Welfare Reform and Work Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(8 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Hollins
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 67, in support of my noble friend Lady Campbell. Given the Government’s ambitious commitment to halve the disability employment gap, it seems logical and common sense to require the Secretary of State to report on progress, but such a report would need to be broken down by disability or impairment. For example, the Spinal Injuries Association draws attention to a number of issues that prevent people with new spinal cord injuries returning to work. I shall mention just two of those. The first is the need to have the right care and support package in place that is flexible enough to enable a person to work. The second is the need for accessible transport to and from work.
The employment rate for people with learning disabilities, mental illness and autism remains stubbornly low, which highlights the very real structural and attitudinal barriers that exist for them. Worryingly, the Health & Social Care Information Centre reports that the percentage of people with learning disabilities in paid work has dropped from 7.1% to 6% in the past few years. To be frank, the current government employment schemes have failed people with learning disabilities. The National Development Team for Inclusion has done some thorough research into the cost-effectiveness of employment support for people with mental health problems and learning disabilities. It shows that much of the current public spending in this area is being wasted, as it goes on non-evidence-based models that are more expensive and have poorer outcomes than the approaches that do work. If scaled up, effective interventions could be expected to support up to three times as many people in retaining paid work. This would save considerable sums in traditional care services.
A major obstacle for people with learning disabilities to getting into work is the lack of aspiration, for themselves if they have grown up not having any expectation of working, and of their families, their supporters and the professionals who advise them. The two approaches found by the NDTi to be effective were individual placement support and supported employment. I declare an interest here as I have published a book for employers which tells the story of Gary Butler and his work at St George’s, University of London, where he is employed to teach medical students how to communicate with people with learning disabilities. It is interesting because it is a job which only those with learning disabilities can do. The normal image of work that is suitable for such people is traditionally along the lines of collecting trolleys at Sainsbury’s and so on, but there are jobs which are particularly suited to people’s own needs and interests. St George’s has been employing two people with learning disabilities as trainers for 23 years. It is something that I initiated after having seen a similar kind of scheme in Boston.
With the right support, people with learning disabilities and those with mental illness make valued employees who are more likely to stay in work with lower sickness rates than non-disabled people, and there is research evidence for this. I hope that the Minister will recognise the value of a detailed report so as to understand any remaining barriers to halving the disability employment gap and, as my noble friend said, to get behind the figures.
Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 64A. On 25 November, the Chancellor stated that he was determined that the economic recovery would be,
“for all, felt in all parts of our nation”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/11/15; col. 1358.]
Increasing employment is a key indicator of the benefits of economic recovery, but there is much debate about whether the increase has been at the cost of job quality, weak pay growth and productivity performance, and rising and deepening job insecurity for a significant number of workers. Understanding the reality and extent of these concerns is important to understanding progress to full employment. Level of employment is a necessary but not sufficient indicator of whether the recovery is benefiting all parts of the nation and providing opportunity for all, which the Chancellor aspires to.
The plethora of amendments to the Clause 1 obligation to report on progress to full employment reveals that many noble Lords share that concern, if for slightly different reasons. Amendment 64A requires the report to address additionally what is happening within the labour market, in particular but not exclusively in terms of changing employment practices and types of employment, as well as on self-employment, non-guaranteed hours of work, quantitative and qualitative underemployment—that is, people working fewer hours than they want, or at a lower level of skill than they are capable of—and younger workers.
The UK Commission for Employment and Skills reports that, since 2008, the UK labour market has been more efficient than some other economies in keeping people at work, but that there have been significant changes in the nature of that employment and that those at the margin are impacted especially harshly. Labour productivity is struggling to recover. This results from factors such as the decline in youth employment, rising underemployment, a falling number of jobs in middle-skill occupations and a shift to a lower-wage, lower-skill economy. There are concentrations of unemployment and evidence of quantitative and qualitative underemployment. The commission found that nearly half of establishments reported that they had employees with skills more advanced than their job required, which accounts for 16% of the workforce and 4.3 million workers—indeed, more than are considered to have a skills gap.
If the commission is correct, when it comes to considering how full employment is interpreted, the available supply of labour will be much bigger than those officially classified as unemployed. Economic growth has increased employment but not always of the type and with the hours that people seek. If the Government want to achieve opportunity for all and lower welfare, the higher minimum wage cannot be a direct replacement for welfare. Arithmetic tells us that the £4 billion rise in pay it will produce will not compensate many whose benefits will fall as a result of the £12 billion cuts. The minimum wage targets the hourly pay of low earners and we hope that it will deliver increased productivity. Welfare supports low-income families. A goal to benefit all families needs the progress report to cover types of employment and practices.
The rise in self-employment—83% of net gains in employment between 2007 and 2014, rising to 4.5 million and 15% of workers—was accompanied by a 22% fall in self-employed average median income. The Resolution Foundation found that more than half of full-time, self-employed people are low paid, compared to around one in five employees. My noble friend Lady Donaghy gave an excellent articulation of the problem and any repetition from me would merely detract from that clarity. To restate, increasing the minimum wage is a solution largely confined to those directly employed. The minimum wage does not apply to low earning, self-employed people. Whether self-employment falls with recovery is uncertain, but policies focused on increasing high-wage employment need to deliver for the self-employed too.
The labour market has witnessed the rise of other precarious forms of employment, such as a sustained increase in the use of fixed-period contracts, casual employment, short-term arrangements and non-guaranteed hours. Recent ONS updates on the use of non-guaranteed hours contracts—zero hours for short—reveal around 1.5 million such contracts where work was carried out in the survey period, which is an increase of 6%. But in addition to the 1.5 million, there were 1.9 million contracts where no work was carried out, which is up from 1.3 million. This is not a small business phenomenon, as nearly half of businesses with employment of 250 or more make use of non-guaranteed hours contracts, compared with 10% of businesses with less than 20.
The key observation is that the increased use of non-guaranteed hours contracts over a period of stronger employment recovery suggests that they are becoming a permanent feature. The Resolution Foundation comments that,
“it is clear that this form of working is not fading away as our employment recovery gains ground … some people value the flexibility offered by ZHCs, for many they bring deep insecurity … for those affected—particularly in low-paying sectors … the danger is that job insecurity is becoming deeper”.
The Clause 1 report needs to inform us whether such contracts are becoming a standard form of employment in low-paid sectors, such as hospitality, care and retail, and how the Government will respond.
Baroness Drake
The Minister is taking us through a series of reasons why he cannot give the granularity in the report that people seek. Given that the Chancellor said that it was his aspiration to have a higher-wage, low-welfare economy that benefits all, unless Parliament has some granularity in the metrics for assessing that progress, it sounds as though the Chancellor is setting his own aspiration and his own marking system. Everyone agrees that there has been a material change in the nature of employment over the last 10 years, which influences what people can earn and how they can participate in the labour force. If one aspires to a low-welfare economy that benefits all, we need to understand these trends and what is happening to people with disabilities, the self-employed, carers, people on zero-hours contracts and so on. The Minister seems to be listing why that cannot be provided.
Lord Freud
As the noble Baroness knows perfectly well, so I do not have to tell her, a lot of these issues are quite contentious and there is a lot of analysis going on, some of which takes many years to complete and to come to fruition. Our problem is that this commitment runs through the rest of this Government to 2020, and putting in some of the management information requirements that these amendments in practice look for is expensive and risks delaying universal credit, because we are on a tight timetable. I know noble Lords have a primary interest in seeing us move with as much speed as we safely can. We would probably not be provided with adequate information anyway, given the length of time it takes to get it into shape, to take us out to the 2020 deadline. I hope that has cleanly summarised why we are not objecting with horror to the prospect. We looked at it very deeply, but we have to use the information that is available and the extra information we are gathering to get this report to work.
Baroness Drake
I am not trying to put an argument for deferring universal credit, and I understand some of the difficulties, but at the very least the Government should be able to commit to giving us an interim report on the progress they are making on these issues, so we can begin to understand the likely developments and how successful the Chancellor’s aspirations are.
Lord Freud
The whole point of our clause is that we will set out our proposals on how we intend to report on employment. Clearly, a lot of the thoughts expressed here and the specific requests and reasoning are pretty valuable to us as we develop how best we can do a good report on what is happening to our progress to full employment.
Our latest figures on NEETs are rather encouraging and show that around 14% of 16 to 24 year-olds are NEETs, which is the lowest figure on record. It is a constantly changing group, and many people leave the labour market for short periods between jobs, so it does not tell us, of itself, where we stand in relation to full employment. Zero hours—which I almost thought I would not talk about, because we always have a little snip at each other about it—is only 2% of the market and we have outlawed exclusivity clauses in those contracts. Over the past year, part-time work has been driven entirely by people choosing to work part-time, which might not have been the case in the depth of the recession. Again, it is a constantly changing group.
On some of the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, I sometimes feel I am living in a parallel universe. Employment growth has been dominated by full-time and permanent employment. It has risen in all regions since 2010. Underemployment is on the turn and going the right way. Wages are now growing quite a lot faster than inflation and temporary work in the UK is among the lowest, so the trends are a lot more encouraging than they have been.
Given these arguments, and given that statistics on these issues are already widely available, I do not believe that specifying them in the report is necessary. However, I understand that full employment is not just about a particular percentage of working-age adults in work, and, as I have said, we will give further consideration to how this annual report can best reflect the diversity of labour. I apologise for the length of my response. I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Welfare Reform and Work Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(8 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, because Clause 11 removes eligibility for the child element of child tax credits for the third and subsequent children and Clause 12 introduces the two-child limit for receipt of the child element of universal credit for families making a new claim. Families with three or more children could lose up to £2,780 per year for each additional child, and may also face the loss of the family element of tax credits—currently £540 per year per family.
Like other noble Lords, I am deeply concerned about the impact of these changes on the families of friends and kinship carers. Some 22% have three or more children in their household—about 29,000 families. That is why these amendments seek to exempt kinship carers from the two-child limit. Otherwise, future carers voluntarily taking on vulnerable children will hit a financial barrier to support, even where the third child is disabled. Yet these carers will still incur significant costs and may face financial distress from taking on these children. Kinship carers provide vital support for some 200,000 children when parents are unable to care for them, often because of urgent circumstances. The children frequently have emotional difficulties, often because they have been living with parents who are drug-dependent or who have abused or neglected them.
The Family Rights Group estimates that exempting carers from the two-child limit would cost £30 million. Yet these carers already save taxpayers the cost of placing the children in care. To restate the figures referred to by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth, the cost of keeping a child in care for a year is £40,000. The cost of care proceedings is £25,000. The savings that the 132,000 kinship families deliver by voluntarily caring for these 200,000 children run into billions. The disincentive effect of the two-child limit needs to deter only 200 kinship carers from caring in the future for three or more children, and the £30 million saving would be wiped out. That is without counting the human cost to the children.
This disincentive effect on kinship carers is compounded by the benefit cap, which will be set at an increasingly lower level. Kinship carers are not entitled to paid leave while children are settled; they care for the children at their own cost. Some 49% have to give up work when the children move in, or reduce their earnings, because they need to take time to settle a distressed child—often a requirement imposed by the social worker, for good reason. Children can arrive with no notice, after a late evening call from the social worker asking the carer to take the children. The impact of the two-child limit on the kinship carer is deeply unfair, and could act as a disincentive to care for the children. It will impact on future carers, whether working with modest incomes or not working. It will impact harshly on carers who already have their own children, or who are young themselves and want to have their own children—such as the family that Grandparents Plus is in touch with, a sibling carer and his partner who are raising four brothers and sisters since their father’s death as well as their own baby.
Let us look at the reasoning for withdrawing support for any child beyond the first two. The impact assessment advises that the Government expect the limiting of the child element of child tax credit and universal credit to the first two children to,
“encourage parents to reflect carefully on their readiness to support an additional child”.
