Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Thursday 9th June 2011 Lords Chamber

I hope that the Minister, in responding, will recognise that that function of monitoring complaints and understanding what is going on will be a critical and necessary part of any body that has oversight of the police service.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I fully endorse everything my noble friend Lord Harris has just said. I just add that I find it quite extraordinary that this Bill proposes a system whereby the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police would effectively be judge, jury and executioner. It puts a huge amount of power in the hands of one person, which is bad enough without a system where there are absolutely no checks and balances of any description. The proposal is deeply flawed. It also lacks an effective framework to safeguard impartiality.

At the moment complaints against senior officers are dealt with by the Metropolitan Police Authority. There is a very good system and it is dealt with by the Professional Standards Cases Sub-Committee. If officers are unhappy with the rulings of that sub-committee, there is a very clear, very transparent appeals system to the police appeals tribunal. This amendment would restore equivalent safeguards, which I believe is absolutely essential. It would make the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime the appeals body, and I endorse again what my noble friend Lord Harris has said: that in order for that to work it is absolutely essential that the MOPC would have statutory access to information and systems where complaints are recorded. The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime simply cannot be sitting there waiting for the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to advise it of complaints and conduct matters. It must be able to have statutory access. Without this, I do not believe that it is possible that it can discharge its functions in the Bill; namely, to ensure that chief constables have fulfilled their duty in the handling of such complaints. I believe that it is absolutely essential to put independence, transparency and impartiality back into this process.

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[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 221 and 222 in this group, concerning the duty of the Home Secretary to deal with national threats by issuing a strategic policing requirement. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has already said, the words “have regard to” in the Bill are definitely too weak and need to be changed to a firm obligation. Allowing a PCC to disregard national threats in favour of political expediency or re-election strategies is not a good idea. PCCs are directly elected. There will be political incentives for them to behave partially, particularly in the run-up to an election. Decisions based on a PCC re-election strategy will not necessarily be the best way to address major threats and public order problems.

Imagine a scenario whereby a PCC has been elected on the promise of putting significant additional police officers into an area of high crime and then, two weeks before the next election, is asked to extract those same officers in order to deal with the policing of a major demonstration in London. At best, they will be very torn between the necessity of trying to get themselves re-elected and whether they should “have regard to” sending the officers to London. It is a difficult issue that really needs to be clarified, and to become a firm obligation rather than a suggestion. Under the Bill, the PCC would be free to disregard strategic policing requirements. We cannot afford to have dealing with national threats undermined by decisions taken for reasons of political expediency.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, this part of the Bill is one of the most important. I speak to Amendments 229 and 230 in my name, and also in support of Amendments 221 and 222 to which I have put my name.

This issue is extremely important because, for most citizens, interaction with the police is obviously about what happens at the most local of levels. It is about what is going on at their street corner, the threat of violence in the streets, burglary and anti-social behaviour. However, people take it for granted that more serious crime is being dealt with somewhere. They take it for granted that terrorism is being dealt with somewhere. However, every part of the country must be making its contribution to that effort. If it does not, there is a real danger that terrorism or serious and organised crime cannot be dealt with effectively. There is a need for a national strategic policing requirement. The Government are quite right to place it in the Bill as they have done.

However, there is a danger in the overall governance proposals in terms of whether the same level of priority will be given under the new governance structure to what the current Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis calls the “balanced policing model”: the balance between the handling of the immediate concern of the local citizen and these national contributions to making the country safer. There is a fear—which has just been expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and by others as well—about the extent to which a directly elected police and crime commissioner, or the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, will necessarily place the same priority on that national obligation as ideally they would. I have heard the Minister of State for Policing get extremely irate on that point. He says that he cannot imagine circumstances in which a responsible person elected to these positions will not take counterterrorism and serious and organised crime seriously. I agree. Most sensible elected politicians would of course give a very high priority to such matters. However, the reality will be, particularly in times of limited resources, that judgments and choices will be made.

I give your Lordships an example. At the moment, police services around the country are facing extremely difficult budget rounds. In those areas of the country without a counterterrorist intelligence unit, questions may well be phrased as to what the appropriate level of requirement for those areas to maintain a level of Special Branch commitment is compared to the past. Local policing bodies, whether under the current model or—even more so—under a directly elected model in the future, may well make a judgment that these issues are not currently significant in their part of the country and that they can reduce their commitment to them. That would be a perfectly sensible and, in many ways, rational judgment.

