Defence Committee
Wednesday 15th July 2026
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10:02
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Order. Order a call to order today's House of Commons Defence Committee evidence session. It is our last session on our High North inquiry and indeed is a ministerial session. So I'm very, very pleased that we've got with us again for her second outing in front of the committee after the regular women in the Armed Forces session. Very warm. Welcome to Louise Sandra Jones MP, who is the parliamentary Under-Secretary of state and the Minister for the Armed Forces. Uh, also we have with us again, Brigadier Jeremy Lamb.
He is the head of Euro-Atlantic security at the Ministry of Defence. And for the first time in front of the committee, uh, Mr. Chris Kay, who is the deputy director, Euro-Atlantic security at the Ministry of Defence, uh, and without further. Ado, let's get straight into the questioning. Uh, Mr.. Obviously, you'll be aware that we've been undertaking a deep dive into defence in the High North. I think I know the answer to this, but just to set the scene, can you explain to us that given the rising tensions across various parts of the globe and in particular across the whole of Europe, why should the UK focus particularly on defence and security of the High North?
He is the head of Euro-Atlantic security at the Ministry of Defence. And for the first time in front of the committee, uh, Mr. Chris Kay, who is the deputy director, Euro-Atlantic security at the Ministry of Defence, uh, and without further. Ado, let's get straight into the questioning. Uh, Mr.. Obviously, you'll be aware that we've been undertaking a deep dive into defence in the High North. I think I know the answer to this, but just to set the scene, can you explain to us that given the rising tensions across various parts of the globe and in particular across the whole of Europe, why should the UK focus particularly on defence and security of the High North?
10:03
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Thank you very much, and thank you very much for inviting me to come here today. And I think this is a really important topic. Um, so I think, um, there's lots that we need to get into on this. So to yeah, help that set the scene. And I don't, this won't be news to, to people here, but the role that the high north plays, it's really fundamental to our homeland security, to European security and indeed across the globe. I think it's important to look at how that's applicable in four different ways.
One is how the High North interacts with homeland security. So, for example, making sure that we are able to maintain our sea lines of communication, to look at how we can operate with our allies. So interoperability, the resilience of our country and wider Europe. When we talk about things like subsea infrastructure and then how we talk about deterrence. The High North plays, therefore, a really critical, enabling role in security, whether we're talking about security in Eastern Europe, whether we're talking about in the Middle East or wider, the capabilities and the deterrence we're able to provide, send crucial messages in a more competitive and contested world to make sure that the UK is able to influence geopolitical affairs, as we would wish in defence of their.
The High North plays, therefore, a really critical, enabling role in security. Whether we're talking about security in Eastern Europe, whether we're talking about in the Middle East or wider, the capabilities and the deterrence we're able to provide, send crucial messages in a more competitive and contested world to make sure that the UK is able to influence geopolitical affairs, as we would wish in defence of our interests. I think it's important to be clear eyed about the challenges that we face in the High North. Some of those challenges, I think, are very well known when we talk about the threats from Russia.
Russia is obviously an Arctic nation. They have significant capability up there. I think it's also important to recognise as well that as the high north becomes more accessible and the Arctic region in general becomes more accessible, there will be increasing economic interest there. And we will see other actors such as China, more increasingly contest and compete in that space. I think it's really interesting topic when you look at how we expect the relevance of it to change over the coming decades, I think we can all point to the risks and the threats that we face today, but we know that they will change significantly over the next decades.
And I think it's important to situate ourselves and understand what we're doing today, but crucially, what we will do in the future.
One is how the High North interacts with homeland security. So, for example, making sure that we are able to maintain our sea lines of communication, to look at how we can operate with our allies. So interoperability, the resilience of our country and wider Europe. When we talk about things like subsea infrastructure and then how we talk about deterrence. The High North plays, therefore, a really critical, enabling role in security, whether we're talking about security in Eastern Europe, whether we're talking about in the Middle East or wider, the capabilities and the deterrence we're able to provide, send crucial messages in a more competitive and contested world to make sure that the UK is able to influence geopolitical affairs, as we would wish in defence of their.
The High North plays, therefore, a really critical, enabling role in security. Whether we're talking about security in Eastern Europe, whether we're talking about in the Middle East or wider, the capabilities and the deterrence we're able to provide, send crucial messages in a more competitive and contested world to make sure that the UK is able to influence geopolitical affairs, as we would wish in defence of our interests. I think it's important to be clear eyed about the challenges that we face in the High North. Some of those challenges, I think, are very well known when we talk about the threats from Russia.
Russia is obviously an Arctic nation. They have significant capability up there. I think it's also important to recognise as well that as the high north becomes more accessible and the Arctic region in general becomes more accessible, there will be increasing economic interest there. And we will see other actors such as China, more increasingly contest and compete in that space. I think it's really interesting topic when you look at how we expect the relevance of it to change over the coming decades, I think we can all point to the risks and the threats that we face today, but we know that they will change significantly over the next decades.
And I think it's important to situate ourselves and understand what we're doing today, but crucially, what we will do in the future.
10:05
10:06
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Um, from my area specifically, I would just like to point out that sort of the deterrence effect that the minister touched on is, is part of our NATO framework. We, we deter across NATO, uh, and the high North plays a critical element within that. Um, and it, it presents a flank that we must retain control of in order to build that deterrence across the Euro-Atlantic area. Um, but I think that's it for now. Thank you.
10:06
10:06
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
I think I'd just say, chair, that, um, if you were doing this inquiry a few years back, this might have been a point of debate. You know, is it really that important to NATO security as as a whole?But I think, as you implied at the beginning, chair, I think that that is now quite well understood. Um, right across the NATO alliance. And I know as a committee you had some good expert witnesses in previous sessions explaining that. And it's our observation that it's no longer required for the UK to be making the case for the importance of the high North.
That's now, um, a widely understood point.
That's now, um, a widely understood point.
10:07
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Okay, Minister, if I may come back to yourself, the Supreme Allied commander, Europe, he has told NATO members that earlier this month to step up their provision and increase the number of aircraft, drones and ships available in a crisis to make up for the reduced US military capability in Europe. Now, we've, uh, had recently reports in The New York Times, which, according if they're to be believed, that the US plans to cut the number of F-16 and F-15e fighter jets from roughly 150 to 100. And also they're looking to reduce the maritime reconnaissance aircraft from 26 down to 15 and removing all eight arterial refueling tanker jets that it previously made available to Europe.
So given that context that for no longer, European security is a focus, it seems, for the new US administration. What does this mean for European security generally, and specifically for the role of the UK in the high North?
So given that context that for no longer, European security is a focus, it seems, for the new US administration. What does this mean for European security generally, and specifically for the role of the UK in the high North?
10:08
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah, I think it's clear that the US is prioritising activity in a way that we haven't seen previously. And they are making rightly making demands on Europe to step up. Um you know, UK has always been a leader within Europe within the North Atlantic and the high North in playing our role. But I think it's clear that we do need to increase that. We can all see the growing threats that we are facing. And it is right that we do step up.
There's a number of things that we need to do as part of that. So, um, if we can look across domains, we need to make sure that we have a land capability that is credible. And I know the Royal Marines have been training for over 50 years. I think now in Norway, as people in this committee will know very well, but it's about making sure that we're transforming them for the future, making sure they have uncrewed systems that they need. And I know that we're also, I think, doubling the presence there in the North as well when we're looking at sea.
And again, NATO has always been based on working in coalition. And so where one partner nation may dial up or dial down their capabilities, other partner nations may wish to step in and change how they're what they're providing. I think it's really important to note that we have an aircraft carrier currently conducting exercises in the north. As you'll be well aware, with Firecrest, that was a really key priority that the sort of flagship exercise, if you like, that it undertakes this year was in the high north, and there's some significant capability there to demonstrate what we're capable of when we look at our presence in the air as well.
Um, we've got significant air assets supporting that. We have p-8s, obviously, and it's about stepping up and saying what we are recognising from the threat and making sure that we are rising to meet that.
There's a number of things that we need to do as part of that. So, um, if we can look across domains, we need to make sure that we have a land capability that is credible. And I know the Royal Marines have been training for over 50 years. I think now in Norway, as people in this committee will know very well, but it's about making sure that we're transforming them for the future, making sure they have uncrewed systems that they need. And I know that we're also, I think, doubling the presence there in the North as well when we're looking at sea.
And again, NATO has always been based on working in coalition. And so where one partner nation may dial up or dial down their capabilities, other partner nations may wish to step in and change how they're what they're providing. I think it's really important to note that we have an aircraft carrier currently conducting exercises in the north. As you'll be well aware, with Firecrest, that was a really key priority that the sort of flagship exercise, if you like, that it undertakes this year was in the high north, and there's some significant capability there to demonstrate what we're capable of when we look at our presence in the air as well.
Um, we've got significant air assets supporting that. We have p-8s, obviously, and it's about stepping up and saying what we are recognising from the threat and making sure that we are rising to meet that.
10:09
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Right. It's good that you said that the UK is stepping up, but I referred earlier to the New York Times report. There have been other such reports. So can you confirm the validity of those recent reports that suggest that NATO members have been told by the US to step up and to expect less military support from the US?
