs, for example, that can exploit that and can have impact.
So we have had some engagement, for example, around what's been happening in Haiti. Exactly. Because of some of the risks and the impacts on other neighbouring countries as well. And looking at particularly some of those organised crime issues to. I think.
So we have had some engagement, for example, around what's been happening in Haiti. Exactly. Because of some of the risks and the impacts on other neighbouring countries as well. And looking at particularly some of those organised crime issues to. I think.
14:19
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
There's not much of a suggestion. I don't think that the problem for Cuba is organised crime. No, I agree exploitation of the issue. I think it's just that they they can't get anything into the country. I mean, the the there has been direct aid going in from Canada and from the EU and from Spain. Will we consider um, joining. Them and giving direct aid to Cuba.
14:20
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
We keep the emergency aid and the emergency humanitarian aid under continuous review. And that is important. So wherever there are particular crises, we are ready to respond at different stages. Through this, we have had particular discussions with our consular team who are there to ensure and make sure that they have the support, and also discuss that with other countries as well. I don't know if there's anything to add on that, Nick.
14:21
14:22
14:22
14:22
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Okay. Um, I just ask you briefly one other question, and that's about the ICJ advisory opinion. We asked the minister many questions about this. I'm not going to go into all of this, but just for those watching, um the ICJ published an advisory opinion on the unlawfulness of the occupation of the Palestinian territories. Um, it came out just two weeks into a Labour government and we've all been waiting for the government's response. I'm sure you agree that we ought to respond.
Um, so really I want to know what the holdup is. I mean, has it been written has the Attorney General got it?Has the Foreign Office got it as the Prime Minister?Got it. I mean, what's the holdup?
Um, so really I want to know what the holdup is. I mean, has it been written has the Attorney General got it?Has the Foreign Office got it as the Prime Minister?Got it. I mean, what's the holdup?
14:24
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So, um, I think this links in to the issues around settlement trade. So do you want to cover those?I want to just on this one. Okay. So I think look, the um, obviously look, the new prime minister is going to have to consider how he wants to address this issue. And I've not discussed it with Andy Burnham yet, although I have discussed some of the policy areas that it touches on. But let me just say a bit more about the sort of advisory opinion and the approach, um, as well.
So it is an advisory opinion. So that means my view is we should make sure we are advised by it. It's not binding but it is important. And look obviously we do have to take our own decisions about how we abide by international law. But we should respect the advisory opinion. And also its conclusions as we do so. So I don't think any other nation state has produced a policy document in response to the ICJ, but I think what we have to do is be clear about the way in which we're respecting the advisory opinion and also respecting it in the things that we do.
And if you look at some of the key conclusions that is around the different ways in which the occupied territories and the Green Line Israel should be treated, and about the different ways in which, for example, trade and economic trade should be treated. So that's why I think this goes into some of the things. So just in terms of the formal.
So it is an advisory opinion. So that means my view is we should make sure we are advised by it. It's not binding but it is important. And look obviously we do have to take our own decisions about how we abide by international law. But we should respect the advisory opinion. And also its conclusions as we do so. So I don't think any other nation state has produced a policy document in response to the ICJ, but I think what we have to do is be clear about the way in which we're respecting the advisory opinion and also respecting it in the things that we do.
And if you look at some of the key conclusions that is around the different ways in which the occupied territories and the Green Line Israel should be treated, and about the different ways in which, for example, trade and economic trade should be treated. So that's why I think this goes into some of the things. So just in terms of the formal.
14:27
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I'm focusing on a document. I'm focusing on a response. The ICJ puts out an advisory opinion. I was certainly I don't think I'm alone in in in as expecting there to be a written response. And we've been waiting for that document. And we were wondering what, you know, what has happened. And, you know, two years on, nothing. We haven't seen anything. And we want to know where it is, first of all, I mean, is the is the Foreign Office going to write a response?Has it written a response?Has the Attorney General signed it off?Is the Foreign Office holding it up?Is number ten holding it up?
14:30
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So, um, the I think there is a question we don't normally do formal responses to as in documents or policy documents that set out a response to an advisory opinion report. A successive ministers have said to you, look, we are still considering this. We will respond. And so I think because we have said that we do need to be clearer with you about the nature of our response. And so that's why I can give you some reflections today. But ultimately, the new prime minister is going to have to reflect on exactly how he wants to respond to it as well.
So that's why I can talk a bit more as and when you want to, about some of the issues around the content of the advisory opinion. And then secondly, some of the things that I think are the policy issues that flow from it. But just in terms of we are in a slightly complicated situation at the moment, just because we are in the final week for the Prime Minister and a new Prime minister, beginning next week. And although, as I said, I have managed to talk to Andy Burnham about some of the issues that we have been working on, on settlement trade and on sanctions, I haven't managed to talk to him about this issue, and so I understand your frustration on this.
But that's why in terms of he he will need to take a view on how we respond. But I am happy to talk to you about some of the content issues, including the way in which we should respond to some of the content in it.
So that's why I can talk a bit more as and when you want to, about some of the issues around the content of the advisory opinion. And then secondly, some of the things that I think are the policy issues that flow from it. But just in terms of we are in a slightly complicated situation at the moment, just because we are in the final week for the Prime Minister and a new Prime minister, beginning next week. And although, as I said, I have managed to talk to Andy Burnham about some of the issues that we have been working on, on settlement trade and on sanctions, I haven't managed to talk to him about this issue, and so I understand your frustration on this.
But that's why in terms of he he will need to take a view on how we respond. But I am happy to talk to you about some of the content issues, including the way in which we should respond to some of the content in it.
14:32
14:32
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
I think it's wrong to say there would be a policy document in response, because that no nation has done that, and we would not normally do that. But in terms of us articulating to you whether that be orally or whether that be in a written ministerial statement or in writing, I think you have been promised that through extensive period. And therefore we need to do that. I can give you some reflections that would contribute to that today, because I recognise that you have waited a long time and you have asked these questions over a long period of time.
But instead. But I am also conscious that because a new prime minister is about to take office, there will be some things that he will also want to reflect on in terms of the way in which we respond to you.
But instead. But I am also conscious that because a new prime minister is about to take office, there will be some things that he will also want to reflect on in terms of the way in which we respond to you.
14:33
14:33
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Yes. Thank you, Foreign Secretary. So you mentioned, um, Andy Burnham there. So I'll start with his position statement and then come on to settlements. Um so he made a statement in relation to Gaza, um saying that we didn't get it right. Um we must do better. Um and it took far too long to call for a ceasefire. Um and that now we must, we must do much more to strengthen our approach because the Foreign Secretary do you agree with his reflections that it did take far too long and that the position was wrong to start off with?
14:35
14:35
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
And I think look what he a lot of what he was talking about, I think, was referring to issues for us as a party in opposition, because I think it's about the kind of the early response, um, that we had on this, where we should have been faster to call for a ceasefire and also been clearer from the start about the importance of international humanitarian law. Um, and I think that is a reflection really for us as a party. But yes, I do agree with that.
14:35
14:36
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So, um, I also think we need to have stronger action going forward. And look, we should be clear about the things that we have done. We have recognised the state of Palestine, historic decision to do that. We have suspended the previous government's negotiations on a trade deal. We have had suspension of all arms exports to the IDF that could be used in Gaza. We have had four waves of sanctions, including sanctioning two members of the Israeli cabinet and including the most recent wave of sanctions on violent settlers.
We've restored funding to Unwra. We've increased support for the Palestinian Authority for both funding and capability building. We've done the medevac and student evacuations. We've also introduced with Australia and Canada, a new international peace fund as well. And we've been strong advocates for the peace process. And I met the Palestinian prime minister yesterday again to discuss what we need to do the next steps, because I am deeply worried both about what is happening in Gaza and the risk of the 20 point plan running into the ground.
And I'm really worried about what's happening in the West Bank with the settlements and the settler violence, some of which is clearly settler terrorism as well, and is a part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the viability of the two state solution, which we believe in. There are two areas we've been looking at to go further. I just complete that and then let you come back. The chairs we've been looking at specifically to go further is around the trade with the illegal settlements, and also around expanding the sanctions regime.
And again, the particular thing about the sanctions regime is also how that links back to the expansion of the illegal settlements, because when we face the E1 expansion, which is fundamentally aimed at undermining the viability of the two state solution, we deeply, deeply damaging, we need to have some stronger pressure, some stronger levers that we can put on the ability we have at the moment to put sanctions on is limited. But we think, and I've been working on this for some time, we think there are areas that we should go further on this.
We've restored funding to Unwra. We've increased support for the Palestinian Authority for both funding and capability building. We've done the medevac and student evacuations. We've also introduced with Australia and Canada, a new international peace fund as well. And we've been strong advocates for the peace process. And I met the Palestinian prime minister yesterday again to discuss what we need to do the next steps, because I am deeply worried both about what is happening in Gaza and the risk of the 20 point plan running into the ground.
And I'm really worried about what's happening in the West Bank with the settlements and the settler violence, some of which is clearly settler terrorism as well, and is a part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the viability of the two state solution, which we believe in. There are two areas we've been looking at to go further. I just complete that and then let you come back. The chairs we've been looking at specifically to go further is around the trade with the illegal settlements, and also around expanding the sanctions regime.
And again, the particular thing about the sanctions regime is also how that links back to the expansion of the illegal settlements, because when we face the E1 expansion, which is fundamentally aimed at undermining the viability of the two state solution, we deeply, deeply damaging, we need to have some stronger pressure, some stronger levers that we can put on the ability we have at the moment to put sanctions on is limited. But we think, and I've been working on this for some time, we think there are areas that we should go further on this.
14:39
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Okay. So, um, in our previous session in December where you came to give evidence, um, you said back then in relation to banning settlement goods, um, because the select committee made recommendations in our report to yourself where your response was, we've not followed the approach that the Select committee has taken on a ban on settlement goods, not least because of the complexity of this and because we do not think that this is the right approach going forward. And obviously, since then, we've had the ban, sorry, the settlement debate where the Minister for trade has said we will actively consider now, um, for different areas to ban goods and services going in and out of Israel.
So why was it not a good thing?Why was it not the right approach back then?Um, and could you have made a different decision in December, given that now we're at a different position now?Um, have you merely changed your position because of the pressure?
So why was it not a good thing?Why was it not the right approach back then?Um, and could you have made a different decision in December, given that now we're at a different position now?Um, have you merely changed your position because of the pressure?