However, the reality is that even—indeed, especially—in the most rural areas of the country there have been organised terrorist training camps. It is a fact, regrettably, that one of the most difficult threats that counterterrorism now faces is the individual who chooses to radicalise themselves on the internet, is not in ready communication with groups which might otherwise be monitored, who decides to build an explosive device following a recipe obtained on the internet, and who then goes out and does something in a local town centre. There have been a number of such individuals in the past few years. Those are precisely the circumstances under which you suddenly discover that that force would have been very well placed to have retained a good, high, strong Special Branch capacity. Yet that is the sort of thing that is vulnerable at the moment. No doubt the Minister will counter that this is not actually a problem, but it is the sort of thing that should be looked at in terms of the level of budgets that have been allocated for those sorts of things.

Similarly, it may not be apparent that activities and organised crime will impact on, say, a rural village, or even some of the leafier suburbs of London. Apart from the fact that these are often precisely the areas where some of the most serious criminals decide they want to live, it is not the case that they do not impact on those areas. Indeed, we have to take into account the insidious way in which serious crime operates, whereby quality of life is diminished over quite a long period. That requires long-term investment in tackling those problems. It is not something that you can just send in a task force to handle; you have to continually work on those areas. There is a risk. There is the sort of conversation which goes, “Why should we, in this force area, maintain a kidnap unit of this capacity and quality, able to deal with these sorts of incidents? Why do we need to do this?”. The reason is that if you do not, or if you do not contribute to something that is provided on a regional or national basis, when something goes wrong it will be your citizens who are potentially vulnerable.

Yesterday, the Home Secretary produced proposals for a national crime agency. One of the central planks is the ability of the national crime agency to direct resources. This will be an interesting way forward, and it will be fascinating to watch some of the discussions which will no doubt take place with chief officers of police as to how this is to be managed and who will have operational control, and all the sorts of counterterrorism issues that have had to be resolved over the past few years. It will be an interesting and exciting set of discussions.

I have no problem with the concept in principle; all I am saying is that it will be that much harder to direct resources if, when you contact the chief constable concerned, you say, “I am sorry. I just don’t have that capacity because I decided I didn’t need that number of detectives or that number of specialist units in my force area because it is not a day-to-day priority as far as I’m concerned. I know there is a problem as this group seems to be operating across my territory but I no longer have the resources”. That is why the strategic policing requirement is so important. I do not believe that sensible police and crime commissioners or the MOPC will deliberately say, “We are going to run down these things”, but when you are faced with difficult budgetary decisions and you are facing a difficult election campaign, having more police tackling day-to-day street crime and anti-social behaviour is a very compelling argument.

In the long distant days when I was a local authority leader, I remember that whatever my personal priorities were in terms of the value of education or the big spending items, the important thing in the run-up to an election was to divert resources to street cleaning as that was the key driver on how people voted. I hesitate to say that there will be similar key drivers in the election for police and crime commissioners or the MOPC in London, but I suspect that there will be. The danger is that the strategic policing obligations will be put to one side, even if for a temporary period, in the run-up to an election. Therefore, there has to be something in the Bill which gives the strategic policing requirement real teeth and real obligations.

My specific proposal is that we should give more powers and responsibilities to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. I say that for two reasons. One is that I think that is the sensible way forward. It would mean that the inspectorate would look at the way in which individual forces had chosen to meet their obligations under the strategic policing requirement, and would then report no doubt to the Home Secretary but also to the elected commissioner, the PCP and anyone else involved. Certainly those parts of the report that can be made public should be made public because, if there is a failing in this area, local electorates will want make to take account of it in determining whether they should re-elect a particular individual or deciding whether it is an important issue for their locality. That should be a regular process. Given the pliability of budgets, it should be done at least once a year; otherwise, I am not sure that you will necessarily resolve the matter. That seems to me the appropriate mechanism and it is consistent with the way in which the police service operates.

The other important reason why I think this is the right way forward is that it gets the Government off the hook as regards how much they specify in the strategic policing requirement. I have heard Ministers say—vehemently in the case of the Minister of State—that they do not want to put an enormous shopping list into the strategic policing requirement. As a general principle, that is right. This is not the way to do it because people will simply follow the shopping list, if that is what they are told to do, rather than necessarily working out what is the best way to deliver their obligations under it. However, I have heard counterarguments from chief constables who say that we have to have a document. They are busily preparing volumes of material which they say should underpin the strategic policing requirement.