10:10
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think it's, uh, really well known that the US is asking and calling on European allies to do more publicly, whether that's where we're talking about targets, whether we're talking about capabilities. Um, I think for specific comment on capabilities, Chris, I don't know if you wanted to come in there.
10:10
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Yeah, maybe a couple of comments, chair, if I may. So members will all have been tracking the, um, the successful NATO summit last week where there was really quite a strong sense of unity both around the article five commitment and the need for a more European NATO. Um, as the, the specifics that you're talking about, um, published in the New York Times, it is the case that the US have begun to start explaining which specific capabilities they are looking to, um, prioritise, uh, for, for different regions, um, I think it's, it's for the US to say exactly how accurate the, the New York Times report is, but we sort of recognise a good chunk of that.
And as you'll know, the UK already commits most of its force structure to NATO. So, um, the, the growth of UK and other allies commitments will take time. Um, but there are a couple of areas where the UK has been able to um find. Uh, a little bit more that can contribute, which is connected to the, the US review. I suppose the other thing I would say in relation to the high North, specifically the, the, the US and its national defence strategy, which it's published a few months back.
It talks about Russian capabilities which have the. Uh, the capability to threaten the US homeland. Of course, many of those Russian capabilities are based in the high North. So, um, it's clear that the US will retain a very strong interest in deterrence and defence in the high North.
And as you'll know, the UK already commits most of its force structure to NATO. So, um, the, the growth of UK and other allies commitments will take time. Um, but there are a couple of areas where the UK has been able to um find. Uh, a little bit more that can contribute, which is connected to the, the US review. I suppose the other thing I would say in relation to the high North, specifically the, the, the US and its national defence strategy, which it's published a few months back.
It talks about Russian capabilities which have the. Uh, the capability to threaten the US homeland. Of course, many of those Russian capabilities are based in the high North. So, um, it's clear that the US will retain a very strong interest in deterrence and defence in the high North.
10:12
10:12
10:12
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Uh, so, so NATO has already responded to this chair, um, by conducting a force sourcing conference. Um, and these are routine meetings, but obviously they, um, they relate to the situation of the moment. Um, and as the situation, uh, changes based on individual nations commitments, then, um, other nations are asked to contribute to, to fill gaps as they appear. Um, that process has already taken place. I can't go into any details. Um, but I can assure you that NATO led in part by, um, Air Chief Marshal Sir Johnny Stringer as the deputy sacker, led that process.
And it has, um, addressed, uh, the immediate, um, declaration from the Americans on, on the, um, the assets they're removing. What they're talking about, though, is basing, it's not necessarily what they will make available to the to occur in, in a crisis. So there's, there's an ongoing process that, um, this is just a part of, it's another iteration. It's just more public because of the scale.
And it has, um, addressed, uh, the immediate, um, declaration from the Americans on, on the, um, the assets they're removing. What they're talking about, though, is basing, it's not necessarily what they will make available to the to occur in, in a crisis. So there's, there's an ongoing process that, um, this is just a part of, it's another iteration. It's just more public because of the scale.
10:13
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, Brigadier, I appreciate you and the minister don't want to make comments on this, but you can appreciate that also that it is a cause of huge concern for many of us. Indeed, for many. The people of European nations across the globe that, um, if there is a crisis, will our American friends be standing with us?So but anyway, you can't shed further light onto that. I'm assuming that in due course, we will have clarification from our US friends. Uh, Lincoln job.
10:14
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Minister, you mentioned the Royal Marines training up in Norway and the aspiration to double the number that are doing it. When we were there, we heard that the infrastructure for doing that is quite creaking at the seams. Um, and politically, there is a problem there because of Norway's prohibition on permanent basing, it would the British government are you are you trying to convince the Norwegian government to lift that prohibition?In the case of our Royal Marines contribution to the High North?
10:14
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yes. As you're aware, we have a really close partnership with Norway across a whole number of different areas. And I think following Luna House, it's clearly only deepened. We've got ongoing discussions with Norway about how we can improve our own training, how we can improve our support to what the capabilities that we're trying to deliver. And I know that Norwegians will be happy to work with us on that. For specific questions about specific parts of infrastructure, I hope you'll forgive me on not having the exact details on that, but I know that as we go forward, Norway and the UK have been working very closely together, and that will definitely continue.
10:15
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10:16
10:16
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. So I think it brings together a coalition of countries which have shared interests in deepening our cooperation, capability development. Training, interoperability. Um, as you know, it was formed in response to the events of 2014. So it has a clear European focus. Um, as I sort of set out at the beginning, we recognise how much the high north, uh, is crucial for security much, much wider than that. And so I think it is fair to say the high north is a very important focus for the deaf.
Um, I believe that is absolutely complementary to and not in competition with security in the Baltics. Um, and across Europe. So I don't necessarily, in my opinion, see um a contradiction, there.
Um, I believe that is absolutely complementary to and not in competition with security in the Baltics. Um, and across Europe. So I don't necessarily, in my opinion, see um a contradiction, there.
10:17
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10:17
10:17
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um I don't, I don't think so. I think the Jeff can cover a whole range of different types of operations. Um, and I think indeed enhance some of the aswj activity. That we do, um, you know, we work very closely with a lot of Jeff, uh, nations on those kind of activities. So I think it supports that. Um, the Jeff is about bringing these nations together. We obviously are able to, um, pursue. Different lines at the same time.
And I would say this group of the Baltic can't be divorced from the security of the North either.
And I would say this group of the Baltic can't be divorced from the security of the North either.
10:18
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10:19
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, I think we're in a period where we, uh, of transition for the Royal Navy where we are, um, looking at getting new capabilities in, obviously, we've announced some of the new capabilities that we're going to get. Um, I think it's quite clear that we have, um, significant capability already, which is focused on that. Um, there are some challenges, as I'm sure you're aware, um, with some availability of some equipment, uh, that we would prefer to be better than it is.
10:19
10:19
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, you know, we talk about some, we'd like to have some platforms perhaps. Um, I'm not going to comment individually on which ones should be where. And I hope you appreciate why. Um, you know, this, this is a really, really important aspect of homeland defense and deterrence that we are sending a very strong message about the importance.
10:20
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10:20
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So I think, um, the, the Jeff is primarily focused on interoperability training, coalition building. Um, and whilst in a crisis, it might have an operational focus. Um, and I understand that we would, um, perhaps look to, um, how. It would work together, but it's very much got that focus on preparation and pre-crisis JFC uh, is one of the operational level commands that's focused on current operations, you know, um, whether that's deterrence, protecting sea lines of communication, it's very much what we are doing operationally now.
Um, so whilst they are similarly focused on the Atlantic high north, I don't believe in the, the main businesses that they're focused on that there is overlap, which is taking away from the effect that they're able to have. Um, I don't know if one of my colleagues wants to come in.
Um, so whilst they are similarly focused on the Atlantic high north, I don't believe in the, the main businesses that they're focused on that there is overlap, which is taking away from the effect that they're able to have. Um, I don't know if one of my colleagues wants to come in.
10:21
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
So I follow, follow exactly what the minister said there. Jeff is the Jeff is, is primarily focused on pre-crisis. So it deals with, um, supporting individual nations. Article three commitments to their own homeland defence. Um, and the Jeff response options are largely built around um a. A. Hybrid threat a pre article five type threat. Um it doesn't require as a rule the same capabilities that are required for high end anti-submarine warfare. And therefore those those two tasks tend not to come into competition for capability equally.
In terms of your second question on on JFC Norfolk Joint Force Command Norfolk is responsible for day to day deterrence and then for war fighting in, uh, um, the North. Western area of operations. Um, once we transition from, uh, a. Into crisis, um, then the, the chances are the Jeff will fold into in some way the regional plan north west anyway. So, um, there's no, there's not a competition between the two. They're entirely complementary. One supports the other.
There is also the issue of the. Jeff. Um only requiring two nations to agree to act for it to take action. So in terms of a. An option available pre-crisis, um, it is available much more quickly than a full NATO response, which would require the consensus of all 32 nations.
In terms of your second question on on JFC Norfolk Joint Force Command Norfolk is responsible for day to day deterrence and then for war fighting in, uh, um, the North. Western area of operations. Um, once we transition from, uh, a. Into crisis, um, then the, the chances are the Jeff will fold into in some way the regional plan north west anyway. So, um, there's no, there's not a competition between the two. They're entirely complementary. One supports the other.
There is also the issue of the. Jeff. Um only requiring two nations to agree to act for it to take action. So in terms of a. An option available pre-crisis, um, it is available much more quickly than a full NATO response, which would require the consensus of all 32 nations.
10:23
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Question is that when I last visited Norfolk, um, I'm sure he's about 18 months ago now, I can't remember exactly. Um we come away with the clear. Well we, we knew because we were told that there wasn't a lot of post hadn't been filled. Uh, and I just wonder whether you'll be looking at this now that we will be leading it. Well, to ensure that staff at Norfolk and it's fully staffed. Is that is that something that's going to be looked at as part of our remit now?Um, that was certainly the message my and my colleagues who went there then were given that there was quite a lot of vacancies.