Of course, such a statement is a nonsense—in fact, contrary to common sense—in the context of kinship carers. The need is not to get such carers to reflect carefully on their readiness to care for the vulnerable child. To the contrary, public policy needs to support such carers in their readiness to care for an additional vulnerable child. That is better for the children and secures savings for the state by not placing them in the care system. Kinship carers are not the birth parents of the children, but voluntarily embrace their care. The Government stress that the limits on benefits beyond the first two children is a behaviour-related measure, because,
“encouraging parents to reflect carefully on their readiness to support an additional child could have a positive effect on overall family stability”.
However, such reasoning is incoherent when applied to kinship carers. Encouraging carers to pause and reflect on the disincentives in the Bill on taking responsibility for a vulnerable child could, perversely, have a negative effect on the family stability available to the child. Kinship carers should not be disincentivised; they should be supported.
During the passage of the Children and Families Bill, I listened to a BBC radio programme examining the experiences of kinship carers and interviewing a lady who recounted the night—she remembered the date, having celebrated her birthday with her own two children—when her doorbell rang around midnight. She opened the door to see a police officer, a social worker and two distressed children, her sister’s children, at risk of domestic violence. She told movingly of how she had raised those children along with her own two, and had struggled, with little support from the local authority services, and of how proud she was of the recent graduation of the little girl on her doorstep that night. That alone was a powerful story but she went on to recall how, a few years after that night, the doorbell rang, again late at night. This time, the policeman and the social worker were holding her sister’s baby. The interviewer asked if she was tempted to decline to take the baby in view of the lack of support that she had received previously. I remember the incredulity in the woman’s voice at the question, and the power of her answer to the effect of: “How could I abandon a little baby just because I had been poorly treated?”. She brought up five children, two that she gave birth two and three that she embraced. I ask the Minister: if someone like that lady were faced with a similar scenario in future, under this Bill, what behavioural response would the Government be seeking to achieve from them with the two-child limit on benefits?
If the Government disincentivise kinship carers, the people they will hurt are vulnerable children. I doubt that that would pass the public litmus test. The Minister has previously demonstrated his understanding of the importance of kinship carers to vulnerable children, so I ask him to commit to considering that kinship carers be exempted from the two-child limit on benefits. It does not make sense, either for the interests of the child or in terms of public expenditure.
Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. The House owes her a debt because of the exemplary work that she has done over many months and years on the subject of kinship caring. Her speech will repay careful study, and I shall look forward to doing that when the Official Report is printed.
This is going to be a harder Committee stage in social security terms than some that we have had in the past. This is basically a Bill that reduces money but does little else of interest. However, it is a very important one. I noticed that the very mild-mannered noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, characterised it as the most wretched Bill that he had ever seen in his life. That is a considered view from a moderate man, so we need to be careful about how we take our proceedings forward.
The Bill dramatically changes the money and resources available to the social security system. I am sure that everyone understands that there is a case in periods of austerity for making special arrangements to deal with immediate and urgent circumstances. However, we need to be careful that we are not making changes that, as if by magic, get woven into the social security fabric in perpetuity. What I am most worried about—this is really a discussion for clause stand part on Clauses 11 and 12—is that the two-child limit is going into universal credit. That is a matter of great concern to me. I say in passing that the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, was contrite earlier about having been too nice to the Government. Indeed he was, but I am pleased that he has put the record straight.
The department has certainly done a very good job, because the universal credit situation could have been a whole lot worse, which would have overshadowed all these proceedings in Committee. The way we contrive to support people is important, particularly those with larger families; it is mainly ethnic minority communities which have that culture, which we know predisposes them to risk of poverty, and we need to take that into account along with everything else as we go forward.
The Minister needs to listen carefully to the case for exemptions. The Committee will be faced, certainly at the later stages of proceedings on the Bill, with deciding to what extent what the Government are trying to do is reasonable in the long term as well as in the short term. As far as I am concerned—I put it bluntly on the record and cannot make it any clearer than this—I am willing to work with the Government to mitigate some of the sharp edges of the Bill as regards the savings that they hope to make. If the Government are willing to make concessions and think carefully, which the Minister in the past has demonstrated he can successfully do, and if he is willing to go away and look at some of these exemptions we are talking about today, I would be much more disposed to decline to support attempts on the Marshalled List to vote against Clauses 11 and 12 standing part. I will approach the Bill in that way. I will not be unreasonable; I perfectly well understand the financial exigencies that we must face and the continuous battle the department has with the Treasury—it would be unrealistic not to accept that. However, the onus is on the department to look at ways of mitigating some of the changes in the Bill, because it needs to be changed.
I said at Second Reading that I wanted to pursue preventive spending. After the cases that have been made, by the right reverend Prelate and others, I find it hard to believe that a saving of £30 million would not risk a much greater public cost in other silos within Treasury spend across central government as a whole. Therefore the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, on whether the Government have done any work about what it would cost if we reduced the support to kinship carers in this way is important.
The situation we face as a Committee will be difficult to reconcile unless the Government are able to answer some of these questions, certainly about spending money and investing to save in future. I certainly hope that the Government will think very carefully about some of the powerful speeches that have been made, in particular on kinship carers.
Lord Freud
Again, all I can say is that the impact assessment looks at all the impacts. The costs and savings derived are based on the full gamut of impacts.
Baroness Drake
Perhaps I may say this to the Minister. That is why I was looking back at the reasoning for this policy. When it comes to kinship carers, it cannot possibly be directed at influencing the decision of the carers as to whether or not a woman conceives and has another child, because kinship carers are taking on other people’s children. The choice is whether you embrace a vulnerable child or you abandon them. That is a totally different choice from someone in a family where their parent decides to get pregnant and have three, four or five children. Therefore the reasoning that applies to the person choosing to become pregnant is not the same reasoning that is applied when someone says at midnight, “I will take on this child rather than see them abandoned to the care system”.
Lord Freud
Clearly there is a difference between the voluntary and involuntary taking on of children, whether they are your own or anyone else’s. That is what our exemptions are for. We are seeking to try to draw the line between where it is involuntary, as in the case of rape, and where it is not.
Pensions: Reforms
Baroness Drake Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I refer to my interests in the register as a trustee of the Telefónica/O2 and Santander schemes and as a member of the boards of the Pensions Advisory Service and the Pension Quality Mark. I begin by congratulating the Minister on her appointment; I look forward to debating with her in this Chamber. She has certainly assumed responsibility for pensions at a time of radical change, but I have no doubt that she is more than capable of embracing it.
Commenting on the freedom of choice agenda is made difficult when the Government’s strategic objectives for the long term remain unclear. People now have open access to their savings, but when the state has auto-enrolled workers into schemes, compelled employers to contribute and invested billions in tax relief, there is a public policy interest in knowing what the Government’s intended long-term outcomes are. As the noble Lord, Lord Flight, conceded in opening this welcome debate, we no longer have a private pension system; rather, we have a long-term saving system. We no longer talk about desirable replacement incomes, because people are no longer required to secure an income. What is the desirable savings pot size for the median earner that policies should be targeting? What is the Government’s aspiration for contribution rates and how will they achieve them? What is the intended balance between individual freedom and societal outcome? As my noble friend Lord Hutton indicated, these are matters of some significance, on which society requires the political system to come to a consensus position.
Let us take employers, for example. Their workplace pensions are key to delivering savings. The Government’s pension proposition has to be attractive to the senior managers who decide on their company’s pension arrangements if we are to avoid a drift to simple minimum compliance. Employers’ disengagement from pensions was, after all, a major reason for the decline in savings that led to auto-enrolment and employer compulsion. Yet their behavioural response to the freedom agenda has attracted very little analysis. There are more changes to come—tax relief, lifetime allowance, annual allowance, salary sacrifice—but what is the impact of policy decisions on the level of employers’ engagement with pension saving? Saving for retirement is a 40-year project and policies must work not only for today’s older workers who have been able to save but also for younger people who are still to save if they are to get to retirement and have a reasonable existence.
There is clearly benefit in giving greater freedom to the saver, but the impact of the extent of the freedoms, the speed of their introduction, the response of the market, the shift of the risk to the individual and the impacts on employers were never fully considered. The Government are dependent on the market to deliver the choice agenda, yet we know that there are features of the pensions market that hinder the proper functioning of competition—complexity, consumer inertia, asymmetry of knowledge—and that legitimise more state intervention than would otherwise be the case.
We see problems emerging that were raised in this House only days ago, in particular by my noble friend Lord Bradley. It was therefore welcome to hear the Chancellor acknowledge that there are concerns that some companies are not doing their part to make those freedoms accessible and that the Government are now considering a cap on charges and have asked the FCA to investigate. Yet the FCA warned some months ago, in its interim report on the retirement income market, that consumers were poorly placed to drive effective competition and that the introduction of greater choice and more complex products would reduce consumer confidence and weaken the competitive pressure on employers to provide good value.
What of the requirement on the independent governance committees to report on draw-down products? Will the Minister be asking them to give the matter priority? The Chancellor advised that he wants to make sure that savers are treated fairly, but the FCA’s rules on treating customers fairly contain no explicit requirement on providers to act in the best interests of savers. They rely on effective competition to deliver for the saver, yet time and time again experience shows that competition is not able to deal with conflicts of interest and the failure to deliver value for money. The Government need to find a sustained resolution to the dysfunctions in this market. We cannot go on endlessly dealing only with the symptoms.
What is required is not an alignment of interests but a hierarchy of interests, where conflicts of interest are resolved in favour of the saver. Providers have to be able to make a profit but only on products which are designed and operated in the saver’s interest and which provide value for money. Now, we face an urgent need for substantive data so that regulators and the Government can identify early and respond quickly to emerging problems. It would be helpful to know from the Minister how the Government intend to meet this need.
New freedoms come with new inefficiencies, which undermine value for money. These include some providers’ restrictive processes for accessing the freedoms, their charges for advice, for transfer out and for transfer in, charges for looking after your money, charges for accessing your money, embedded commission and other charges, which need to be addressed.
There is a danger in the current debate that the message simply becomes, “Everyone must be free to make a dash for the cash and no barriers must be put in their way”, but of course that cannot be right either, and we need a measured debate on this matter. The Government are right to require individuals to take advice in certain circumstances, such as when seeking to transfer substantial defined benefits or protected rights into cash. The risk from pension scams is growing.
It is right that people take time to consider their options, because choices taken can be irreversible. We want providers to behave more responsibly. It is difficult to compel providers to provide certain products, and one would not want to compel the inefficient ones simply because of the debate that is currently taking place. We know that some employers and trustees are reluctant to provide access to choice through their workplace schemes. They are concerned about their own liability. Some fear associating with poor decision-making by savers or assisting access to products in case there is a mis-selling scandal. They are waiting to see how the market evolves.
Providers are setting their own access processes and requirements for customers wanting flexible access. Some face problems. As Martin Wheatley at the FCA observed, the timescale for delivering the freedoms and design products was challenging, and providers struggled to complete due diligence testing on their products. Many have had to significantly change their business model, systems and procedures. For some, that remains a big challenge. Some providers may also be cautious because they fear the risk of mis-selling. When advice should or should not be required is an example of the struggle between public policy and what the market feels it wants as its operating model.
The issue of the ease and cost of transferring from one scheme to another so that people can access their freedoms becomes of increasing importance, as the Government are now discovering. However, we know that there are real inefficiencies in facilitating ease of transfer between one pension scheme and another.
Much of the recent debate is focused on the post-55s, significant numbers of whom were in good occupational schemes. They may not be reliant solely on their DC pots; they may have other incomes, such as from DB schemes, but over time this will change. The savings of future generations may all be DC. Greater freedom and irrevocable decisions put more risk and responsibility on to the individual.