I propose that there should be a police-led discussion on the most effective way of meeting a strategic policing requirement. The inspectorate would have the key role in determining what it is looking for as it goes round forces to see whether the strategic policing requirement is being met. The Government would not have to specify in mind-boggling detail how many officers should patrol a regional airport, for instance—expect that in that case the airport ought to be paying for them—or specify in enormous detail the size of a force Special Branch or how many detectives it is necessary for each force to maintain so that they have the capacity to receive instructions, guidance and requests from the national crime agency or from the local counterterrorist unit. Those matters would be determined within the police service in discussions led by the inspectorate.

Unless you have this sort of mechanism, it seems to me that despite having a strategic policing requirement there will be no means of making that happen. As a consequence, there is a real danger that over time we will find that we do not have the resources that the country needs to deal with serious organised crime or terrorism.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Monday 6th June 2011 Lords Chamber

I hope that the Minister will recognise that these are important principles and that, without a framework against which it can be seen that an elected individual is acting responsibly in dismissing or suspending a chief officer of police, there will be endless problems.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 170, 171, 181, 182, 227 and 228 and I thank my noble friend Lord Harris for supporting them. My concern is about the hiring and firing of chief constables and, in London, the hiring and firing of Met commissioners and deputy commissioners. I am concerned that the police and crime commissioner, or MOPC in London, has the power simply to decide to sack a chief constable or the Met commissioner. My concern is only magnified by the fact that there are absolutely no checks and balances, as noble Lords have already said. I do not believe that there will ever be a police and crime commissioner, or the equivalent in London, who will not be tempted to interfere in the day-to-day running of police and operational issues. There is no room for interference in operational issues, but, as night follows day, it is exactly what happens. As long as somebody has the ultimate power to fire the commissioner, it is quite easy to see that the commissioner might be persuaded to turn a blind eye to something because somebody feels particularly strongly about it and because, ultimately, they know that if they worry about it too much, they can be fired. That is a major problem and it risks the politicisation of the police.

I have a further concern relating to the hiring of chief constables. The Bill contains no selection criteria, which I find very worrying. There is no requirement for expertise or experience in policing; there is no requirement for political independence, as there ought to be. One of the greatest weaknesses of the Bill is its provisions for the hiring and firing of chief constables. The amendments would restore at least some clarity and probity.

[Lord Condon]

I support the amendments described by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, in relation to the appointment of chief officers below the level of chief constable. The problems inherent in the Bill as drafted have been described by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. For reasons of credibility, legitimacy, transparency and national requirements, it is important that the selection process for chief officers below the level of chief constable include people beyond the chief constable of the force involved. Otherwise, all the problems described by other noble Lords will emerge. It perhaps sounds paradoxical for me as a former chief constable and commissioner to support the amendments, but I really believe that it is in the public interest that appointments below chief constable level, at ACPO level, should involve some influence beyond that of the incumbent chief constable.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I should like to address Amendments 103, 105, 112 and 116, the four amendments in my name in this group. The purpose of the amendments is to ensure democratic legitimacy to the function of police and crime commissioner as exercised in London. I have no objection to the concept of the Mayor of London, acting as the PCC, appointing a deputy mayor for policing and crime. The issue that arises is the fact that the deputy mayor for policing and crime will not be an elected person. The mayor has the right to appoint anyone to this position.

Mayors are not infallible. London has so far had two elected mayors. Both have appointed a range of unelected people to a wide variety of important posts, some of which have resulted in controversy, resignations and sackings. I recognise that no such mistake has been made in the appointment of the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority or, in fact, any of the appointments, but the fact is that that very important principle still stands.

However, I believe that there is a much more fundamental objection. Were the mayor to appoint an unelected person to the post of deputy mayor for policing and crime, it would negate the whole purpose of the Bill. How on earth can an unelected police and crime commissioner be accountable to local communities? Does not this proposal to hand the powers of the PCC to any unelected individual make a nonsense of the Government’s argument about democratic legitimacy?

Previously in Committee, my noble friend the Minister said:

“Cabinet Office research in 2008 showed that more than two-thirds of the public wanted an elected person to hold the police to account … It means an elected individual charged with being the voice of some of the most vulnerable people … I believe that police and crime commissioners will be both visible and democratically accountable”.—[Official Report, 11/5/11; col. 940.]