10:24
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10:26
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Thank you, thank you. Um, yeah, I'd like to, uh, speak about the deterrence implications. And, um, given the consequences of a continued US shift in priorities from Europe into the Indo Pacific, uh, region could have profound implications for deterrence as adversaries may perceive this as a weakening of the US commitment to Europe, also eroding NATO's ability to deter. So a credible collective deterrence posture, uh, underpins any effective security in the North. What steps are needed to achieve and sustain that deterrence in the I North?
10:27
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, you're absolutely right that deterrence is, uh, fundamental and never more. So when we talk about the high north, um, and the Arctic, the foundation of the UK's deterrence is of course, our independent UK nuclear deterrent. Um, the only European country to assign it to the defence of NATO. So we are, I think, well placed to show um the level of commitment and capability that NATO has in Europe. Um of course we have to step up and take on our share and recognize the changing threat landscape.
Uh, and we are doing that with investments into our submarine programme. We are doing that with, uh, our orders for F-35, a, um. And we're also looking at how we can improve our interoperability with our allies. So working more closely with France, for example, the other nuclear power in Europe, uh, and our other allies, whether it be that Norway, be that Germany, to show that we in Europe are united, we are determined, we are steadfast, and we do have considerable capability at our disposal.
Uh, and we are doing that with investments into our submarine programme. We are doing that with, uh, our orders for F-35, a, um. And we're also looking at how we can improve our interoperability with our allies. So working more closely with France, for example, the other nuclear power in Europe, uh, and our other allies, whether it be that Norway, be that Germany, to show that we in Europe are united, we are determined, we are steadfast, and we do have considerable capability at our disposal.
10:28
10:28
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Maybe, maybe just an opportunity to draw the distinction between U.S. commitments and U.S. capabilities. So it's at the level of capabilities that the discussion is ongoing in NATO. Um, the, the, the remarks that the chair pointed towards and in terms of particular capabilities. So that's part of the overall NATO capability planning process, as you'll know. Um, NATO sets capability requirements for each ally and those capability requirements are based on the plans. So what Secor needs to conduct the mission.
Um, that's a cyclical process. We're partway through a cycle. Um, and it's in that context that the Americans are making known to NATO here. The capabilities we intend not to offer in the future. And that is what we think a more European NATO looks like. It's for the Europeans.
Um, that's a cyclical process. We're partway through a cycle. Um, and it's in that context that the Americans are making known to NATO here. The capabilities we intend not to offer in the future. And that is what we think a more European NATO looks like. It's for the Europeans.
10:29
10:29
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Um, so it's not a wholesale change, but it's a gradual change. Um, but that gives the rest of the allies, including the UK, uh, the basis to um, move toward. A more European NATO with a heavier European capability. Um, uh, commitment, but it's not an exclusive European capability commitment. So through these NATO processes, through the growth and defense budgets that will help us align the capabilities delivered to the requirements for article five.
10:29
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Particularly around the nuclear deterrence. Obviously, uh, the UK strategic nuclear deterrence, uh, remains committed to NATO. Uh, regarding the I North, how does it help deter aggression?Uh, what role will the new Substrategic capability play and will the UK practice forward deploying these nuclear capable aircraft into the region?As has been mentioned in the dip with the, um with the F-35s?
10:30
10:30
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
So we don't consider the high north to be a deterrence region in its own right. I sort of touched on this before, but we see all of NATO and all of NATO's area being a contiguous, um, deterrence effect or delivering deterrence effect against Russia. So we wouldn't necessarily, uh, deter Russia specifically through the high north. We do it, uh, through NATO, across the entire area of operations in terms of, um, employ. Of, um, for instance. Dual capable aircraft and so on.
We would do that within a NATO framework where NATO considered it most appropriate at the time to deliver either training effect, um, interoperability effect or deterrence effect. And you may be able to do all 3 in 1 activity that may be in the high north, but it will come down to where Sakya at the time, based on his assessment, feels it's most appropriate. Um, so that would be my, um, my response to it is the high north, the specific area we wish to deter in it is a part of a much bigger picture.
We would do that within a NATO framework where NATO considered it most appropriate at the time to deliver either training effect, um, interoperability effect or deterrence effect. And you may be able to do all 3 in 1 activity that may be in the high north, but it will come down to where Sakya at the time, based on his assessment, feels it's most appropriate. Um, so that would be my, um, my response to it is the high north, the specific area we wish to deter in it is a part of a much bigger picture.
10:31
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, do you mean specifically nuclear or conventional?Conventional as well. So, um, I think it, uh, you know, if our deterrence is based on capability and also our alliances, the strength of how we can work with other countries and interoperate with them, then I think it sends another powerful message that shows how NATO is working together. Um, that cooperation is, is obviously going to take lots of different forms. It will involve various different NATO nations. Sometimes it will be bilateral, sometimes it will be a larger grouping, you know, like for example, the.
Jeff. And I think it's a really clear signal of intent about our committal to, um, European security and our commitment as well to the importance of a nuclear element to that.
Jeff. And I think it's a really clear signal of intent about our committal to, um, European security and our commitment as well to the importance of a nuclear element to that.
10:32
10:32
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, Jeff is focused on, uh, the. Coalition element. You know, it's interoperability training. It's working together. It's, it's focusing on specific interests within Europe that we have a shared focus on. And I think we can see from the activity that is conducted as part of Jeff, whether it's, uh, for example, training exercises. And I think that's really useful and really valuable, um, work. I think it's important to, uh. Bear in mind the distinctions between Jeff and JFC or between wider NATO is that, you know, we've repeatedly stated, um, that we have a NATO first approach.
We, you know, JFC is an operational level headquarters. And, um, you know, there are commitments that NATO members have made to one another. Jeff is about, uh, supporting. That and helping improve capability. It's certainly. Um, so, so I would say that the, the, the angle of saying, you know, it's not sort of fitted into the orbat, I would say is not, is not, is not really the question to ask when you consider the focus of the. Jeff.
Um, if we needed to step up operations as part of NATO, we have a very clear operational structure to be able to do that. Um, and I think we would be all the better for it because of the work that Jeff is currently undertaking.
We, you know, JFC is an operational level headquarters. And, um, you know, there are commitments that NATO members have made to one another. Jeff is about, uh, supporting. That and helping improve capability. It's certainly. Um, so, so I would say that the, the, the angle of saying, you know, it's not sort of fitted into the orbat, I would say is not, is not, is not really the question to ask when you consider the focus of the. Jeff.
Um, if we needed to step up operations as part of NATO, we have a very clear operational structure to be able to do that. Um, and I think we would be all the better for it because of the work that Jeff is currently undertaking.
10:34
10:35
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, Jeff, I think has already got good links with, with Canada. Um, they've participated in exercise. Terrasses was it?Yes. Um, and so that is really helpful, really useful. I think it's important to remember that Jeff is for Jeff nations to decide where they would want to take the focus forward. Um, and, um, how that could work with nations like Canada or other nations were, were interested. Um, so I think it's important that we are doing that joint training at the moment.
Um, but I think the question of whether they should join is, is, is one for, for nations to discuss and decide together.
Um, but I think the question of whether they should join is, is, is one for, for nations to discuss and decide together.
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10:36
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10:36
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, but I hope you appreciate that it wouldn't be appropriate for me to go into that level of detail on the decision making. I can assure you, we remain very committed to intercepting the shadow fleet vessels. Um, and I hope he will understand that it is not through that lack of commitment, um, that we've done this, but I hope we will hope you will appreciate that. I can't go into depth and details as to exactly the conditions that need to be met.
10:37
10:37
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Morning, Minister. So we know how important High North security is to the UK. And we also know how important our Royal Navy fleet is and how critical it is to that. So can you give me an update on what's currently available for operations out of our two carriers, our six type 45 destroyers, our five remaining type 23 and our five astute class attack subs, please.
10:38
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, all of those platforms will have varying levels of readiness and every platform will need to go through a cycle of deployment. Uh, maintenance. Um, deeper maintenance. And then of course, training and preparation and exercises, um, like that. So. All of that has to go through those processes. So, you know, when I point to what we've got deployed at the moment, you know, we've got firecrest going on at exercise firecrest going on at the moment.
So we have, um, the carrier strike group that's currently deployed. We obviously always have our contingency deterrent. We have other ships deployed around the world, for example, in the Middle East. Um, so we have significant capability deployed at this time.
So we have, um, the carrier strike group that's currently deployed. We obviously always have our contingency deterrent. We have other ships deployed around the world, for example, in the Middle East. Um, so we have significant capability deployed at this time.
10:39
10:39
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
So, so one carrier is deployed. It's in the high north. Um, and it is, uh, conducting operations on behalf of NATO. It is, it is transferred to NATO. Uh, and it's delivered, for example, air policing, um, from afloat. Um, the second carrier is at readiness. The point I would bring out here is that our, our commitments to NATO are graduated. And therefore we hold our capabilities at different readiness depending on the capability they are required to meet for NATO.