14:40
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So I think there were two things that were consideration back in December. The first was at that point we were still seeking to support what I think we hoped in the autumn was a process that was going to make progress towards a two state solution. So the fact that we had the 20 point Gaza peace plan, the fact that the 20 points explicitly link into the Palestinian Authority ultimately taking over in Gaza as well. So there was references as part of that, internationally supported 20 point plan, effectively towards the two state solution.
We obviously, among other countries, had supported the recognition of the state of Palestine, and it felt there was a huge amount of work away work underway, including involving the United States, including involving many different countries, to put that pressure on what we've seen since then. And I think the other thing is, look, there are practical difficulties with this, and I can go through some of the practical difficulties we've been working to overcome. I think the things that have changed since then has been the total blatant disregard by the Israeli government for any of these processes.
And in fact, actually, they've been doing the opposite. They've been accelerating the work around the illegal settlements and pursuing the action in not just the West Bank, but also in Gaza as well. The humanitarian restrictions in Gaza.
We obviously, among other countries, had supported the recognition of the state of Palestine, and it felt there was a huge amount of work away work underway, including involving the United States, including involving many different countries, to put that pressure on what we've seen since then. And I think the other thing is, look, there are practical difficulties with this, and I can go through some of the practical difficulties we've been working to overcome. I think the things that have changed since then has been the total blatant disregard by the Israeli government for any of these processes.
And in fact, actually, they've been doing the opposite. They've been accelerating the work around the illegal settlements and pursuing the action in not just the West Bank, but also in Gaza as well. The humanitarian restrictions in Gaza.
14:42
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So do you mind if I say sorry?Sorry, sorry, sorry to cut in, but but I mean, I think I think that the difficulty is, is that is that is that the the settlements were continuing and the intimidation was continuing on the West Bank during the very worst times of what was happening in Gaza during the 20 point peace. I mean, it was it's not as though everything stopped in Gaza. It's in the West Bank. The pressure continued. And indeed, you know, many felt that whilst we were all looking at Gaza, that more more was happening on the West Bank, which was why this committee recommended as strongly as we did, that we had to do something about the West Bank and we had to stop trade at that point.
I'm sorry to cut in, but I just wanted to.
I'm sorry to cut in, but I just wanted to.
14:43
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Just know and look, I recognise that I'm just explaining that we, um, I think in the autumn were seeking to try and leverage a diplomatic process that at least in Gaza, did seem to be delivering some pressure and some progress. By Christmas, it became clear. We then had, I think we raised a series of concerns through the Christmas recess through into the new year as well, about what was happening in both in terms of the settlements and also in terms of the humanitarian crisis that was continuing in Gaza.
So it became clear, actually into that period how difficult this was going to be and the risks that we were going backwards. The second thing that I think has changed has been other countries have sought to make some progress. And so therefore, we've always said we should work with international allies on this. You have, I think, Spain, Ireland.
So it became clear, actually into that period how difficult this was going to be and the risks that we were going backwards. The second thing that I think has changed has been other countries have sought to make some progress. And so therefore, we've always said we should work with international allies on this. You have, I think, Spain, Ireland.
14:44
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Foreign Secretary, on that point. Why are we watching other countries take the steps first?Why are we not leading, and why are we not taking the action and bringing other countries with us?Because if we're not other countries Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, they've all been more proactive than us on this particular issue. Why has the UK not decided?Well, this is a step that we want to take and then bring other countries with us.
14:46
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So, um, only a small number of other countries have done this. And actually they have faced significant limitations. What we're trying to do at the moment is learn from those limitations and see how much further we can go. So we are looking at going further than other countries at the moment in terms of the options we're looking at, we have also continually led the way on a lot of the sanctions issues. So if I just say something about the things we are looking at at the moment, one of them is around, um, expanding the sanctions regime so that you can use it in a targeted way against the settlements.
So if you look at the E1 settlements at the moment, we've got the ability through the sanctions regime to go after settler violence for abuse of human rights. So we can take action, we can put sanctions down where there's evidence of being linked to settler violence. But if it's simply a contractor that actually does a contract for E1, that is quite hard for us to use our existing sanctions regime to do. So, we think we need to expand the sanctions regime to make it to look at making it more about international humanitarian law, not just human rights abuses.
That would allow us to then say to all businesses who are considering contracting to develop the E1 settlements, if you do, we will be pursuing sanctions. That will take us a bit of time to bring in and to expand that. But I strongly think we need stronger levers to be able to put pressure on international businesses that are tempted to get involved in the E1 settlements. Those settlements are illegal. They should not be going ahead. And it's not just about short term illegality.
This is about the long term undermining of the viability of a two state solution. And so that is the warning I want to be able to give to businesses now. Do not engage with the E1 settlements. We are going to pursue sanctions on that, and we also want to work with other countries to encourage them to do the same.
So if you look at the E1 settlements at the moment, we've got the ability through the sanctions regime to go after settler violence for abuse of human rights. So we can take action, we can put sanctions down where there's evidence of being linked to settler violence. But if it's simply a contractor that actually does a contract for E1, that is quite hard for us to use our existing sanctions regime to do. So, we think we need to expand the sanctions regime to make it to look at making it more about international humanitarian law, not just human rights abuses.
That would allow us to then say to all businesses who are considering contracting to develop the E1 settlements, if you do, we will be pursuing sanctions. That will take us a bit of time to bring in and to expand that. But I strongly think we need stronger levers to be able to put pressure on international businesses that are tempted to get involved in the E1 settlements. Those settlements are illegal. They should not be going ahead. And it's not just about short term illegality.
This is about the long term undermining of the viability of a two state solution. And so that is the warning I want to be able to give to businesses now. Do not engage with the E1 settlements. We are going to pursue sanctions on that, and we also want to work with other countries to encourage them to do the same.
14:49
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
When we when we banned trade with Crimea after the Russians invaded that, how long did that take and why is this taking so much longer?We have a trade deal with Israel where we where we make a distinction between between the West Bank and Israel. We're able to distinguish when it comes to giving Israel preferential treatment on bringing their goods in. But but we don't seem to be able to just stop the trade, I don't understand.
14:50
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So the on the trade issue. So there's how we use sanctions in a targeted way for those who do contracts. So then alongside that, there's what more can we do on settlement trade. Obviously the additional complexity for the settlements compared to Crimea is with Crimea. We also had a sanctions regime for Russia and for Belarus. And if they had knock on consequences for what was happening in Crimea, to be honest, we thought that was fair enough. And if, um, for the settlements, there's obviously an issue about not wanting to have an impact on Palestinian businesses in the occupied territories and not wanting to have an impact on legitimate Israeli businesses in Greenland, in Israel that have never had any engagement with the settlements and who may have had all sorts of trading relationships.
So that means.
So that means.
14:51
14:52
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Indeed. And so there are ways to do this through the again, the dedicated sanctions regimes. And we've also been looking at whether there are things you can do through the goods licensing process as well, in terms of where other countries have got to, because it is, um, worth reflecting on. Most of the other countries have focused on goods and focused on goods only. Services is more complex. So if we want to look at things like advertising bans and things like that, that is more complicated.
The Spain has done import of goods. Ireland is currently, uh, will they'll be completing their legislation next week. So I spoke to the Irish Foreign Minister again yesterday. I have previously discussed it with her, but I spoke to her again yesterday about it at the Palestinian donor group. But they made a decision to just focus on goods and not on services. Similarly, the Netherlands has done so. Norway is consulting on things. Slovenia did introduce an import and goods ban, and then they've introduced.
The Spain has done import of goods. Ireland is currently, uh, will they'll be completing their legislation next week. So I spoke to the Irish Foreign Minister again yesterday. I have previously discussed it with her, but I spoke to her again yesterday about it at the Palestinian donor group. But they made a decision to just focus on goods and not on services. Similarly, the Netherlands has done so. Norway is consulting on things. Slovenia did introduce an import and goods ban, and then they've introduced.
14:54
14:54
14:55
14:55
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Ban it just takes a long time so that Ireland have chosen to do this through primary legislation. What we are looking at is what the options would be in terms of using secondary legislation, including using effectively the statutory instruments and the existing UN sanctions regime processes. So we're looking at all of those things at the moment. Ultimately, the new prime minister will need to take a view on all of this. But these are the things that we are working through in some detail because, look, the fundamental principle here is, first of all, that nobody should be profiting from stolen land.
And secondly, we need to have stronger levers to put pressure on, particularly around the E1 settlement, because of the damage that it would do. So, look, it's first it's about, you know, look, we want to have a position that reflects the fairness and what we think is right. But actually, the most significant thing that's driving the pressure on this at the moment is the need to have additional levers and ability to put pressure on in this area.
And secondly, we need to have stronger levers to put pressure on, particularly around the E1 settlement, because of the damage that it would do. So, look, it's first it's about, you know, look, we want to have a position that reflects the fairness and what we think is right. But actually, the most significant thing that's driving the pressure on this at the moment is the need to have additional levers and ability to put pressure on in this area.
14:57
14:57
14:58
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So, um, there have been rumors about different timescales. We are currently anticipating. It's possible that they will do so during August. And. Exactly. And that's why we want to be able to give a clear warning at that point about what our intention is, so that even if the regimes are not fully in place, we want to be able to say to businesses they should not be contracting with the E1 settlements.
14:59
14:59
15:00
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Yes, I do, um, I can tell you that Alistair Burt is appointed as the UK's first ever envoy for complex consular cases. His focus will be on the most difficult and complex detention cases um, involving British people overseas, including those where there are obviously human rights concerns. And I think, um many of you will know, Alistair, as somebody who I think was an extremely well respected minister, including minister of the Middle East, and I think will have both the experience and the dexterity to be able to deal with what are often very difficult cases with a lot of distressed families and also complex negotiations that need to take place.
Um, with the states involved.
Um, with the states involved.
15:01
15:01
15:01
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Yeah, I do. There's some follow up on that. Thank you. That's welcome news from this committee. Um, as part of the evidence last week, I asked the Minister for the Middle East questions about Doctor Husam Abu Safiyya, director of Kamal Adwan hospital, who's been in Israeli detention for 18 months without charge. The UN has deemed his detention arbitrary and called it a flagrant violation of international law. Earlier, we heard from a quote from you that you said it's imperative.
