Civil Service Pensions

Debate between Baroness Finn and Lord Pack

Monday 13th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House and to the Minister for having to wear these glasses today. I am doing so on medical advice.

Before turning to the questions raised by the Statement, I want to express my deepest sympathy with the civil servants and families caught up in this failure. Many of those affected will have given more than four decades of their lives to public service. They have planned their retirement in good faith and, having left work, may now be entirely reliant on their Civil Service pension to meet ordinary household bills and maintain the standard of living for which they have worked and saved. They should not be forced to borrow, depend on relatives or postpone retirement because the state cannot administer the pension it promised them. The damage done to their finances, health and confidence is unprecedented and entirely unacceptable.

I thank the noble Baroness for giving the House the opportunity to question this important Statement. Our first concern must be the people affected, with more than 6,700 pension quotations still outstanding for past retirement dates and more than 4,100 bereavement cases on which Capita can take action. Behind every figure is a retired public servant, a grieving family or a household left in uncertainty. They must remain at the forefront of the Government’s response.

The Paymaster-General has emphasised that the Capita contract was signed in November 2023 under the previous Government. That is a relevant fact, but it cannot be the end of the matter. The Cabinet Office retained institutional responsibility throughout a two-year transition between Governments, and critical decisions on readiness, data migration, contingency planning and the go-live of the contract on 1 December 2025 were taken after repeated warning signs. The issue is not only who originally signed the contract but whether the Cabinet Office acted as a capable and sceptical contracting authority. On these Benches, our concern is not ideological and we remain agnostic about whether a service is delivered in-house or by a contractor. Either way, the Government must remain an intelligent and accountable customer.

The National Audit Office reported in June 2025 that Capita had already missed three of the six transition milestones that were then due, that the Cabinet Office had withheld £9.6 million of payments and that the service planned for launch had been simplified because important functionality would not be ready. It also found there were no fixed innovation or digitalisation milestones against which the promised benefits could be managed. In October, the Public Accounts Committee warned that there was a clear risk that Capita would not be ready to take over as planned and concluded that the Cabinet Office had not shown that it could effectively manage the outsourced administration of the scheme.

The evidence given to parliamentary committees since the collapse is more troubling still. Senior Cabinet Office officials have acknowledged that they relied heavily on assurances from Capita, that there are lessons to learn and that the department is still not fully confident in the quality of Capita’s management information. Independent technical auditors are now being brought in to test the data, systems and assumptions. That is welcome, but it raises the obvious question: why was that independent specialist verification not completed before the system was permitted to go live?

We welcome the withholding of £9.9 million from Capita and the intervention of the pensions recovery task force, but a recovery task force, however necessary, is a remedy for failed contract management. It is not a substitute for proper assurance before launch. Can the Minister therefore tell the House who authorised the go-live decision, what objective go or no-go criteria were applied, which criteria Capita had failed to meet and whether any requirements were waived? Will the Government publish the relevant readiness assessments, assurance reports and risk decisions, subject only to genuinely necessary commercial redactions?

Capita has now missed both its end-of-April and end-of-June recovery milestones. Scheme members should not be asked to rely on another unverified promise. What firm dates have now been set for clearing the overdue retirement quotations and actionable bereavement cases? Have those dates been independently stress-tested by people with the technical and operational expertise to verify that they are deliverable?

There are also wider questions about supplier management across government. Will Capita be referred to the Debarment Review Service or will it continue to be permitted to compete for public contracts without such a review? Why was Capita selected in February as the preferred bidder for the DWP-led Synergy shared services contract while serious concerns about the pension transition were already evident? What cross-government assessment of Capita’s delivery risk was undertaken before that decision was finalised?

Finally, I welcome the provision for interest where full pension benefits are paid more than one month late and the ability to seek redress for other losses through the complaints process. However, compensation delayed can compound the original harm. What service standards will apply to those complaints? How quickly will consequential losses be assessed and paid? How will the Cabinet Office ensure that Capita, not affected pensioners and not the taxpayer, ultimately bears the cost of this failure?

This is a corporate failure by Capita, but it is also a grave failure of public sector commissioning, assurance and contract oversight. Civil servants who have spent their working lives serving the country were entitled to expect the Cabinet Office to test promises, verify systems and manage risk before transferring a service on which their livelihoods depend. The Government must now resolve the individual cases urgently, compensate those who have suffered loss and demonstrate that the machinery of government has learned the fundamental lesson: outsourcing responsibility does not outsource accountability.