Uh, and there are largely three bands of capability. So, um, while I. Wouldn't wish to go into the operational deployments of each of our capabilities, because that we consider beyond the classification of this meeting. Uh, that those capabilities sit within those bands that we offer to NATO, um, at varying readiness as required by Sasha for his war fighting plans.
Uh, and there are largely three bands of capability. So, um, while I. Wouldn't wish to go into the operational deployments of each of our capabilities, because that we consider beyond the classification of this meeting. Uh, that those capabilities sit within those bands that we offer to NATO, um, at varying readiness as required by Sasha for his war fighting plans.
10:40
10:40
10:40
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
I suppose our concern is that you'll appreciate there's been lots in the press around availability of the fleet in that out in the public domain. There is one carrier out of action. Three type 45 out of action for type 23 out of action. And all of our astute class subs out of action. That's what's in the public domain. Can you confirm or deny that for us?
10:41
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
So I was just going to say, for example, the second carrier is about to be, uh, increased in readiness for a different task. So, um, I wouldn't necessarily agree with the reporting that you're describing in its, in its plainest sense of it is not available. They are, they are all, um, available at one, uh, readiness level or another. Um, not all of them are necessarily where we would choose them to be, but they are all on a graduated scale of readiness, uh, for.
10:41
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
I suppose my main concern is if we can take it back to the astute class attack subs, then they, they protect our nuclear deterrent. And also submariners on that nuclear deterrent. And the reports that we get is none of them are actually deployed or deployable. They're all in deep refit or deep maintenance. Do you do you see why our committee is concerned?And I appreciate I'm not going to get an answer. It's very clear you're not going to answer that.
But I think that's something that perhaps we should be told as a committee, perhaps in private, because we do have a concern about that. And I suppose the crux of my question in relation to the high North then is, is the Department satisfied that all of this availability that I've. And the numbers that I've just went through is adequate for our high North commitments?
But I think that's something that perhaps we should be told as a committee, perhaps in private, because we do have a concern about that. And I suppose the crux of my question in relation to the high North then is, is the Department satisfied that all of this availability that I've. And the numbers that I've just went through is adequate for our high North commitments?
10:42
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So we'd be very happy to offer a private briefing for sure. Um, and, and, but, but for the avoidance of doubt, we have significant layers of support to our continuous nuclear deterrent. I think it's very important to state that, um, and, uh, when I look at what we currently have in support of the security of the high North and the Arctic, um, and we have, you know, the carrier strike group conducting exercises there at the moment and what has been achieved by, by other elements. Um, I can see that we have, um, clearly, uh, we're clearly looking at how we can step up.
Um, the effects that we have there that will, as I'm sure you'll appreciate being ongoing process. Um, and, you know, um, I understand you're speaking to the fleet commander later. Um, so I'm sure he'll be able to go into, into more detail, but I hope you can appreciate how seriously we are taking the situation in the high north. Um, and we're making sure that we are orientating where we need to, to face that.
Um, the effects that we have there that will, as I'm sure you'll appreciate being ongoing process. Um, and, you know, um, I understand you're speaking to the fleet commander later. Um, so I'm sure he'll be able to go into, into more detail, but I hope you can appreciate how seriously we are taking the situation in the high north. Um, and we're making sure that we are orientating where we need to, to face that.
10:43
10:43
10:44
10:44
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
And I'm not I'm not trying to be difficult in not not giving a simple answer. Um, you know, I'm someone who always wants to challenge and to push further. Um, and, you know, this case is, is no different. Um, I also recognise that where we do want to increase or uplift capability, then it means we have to reprioritise from elsewhere. Um, I would say that there is considerable activity going on in the high north, um which I am happy with.
10:44
10:45
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Would make me unhappy. Um. I think if we. Gosh, I think it's quite difficult and probably, um, not. Wise to really focus on specific details of what we should or shouldn't have there. Um, what, you know, if, if we were sat here and were having a discussion about how we didn't feel like the high north was relevant, if I couldn't sit here and tell you about the activity that we're doing there. Um, then I think quite rightly, there would be challenge.
10:45
10:46
10:46
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
Just a specific one. Um, there, I'm sure you're aware there are rumours online, specifically on Reddit that, um, the, uh, when our nuclear bomber boat went out recently, there was not a UK astute class submarine available to delouse the sea and get it out to sea, get the bomber out to sea without being detected. Is that true?
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10:50
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Um, uh, one of the issues with Norfolk is it's a relatively, uh. Young organisation and therefore a lot of nations haven't met their initial commitment, commitment to, to that, um, uh, organisation. So it's not that people aren't filling posts. They're filled in the past. They just never filled them because the, the organisation is new. Uh, and we are lobbying to achieve that.
10:51
10:51
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
Thank you chair, we're going to talk about, uh, our, the United Kingdom and our allies and particularly want to obviously talk about, um, our sister nation Canada. Um, obviously, uh, a relationship that is incredibly important. The only nation that we share, um, obviously a NATO relationship, a Commonwealth relationship and five eyes. Um, so, you know, right up there from my perspective, in terms of allied relationships, Mark Carney obviously recently talked about a rupture, not a transition in terms of international relations, and set out set out an ambition where middle powers, collective investments are, are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses.
Minister, do we see ourselves as a middle power?
Minister, do we see ourselves as a middle power?
10:52
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think we've always recognised that we in the UK, um are play a significant role around the globe. We are well respected. Um our military has a huge range of capabilities. Uh, whether that's the nuclear deterrent or um right down. To our specialist infantry. Um and, but we have always, uh, been made more impactful through the work that we do with our allies. Um, and particularly we've seen that as part of NATO seen that as part of operations that I and others have deployed on.
So, um, I certainly recognise the call to make sure that we are working closely with our allies to improve interoperability, um, to look at where we can work together on capability that goes beyond a shared platform. For example.
So, um, I certainly recognise the call to make sure that we are working closely with our allies to improve interoperability, um, to look at where we can work together on capability that goes beyond a shared platform. For example.
10:53
10:53
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um. I, I think for me, um, we need to recognise the change in the threat picture that we are facing, which is nothing like I've experienced in, in my lifetime. We are seeing a hugely disruptive changes be that in technology, be that in certain geopolitical realignments. These are significant, you know, century defining changes that we are facing. And we need to be very clear eyed on what needs to be done to meet those challenges. And I feel very strongly that that doesn't look at replacing.
It shouldn't look similar to what we've had in the 20th century. Be looking at and asking our. Ourselves, you know, are we making deliberate decisions when we continue activity?Or are we saying, right, actually, what could be a more impactful way of delivering this same effect?Um, with today's incredibly interconnected world, it's no longer, I think, true to say that, um, we can have the luxury of just focusing on the near abroad. We know how intertwined our interests are around the globe to be able to meet that, we're going to have to work very closely with, with allies all around the globe, um, of which of course, Canada is a long, long standing, very important ally.
Um.
It shouldn't look similar to what we've had in the 20th century. Be looking at and asking our. Ourselves, you know, are we making deliberate decisions when we continue activity?Or are we saying, right, actually, what could be a more impactful way of delivering this same effect?Um, with today's incredibly interconnected world, it's no longer, I think, true to say that, um, we can have the luxury of just focusing on the near abroad. We know how intertwined our interests are around the globe to be able to meet that, we're going to have to work very closely with, with allies all around the globe, um, of which of course, Canada is a long, long standing, very important ally.
Um.
10:54
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
One of the things from my side is I, I, I look at, you know, obviously what happens in defence and it just seems we do the same thing over, over and over again. And sometimes, you know, we need to do radical things and do different things and prove that actually we can do things differently. What does that look like?What could that look like in the context of our work with, with an ally like Canada and in the context of the high North.
10:54
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
It's about, um, making the case for what military capability needs to be in the future. I'm really reassured when I look at, for example, the vision for the hybrid Navy. Um, and, you know, that's a really ambitious vision that's been set out about combining, you know, crewed and uncrewed autonomous. Uh, drone systems. And I look at that, or I look at other measures we're taking, you know, the, the Uncrewed Systems task force, the increased system centre. We recently set up, uh, and part of the reason why I think that's so important is there's a chance here for the UK to really be a leader in NATO on these capabilities.
And I know every country is watching how war is developing in eastern Ukraine. And seeing the technical challenges that they're rising to me. And I think it's really fundamental that the UK is able to to lead that transition. When we're talking about our relationships with, with, with, with Canada, etc.. Um, and. So I think we, I think we can point to some really quite big muscle moves that are being made, uh, which will be hugely impactful on interoperability and coalition building.
And I know every country is watching how war is developing in eastern Ukraine. And seeing the technical challenges that they're rising to me. And I think it's really fundamental that the UK is able to to lead that transition. When we're talking about our relationships with, with, with, with Canada, etc.. Um, and. So I think we, I think we can point to some really quite big muscle moves that are being made, uh, which will be hugely impactful on interoperability and coalition building.
10:55
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
What does this look like in terms of, um. The, the landscape of intelligence, obviously, you know, that five eyes relationship is so important, obviously a risk that, you know, obviously what we would like to do is start sharing some of that intelligence, maybe, you know, helpful for, you know, our European partners to be able to have access to some of that intelligence. But obviously, you know, how is that going to play out with the US?What does, uh, you know, what are the sorts of radical things that you could do from an intelligence perspective with allies like Canada that would allow a greater access to some of the things, uh, in some of the information that might help us, you know, as Europe to get this right.
