(14 years, 7 months ago)
Grand Committee My Lords, this is a most interesting report and the debate has lived up to its billing as one to watch, but let me start with a note of regret that the committee considered naming its inquiry “The Process of Constitutional Reform” and then, overcautiously in my view, abandoned the noun “reform” for the noun “change”. It says that “reform” was somehow inappropriate as it implied a subjective position—to change things for the better—and therefore it stuck to more neutral language, “change” being merely to make or become different. This is far too timid an aspiration for a committee of such distinction and influence, and my vote would certainly have been for reform.
On the substance of the report, there is a desire to place some constraints on the flexibility of the constitutional arrangements currently available. The danger of partisanship, whereby the Government of the day may wish to change constitutional aspects to their own advantage, is recognised, and the report recommends, rightly in my view, that constitutional legislation needs to be treated differently from other public policy. I agree wholeheartedly that there should be no surprises in the introduction of constitutional legislation, but this does not automatically take me down the committee’s preferred route of pre-legislative scrutiny as norm. I shall take an example from recent practice to illustrate my point.
On the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill, it was very well known that both parties in the coalition considered the size of the Commons to be too large and had said so in their election manifestos—in the case of the Liberal Democrats, in several election manifestos. The public were aware of these positions, so it was not entirely unexpected as a proposal. Moreover, if it were to be implemented for the next election, its timescale was tight due to the re-drawing of boundaries, hence not allowing for pre-legislative scrutiny.
The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill was unexpected in so far as it had not been a longstanding Conservative ambition to fix parliamentary terms, as had been the case for my party. However, the exigencies of coalition government led to a situation whereby, to provide certainty in a more fluid situation than previously experienced, the Government decided to bring in this legislation.
Now, ideally, a Government moving to this kind of change—less unusual in reality than we might think, as several Governments in recent history have gone to a full five years—should have gone through consultation with a Green Paper, a White Paper, a draft Bill and then the actual Bill. The process would undoubtedly have taken at least an additional year and, in my view, as this was a political decision, was better settled sooner to lend predictability to public policy.
I note that what I am saying is controversial. If noble Lords want to intervene, I wonder whether they might do so and I would be prepared to deal with that.
It was indeed political and there was no constitutional reason for it to be introduced. It would be quite sufficient for the Prime Minister to say that he would not advise the Sovereign to dissolve until May 2015. You only need the Bill if you do not trust the Prime Minister.
That is a well rehearsed point, I know, from the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. My rebuttal to him at the time that we had this discussion in Committee was that all public policy can be construed as political; we nevertheless go through a process of giving it substance through law and deliberation prior to it becoming law. That was why it was quite right for it to go through Parliament. There is a philosophical imperative in respect of this public policy measure not just to have it for a single Parliament but to have it as good practice enshrined as a constitutional convention. That was the basis on which we introduced it.
I could not resist the noble Baroness’s invitation to intervene on her. I want to make two points. First, on the point of the parliamentary Bill and the boundaries, it is of course quite right that both partners in the coalition had expressed their intention to reduce the size of the House of Commons. However, they had very different numbers, which have crucial implications for the outcome. Therefore, it is completely proper, as the committee said, that this should have been open to all sorts of prelegislative scrutiny. Secondly, the point the noble Baroness made about the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill proves the point that the committee was arguing: that Bill was precisely in the interests of the Executive, and it is the need to fetter the Executive that a lot of the measures put forward by this report are aimed at.
If the noble Lord were to read what the report says on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, he will see that there were contested opinions as to whether it amounted to better governance or merely the Executive overriding to their advantage.
The important examples of the need for proper constitutional process do not necessarily lie in this Parliament but in previous Parliaments; for example, the change to the role of the Lord Chancellor in 2008—noble Lords have referred to it already—or, as the committee mentions, the handling of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill in the closing stages of the previous Parliament, which ran a full five-year term, and where the previous Government, with eight years of power till 2005, should have introduced their Bills in the early part of the previous Parliament rather than leaving it to the wash-up. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which had significant implications for habeas corpus, was not subject to prelegislative scrutiny and, in my view, it should have been. There are some Bills that require flexibility and, as long as justifications are provided for deviation from good practice, we should take each Bill as it comes.
