National Resilience Committee
Thursday 16th July 2026
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10:57
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Infrastructure parts, and those are regulated and we deal in a very different way with them than we would with small and medium sized enterprises. So you have to sort of cut up the private sector label into something a bit more manageable and make sure that you get information and advice at the range at which they can sensibly use it. So I think that's probably the first thing I'd say. Um, we've um, particularly out in the aftermath of the, um, the war in the Middle East and the problems that that has created, we've, we've, we've had meetings in cobr of the Middle East response, um, committee Merck, as it's known, official and um, ministerial levels and that's looked at in, in a great, um, sort of detail using, uh, local government department leads on what the supply chain issues are in different sectors, um, where there might be critical shortages or effects, um, take one off the top of my head from my previous job at Defra.
Um, fertiliser is a huge issue. Um, not particularly for us, but global prices going up because um a lot of, of it goes through the Straits of Hormuz. We had particular issues with supply of CO2, which is very important, uh, for in the food sector, in the food manufacturing sector and in the primary sector, because they use it to kill livestock. So there's a range of things that we have discovered because we've been doing this work as to where our critical bottlenecks and, and, and, uh, sort of weak points are.
And so, uh, there's now a supply chains. Um, uh, sort of committee in the DBT so that they're looking at what they can do to make sure that we're never going to run short of the things that are very critical, um, that you might not think about, be it CO2 or carbon or, or phosphorous or whatever, these basic chemicals that everybody's forgotten that we need, that you shouldn't need realise are at the centre of supply chains. Um, and so. As we work through these things, we get more and more information about um.
These scenarios and what we can do to increase our resilience. And that is a key part dealing with the private sector. They had a lot of information about what they need in their supply chains. We need to understand their supply chains so that we can see what's critical. So the, the sort of cooperation and collaboration with private sector is absolutely crucial to getting this right.
Um, fertiliser is a huge issue. Um, not particularly for us, but global prices going up because um a lot of, of it goes through the Straits of Hormuz. We had particular issues with supply of CO2, which is very important, uh, for in the food sector, in the food manufacturing sector and in the primary sector, because they use it to kill livestock. So there's a range of things that we have discovered because we've been doing this work as to where our critical bottlenecks and, and, and, uh, sort of weak points are.
And so, uh, there's now a supply chains. Um, uh, sort of committee in the DBT so that they're looking at what they can do to make sure that we're never going to run short of the things that are very critical, um, that you might not think about, be it CO2 or carbon or, or phosphorous or whatever, these basic chemicals that everybody's forgotten that we need, that you shouldn't need realise are at the centre of supply chains. Um, and so. As we work through these things, we get more and more information about um.
These scenarios and what we can do to increase our resilience. And that is a key part dealing with the private sector. They had a lot of information about what they need in their supply chains. We need to understand their supply chains so that we can see what's critical. So the, the sort of cooperation and collaboration with private sector is absolutely crucial to getting this right.
10:59
10:59
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
A very quick question. Um we learnt at one of the evidence sessions that we have, we no longer produce antibiotics for example. Um and I know that um securing supply chains and all of that is really, really important, but are there not certain things that we should be actually, you know, uh, manufacturing or producing at home because we do have, um, the expertise there. We have pharmaceutical companies. So I mean, I would have thought that's actually a very.
11:00
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, I mean, uh, antimicrobial resistance, for example, is one of our, is a, is a, is a critical threat that we keep a very close eye on. And I think we've just, we've just published a, a a, a. Uh. Some, um, information about how we might deal with that. I agree with you that we need to think about home production. Um, and in fact, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister has just announced that we have a vaccine production factory, which we can rely on.
If there was another pandemic. And I a production centre. But we've got to make decisions about. We can't produce absolutely everything on our own land. Um, we also have a duty to make sure that things like antibiotics are available in other areas of the globe. So we've got to make sort of strategic decisions about whether we try to, um, uh, bring. Back to our country, uh, the actual production of those or whether we do deals with the pharmaceutical industry, which produces all over the world, um, to ensure that we have supplies when we need them.
Um, but clearly, uh, the battle that there was for a Covid vaccine, um, during that time had some lessons to teach us. So we got to get the balance right, I think, and have plans if things happen to make sure that we are, um, that we are resilient to shortages.
If there was another pandemic. And I a production centre. But we've got to make decisions about. We can't produce absolutely everything on our own land. Um, we also have a duty to make sure that things like antibiotics are available in other areas of the globe. So we've got to make sort of strategic decisions about whether we try to, um, uh, bring. Back to our country, uh, the actual production of those or whether we do deals with the pharmaceutical industry, which produces all over the world, um, to ensure that we have supplies when we need them.
Um, but clearly, uh, the battle that there was for a Covid vaccine, um, during that time had some lessons to teach us. So we got to get the balance right, I think, and have plans if things happen to make sure that we are, um, that we are resilient to shortages.
11:01
11:01
11:02
11:02
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, I mean, I didn't say that. I said. didn't you know, I said that we're aware of these risks. Um, that we've certainly, um, made sure that we have production facilities in the UK for vaccines. And clearly we keep a very careful eye on what other things we, we might need. We've all seen what happened post-Brexit with supply of um important medicines. And we've got to learn a lot about these supply chains. The other side of the coin is if you centralize the supply, the manufacturer of all of these things to the richer nations, it makes it very difficult then to have a global supply.
So there's a balance, right?There's a balance.
So there's a balance, right?There's a balance.
11:03
11:03
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Tactical operational terms. It's night and day compared to say where it was five years ago. In terms of our understanding of these things and. In many respects, dealing with the kind of policy problems that you're describing requires us first to have that understanding of where the vulnerabilities lie. And now we understand that much more clearly, like the, the Middle East experience is really interesting because we were able on day one to put in front of people immediately the effects of what we were seeing and what it meant.
Whereas if you compare that to even like Russia, Ukraine, it took time for some of the problems to emerge and become apparent, even for businesses themselves. And the work that we are doing, uh, is really helpful. On that front, we have something called CNI knowledge Base, which is effectively a map of the UK's critical infrastructure, not just physical assets, but also ownership and other dependencies. So the clarity of our sense of what what's going on is, is just profoundly different. And better still leaves those policy challenges.
We are ultimately on the receiving end of other decisions, but those decisions are made for other good policy reasons. There are lots of reasons why it might make sense to have more internationally diverse supply chains. It might make them more resilient in other circumstances, or it might reduce the costs, which means day to day you get better results, even if in emergencies, things are more difficult and it's quite difficult to interfere with all of those choices purely from a resilience perspective, because that's one narrow look at.