10:56
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. I think, um, as a, as a former intelligence, um, I know how closely we worked with Canada and the Five Eyes, I know how fundamental that relationship is to our intelligence and our, um, security architecture. And we have to be very careful, um, at looking at whether we would expand that. I think outside of that, when we look at intelligence sharing, I was conscious I have to stay within the classification of the room here. Um, we've always worked with five Eyes partners.
Um, and within NATO, there's always the balance between maintaining our own security of our own capabilities and using intelligence to its best effect. And I, I'm a big believer in making sure that we are balancing those capabilities. Um, and we're not just saying computer says no, but on the other hand, I think we have to, to really recognize, um, uh. The really big challenges if we were to significantly change. The agreements we have at the moment.
Um, and within NATO, there's always the balance between maintaining our own security of our own capabilities and using intelligence to its best effect. And I, I'm a big believer in making sure that we are balancing those capabilities. Um, and we're not just saying computer says no, but on the other hand, I think we have to, to really recognize, um, uh. The really big challenges if we were to significantly change. The agreements we have at the moment.
10:57
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
And then, um, so Canada obviously really has been doing a lot of pioneering work on the defence, security and resilience Bank. I've been campaigning for the UK to be a member of that bank. It's something obviously Canada cares deeply about. Um, obviously, you know, I've been talking to Canadians and there has been this frustration that, you know, we haven't been on the same page. It was good to see an acknowledgement by by the Chancellor at Ankara that these are different things.
You know, MDM and Dsbb are are different things. Do you recognize, you know, the bumpiness of you know, that, you know, things how we have dealt with, um, things like, uh, you know, MDM versus Dsbb and what are the implications on, uh, our wider, you know, relationship and things like the high north if we don't get this right.
You know, MDM and Dsbb are are different things. Do you recognize, you know, the bumpiness of you know, that, you know, things how we have dealt with, um, things like, uh, you know, MDM versus Dsbb and what are the implications on, uh, our wider, you know, relationship and things like the high north if we don't get this right.
10:58
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. And I think, you know, anybody who's worked with allies knows that, um, you won't agree on everything, um, all the time. Uh, and, you know, this is one area where there have been discussions and a difference of view. Uh, I think it's important that we keep discussing and we keep abreast of what each other is doing so we can recognize where, um, if there's a path that we've taken, if there's a complementary capability that we need to, to look out for sure. And, uh, I think it's important that we can have these discussions and we can have these points of difference, um, rather than, um.
Uh, feeling that we all need to be cookie cutter. Um, but I recognize, I recognize your frustrations on this issue.
Uh, feeling that we all need to be cookie cutter. Um, but I recognize, I recognize your frustrations on this issue.
10:58
10:58
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Um, Minister, can we talk about, um, type 26 frigates?Um, so we're due to build eight for ourselves and we're due to build at least five for the Norwegians. Um, as I understand it from when we visited there, um it's not like we're going to do R eight and then they can have their five. So essentially we have denuded ourselves of sovereign capability. So we'll take some out of our own pipeline. And those will be redirected towards Norway. And so it all of a sudden doesn't sound like quite the deal of the century that it was.
Um, is it, is it sensible?Um, when we need sovereign frigate anti-submarine warfare capability to fire off the stuff we're making for ourselves to other people, I.
Um, is it, is it sensible?Um, when we need sovereign frigate anti-submarine warfare capability to fire off the stuff we're making for ourselves to other people, I.
10:59
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Think firstly it's a really important deal to have those frigates being built and I really welcome it. Um, obviously we're working very closely with Norway. We face the same threats. Um and um those threats that we face, anti-submarine warfare operations has always been multinational. So I don't think it's quite right to characterize that. Um, if there is a Norwegian ship before there's a British ship that somehow the threat is not being met, you know, they're very interoperable. It's designed to be almost interchangeable.
How we're working with the Norwegians. Um.
How we're working with the Norwegians. Um.
11:00
11:00
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11:00
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. There'll always be um differences in, in uh in non NATO deployments. You know we have interests all around the globe, you know, we have um in the Indo-Pacific, in the South Atlantic, um and in, in the Caribbean, although not, not aswj focus there. Uh, and so there'll always be other activity that we need to focus on. Um, what we are doing is we are getting these eight new ships and Norway is getting it, you know, at least five. And I think that's a really, really powerful capability that will be, um, at sea in defence of NATO focused on anti-submarine operations.
11:01
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Will be by 2035. But we think the Prime Minister said that, you know, he anticipates Russian you know, potential Russian conflict in 2030. Um and I'm just asking the question, do you think it's sensible, the way in which we're approaching this to steal from our own pipeline for sovereign capability and to send it to to our brothers in Norway?
11:01
11:01
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
So the fleet will be entirely interchangeable. And we'll even have at times mixed crews. So this is all about alliances. Everything about the high North is working in alliances. So just. Because a ship comes off the production line and goes to Norway initially rather than the UK, excuse me, doesn't mean it is lost to UK. Security or defence. Um and we will maintain a fleet of uh of sufficient size as the type 26 replaces um the type 23, but the type 23 won't be withdrawn until uh capacity exists equally under the future Navy sort of vision.
Um, a lot of what we're going to do is going to become autonomous. And so we need fewer ships to deliver greater capability. So it's not, it's not necessarily a zero sum game here. We are going to have a greater capability and a much stronger alliance with Norway. Um, as a partner in everything we do. It's worth noting that a Norwegian ship did take part in Operation High Mast. So the, the carrier strike group deployment to the Far East.
So, um, we already have a commitment from Norway to an extent to assist with um operations that aren't necessarily, uh, within the area of Operations that aren't necessarily within the area of operations, they would naturally choose to operate.
Um, a lot of what we're going to do is going to become autonomous. And so we need fewer ships to deliver greater capability. So it's not, it's not necessarily a zero sum game here. We are going to have a greater capability and a much stronger alliance with Norway. Um, as a partner in everything we do. It's worth noting that a Norwegian ship did take part in Operation High Mast. So the, the carrier strike group deployment to the Far East.
So, um, we already have a commitment from Norway to an extent to assist with um operations that aren't necessarily, uh, within the area of Operations that aren't necessarily within the area of operations, they would naturally choose to operate.
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11:04
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Do I want do I want Canada to join?Um. I don't think it's, uh, unfortunately, I don't think it's down to, to, to what I want. What I recognize is the Jeff's focus, um, has come about as a European focus on the high north on the Baltic. And it's been very much founded on the principles that it's these nations that are working together to deal with shared threats. Um, and I think it's that principle that should continue above all else about these nations working together.
Um, and partner nations agreeing to where the future direction it should take.
Um, and partner nations agreeing to where the future direction it should take.
11:04
11:04
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Well, I think we can point to some of the advantages. Um, but then equally, I can recognize, um some of the, um, great effect of Jeff is that it's, it's been a tighter group of nations. It's had a tighter focus. Um, the exercises and some of the principles behind that is that a specific focus?So, um, for me, I don't, I, for me, I don't see it as a binary right or wrong answer. It's a much broader question of where Jeff would go in the future.
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11:05
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um. I think it's been really. Encouraging to see the direction that Canada is taking, the focus that they've had. Um, and, you know, I do really welcome that. You know, there's, we can talk about individual programs, individual organizations. Um, I obviously would always welcome us working closely with Canada. Um, and I mean, I don't know if either of you want to come in specifically on where we're at with GCap.
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11:07
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Thank you. Chair. Um, so you've spoken quite a lot about the kind of collaboration with. With other countries. Um, and how that might make us stronger, make us stronger, make the kind of the Europe's northern flank better defended from adversaries from a, from a UK point of view, because we can't scrutinize Europe, we mod from a UK point of view, what are the most important capabilities that the UK has in terms of this defense of the High North?
11:08
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So um, I think there's some multi level multi-layer approach to that. First and foremost would be our nuclear deterrent. Obviously that's not just focused on the high north, but nonetheless has a hugely important deterrence effect. And I think it goes back to what I said at the beginning. When we come to the high North and what we need to focus on in deterrence is a is a really key part of that. So obviously, the nuclear deterrent is incredibly important.
Um, the second thing I would come to is the real is the vital importance of our undersea infrastructure and the sea lines of communication. So the capabilities that help us to safeguard those two elements are hugely important. You know, whether that's RFA, Proteus, for example, um, or um, uh, exercises that the carrier and destroyers are taking part in. For example, um, when we come to, uh, any activity that we might need to do to conduct, um, against a raised level of threat, you know, either something that could happen relatively soon or we're talking about what becomes possible when the Arctic ice.
Um, uh. Melts further. Um, I, I can say. For sure. Is that absolutely. Our ability to work with others will completely underpin everything that we are doing and making what we have greater than the sum of its parts. So the capabilities that we contribute to part of that, whilst they don't, um, fully answer the question, I wouldn't expect them to nonetheless play a vital role. And I think I would point to our marine capability, Royal Marines capability here as a classic example.