My noble friend made the same comment earlier this evening.

Therefore, I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said earlier. Why on earth should every area outside London have a democratically elected individual carrying out the job of PCC, but not London? What rationale is there for treating London differently from any other part of the country? Whatever misgivings one might have about certain sections of this Bill, it is essential that the new legislation works in practice and does what it is supposed to do. But it must also be logically consistent and ensure the same degree of democratic accountability throughout the country. These amendments would achieve these objectives by obliging the Mayor of London, in delegating his functions as PCC, to choose a deputy mayor for policing and crime only from elected Members of the London Assembly.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I will speak to an amendment that is in my name, to four other amendments to which I have added my name and to an amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The amendment in my name is Amendment 110. I have to confess that this is possibly a refugee from what should have been another group. However, it could stand on its own here. It essentially deletes Clause 19(4), which is about the power of the deputy mayor for policing and crime to,

“arrange for any other person to exercise any function of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime which is, in accordance with subsection (2), exercisable by the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime”.

This comes back to the issue that we keep raising in relation to policing and crime commissioners: their ability to delegate functions to people who are not accountable in the same way. The proposal is that, even though this is an activity which is specifically the responsibility of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and specifically should be carried out by the deputy mayor, it should not be possible to delegate this to any other person in such a cavalier way.

I also wanted to speak to Amendments 103 and 116, which essentially say that the deputy mayor for policing and crime shall be a Member of the London Assembly. If your Lordships and the Government are not minded to accept the principle of direct election, then the second best must be that the person delegated by the Mayor of London must themselves be an elected person, a Member of the London Assembly. It really is extraordinary that the Bill gives such latitude to the Mayor of London to appoint someone whom they have not met and may have no personal direct mandate. One could create a justification as to why it would be inappropriate to have a direct mandate, but it seems to me that the main thrust of this ought to be that that the person who is acting on behalf of the Mayor of London in this very important role should themselves have at least been subject to the electorate for at least part of London, if not the whole of London. It is important that the deputy mayor of London for policing and crime should be an elected Member of the London Assembly, and Amendments 103 and 116 deal with this.

I have also put my name to Amendment 105, which enables the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime to delegate to any person the functions that would otherwise be carried out by the deputy mayor for policing and crime. The issue is the same: whether it should be possible for these functions so easily to be delegated to people who are not elected. Amendment 105 would at least require the mayor to delegate them to somebody who was part of the structure of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime rather than to someone completely different. What would be the point of having a Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime if the mayor could say, “Well, one of these functions I am not having done by somebody who works for the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime; I’ll have it delegated somewhere else”? I suspect that this was an unintended consequence of something else when the drafting was done, but it seems to be a very strange arrangement.

Amendment 180 would involve Members of the Assembly in the appointment of police officers of ACPO rank other than simply the commissioner and deputy commissioner. I spoke earlier today about the importance of that responsibility being shared. It is an important issue of governance. It is also important that senior officers of the Metropolitan Police not only see the line of accountability to the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis but recognise the importance of democratic accountability. The involvement of Members in the appointments process would help facilitate that.

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[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I should like to speak briefly to the amendments in my name in this group—Amendments 73, 152, 159, and 160 to 163. Their purpose is to make the provisions of the Bill consistent with those proposed in the Localism Bill. That Bill will change the relationship between the London Assembly and the Mayor of London, as set out in the Greater London Authority Act 1999, because it will give the London Assembly a new power to reject by a two-thirds majority the Mayor’s statutory strategies.

However, this Bill makes no equivalent provision. As it stands, it would not allow the Assembly to reject the Mayor’s draft policing and crime plan. Consequently, once both Bills have become law, the London Assembly would have the power to reject every one of the Mayor’s strategies, with the sole exception of the police and crime plan. This discrepancy makes no sense. There are no substantive differences between the police and crime plan and other mayoral strategies that would justify it being excluded. These amendments, which are supported by the Mayor of London and all political parties on the London Assembly, would remedy this discrepancy.

The amendments also propose that the power to reject a draft police and crime plan would be exercisable by the whole Assembly. I am very aware that the Bill’s provisions suggest that none of the functions of the police and crime panel should be carried out by the full Assembly. However the whole point of vesting this specific power in the full Assembly, as opposed to in a committee of the Assembly, is to provide consistency with the provisions of the Localism Bill in relation to mayoral strategies.