Things. What we are trying to do is make sure that where people make choices about government intervention or businesses make choice about their international supply chains, they've got the best possible information about what the risks are and what might go wrong. So just altering the balance slightly between just in time, just in case, that sort of thing.
Whereas if you compare that to even like Russia, Ukraine, it took time for some of the problems to emerge and become apparent, even for businesses themselves. And the work that we are doing, uh, is really helpful. On that front, we have something called CNI knowledge Base, which is effectively a map of the UK's critical infrastructure, not just physical assets, but also ownership and other dependencies. So the clarity of our sense of what what's going on is, is just profoundly different. And better still leaves those policy challenges.
We are ultimately on the receiving end of other decisions, but those decisions are made for other good policy reasons. There are lots of reasons why it might make sense to have more internationally diverse supply chains. It might make them more resilient in other circumstances, or it might reduce the costs, which means day to day you get better results, even if in emergencies, things are more difficult and it's quite difficult to interfere with all of those choices purely from a resilience perspective, because that's one narrow look at.
Things. What we are trying to do is make sure that where people make choices about government intervention or businesses make choice about their international supply chains, they've got the best possible information about what the risks are and what might go wrong. So just altering the balance slightly between just in time, just in case, that sort of thing.
11:04
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
And by the way, just to give you an insight, um, the, when, when I was at Defra and the Merc set up, um, we were having Cobra gathering this information, but also I was having round tables with all of the stakeholders in the agricultural supply industry who told me exactly what was happening with fertiliser prices, where they got them from, what they were worried about, what they might be short of. They talked about phosphorus and various other things. And so I was able to have really detailed conversations in a round table with the people that do the, the actual work in, in the private sector and then feed that back.
So it was actually a very, very good and thorough approach that I, that I thought worked really well.
So it was actually a very, very good and thorough approach that I, that I thought worked really well.
11:05
11:05
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Um and so following on from what you've just said in terms of the, of, of understanding something which is fast moving and extremely risky. And that's the challenges of, of cyber risk enhanced by AI. And so, um, what I'm asking is about how the government's enhancing its approach to these serious risks that the country faces. Um, now some of it is obviously to do with disinformation and so on and undermining the very trust that we need to build in order to implement some of the things that you're talking about.
The other is the the catastrophic risks that are all interconnected as a result of cyber attacks. Now, we're dealing at the moment with the Cyber Security Act in the Lords, and we've received evidence to this committee, um, that that the legislation is too limited, um, that the EU regulations take a whole of economy approach, including manufacturing, public administration, and food production. And so, for example, the attacks on JLR and Marks and Spencers wouldn't be in scope of the regulations under the under the bill that we're looking at at the moment.
And we've also received evidence saying that voluntary codes of practice sitting alongside those regulations are insufficient. Um, you've talked about risks being multi cascading. And so therefore what I would like to ask is how you how you hope to take this forward. It sounds as if we are already out of date in the legislation. We're looking at. What can we do to address that?What can we do in terms of insurance?How do we make sure that all the relevant areas are actually seriously addressing this, not just advice, which they which they clearly at the moment are not fully taking up, given that, as we have been told in our evidence, it's not whether attacks will occur, but when.
Including on SMEs. Yeah.
The other is the the catastrophic risks that are all interconnected as a result of cyber attacks. Now, we're dealing at the moment with the Cyber Security Act in the Lords, and we've received evidence to this committee, um, that that the legislation is too limited, um, that the EU regulations take a whole of economy approach, including manufacturing, public administration, and food production. And so, for example, the attacks on JLR and Marks and Spencers wouldn't be in scope of the regulations under the under the bill that we're looking at at the moment.
And we've also received evidence saying that voluntary codes of practice sitting alongside those regulations are insufficient. Um, you've talked about risks being multi cascading. And so therefore what I would like to ask is how you how you hope to take this forward. It sounds as if we are already out of date in the legislation. We're looking at. What can we do to address that?What can we do in terms of insurance?How do we make sure that all the relevant areas are actually seriously addressing this, not just advice, which they which they clearly at the moment are not fully taking up, given that, as we have been told in our evidence, it's not whether attacks will occur, but when.
Including on SMEs. Yeah.
11:07
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, I'd like to separate out your comments about information, misinformation and disinformation, which is a social media issue. And it's a serious issue, don't get me wrong, but it's slightly different to the cyber attack issue. Um, and we need to look at both of those threats in a slightly different way. I think, um, just to give you an idea of the scale, um, the number of nationally significant cyber incidents more than doubled in the last year with the National Cyber Security Centre handled 200 nationally, significant incidents and the cost to business, um per business of, of that is about 100 and 195 000.
That's 15 billion a year. We know that the attack on Jaguar Land Rover actually affected our GDP. Um, because it shut down production completely. Um, our view to begin with is that, uh, that some of the best ways to deal with this are actually what we call basics, doing the basics and housekeeping. So get the basics right first and then keep it up to date. Um, and we are, um, we are sort of doing a lot of work in terms of trying to get information out there, um, about how for companies of all sizes to do the basics and then, uh, do the housekeeping.
Um, so we are also doing work to make the internet automatically safer. Um, and building basic protections to benefit all UK businesses into those networks. So we're trying to put that, make that as automatic as possible. Um, but we need business to lead the way in their own areas. Firstly, by taking this seriously, by making sure that someone who's high up the company takes, um, takes, responsibility for making sure it's right. And then we've got a whole range of, um, practices and best practice that we are getting out there in terms of, um.
Cyber security. Um, the anthropic AI threat. Um, we are dealing with, um, with the AI safety, uh, centre, the institute there, which is world leading. Uh, and there's a lot of very good work going on there. Um, I don't know, uh, we have a, a national cyber action plan, which is due to be published very soon, probably, probably now after summer. Um, but that will, um, enable best practice to happen. Um, I don't know whether you want to deal in detail with some of the work we're doing with the cyber certificate.
That's 15 billion a year. We know that the attack on Jaguar Land Rover actually affected our GDP. Um, because it shut down production completely. Um, our view to begin with is that, uh, that some of the best ways to deal with this are actually what we call basics, doing the basics and housekeeping. So get the basics right first and then keep it up to date. Um, and we are, um, we are sort of doing a lot of work in terms of trying to get information out there, um, about how for companies of all sizes to do the basics and then, uh, do the housekeeping.
Um, so we are also doing work to make the internet automatically safer. Um, and building basic protections to benefit all UK businesses into those networks. So we're trying to put that, make that as automatic as possible. Um, but we need business to lead the way in their own areas. Firstly, by taking this seriously, by making sure that someone who's high up the company takes, um, takes, responsibility for making sure it's right. And then we've got a whole range of, um, practices and best practice that we are getting out there in terms of, um.