International law is respected. Here's a very clear case where it's not. The minister told us that it's been raised by the Fcdo. I wanted to ask you how this has been raised. What have we done?
International law is respected. Here's a very clear case where it's not. The minister told us that it's been raised by the Fcdo. I wanted to ask you how this has been raised. What have we done?
15:03
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So, um we are I think they're very got a lot of distress about this case. And I think it's also um we've had evidence obviously in this case that um there's been a lot of focus on, but actually I think there are other cases, including of doctors and healthcare workers being detained and um, no transparency for those cases, real concerns about human rights abuses, real concerns about the implications. So we have raised it. This is something that, um, Hamish Faulkner has been pursuing, and this is something that we will continue to pursue as well.
15:04
15:04
15:05
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Yes. We welcome you writing to us. So, um, the minister told us that questions of specific crimes against doctors or anyone else. It's right that those international mechanisms or indeed Israel's own accountability mechanisms take place. The issue is here. The UN have had to weighed in on this situation, saying that he is being held without charge, and this is a violation of international law. Israel doesn't seem to be listening to anybody on this. His situation is very grave.
He may well die in captivity. What do you say to the British people who are looking on at this and wondering, why is this situation being allowed to unfold?
He may well die in captivity. What do you say to the British people who are looking on at this and wondering, why is this situation being allowed to unfold?
15:06
15:07
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Nationally. Ultimately, the. Ultimately, it is the Israeli government that needs to be accountable for the decisions that they have taken. It is one of a whole series of individual cases where there are real concerns about the abuse of human rights law, about the abuses of international humanitarian law in this case.
15:08
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Thank you. In line with that, as part of our questions to him last week, Minister told us that the basic norms of international humanitarian law are being increasingly adhered to and that a whole range of questions on accountability remain unanswered. Yesterday you would have seen, as we did, EU foreign ministers struggling to reach an agreement regarding trade with illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. And we've heard from you this morning as well. We are agreeing that we can see that the Israeli government are openly stating that erasing internationally recognised borders, and there is state sponsored settlement activity.
We agree that Israeli settlements are a barrier to peace. There is round agreement with counterparts that they are illegal, but we're still. Finding reasons for why we're not banning trade with illegal settlements outright. The incoming PM has said we've got it wrong on Gaza. What do you say to all these things as the current Foreign Secretary?Because I'm aware some of this predates your time.
We agree that Israeli settlements are a barrier to peace. There is round agreement with counterparts that they are illegal, but we're still. Finding reasons for why we're not banning trade with illegal settlements outright. The incoming PM has said we've got it wrong on Gaza. What do you say to all these things as the current Foreign Secretary?Because I'm aware some of this predates your time.
15:10
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. Um, so I think there's two issues there. There's the settlement trade and then there's the wider international human humanitarian law breaches. So on the settlement trade I agree. We do need to do more. And we have been looking at a range of different options as to how we go forward. The new Prime Minister will need to take a final view on those. So I agree, we do need to do more, and I think we are ahead of the EU at looking at this.
Individual countries may have gone further. A small number of individual countries have gone further, but we are ahead of the EU in looking at this. But the broader point about international humanitarian law, I think, is important because we've seen a series of breaches of international humanitarian law, not just in terms of what's happening in Gaza and in the West Bank, but in other parts of the world, as well as sanctions regime currently can't effectively be used on breaches just of international humanitarian law. That's what I believe we need to change, and that's what we are looking at how to change, to expand the sanctions regime that would then allow us to take, particularly to use sanctions in those cases where we have egregious breaches of international humanitarian law, where, for example, if humanitarian aid is being withheld in a really obvious and detrimental and incredibly damaging and immoral way, we would have the ability to then use sanctions in those cases to put pressure on as well.
At the moment, we don't have many of those levers. We have our diplomatic pressure, which works in some places, but not in others. But we don't have a sanctions lever to use effectively in that way.
Individual countries may have gone further. A small number of individual countries have gone further, but we are ahead of the EU in looking at this. But the broader point about international humanitarian law, I think, is important because we've seen a series of breaches of international humanitarian law, not just in terms of what's happening in Gaza and in the West Bank, but in other parts of the world, as well as sanctions regime currently can't effectively be used on breaches just of international humanitarian law. That's what I believe we need to change, and that's what we are looking at how to change, to expand the sanctions regime that would then allow us to take, particularly to use sanctions in those cases where we have egregious breaches of international humanitarian law, where, for example, if humanitarian aid is being withheld in a really obvious and detrimental and incredibly damaging and immoral way, we would have the ability to then use sanctions in those cases to put pressure on as well.
At the moment, we don't have many of those levers. We have our diplomatic pressure, which works in some places, but not in others. But we don't have a sanctions lever to use effectively in that way.
15:12
15:13
15:13
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
And thanks for. Thanks for joining us today, Foreign Secretary. I wanted to raise Syria, and I draw the committee's attention to my register of interests. I was in Syria earlier this month at the inaugural Syria Britain Business Council conference, and it's clear that there are opportunities for the UK to support the transition and the reconstruction of the country. But we may be missing some opportunities by not having an ambassador in place or our embassy up and running. And notwithstanding the recent attacks, I wonder if you could say a bit more about when you think we will have a permanent presence in Damascus.
15:14
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So I'm going to defer. To Nick on this, because some of the issues around our the scale and nature of our diplomatic presence, um, obviously raises a range of issues. Um, we are very conscious of this as a, um, priority area where in terms of our relationship with the Syrian government, um, it's something that Hamish Faulkner, Minister Faulkner has been looking at a lot. We are currently recruiting for the next special envoy to Syria, um, as well. Um, and we are reviewing the, the diplomatic presence.
15:15
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Yes. So we are looking at our overseas network review as part of our broader transformation and looking at how we can deploy our staff differently to reflect the new realities of the global world that we live in. Uh, part of that is obviously places that we're not in, including Syria. We've had a look, an initial look at the, the options of a permanent presence in Damascus. Uh, it is incredibly expensive. I will say that. So there are trade offs and we just need to work through what the trade offs are.
So we need to do two things. First of all, work out what is what are the options. And the whole bunch of options that I've seen and what we think is the best option. And then secondly, what is the trade off?So if we want to open this mission, which ones are we prepared to reduce?And I think that's a set of options.
So we need to do two things. First of all, work out what is what are the options. And the whole bunch of options that I've seen and what we think is the best option. And then secondly, what is the trade off?So if we want to open this mission, which ones are we prepared to reduce?And I think that's a set of options.
15:18
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Well the so the overseas network review and frankly I'm pausing that until we get a new POS in place because I think the new POS want to have a view on that as well as the ministers. Uh, so, uh, we will actually, we're having to first cut a conversation this week and then we'll probably take it into the early autumn.
15:18
15:18
15:19
15:20
15:20
15:21
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Thank you, Chair and Foreign Secretary, when you were before the committee last December, we talked a little bit about the US National Security strategy that had come out, uh, the one month prior. Um, and, uh, you'll know very well that the, the United States talks in that document about helping Europe by, quote, cultivating resistance to Europe's current trajectory within European nations. Um, how have you found that the US has been cultivating resistance to our current trajectory, uh, in the, in the time that has elapsed since the last committee meeting with the.
15:22
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, look, we had the. Just had the NATO summit last week. I had very many discussions with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Um, as part of that on a whole range of different issues, which are very positive. Um, discussions. And I think the, the big focus has been how we increase Europe's role within NATO. And I think that's exactly what we've delivered. And working across European countries, um, strengthening. So the US remains a very important partner in NATO.
And the agreement really was about a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO. But Europe has to do much more to, um, to carry the weight in particular in the face of the increased threats. So I think that has been my sense has been the biggest focus from the US on Europe over the last six months has been ensuring that actually Europe does go further. So Europe and Canada together have substantially increased the funding for NATO, for defence, um as well. Um and that really has been an agreement because I do think reality is we have all relied on the United States for too long.
And Europe, including the UK, does need to step up.
And the agreement really was about a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO. But Europe has to do much more to, um, to carry the weight in particular in the face of the increased threats. So I think that has been my sense has been the biggest focus from the US on Europe over the last six months has been ensuring that actually Europe does go further. So Europe and Canada together have substantially increased the funding for NATO, for defence, um as well. Um and that really has been an agreement because I do think reality is we have all relied on the United States for too long.
And Europe, including the UK, does need to step up.
15:25
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. So obviously this, uh, first became the focus back in the late January, early February of this year. The view we strongly took and was shared by, um, most of our, of our European partners as well. Um, was the Greenland is part of Denmark, Greenland's sovereignty or the part of the kingdom of Denmark. Um, the sovereignty um lies with green mark with Greenland and the people of Denmark and the people of Greenland. And it is for them to decide and for Greenland to decide its future, not for the United States to do so.
That's been our strong principle of sovereignty. What we also did alongside that was work, again, with our allies on developing a multilateral response to Arctic security, because some of the points that the US had made were about Arctic security. Well, Arctic security is a shared issue because if you want to defend the US against the Russian Northern Fleet, the crucial thing is that area of water between northern Norway and Iceland, between the UK and Iceland. And so the crucial issue is how do you defend that in a maritime way?And therefore the role that the UK and Norway play is fundamental to the defence of the North America as well.
So that's why I went to the north of Norway with the Norwegian Foreign Minister. While we. Why we all pressed for a new Arctic century as part of NATO. And that has what's been agreed. And that's now what is operating. The carrier strike Group was operating as part of that very recently. Um, and I think that has been really a combination of us defending principles and also coming up with a practical alternative way forward to stop NATO fracturing bluntly and to make sure that we pull NATO together around Arctic security.
That's been our strong principle of sovereignty. What we also did alongside that was work, again, with our allies on developing a multilateral response to Arctic security, because some of the points that the US had made were about Arctic security. Well, Arctic security is a shared issue because if you want to defend the US against the Russian Northern Fleet, the crucial thing is that area of water between northern Norway and Iceland, between the UK and Iceland. And so the crucial issue is how do you defend that in a maritime way?And therefore the role that the UK and Norway play is fundamental to the defence of the North America as well.
So that's why I went to the north of Norway with the Norwegian Foreign Minister. While we. Why we all pressed for a new Arctic century as part of NATO. And that has what's been agreed. And that's now what is operating. The carrier strike Group was operating as part of that very recently. Um, and I think that has been really a combination of us defending principles and also coming up with a practical alternative way forward to stop NATO fracturing bluntly and to make sure that we pull NATO together around Arctic security.