The Minister wishes to promote greater financial awareness and understanding, and the decision to provide guaranteed guidance was a welcome step in that direction. However, the need for guidance over a working life will grow as the personal responsibility to make provision for retirement and other needs increases. Access to advice at a cost that is reasonable, particularly for those on moderate incomes, will not be readily available. People will be left with limited support if there is no source of independent and impartial guidance. People need guidance from a trusted source, delivered by an entity that has no commercial interest in the customer’s next steps. This allows the guidance to be personalised and gets closer to the boundary of the advice—without stepping over it—that can be delivered by a commercial organisation that has a vested interest.
Guidance should be offered at the main life event touch points, such as student loans, childcare costs, changing employment and starting to save. If the future is greater personal responsibility, the provision of support and guidance needs to be more radical. The noble Baroness has been radical in the past and I am sure that she will be so in the future.
Perhaps I may conclude by making a personal plea to the Minister: could she please pay full regard to the position of women in pension reforms? We now face a situation where a little over one in three of the people who are auto-enrolled are women. In part, the problem has evolved because of the earnings trigger—the level of earnings that you have to achieve before your employer is obliged to auto-enrol you into a pension scheme. Fortunately, after several years of argument, the Government have frozen the value of the earnings trigger rather than relentlessly tracking the income tax threshold. I fear that there is a loss of focus on the need for the private pension system to work for women as much as for men. At the moment, two in every three of the people being auto-enrolled are men. I hope that the sororal commitments of the Minister, which have been ably and warmly demonstrated in the past, are not diminished by ministerial office.
Pensions: Draw-down Charges
Baroness Drake Excerpts(8 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Freud
We are doing that, as exemplified by the new Pensions Minister meeting the industry and working with it to make sure that it produces the right level of charging. The Government and the FCA are able to monitor that to see that we get appropriate and fair charges.
Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register of interests, including my role with the Pensions Advisory Service. Some providers of income draw-down will charge between £150 and £200 each time a customer takes out cash, so a person with a £30,000 pot who takes out £5,000 in cash over six years will lose between £900 and £1,200. Will the Minister challenge the industry on why the charge to access cash now is so ridiculously high?
Lord Freud
As I said at the outset, this market is two months old and we are watching very closely to see how the charges develop. There is a range of different charges; some providers charge for drawing down and others do not, but we will be watching it very closely.
Pensions Act 2011 (Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014
Baroness Drake Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope (LD)
My Lords, I am pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to this technical debate. I declare an interest as chairman of the defined benefit superannuation scheme of the General Medical Council, so unfortunately I know nothing about money purchase schemes. I did try, honestly—I took home the 36-page judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, and read it carefully until Germany scored the second goal. I still do not understand the noble and learned Lord’s reasoning, but I am sure that it is sound.
I hope that the Minister can help me. I understand that we are dealing with two sets of statutory instruments. The department deserves credit for taking on board the suggestion made by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of teasing out the negative from the affirmative. That is always good practice. However, I do not know where the transitional regulation, Regulation 1711, comes from. I assumed that it would have been sensible to have taken these together because they talk about the same thing and are all part of a piece. However, I may have missed something and the Minister might be able to put me right on the procedure that is involved.
This is a small but important issue and anyone who looks at it will be reminded of the ineffable complexity of our pensions system. I have to say that although this is the right thing to do and I am content with the regulations, they form another layer of complexity—because they have to. If money purchase is not defined in this way, it would leave a terrible amount of uncertainty. If people do not understand a valid, watertight description of money purchase, chaos will ensue. Lots of schemes could get into even greater difficulties in the future.
We always have to be careful about retrospective provision. These regulations go back to 1 January 1997. I understand perfectly why and, in the circumstances, that is justified, but, as I say, we must always be careful about retrospective provision. However, I think this is the right tactic. It is not perfect because retrospection never is, but the stated case is accepted, certainly as far as I am concerned. Clarity is the order of the day, as much as we can achieve it in pension provision.
I have a couple of questions for the Minister. Some of these things are imponderable because the data are not available in money purchase schemes to the same extent as in defined benefit schemes, but the number of affected schemes has been listed as being around 800. Is there an update on that figure and is there now a better definition? Has the number gone up or down since these matters started to be drawn up by the department? I also want to try to understand what the costs of non-compliance would amount to. What is the worst that could happen? If everything that can go wrong does go wrong, what would happen to hybrid schemes such as these which involve money purchase in a way that we have to change through these regulations?
As the chairman of a superannuation scheme myself, the key and overriding priority of a trustee is to protect the members’ benefits. Are there any circumstances where benefits afforded to members could be prejudiced by these changes? I have looked at the very helpful Explanatory Memorandum. Paragraph 19 explains the provisions of,
“transitional measures to assist affected schemes in three ways”.
The first bullet point talks about,
“retrospective protection so that schemes do not have to revisit past decisions”,
and goes on to conclude that,
“there is very likely to be no detrimental material impact on member benefits”.
That is a nuanced subordinate clause, and perhaps it has to be so. I would rather have the truth than be given a more definitive statement that was easier to understand and more reassuring. However, that is a key question for me. If I could be given some reassurance on that point, I would be even happier than I am at the moment.
Finally, I think that the consultation was exemplary. I looked at the document very carefully and the department did everything it could. The consultation was responded to well and those who did respond are experts who know the exact consequences of these changes. For me, that has lifted a great deal of concern and apprehension about the effects of these changes. These regulations reflect circumstances that no one could have foreseen and the Government have responded to them in the best way they can. The situation is still a bit fuzzy at the edges, but I hope that the Minister will give us an assurance that the appropriate officials who understand these things will monitor the position so that we can be assured in the fullness of time that the assumptions we are making of very little or no loss of benefit to individual members are found to be what happens in practice in the future.
Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interests as a trustee of both the Santander and Telefónica pension schemes.
This statutory instrument has been on a rather interesting journey. In part it supersedes draft regulations published in May, which were withdrawn and subsequently divided into two in order to separate provisions required to go through affirmative procedure from those required to go through negative procedure. It has therefore been a little confusing to try to anticipate the affirmative provisions to be relaid in the form of a pared-down instrument, as this SI was not laid until last Thursday. Having said that, I appreciate that dealing with the uncertainties and complexities that flow from the Supreme Court decision in Bridge cannot have been straightforward for the Government. I compliment the drafters of the Explanatory Memoranda and the impact assessment, who tried to provide clarity as to what the Government intend and why, in what to most normal people would seem a rather dense and complex set of requirements.
The two regulations have separate Explanatory Memoranda, but they share a common impact assessment, so one can assume that certain key assumptions and conclusions underpin both orders. I refer in particular to the fact that, having considered the consultation responses, the department has changed its policy on retrospection for non-compliant schemes. Decisions taken by schemes between 1 January 1997 and the coming into force of Section 29 will be validated, except in two limited circumstances that relate to winding up and employer debt, where there is a risk to members’ benefits.
The department has been persuaded that it would therefore be unduly burdensome to require schemes to revisit past decisions, which could give rise to expensive administrative costs that could deplete scheme assets and therefore the ability to fund members’ benefits—that is the argument put by the Government—and that the impact of members’ benefits of revisiting past decisions since July 2011 would be negligible. In summary, the Government are persuaded that with two exceptions, Section 29 will come into force only with prospective effect; there will be retrospective protection for schemes and past decisions will be validated.
However, in coming to that view and giving that retrospective protection to decisions made, the department is unable to quantify the impact of the regulations on schemes likely to be affected. There are no data available at an industry-wide level. The consultation did not elicit sufficient data at scheme level to allow the department to produce reliable estimates of the impacts on schemes and on members—and indeed, on employers. The department engaged further through the pensions regulator’s annual survey and the wider pensions industry to enable some quantification of costs and benefit. However, insufficient information was forthcoming.
A question must be, therefore: are the Government right to be persuaded, and indeed confident, that except in the defined limited circumstances that they have identified, there is negligible risk to members’ benefits in validating decisions taken by schemes before the coming into force of Section 29? Should there be more exceptions to the retrospective validation? How do the Government give themselves the level of confidence they need to give that retrospective validation? I will illustrate my concern with reference to a couple of examples.
The very important rules which govern any attempts to change pension rights or entitlements are detailed in Section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995, popularly referred to as “Section 67 rights”—an often quoted phrase because of its protected nature. During the course of the consultation on the regulations arising from the Pensions Act 2011, stakeholders advised the department that there could be schemes which had inadvertently changed their benefits from non-money purchase to money purchase; for example, by removing a guarantee from a cash balance scheme because of their interpretation of the law in force at the time. In doing so they may not have secured the members’ consent as is required.
The department has taken the view that schemes should not be required to revisit these decisions and that it would deem that the requirements of Section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995 had been satisfied where the actuarial equivalence requirements were met before such a scheme modification took effect. But those actuarial equivalence assumptions may not hold good over the longer term, and the issue remains that a guarantee or some other right has been removed without consent. The Section 67 requirements have not been met and the beneficiaries may be worse off.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, this may be an appropriate moment to intervene because I want to push the Minister on a couple of points. I have been trying to anticipate when he would be coming to the end of his remarks.
Perhaps I may go back to two points. First, Section 67 rights under the 1995 Act are pretty important rights that get people rather excited. The concern I was trying to express was that this seems to set the precedent that you can provide retrospective protection for schemes that have breached Section 67 rights and obligations. What level of assurance can the Minister give that this is not a precedent that could be used for undermining the strength of Section 67 in the future by giving retrospective protection?
Secondly, in terms of how this retrospective protection applies where schemes have breached Section 67, I should point out that the Government do not know which schemes have done this. They have just heard about this from the industry, so they are giving a sort of blanket assurance without knowing the number and type of breaches of Sections 67. If they do not meet the actuarial equivalence terms, it is not clear whether they will have to go back and redo it.
Thirdly, if they did it inadvertently, they probably did not do any actuarial equivalence exercise at the time. Is it therefore being said that they can do one with hindsight now, and can look back and say, “Had that been applied at the time”? It is quite important to get clarity on this Section 67 point, because there are lots of disputes and case law around it. It tends to get people who are interested in members’ benefits quite excited if there is an attempt to compromise it in some way.
On the flipping schemes, which are not protected in terms of access to the PPF until April 2015, I note that, as was said, if you have not paid the levy then the liability if your employer goes insolvent should not go to other levy payers. However, the issue is that it is a government responsibility, because the Government are obliged under the EU directive. I was looking for as firm an assurance as possible that, if an employer with a scheme that has to flip from DC to DB goes into insolvency before or up to April 2015, the Government will not walk away from giving some kind of protection to those schemes with DB benefits the members of which may now be caught outside the protection regime; hopefully there are none or, if there are, they are very tiny.
Lord Bates
I am grateful for those additional points. Let me try to answer them as best I can. It might be helpful if I wrote to the noble Baroness and shared those responses with the Committee. I realise that they are important issues.
To respond to the specific issue of Section 67 rights, the appropriate regulation is Regulation 8(3)(b). The Government believe that the protection is not undermined, because there must have been an actuarial equivalence. If they do not meet the actuarial equivalence requirements, they will have to go back and unpick them. In fact, the regulations introduce a new protection for members, which underpins the benefits. However, as I said, I shall seek further guidance on that and write to the noble Baroness and other Members of the Committee.
These draft regulations make modifications to existing primary legislation to provide supplementary and consequential measures to support the coming into force of the clarified definition of money purchase benefits in Section 29 of the Pensions Act 2011. I hope that I have set out for the Committee the rationale for these regulations and have responded to the matters raised. I commend these regulations to the Committee.