Cyber security. Um, the anthropic AI threat. Um, we are dealing with, um, with the AI safety, uh, centre, the institute there, which is world leading. Uh, and there's a lot of very good work going on there. Um, I don't know, uh, we have a, a national cyber action plan, which is due to be published very soon, probably, probably now after summer. Um, but that will, um, enable best practice to happen. Um, I don't know whether you want to deal in detail with some of the work we're doing with the cyber certificate.
11:10
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
And yeah, I, I. Think it's. It's quite striking the extent to which perspectives are changing rapidly on this. Even from my personal perspective, I used to get invited to far fewer sort of business type events rather than other more resilience focused events. And since JLR and Marks and Spencer, I just get a steady stream of invites. And it's sometimes the case that when you have an emergency, the emergency itself is the signal to people, and you can tell them as much as you want in the planning phase or in abstract, and it's only when they see it in front of them that they change their perspectives.
To say that lots of businesses weren't doing something. It's just that that sort of supercharges interest. And we've got a model which is largely built on advice rather than mandation. But there are some really strong incentives there. I mean, the the my colleagues in the National Cyber Security Centre do lots of excellent work putting advice out there. But if you talk to them, they don't they don't expect people to do something incredibly fancy. They're saying, just do the cyber essentials.
Firewall, secure configuration, user access controls, malware protection and software updates. Those are things that people see ordinarily at work and so forth. These are these are not huge and complicated things. Many businesses choose not to do them. Those that do, uh, are far less likely to claim on insurance, massively less likely to claim on insurance for cyber incidents. They may get other benefits in terms of their day to day operations. They may get reduced insurance premiums, so on and so forth.
But this is a choice for organisations. And in the same way that we don't prescribe people's physical security, we don't prescribe cyber security. In most instances, the question should we do more on that front?Actually, there's a there's a kind of political choice there about the extent to which government takes responsibility for the conduct of business, or whether the incentives are strong and clear enough for business to take its own action. And that's.
To say that lots of businesses weren't doing something. It's just that that sort of supercharges interest. And we've got a model which is largely built on advice rather than mandation. But there are some really strong incentives there. I mean, the the my colleagues in the National Cyber Security Centre do lots of excellent work putting advice out there. But if you talk to them, they don't they don't expect people to do something incredibly fancy. They're saying, just do the cyber essentials.
Firewall, secure configuration, user access controls, malware protection and software updates. Those are things that people see ordinarily at work and so forth. These are these are not huge and complicated things. Many businesses choose not to do them. Those that do, uh, are far less likely to claim on insurance, massively less likely to claim on insurance for cyber incidents. They may get other benefits in terms of their day to day operations. They may get reduced insurance premiums, so on and so forth.
But this is a choice for organisations. And in the same way that we don't prescribe people's physical security, we don't prescribe cyber security. In most instances, the question should we do more on that front?Actually, there's a there's a kind of political choice there about the extent to which government takes responsibility for the conduct of business, or whether the incentives are strong and clear enough for business to take its own action. And that's.
11:12
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
I think also, I mean, we're we're investing 90 million to provide a range of free guidance tools and training to help businesses and organisations improve their cyber resilience. So there's a cyber action toolkit, which helps small businesses to take the first steps to protect themselves. There's this cyber essentials, um, almost like certificate, which if you, if you put the basics in place and protect yourself, can, as was just said, lead to lower insurance premiums. And anyway, massively decrease your likelihood of suffering from an attack.
Uh, and there's a cyber governance code of practice to help boards and directors manage their digital risks more effectively. So this is an issue that because of the up, you know, the, the, the very high profile recent events, I think there's a lot more interest in and, and it's a pity that it had to be in high profile event that caused it, but it's a good thing that there is more interest in this. And we are trying to facilitate it as much as possible.
Uh, and there's a cyber governance code of practice to help boards and directors manage their digital risks more effectively. So this is an issue that because of the up, you know, the, the, the very high profile recent events, I think there's a lot more interest in and, and it's a pity that it had to be in high profile event that caused it, but it's a good thing that there is more interest in this. And we are trying to facilitate it as much as possible.
11:13
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Thank you. Now we've got very quick supplementaries from Lady Paul and Lord Oates, so I suggest they we hear from both of them first, then you can answer both together. And because I just need to remind colleagues, please, that we're only halfway through the questions, but we're way more than halfway through the time that we've got our witnesses for. So much. So quick supplementaries on the cyber issue then please first.
11:14
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
So I suppose mine was more, you mentioned Incentivization and the idea that really, you know, it's up to businesses themselves to find their own way through some of this. The guidance is there. However, when the cost is borne, then by the taxpayer, because we have to step in and we have to make loans or in, you know, in more catastrophic events, we may have to come up with other things. I do think that that that that's a problem for us. And I think the cost of who pays is, is a really important question.
And I, I do think that we need to think more about incentivization of people to take up insurance and on cyber essentials plus or cyber essentials, which I understand is if everybody takes up basic and they do it to a really high level, that will be helpful. We'll all come up across the board, but take up is so low, it's so small, so low, that I think I think my question is, what are we going to do to change behaviour?Because what we're doing right now is not having the desired effects that we want to have in order, increasing the cyber resilience that we have.
And I, I do think that we need to think more about incentivization of people to take up insurance and on cyber essentials plus or cyber essentials, which I understand is if everybody takes up basic and they do it to a really high level, that will be helpful. We'll all come up across the board, but take up is so low, it's so small, so low, that I think I think my question is, what are we going to do to change behaviour?Because what we're doing right now is not having the desired effects that we want to have in order, increasing the cyber resilience that we have.
11:14
11:15
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Yes, it relates really, um, you know, in the financial, um services arena, you'll be aware that in order to avoid systemic risk, um firms are, are required to um, run into. Stress tests, um against um the material risks unique to their businesses and that that's then evaluated by the prudential regulation authority. Um, do you think there is a potential to learn some lessons of that, particularly given the comments you made Minister, about the impact on GDP, for instance, of JLR and the comments that, um, Lady Paul has made, um, of actually having a more robust system and drawing on those lessons from the financial services industry.
11:15
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
I think we're literally on the cusp of, um, much more, uh. Understanding of the risks that this presents because of the high profile hacks that we've seen in the last year. Um, I think the business, the chancellor, the business and tech secretary have written and the heads of the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Crime Agency have written to all CEOs and FTSE 350 companies imploring those businesses to recognise the threat that's facing them and do something about it. We can tell them what to do if they want to ask us, or they can hire their own people.
Um, and I, I just think we are at the beginning of there being a much more robust, um, response in business to this. Uh, there's always lessons that can be learned. Uh, it to your issue about the financial services sector. I mean, it is one of the most obviously targeted areas. And so they'll have expertise. At the moment, we want to do it voluntarily. It's a very different thing to shift to total regulation across the entire sector.