You know, Sweden and Finland have got a fantastic Arctic warfare capabilities and you would expect them to have that. And it's certainly much more embedded into their more conventional forces than it is in ours. But the fact that we're able to deploy a respected, trained capability, which, you know, we've set aside plans to transform them, get them extra. Equipment. I think they're getting a future all terrain vehicle, for example, the fact that we're able to deploy a serious capability alongside that is hugely important and is critical that we retain that aspect.
Um, the second thing I would come to is the real is the vital importance of our undersea infrastructure and the sea lines of communication. So the capabilities that help us to safeguard those two elements are hugely important. You know, whether that's RFA, Proteus, for example, um, or um, uh, exercises that the carrier and destroyers are taking part in. For example, um, when we come to, uh, any activity that we might need to do to conduct, um, against a raised level of threat, you know, either something that could happen relatively soon or we're talking about what becomes possible when the Arctic ice.
Um, uh. Melts further. Um, I, I can say. For sure. Is that absolutely. Our ability to work with others will completely underpin everything that we are doing and making what we have greater than the sum of its parts. So the capabilities that we contribute to part of that, whilst they don't, um, fully answer the question, I wouldn't expect them to nonetheless play a vital role. And I think I would point to our marine capability, Royal Marines capability here as a classic example.
You know, Sweden and Finland have got a fantastic Arctic warfare capabilities and you would expect them to have that. And it's certainly much more embedded into their more conventional forces than it is in ours. But the fact that we're able to deploy a respected, trained capability, which, you know, we've set aside plans to transform them, get them extra. Equipment. I think they're getting a future all terrain vehicle, for example, the fact that we're able to deploy a serious capability alongside that is hugely important and is critical that we retain that aspect.
11:10
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
What would be what would be some of the capabilities that obviously, you know, we're limited. Our resources is limited as a country. We've been through the whole ongoing conversations around the debt, etc. but if we did have all the resource in the world, if we if we kind of had American levels of funding, what were some of the things that you would quickly, um, be acquiring as the most useful to, to kind of field in the northern flank that we currently can't afford because obviously we can't afford everything.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, a range of elements be that from surveillance platforms. So, you know, um more p-8s. But I would also say it's not just about the platforms, you know, it's, it's, it's support from space. It's, um. Uh, support with other radars. But for me as well, crucially, it's how we are, um, bringing that together in a, in a single intelligence picture.
11:11
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
So I'll take you back to space there. Um, the UK relies pretty heavily as I understand it. Um, most of the European operations probably pretty heavily on us. Um earth observation, optical earth, so not SA just optical with cameras. Um do you think there's a place for UK to have sovereign earth. Satellites. Something you endorse.
11:12
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So we all I think it's um. And I would I would go back to Mark Carney's comment here as well about, um, the difference between recognizing that a capability is hugely important. Um, and, you know, my, my own career, I both within the military and outside, I saw the huge importance of space based platforms, whether it's EO or SA or whatever. Um, and what's important is when we look at what is the capability that we have access to, and what can we do to enhance that?That doesn't necessarily, in my opinion, means that we should always focus on developing our own sovereign capability.
We'll always have to work with our allies, particularly when it comes to things like like space, um, to make sure that we're able to use our platforms in the way that we would wish.
We'll always have to work with our allies, particularly when it comes to things like like space, um, to make sure that we're able to use our platforms in the way that we would wish.
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11:14
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
So I mean, from my perspective, obviously I'd love everything. Um, and of course we would want every single capability we could, we could make available to us, but um, given the, um. The scale of the, of the capabilities you're sort of describing, there is no way we're ever going to be able to afford, the, the, the breadth of, and depth of capabilities that, that I would wish to have available. And I'm sure CDs would want if he was, if money was no option. However, we do have access to space based capabilities.
They are phenomenally expensive to build from scratch. Um.
They are phenomenally expensive to build from scratch. Um.
11:14
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I would challenge that. I mean, some of them are quite cheap. Obviously some of them are really expensive. They're getting cheaper year on year. I mean, just to give you some context of why we're going down this, we were in Norway recently, the committee, um, and we spoke about lunar House earlier. And within that, as my colleague alluded to, you know, there's some scheduling of the actual frigates, but there's also this arrangement where we need to buy back from Norway, some in some, some arrangement, some capabilities.
And one of the things we heard about over there was an option to do that with satellites. And do it sort of joint procurement of what would then be kind of UK, Norway uh, sovereign. Satellites for earth observation or for some kind of wide swathe SAR option. It's actually pretty cheap, certainly within the 10 billion of the frigate deal. Like very affordable. Um, so yeah, I challenge it's unaffordable. I mean, it's clearly these are choices that can be made.
And within the dip, we've seen about 15 billion extra for space. So it's going to be spent on somewhere.
And one of the things we heard about over there was an option to do that with satellites. And do it sort of joint procurement of what would then be kind of UK, Norway uh, sovereign. Satellites for earth observation or for some kind of wide swathe SAR option. It's actually pretty cheap, certainly within the 10 billion of the frigate deal. Like very affordable. Um, so yeah, I challenge it's unaffordable. I mean, it's clearly these are choices that can be made.
And within the dip, we've seen about 15 billion extra for space. So it's going to be spent on somewhere.
11:16
11:16
11:16
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Uh, yes. And I'm sure that is a consideration alongside, um, every. Other capability in terms of prioritisation and where it may fit in, in future decision making. Um, but at the moment, um, uh, the, the decision has been made that, um, we have access to, um, us supplied. Data and therefore, um, the value for money, uh, line hasn't quite been reached.
11:17
11:17
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
Thanks, chair. I'd like to talk about frigates and destroyers, if I may. Um, so we are. Phasing out our type 23 frigates. Two of them announced today, um, have gone out of service. So we currently have five frigates and um the dip that all of those type 20 threes are going to be out of service by 2033. And uh, they are going to be replaced primarily by the type 26 seconds, which are the anti-submarine frigates.
So obviously you. Have some going out of service and some coming into service. So there'll be a shifting number of frigates in service at any one time. Minister, how many frigates will we have in service in 2030?
So obviously you. Have some going out of service and some coming into service. So there'll be a shifting number of frigates in service at any one time. Minister, how many frigates will we have in service in 2030?
11:18
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So I know the Royal Navy is going to manage very closely the transition from predominantly the older platform to the new, um it's absolutely vital that we get that right because of the capabilities that they provide and that we can meet the threats that we need to face 20, 30 or in any other year. Um, I know that significant amount of work has gone into managing this transition. To ensure that our tasks can be met. And I'm sure you appreciate that as always, that fits within multi-layers that compliment each other, of which the frigate is a hugely important part.
11:18
11:19
11:19
11:19
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
Okay. Let's do destroyers. So we have, uh, six type 45 s now I think most of them are tied up. Uh, they are due to. Go out of service by 2035, according to the DEP. Um, obviously destroyers provide air defence and they're going to be replaced by. Uh, not not one ship because the type 83, which were there like for like replacement have been cancelled in the dip. So we now have this new hybrid fleet, uh, of.
A cc v like a mothership that will have people on it, and then a fleet of other autonomous vehicles. So perhaps maybe five classes of ship slash autonomous vehicle in that mix. And they are due to arrive. Like most of the dip between 2030 and 2035. Are you confident that we can deliver five classes of ship, most of which are. Well, they only really exist as PowerPoint slides at the moment. Can we get them to C in nine years?
A cc v like a mothership that will have people on it, and then a fleet of other autonomous vehicles. So perhaps maybe five classes of ship slash autonomous vehicle in that mix. And they are due to arrive. Like most of the dip between 2030 and 2035. Are you confident that we can deliver five classes of ship, most of which are. Well, they only really exist as PowerPoint slides at the moment. Can we get them to C in nine years?
11:20
11:21
11:21
11:21
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
That's this fleet is, uh, so as I understand it, will provide the air defence capabilities that the current destroyer fleet provides. It will also provide some anti-submarine options. And there are, you know, sensor ships and missile ships and above surface and below surface or, you know, an autonomous fleet. Uh, so, and there's a reason why we've, we're sort of bringing autonomy to the maritime domain last, because that's the most difficult domain. Um, so you said earlier you were very confident that we could get this, this five classes of ship, give or take to sea in nine years.
Why are you very confident about that?
Why are you very confident about that?
11:22
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Because I can see I can see the work that has been done. And I think what's really crucial here is I think, um, the, uh, I. Think it's firstly important to state is the importance of having this vision that the first sea Lord has for the hybrid Navy, um, which I agree, and it has taken that decision to prioritise what we believe are the technologies of the future, rather than doing a like for like replacement and um, of course. That brings with it a level of uncomfort, uh, which because of what we're used to seeing and, you know, be the same in the land and the air.
But I also think it's important to recognise that large parts of what we are trying to deliver already exist are being trialled. You know, when we one of the key enablers of the hybrid Navy will be, if you like, the software architecture that supports that, um, that's already being used in many different ways. And I'm sure you've seen how it's being used abroad as well. Um, and when I can see the progress that is being made there and what is capable, um, you know, I see that as a very, very credible delivery pipeline.