[Lord Pack (LD)]

My Lords, Capita’s failure to meet its end-of-June deadline following the previous end-of-April missed deadline is obviously extremely disappointing, but this is a story not just of corporate failure, missed KPIs or missed calendar dates but of so many individual cases of heartbreaking distress, especially for those whose loved ones died unexpectedly and who are now left in limbo, in uncertainty and, in many cases, facing financial hardship as well.

To be fair, the Government’s rhetoric on this has been fairly robust not only in reminding us of when the original contract was signed but also, for example, in the Minister saying in the Statement:

“I will continue to apply the most stringent commercial levers”.

I note that, in the discussions in the Select Committees’ joint meeting in the House of Commons last week, there was some discussion of the pros and cons, for example, of sacking Capita outright from this contract. But one of the other stringent commercial levers that could be applied, of course, would be to raise the question whether Capita should be placed on the debarment list, if its failures in this case so significantly undermine our confidence in its ability as a company to deliver on its promises that it would not be appropriate to award it any new future contracts. Such a step might help concentrate minds somewhat when it comes to resolving the current problem.

Of course, adding any company to the debarment list—and I think this would be the first company to be so added—is, I appreciate, not a step to be taken lightly, but the scale of repeated failure in this case is quite striking, as is the scale of repeated broken promises. Capita clearly made commitments on technology and then to meet remedial deadlines that it has not met. Those commitments were not just made off the cuff, casually, at a junior level; as the Cabinet Office’s Permanent Secretary set out in her evidence in the House of Commons last week, these were very serious commitments made at senior level that have not been delivered on. Given this record from Capita, can the Minister tell us: will the Government consider commencing the process to review adding Capita to the debarment list?

I turn to the existing contract and its problems. The Cabinet Office has said—and I think this is very welcome—that it is doubling its capacity to deal with pension complaints, which will increase following these many problems. Of course, the Pensions Ombudsman, a little bit further down the track, could expect a surge of complaints working its way through the system as well. Although there have been comments and commitments about how Capita is paying some of the costs of dealing with this mess, I do not think it has been made clear yet, and I hope the Minister can therefore clarify, whether Capita will pay for the extra costs that the Cabinet Office, and in due course the Pensions Ombudsman, will incur for dealing with the complaints arising from this mess.

Given the dependency on Capita for getting the McCloud remedy cases resolved, and indeed the extra pressure of legal deadlines in those cases, what extra steps are the Government now taking, given Capita’s failure to deliver on that end-of-June deadline and the obvious doubts that therefore arise about its ability to deliver what it has promised in other key areas? That question also applies to Capita’s recently won synergy contract.

Finally, to return to the main pensions fiasco, the Minister in the Commons said the Government are imminently expecting a new update and a new set of promises from Capita. Given that we will shortly go into recess, can the Minister also update us on what the Government’s intentions are to ensure that Parliament is fully updated on those new plans before recess commences?

Lord Mandelson Humble Address: Government Response

Debate between Baroness Finn and Lord Pack

Tuesday 2nd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, this scandal began with the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Peter Mandelson as His Majesty’s ambassador to Washington. Mandelson is a man whose relationship with Jeffrey Epstein was already known to be a profound reputational risk and whose later published record included cash payments and benefits from Epstein, including travel.

At the core of this story is not merely a failure of process; it is a failure of judgment. It is the Prime Minister’s failure, and it shows a callous disregard for the victims of one of the most notorious sex offenders of modern times.

In truth, we have learned little that is surprising from what is actually in these documents. It is no surprise that Lord Mandelson displayed contempt for the Prime Minister, for cabinet government and for officials and advisers alike, despite his public utterances. He described No. 10 as “beleaguered and bereft”, said it needed a “complete revamp” and claimed that senior people in Downing Street did not know what the Prime Minister wanted; indeed, that most of them did not think that the Prime Minister knew what he wanted.

Of equal concern is that, clearly, Ministers spent a lot of time discussing party politics with a supposedly politically impartial official. Can the Minister confirm that that failure to uphold the impartiality of the Civil Service is in contravention of the Ministerial Code?

What is most revealing is not what the documents contain; it is what they do not contain. Nowhere is there candid written submission, whether from officials or political advisers, saying, “Prime Minister, this appointment is unwise. This candidate carries unacceptable reputational risk. This office demands a higher standard”. We have not been shown a written decision from the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary authorising the appointment on the merits. Instead, we are given peripheral documents: process, risk, choreography, vetting, and announcement handling. One chain says simply that

“a political appointment has been agreed”.