There are regulations in the critical infrastructure, but. There's an issue there about precisely what's going to work. The best.
Um, and I, I just think we are at the beginning of there being a much more robust, um, response in business to this. Uh, there's always lessons that can be learned. Uh, it to your issue about the financial services sector. I mean, it is one of the most obviously targeted areas. And so they'll have expertise. At the moment, we want to do it voluntarily. It's a very different thing to shift to total regulation across the entire sector.
There are regulations in the critical infrastructure, but. There's an issue there about precisely what's going to work. The best.
11:17
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
I. Think goes back to the minister's answer about different parts of the private sector. Financial services is very heavily regulated for critical infrastructure. And those regulated bits of the economy. It. There are much clearer demands and expectations around cyber protection. And we have more active debates because there are more levers available to government. It is very difficult for government to fix the individual cyber security inadequacies of a million small businesses. Um, but their advice is, is the main vehicle.
What's interesting is what we do with the largest businesses. And I think there's a policy question about whether it's government's job to run Jaguar Land Rover well and get them to ensure they've got the right cyber security, or whether they're the wrong example because they've been through it. But a big company like should it be for government to fix that?Or does the company fix it itself?We come back to the question of who bears the cost if it goes wrong for the company, it's it's.
A policy question rather than an operational one. From our perspective about how our government interferes in the running or, you know, effective or otherwise of a private companies.
What's interesting is what we do with the largest businesses. And I think there's a policy question about whether it's government's job to run Jaguar Land Rover well and get them to ensure they've got the right cyber security, or whether they're the wrong example because they've been through it. But a big company like should it be for government to fix that?Or does the company fix it itself?We come back to the question of who bears the cost if it goes wrong for the company, it's it's.
A policy question rather than an operational one. From our perspective about how our government interferes in the running or, you know, effective or otherwise of a private companies.
11:19
11:19
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
Can I first say how very, very pleased I am to see Dame Angela in her new role?Um, she and I worked together, I'm afraid, many years ago. Angela. Our age very. Yeah. Um, in the foot and mouth crisis and in the fuel crisis. So this is somebody with considerable expertise and a long, long interest in this area. So I'm delighted that you're here. And I hope the new Prime Minister takes note of that as well.
Uh, we are interested in the media landscape here and communications. Um, and, and the changing nature of the, of, of the landscape. Only 50% of people now get their, their news from the national broadcasters. Uh, there's a massive decline in trust in politicians in mainstream media. Um, so. How would you, I mean, I know the chief secretary and that made this announcement about starting the national conversation. How are we going to have the national conversation in this new media landscape?And secondly, how would we communicate with people if the, you know, if there were power outages and, you know, um, just inability to communicate.
Uh, we are interested in the media landscape here and communications. Um, and, and the changing nature of the, of, of the landscape. Only 50% of people now get their, their news from the national broadcasters. Uh, there's a massive decline in trust in politicians in mainstream media. Um, so. How would you, I mean, I know the chief secretary and that made this announcement about starting the national conversation. How are we going to have the national conversation in this new media landscape?And secondly, how would we communicate with people if the, you know, if there were power outages and, you know, um, just inability to communicate.
11:21
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Uh, well, thank you for the, for reminding me of how long we've both been, um, in. This place, um, I, I think it's absolutely true. Resilience is about, uh, the way trust in society and trust in the institutions works, um, as well as what we actually plan to do. So the less trust, the more fragmented nature of our society, uh, the harder it is to get resilience. And so I, for one, um, thinking back to pre foot and mouth times all those years ago, uh, wouldn't have ever anticipated that we would have, uh, the vaccines.
Skepticism we have, uh, that we would have the, um, dis and misinformation being believed so much. And it does come over on the doorstep when I go out canvassing in various places. Um, that people actually believe a lot of this stuff. Um, because they've got it from a different, in fact, they don't trust the BBC and they don't trust our national broadcasters. So they get their information from other places, uh, with, with no bona fides at all. So we recognise that there is, um, a fragmentation, um problem and we are going to try to take account of that in the way that we get our messages out.
We are not going to put a pamphlet out to everybody's um. Household telling them what they ought to do. There is stuff already, um on gov.uk/prepare if you want to have a look at that.
Skepticism we have, uh, that we would have the, um, dis and misinformation being believed so much. And it does come over on the doorstep when I go out canvassing in various places. Um, that people actually believe a lot of this stuff. Um, because they've got it from a different, in fact, they don't trust the BBC and they don't trust our national broadcasters. So they get their information from other places, uh, with, with no bona fides at all. So we recognise that there is, um, a fragmentation, um problem and we are going to try to take account of that in the way that we get our messages out.
We are not going to put a pamphlet out to everybody's um. Household telling them what they ought to do. There is stuff already, um on gov.uk/prepare if you want to have a look at that.
11:22
11:22
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
No. And so we are, we are going to be pushing people to that. But we're also going to be trying to get messages across about what people can do in, in situations to ensure that, uh, for example, they have a 72 hour supply of water batteries, wind up radios or battery radios, and we will be able to broadcast on certain in certain ways. If there was a problem. We have the national alert scheme, which goes to people's phones. We want people to make certain that they've got um food.
Um. A first aid kit, if they're on particular drugs to make sure they've got enough of a supply for three days or a week. Um, and so there are practical things like that, but I absolutely accept, um, that we are in a period where trust in institutions is low, where people are not likely to listen, but there, the, in many ways, they're the ones that complain a lot. There's an awful lot of silent people out there that, that, that will take this information and do things with it.
I think that that that will make us more resilient. Um, if I could wave a magic wand and make our society, uh, less fragmented and, uh, trust in institutions return, then I would do it. Um, but we've got to make sure that we communicate with people in a place where they are in a way that they can take seriously.
Um. A first aid kit, if they're on particular drugs to make sure they've got enough of a supply for three days or a week. Um, and so there are practical things like that, but I absolutely accept, um, that we are in a period where trust in institutions is low, where people are not likely to listen, but there, the, in many ways, they're the ones that complain a lot. There's an awful lot of silent people out there that, that, that will take this information and do things with it.
I think that that that will make us more resilient. Um, if I could wave a magic wand and make our society, uh, less fragmented and, uh, trust in institutions return, then I would do it. Um, but we've got to make sure that we communicate with people in a place where they are in a way that they can take seriously.
11:23
11:24
11:24
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
On the specific point about communication in emergencies and ministers mentioned emergency alerts, that's a very effective system. Um, but a good example of something about which there's a lot of debate in relation to its utility. Would we ever use it. And 1 in 6 of the population have received an emergency alert in a life saving situation now. So we do make use of those systems. We have the arrangements with broadcasters to put out emergency broadcasts, absent power and so forth.