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Lord Lawson of Blaby (Con)
My Lords, I need not detain the House long because, I am glad to say, my noble friend the Minister has met pretty well in full the points that we made at earlier stages of the Bill. I am extremely grateful to him for that. There is a real mischief in the huge range of costs which bear no relation whatever to investment performance incurred in different pension schemes. It has always been known, but it was documented fully by the Pensions Commission some time back. That we have been able to improve the Bill in this way is a tribute to this House, but particularly to my noble friend the Minister, who has listened carefully, accepted the need to deal with that mischief, and put forward a practical and sensible way of doing it.
There is only one loose end, and although the Minister dealt with it I would like to spend a minute or two on it. The amendment says “some or all” costs, but that is purely a legal technicality and in fact it means all costs, itemised. That is the firm intention. They will be published generally, not just given to the members of the schemes, so that all can see. However, as the Minister said, the provision deals exclusively with defined contribution schemes and not with defined benefit schemes. I understand his reason for that—because it is only in the defined contribution schemes that pensioners are, in effect, from time to time ripped off by investment managers who charge far too much in the way of costs. There are five times as many people in defined benefit schemes as in defined contribution schemes, however, and the money in defined benefit schemes is well over £1 trillion.
Of course, if the same kind of ripping off goes on—obviously it does; there is no difference in the investment manager’s behaviour from one to the other—it is not a victimless crime. The pensioners may not be the victims, but the shareholders in the companies certainly are. The Government cannot desire to see shareholders ripped off when it can so easily be prevented by extending to defined benefit schemes the disclosure and transparency requirements that the Minister will put in place for defined contribution schemes. He says that he will consult on that. I am delighted to hear it, but I very much hope that the result of the consultation will be to require the same disclosure and transparency for defined benefit schemes as for defined contribution schemes.
Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interests in the area: I am a trustee of the Santander and Telefónica pension schemes, and a member of the NAPF Pension Quality Mark board. As no doubt other noble Lords here today are, I am concerned to understand the extent to which Amendments 2 to 5 provide for full transparency on transaction costs and deliver on the assurances that the noble Lord, Lord Freud, gave on Report. I would therefore like to ask the Minister several questions.
The Minister confirmed that the Secretary of State would be divested of the power to set the requirements for securing transparency of transaction costs in relation to money purchase personal pension schemes, by giving that responsibility to the FCA. As he said, the amendment does not extend the existing powers of the FCA but imposes a duty on it to make rules on the disclosure of information, following consultation with the Secretary of State and the Treasury, to ensure consistency between FCA rules and the regulations made by the Secretary of State. If the FCA response to that consultation is not considered adequate in achieving such consistency, which Minister will be responsible for ensuring that the FCA fulfils its duty in that regard, and with which powers?
There will no doubt be much consultation and lobbying prior to regulations and rules being set, and no doubt various interests will be brought to bear in those considerations. However, does the Minister agree that the draft statement of recommended practice put forward by the Investment Management Association to the FCA does not provide a sufficient set of requirements for full reporting on transaction costs by investment managers?
Lord Freud
My Lords, let me start by dealing with the question raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Drake and Lady Sherlock, on the way in which the regulation works between two groups. The Pensions Regulator and the FCA work closely together to ensure that the regulatory frameworks for trust-based pensions under the regulator and contract-based pensions under the FCA are aligned and provide for a robust system of governance and fair treatment for members. The Government are not looking to change the current regulatory structure, as was confirmed in the DWP’s Triennial Review of Pensions Bodies, which was published in December 2013. Structuring the duties in this way is necessary to reflect the dual regulation structure and the fact that the FCA is an independent body in statute. Without this approach, there would be no duty on the FCA to make these rules.
In addition to their existing duties to consult, the amendments mean that both the Secretary of State and the FCA will be under statutory duties to consult one another in making regulations and rules, enabling us as far as possible to ensure consistency of approach with the rules following the regulations. There is absolute commitment from the Government and from the FCA to aim for consistency. The FCA would not propose to deviate from government regulations. The aim of a separate duty is not to provide room for inconsistency—far from it; it is about giving the FCA the flexibility that it needs to use its powers and expertise to respond as an independent regulator.
The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, raised a question on hybrid schemes. The regulations will be able to extend the disclosure rules to the DC element of hybrid schemes. The duty is in addition to the existing power in Section 113 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.
The noble Baroness also raised a question on the relative position of the PRA—the prudential regulator—and the FCA. The FCA, as per its rules, will be consulting on the development of disclosure and requirements and will work closely with both Her Majesty’s Treasury and the PRA. Treasury Ministers are committed to strong disclosure of member-borne costs and believe that the FCA is best placed to make those rules.
On the question of the SORP code, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, the Government recognise industry initiatives to improve transparency of pension costs and charges, but as the OFT noted, such measures are voluntary and can be piecemeal. That is why the Government believe that transparency measures should be compulsory and standardised.
Baroness Drake
The Minister’s response on the SORP is helpful to a point. The Minister is making a distinction between a compulsory and a voluntary regime. My more detailed point was about the proposals as to what there should be transparency on, and the costs involved. I was asking whether the Minister could give an assurance that he accepts that the range of costs proposed in SORP would not be sufficient to meet a full transparency criterion.
Lord Freud
The DB element will be part of the consultation. Depending on that consultation, we will have to decide how to treat that particular aspect.
On the questions around the EU, clearly right now we are free to write these regulations and rules and there are no EU rules to hinder that. However, that might change in the future. One of the attractions of pulling the FCA into this process is that it has technical expertise in this area and is the body negotiating in Europe on relevant EU legislation. It is therefore best placed to work with DWP on determining how costs and charges can be defined, captured, measured and disclosed. By using its own rule-making power, the FCA may be able to respond quicker than the parliamentary process to changes in the market or from the EU.
I think I have dealt with all the issues.
Baroness Drake
I hope the Minister does not think I am being pushy, but this is probably the last chance we will have to question him on this before we complete this stage of the Bill. On the issue of EU regulations, the Minister has confirmed that at the moment there are no EU rules constraining the Government from pushing for full transparency on transaction costs. Hopefully, any product from the EU in favour of transparency would work to the Government’s remit. However, one of the underlying concerns is that the earliest there could be any impact from any change that comes out of the European Parliament and from the EU would be 2016, maybe later. People are looking for an assurance—I certainly was asking for one—that the FCA would fulfil its duty without being constrained to await the outcome of any EU discussions and would push ahead to an early timetable consistent with the spirit of the point the Minister made on Report.
Lord Freud
I am pleased to be able to confirm that it is not tied to the EU in any way. We will be pushing ahead with this at the speed I indicated, which is—
Pensions Bill
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Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 23 and the associated amendments to Schedule 17. I declare my interests as a trustee of both the Santander and Telefónica pension schemes, and as a member of the NAPF pension quality mark board.
It is clear that the Government are right that a solution is needed for millions of dormant small pots arising under auto-enrolment because of the large number of workplace schemes and the frequency with which workers change employers. The Government are right that neither scheme members nor providers benefit from workers leaving behind small pots as they move from job to job. The Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to transfer automatically small pots to form, and keep track of, bigger, more efficient pots. The contentious issue is what the default transfer solution should be.
The Government, as my noble friend has said, has chosen pot follows member, whereby a small pension pot automatically follows a member to their new employer’s pension scheme, rather than the alternative of small pots being transferred to an aggregator scheme which consolidates all the small pots accumulated by an individual each time they change their employer. The Association of British Insurers supports this view but, as my noble friend has pointed out, many others—the Confederation of British Industry, the NAPF, the Cass Pensions Institute, Which?, EEF, Age UK, the TUC, the centre for pension studies and others—believe that pot follows member has a number of inherent risks and weaknesses.
The amendment retains the power of the Secretary of State to make regulations to transfer small pots automatically, but not the requirement that this must be through PFM. It allows time for further consideration by the Government without excluding any particular solution, as the consequences of getting this wrong are absolutely huge. PFM cannot be implemented without raising quality standards, or the Government risk transferring the savings of millions of ordinary people into many thousands of different schemes over which they have very little quality control.
Confidence that quality standards would be raised sufficiently has also been dented by the decision to defer introducing a charges cap, increasing the risk of saver detriment. PFM also increases the risks of charges and transaction costs being incurred on the whole pension pot as it moves with each job change, rather than on the incremental amount saved with the previous employers. Savings would be switched out of investment assets into cash, then reinvested with every job change, exposing workers to repeated transaction costs, extra investment risk and the risk of being switched out of low-risk lifestyle funds as they approach retirement. The more frequent the change of job, the greater the risks—risks that an aggregator could reduce.
The impact assessment acknowledges that individuals may be better or worse off, depending on the charges or the performance of the investment fund into the scheme into which they are transferred. However, the DWP expects,
“the gains and losses from differences between scheme charges and investment performance to cancel out on average”.
However, there is no consolation for individuals if their higher charges on transfer are off-set by another’s lower charges. An automatic transfer solution, using a limited number of aggregators, can require them to deliver a low-charge, high-quality standard, so mitigating the risk of saver detriment overall on transfer.
All qualifying automatic enrolment schemes should meet minimum standards, but regulating for differences in quality between schemes is impossible. There will always be a wide range between minimum standards and best practice. PFM fails to work for everyone, as it only transfers a pension pot into a workplace scheme of which an individual is an active member. It fails those who leave the workforce or become self-employed, as they are no longer active in an employer’s scheme. Their small pots are left to flounder. Employers may even default their small pot into a poorer-quality personal pension because they simply do not allow ex-employees to remain in their existing scheme. By comparison, an aggregator does not require a worker to be an active member, so it can cater for more people. PFM increases administrative burdens on employers, obliging every workplace scheme to be capable of communicating with every other scheme. Aggregators reduce this burden as there would be only a few schemes in which to transfer. Auto-enrolment was intended to carry a lighter regulatory burden on employers, especially SMEs. However, PFM rows in the opposite direction.
DWP modelling suggests that for any pot size, the aggregator will achieve slightly less consolidation with PFM, and that irrespective of pot size limit, the aggregator model would achieve at best only half of the net present value of the economic benefit of the PFM approach. DWP modelled pot follows member and aggregator over a range of pot size transfer limits, initially setting a £2,000 pot limit for aggregators while modelling PFM up to £20,000. After protests, it issued an ad hoc release, modelling the limit for aggregators up to £20,000. The Government argue that an aggregator solution would require transfers to be restricted to pots of £2,000 or less rather than the £10,000 intended for pot follows member, a figure suggested by providers to ensure that aggregators did not dominate the market and upset competition. The whole analysis underpinning auto-enrolment, the building of NEST and the need to regulate value for money is based on massive market failure and the inability to rely on fair competition. A hypothesis that dominant aggregators might emerge is not a valid argument against aggregation at higher pot levels.
The assertion that the aggregator model would achieve only half of the net present value of the PFM approach assumes a one-off cost of £105 to transfer a pot and a PFM, and a saving of £20 each year from not having to administer annually a transferred pot. However, if that saving and assumption, an uncertainty in itself, turns out to be lower, the economic advantage of PFM also falls.
The DWP assumes that an aggregator cannot hold live pots, but if employers were also allowed to use a good-quality aggregator as their scheme, it could provide pension portability to many members, removing the need for transfers at all when they change jobs, and the costs that would go with it. The Government impact assessment accepts that it would be more efficient to use existing schemes as aggregators because,
“active members would be saving in the scheme that also holds their dormant pots”,
but they fail to reflect this concession in their own modelling.