Um. Parts of what these uncrewed vessels have done are, you know, in trials, in production being used around the world, this might feel in many ways like a new capability, but it is developing so quickly, uh, that what?We might have thought impossible five, ten years ago. Is, is, is, is almost becoming obsolete because of how quickly we're moving within crude. And you're right that the, you know, maritime will present challenges in a way that the land won't. But again, all of these challenges are currently being met.
And it's about um. Delivering this at the scale and the interoperability that we require.
But I also think it's important to recognise that large parts of what we are trying to deliver already exist are being trialled. You know, when we one of the key enablers of the hybrid Navy will be, if you like, the software architecture that supports that, um, that's already being used in many different ways. And I'm sure you've seen how it's being used abroad as well. Um, and when I can see the progress that is being made there and what is capable, um, you know, I see that as a very, very credible delivery pipeline.
Um. Parts of what these uncrewed vessels have done are, you know, in trials, in production being used around the world, this might feel in many ways like a new capability, but it is developing so quickly, uh, that what?We might have thought impossible five, ten years ago. Is, is, is, is almost becoming obsolete because of how quickly we're moving within crude. And you're right that the, you know, maritime will present challenges in a way that the land won't. But again, all of these challenges are currently being met.
And it's about um. Delivering this at the scale and the interoperability that we require.
11:23
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
So I, I, I'm. I agree with you. Absolutely. We need to make the leap into this new world of autonomy. And, you know, no time like the present. So I do agree with that. Um, of course, I think you touched on this, um, the maritime domain is extremely difficult and particularly the North Atlantic and the high north is extremely difficult. Everything breaks at sea all the time. And that's why you need people because they fix stuff.
MM. So you know, it is a risk. I think we can agree there's a risk there. Uh, and one way of de-risking that would be to properly fund the program. So if we look at the dip, only £1.3 billion has been allocated to this hybrid Navy project. The rest of it is beyond 2030 needs to be confirmed in the next spending review. So effectively it's unfunded. So do you think 1.3 billion is enough to do the design and development work for five classes of ship?
MM. So you know, it is a risk. I think we can agree there's a risk there. Uh, and one way of de-risking that would be to properly fund the program. So if we look at the dip, only £1.3 billion has been allocated to this hybrid Navy project. The rest of it is beyond 2030 needs to be confirmed in the next spending review. So effectively it's unfunded. So do you think 1.3 billion is enough to do the design and development work for five classes of ship?
11:25
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah. You know, I think it's important to state the significant sums, um, that are going into this and uncrewed in general, which will have a lot of utility across maritime as well. Um, of course, uh, we know the targets that we have to meet 3.5% by 2035. The spending review will set out the process to, um, get to get towards 3%. Um, the, the demands on what we need to spend, you know, are really well recognised to meet the threats that we face.
Um, and I would say, you know, when we are pushing ahead with this, um, and the funding we need at this stage, um, we noting what capabilities already exist. I think we can make really huge strides in delivering what we need to, to get after in the uncrewed space. Um, and it, you know, it may be that the conversations are different in 2030, 20, 35 again.
Um, and I would say, you know, when we are pushing ahead with this, um, and the funding we need at this stage, um, we noting what capabilities already exist. I think we can make really huge strides in delivering what we need to, to get after in the uncrewed space. Um, and it, you know, it may be that the conversations are different in 2030, 20, 35 again.
11:26
11:26
11:26
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Yeah. So so the first thing I'd set out is I think we need to sort of we, we need to recharacterize what we're talking about, uh, in the future. We're not talking about sort of ships as we would necessarily recognize them today. We're talking about uncrewed systems that, because they don't have a crew, can be much, much smaller, but they also, um, tend to be more specialized. So they will do one thing rather than a whole fleet of inappropriate term, a whole raft.
I can't think of another term, a whole range of activities. Yeah. Um, and so therefore they can be smaller. Um and therefore easier to manufacture, um cheaper to manufacture, so on and so forth.
I can't think of another term, a whole range of activities. Yeah. Um, and so therefore they can be smaller. Um and therefore easier to manufacture, um cheaper to manufacture, so on and so forth.
11:27
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Yes. But the next point I come to is you're probably talking about three different types of, of vessel. You're talking about a crewed vessel that looks largely like something you'd recognize today. You're talking uncrewed, which is sort of, um, still quite a large thing, but it supports a whole collection of autonomous. Things. Um, and there are already in the world autonomous air defense capabilities that are very. Very cheap by comparison, because effectively they're just a platform that detects and launches.
Um, and therefore, um, compared to the actual ship, um, you're talking something that's very small. Um, and it is accepted that a number of them will be lost either because they, um, they do their job and then they run out of ammunition or they are um, they're. Choice is to go and destroy something in their own right. So they cease.
Um, and therefore, um, compared to the actual ship, um, you're talking something that's very small. Um, and it is accepted that a number of them will be lost either because they, um, they do their job and then they run out of ammunition or they are um, they're. Choice is to go and destroy something in their own right. So they cease.
11:28
11:28
11:28
11:28
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Okay. So, so certainly, um, in the air environment, there are one way attack drones. Yeah. Um, they still um exist, but you. Don't build a one way attack drone to be able to fly thousands and thousands of hours. You design it to fly six hours. I get that the same. Is it the same is true to a certain extent in the maritime environment. Because if you've just got a, a launcher that is that has a very single purpose, you're not going to design it to be able to survive for years on end at sea.
11:29
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
So one of the advantages of having an uncrewed missile platform at sea is that you can carry your magazine depth is much greater, right?Because you don't need people, spaces for people, protection, all the rest of it, right?So you can have a much bigger magazine depth. The type 45 have, you know, they run out of missiles. So that means that your maritime logistics has to be much greater because you're going to be resupplying these things much more often. So can you point to me where in the dip we have funded the RFA to deliver those that vastly increased level of logistics to account for the greater magazine depth in the hybrid fleet.
11:30
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
So again, I would say, um, logistics is less about what we'd have recognized in the past in terms of, uh, a fleet of rfas available to resupply the fleet on an enduring basis. It's much more about a connected network that allows you to, to, to get the right piece of equipment to the right place at the right time. And that's particularly true of.
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11:31
11:31
11:31
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11:32
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
I don't have that on hand. Can come back to you on that. The other comment I thought I might make is on de-risking. So one of the ways we'll de-risk is by working with our allies on this. So, um, the Jeff Chiefs of Navy, um, are all talking to each other about future hybrid Navy. And we're talking to the Supreme Allied commander transformation at NATO. Lots of allies are going on a similar journey and we will learn from each other.
11:33
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
It'd be great if we could plug and play some of that stuff. Okay, a couple of quick fire ones, if I may. So. So we've just had these two frigates taken out of service. Um, we spent over 100 million didn't we, on refitting Iron Duke. Of years ago, I think the refit took longer than the payback of service. Can we just go through that?I mean, that does not seem like good value for money for the taxpayers.
Why was that decision made?How have we, you know, both to refit it and then to take it out of service?How do we end up in such a mess?
Why was that decision made?How have we, you know, both to refit it and then to take it out of service?How do we end up in such a mess?
11:34
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Well. Um, I'll speak to the decision that we have made, um, about Iron Duke of Richmond, um which is that it was it cost effective to keep those, um and um how did that fit with the effects that we need to have on our adversaries?And so we made the decision, um, that those two, uh, retire, you know, they've gone significantly, I think, beyond their original lifespan. Um, and, um, you know, as always with these things, it would have been good if we could have started five years ago and we'd be five years ahead of where we are now.
Um, but I can only speak to the decision that we've made.
Um, but I can only speak to the decision that we've made.
11:34
11:34
11:35
11:35
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
Yeah. Okay. Could you would you be able to write to the committee about why?You know, what was the. I assume it's hull strength because it ships. I mean, they're all well past their their dates. Okay. And then there was a, you know, same ship. We were going to fit a towed sonar array to Iron Duke as well. And that was sort of started and then abandoned. Could you tell the committee how much money was spent on that plan?That was started and abandoned?
11:36
11:36
11:36
11:36
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
For sure. But but I think, you know, it's important to recognize that the decision was made. Looking at the effect we need to have. Um, so I wouldn't want this to be read as we were going to have, you know, the capability provided by this. And now we don't, um, we've taken a view of what we need to have where working with allies to make sure that we have what we need to have.
11:37
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
Thank you. And then final question, please, Minister. You spoke very early on. You were very sure around, you know, the frigate numbers and having the right number of frigates for the for the threat. We have five frigates at the moment. Can you guarantee categorically that. 23 will be withdrawn from service until there is a replacement at sea in the form of a type 26?That is that there will be a one for one swap.
So frigate numbers will not go below five. Can you give that guarantee to the committee?
So frigate numbers will not go below five. Can you give that guarantee to the committee?
11:38
11:38
11:38
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11:39
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
As I'm sure you'd appreciate. It's multi-layered. Um, the capabilities that are provided by frigates again is, is complemented by our allies. And for me, it is right to be effects focused rather than platform focused. Um, and so we would make sure that we have the capability that we need to meet the threats that we face.