The Cabinet Secretary later records that earlier advice explained the Prime Minister’s right to

“make such an appointment and the process for doing so but did not give specific advice on candidates”.

So, for all the Prime Minister’s talk of leadership, the record before us suggests that not one person serving him felt able or willing to advise him candidly in writing that this appointment was folly. That is a remarkable indictment of the culture at the centre of government.

It is also deeply ironic. This is a Prime Minister who has staked much of his moral authority on the Hillsborough law and a statutory duty of candour. He has said that such a duty is needed so that the truth is not optional and cover-ups are impossible and that the law would change the balance of power so that the state can never hide from the people it should serve. Those are admirable sentiments. They arise from hard and bitter experience: Hillsborough, infected blood, Covid—all where families were forced to fight the state, not only for justice but for records, evidence and truth.

Perhaps the one person in government who did, in private, take the duty of candour seriously was Pat McFadden, who told Lord Mandelson:

“Every meeting I have is: ‘Who can we tax in order to pay benefits to others?’ They’re asking the wrong questions”.


What a shame that he felt that that duty did not extend to the electorate.

Does the Minister appreciate how surreal it is for a Government to preach candour in public office while, in relation to one of the gravest scandals in British diplomatic history, they appear assiduously to have avoided creating clear records of advice and decision? Candour is not merely what Ministers say at a Dispatch Box after the event. Candour is what advisers write down when the powerful are about to make a grave mistake.

There is a further problem. The Government acknowledge that material has been withheld so as not to prejudice an ongoing Metropolitan Police investigation, and say that further publication may follow. But where is the schedule? How many relevant documents have been withheld? What categories do they fall into? Who authored them? What dates do they cover? What broad subjects do they concern? I ask the noble Baroness to undertake that the Government will provide the House with a clear account of what has been withheld and why.

Finally, responsibility cannot be outsourced to officials, advisers or process. The responsibility lies with the Prime Minister. If further confirmation were needed of Lord Mandelson’s total unsuitability, it is found in the extraordinary discovery that after his appointment had been publicly announced, he still planned to participate in UBS’s Greater China Conference in Shanghai in his Global Counsel capacity, and that he would be paid for it. Officials further recorded that he asked to start on the FCDO payroll in order to facilitate that private engagement. This was a man with no proper regard for propriety, ethics or the dignity of public office, and he has been driven from office and from public life. The remaining question is how long the Prime Minister who appointed him can credibly remain.

[Lord Pack (LD)]

My Lords, when discussing such matters we should always start with remembering and honouring the bravery of the women and girls who came forward to tell the truth, revealing the grim reality of the behaviour they and others had been subject to. Their commitment to truth stands in stark contrast, sadly, with Peter Mandelson’s decision to withhold key information from the papers we are discussing today.

However, turning to what we do have, and starting on a positive note, the Government’s new guidance on direct ministerial appointments published alongside the humble Address now says—and it is very welcome:

“Where security vetting procedures are necessary, these should be undertaken and completed before an appointment is confirmed and announced”.


I have raised before the rather bizarre, back-to-front nature of appointing somebody first and only then checking whether they are suitable, so that is a very welcome change and should be acknowledged as such.

On a possibly less positive note, I see that the terms of reference for the vetting review have also been published alongside this tranche of documents. I have previously expressed concerns about how the results of Peter Mandelson’s vetting were reported to others through a daisy chain of verbal briefings, such that in the end the Prime Minister was hearing the outcome of the vetting process third hand, without sight of the relevant outcome documents. Whatever we think about the judgments made in that process, that is clearly a very brittle process, prone to error and lack of accountability. Can the Minister therefore confirm that the vetting review will include not just how vetting is done, which is clearly within scope, but how its results are reported to others, including looking at the merits of replacing that culture of verbal briefings with a clear, documented paper trail?

Moving on to what is definitely not, I am afraid, a positive note, the messages that we now can see from inside government show a clear and widespread embedding of the culture of government by WhatsApp. I have previously asked about the promised review of the Cabinet Office’s guidance on the use of WhatsApp, which still, at the bottom of the page on GOV.UK, states:

“This guidance will be reviewed on or before 31 December 2025”.


Last month, when I queried when the review will be completed, the Minister told me:

“I expect it to be before your Lordships’ House imminently for us to discuss the detail”.—[Official Report, 19/5/26; cols. 280-81.]