15:28
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
And part of that sort of effort to pull NATO together, I suppose, might have explained the extension of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements. So last June, the government announced that the UK would, alongside seven other NATO countries, would acquire dual capable aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Um, I understand that we heard last week in a in a defence written question or answer that the, um, the F-35 aircraft won't now be delivered to the UK until the early 2030s. I'm interested in the diplomatic aspects rather than the defence technical aspects.
But why won't the UK be able to acquire those aircraft?Why won't the UK be joining this nuclear mission until the early 2030s?
But why won't the UK be able to acquire those aircraft?Why won't the UK be joining this nuclear mission until the early 2030s?
15:30
15:30
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Dan Jarvis and to the Defence Secretary for decisions about the, um, the defence Investment plan and the priorities and the timescales within it. That's um I think for them rightly to set out in terms of the, the diplomatic issues, I think we have had some very strong, very positive discussions with not just the United States, but more widely with our allies, both about the defence investment plan, but also more widely about our cooperation. I think the UK does more than most countries to put our defence capabilities into NATO and at the um to be um, uh, part of the NATO response.
And we do more than a lot of other countries in terms of doing that. Um, and that's what we will always continue to do. So I think we're the third biggest contributor in cash terms to NATO and our support and our role in NATO will continue to be incredibly important.
And we do more than a lot of other countries in terms of doing that. Um, and that's what we will always continue to do. So I think we're the third biggest contributor in cash terms to NATO and our support and our role in NATO will continue to be incredibly important.
15:31
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
Um, thank you, chair. I think probably the summit in Ankara was a success considering all the problems the Americans, uh, suggesting they might cause there, um, compared to everything else you talked about some of the areas the, the UK was cooperating with allies to have a stronger Europe inside a stronger NATO. There were a few areas I noticed where the UK wasn't cooperating, um, that we might have done. Um so the critical raw materials project, the Halo space initiative and the one 155 millimeter artillery areas, all things that arguably the UK would have a role to play.
I just wondered in your, in your time, um, at Ankara, what was the discussions around the reason why the UK was not participating in these in these areas?
I just wondered in your, in your time, um, at Ankara, what was the discussions around the reason why the UK was not participating in these in these areas?
15:32
15:32
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Issues by any of our allies. And again, I think the, um, uh, the sort of detailed decisions in terms of priorities, obviously is a matter for the Defence Secretary. I think what I would say is, look, the UK has particular capabilities and particular specialist capabilities and um, and therefore it's right that there'll be particular roles that the UK will play as part of NATO. And um ultimately no country can spread itself across every single area or capability or actually our contribution is limited and we are best focusing in parallel.
That's the whole point about having NATO alliance is that we, we focus alongside allies on different areas and capabilities.
That's the whole point about having NATO alliance is that we, we focus alongside allies on different areas and capabilities.
15:33
15:33
15:34
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
Fair enough. Um, uh, Zelensky made a lot of Ukraine's defensive capabilities and the contribution they were putting forward to European defence, which I think is absolutely justified. Um, many people have talked to a path to NATO for Ukraine. Uh, what's your view on how that would happen and how is the UK supporting that process?
15:34
15:35
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
That, um, for Ukraine, but we recognise there are different obstacles and disagreements in different places around that. But for us, um, Ukraine is already part of the defence of NATO territory. Ukraine is also crucially part of the defence of Europe and Europe's stability um as well. And that's why I think we have to think about a really Europe's security and defence as running from the UK to Ukraine, from Norway to Turkey. It's that crucial role that they play and their resilience in this conflict, the, um, the sense of us moving now actually into a new phase where Russia actually is on the back foot as a result of Ukraine's resilience and strength.
That's been consistently underestimated by Russia, and also the support of Ukraine's friends.
That's been consistently underestimated by Russia, and also the support of Ukraine's friends.
15:36
15:36
15:37
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
And thanks. You mentioned in your Chatham House speech that we need to build global alliances to strengthen our country's security. And our national security is linked to our economic security at a time when we're seeing energy weaponised, um, chokehold and. Critical minerals. Can you see any more about the kinds of alliances you think we should build and how the UK can keep the global economy open?
15:38
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. Some of the alliances that um the more agile alliances that we have, our core alliances particularly, um, around NATO, um, as well, and our close partnerships. So for example, the work we do, particularly with France and Germany in the E3, but more widely, our European cooperation, um, as well. Um, and we are obviously a P5 member. So there's, there's areas of five eyes member and so on. There's those um, structures that, that endure. I think the point I was making was that we increasingly need to work on an agile basis on different things.
Some of the ones that we've focused on so far have been the coalition of the willing, which met again in Paris this week. The on Ukraine, the multilateral maritime mission, which is about having de-mining capability and, uh, reassurance support available to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. That is sadly currently not the point at which we have reached at the moment. Um, given everything that's happening in the Strait of Hormuz at the moment. But nevertheless, I think remains important. And a coalition around freedom of navigation, I would say that is an economic policy and that is an economic security policy, because it is a chokehold on the economy that's taking place at the moment.
We've also got a new alliance of um. Countries around violence against women and girls that we have drawn together as part of an international Violence Against Women and Girls Coalition on how countries can learn from each other. Includes. Spain includes Jamaica includes Morocco, series of different countries there as well. You're referring referred particularly to some of the issues around the economic, security and partnership. We've been interested in working, for example, with countries like Japan and South Korea and Australia and Canada, where we're countries that are outside any of the big trading blocs, but where we have some shared interests around things like maritime freedoms, around things like critical mineral supply and so on from different perspectives.
So there's different areas I think we can explore and do a lot more in this area.
Some of the ones that we've focused on so far have been the coalition of the willing, which met again in Paris this week. The on Ukraine, the multilateral maritime mission, which is about having de-mining capability and, uh, reassurance support available to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. That is sadly currently not the point at which we have reached at the moment. Um, given everything that's happening in the Strait of Hormuz at the moment. But nevertheless, I think remains important. And a coalition around freedom of navigation, I would say that is an economic policy and that is an economic security policy, because it is a chokehold on the economy that's taking place at the moment.
We've also got a new alliance of um. Countries around violence against women and girls that we have drawn together as part of an international Violence Against Women and Girls Coalition on how countries can learn from each other. Includes. Spain includes Jamaica includes Morocco, series of different countries there as well. You're referring referred particularly to some of the issues around the economic, security and partnership. We've been interested in working, for example, with countries like Japan and South Korea and Australia and Canada, where we're countries that are outside any of the big trading blocs, but where we have some shared interests around things like maritime freedoms, around things like critical mineral supply and so on from different perspectives.
So there's different areas I think we can explore and do a lot more in this area.
15:41
15:41
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So because we have a, um, a very effective diplomatic network, actually, we can leave our existing diplomatic network and relationships, um, in order to support those things. And, you know, look, ultimately it depends on how, you know, how intensive you want the collaboration to be and what you want it to do in practice and how much it's about alignment of things that we're doing already. Thank you chair. Thank you. I'm going to ask a couple of questions about conflict resolution and peace building, and the changes in the Fcdo, and where that leaves us with the conflict resolution and peace building.
At a time when the world is more dangerous, as you know more than most because you go to many of those areas. Um, but also it seems from the outside as though defence capability is being ratcheted up at the same time as conflict resolution and peace building is being brought down with, with the cuts, we are flying a bit blind as a committee here because we haven't got the annual report, but there have been some some rumours and some reports of what's happening within the department. So the Integrated Security Fund, we know, is being reduced from 965 million to 438 million.
The gender peace and security line from that seems to have been cut. The Western Balkans line, as well as other lines, the conflict, Security and Monitoring project has been terminated or moved. The International Humanitarian Law Unit also moved to another team, absorbed into other directorates. Um, it's unclear to us. To me, um, the conflict prevention and humanitarian policy teams are expected to lose about 20% of their staff. Um, I could go on, but a lot of conflict specialist conflict analysis there, but also in country conflict prevention work, for example, even in Sudan, that seems to be being cut by.
So what what is your view on where we have conflict resolution and that read across between defence going up, but conflict prevention going down.
At a time when the world is more dangerous, as you know more than most because you go to many of those areas. Um, but also it seems from the outside as though defence capability is being ratcheted up at the same time as conflict resolution and peace building is being brought down with, with the cuts, we are flying a bit blind as a committee here because we haven't got the annual report, but there have been some some rumours and some reports of what's happening within the department. So the Integrated Security Fund, we know, is being reduced from 965 million to 438 million.
The gender peace and security line from that seems to have been cut. The Western Balkans line, as well as other lines, the conflict, Security and Monitoring project has been terminated or moved. The International Humanitarian Law Unit also moved to another team, absorbed into other directorates. Um, it's unclear to us. To me, um, the conflict prevention and humanitarian policy teams are expected to lose about 20% of their staff. Um, I could go on, but a lot of conflict specialist conflict analysis there, but also in country conflict prevention work, for example, even in Sudan, that seems to be being cut by.
So what what is your view on where we have conflict resolution and that read across between defence going up, but conflict prevention going down.
15:45
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
So um I'll pass over to Nick in a moment to follow up on some of the just restructuring issues in terms of the Foreign Office. But um, I think the, um, the focus in terms of the, how conflict prevention fits into diplomacy and fits into our approach in some ways, I think is more important than ever because of the areas that we have chosen to focus on. So the fact that within our Oda allocations, the areas that we are focusing on and protecting are the fragile and conflict affected states.
But what I've also been clear about is that those Oda approaches have to be aligned with diplomacy around conflict prevention. So you don't simply have or we have one bit of the system does Oda over here we have another bit, which is a cross-cutting conflict prevention over there. Actually, we try and align those and link those together. The areas, obviously we are putting greater focus on have been, um uh. Ukraine, which is fundamentally about how you try and contain and resolve a conflict.
Sudan, where we are seeking to reach a ceasefire. Um, Israel-Palestine, where actually the meeting yesterday that I was at in Brussels was all about how do we re-energise the 20 point peace plan in Gaza and how do we broaden it?And how do we prevent conflict extending and erupting there?So, um, and what we've also done is focus and revive and re-energize some of the work around sexual violence in conflict, as well as part of the women and girls priority to that is particularly acute around Sudan.