As my noble friend said, there are significant delivery challenges with PFM. The Government believe that in the long term PFM will deliver low charges for savers due to efficiency savings made by the industry having to manage fewer small pots. However, those savings are by no means assured. The impact assessment acknowledges that,
“there is a risk that some providers will not experience the resource savings projected”,
that,
“trying to estimate the cost of administrative processes many years ahead is fraught with difficulties and is a key uncertainty over the estimated cost savings”,
and that the,
“wide range of estimates provided … in discussions with stakeholders suggests there may be some genuine variation across providers”.
To be successful and to be delivered, PFM requires pan-industry collaboration. There are significant technical challenges for it to be delivered. The DWP is working with providers to find an industry-led IT solution. However, what happens if the direction of travel gets too tough and they disagree with the Government or with each other—not an infrequent occurrence? Do we get another deferral?
The unresolved weaknesses in the pot follows member solution are apparent in the inherent risks, the uncertainties in key assumptions and the delivery challenges. The transfer solution chosen by the Government must give greater confidence to mitigating saver detriment. This amendment reflects the very real concerns that not only I but many others have expressed, but it retains the power of the Secretary of State to make regulations automatically to transfer small pots while allowing him to give more time to detailed consideration on the model of the solution.
Lord Freud
Those figures are pretty detailed and I will write to the noble Lord with them if I do not get a detailed breakdown in the next minute or two—which I might. It is a huge amount of money, which the noble Lord will appreciate as well as anyone else, and it is a lot of money to have in a complacent and stagnant market. If, as the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, suggested, employers could choose the aggregators, and these aggregators were to become open to active members, this market dominance would be complete.
Baroness Drake
I do not think I said that the employer could choose the aggregator. I said that if the aggregator was able to have active members as well as aggregated members, that would enhance portability, particularly in some industries, which would reduce the need for transfers and the consequential costs. I do not think I actually said that the operating model would mean the employer chose the aggregator—I left that to the departmental assessment.
Lord Freud
Well, if they started moving to active members as well, whatever the route, it would give this group of organisations an enormous market position. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, that I will have to write to him.
It seems strange that, in response to the OFT’s conclusion that there is a lack of competition in the pensions market, the Opposition are calling for the creation of a market dominated by a few big master trusts. We need only to look at other industries, such as the energy market or banking sector, to see that dominance by a few powerful players can result in real concerns for consumers. If we were to press on regardless with enabling these large aggregators to come into being, we would need to be clear that there would be no turning back. It would be extremely difficult to reverse the process if we found that an aggregator model was not sustainable, and to tackle the vested interests if consumers were getting a poor deal.
We have heard—for example, from the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock—that the Government are alone in supporting pot follows member. It is not true that few people support it but I agree that there is a powerful lobby supporting the aggregator model. It is hardly surprising that those who are shouting the loudest are those who are lobbying on behalf of master trusts that could come to dominate the market under an aggregator model.
The ABI itself supports pot follows member, as do many groups within it—Aviva, Fidelity, Friends Life, HSBC, Origo, Scottish Life and Scottish Widows—as well as non-members of the ABI such as Alexander Forbes, Altus, Buck, Foster Denovo, the Investment Management Association, JLT and the National Federation of Occupational Pensioners.
This Government’s starting point is the consumer—and it is the individual who wants to see their pension follow them to their new employer, as the research from NOW: Pensions, which we have already touched on, underlines. The ABI’s consumer research showed that 58% of individuals said that the pot should follow them automatically to the new job; 10% were in favour of a new central scheme, the aggregator; 15% said the pot should stay where it is and it is up to you to move it; and 17% said it should be visible with all other pension pots at a central place online. That is the sentiment among consumers.
I appreciate that some consumer groups have concerns. I say to them that we are listening to those concerns and that low charges and scheme quality are top of our agenda, not just for automatic transfers but for all schemes. We want these groups to work with us and the industry now to deliver pot follows member in the simplest, safest way for consumers.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Drake and Lady Sherlock, raised concerns about consumer detriment. I remind the House about the work the Government are doing to ensure that all schemes are good schemes. Uniformity is not good for consumers, but only if all aggregators had identical charges and standards would we completely remove the risk of an individual moving to a worse scheme. The noble Lord, Lord Turner, made the point about the interconnectedness of these issues. The Minister for Pensions has confirmed that he remains “strongly minded”—I think that is fairly parliamentary language —to introduce a charge cap. My noble friend asked about the DWP response to the OFT and the consultation on charges. That response is coming soon and we will be discussing that later this afternoon.
Lord Turner of Ecchinswell
Obviously, it is possible that with higher charges there might be a higher return, but many of the variations that we see in charges in the industry are for things that clearly will not produce a different return. One sees, for instance, a wide spread of charges for index funds, where one knows that there will be no difference. We also know that, on average, active management does not add a return above index funds: that is a very strong empirical result from a lot of analysis. While it is possible that with higher charges come higher return, in a great many cases that is not so. One thing pension savers would be wise to concentrate on is the charges they face, because that is one of the few things that they can definitively influence, whereas the gross return is a promise that may or may not be delivered.
Those are the reasons that led the Pensions Commission to focus very strongly on the issue of cost and the variation of cost. We noted, for instance, that many people employed in the UK are in large trust-based schemes and already enjoy, on defined contribution schemes, total fund management charges of 20 basis points, 0.2%, or less. For those 20 basis points, they get fund management at the gross level quite as good as people paying 1.5%. If you pay 0.2%, by the end of your savings life, you would have given up only around 4% or 5% of your savings in the charges, which is probably about as low as we can get it, given the fundamental things that have to be done. Again, that is confirmed in the Government’s own consultation paper on charging, which illustrates that 10% of trust-based firms have annual management charges of 0.19% or less. That is possible, provided we get economies of scale, without giving up a significant choice of range of funds. However, at the other end of the scale, we noticed many SMEs were paying 1.5% and therefore, as per the Government’s consultation paper, losing 34%; or 1%, at which point you lose 24%.
That is why, as I said earlier, the recommendations of the Pensions Commission covered not just auto-enrolment, to use the inertia power to get people to save, but the design of the scheme, to ensure that access at the sort of low costs already enjoyed by employees of large firms can be enjoyed by employees of small firms. That was the reason for the design of NEST, which was designed by looking at detailed cost analysis and working out at what level it ought to be possible to deliver a default fund and also at models from elsewhere, such as Sweden. We became convinced that it ought to be possible to deliver to all people the opportunity to invest in a default fund—probably an index fund—with all explicit end costs of 0.3%. A set of decisions were subsequently made that the cost would have to be 0.5%, which is what it went forward as in the NEST environment. That at least establishes a benchmark and means that people who invest in NEST are only giving up 13% of their end-of-life savings pot in charges.
It is important that that should be the benchmark and that we have a charge cap. We know from the OFT’s and other analysis that this is simply not a market where the operation of individual customer choice is effective in driving cost-efficient competition. If that were the case, we would never have had to have the recommendations of the Pensions Commission and the auto-enrolment to which we are now committed. If we do not impose a charge cap, we will leave many savers, in particular lower-income people working for SMEs, facing unnecessarily high costs. I think they are unnecessary if, for a default fund, we are above 50 basis points, or 0.5%. I am therefore concerned that the two options the Government were looking at in their consultation paper on charging were 0.75% and 1%. If we come forward with a cap of 1%, we are giving to the ordinary saver the extraordinary promise that, on their behalf, we have made sure that their loss of pot at the end of their life is only 24%. I do not think that is a very compelling promise to give to people. I therefore strongly believe that we should make a clear commitment, by a clear date, to get on with this and have a charge cap in place, and that 0.5% is the appropriate figure.
Although a price cap on explicit costs is important, it is not sufficient. That is why I strongly support the sentiment of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, which seeks to cover all the other costs which are not covered in explicit fund management charges. The issue of these other costs was also one with which the Pensions Commission was concerned. We were concerned that, beyond what you can see in an annual management charge for a fund, there are lots of other costs involved. These are precisely the sort of costs described in Amendment 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, which inlcude,
“fees and performance fees paid to investment managers … commissions and bid-offer spreads paid … fees, revenue splits and bid-offer spreads paid to custodian banks”.
These are very significant but are not well understood.
On the Pensions Commission, we sought to see whether research had been done on how big these were. Interestingly, there was one piece of research, which was sponsored by the FSA back in 2000 and written, after a lot of research, by a man called Kevin James. It tried to work out just how large these other costs were in the UK and in the US. We called them implicit costs in addition to explicit costs. There is a box in the first Pensions Commission report which explains that piece of analysis and how big they are. His analysis, which we interpreted, suggested that some of these costs might be as high as 90 basis points, on top of the overt, explicit costs. We ended up, for the purposes of modelling, believing that if we were to try to understand what got lost between the gross return on equities that you see by looking at the FTSE All-Share Index every year and what the saver gets, we had to allow, in addition to the explicit asset management costs, for 65 basis points on average going in these implicit costs—more for actively managed funds, less for index funds.
It is possible that those costs have come down since that analysis was done and since we looked at it—there has, for instance, been some compression of bid-offer spreads—but they are sufficiently large that it is incredibly important to focus on them, pay attention to them and, as it were, bring the disinfectant of transparency to bear on this bit of the cost base. Let us suppose that they were 65 basis points. That means that if somebody thought that they were paying 0.85% on an explicit annual management charge, between the gross return on equities in the market and what they actually get, they would be paying 85 basis points plus 65 basis points, which takes us back to the 1.5% per annum, which is 34% of their pot disappearing.
The noble Lord, Lord Lawson, has put an immensely important issue on the table. I would encourage the Government to widen their focus even beyond pensions, because it is important not only in the pensions arena but for the other ways that people save, for instance with ISAs. When people save in ISAs, they are looking at an overt, explicit asset management charge, but sitting behind that is a set of other hidden costs. This is an issue where more information will help. It will not transform the situation—we are deluding ourselves if we believe that lots of individual savers are themselves, individually, going to pay attention to this—but as the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, has said, the press, including the specialist press, will pay attention to it and a wider debate about just how large these charges are is very important. It would, for instance, be very interesting to start seeing how much higher these hidden costs are for actively managed funds versus index-linked funds, because that is a piece of information that people ought to bear in mind when they make those decisions between different classes of assets.
I urge the Government, as they go forward with this idea, to look at whether that disclosure should in future apply not just to pensions but to a wider class of investments—to cast it, as the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, said, as widely as possible so that we capture all costs—and to see this as a start point of an extremely important debate in which we get a better handle on the total costs that are being imposed by the asset management and investment fund management industries.
I do not think that transparency is an alternative to a charge cap, which is why I have also put my name to Amendment 29, but it is a very valuable additional tool.
Baroness Drake
I do not intend to make my contribution because I do not think there is anything I can add to what the noble Lord, Lord Turner, has said. However, as I have never been a Minister I am not familiar with the dark art of crafting ministerial syntax, so perhaps I could take this opportunity to ask the Minister a question before he responds.
I have before me the Written Ministerial Statement, which says:
“Last year, we consulted on whether to cap charges in the default funds of schemes used for automatic enrolment, and the Government remains committed to seeing this policy through during the life of this Parliament”.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/2/14; col. 11WS.]
My simple question is: does the phrase,
“seeing this policy through during the life of this Parliament”,
mean that the Government will introduce a charge cap before the election in 2015? A simple yes or no answer would be helpful.
Viscount Eccles
My Lords, I had not really intended to intervene. I have not played any part in this Bill since Second Reading, but I just want to draw attention to the fact that there is a difference, in my opinion, between price control and transparency.
I am 100% in favour of transparency. Perhaps I should declare that I have a very complicated pension situation. I have been in defined benefit schemes and money purchase schemes and I have a SIPP. I have also been the trustee of probably half a dozen pension schemes. I have done transfers of people under TUPE in the Local Government Pension Scheme. So I have had a lot of reasons to worry about the amount of somebody’s pension fund that is absorbed by costs. I am totally on board with complete transparency on that issue.