However, yesterday, in the House of Commons, the Minister, Darren Jones, told the House simply that the terms of reference for the review will be published “very shortly”. So we have gone from a promised review before 31 December 2025, to an expectation last month that details were imminent, to a hope yesterday that the terms of the review will be published very shortly. It seems that each time, as time passes, we are getting further away from the completion of the review. What assurances can the Minister give us about the Government’s commitment to sorting this issue out and ensuring that this review is fully completed —and promptly?

Turning to the papers themselves, I have four questions. Running through much of the correspondence is the idea from officials that membership of the House of Lords exempts you from vetting requirements in many circumstances. It is a repeatedly expressed belief. Given the limited nature of the checks made on those of us who have the privilege of joining this House, and given that those checks have in many cases been carried out several decades previously, can the Minister confirm the Government’s position? On what occasions, and for which posts, would someone who otherwise has to be vetted be exempted from vetting by virtue of being a Member of this House?

Secondly, there is the email from a civil servant to Peter Mandelson on 21 January last year—volume 1, page 77—regarding the vetting team’s request for the names of his foreign contacts. The email said:

“I suggest you send over the handful of names you mentioned, even though you don’t consider them ‘close contacts’. That will reassure the vetting team that you’ve been comprehensive, even if it’s all quite artificial”.


That apparent coaching on how to mislead the vetting team with extraneous information is clearly concerning. Can the Minister tell us when the Government became aware of such exchanges, and what action has been taken to ensure that similar such coaching or advice is not proffered in future?

Thirdly, there is the curious email from Ailsa Terry to Peter Mandelson and Morgan McSweeney on 13 February last year—volume 1, page 386. It says:

“Olly has been clear about the need to delete all traffic on this”.


Why would a senior civil servant be telling those two people to delete all the records of something?

Finally, I turn to a matter of detail—it would be a useful one to clear up—regarding volume 3, page 128. It appears to show the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, arranging a meeting with a paid lobbyist, yet the Treasury’s list of declared such meetings does not have any matching entry. Did that meeting take place? If so, who attended it, and what is the reason for that meeting not appearing in the register?

I appreciate that, obviously, the Minister may not be able to give detailed answers to all those points now, but I hope she will be able to commit at least to writing to me, because clarity and transparency are crucial as part of not just the Government’s but the whole political system’s reaction to the scandal we have been facing.

Pension Schemes

Debate between Baroness Finn and Lord Pack

Tuesday 28th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a former special adviser and future recipient— I hope in the long-distant future—of a civil service pension. At the heart of this issue are former public servants who are entitled to expect that the Civil Service Pension Scheme would be administered with competence, care and basic humanity. Instead, many have faced delay, uncertainty and financial anxiety. The Government have acknowledged that Capita’s performance was unacceptable, and we acknowledge that this contract was awarded under the previous Government. However, the appalling performance has been sustained under this Government. Warning signs were not acted on sooner and contingency arrangements were not in place before the handover on 1 December.

Last month, officials from the Minister’s department confirmed that the Cabinet Office had access to data showing that the backlog of CSPS cases was increasing exponentially during the final months of MyCSP’s tenure. This was known before the transfer, yet Ministers failed to put in place robust contingency plans. They did not require additional resources from Capita ahead of the handover and proceeded regardless, despite being aware that the incoming provider faced a far greater operational challenge than originally anticipated.

The National Audit Office had already found that Capita had failed to meet key transition milestones. The Public Accounts Committee had warned of a clear risk that Capita would not be ready to take over the administration of the scheme and specifically called on the Cabinet Office to fully develop contingency plans before making a final decision. Why, then, did the Government not anticipate this situation as they should have done?

The NAO report highlights a serious issue with the handling of TUPE, the process by which staff transfer to the new contractor. This is meant to ensure continuity by moving experienced staff across with the work, but the NAO notes that the formal TUPE process began only in May 2025, very late in the transition. The consequence is obvious: staff faced prolonged uncertainty about their future, increasing the risk that they would leave before the handover. In a service that depends heavily on experienced personnel, that loss of expertise directly undermines performance. Why was this process started so late and what assessment was made of the risk this posed to service delivery?

The NAO also found that financial penalties were rarely applied under the previous contract and could be waived on the basis of so-called extenuating circumstances. The new contract is supposed to strengthen those provisions, so can the Minister tell the House how many penalties have actually been applied to Capita since go-live, whether any penalties have been waived, on what grounds they were waived and who authorised the decisions?