Have seen the most horrendous sexual violence used in conflict as well. There is obviously look, there's a broader backdrop, which is the, um, the UK staffing of the Foreign Office and the um. The, of the Fcdo compared to the combined UK staffing of the Foreign Office and DfID put together is actually a 39% increase in ten years. That is not sustainable. And so that is why as part of not just the spending review, but as part of focusing the organisation, we do have a programme which is about reducing, having had some staff reductions as part of that.
So that is a backdrop.
But what I've also been clear about is that those Oda approaches have to be aligned with diplomacy around conflict prevention. So you don't simply have or we have one bit of the system does Oda over here we have another bit, which is a cross-cutting conflict prevention over there. Actually, we try and align those and link those together. The areas, obviously we are putting greater focus on have been, um uh. Ukraine, which is fundamentally about how you try and contain and resolve a conflict.
Sudan, where we are seeking to reach a ceasefire. Um, Israel-Palestine, where actually the meeting yesterday that I was at in Brussels was all about how do we re-energise the 20 point peace plan in Gaza and how do we broaden it?And how do we prevent conflict extending and erupting there?So, um, and what we've also done is focus and revive and re-energize some of the work around sexual violence in conflict, as well as part of the women and girls priority to that is particularly acute around Sudan.
Have seen the most horrendous sexual violence used in conflict as well. There is obviously look, there's a broader backdrop, which is the, um, the UK staffing of the Foreign Office and the um. The, of the Fcdo compared to the combined UK staffing of the Foreign Office and DfID put together is actually a 39% increase in ten years. That is not sustainable. And so that is why as part of not just the spending review, but as part of focusing the organisation, we do have a programme which is about reducing, having had some staff reductions as part of that.
So that is a backdrop.
15:50
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Would you say it's gone from an overall conflict resolution, looking around the world to much more focused on those?The four countries are are Ukraine, Sudan, Palestine and Lebanon that are talked about?Do you think it's the focus is on those four countries alone and at the expense. All you have to make decisions of that more global conflict resolution. And so areas like the Western Balkans, which may be coming up as conflict areas, are having to be reduced because of the cuts.
15:51
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Well, um, so Stephen Doughty has just been doing a very intensive period of diplomatic engagement in the Western Balkans, Balkans. We've obviously had, um, Karen Pierce as our envoy in the Western Balkans as well. So I think in terms of our expertise and capability, we maintain a very strong focus on the Western Balkans. The other thing I would say we're trying to do is to make this more thematic across all of the development, because of the nature and the way in which we're focusing a lot of the development funding on the conflict affected areas.
So as part of the reforms that Jenny Chapman has been working through, setting up a new community of expertise, we've called it, but it's effectively about a network of expertise on violence and conflict and conflict support and atrocity prevention to operate right across our overseas network so that we're actually providing that support in country in all of the areas where that is significant and relevant. But, Nic, probably I should say more about that.
So as part of the reforms that Jenny Chapman has been working through, setting up a new community of expertise, we've called it, but it's effectively about a network of expertise on violence and conflict and conflict support and atrocity prevention to operate right across our overseas network so that we're actually providing that support in country in all of the areas where that is significant and relevant. But, Nic, probably I should say more about that.
15:53
15:53
15:54
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Well, I these, these communities expertise come with people. They also come with facilitation to actually do projects and programs as well. So it depends on what the choices will be. But just on the, on the ISF, one thing I would say is that whilst the ISF has received a reduction, the Fcdo also received additional non Oda funding through the SR. So we got a £200 million non odor budget which was new for us. So we've we've also looking at that in the context of the ISF and looking at the ISF and the non Oda budget together.
So all the work that we were doing through the ISF, whether that's on hybrid threats, cyber security, serious organised crime, migration, CT that's now spread over a larger funding base.
So all the work that we were doing through the ISF, whether that's on hybrid threats, cyber security, serious organised crime, migration, CT that's now spread over a larger funding base.
15:55
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Those lines are in the list I've got for future ISF spending reviews. Well, we'll wait to see in the report on that. Um my second question is about the G20. So what are you going to be your priority areas for the G20. Will you be including debt cancellation in that um taking forward the the work done of partnership from the Global Partnership Conference and will include a route back to 0.7 over maybe ten years. I know we can't get there straight away, but will that increase in Oda be part of the work of the G20?
15:56
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
So we have been looking at a range of options for the G20 priorities um next year, which does include looking at um different forms, reforming finance to make it easier, um to mobilise, whether it's the world Bank, world Bank, whether that's about other forms of the development bank, finance and so on. So some of those finance reforms have definitely been issues that we have been looking at. I would say another area that I've been pushing personally as a priority is to do the violence against women and girls as a global issue next year.
I think there's a series of ways that we can do that. Um, as an international priority, but, um, as you can imagine, G20 priorities is absolutely something that a new prime minister is going to have to decide. So I think we, we're not really able to set that out more broadly at this point.
I think there's a series of ways that we can do that. Um, as an international priority, but, um, as you can imagine, G20 priorities is absolutely something that a new prime minister is going to have to decide. So I think we, we're not really able to set that out more broadly at this point.
15:57
15:57
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
Thanks. Thank you. Um, just to pick up some of Fleur's points on the on the ESF and conflict prevention. I mean, you said in the outset, Foreign Secretary, growth, security and migration were your. Three well, the first three priorities that you mentioned. And obviously, conflict has a massively negative effect on on each of those. I think Fleur actually outlined some of the concerns that we've got got pretty well. So it's just it was just just to follow up really, um, you said that there's an increasing proportion of Oda being spent on fcas countries.
Um, I just want to confirm maybe Nick can answer this, that we'll see that in the, um the annual review, because the impression we're being given from the sector is more money is being spent on middle income countries through development, finance, um, through climate finance, unless with the exception of Sudan and Ukraine, um, on fcas, uh, the most conflict affected states around the world. So just, just a confirmation really that what you said, and I'm sure you're right, we'll see that in the statistics that come out.
Um, I just want to confirm maybe Nick can answer this, that we'll see that in the, um the annual review, because the impression we're being given from the sector is more money is being spent on middle income countries through development, finance, um, through climate finance, unless with the exception of Sudan and Ukraine, um, on fcas, uh, the most conflict affected states around the world. So just, just a confirmation really that what you said, and I'm sure you're right, we'll see that in the statistics that come out.
15:59
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Yeah. Um, Foreign Secretary is of course. Right to see we have fully protected our funding to Ukraine, Palestine and Sudan. So that hasn't been cut at all. You will see in the annual report and accounts the individual allocations to countries. You will see in that that we have reduced the number of countries that receive direct funding from the Fcdo. You will see in that as well that some of the G20 countries, in fact, all the G20 countries, will be zeroed out and there will be a higher proportion of that.
Direct funding is indeed going to fragile conflict affected states and a smaller number.
Direct funding is indeed going to fragile conflict affected states and a smaller number.
16:01
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
That's good news. Um, and then the non Oda money you said that was additional for the Esaf. Obviously great that there's more opportunities for migration and security cooperation. Can we spend any of that on conflict prevention, the civilian peace building, the stuff on the ground that helps prevent conflict start in the first place, rather than that hard security.
16:02
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Um, so yes, so we've, we've allocated funding, um, on migration that is separate from the Oda budget. Um, for the first time. And this is part of our, um, a significant expansion of the migration team in the Foreign Office. And alongside that, I've been developing effectively a migration hub, discussions with other, with foreign ministers. So very often the issues around migration are simply seen as issues for interior ministers, for Home Office ministers to focus on. Whereas actually, what we know, if you really want to talk about prevention, if you want to talk about some of the international issues that impact or support returns, agreements or support diversion or support for refugees in the region, you need to see this as a foreign policy priority.
So that's what we've been doing. Uh, and that has helped support increased law enforcement cooperation. It's helped support a big increase in returns, arrangements and returns agreements, and also some of the upstream prevention work as well. So that does allow us some flexibility. And this is a developing area of work that we are trying to expand significantly. Um, and that does give us some flexibility to do more of that prevention work where we're clear that it does actually have an impact on migration, because sometimes you can identify projects that look really good, but they don't necessarily have any impact in terms of preventing dangerous journeys.
So that's what we've been doing. Uh, and that has helped support increased law enforcement cooperation. It's helped support a big increase in returns, arrangements and returns agreements, and also some of the upstream prevention work as well. So that does allow us some flexibility. And this is a developing area of work that we are trying to expand significantly. Um, and that does give us some flexibility to do more of that prevention work where we're clear that it does actually have an impact on migration, because sometimes you can identify projects that look really good, but they don't necessarily have any impact in terms of preventing dangerous journeys.
16:04
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
I really welcome that slightly. Um, my question was slightly different. Of course, another great way to prevent migration is to prevent conflict. So the fewer people will be fleeing from the conflict. Um, are we going to see any of that money spent on peace building mediation. Um, conflict prevention, civilian programs that we've seen in lots of parts of sub-Saharan Africa, in the Middle East in the past that have had successes.
16:05
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
There is no reason why those, those who are getting direct, uh, programme funding for those fragile conflict affected states can't use it on activities like that. If they think that is the best priority and use the funding. So yes, in terms of the Non-oda and Esaf, similarly, as we are working through what the options are in terms of how to spend all that resource, then that would fit very much as one of the options for that funding.
16:06
16:06
Speaker 11
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Speaker 11
Thank you. Um, Foreign Secretary, the chair at the start asked you about your priorities. And in March this year, you wrote to the committee setting those out against the backdrop of what you described as a more volatile, contested and unstable world. And I welcome the government's continued support for Ukraine, which has been rightly steadfast, but beyond Ukraine, many would argue that Britain's strategic position has deteriorated rather than strengthened. Your government has approved the Chinese super embassy in London, despite serious security concerns about the potential for espionage, pursued the transfer of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory, weakening Britain's strategic position in the Indo-Pacific, overseeing relations with Israel deteriorate to the point where high level communications are now described as non-existent at a time when engagement is vital to securing a lasting peace.
Overseeing the UK's fall in the global soft power rankings, not to mention the government's disastrous decision to appoint a known close friend of a prolific paedophile to one of the country's most important diplomatic postings. So given all of that, by what objective measure would you view?Your foreign policy has made the United Kingdom more secure, more influential and better placed in the world?