So there is a lot that we have in place that you don't necessarily see because we don't use it day to day, but.
So there is a lot that we have in place that you don't necessarily see because we don't use it day to day, but.
11:24
11:24
11:25
11:25
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
It does. And I want to focus in many ways more on the message than the mechanics, although I accept the mechanics are important and how the Cabinet Office, for example, is working across government to make resilience, education, training and exercising more formal and robust, including schools, senior leaders, organisations responsible for critical services. But behind that is we have to decide what the message is and who is deciding what the what, what what the message is at different, maybe, maybe at different levels. Where's the centre of gravity in this, in this whole position, who are working out the extent to which we make people aware of the threat that we're facing, and also, um, what they, what they can do, but also what the state is doing in order to help them.
But how are we phrasing that?Um, how are we using, you know, those, those who use social media, but also those who can actually think in tabloid, you know, we're not asking, we're not asking people to write a times article. We want people who can write the front page of the sun and the mirror in order to be able to get that, get that message across. Where was the where's the centre for all of that?The focus of all of that, that's really a political question.
But how are we phrasing that?Um, how are we using, you know, those, those who use social media, but also those who can actually think in tabloid, you know, we're not asking, we're not asking people to write a times article. We want people who can write the front page of the sun and the mirror in order to be able to get that, get that message across. Where was the where's the centre for all of that?The focus of all of that, that's really a political question.
11:26
11:26
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Um, the campaign that we put out in the autumn is being finalized now, as the minister said. But a really important part of that has been a period where we've carried out a lot of research with the public, a lot of focus groups and other targeted activity to understand what the public appreciate and what messages will connect with them effectively.
11:26
11:26
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Yes. So this tells us lots of interesting things. So for example, on message carrying, we started off thinking it would be really helpful if the message did not come from government, because people do not always trust the government. As much as I might like. But, um, and so we've got 30 or 40 civil society organisations who will take part in our campaign already signed up to it. But when we talk to the public, they were much clearer that on this topic, this was something they did want to hear from the government on.
So we will elevate the government role. We've tested different framing of the messages to the public. Does a message that is about being ready, which focuses on the kind of incident itself make more sense, or should we have something which is more about people playing their part, which can include both emergency response and a wider contribution?Going back to the earlier points on the role of the voluntary sector, or do we want something that's very mechanical, like 72 hours, and that being the focus of it is it is saying in Finland, um, so we tested all those points as well.
And we're just we will provide advice to ministers shortly as the final outcomes of that work are concluded on precisely the way in which stuff will be framed, but it will be a result of that testing, and we'll make sure we do it correctly. Um, and the sort of decision making around that advice will sit with, with me from the kind of professional side on the resilience side, but also sit with David Dinsmore, former tabloid editor. So who does understand how to write a sun headline?Who is sick of government communications?So we have that communications input, as well as the professional resilience input, which will allow ministers to make the decision.
So we will elevate the government role. We've tested different framing of the messages to the public. Does a message that is about being ready, which focuses on the kind of incident itself make more sense, or should we have something which is more about people playing their part, which can include both emergency response and a wider contribution?Going back to the earlier points on the role of the voluntary sector, or do we want something that's very mechanical, like 72 hours, and that being the focus of it is it is saying in Finland, um, so we tested all those points as well.
And we're just we will provide advice to ministers shortly as the final outcomes of that work are concluded on precisely the way in which stuff will be framed, but it will be a result of that testing, and we'll make sure we do it correctly. Um, and the sort of decision making around that advice will sit with, with me from the kind of professional side on the resilience side, but also sit with David Dinsmore, former tabloid editor. So who does understand how to write a sun headline?Who is sick of government communications?So we have that communications input, as well as the professional resilience input, which will allow ministers to make the decision.
11:27
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
I would actually also want to make sure that we we got to places where government communications doesn't always get, if I could put it that way, particularly with the younger generations, I don't know what we're going to do with the under 16. But but but the thing is that um. Because we want to get this, uh, there to be a drumbeat of this advice. And this is the first time it's been like this for a very long time. This will be cumulative over time.
It's not, are we going to do one, one big push on homeland security and then it's going to disappear. This is the this is it's essentially, um you know, the batsman getting onto the front foot so that they can actually deal with the stuff that's coming at them. It's a change of posture. So the first, um, iteration of it we will learn from and we will carry on with this message over time, because we have to be in a situation where this stuff becomes ingrained and people, the.
Work that's been done shows that people want to be ready, but they don't know what it is that we want them to do. Well, after this first campaign, I certainly hope that they'll they'll know what it is that we want them to do, and then we can start having conversations with them about readiness in other ways, too.
It's not, are we going to do one, one big push on homeland security and then it's going to disappear. This is the this is it's essentially, um you know, the batsman getting onto the front foot so that they can actually deal with the stuff that's coming at them. It's a change of posture. So the first, um, iteration of it we will learn from and we will carry on with this message over time, because we have to be in a situation where this stuff becomes ingrained and people, the.
Work that's been done shows that people want to be ready, but they don't know what it is that we want them to do. Well, after this first campaign, I certainly hope that they'll they'll know what it is that we want them to do, and then we can start having conversations with them about readiness in other ways, too.
11:29
11:29
11:29
11:29
11:29
11:29
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
I've seen. No, no. But that worries me even more. It's. And we've seen this so often in the political world as well. It's government or campaign by focus groups. They have a role primarily to road test what you actually have have thought out as the as the as the strategy in in all of this, that's where you need the political involvement. That's where you that's where you need the wordsmiths involvement. And in a way, the focus groups then become part of the mechanics.
And obviously, if there's feedback and things don't work, then that's obviously part of the feedback loop. But there's got to be that, that, that, that, that engagement. Otherwise, it's still becoming a very mechanical exercise and not one that's going to cut through to the public. There will be, by the way, our opponents do our opponents, the political centre is thinking they're the people who drive this process. We're making it more bureaucratic. Politics is at the heart of what our opponents do.
And obviously, if there's feedback and things don't work, then that's obviously part of the feedback loop. But there's got to be that, that, that, that, that engagement. Otherwise, it's still becoming a very mechanical exercise and not one that's going to cut through to the public. There will be, by the way, our opponents do our opponents, the political centre is thinking they're the people who drive this process. We're making it more bureaucratic. Politics is at the heart of what our opponents do.