The Minister in the other place was also asked about standardised mitigation letters for lenders. Members affected by pension delays need clear documentation that they can provide to banks, mortgage providers, landlords and creditors, explaining that their financial difficulty has been caused by administrative failure in the Civil Service Pension Scheme. Can the Minister now confirm whether those standardised letters have been issued? If they have not been, why not? When exactly will affected members receive them?

I ask the Minister about contingency planning. The Statement refers to commercial levers, withheld milestone payments and possible legal remedies. It also refers to explicit personal assurances from Capita’s chief executive, but those assurances were plainly not met. To whom were those assurances made and on what date? What due diligence underpinned them? Who accepted them? Were they set out in writing?

Finally, I am concerned that the department apparently plans to begin a review only in late summer. Why is that timetable considered acceptable? The failures are happening now. There needs to be a credible contingency plan and realistic consideration of future options.

Capita’s failings are unacceptable, but ministerial accountability does not end with condemning the contractor. The contracting authority needs to be relentlessly on the case. This is an issue that I have raised many times previously. Can the Minister tell the House what concrete steps the Civil Service has taken to improve the quality of its contract management? No well-run business would tolerate a contractor performing in such a way, so why should the Government tolerate it?

I appreciate that I have asked a number of detailed questions and that the Minister might want to reply in writing to some of them, but I hope she can shed some light on the concerns raised.

[Lord Pack (LD)]

The Minister may be glad to know that I have a slightly smaller number of questions to ask. Running basic services reliably is at the heart of the Government’s responsibility to us all. Grand promises, fancy manifestos, clever policies or visionary plans about AI mean very little if the basic plumbing of the state is falling apart all around us. Here we have, unfortunately, another failure of that basic plumbing, one with very serious direct consequences for people’s well-being. It is certainly welcome that, faced with another pension scheme going horribly wrong at the hands of Capita, the Government have bitten the bullet and terminated its contract, but that coming after the Civil Service pension contract problems raises two key questions about the Government’s decision-making.

There is certainly a lot of blame to allocate to Capita and MyCSP, but there are also two questions that are fully within the Government’s area of responsibility. One, as I pointed out when we discussed this issue in Questions on 5 February, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, has just touched on, is that the Cabinet Office told the Public Accounts Committee that it was aware of very significant problems with Capita’s preparations to take over the contract on 1 December and that it had a contingency plan ready to use if necessary. Why, therefore, did the Cabinet Office decide to go ahead with the 1 December transfer to Capita rather than invoke its contingency plan? I think it is fair to say that the fact that another Capita pension scheme, the Royal Mail one, has now gone so badly wrong as well redoubles the doubts about why that 1 December transfer was greenlit by the Government.

In addition, in the light of Capita’s failing on these two pension contracts, there is also the problem that the Government have just signed another contract with Capita—a £370 million contract that involves, to quote Capita’s press release from just a few weeks ago,

“tech-enabled back-office services for public servants across four major UK government departments: the Department for Work and Pensions, Ministry of Justice, Home Office, and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Capita will deliver a suite of services including HR, payroll, recruitment, finance, procurement, and service desk support”.

That sounds remarkably similar to the very things that Capita has just got so badly wrong twice.

Warned last year that Capita was getting it wrong, the Cabinet Office pressed ahead with Capita on that 1 December deadline. With Royal Mail, Capita has been getting exactly the same sort of work badly wrong. I hope the Minister will explain why those two failures were not enough for the Government to say for this new contract, “Hang on. We’ve seen your track record, we’ve learned from our mistakes, and no, we’re not going to hand over more money and give you more responsibility for financial IT systems”. Will the Minister tell us what consideration was given to those two other failures by Capita when deciding to award it this new contract? Why were those two failures not considered serious enough for the Government to spend their £370 million—or, I should, say the public’s £370 million—elsewhere?

Lord Mandelson Humble Address: Government Response Update

Debate between Baroness Finn and Lord Pack

Tuesday 28th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for agreeing to take questions on yesterday’s Statement.

The Falklands War was won in less than 12 weeks. This Government, however, cannot piece together a paper audit in that time. We have today simply been given a holding statement that more documents will be forthcoming. We remain no more enlightened than we were a month ago. No information has been forthcoming on the quantity of documents within scope of the humble Address passed in the other place, how many documents have been reviewed and by whom, whether the Cabinet Office has sought redactions and whether the Intelligence and Security Committee has agreed to those redactions. Can the Minister give the House a hard deadline by which the second tranche of documents will be published?