These amendments would ensure that accountability arrangements within the Greater London Authority are coherent and internally consistent.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I have put my name to the amendments to which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred. It is extraordinarily anomalous that two Bills that we will be considering at the same time in your Lordships’ House have such very different provisions for the role of the London Assembly and the strategies of the mayor. It seems sensible that they are made consistent. The proposal that the London Assembly has the power to reject—or, when it comes to the Localism Bill, perhaps even amend—the plan is extremely important and it would be sensible if the power was consistent across the two pieces of legislation.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Lords Chamber

On Amendment 123C, I offer congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I was struggling with how to deal with a call-in right and could not see where it could be called in to. I am glad to support his amendment because it deals with it very neatly.

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group and I would like to speak briefly to both of them. As this is the first time that I have spoken in this stage of the Bill’s passage. I need to declare an interest as a member of the London Assembly, a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority and a member of the Home Office Olympic Security Board. I am pleased that I do not have to say all that every time I stand up to speak.

I shall deal first with Amendment 156 and then go on briefly to Amendment 165. The purpose of this amendment is to clarify the powers of the London Assembly to co-opt independent members to the police and crime panel, which might otherwise be subject to legal challenge. The Bill establishes police and crime panels throughout the country but there are different arrangements for London. Outside London each police and crime panel will consist of 10 or more members of the local authority plus two independent members who are co-opted. Within London the police and crime panel will be one of the Assembly committees, formed as a panel, and it may co-opt independent members. To make this possible the Bill removes the restriction in the Greater London Authority Act which provides that only Assembly members may serve on ordinary committees of the Assembly. However, I believe that the Bill is very unclear on certain aspects. It does not make it explicit that the London Assembly could appoint independent members. It also does not make it explicit that if the London Assembly did appoint independent members, it could allow them to vote. There is no provision in any of the other legislation that gives the Assembly such powers, so if the Assembly were to appoint independent members to the police and crime panel it could be open to legal challenge.

This amendment would remedy that deficiency by giving the London Assembly the specific power to appoint independent members to the panel, thereby removing the possibility of legal challenge. The amendment is important regardless of whether the current London Assembly wishes to appoint independent members because it would make the Bill sustainable in the long term. I should add that the amendment would not give special treatment to London; it would merely try to treat London in the same way as the rest of the country.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee has covered many of the points on Amendment 165 and I do not intend to repeat what she has said. I would just agree wholeheartedly with her assessment that it is essential that the panel has the right to summon the Metropolitan Police in London and senior members of the police staff to give evidence. For example, if the Mayor of London identifies neighbourhood policing as a priority, the panel will need information about the allocation of resources within the Metropolitan Police, and about its performance, in order to inform its deliberations. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said so powerfully the other day, we on the Metropolitan Police Authority hold the commission and the police to account in public. We question police officers, including senior police officers, and we receive and publish information provided by the Metropolitan Police. It is very important that we continue to do this, and that there is openness and transparency. It is important also to point out that the amendment enjoys the support not just of my party but of all parties on the London Assembly.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendments 156 and 165, which deal with the panel arrangements in London. It is worth reflecting on the way in which the London arrangements will be substantially different from those in the rest of the country. The Bill replaces the panel responsibility on the London Assembly. Therefore, one will not be able to make—in the way that one will elsewhere in the country—the automatic assumption that every relevant local authority will be represented on that forum. There will be representatives from various parts of London, but it is possible that some parts of London will not be represented on the London Assembly panel. Therefore, it is worth remembering that the London arrangements for the panel are significantly different.

This highlights also the importance of Amendment 156 in dealing with co-opted members. It is designed not to frustrate the Government's intention but to tidy it up. If there are such co-opted members, they should be appointed by a resolution of the whole London Assembly, which would avoid some of the complexities that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, highlighted. I support the points made by her and by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about who could be summoned to a panel. This is a particularly important issue, not just in London but around the country.

In the past, I talked about two particular difficulties with some of the arrangements in the Bill. First, where is the visible answerability of the police service in any particular area to those who are holding it to account? I understand the Government's argument, which is that in London the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime will hold the police service to account, and that outside London it will be the police and crime commissioner—or the police and crime commission, if the House’s preferred option goes forward. However, the scrutiny process will be very strange if the only scrutiny that is possible will be of the actions of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime—or the deputy MOPC, because the mayor will almost certainly appoint a deputy—and, in areas outside London, of the police and crime commissioner.