Let me turn to public engagement, which is emphasised in the report. It is, of course, right that in constitutional matters, more than in any other area, there should be at least a minimum awareness in the country of what is proposed and, preferably, meaningful consultation on the merits of the proposals. The nub of the problem lies in what threshold we apply. Noble Lords will be aware of the new e-petition system whereby 100,000 votes on a Downing Street petition can trigger a discussion in Parliament on public policy. As we have seen from the anti-European Union debate recently, a mere debate publicises an issue but does not lead to changes and therefore can disappoint. Consultation that leads people to think that they have a say without it being reflected in substance just makes the electorate more cynical. Another factor is the appropriateness of public engagement. The e-petition system calls forth rather esoteric and special interest issues, and I will give the Committee a flavour of them. Recent petitions include: Convicted London rioters should loose all benefits; Fight for BAE Systems Jobs; and Protect Police Pensions. Some of these may be areas where a debate might be sufficient to deal with them, but the people who have signed the petitions would wish the Government to take action. So, yes, there should be public consultation, but it should be meaningful.
Let me go to the most controversial recommendation. I beg the indulgence of the Committee in going on for a minute or two extra since I have lost some time. The report proposes that legislation should be accompanied by a ministerial statement and provides a comprehensive list of what should be covered in that statement. It further asks the Minister to justify why the Government might agree or disagree with the responses given. The Minister would also be required to set out the extent to which rigour was applied in Cabinet committee. It stops short of asking for a justification of Cabinet decisions, but that is not far off. This perhaps goes too far, and the Government’s response—that they will consider these matters further—is the right one. In today's age of spin, we cannot expect that the internal deliberations of policy within government would not be subject to speculation about who said what, when and for what motive. That would not increase confidence in the Government but would, in fact, decrease it. Having read the multitude of diaries that appeared within months of the previous Government's departure, I come from the perspective that those of us outside are better off not knowing how carelessly or, indeed, controversially serious decisions are made. I suspect that there is at least one member of the committee who would rather that his advice to Cabinet had not been the matter of such intense speculation in the aftermath of the Iraq war.
There are several good things in the report, which have been mentioned by noble Lords, on First Reading and Second Reading timescales and so on. I wholeheartedly agree with them. On the whole, the report is excellent, and while I share some disappointment about the Government’s response, I look forward to the summing up by the Minister. In the words of the noble Lord, Lord Desai, I look forward to hearing him face the music.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we are now facing a clear difference of timescale in the things under way. There is a real urgency about managing the eurozone crisis. That is a matter of weeks. Examining the balance of competences within the European Union is a much longer-term investigation, with which the British Government are engaged, and on which we expect to have plenty of allies among the other member states of the European Union.
My Lords, would my noble friend accept that, in a spirit of constructive engagement, the Prime Minister has made it very clear that he is not about to go to the European Council with a shopping list of powers to be repatriated, that the coalition agreement did not envisage that, that the coalition agreement envisaged only a review of the working time directive and that the repatriation of powers is not on the agenda here and now?
My Lords, we all recognise that Britain’s future economic prosperity depends on the eurozone not collapsing and that it is therefore very strongly in our interest to do everything we can to assist in the management of this current crisis. Britain’s priorities are: first, to maintain the integrity of the EU 27; secondly, to maintain and strengthen the single market; thirdly, to promote recovery and economic growth; fourthly, to defend specific British interests in financial services; fifthly, to ensure that social and employment legislation does not hold back growth; and also to rebalance competence away from detailed regulations on matters better left to national, regional or local government.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI repeat that the Government’s primary objective is to press for the resumption of negotiations between the two parties, based on the principle of a two-state solution around boundaries to be agreed but based on the 1967 boundaries. We are conscious that we are slipping away from that possibility for a range of reasons. We are also conscious that if neither side were to believe any longer in the possibility of a negotiated solution, the threat of a return to violence would be real.
My Lords, does my noble friend accept that the case for Palestinian statehood would be much improved if Fatah and Hamas—in other words, the two different jurisdictions within former Palestinian lands—were able to meet in accordance with the reconciliation agreement of May 2011, the Cairo agreement, and speak with one voice on a Palestinian state rather than with two?
My Lords, the Government would be extremely happy to see a successful reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas based on the acceptance of the state of Israel within a two-state solution and the provision of a viable shared Administration for both Gaza and the West Bank.
(14 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is my pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Chesterton, in this wide-ranging review of the UN agencies and I congratulate him on securing this short debate.
In the 60 years since the formation of the UN, we have come a long way, going much further than the original conception of forming an organisation for maintaining peace and security through mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. The specialised agencies, numerous as they are, have come about as Governments have realised that some of the most pressing problems of the world are not capable of resolution through the exercise of bilateral co-operation alone.
Winston Churchill saw that in his advocacy of concentric circles, which included the countries of empire, the alliances of Europe and the strategic north Atlantic interest that the UK was dependent upon after the war. So pooling sovereignty to the extent that we have in multilateral organisations is not something new. Yet in the UK, a founding member of the UN, it is becoming increasingly fashionable to knock the UN and its agencies except when we need them. At that point, the same people lament their inability to do whatever we want them to do at that particular time.