However, that is a different matter from price control. The problems in this market, which I fully agree has very considerable aspects of dysfunctionality, are created, in part at least, by the incredibly complicated structure of pensions that we have created, in both the public and private sectors, over many years. It is a very complicated subject and of course there are people who take advantage of that complexity, I completely agree. There are also people who are so frightened by the complexity that they do not know when they are getting value for money and when they are not.
That is my point: there is a great difference between a market which by its transparency enables people to see whether or not they are getting value for money and a market in which there is price control. Picking a figure for the price control would be a very foolish thing for any Government to do.
Pensions Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(10 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, a sustainable welfare system needs to be affordable, but it also has to be inclusive and responsive to the realities of the contemporary labour market. For a long time, the national insurance and state pension system has been exclusive, indeed unfair, in its application to a particular group of workers, mainly women—a community which the department estimates to be about 50,000 and consisting of people who undertake mini-jobs. Each job delivers earnings below the lower earnings limit of £5,668, the access point for the national insurance and state pension system, but there is no provision for people with these mini-jobs to aggregate their earnings in a way that would allow them to enter the national insurance system. For example, a woman with two part-time jobs, earning £100 a week from each, will not accrue national insurance and pension rights unless she is covered by some alternative crediting arrangements. Someone earning £110 from one job would accrue. Yet £100 equals about 16 hours on the national minimum wage, so a person with more than one such mini-job could be working a significant number of hours.
Mini-jobs may be driven by caring responsibilities, work availability and, more recently, the increasingly common phenomenon of the zero-hours contract. Some of these women could gain state pension through their husband’s entitlement, but from 2016 they will not be able to build up an entitlement through their spouse because the new single-tier pension allows women to accrue pensions only in their own right. My noble friend Lady Hollis demonstrated the example of women in households who no longer have young children and whose spouse’s income floats them off universal credit being locked out of the pension system. The Bill makes the default position of entitlement through their spouse for many women disappear, which gives the problem fresh urgency.
My noble friend Lady Hollis has long campaigned to have this unfairness addressed and lists the rebuttals she has faced over the years: that it is not reasonable to try to share employers’ national insurance across mini-jobs; that the women will not want to pay class 1 contributions; that there are not very many of them; that their situation is temporary; that they have time to make up missing years; and, if all else fails, that there is pensions credit.
However, the urgency and the scale of the problem have increased exponentially since my noble friend started her campaign and those rebuttals are no longer valid. A much larger number of people with mini-jobs are affected as a result of the growing use of zero and short-hours contracts, where workers have little or no control over the hours they may be offered in any one week. The Office for National Statistics estimates that 250,000 people worked on zero-hours contracts between October and December 2012. However, its survey relied on people understanding that they were on zero-hours contracts, and the ONS has conceded that that may well have resulted in the true figure being substantially understated and that it may be much higher. The ONS is now running a survey to,
“obtain robust data directly from employers”.
As my noble friend said, the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development suggested that up to 1 million people—around 3% to 4% of workers in the UK—are on zero-hours contracts.
The zero-hour mini-job problem is now systemic in nature. According to the Government’s workplace employment relations survey, in 2011 23% of workplaces with 100 or more employees used zero-hours contracts. Surveys reveal sector concentrations too: 61% of domiciliary care workers in England were employed on zero-hours contracts; and Unite and others report a high incidence in low-paying sectors such as the docks, retail, catering and social care, and they are not restricted by age. These workers face weekly insecurity in hours and pay and many are not building up entitlement to national insurance benefits. The DWP and the Government will have to address a problem that now has scale, is systemic and does not interface with the national insurance system.
When launching his consultation on zero-hours contracts, the Secretary of State, Vince Cable, said:
“It is clear that they are much more widely used than we had previously thought”,
and further that:
“Our aim through this consultation is to find which options best prevent any abuse of zero hours contracts while maximising the opportunity and flexibility such contracts can present”.
This suggests he believes these contracts will be a widespread and sustained phenomenon. The noble Lord, Lord Freud, in his normal straightforward manner in Committee when responding to my noble friend Lord Browne, recognised the growing evidence of zero-hours contracts. He said that,
“the Government have estimated their costings and needs, on the basis that it is a tiny minority”,
and that this basis,
“will be undermined. He certainly makes me even more uneasy about the neglect of this group than I was before we discussed the issue today”.—[Official Report, 18/12/13; col. GC 332.]
Automatic Enrolment (Earnings Trigger and Qualifying Earnings Band) Order 2014
Baroness Drake Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, I wish to speak on the earnings trigger in particular. I offer my apologies to the Committee: this item of business was not published and I have been sitting in a finance sub-committee taking evidence from Her Majesty’s Treasury and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which was quite compelling. I therefore ask your Lordships to accept my apologies for being a few minutes late.
I rise to speak on this statutory instrument because we see another year and another increase in the earnings trigger for automatic enrolment and another several thousand more women being disadvantaged and excluded from the UK pension system. I shall persist with this issue year after year because I fear that we are taking what started as a well designed private pension system, certainly in intent, and trying to make it an increasingly part-time-women-free area.
In 2011-12, 600,000 individuals, 78% of them women, were excluded from automatic enrolment. In 2012-13, the Government excluded another 100,000 people, 82% of them of women, by virtue of raising the earnings trigger. In 2013-14, another 420,000 people were excluded, 72% of them women, and now, for 2014-15, by increasing the trigger to £10,000, another 170,000 people will be excluded, 69% of them women. It reads as a rather depressing roll-call. The culling of women from the UK private pension system has almost become the Government’s annual sport.
I find it quite extraordinary that the coalition Government are so determined to carve out so many women from the UK private pension system. If women and men who earn below £10,000 are not automatically enrolled and do not, because of inertia, voluntarily opt in to their employer’s workplace scheme, many of them will experience several disadvantages. When automatic enrolment is phased in to their employer, they will not be in the pension scheme. Those excluded—mostly women—will suffer a loss in lifetime pay, albeit deferred pay, because they do not have access to the employer’s 3%—for some, where the employer contribution is above 3%, the loss is even greater. However, they will still lose out from any reduction in wage levels that flows from the cost to the employer of automatic enrolment.
When they move from a full-time job with one employer to a part-time job with another, they may not join the new employer’s scheme and are therefore at risk, first, of becoming an inactive member and subject to inactive member charge premiums on their existing pension pot unless the Government ban active member discounts—whether they will do that is a big question. Secondly, they are at risk of being defaulted into a personal pension by their previous employer, who does not allow ex-employees to stay in their workplace scheme. Therefore they leave an employer and are full-time, and then as a part-time employee they are not covered by auto-enrolment. Their accrued pot is vulnerable to higher charges and would not be protected by a pot-follows-member or any other aggregation mechanism.
As I said, they would not benefit from any aggregation mechanism, so they are not in their new employer’s scheme. They are not an active member, so their previous pension pot will flounder. When I raised this point in Committee the last time we discussed the increase in the earnings trigger for auto-enrolment, it was before we had the detail of pot follows member. The Minister, Lord Freud, commented:
“I will stand my ground a little bit on this, because these are some of the issues that really come into consideration when we look at the broader issue of pension pots”.—[Official Report, 22/5/12; col. GC 20.]
However, we now know that pot follows member will apply only where an individual is an active member of their employer’s scheme. Therefore, if these women are not automatically enrolled and inertia keeps them out of their scheme, they are unprotected; they are not protected by pot follows member. The noble Lord, Lord Freud, may have stood his ground then, but I am afraid that, now that we know the details of pot follows member, that ground has now moved from beneath him. Those women’s pots will just flounder without protection.
If part-time workers earning below £10,000 are not persistent low earners over their lifetime, which many will not be—a point confirmed in the Johnson review commissioned by the Government—and are not automatically enrolled into their employer’s pension scheme when they are on the lower earnings, the persistency of the savings habit that they built up will be broken and the accumulated value of their pension pot over their lifetime of pension saving will be reduced. Given the advent of the single-tier pension, which will be set at a level only slightly above pension credit but which will be based on national insurance record and crediting and not means-testing, the fact that low-paid workers are not automatically enrolled into their employer’s pension scheme means that they will simply be denied the opportunity to accrue even a modest amount of capital. That is yet another example of the awful attitude that says that public policy does not need to assist low-paid workers to accumulate capital or assets.
The reasons why the earnings trigger should not be raised any further are absolutely clear. Not all those earning below the earnings trigger of £10,000 are persistent low earners. Low earners should be able to accumulate savings over and above the single-tier pension, and the trivial commutation rules will allow most of them to take it in cash. This disproportionately affects women and breaches a basic principle that, in designing state and private pension systems, both systems should work for women, yet each time this earnings trigger is raised we carve out or cull thousands of women from the UK private pensions system.
Let us look in detail at some of the Government’s arguments—their preoccupation with the low earners. Almost half of those in the lowest-earning group are in couples where one works part-time and the other full-time. Most very low earners are women who live in households with others on higher earnings and they are receiving working tax credits. These are precisely the people who should be automatically enrolled in saving, yet we have seen persistently a rising earnings trigger that excludes them. Furthermore, the value of the loss of the employer’s contribution of 3% of qualifying earnings from raising the earnings trigger and not being auto-enrolled is greater than the tax reduction that they get from increasing the tax threshold. The combination of the two therefore means that the lowest earners could be worse off. They lose more from not being auto-enrolled than they gain from the increase in the tax thresholds.
Earnings are not static for many workers, either men or women. They can change significantly over a lifetime. Most low earners go on to earn more, so saving would still be beneficial because of the continuing contribution to their pensions over their working lives. Millions of women have a life pattern in which periods of full-time work are interspersed with significant periods of part-time work when caring responsibilities are at their greatest. Part-time working is part of the systemic solution to childcare in this country. When we look at the labour market statistics, we see that we respond by saying, “We are not going to auto-enrol you into your employer’s pension scheme when you are working part-time for periods of childcare or other forms of care”.
The Explanatory Memorandum states:
“The Secretary of State has concluded that it is appropriate to enrol people automatically into workplace pension saving once they earn enough to pay income tax”.
However, this disregards how working-age benefits can make it pay to save. The 100% disregard of individuals’ pension contributions from income brought to account when calculating entitlement to universal credit has been maintained thanks to the intervention of the Minister and the consequence is that it provides a positive incentive to save for many low-paid people. However, what are we doing? We are excluding them from the benefits of auto-enrolment by raising the earnings trigger.
As to persistent low earners, because within that population there will be some, the argument that they should not save because they get state pension and benefits means that yet again there will be no asset accumulation strategy for them. That position is even more indefensible with the advent of the single tier because it is not means-tested, so there is no means-tested track against the single tier that they can genuinely build up, even by only a modest amount of capital, by being auto-enrolled, that will not be lost on the means-tested basis against that single tier.
On my approximate estimates, increasing the earnings trigger to £10,000 from its original level has excluded 1,290,000 individuals per year from workplace pensions, 75% of whom would be women, at a loss to those individuals of approximately £40 million of employer pension contributions. But the cumulative total of those impacted, because different individuals are impacted year on year, will be much higher. This suggests that the group targeted to benefit from workplace pension reform will comprise approximately 65% men and only 35% women.
I come back to my basic point. We are increasingly designing, or “undesigning”, a private pension scheme to exclude ever greater numbers of women every time the earnings trigger is raised. It is simply not a credible argument to say that the impact of the earnings trigger can be mitigated by those earning below the £10,000 threshold being allowed to opt in voluntarily. Inertia prevents people from saving, and that is the whole point of auto-enrolment. You cannot say, “Because the rest of the population will not save we have to have auto-enrolment, but the very low earners can opt in”. It is an absolute nonsense. Low earners are not exempt from the maxim that inertia stops people saving, which is why you need auto-enrolment. As I said, a key principle of pension reform is to enable women to build up a pension in their own right. The higher the earnings threshold for auto-enrolment, the less the reforms will work for women. Each year since 2010, the Government have consistently excluded more and more women from the UK private pensions system.