Overseeing the UK's fall in the global soft power rankings, not to mention the government's disastrous decision to appoint a known close friend of a prolific paedophile to one of the country's most important diplomatic postings. So given all of that, by what objective measure would you view?Your foreign policy has made the United Kingdom more secure, more influential and better placed in the world?
16:08
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
So you won't be surprised to know that I disagree with you on a whole series of those issues. Obviously, though, we do continue to agree with the importance of the support for Ukraine, and that is fundamental to our security. But look, if you look at the different roles we are playing in each of these areas on, uh, on security, our role in terms of supporting Ukraine has been vital.
16:09
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Can use to strengthen as part of strengthening European NATO. Um, our support directly for Ukraine. And we are now part of the European loans that as was agreed and announced yesterday. We've also played the crucial leadership role on the coalition of the willing, as we saw the Prime Minister and, uh, French President sharing yesterday and alongside France, again, we are leading the multilateral maritime mission, which is about the support needed to ultimately reopen the Strait of Hormuz, where we don't believe that Iran has the demining capability in order to get the Strait of Hormuz reopened.
We also have the Aukus relationship and the strengthening of that, and our work with Australia and the Indo-Pacific and the strengthening of those relationships we play, have played a very important role in helping defend our Gulf partners in the Middle East. When they faced attacks from Iran. And, uh, we continue to play an important role in the United Nations as well. So I think in terms of our security, both in terms of our European security and the Middle East, um, as well, and also some of those wider global relationships that we've been playing a hugely important role.
The other area I would flag, I think is Sudan, where the UK has been the country that has shone the spotlight and continued to shine the spotlight on Sudan. I used the opportunity of NATO last week to raise Sudan and the risks to El Obeid again, um, with other European colleagues who have also since put pressure on and with the United States and with Gulf partners, who we are continuing to raise this with. And, uh, the Prime Minister also raised this with President Trump as well. So we are also playing an important role, I think, there in what is probably the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century.
We also have the Aukus relationship and the strengthening of that, and our work with Australia and the Indo-Pacific and the strengthening of those relationships we play, have played a very important role in helping defend our Gulf partners in the Middle East. When they faced attacks from Iran. And, uh, we continue to play an important role in the United Nations as well. So I think in terms of our security, both in terms of our European security and the Middle East, um, as well, and also some of those wider global relationships that we've been playing a hugely important role.
The other area I would flag, I think is Sudan, where the UK has been the country that has shone the spotlight and continued to shine the spotlight on Sudan. I used the opportunity of NATO last week to raise Sudan and the risks to El Obeid again, um, with other European colleagues who have also since put pressure on and with the United States and with Gulf partners, who we are continuing to raise this with. And, uh, the Prime Minister also raised this with President Trump as well. So we are also playing an important role, I think, there in what is probably the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century.
16:13
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Thank you, Matt, for that. And thank you for Raising Sudan. I wanted to pick up specifically on the British Indian Ocean Territory. Um, according to the minutes of the Mauritian cabinet meeting on the 10th of July, the UK has informed the Mauritian government that, and I quote a new UK prime Minister was likely to be appointed by the 20th of July 2026. But the UK policy with regard to the Chagos Archipelago was unlikely to change. Can you confirm that the new Prime Minister does indeed intend to continue the deal on the terms agreed by the Starmer government, including the roughly £35 billion cost to the British taxpayer?And can you clarify whether this assertion made by the Fcdo to the government of Mauritius, was based off access talks that the next Prime Minister has been involved in?
16:15
16:15
16:16
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
That's a matter for the new Prime Minister. He will set out. He will set out his position. It's not an issue that I have discussed with them. The fundamental issue here is how we make sure that the capabilities around Diego Garcia, the capabilities that we have and the basing that we have is protected and its security is protected, including from threats, whether that be security issues around China, whether that be security issues more widely. The important thing is the security is protected.
We set out as part of that. We set out as part of that a treaty. That would be the effective way to do that. It's currently something that we are continuing to discuss with the United States. So those discussions will continue, and the new Prime Minister will take a view on those discussions.
We set out as part of that. We set out as part of that a treaty. That would be the effective way to do that. It's currently something that we are continuing to discuss with the United States. So those discussions will continue, and the new Prime Minister will take a view on those discussions.
16:18
16:18
16:18
16:19
16:19
16:19
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Currently having discussions both with the US and with Mauritius. And we said that we wanted the US agreement to approach because of course, that this is about shared capabilities that we have. We have set out what we believe to be a sensible way to address the security risks and the legal risks to the base. There's no getting around what those security challenges are, and we have a responsibility to ensure that the security there is protected. We'll continue to work with both the US and with Mauritius, but this is an issue is not yet resolved.
16:20
16:20
16:21
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Just moving on to a totally different topic. You'll be relieved to know, um, uh, as you know, yesterday the Home Secretary took steps to close legal loopholes so that the leader of the Rochdale grooming gang, Shabbir Ahmed, a vile individual guilty of horrendous crimes, of exploiting, raping, abusing young girls, can be deported to Pakistan despite being stripped of his British citizenship in 2016, media reports are suggesting that Pakistan is refusing to accept Ahmed and is demanding the extradition of two political dissidents from the UK in order to do so.
I just wondered what conversations you might have had with your counterpart in Pakistan and what steps the Foreign Office is taking to ensure that Shabbir Ahmed will be deported.
I just wondered what conversations you might have had with your counterpart in Pakistan and what steps the Foreign Office is taking to ensure that Shabbir Ahmed will be deported.
16:22
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah, I mean, this individual should not be in the United Kingdom. He should be deported. He has no right to be in the United Kingdom. So, um, I strongly support the action that the Home Secretary is taking. Um, look, this is something we have repeatedly raised with Pakistan and will continue to raise with Pakistan. Um, and it's not just this individual case. There are a small number of similar cases where we also believe that these individuals have no right to be in the United Kingdom and should be returned to Pakistan.
Those discussions will continue. Um, and because we think ultimately the rules should be enforced.
Those discussions will continue. Um, and because we think ultimately the rules should be enforced.
16:23
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
On that point in the Home Secretary's speech in the House yesterday, she did say that the Foreign Secretary and I will continue to work on all avenues to pursue a deportation. Do you agree with the shadow Home Secretary that if a country refuses to take back a convicted criminal, they should face visa sanctions?
16:24
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
We've already taken some strong measures and increased the number of foreign criminals that are being returned as a result. So there's been a significant increase in foreign criminals returned over the last two years. We've also taken action, including around some visa measures and so on, which have also prevented some of the abuse of the system as well. So we've seen a reduction in abuse in certain areas and from certain countries as a result of taking measures around visas or as a result of the negotiations, which have included covering those things.
And we've also secured an increasing numbers of returns agreements. You'll understand why I'm not going to go into the sort of detail in terms of discussions with individual countries, but in terms of the broad point, do we believe that all possible levers should be looked at in order to ensure that the immigration system has credibility and that the rules can be enforced?Yes we do.
And we've also secured an increasing numbers of returns agreements. You'll understand why I'm not going to go into the sort of detail in terms of discussions with individual countries, but in terms of the broad point, do we believe that all possible levers should be looked at in order to ensure that the immigration system has credibility and that the rules can be enforced?Yes we do.
16:24
16:24
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Um, thank you chair. Um, Foreign Secretary, can I turn to Russia, which has been described as the most serious threat that this country faces and where we know there has been a steady stream of attacks in the form of sabotage, assassination squads, the attacks on the Prime Minister's own house, cyber, um, and every other, uh. Lever, including disinformation, um, at the same time, British citizens continue to go to Russia and Russian citizens come here. British businesses are doing business in Russia, and Russia seems to be gradually being included once again in international and sporting and cultural events.
So what is our strategy towards Russia?
So what is our strategy towards Russia?
16:24
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So we work very closely with our NATO allies and also particularly with ether as part of the E3 countries and also some of our E5. So in other words, the France, Germany, Italy, Poland, we have very many discussions about the approach to Russia. I think you're right to describe Russia as the most serious threat to Europe, and that is a range of different kinds of threats. So in Poland, they obviously are preparing to ensure that they can deter any direct military threats. And so I've been to see the concrete tunnels that are being dug along the border with Kaliningrad.
Um, and the anti-tank defences that they're ensuring are in place as a deterrence against physical threats. But we're also seeing is the hybrid threats, the sabotage, the the cyber threats, the misinformation, the industrial scale of disinformation that I know the committee has a lot of expertise on and has looked into in some detail. So what we seek to do is to be able to respond on all fronts. Look, NATO is a defensive alliance and is about deterrence and responding to that. But what we seek to do is to be able to have those the strength and resilience to respond on all fronts.
One of the things that we have done is expand the Foreign Office's capability around dealing with hybrid threats, including cyber threats, but also including the misinformation, disinformation. So we are increasingly using sanctions to go after the the disinformation factories, the Russian disinformation factories, and some of those things which are about destabilising democracies as well as about some of the more physical, tangible threats that we deal with. So we're expanding that. We're working with allies on making sure we've got those shared capabilities to respond as well.
And then other beyond that, a lot of the thinking in terms of the strategy is, of course, linked in with the response and the support for Ukraine and how we seek to bring the Ukraine conflict to a just and lasting peace that the Ukrainians want.
Um, and the anti-tank defences that they're ensuring are in place as a deterrence against physical threats. But we're also seeing is the hybrid threats, the sabotage, the the cyber threats, the misinformation, the industrial scale of disinformation that I know the committee has a lot of expertise on and has looked into in some detail. So what we seek to do is to be able to respond on all fronts. Look, NATO is a defensive alliance and is about deterrence and responding to that. But what we seek to do is to be able to have those the strength and resilience to respond on all fronts.
One of the things that we have done is expand the Foreign Office's capability around dealing with hybrid threats, including cyber threats, but also including the misinformation, disinformation. So we are increasingly using sanctions to go after the the disinformation factories, the Russian disinformation factories, and some of those things which are about destabilising democracies as well as about some of the more physical, tangible threats that we deal with. So we're expanding that. We're working with allies on making sure we've got those shared capabilities to respond as well.
And then other beyond that, a lot of the thinking in terms of the strategy is, of course, linked in with the response and the support for Ukraine and how we seek to bring the Ukraine conflict to a just and lasting peace that the Ukrainians want.