I welcomed the Government’s multilateral aid review earlier this year as an extremely useful exercise in evaluating our relationship with the UN specialised agencies and in taking forward a new approach. I want to make just three broad points in relation to these bodies.
The first is that while an individual member Government can do well to review the effectiveness of an international organisation—and I want to put it on the record that I think the multilateral aid review did an excellent job—it nevertheless brings to that exercise a narrow prism of sight, hence the review was commissioned to assess the value for money of UK aid funding for those organisations. I accept that the criteria related to strong behaviours which are capable of measurement—in this case, organisational strengths and contributions to UK development objectives—are entirely worth while. Any keen observer of UN agencies will not have been surprised to see that the list contained few surprises, and those that performed poorly or were merely adequate were those that had had a poor track record for some time. It was also not particularly surprising to see that they shared some similarities in weaknesses: a lack of a sharp focus on their mandate; an overly bureaucratic administration, which caused delays; inefficiencies built into the system; poor cost controls; and references to poor leadership and thereby, implicitly, to poor governance.
They are all areas which, were they to be found in corporate life or indeed in government, could be resolved through process and management change. However, the very essence of multilateralism—of being beholden to multiple stakeholders—makes consensus on change an extremely challenging task. Most countries can agree on what they think is wrong, but it is far more difficult to agree on what they think they want from that organisation going forward.
I refer back to my own experience at the Commonwealth Secretariat where we were constantly being pushed in one direction by a particular group of countries, and in another direction by another group. I think it is fair to say that when one thinks of the failure of the Commonwealth to resolve the political situation in Zimbabwe, it was not a failing on the part of the organisation but the lack of consensus on the part of its key members to be able to see a way forward which prevented effective action at the time. I use this example to suggest to our Government that achieving change in the direction we seek will be more easily delivered if we work across the other groups of stakeholders in a diplomatic and consensus-building fashion—sotto voce rather than megaphone diplomacy.
My second point is related and concerns the more practical aspects of cost controls and building efficient and transparent systems. There is a crying need for reorganisation of the governance of these bodies if they are to carry out their mandates. Some have overly cumbersome executive boards, overstaffed senior levels that have been in post too long, and a general risk aversion, which makes new learning more difficult. While we want lean and efficient structures, we the member countries do not accept that a quota system of recruitment actually works against the most high-calibre candidates.
If one is to take leadership changes at the IMF or World Bank, it is not an edifying spectacle in a global economic crisis to see a jockeying for position for the top job, not on the basis of merit but on the basis of whose turn it is. It also leaves the population of countries that do not “win” that post with the impression that the officeholder will from now on be partisan. This cannot possibly encourage confidence in those bodies. On the board, Buggins’s turn results in compositions that may not be fit for purpose. At executive level, the need for geographical balance may well deliver a less than optimal workforce. I urge like-minded countries to work with the Secretary-General and director-general to streamline board and human resource practices to reflect a stronger emphasis on merit, to the exclusion, if need be, of the requirement for geographical balance if the case is strong enough.
A further point is about the location and mandate of UN agencies. A good example of a body stifled from birth is that of UNEP. By basing it in Nairobi, it was hampered from the outset by the fact that it was cut off from the rest of the UN system geographically, and it struggled to recruit the highest calibre staff. In keeping with a somewhat lower status as a UN programme, it has had one of the smallest budgets within the system. Given that it is expected to look after a range of environmental issues, from climate change to biodiversity, water and ozone depletion, it is overstretched and underresourced. Given those constraints, it does a remarkably good job.
Let me turn now to one of the priority areas identified by the MAR—that of programmes supporting the empowerment of women and girls. Last year saw the creation of UN Women. Its full title is the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. The reason it is an entity, we are told, is because its mandate is cross-cutting across other UN bodies to cover all themes related to women. It has strong leadership in the appointment of its first head, Michelle Bachelet. Its mandate is wide-reaching, so it was a little surprising to see that Saudi Arabia, that leading example of gender equality and empowerment, was voted on to the executive board. It came in in an obscure category of,
“developing country not on the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD”.
It stretches the imagination to think of Saudi Arabia in the context of gender equality but it also stretches the imagination to see it as a developing country. I wonder why it is in the G20 in that case.
I know that my noble friend will be prevented from commenting on this aspect of less than good governance because of diplomatic protocol, but I raise it to illustrate how we the member countries need to build smart alliances with other like-minded players to prevent perverse outcomes which simply heap ridicule on bodies which have important roles.
The UN agencies operate in challenging environments and perhaps our expectations of them are too high. However, as the multilateral aid review points out, it is our obligation to secure the best possible outcome for UK taxpayers and we must continue to press for our reform priorities if we are to maintain public confidence in the UN system, which it benefits us to do.