The numbers remaining in employers’ pension schemes as a consequence of auto-enrolment have been a success for the Government. To date, roughly 90% of people have embraced auto-enrolment and stayed in. Perhaps that will drop a little when we get to the smaller companies, but it has been a success and the Government should be pleased with that. But when it comes to the reforms working for women, particularly women who work part-time, the Government are in danger of snatching failure from the jaws of success.
With the exclusion of 1.25 million women—and rising, because I am sure that the earnings trigger will go up again—we are designing a private pension system that does not work for women who work part-time. We know that in five or 10 years’ time the absolute failure of that decision will be exposed, as previously when women who work part-time were excluded from pensions. But by that time millions of women will have lost the advantage of being auto-enrolled into a private pension. The Government are simply wrong to say that simplicity for employers is worth the price of excluding 1.25 million women—and rising—from the benefits of auto-enrolment.
Lord Bates
My Lords, first, both the noble Baronesses referred to the speed with which we have gone through the Order Paper. In fact, that caught all sides on the hop, and apologies are due all round. The responsibility, of course, lies in the preceding orders going too speedily. However, I am grateful to both noble Baronesses, who, in the exchanges we have had over many sittings on the Pensions Bill, have demonstrated their incredible grasp and knowledge of these complex areas, and have spoken passionately about the impact upon women in particular. I will come to these points, and respond to them as best I can.
One of the key things I said in the concluding remarks of my speech was that we recognise that setting these thresholds is a balancing act and that there is no right or wrong answer. It is therefore right that there should be a debate and that it has become an annual debate. It is an affirmative instrument and therefore any changes that are made annually have to come before your Lordships’ House for consideration. That is the right way to do it.
The other point of context we need to acknowledge, which the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, was good enough to make, is that the figures for auto-enrolment, which I accept came out of the Turner commission, which in turn came out of the Pensions Act 2008 under the previous Government, have been impressive. Significant progress has been made in encouraging the right people to save for their retirement. In pursuing that, we are absolutely on common ground.
It might be helpful if I went through some of the figures that we have for the number of people affected. Raising the 2014-15 value of the automatic enrolment trigger from £9,440 to £10,000 will exclude around 170,000 individuals, of whom around 120,000—69%—are women. Raising the 2013-14 value of the automatic enrolment trigger from £8,105 to £9,440 excluded around 420,000 individuals, of whom 300,000—72%—are women. I am going back through these numbers because it is a rough way of getting back to the calculation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, which the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, asked me whether I agreed with. Raising the 2013 value of the automatic enrolment trigger from £7,475 to £8,105 excluded around 100,000 people, 82% of whom were women. Finally, raising the 2011-12 value of the automatic enrolment trigger from £5,035—in 2006-07 terms—to £7,475 excluded 600,000 individuals, 78% of whom were women. If one calculates those figures, one begins to recognise the numbers that the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, presented to us.
However, it is not so simple as to say that 70,000 women would be in automatic enrolment if their part-time earnings were brought together. I realise that there is a big education job to be done here, because many women who are underneath the threshold need to realise that if they are above £5,772 in terms of the lower earnings limit, they can opt in and therefore get the benefits that would accrue from that.
Baroness Drake
Does the Minister agree that we do not ask the rest of the population to opt in to get the benefits of pension saving and an employer contribution? Why should we ask women to opt in to get the benefit, when all the evidence is that most people will not opt in? Why do we discriminate against lower earners in that way? We do not expect a £40,000-earning male to overcome his own inertia. Why do we expect a £9,000-earning woman to overcome her own inertia?
Lord Bates
I take the point, but the threshold needs to be drawn somewhere. That is the discussion that we are having. There has to be a threshold somewhere because, below a certain level, the benefits of saving will not be as acute for the retirement pension. The question that we are debating is where that threshold should be set. We are not saying that this is a gender issue; we are saying that it is a threshold and income issue.
The noble Baroness is perhaps being a little harsh on this Government’s record on auto-enrolment, but it is worth pointing out that we have also taken a very large number of people, mostly female, out of tax altogether. The rises in the personal allowance since 2010 have taken 2.7 million people out of paying tax. The majority of those people will be female. That is a very positive thing, but I accept that more needs to be done to encourage people to save for their retirement. The benefits of the 3% employer contribution, which the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, pointed to, will come when the scheme is fully implemented in 2018 and the thresholds and contribution levels increase. At the moment it is 1%, but it is very important that people engage at that 1% level so that their savings can rise as the employer contribution increases.
Of course, in addition to the employer contribution increasing, the employee contribution will rise, and many people who do not make pension savings point to the fact that affordability is the key issue that they are wrestling with.
Baroness Drake
I am sorry for interrupting, but I feel really strongly about this point and I shall come back to it year after year. We are, admittedly, phasing in the contribution rate. However, you cannot get the benefit of the 3% contribution rate unless you are also enrolled at the 1% contribution rate.
Lord Bates
I do not think we disagree with that. I accept that you need to enrol in—to opt in to—the scheme. We are saying that you can opt in and get tax relief from the lower earnings limit of £5,772, and that your employer will have to do that from £10,000. Therefore, we agree on that. Persistent low earners tend to find that the state pension alone provides them with a retirement income similar to that which they would have had during their working life.
Baroness Drake
The noble Lord is arguing that if someone is poor all their life they can make do on the single tier and we are not obliged to give them the opportunity to build up a little capital—is that the policy of the coalition Government?
Lord Bates
The noble Baroness knows that is not our argument. We are encouraging people to save, as far as possible, but we recognise that savings, and how people spend their disposable income, is a choice. At what point does it become an automatic responsibility of the employer to enrol an employee in the scheme? That is what we are debating, not whether people are being encouraged to save. I hope that there is genuine cross-party agreement on this, coming out of the Turner commission, of which the noble Baroness was a distinguished member.
Of course, the whole objective is to increase savings across society. Thirteen million people are not saving enough for their retirement and we want that figure to improve. We want to ensure that as many people as possible are automatically enrolled. The Government believe that the decision on lower earnings is a decision for each person to take, and I hope they will take advantage of it.
Baroness Drake
The noble Lord is defending arguments that are untrue. Auto-enrolment does not work on the basis of it being a decision for individuals. They are put in, they have to come out. They have the choice to come out, but they are put in in the first place. These women are not getting the advantages of auto-enrolment. The point of inertia is that it is not based on informed choice; it is based on the assumption that the individual does this because it is in their best interest.
Lord Bates
We accept that. However, basically we are talking about the same issue: whether people have to opt out when they are put in an auto-enrolled scheme. They have the opportunity to decide to opt out. If they are above £5,772 they have the opportunity to opt in. I take the point that the threshold has to be set somewhere. Having looked at all the evidence, this is where the Government have come down—for this year. As the scheme gathers pace, more information will be available to us and we will be able to make that information available to your Lordships and have it influence decisions.
Baroness Drake
I do not want to be too difficult. However, the Secretary of State has stated clearly that this is driven by his view that people should not be auto-enrolled into pensions until they start paying tax. That is not doing a balancing act; that has been the Government’s consistent position since 2010. The Hansard record shows that I keep asking the question, “Are you going to keep tracking the tax threshold, because if you keep doing that you will exclude more and more women?”. That is not a balancing act. If you did a balancing act, you would say, “What is the balance between that approach and the number of women excluded?”.
The Government have locked themselves in, both by the Secretary of State’s statement and by their behaviour since 2010, when they said that people who do not pay tax should not have the advantage of auto-enrolment. The benefit of releasing them from a certain level of tax is reduced by the fact that they lose the employer’s contribution, and we are now getting to a point where the gain from the increase in the tax threshold is less than the loss of the 3% of the employer’s contribution. So over their lifetime, the low-paid person is actually worse off.
Baroness Sherlock
My Lords, before the Minister answers that, I asked him whether he felt that the way in which the Government have designed the service served women well. His defence appeared to be that there has to be a line somewhere. The point I was trying to put to him is that the Government have designed this scheme in such a way that only a third of its target population are women; in other words, they have designed a scheme that will benefit two men for every woman. Does he feel that the way the Government have chosen to design the scheme benefits women?
Pensions Bill
Baroness Drake Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Drake
“(c) may provide for requirements for the identification, avoidance and management of conflicts of duty and interest”
Baroness Drake (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 62GA is designed to address shortcomings in the governance of pension schemes, particularly contract-based schemes. It would give the Secretary of State the power to set regulations that
“provide for requirements for the identification, avoidance and management of conflicts of duty and interest”.
They would require, in the event of a conflict of interest, for priority to be given to the interests of the saver and to ensure that the duties to the saver are met despite the conflict.
In his review, John Kay criticised FCA rules as falling,
“materially below the standards necessary to establish”,
trust, confidence and respect. He recommended a shift towards fiduciary standards. In an auto-enrolled world, that comment has even more resonance because, increasingly, private sector workers’ pensions will be contract based, where, as the noble Lord, Lord Turner, mentioned in debate last Wednesday, there is a,
“fundamental inefficiency of the market ... It is a system absolutely shot through with market failure where the process of trying to provide in a competitive fashion simply does not work well”.—[Official Report, 15/1/14; col. GC 161.]
My amendment seeks to capture that governance challenge. To achieve an increase in pension savings, workers are auto-enrolled into workplace pensions. There can be no caveat emptor, as the saver does not buy. The system is designed to restrict the saver to one choice—either stay in or opt out and lose the employer contribution. Current regulation of contract-based pensions is at odds with the assumptions underlying auto-enrolment. Contract-based regulation is built on informed consent and consumer choice. Auto-enrolment is designed and built on the principle of inertia, on a population of savers who do not engage with investment choice. A plethora of reports has revealed the conflicts of interest in the industry. The OFT report confirms a dysfunctional pensions market with a weak demand side and concludes that the market could not be expected to self-remedy and that there is a need for intervention.
The introduction of auto-enrolment has been a success and the Government should be pleased. Opt-out rates have been low. The Government must now secure a level of quality and governance that delivers optimal results for savers in terms of building trust so that workers persist with their savings, thereby setting the ground for increasing contributions beyond the current statutory minimum and improving savers’ chances of achieving a reasonable income in retirement. Measures to encourage savers to engage with their pension savings are important but of themselves are not sufficient. The majority of savers will not actively engage. It is that very inertia that can be used by some providers to create or sustain profitable inefficiencies. The legal framework must protect those who do not engage.
The challenge of inertia means that there is a need for efficient defaults over the life cycle of the pension saver. For example, there is a need to get people saving; to determine a minimum they should save; to determine their investment choice at different intervals in the life cycle on, for example, joining a scheme or following a quality review as they get nearer to retirement age; and, by default, to transfer and consolidate their pension pots. Over time, I suspect that we will be considering default arrangements on decumulation when a person retires. The need for defaults raises the bar on governance because someone is using their discretion on behalf of the saver.
Contract pension provision has systemic weaknesses of governance and a particular feature that constrains efficient default arrangements. For example, looking forward, an employer conducting a triennial review that decides that the current scheme is poor value will be unable to switch workers in a contract-based scheme unless they individually consent. However, the very nature of auto-enrolment means that this active consent is unlikely to be granted by many savers. On legacy schemes and pots, I am sure that any OFT-driven audit will reveal poorly performing funds and high charges, but the solutions will not be effective if they require individuals’ consent.