In light of press coverage in the Guardian suggesting that the Cabinet Office considered withholding certain documents from the Intelligence and Security Committee, can the Minister give us a categorical assurance that no documents within scope of the humble Address will be withheld from that committee?

In the other place, my honourable friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar asked the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister a number of specific questions that went unanswered. The Chief Secretary’s silence on questions relating to Peter Mandelson’s declaration of interests form was deafening. Can the Minister confirm that that document exists and that it will not be withheld or redacted without the consent of the Intelligence and Security Committee? Serious questions are being asked about Peter Mandelson’s links through business interests, and how his activities as ambassador may have been linked to those interests.

We are also told that the security mitigations that were put in place for Peter Mandelson were not in response to his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. Can the Minister give the House more clarity on that? Can she say whether the detail of those concerns will be made public if the ISC judges that they may be published? On a day when the Labour Party is whipping its MPs to prevent the Privileges Committee making an independent assessment of the Prime Minister’s conduct, can we be reassured that His Majesty’s Government will not stand in the way of other committees doing their work?

The Government’s excuses for delay are wearing a little thin. We have heard all about the urgency that the Government are bringing to the matter: I hesitate to use the famous words “working at pace”. Yesterday, we heard from the Minister in the other place that documents should be published “in a chronological order”. He went on to say:

“Otherwise, I suspect there would be questions about what documents were missing, subject to the conclusion of the Committee’s work”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/4/26; col. 589.]


If it is the Government’s intention to avoid questions about what documents are missing, why are they still refusing to publish a list or overview of all the documents and whether they have been published? That overall document would help us greatly, and surely the titles or descriptions of the documents cannot be seen to prejudice any matter that is currently sub judice. Can the Minister say what progress is being made towards the publication of such a document? We have asked about this many times before and we still await a clear response.

[Lord Pack (LD)]

My Lords, at the heart of this issue is the bravery of the women and girls who spoke up to reveal the truth about Jeffrey Epstein. Following his evil and criminal behaviour, there have been multiple failures of our political systems—failures that are now rightly seeing the end of various political careers. The events also raise questions about how we fix our broken systems so that we can deal much better with whatever future crises or scandals occur.

So I very much welcome the positive noises now being made about new legislation—for example, to allow peerages to be revoked in the case of scandal. However, it is fair to say that the track record of reform in this place is somewhat slow, so I hope that the Minister can confirm both that such legislation is imminent and that it will be given priority in the legislative queue, so that there is an opportunity for Parliament to debate and, if it so decides, pass such legislation promptly in the new Session.

It is also very welcome to have heard of the plans for the review into the vetting processes by Adrian Fulford, particularly because the more we hear details of what happened with the vetting, the more questions are thrown up. I will give just two examples. One is the sequence: make an appointment, announce the appointment, then carry out vetting after the announcement. Leaving aside questions of how well established that process and sequencing is and who knew about it, it is clearly a sequence of events that invites disaster. Vetting should surely come before an announcement, not after, because that is the way to minimise any pressure to come up with a politically convenient answer and to be fair to everyone involved, including somebody who fails the vetting process.

Also inviting disaster is the daisy chain of oral briefings that we now know took place without key decision-makers seeing the relevant summary of the vetting verdict paperwork. As we now know, the official who saw the paperwork orally briefed the FCDO official, Ian Collard, who did not see the paperwork himself. He, in turn, orally briefed Olly Robbins, who also did not see the paperwork. He, in turn, had oral discussions with the Prime Minister, who again did not see the paperwork so was, in fact, having matters described to him third hand. In other words, the more senior the person and the more crucial their personal decision-making in the process, the more removed they were from seeing the core paperwork involved.

There is obviously a political question in this about why the Prime Minister proceeded with such a process, but there is also a crucial issue for the future. Such a daisy chain of decision-making—with one person speaking to another person, who then speaks to another person, who then speaks to another person, without the authoritative written verdict of the vetting system being in front of everyone—is a process that invites disaster.

I hope the Minister can, as well as addressing my question about legislation to remove peerages, also confirm that these issues relating to vetting processes are within the scope of the Fulford review, that the review will be published soon—maybe even at pace—and that this House will have an opportunity to discuss that review promptly.