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Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
And you yesterday announced another package of sanctions, including specifically aimed at those responsible for cyber attacks and disinformation. But in other countries, you mentioned Poland and particularly the Baltic states, and they are raising awareness of their citizens that they are facing an actual threat. Um, do you not think that we need to do more to make British citizens aware of the scale of the threat that is now posed to the whole of Europe?Mhm.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So I think this is a really good point. And it's something I've been reflecting on, because what is really striking in Poland is how much they feel that the sense of the sort of sense of a society wide sense of needing to ensure their strength and resilience and their defences against the threat from Russia, that is also very clearly the case in Scandinavian countries, in places like Finland and Sweden. Again, some of this is about history because obviously it's a key issue for the Baltic states as well.
For the UK on the far side of Europe, it can feel a little bit more distant, um as well. And yet when you have those cyber threats, when you have those hybrid threats, they can actually be very immediate. So I do think that this is something that we are going to have to debate far more. I think it's going to need to be part of a public debate as we continue to need to increase defence investment, for example, it's going to have to be much more part of our public debate than I think it has been for a long time.
We probably all of us just assumed that, you know, we had a peace dividend after the Cold War. And actually, I think people took that peace dividend for granted for much longer than collectively that we should have done, because after Crimea, all the signs were there and we needed collectively to respond. So I think we are going to have to debate this a lot more.
For the UK on the far side of Europe, it can feel a little bit more distant, um as well. And yet when you have those cyber threats, when you have those hybrid threats, they can actually be very immediate. So I do think that this is something that we are going to have to debate far more. I think it's going to need to be part of a public debate as we continue to need to increase defence investment, for example, it's going to have to be much more part of our public debate than I think it has been for a long time.
We probably all of us just assumed that, you know, we had a peace dividend after the Cold War. And actually, I think people took that peace dividend for granted for much longer than collectively that we should have done, because after Crimea, all the signs were there and we needed collectively to respond. So I think we are going to have to debate this a lot more.
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Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
And you referenced the work that the committee has done on disinformation, and you identified that, I think, in your Chatham House piece as being one of the significant threats. Now, this committee, uh, visited the French centre, which counters disinformation, Vaginam we've talked to other countries, all of whom have their own capacity for countering, but this country doesn't have a national centre for countering disinformation. Will we establish one?
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, I think you make a fair point. We provided, I think, very effective help to Moldova when in terms of exposing and countering disinformation, there is work, there is specific work that we do now, um, in the Foreign Office, which is about being able to identify where you've got the, um, those effectively industrial disinformation efforts and to be able to expose them and to be able to sanction them. So that, I think is our part in this response to, to disinformation is to be able to identify, to expose and to sanction your.
Look, there are other aspects to this, but our focus is on the, um, effectively the foreign instigated industrial scale disinformation. If it's an argument, look, we all have strong tradition of free speech in this country. People can say things that are wrong in this country, but there's a difference between that sort of freedom of speech debate or people saying things that are wrong. And that is part of our normal democratic arguments and debates. There's a difference, however, when you've got foreign funded, industrial scale disinformation, and that has been our focus indeed.
Look, there are other aspects to this, but our focus is on the, um, effectively the foreign instigated industrial scale disinformation. If it's an argument, look, we all have strong tradition of free speech in this country. People can say things that are wrong in this country, but there's a difference between that sort of freedom of speech debate or people saying things that are wrong. And that is part of our normal democratic arguments and debates. There's a difference, however, when you've got foreign funded, industrial scale disinformation, and that has been our focus indeed.
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Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
And I just want to take you back to what you said right at the start, which is AI. I've seen recently evidence about how Russia is successfully poisoning or grooming whatever word you like to use large language models so that they become a vehicle for disseminating Russian disinformation. Now, is that something which you are concerned about?And are you talking to the platforms about what they can do to stop that happening?
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. This is, um, this is something I am very worried about. Um, it's something that obviously Dcit is engaged with. That Ministry of Defence has engaged with that. The Home Office is engaged with as well as the Foreign Office. There's masses of opportunities on AI and that includes for our defence capabilities, huge opportunities. Um, in terms of the use of AI and also the partnerships and huge opportunities in terms of our economic growth as well.
But the point that I made in the essays, it seems to me that this is analogous to the debates 70 years ago around nuclear safety, because at that time, look, you have nuclear capability. You have abilities to use this as part of nuclear energy and for nuclear power in ways that are safe, but also huge threats and risks, particularly if malign actors or terrorists or extremists can get hold of nuclear material. As a result of that, we developed the um, international agreement effectively, international consensus around standards, around guardrails and so on.
And look, some of what drove that was everybody's understanding of the toxic threat because of the, um, experience of Hiroshima and recognizing therefore, what would happen if that capability reached the wrong hands. But you can see similar issues now on AI. And yet we've got parallel discussions going on about standards and safety. We don't have a proper sort of global engagement. We don't have a proper engagement taking place between the biggest powers, particularly that involves the US and China, but also the US, UK as a third capability power, and also because actually of the work Rishi Sunak did, having the expertise around AI safety as well, that we have continued to build on.
So therefore, my argument is we should take a parallel, similar approach to learning from the experience around nuclear safety. We should be looking to develop global standards and a global debate about what the safeguards need to be.
But the point that I made in the essays, it seems to me that this is analogous to the debates 70 years ago around nuclear safety, because at that time, look, you have nuclear capability. You have abilities to use this as part of nuclear energy and for nuclear power in ways that are safe, but also huge threats and risks, particularly if malign actors or terrorists or extremists can get hold of nuclear material. As a result of that, we developed the um, international agreement effectively, international consensus around standards, around guardrails and so on.
And look, some of what drove that was everybody's understanding of the toxic threat because of the, um, experience of Hiroshima and recognizing therefore, what would happen if that capability reached the wrong hands. But you can see similar issues now on AI. And yet we've got parallel discussions going on about standards and safety. We don't have a proper sort of global engagement. We don't have a proper engagement taking place between the biggest powers, particularly that involves the US and China, but also the US, UK as a third capability power, and also because actually of the work Rishi Sunak did, having the expertise around AI safety as well, that we have continued to build on.
So therefore, my argument is we should take a parallel, similar approach to learning from the experience around nuclear safety. We should be looking to develop global standards and a global debate about what the safeguards need to be.
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Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Foreign Secretary. You said a moment ago you made a distinction between the hybrid threats and physical, tangible threats. And, um, I'm not asking you to speak about information that is classified and that you cannot speak about, but I'm curious about the Prime Minister who said on the 5th of June, it is our intelligence assessment and the assessment of other countries in NATO that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030. Are you able to, uh, to at least sort of say whether he was talking about some of these hybrid attacks of the sort that, frankly, some are already with us, or whether he was talking about the physical, kinetic, tangible attacks.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think NATO increasingly has to assess all those kinds of threats, including physical threats, and also including hybrid threats, including cyber threats and so on as well. And so we have expanded some of the capability and some of the discussions across NATO countries on some of those cyber and hybrid threats as well. But look, I think one of the issues that people are concerned about is that, um, uh, Russia has the capability to escalate. Um, when they are under pressure. And, uh, the Putin has the capability and the risk of escalation when he is under pressure, effectively a kind of desperate lashing out and also of looking to find diversion tactics as well, given the scale of their war economy that they have built up.
If we are to reach the point where we reach a peace agreement for Ukraine, there is still a risk that Putin's response to that might be to then launch forays elsewhere, including risks to NATO countries as well. So I think what they are effectively then trying to identify is that there are risks from Russia to NATO countries. NATO is a defensive alliance. We have to ensure we have strong enough deterrents in place to prevent Putin thinking. There are easy hits against NATO countries, that there will be no response, or that he will be able to get away with.
And so I think that is the point that the Prime Minister was making. It is one of the reasons why Poland is strengthening their physical border in order to have deterrence against that kind of threat.
If we are to reach the point where we reach a peace agreement for Ukraine, there is still a risk that Putin's response to that might be to then launch forays elsewhere, including risks to NATO countries as well. So I think what they are effectively then trying to identify is that there are risks from Russia to NATO countries. NATO is a defensive alliance. We have to ensure we have strong enough deterrents in place to prevent Putin thinking. There are easy hits against NATO countries, that there will be no response, or that he will be able to get away with.
And so I think that is the point that the Prime Minister was making. It is one of the reasons why Poland is strengthening their physical border in order to have deterrence against that kind of threat.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Thank you very much to. John. Um, I've got a couple of questions which really also illustrate the point we were making earlier about cuts within the Fcdo and in particular the cuts to the atrocity prevention team, which is needed now more than ever. Um, but I've got specific questions. So you, you know, the situation in Sudan. Um, it's a. About two, 25 million people are suffering severe hunger. The civilian death toll estimates range from 150,000 to 400 000, a UN fact finding mission said that the crimes committed in and around El Fasher in North Darfur bear the defining characteristics of a genocide.
11 million people are internally displaced. I've got two specific questions about the Sudan conflict. The first one is about gold. So the conflict is fueled by profits from the country's gold trade. A lot is smuggled out, but a lot benefits belligerents on both sides. Alongside support from international backers with strategic interests in Sudan, they are managing to keep fuel this conflict to keep it going. Yesterday, the EU announced a ban on the purchase, import or transfer of gold originating in Sudan.
This would have been even more powerful if, alongside that, the UK could have done the same, could have announced it on the same day. Adding to the weight of that, have you received advice on the banning the purchase, import or transfer of gold and what's your view on this, and will the UK be doing the same?
11 million people are internally displaced. I've got two specific questions about the Sudan conflict. The first one is about gold. So the conflict is fueled by profits from the country's gold trade. A lot is smuggled out, but a lot benefits belligerents on both sides. Alongside support from international backers with strategic interests in Sudan, they are managing to keep fuel this conflict to keep it going. Yesterday, the EU announced a ban on the purchase, import or transfer of gold originating in Sudan.
This would have been even more powerful if, alongside that, the UK could have done the same, could have announced it on the same day. Adding to the weight of that, have you received advice on the banning the purchase, import or transfer of gold and what's your view on this, and will the UK be doing the same?
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, so we've been looking directly at this um the um uh and specifically about gold and also some of the other underpinning illicit finance, um issues. And we have parallel work underway. We've had with some of our work with the EU because simply just making sure that we've got all of the work in place and the different systems, there have been times where they have moved slightly ahead of us on this. There have been times when we have moved slightly ahead of them, but I can assure you that work is underway.