We have a misalignment between what contract-based provision can do and what it is necessary to deliver in the interests of the saver. How does one respond to that challenge? Recent press comments are peppered with references to making it easier to move contract-based scheme members from old to new schemes. Standard Life’s head of workplace pensions, speaking at the NAPF conference, said that contract law acted as a barrier to moving people from poor-quality schemes to good-quality schemes, and added:
“We need to learn the stuff that works in the trust-based world”.
A recent Pensions Institute report found potential for massive improvement in outcomes where poor-quality legacy schemes transferred en masse into better-quality modern schemes with lower charges. The Pensions Institute called on the Government to facilitate changes to contract law to allow such transfers to be made without the individual consent of scheme members where it is clearly in their best interests. However, there is the rub. Who decides where it is clearly in their best interests? How is the primacy of the saver’s interest protected? Governance requirements must be fit for purpose under auto-enrolment and remove a constraint in contract provision, but in a way that ensures that the interests of the saver trump the interests of others when there is a conflict. Putting the legal responsibility for the best interests of the saver on the employer will be problematic, particularly for the long tail of SMEs and micros.
The Government’s use of statutory overrides has a role to play, particularly in placing new quality and governance requirements into future, existing and legacy pension contracts. I ask the Minister to confirm whether this Bill would give the Secretary of State the power to change retrospectively the terms of existing pension contracts to embrace any new quality or governance requirements.
However, the solution must rest in major part in raising the governance in the pensions industry. Like trustees, it should carry a fiduciary responsibility in the management and provision of its pension products and investments. Conflicts of interest must be resolved in the interests of the saver. An efficient private pension system that requires the default transfer of savers’ pots to new schemes and funds simply cannot happen without that.
There is an imbalance in the duties of contract-based pension providers, compared to those placed on trustees, which challenges the success of auto-enrolment. The OFT stressed the need for stronger measures to improve governance but I fear that the independent governance committees that it has agreed with the industry—here there are shades of what the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, referred to as the fox in the hen coop—will fail to achieve the requirement of aligning scheme governance with the interests of savers.
The proposed independent governance committees have many weaknesses. At the very least, such bodies need both a duty to act in members’ best interests and the power to make decisions. The current OFT proposal fails on both points. As the Law Commission commented,
“there are many difficult questions about how these committees will work”.
They,
“will not have the power to change investment strategies or investment managers ... Furthermore, it is not clear whether ... the committees will be under explicit legal duties to act in the interests of”,
the savers. Introducing independent governance committees accountable to the boards of pension providers, without addressing any of the conflicts faced by these providers, or clarifying that decisions must prioritise the interests of policyholders over those of the shareholders, does little to solve the governance deficit.
As a comparator, the governance requirements for the Australian private pension system have been toughened up recently. It is a sad reflection on my character that I spent a significant number of days over the Christmas holidays ploughing through the regulatory requirements under the Australian system—I promised in my new year’s resolutions to get a more exciting life in future. The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority enforces a range of prudential standards on pension providers, including an unequivocal requirement that conflicts of interest must be resolved in the beneficiaries’ interests and a specific duty to deliver value for money.
The advent of auto-enrolment raises the bar on governance. I welcome the Government’s decision to impose quality and governance requirements on pension schemes, but I think that it is necessary to make it explicit that those requirements should provide for the identification, avoidance and management of conflicts of duty and interest. Conflicts of interest go to the heart of the problems in the private pension system. The regulations, when addressing governance requirements, must address the issue of conflicts of interest. Amendment 62GA, without being prescriptive, seeks to do that. I beg to move.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
My Lords, I speak to Amendments 67ZB and 67ZC in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Sherlock. It is always a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Drake on issues such as this. She has once again characteristically set out an informed and persuasive argument in her contribution to the debate. To a degree, I accept that it could be said to undermine Amendment 67ZC in that it approaches the same issue but in a distinctly different fashion, accepting the same principle. From my perspective, however, I am not that concerned how the Minister responds to the nature of the challenge that my noble friend set out. If he chooses to accept her amendment—I venture to suggest to him that he would invariably be wise to do so in such matters—he will find no great cavil from these Benches that our amendment fell by the way as a consequence.
Amendment 67ZB is designed to address the issue of scale by way of a new clause. It would promote good value in scheme sizes and would require trustees to consider whether the scheme had sufficient scale to deliver good value. I note that, in the Government’s consultation on quality standards in workplace defined-contribution schemes, the Government reveal that they are “interested” in the idea that trustees should have a duty, and underline their interest in the Australian approach to imposing duties on trustees.
I am glad that the Government are beginning to catch up with the Labour Party’s policy review on these issues, but I also note that they have not yet progressed sufficiently far in its investigations to recognise that the Australian Government, the policies of which have already been prayed in aid by my noble friend, also deploy the regulator in this respect. It is not clear why the Government think that trustees of very small UK schemes, which we know from the TPR surveys self-identify as not incapable of understanding investment processes, will be able to make a judgment as to whether they have sufficient scale. If these trustees fail to act, what is supposed to happen?
In Australia, those intending to supply a pension scheme have to apply to the regulator for a licence, and one of the licence conditions requires a reasoned attestation as to how the trustees of the scheme will meet best practice in terms of scale at the investment and administration layers. This process has a ratcheting effect, as the attestation must be repeated on an annual basis and, as best practice improves, this forces mergers. Failure to attest would mean a breach of the regulatory licence, and commentators believe that there will only be a sixth of the current number of schemes within 20 years. For trustees to move to scale we would need a ubiquitous requirement for trustees, a duty on them to assist scale and a mechanism to require action where they fail to act or mis-assess. That is what we seek to provide the beginnings of with this amendment.
Amendment 67ZC would provide for regulations to require any pension scheme to appoint a board of trustees which will have fiduciary duties towards the members of the pension scheme. Our view is that a minimum requirement for auto-enrolment schemes is that they must be governed in a way which legally requires the scheme to prioritise the interests of members over all other interests.
The Minister may say that they have consulted on governance for automatic transfer schemes; again, it is a good thing if he is catching up with our policy review. However, his quality standards are intended for automatic transfer schemes only. Under our approach, automatic transfer will be limited to aggregators, as the Minister is well aware. Our requirement for trustees applies to all qualifying schemes, not just to automatic transfer schemes, and, in addition, our definition of qualifying schemes includes closed-book schemes, which his does not.
As a further point, these conditions will apply to schemes that wish to operate as automatic transfer schemes, but an automatic transfer system is years away. The requirement for trustees is immediate, however, as my noble friend has pointed out. Why should we adopt a lesser principle than that adopted by the Australians? Their Cooper review found:
“Superannuation must always be for the benefit of members. The superannuation system does not exist to support intermediaries. Trustees must be relentless in seeking benefits for members”.
Thanks to my noble friend Lady Drake, we now know that that has also been translated into regulation in Australia.
Lord Browne of Ladyton
Perhaps I might engage with the Minister on the issue of whether or not larger pension schemes provide better returns to their members. I do not intend to delay the Committee long on this issue but I have before me a page and a half of significant research that challenges the assertion made by the Minister. I will say only this: recent NAPF research shows that a person in a larger scheme will get a 28% larger pension pot than a person in a smaller scheme. Indeed, research from Australia supports the assertion that fund size has a positive impact on the performance of not-for-profit superannuation funds there. I shall arrange for the Minister to have access to this research but I could not let that assertion remain unchallenged.
Baroness Drake
I thank my noble friend Lord Browne for his supporting contributions in this debate. I thank the Minister for his response but he has not actually answered my question—I did listen; perhaps I missed it but I do not think so—which was: can the Minister confirm that this Bill will give the Secretary of State the power to retrospectively change the terms of existing pension contracts to embrace any new quality or governance requirement? It is a pretty key point because it goes to the heart of what the Government can or cannot do unless they take those powers to themselves. A lot of people are quite interested in whether the Government are taking those powers so that when they decide what the quality and governance requirements are, they have the power to retrospectively apply them to existing pension contracts.
Lord Bates
Perhaps I can seek some clarification from the noble Baroness on the nature of her question; I apologise for not responding to it directly. The whole point of what we are introducing is that we are seeking to tackle the issue of the quality of schemes. Therefore it would stand to reason that if one is seeking to improve the quality of schemes, it would be wrong to disbar those who were in previous schemes from getting the benefits of those improved quality standards. That provision is therefore there: it will be necessary to enhance the quality of schemes. I might be missing something; I am sorry if I am.
Baroness Drake
The Minister has got the sentiment of my point. I was looking for firm clarification that the Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to put in place those quality and governance standards, once they are decided, to existing pension contracts, because they are contracts.
Lord Bates
The noble Baroness has a high degree of expertise in this area, which is respected on all sides of the Committee. I wonder if I could write to her on the specific point on which she is pressing me, with a response on the record. If she wishes to press it further, she can of course come back to the issue on Report.
Baroness Drake
I thank the noble Lord for his offer to write to me on the matter. Maybe having it in writing will be better, because the efficiency or ability of any requirements under the Bill will be heavily influenced by the extent to which they can retrospectively apply to existing pension contacts. However, if the noble Lord is going to write to me on that point, I will also deal with other matters.
We need to get a sense of perspective on this. Auto-enrolment potentially affects 20 million people in this country. The whole of the private sector workforce, when it is engaged in employment above a certain income level, is a huge community of people; it is a great statement of trust between the working population and the Government. People are saying that they accept the argument that the people must take responsibility for providing for our income in old age, but they have the right of a reciprocal entitlement to know that the Government are doing what is necessary to ensure that those who have discretion over their savings and are managing them do so in a way which is in their interests and to high standards of governance.
I am afraid that I do not buy “balance of interests” at all on this issue. If you come into the market to provide a pension product under auto-enrolment, you cannot sell or manage a product that does not meet the needs of the savers. You would not say, “Well, I will leave the brakes off a car in the interests of not making the employees redundant”. You have to sell a product that meets the interests of the members and is designed and managed with the interests of the saver at heart.
The independent governance bodies, or committees, are very weak as they are proposed. There are lots of people commentating to that effect. As proposed, they have fewer new powers—or no powers—for resources, for information, or for appointment of members to the board. It is in the gift of the companies themselves. As currently advised, they have no powers or capacity to address conflicts of interest. I know that this issue of governance is a work in progress. The Government are considering the matter and are due to report further. The OFT says that it has more work to do on its recommendations. The Law Commission is looking into this.
What cannot be dodged at all, in my view, is that any governance structure, requirements or arrangements for a private pension system that does not put the identification and resolution of conflicts of interests in the interests of the saver at its heart will be flawed. Successive Governments will keep picking up the consequences of that. There must be some—cross-party or whatever—biting on the principle that if you give the market a huge demand side that it could never have created itself under a voluntary system, that carries with it the requirement for a high standard of governance. The Government must say that those who enter the market under auto-enrolment to provide pension products must operate on the basis that any conflicts of interest are resolved in favour of the beneficiary or saver.
Lord Bates
I do not have any information to hand on that. However, we have got the point that I was perhaps overegging this by saying it was the only thing, and I need to recognise that other factors were perhaps considered when it came to putting this restriction in place. There was no sinister purpose, it was simply to say that there was a huge task to be undertaken and to ensure that NEST’s systems and operations could actually handle this. We do not want to put excessive burdens on NEST so that it fails when so many are dependent on its success.
Baroness Drake
Will the Minister also accept that volumes are critical to the success of NEST and to its charges, and that there is a fine balance between accommodating the concerns of other operators in the industry and not maintaining constraints so long that it undermines the efficiency of the NEST project as a whole?
Lord Bates
The noble Baroness makes a important point in relation to this and I would not dissent from it. NEST has a vital role to play and we want it to be a success. However, it is new, and a new system is coming online, so this ought to be done through learning from experience in a gradual and incremental way rather than as a big bang, of the sort which has had its problems in the past.