11:31
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Um, all I can say is that, um, this is not a one off thing. It will be iterated. It's not a top down thing. It won't work if that's what it is. Um, we have to get awareness up, but we also have to empower and we have to keep those messages going. So I completely agree as you wouldn't be, um, you wouldn't be surprised to know that I agree with you. Um, Lord speller about, about how communication works.
And we don't only have one shot at it.
And we don't only have one shot at it.
11:32
11:32
11:32
11:32
11:33
11:33
11:33
Speaker 11
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Speaker 11
I just wanted to widen out a little bit more into the international field. Um, because just following on from, the previous, uh, answers, we've had evidence, for example, from the Finnish ambassador who spoke about what they do there, where I think it was the leaflet there, wasn't it, which went to every household with cartoons.
11:33
11:33
Speaker 11
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Speaker 11
Indeed. But but I suppose what we're what we're asking, having received this evidence is are there um is the government drawing from places like Finland's approach to, for example, resilience training, um where there's quite structured training for leaders and sort of whole of society preparedness. That's just one part. But the, the other thing that I just wanted to press you on a little bit was because I'm on the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and so very aware of international work that's going on in terms of interference in elections, cyber attacks, and so on.
And whether you do much on the international front. I mean, are there meetings, for example, of, um, security ministers across different countries where joint action might be taken in some of these areas?
And whether you do much on the international front. I mean, are there meetings, for example, of, um, security ministers across different countries where joint action might be taken in some of these areas?
11:34
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, first things first, we do actually, um, keep in close. Contact with NATO, with our NATO allies about preparedness and readiness. And so we have had meetings with our Finnish colleagues and I'm sure other NATO colleagues about what they do every, um, approach. Obviously fits the geography and situation that the country is in. And Finland has got a particular, um, closeness to the Russian border in a very long border with Russia and therefore over, over historical times has always had a very, very integrated military civilian approach to what it does in a huge infrastructure of bunkers and protected areas in a way that we haven't.
Um, but, but we want to get best practice from as many of our NATO allies as we can. And so we do, we do do that work. Um, I think, uh, the whole society training is probably a bit, um, extreme, uh, where our, where our particular approach is, but there is a resilience academy that's been set up, both ministers and civil servants, I think 3000 odd have been trained in best practice there also including um people from other sectors and, and the business community too. So we are trying to professionalize and standardize the approach, uh, to some of this.
And I think our international issue, uh, approach is really done via NATO. Um, for, uh, for resilience, um, to, uh, hostile state action.
Um, but, but we want to get best practice from as many of our NATO allies as we can. And so we do, we do do that work. Um, I think, uh, the whole society training is probably a bit, um, extreme, uh, where our, where our particular approach is, but there is a resilience academy that's been set up, both ministers and civil servants, I think 3000 odd have been trained in best practice there also including um people from other sectors and, and the business community too. So we are trying to professionalize and standardize the approach, uh, to some of this.
And I think our international issue, uh, approach is really done via NATO. Um, for, uh, for resilience, um, to, uh, hostile state action.
11:35
11:35
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Yeah. And I was I was going to get on to that. The security minister here. So I chaired my first meeting of the Defending Democracy Task Force. Um, and that is a cross-departmental, um, task force. But it all it does look at, uh, hostile state, um, actions, disinformation, misinformation, attempts to interfere in elections, what we can do about security of candidates, which is very sadly a huge issue at the moment. Um, and I see that I haven't had a chance to talk to a lot of people about this having only been in the job a month, but I see that very much as the center of a hub, um, of protections and, and things at the end of the hub are things like, um, state foreign interference.
Um, uh, corruption, uh, money. Ordering and how, um, bad money gets into, uh, UK systems to try to affect our democratic rights. And so there's a kind, there's a range of resiliencies there. And it also includes things like education so that we can, we can actually make a positive case for democracy. Um, and because let's face it, we all know that the alternatives are much worse. Even if, uh, even if there are frustrations that one has with democratic systems.
And I don't think the positive case has been made for a very long time. Everyone has assumed that somehow everybody in succeeding, um. Succeeding generations will somehow think the same about democracy as we do. Well, they won't unless we demonstrate that it's true. And so we have to do a lot more. Um, I think, uh, to ensure that we can, we can shore up what we thought was a one argument.
Um, uh, corruption, uh, money. Ordering and how, um, bad money gets into, uh, UK systems to try to affect our democratic rights. And so there's a kind, there's a range of resiliencies there. And it also includes things like education so that we can, we can actually make a positive case for democracy. Um, and because let's face it, we all know that the alternatives are much worse. Even if, uh, even if there are frustrations that one has with democratic systems.
And I don't think the positive case has been made for a very long time. Everyone has assumed that somehow everybody in succeeding, um. Succeeding generations will somehow think the same about democracy as we do. Well, they won't unless we demonstrate that it's true. And so we have to do a lot more. Um, I think, uh, to ensure that we can, we can shore up what we thought was a one argument.
11:37
11:37
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Thank you, chair, and thank you, Minister. And thank you, Mr. Hargreaves. And making ourselves available today for, uh and giving us useful information. Uh, I mean, it's just on the subject of disinformation and misinformation, which seems to be quite a big subject today. It's to individual, local and, uh, democratic resilience. Should there be a training, uh, of how to. Tackle this?Should there be a training for, uh, you know, for government ministers or in government?To how to tackle, how to argue against this, this misinformation, particularly among young people.
And I was thinking you've you've passed the Hillsborough law this week, which has sort of demanded a duty of candour, candour and and, and when it comes down to lack of trust in government, it seems to me that's almost at the heart of it that we're not hearing the honesty behind it. So is this duty of candour, uh, you know, to be pushed through all government communications.
And I was thinking you've you've passed the Hillsborough law this week, which has sort of demanded a duty of candour, candour and and, and when it comes down to lack of trust in government, it seems to me that's almost at the heart of it that we're not hearing the honesty behind it. So is this duty of candour, uh, you know, to be pushed through all government communications.
11:38
11:38
11:38
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
You know, I mean, it's a, it's a very philosophical question in some ways. What, what, what, what we can do about, um, um, duty of candour in political campaigning. Um, I think that the best way of dealing with a lot of this is to equip young people with the capacity to judge what is true and what is false. I personally worry about the battle for truth. And if you're in a democracy and there is no agreement about what the truth is, and I don't mean opinions, I mean the truth.
You're in a very difficult situation. And the rise of social media and what we've seen with misinformation, disinformation, and that kind of propaganda has bled over into people's real behaviour. Uh, I talked to the terribly tragic parents of people who've killed themselves using sodium nitrate because they went on suicide websites. We've seen some of the incel, um, manosphere. Effects. Uh, dripping over into the behaviour of real life. And when we look at the number of, um, plannings for mass casualty attacks, and we see that 15% of them are under 17.