11:39
11:39
11:39
11:40
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Um, thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm sorry to have joined the meeting late. Um, Mr. K, you talked about the Defence investment plan. Um, bracketing frigates. Could you just explain a little bit about how the dip works in relation to the added capability that you're hoping to deploy in the high north, and what additional value does it give us as a nation over time?
11:40
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Um, if I may, um, uh, I brought up the dip figures, just to clarify, one that was particularly mentioned. Um, I think we have, uh, got a range of investments, uh, planned, which will help with the capability required in the high north. Um, I don't have that information immediately to hand, but let me.
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11:41
11:41
11:41
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
So the first thing I'd say is, um very little of our capability is specifically designed only for use in the high north. So, uh. Um, we've very rarely buy equipment that only can be used in one theatre. So while a lot of what is in the dip will be useful in the high north, um, there is very, very little in there where you would say that piece of capability is only usable in that region, which is why we're struggling to answer the question because it's so broad.
Almost everything in the dip could be applied to the high north if required.
Almost everything in the dip could be applied to the high north if required.
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11:42
11:42
11:42
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Think, I think that's a euphemism for a snow cat or something. So okay, that that's the kind of thing you're talking that clearly is, is, is bespoke to the high north. But that what we're trying not to do is focus all of our capability on one region or another because, um, even under our NATO requirements, we're expected to be able to operate across all three, um, areas of operations which could see us in the far south in a Mediterranean environment or in the high north. So what we would want to make sure is they can operate in the high north, but not that they're necessarily bespoke unless they have to be.
11:42
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
I mean, obviously, um, the way we've configured our Navy so far, over a hundred or more years has been in part a reflection of um, maritime. Challenges in the North Atlantic. And increasingly as the high north opens up there. Um, what change in doctrine is going alongside the fact that we are not deploying destroyers. We've changed towards a hybrid navy. How is that changing?How has your thinking changing alongside the way in which technology is changing?Do you think, for example, that we're unlikely to be deploying carrier strike groups, you know, in the high north now, because we've got these additional capabilities coming on stream?
11:43
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
I'd almost just the question is, is is reversed. I think the recognition that there is a different way to fight has led us to look at different capability options to deliver against how we intend to fight in the future. Um. In terms of your specific question on do I see us being less likely to deploy the the carrier to the high north?No, I don't think so. I think that sits within the Navy's concept of crewed uncrewed and and autonomous.
That just happens to be, um, a crewed element of it. I can see in the future that it will have far more autonomous, um, aircraft aboard. But in principle, I think the carrier is um, is just as useful in the high north in the next ten years as it is now.
That just happens to be, um, a crewed element of it. I can see in the future that it will have far more autonomous, um, aircraft aboard. But in principle, I think the carrier is um, is just as useful in the high north in the next ten years as it is now.
11:44
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Okay. And, and then, uh, I won't take us too long, but, um, if you're thinking about, obviously if we think about the way in which the US has changed its defence posture over the last ten years, a massive emphasis on Asia Pacific, uh, you know, increasingly tough attitude towards NATO, the defence of Europe are more theatre based view of defence. How do you think um, from a British perspective that plays out, we can't prioritise the high North as it opens up and not prioritise and also prioritise everything else.
Where where do you see the balance of our own deployments?
Where where do you see the balance of our own deployments?
11:44
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Well, this is where we where our alliances are so fundamental to everything we do. I mean the the geography involved is eye watering. I mean, the distance is the volumes of water. Are phenomenal. Uh, and therefore there is no way the UK is going to resolve any of these threats in its own right. Um, you know, our first capability, if you like, is NATO first. It is our, um, our commitment to multilateral and bilateral relations with, with nations that are critical to our own defence and security.
Therefore, we never have to make a binary decision between where we carry risk versus where we deploy capability.
Therefore, we never have to make a binary decision between where we carry risk versus where we deploy capability.
11:45
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
That's quite true. Is there any overseas territory start getting attacked, um, as it were, ancient possessions, commitments of ours. We're not going to we, you seem to me to be putting us in a position where we can either say, we're unquestionably going to defend these places, and yet we can't at the same time say that there are allies who will necessarily defend them. Is that right?
11:46
09:44
09:44
09:44
09:44
09:45
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
You. Question. But I've got the fantastic Commando logistic Regiment in my constituency of North Devon who deployed to the north every year for training. So given that the dip I likes an expansion of the commando force. Uh, but but expeditionary operations rely on robust logistics. How is the government investing in the CLR to ensure it can support the expanded force in demanding environments such as the North?The Dip specifically says about the North expanding the Commando regiment.
I think it's to a thousand or whatever it is.
I think it's to a thousand or whatever it is.
09:45
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
So so the actual, um, uh, commitment is to double our presence in the high North for training annually from 1000 to 2000. That is just an increase in the number of people who go from the standing force is not an increase in the scale of the Royal Marines in order to deliver against that specific task by 1000 people, there will be clearly a greater demand on the Commando logistic regiment because they've doubled the number of mouths to feed, if nothing else. Um, and therefore, um, I can only assume that the fleet commander who's coming to speak to you this afternoon would be able to explain how he can allocate resource to the Commando logistic regiment, specifically in order to achieve that increased burden, I would.
Assume. Be a question for him that the Commando Logistic Regiment is resourced um to, uh, to support and sustain the entire commando force, because that is, after all its purpose. So therefore, in theory it should be set in camp capable of doing that role already. I imagine there's a there's a capability uplift, um, that. May be required alongside that, but in terms of its scale, it should already be. I would, I would imagine, capable of doing that. But I don't know the specifics, I'm afraid.
Assume. Be a question for him that the Commando Logistic Regiment is resourced um to, uh, to support and sustain the entire commando force, because that is, after all its purpose. So therefore, in theory it should be set in camp capable of doing that role already. I imagine there's a there's a capability uplift, um, that. May be required alongside that, but in terms of its scale, it should already be. I would, I would imagine, capable of doing that. But I don't know the specifics, I'm afraid.
09:45
09:45
09:45
09:45
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Um, okay, but I bet the water's still as cold, isn't it?Um, so, um, thanks for highlighting. No, I always say, um, amateurs talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics. So you're absolutely right to hone in on, on that aspect. Um, and I, you know, every single lesson from war that we look at is having the logistics train. And we've, we've touched on that. Um, the logistics burden tends to come from, uh, from missiles and ammunition for heavier platforms like artillery.
So that, that affects the kind of demands that the commando logistics would, would expect to face, um, as, as being towards the lighter end of forces. Um, I don't know the specifics, but I would imagine that the future all terrain vehicle would be very welcome to the regiment for the capabilities that, that will bring. Um, and um, I think for me, looking at the vision and the size of the investment, we're making the commando force and, um, quite a clear focus as well. I think we have for them, I think it's got a really fantastic bright future.
So that, that affects the kind of demands that the commando logistics would, would expect to face, um, as, as being towards the lighter end of forces. Um, I don't know the specifics, but I would imagine that the future all terrain vehicle would be very welcome to the regiment for the capabilities that, that will bring. Um, and um, I think for me, looking at the vision and the size of the investment, we're making the commando force and, um, quite a clear focus as well. I think we have for them, I think it's got a really fantastic bright future.
09:45
09:45
09:45
09:45
09:45
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think just in general, and then, um, I might throw to Brigadier Lamb, if I may, um, which is. Um, I think that Jeff has been very successful so far in, in the activity that it's been able to generate and the interoperability that it's gained. And I would like to see it continuing to go from strength to strength. Um, it will always have, I think more of that focus on capacity building rather than specifically the conduct of operations. But if I, if I turn to.
09:45
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Uh, so the Jeff doesn't have a standing force, it. It is built for each activity. So nations commit forces, uh, in order to achieve each aim. So, um, this wouldn't. Be a case of creating more capability for the. Jeff. It would be sovereign nations own capability that was then merged into delivery for the. Jeff. If the Jeff was to start to, uh, take on slightly different types of mission, that would probably be, um, an agenda item for the next, um, either defence ministers or leaders meeting.
Um, uh, in order to determine what collectively the organisation feels is appropriate for the Jeff to undertake. Um, so I, I think it sits at that level rather than a question of specifically resourcing the. Jeff.
Um, uh, in order to determine what collectively the organisation feels is appropriate for the Jeff to undertake. Um, so I, I think it sits at that level rather than a question of specifically resourcing the. Jeff.
09:45
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Right. Okay. And Minister, lastly, you'll be aware that one of the previous recommendations from the committee in terms of high North operations in particular, but, uh, more widely, is that holes need to be hardened, uh, for our vessels, but for high north operations. Do you actually agree that under Ice operations are not just some nice to have?Niche capability, but they're actually essential for all submarines that operate there.
09:46
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So, um, I think I just careful here before I start touching the, the bounds of classification. Um, but, um, absolutely we need to be able to operate where we need to operate. Um, and with the high north, that would obviously include different. I don't know what the technical term is. Sea states. Is that the technical term. And um and the different effects that we need to have, need to be able to operate there, but I don't want to dig in too much to the specifics.
09:46