You'll appreciate we don't announce detailed sanctions and things before we do them, but we are looking at exactly this issue. It was a wider thing. So the approaches we've been taking on Sudan is obviously the top level diplomatic pressure, including on any of those countries that can influence the warring parties and having trying to have maximum pressure there. Secondly, just the shining, a spotlight, keeping the focus on Sudan because it very easily becomes a forgotten war. And then thirdly, looking at some of the underpinnings, including around illicit finance, including around other sanctions measures and including looking at arms flows as well.
So looking at all of the different ways we can put pressure on, ultimately, we have to get to a ceasefire because, you know, without the ceasefire in place, this conflict is just truly horrendous. And the sexual violence is part of this conflict is incredibly disturbing.
You'll appreciate we don't announce detailed sanctions and things before we do them, but we are looking at exactly this issue. It was a wider thing. So the approaches we've been taking on Sudan is obviously the top level diplomatic pressure, including on any of those countries that can influence the warring parties and having trying to have maximum pressure there. Secondly, just the shining, a spotlight, keeping the focus on Sudan because it very easily becomes a forgotten war. And then thirdly, looking at some of the underpinnings, including around illicit finance, including around other sanctions measures and including looking at arms flows as well.
So looking at all of the different ways we can put pressure on, ultimately, we have to get to a ceasefire because, you know, without the ceasefire in place, this conflict is just truly horrendous. And the sexual violence is part of this conflict is incredibly disturbing.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Which is particular concern at the moment in North Kordofan, the humanitarian conditions right now are dire. Even if the CSF waits until after the rainy season to launch an attack on this besieged city. The current aid blockages coming in, um, are extremely concerning. Um, has the government considered or working with Turkey as a key ally of the Saff who are in control of El Obeid to open up a humanitarian corridor into El Obeid to allow um allow. Food, obviously, but also water, sanitation and hygiene, specifically because the destruction of the water infrastructure in El Obeid is particularly concerning to allow aid in and to allow people out, is that humanitarian corridor a possibility?Have you been engaging with Turkey on that?
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, we are looking at humanitarian corridors. We are keen to see those. And we're also keen to keep the pressure on both the CSF and the Saff in terms of the humanitarian corridors in because whilst most of our pressure has been about any route in to halt the RSS attack on um El Obeid, uh, just as we saw the atrocities for El Fasher, what we have also been seeking to do is to keep pressure on the Saff as well, because we need both sides to sign up to a ceasefire and both sides to agree to humanitarian routes in, because both sides have been restricting humanitarian aid as well.
Um, I will check with about the specific discussions with Turkey, um, and come back to you on those, but comprehensively, we've been focusing on all of those. And I just got a message, I think, from the, um, French foreign minister, just as I walked in the room, I think they have been coordinating a G7 statement on Sudan as well. So that was part of that comes out of some of the discussions we had last week at NATO, where I have been just continuing to try and keep that focus and the international spotlight on Sudan as well.
Um, I will check with about the specific discussions with Turkey, um, and come back to you on those, but comprehensively, we've been focusing on all of those. And I just got a message, I think, from the, um, French foreign minister, just as I walked in the room, I think they have been coordinating a G7 statement on Sudan as well. So that was part of that comes out of some of the discussions we had last week at NATO, where I have been just continuing to try and keep that focus and the international spotlight on Sudan as well.
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Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Foreign Secretary, um, your predecessor, uh, came before this committee and told us about the establishment of the Soft Power Council, uh, something which we welcomed, as we have always felt on this committee, soft power is as important as hard power. Um, however, it seems to have run into the ground. You may have seen the article on the FTT, one member quoted. It's been a bit of a waste of time. It hasn't had much steam. And another member said since the change in Foreign Secretary, from David Lammy to Yvette Cooper, there's been zero interest in it.
Is that correct?
Is that correct?
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, Chris Elmore has been taking forward some detailed work with the Soft Power Council. I think we would agree that in terms of the first year, focus has ended up being too broad. And what we actually need to now focus on is very practical deliveries for the Soft Power Council. Because, look, the reality is we have our soft power spread across a whole series of institutions that deliver things, including British Council, including universities, actually, our Premier League and our diplomatic network. Um, right across the world.
And so what we really need to do is to have the Soft Power Council focused on what the added value can be and what the particular things it can focus on and can deliver. And so that is what Chris has now been doing, is now starting to work with them in more detail on some actually specific projects, specific things that they can focus on and deliver.
And so what we really need to do is to have the Soft Power Council focused on what the added value can be and what the particular things it can focus on and can deliver. And so that is what Chris has now been doing, is now starting to work with them in more detail on some actually specific projects, specific things that they can focus on and deliver.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yes, they've had two meetings since I was appointed. The first, unfortunately, that I was due to go to was at the time, I think it was. I think it was the time the Iran conflict broke out. The second one has been more recently that Chris has had the more focused detail discussions with them on. Right. Let's try and refocus around some tangible outcomes, but I'm sure I will do so.
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Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
And another area in which Britain took a lead very much to our welcome by this committee was the taking back of the chair of the Media Freedom Coalition. However, since that happened, all we've seen actually is withdrawal of support for independent media organisations as a result of the cuts in the Foreign Office budget. So what are we actually doing to champion media freedom?
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
We are part of that coalition and we are co-chair. As you have rightly said, with Finland. And, it's why we have also raised the issues around, and it's why it's been part of our concern, for example, that we do not have journalists able to get into somewhere like Gaza and able to be able to provide reporting there as well.
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Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
The actual actions that the UK could be taking, and the high level panel made a number of recommendations, such as giving greater consular support, giving emergency visas to journalists who are under pressure, imposing sanctions targeted on people who are repressing journalism. None of those things have happened, and as I say, we are seeing media freedom in decline across the world, and yet we are withdrawing our support rather than increasing it.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So I think if by withdrawing our support, you mean in terms of, look, the, um, the whole of the Fcdo is having to be a sharper focus and also to not have as many staff as we had ten years ago, or sorry that as many staff as we have now compared to ten years ago, or we have seen the expansion, that is the case across every area. That doesn't mean to say that we are reducing the focus in terms of things that we do. Um, and we have raised on diplomatic cases where there are cases where we have raised with individual countries, diplomatic cases around journalists for exactly that reason.
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Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Okay. And just to flag one particular case, um, Jimmy. Has had a lot of attention and we have rightly put a lot of pressure on. But are you aware of the case of the Georgian journalist who is, I believe, at risk of losing her sight?She has been sentenced to prison in Georgia. She's been made the number one campaigning journalist to try and obtain release by international bodies. Are we going to use every pressure that we can to try and ensure that she is released?Uh, and not subjected to the political imprisonment which she is currently undergoing?
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Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Thanks. Can we thank Minister Elmo for his work to fix the British Council's financial situation?As a former member of staff, it's quite hard for them to get ideas into the Foreign Office from time to time. And I wonder if you might commit in your permanent Secretary to to making sure that we see the British Council's chief exec as our ultimate sort of soft power diplomat, and they get time with you as foreign section that you task them and that you hear what they're up to.
And we make sure that that organization to organization link is working well.
And we make sure that that organization to organization link is working well.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yes. Um, and I think, look, you're right, I would also pay tribute to what Chris Elmore has been doing to help try and get the finances on a more secure footing. We have increased the grant in aid funding for the British Council, and we have also, uh, almost concluded the process of restructuring their loan as well.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So they, um, look, I think the, we will take the decision as swiftly as possible once the final interviews are concluded. Um, in terms of how long it then takes for the individual to then take up post will partly depend on what post they are currently doing and what that transition will be. But look, we want to have the um, new. POS in place as rapidly as possible. I will pay tribute to Nick, um who has done such an important job.
Um, in terms of continuing to lead the organisation in the meantime.
Um, in terms of continuing to lead the organisation in the meantime.
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Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Well, I'm happy to. Well, look, let me let me see what information we can give to you to give you more information on, on that structure. But the the wider point is the strategic workforce plan in terms of what capabilities that we need for the whole organization. We do need to do some more work on that. And I've asked our chief Operating officer to progress that work, and hopefully we'll get something in the in the early autumn.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
And so, yes, uh, we do have oversight of it. Um, it is, uh, rightly the. The responsibility of the P s and Nick has taken on those responsibilities in terms of the implementation of that about that's classic. Um, uh, the civil service responsibilities. But we do have oversight and also other ministers, um, in the department have also had a chance to look further at the overall programme. But ultimately the implementation and the delivery is the responsibility of the POS.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
So you mentioned in this digest then that there is still work to be done on what the final, um, operational headcount looks like. Um before the procedure committee last week or the procedure committee last week highlighted the fact that there had been, uh, you know, the Fcdo was amongst the worst in responding to written questions. I mean, I guess the question that I ask about the restructuring process and how long it's going to go on for is highlighted by that evidence that the procedure committee, because, of course, if written questions are not being responded to timely, the inevitable question is what else is the staff of the Fcdo distracted from delivering in terms of their day to day job, why they worry about whether or not they have one.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I just quickly just point out, just on the on the written questions. We have substantially improved the Fcdo's performance. There has been a big turnaround. You are. It would be fair to criticise the Fcdo's performance on written questions, but some very heavy lifting has been underway. Some extensive work has gone on. So I think the evidence that Malhotra gave to the committee was actually about all the work that's gone on to improve the performance and to turn that around, of course.
Look, there are tensions between the pace of change, meaning that you can make changes quickly and then get on with things. But also, you know, there's on the other hand, if you take longer about it, then there's a less intense period. So of course there are trade offs in that. But ultimately those are the management decisions that I think are a matter for the civil service.
Look, there are tensions between the pace of change, meaning that you can make changes quickly and then get on with things. But also, you know, there's on the other hand, if you take longer about it, then there's a less intense period. So of course there are trade offs in that. But ultimately those are the management decisions that I think are a matter for the civil service.
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Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Yes. And just to reaffirm that on the written ministerial questions, I mean, that was more about procedures, not about staff numbers of staff. So we have strengthened and changed our procedures. We recognise that we were falling way behind in terms of performance, and now we are meeting the 85% standard that is set.
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Before you move on to that, may I just ask something specifically which is about I mean, from what I understand, um there's a bit of a mess about pensions people don't know at the moment, particularly a senior end, what pension they're going to have. There's the whole thing has been, you know, still subject to negotiation that's being changed. And so is it is it not right that senior people who are considering redundancy are essentially on gardening leave in the Foreign Office whilst they're whilst their pensions are being