Now, we know that something really difficult is happening, that we've got to get a grip on. Now we are right in the Wild West of social media, and the way that the internet has worked at the moment. And we are all in our democratic societies, have got to think of ways of getting a grip on truth, uh, and being able to ensure that people can distinguish the truth from fiction. And that is really, really important. If we're going to defend our democracy, don't ask me how to do it.
At the moment, I'm still thinking about it. But all democratic societies have got to think about how to reassert those values and those facts in our national lives.
You're in a very difficult situation. And the rise of social media and what we've seen with misinformation, disinformation, and that kind of propaganda has bled over into people's real behaviour. Uh, I talked to the terribly tragic parents of people who've killed themselves using sodium nitrate because they went on suicide websites. We've seen some of the incel, um, manosphere. Effects. Uh, dripping over into the behaviour of real life. And when we look at the number of, um, plannings for mass casualty attacks, and we see that 15% of them are under 17.
Now, we know that something really difficult is happening, that we've got to get a grip on. Now we are right in the Wild West of social media, and the way that the internet has worked at the moment. And we are all in our democratic societies, have got to think of ways of getting a grip on truth, uh, and being able to ensure that people can distinguish the truth from fiction. And that is really, really important. If we're going to defend our democracy, don't ask me how to do it.
At the moment, I'm still thinking about it. But all democratic societies have got to think about how to reassert those values and those facts in our national lives.
11:40
11:41
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
No, no, not directly. And the Resilience Academy is largely focused on the provision of technical training in relation to resilience for people who work in the area, particularly in local response organisations and businesses. So they, you know, there are big training organisation based in North Yorkshire and have a very significant throughput of courses physically and online. Separately, we do training inside Government Crisis Management Excellence programme, which is focused on um, a wide range of civil servants at different levels, as well as ministers and special advisers.
But again, that's largely about the management of crisis. Now, an important element of that training is on communications with the public, which does touch on mis and disinformation. But, um, I think it's probably a more technical approach to how you get government messages across in a trusted way, where there have been some quite big changes in how we approach it, because particularly during crisis, we see a point of vulnerability around mis and disinformation. Um, one, because people want to share information too, because sometimes foreign states or others who wish us harm will try and amplify problems.
And we've actually changed the way in which we communicate in crisis and moved away from a model which you would observe at the early stages of Covid, which was very simple messages assuming a public which sort of wouldn't be compliant and needed simplicity. So things cut through their hands, face, space, sort of message to one. By the end of Covid, which has now been baked into our doctrine more generally, which is you give the public more information and they are far more intelligent consumers of that information than they've been given credit for in the past.
They will do what they're advised to do if that advice is sensible and clear and evidenced, and therefore the provision of more information from government is one of the best antidotes, both to the Mis. And disinformation, but also as a vehicle to getting the public to play their part in crisis, which touches on some of the earlier points as well. But that's all now set out in the guidance for training and everything else.
But again, that's largely about the management of crisis. Now, an important element of that training is on communications with the public, which does touch on mis and disinformation. But, um, I think it's probably a more technical approach to how you get government messages across in a trusted way, where there have been some quite big changes in how we approach it, because particularly during crisis, we see a point of vulnerability around mis and disinformation. Um, one, because people want to share information too, because sometimes foreign states or others who wish us harm will try and amplify problems.
And we've actually changed the way in which we communicate in crisis and moved away from a model which you would observe at the early stages of Covid, which was very simple messages assuming a public which sort of wouldn't be compliant and needed simplicity. So things cut through their hands, face, space, sort of message to one. By the end of Covid, which has now been baked into our doctrine more generally, which is you give the public more information and they are far more intelligent consumers of that information than they've been given credit for in the past.
They will do what they're advised to do if that advice is sensible and clear and evidenced, and therefore the provision of more information from government is one of the best antidotes, both to the Mis. And disinformation, but also as a vehicle to getting the public to play their part in crisis, which touches on some of the earlier points as well. But that's all now set out in the guidance for training and everything else.
11:42
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
I mean, there are also, um, things that the. DfE is doing about education in, in, in the area of dis and misinformation and some of the preparations they're doing for the proposals to lower the voting age. Um, so there's a range of work going on across government dealing with some of that, but I also think we've got to think about, um, how we. Can get a handle on how some of this stuff gets dispersed through the internet. And we certainly do that for child sexual abuse.
We do it for, um, terrorism. And we've got to think about how to just get a more, um, a less damaging, uh, series of things available, uh, often to be consumed by very young, impressionable minds.
We do it for, um, terrorism. And we've got to think about how to just get a more, um, a less damaging, uh, series of things available, uh, often to be consumed by very young, impressionable minds.
11:43
11:43
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Just very brief point on the international comparisons. Yes, I know you've heard from me. And, like, we do an awful lot of work with our international comparators. We do a lot of that through NATO, as the minister said. But we also have a lot of important bilateral relationships. And like, you know, no one, you don't go to another country and say that you're doing a bad job of stuff. You present your best possible story. And so you'll hear good stories about what other people do.
We have got to a point with a number of key countries where we have a much more honest dialogue, and we are both sharing our best practice with them, and they share it back to us in return. So we do a lot of work with the Scandinavians. They are very interested in the work we do on risk, the work we do on data. We learn a lot from them on.
We have got to a point with a number of key countries where we have a much more honest dialogue, and we are both sharing our best practice with them, and they share it back to us in return. So we do a lot of work with the Scandinavians. They are very interested in the work we do on risk, the work we do on data. We learn a lot from them on.
11:44
11:44
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Really good example of that is Ireland. We didn't used to do much with Ireland at all. If you are looking through our international cooperation on civil protection through an EU lens, then Ireland is not a big player in the context of the EU, but in the context of our geography and our relationships, Ireland is critically important, arguably our most important international partner on civil protection work. And so we have an MOU with them. We meet with them regularly. We talk to them a lot about cross border issues, cooperation, you know, operational coordination and that kind of thing.
Um, but we do that also with the French, the Dutch, um, and others, Scandinavians with whom we share operational priorities as well. So we found we've got a really good basket of international cooperation, but it's definitely not a one way street with other people telling us how it's done. There's as much in the other direction where we're sharing our best practice, and people are really keen to talk to us because they can see the quality of what we do often.
Um, but we do that also with the French, the Dutch, um, and others, Scandinavians with whom we share operational priorities as well. So we found we've got a really good basket of international cooperation, but it's definitely not a one way street with other people telling us how it's done. There's as much in the other direction where we're sharing our best practice, and people are really keen to talk to us because they can see the quality of what we do often.