There are a number of problems with that. It will mean that the entire focus of discussion will be about political debate. One elected politician will appear before a group of other elected politicians, possibly with one or two independents. Discussion will focus on the political decisions that the policing and crime commissioner, or the mayor’s office, have taken. That is all well and good: people may say that that is as it should be. However, I suspect that one will lose a lot of the granularity around what has happened in the police service in that area in the intervening period with which the panel is concerned.

We are told that the chief officer of police—the commissioner of police in the metropolis—may attend meetings of the panel. However, they will not be obliged to attend, but may attend by their own grace and favour. The importance of Amendment 165 and parallel amendments is that they would ensure an expectation that certain senior police officers could be required to attend. That will be critical to ensure that the discussion moves away from the political knockabout that all of us in Committee enjoy and have participated in at various times in our life, and towards scrutiny of important policing issues. The panel will have the power to call before it senior police officers who are responsible for the area of policing that is being debated. This will be critical to remove some of the political knockabout that will otherwise happen and to provide at least some, though not all, of the visible political answerability that is so necessary to policing.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Wednesday 27th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I would like to address my remarks to how Part 1 will impact on London. I need to begin by declaring an interest as chair of the London Assembly. I also serve on the Metropolitan Police Authority and the Home Office Olympic security board. I have a number of concerns about this Bill, not least the Government's plans to implement it in London from 1 October this year. There are two reasons for my concerns: the Olympic Games and the London mayoral elections.

The Games are not just a London issue; they will affect every police force in the country. They take place between July and September next year but there are also many preparatory events—notably the torch relay, which will start on 18 May, last for 70 days and impact on every area of the UK. The Olympics present the biggest peacetime challenge the police have ever faced and officers from all over Britain will be involved in providing mutual aid. The logistics of this huge operation are truly mind-blowing. The Met has spent years planning for every eventuality and will continue to refine those plans right up to the Games. To force the police to divert their efforts from the security of the Games to a major reorganisation at this critical time almost beggars belief.

If that was not enough there is also the issue of the mayoral election in London next May, the outcome of which is uncertain. It is quite possible that a new policing system could be put in place this October, designed to reflect a Conservative agenda, only to be dismantled again next May if another party wins the mayoral election. Such an expensive and time-consuming process should happen only once. The Bill does not stipulate when its provisions will be implemented and the Government are free to choose a sensible date. I strongly urge them to do so.

My next concern involves the democratic legitimacy of the office of police and crime commissioner as exercised in London. The Bill provides for the post of elected police commissioner to be carried out by the Mayor of London, in the form of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. The mayor may appoint a deputy mayor for policing and crime with most of the same powers and responsibilities. However, there is no requirement for the deputy mayor to be an elected person. The mayor could simply hand this job to a non-elected friend, making a complete nonsense of the argument about democratic legitimacy.

I have a specific concern regarding the proposed system of police complaints in London. The Bill proposes that, where senior officers below the rank of deputy commissioner are subject to complaint, responsibility should be moved from the Metropolitan Police Authority to the commissioner, who will hear not just the complaint but the appeals. This would make the commissioner both judge and jury, and remove all elements of independence and transparency. I believe we should remedy this by making the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime the relevant appeal body. Like other noble Lords, I believe that the powers of the police and crime panels need to be significantly enhanced. I have three specific proposals for London: that the panel should be able to reject the mayor's draft police and crime plan by a two-thirds majority; that the panel should have the power to require senior officers from the Met to provide information and attend meetings; and that the power to co-opt voting independent members to the panel should be vested in the London Assembly, to ensure that such appointees have a proper statutory basis that is not open to challenge.

One of the greatest weaknesses of the Bill is its provisions for the hiring and firing of chief constables and I share many of the concerns that other noble Lords expressed. We need appropriate procedures to ensure that those appointed have the necessary professional knowledge and experience, that dismissals are for professional or disciplinary failures and not political convenience, and that operational independence cannot be compromised by inappropriate political pressure via the threat of a dismissal.

My final point concerns the duty of the Home Secretary to issue a strategic policing requirement to deal with national threats. Under these proposals, police and crime commissioners would effectively be free to disregard such requirements in favour of political expediency or re-election strategies. They must be obliged to respect them. When we move to Committee, I shall seek to address all these issues.