11:45
11:45
Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
It is. Thank you so much for your contribution so far. I think you have covered a lot. What hasn't been covered are legislative changes that may need to be introduced. And with that in mind, what specific gaps and overlaps in the current resilience Resilience framework does the government believe require legislative change?And how would those gaps and overlaps be addressed through the upcoming review of the Civil Contingency Act and other. Related reforms?
11:46
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Okay. Well, I mean, obviously you're right to point out that there is a review. Um, and we have just issued a public call for views on that. Um, we think that certainly, um, the, uh, parts, one of the act has worked very well. The one that sets up all the local resilience forums and it's solid, it works well. Um, but we're anxious to learn if there's anything else that we can do to make it better. We also, I mean, we've added certain bodies, for example, to, um, the.
Local responders, the, the, the obligations that those bodies have obligations under part one. So, um, and category two, um, we've added the Met Office, we've added the coal authority because of legacy industrial issues. You see all those if a sinkhole opens up, you probably need the Coal Authority to tell you what's going on underground. Um, so there's a range of things that we've done to try and, um, increase, make it, make it up to date. The, I think the other thing that I have certainly clocked is that, um, the local resilience forums are based on police authority areas and we are in the middle of looking at police reform to reduce the number of um, of police authorities.
So there may be a boundary issue. There are issues around English devolution changes since the civil. Agencies act came into being in 2004 as well. So we'll be looking at things like that. But we are we are approaching it with an open mind in terms of the public call for views that we've asked for, and we'll deal with, um, our views on all of this as part of the review, which is due to be published next year.
Local responders, the, the, the obligations that those bodies have obligations under part one. So, um, and category two, um, we've added the Met Office, we've added the coal authority because of legacy industrial issues. You see all those if a sinkhole opens up, you probably need the Coal Authority to tell you what's going on underground. Um, so there's a range of things that we've done to try and, um, increase, make it, make it up to date. The, I think the other thing that I have certainly clocked is that, um, the local resilience forums are based on police authority areas and we are in the middle of looking at police reform to reduce the number of um, of police authorities.
So there may be a boundary issue. There are issues around English devolution changes since the civil. Agencies act came into being in 2004 as well. So we'll be looking at things like that. But we are we are approaching it with an open mind in terms of the public call for views that we've asked for, and we'll deal with, um, our views on all of this as part of the review, which is due to be published next year.
11:48
11:48
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Uh, I'm responsible for making sure it's delivered. So in that sense, yes. So, uh. As minister said, we could we could invest an awful lot of time continually rehashing the legislative frameworks, but they're quite general. And that allows us to do a lot within them. So this process is as much about the regulations and guidance that underpin the legislation that oversee delivery, rather than ripping the the primary legislation up and starting again. There are changes that we've had to do over the years.
We review the act every five years, so it's not like it's 20 plus years old, and we've not looked at it before. And we do adjust it carefully each time to reflect changing institutional arrangements. There are a couple of other areas where we were doing some exploratory work in terms of the coverage of the act. These relate largely to what we were discussing earlier in relation to the role of the private sector. There are two things in particular. One is whether we've got the right arrangements in respect of critical national infrastructure.
A lot of CNI is regulated, but not all of it is. So are the gaps we need to fill in in terms of the extent to which we have regulatory powers across all CNI. And secondly, there is a particular issue around the behaviour of individual businesses where they might make perfectly rational business decisions individually. But those business decisions can have wider external effects that lead to emergencies. So on the same principle that we would have environmental legislation that applies to businesses because their behaviour, whilst perfectly rational as a business, has environmental externalities that flow from it.
There is a question about whether we need to be able to take steps. If a business is doing something that might lead to an emergency, it's not always straightforward to tackle that. And the powers we've got a very general. So we're looking at that question in particular. So we're not sort of idle on the on the legislative regime. We understand it really, really clearly. We're adjusting it where we need to, and we're going through quite a process at the moment.
We review the act every five years, so it's not like it's 20 plus years old, and we've not looked at it before. And we do adjust it carefully each time to reflect changing institutional arrangements. There are a couple of other areas where we were doing some exploratory work in terms of the coverage of the act. These relate largely to what we were discussing earlier in relation to the role of the private sector. There are two things in particular. One is whether we've got the right arrangements in respect of critical national infrastructure.
A lot of CNI is regulated, but not all of it is. So are the gaps we need to fill in in terms of the extent to which we have regulatory powers across all CNI. And secondly, there is a particular issue around the behaviour of individual businesses where they might make perfectly rational business decisions individually. But those business decisions can have wider external effects that lead to emergencies. So on the same principle that we would have environmental legislation that applies to businesses because their behaviour, whilst perfectly rational as a business, has environmental externalities that flow from it.
There is a question about whether we need to be able to take steps. If a business is doing something that might lead to an emergency, it's not always straightforward to tackle that. And the powers we've got a very general. So we're looking at that question in particular. So we're not sort of idle on the on the legislative regime. We understand it really, really clearly. We're adjusting it where we need to, and we're going through quite a process at the moment.
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11:50
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
You mentioned the the powers being general, but possibly not broad enough. Is there a case with the developing international crisis for for putting in something like the United States War Production Act or our previous defence of the Realm Act?The fact is, fundamentally enabling legislation to face a crisis.
11:51
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
So we've got, um, the commitment to have a defence readiness bill that's being generated at the moment, the Defence Readiness Bill is partly analogous to the, the, the, the relevant defence production legislation in the US, which is about making sure our economy and society is configured for the pre-war phase and allows you to build capacity, supplies, infrastructure in the UK system. Traditionally, what's happened is you have that kind of enabling legislation early on, and then at the point you go into conflict, you have a defence of the realm act or similar, which gives you wartime powers.
So if we find ourselves in a scenario where we were facing conflict, we'd probably follow the same model, do the Defence Readiness Bill now come to the defence regulation making powers later on. And that's that's a model that works well in the UK. It's worth also observing, though, that the emergency powers provisions in the Civil Contingencies Act are themselves the child of, uh, the. Emergency Powers Act that was passed in 1920, which in turn was putting onto the statute book permanently the defence regs from World War One.
So the mechanics have actually been in place for 100 years. And this is about an overlay, particularly for wartime powers, rather than something that is an area of absence.
So if we find ourselves in a scenario where we were facing conflict, we'd probably follow the same model, do the Defence Readiness Bill now come to the defence regulation making powers later on. And that's that's a model that works well in the UK. It's worth also observing, though, that the emergency powers provisions in the Civil Contingencies Act are themselves the child of, uh, the. Emergency Powers Act that was passed in 1920, which in turn was putting onto the statute book permanently the defence regs from World War One.
So the mechanics have actually been in place for 100 years. And this is about an overlay, particularly for wartime powers, rather than something that is an area of absence.
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