3 Baroness Levitt debates involving the Scotland Office

Mon 16th Nov 2026
Courts and Tribunals Bill
Lords Chamber

Committee stage part one
Mon 16th Nov 2026
Courts and Tribunals Bill
Lords Chamber

Committee stage part two
Lord Russell of Liverpool Portrait Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, as was the case at Second Reading, on these occasions the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I tend to come at matters from a slightly different direction from the majority of noble Lords, particularly those who have a legal qualification. While a lot of the discussion is about the intricacies of the legal profession and areas where it is particularly sensitive, we come at it from a different direction. Despite all the nuances in the judicial system, its problems and the rules within it, we are concerned about what actually happens to the victims. If all these attempts by the judicial system to make things work to its own satisfaction have the opposite effect on victims, it is important that their voices are heard. That is what is behind this group of amendments.

I support Amendments 47A and 47B from the noble Baroness. I agree that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, goes even further, so I support that even more. However, I will speak primarily to Amendment 49, which is about the victim’s right to review. As the noble Baroness said, we have tried to argue this case on several occasions, not least when the late lamented Baroness Newlove was here and was able to speak with all the force that came from her own searing personal experience, as well as the experience she had in being instrumental in setting up the role of the Victims’ Commissioner and then, on two separate occasions, holding it in a very distinguished way.

Essentially, we are trying with this amendment to enable the CPS to discontinue proceedings in the Crown Court up until the trial, bringing its opportunity to do so in line with the opportunity in the magistrates’ court. Importantly, this change would mean that proceedings could be ended at a later point and still be reinstated where it is determined that the prosecution was ended in error. For victims, this would be an important safeguard, enabling them to exercise their right meaningfully to challenge CPS decision-making.

One might ask why this change is needed. Currently, the CPS can end proceedings in two principal ways in the Crown Court. It can do so within a narrow timeframe by discontinuing proceedings, which allows it to reinstate proceedings at a later point, or it can offer no evidence, which it can do right up until the start of the trial. The latter is, in effect, an acquittal of the defendant, meaning that even where proceedings are ended in error, there are no means to reinstate them.

Following campaigning by a victim known as Jade Blue, who was subject to this procedure, in June 2025 the CPS launched a pilot in the West Midlands for rape cases, enabling survivors to be told that a decision has been made to offer no evidence and to request a review before final closure. This approach aims to provide an additional safeguard, allowing decisions to be reconsidered before proceedings are halted. We are told that this scheme is being robustly evaluated to ensure that the right balance is struck between victims’ rights to review, the requirements of the court process and the defendant’s rights to timely notification. I would be happy if the Minister could update us on exactly where that has got to, and whether it is likely to be rolled out.

Would this increase the likelihood of more cases being reinstated? One concern that the Government may have is that this would enable the Crown Prosecution Service to take this up rather enthusiastically and be even more exercised in stopping some of these cases happening. Yet discontinuance processes or powers are quite common in a variety of jurisdictions, not just in this country. They are common in several Australian territories and New Zealand, and are available in Scotland, the United States of America and Canada. All the evidence shows that rates of reinstatement are extremely low, even where the regime is more liberal than it is in this country. This tends to indicate that prosecutor behaviour limits the use of the power to reinstate cases to those very rare ones of wrong decisions or where further evidence has become available, and to use the theoretically wide power sparingly and only where appropriate. The power to discontinue is already available in magistrates’ court up to the point of trial in England and Wales. Even so, reinstatement there is so rare that it is difficult to find any examples of its use.

That is the case we are putting forward. For a small group of victims, this would be a very important right and would not leave a victim of rape or a sexual offence hanging at the point that they thought there might be a trial, where they are told that not only would there not be a trial but there was no chance of a trial in future. For all those reasons, I hope the Government will answer in a compelling and full way, and above all will indicate where their thinking is at the moment and how this process of evaluating a new way of doing this is proceeding.

Baroness Levitt Portrait Baroness Levitt (Lab)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My Lords, my Amendment 52 is a practical amendment based on a simple proposition: where a child witness or a witness already recognised by law as vulnerable or intimidated wishes to use a screen, live link or prerecorded evidence in chief, they should not have to apply for it. It should be available automatically, unless there is good reason not to allow it. These are not exceptional measures. They are not novel. Nor are they granted only in rare circumstances. Prerecorded evidence in chief, screens and live links are the three most common special measures used in criminal courts every day all over the country. In the overwhelming majority of cases, applications are made, considered and granted as a matter of routine.

If that is the reality, we should ask a simple question: why are we still requiring vulnerable witnesses to jump through a procedural hoop to obtain something that everybody expects them to receive anyway? The current process creates delay, paperwork and uncertainty—more importantly, uncertainty for victims and witnesses. Giving evidence is often the most stressful part of the criminal justice process. Many victims spend months, sometimes years, worrying about what will happen when they finally enter that courtroom. They deserve clarity from the outset about the basic protections that will be available to them but, instead, we tell them that an application has been made and that a decision will follow. Technically, that is true but, in reality, the measure is almost certain to be granted, so what purpose is served by making vulnerable witnesses prove that they need what everybody already knows they need and are overwhelmingly likely to be given?

My amendment would reverse that: it would provide that eligible witnesses were entitled to these basic and routinely used measures without having to make a formal application. They could simply indicate which measure they wished to use and the court would grant it, unless there were compelling reasons why doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice.

I anticipate that my noble friend the Minister may raise a number of concerns, so I want to anticipate what she is going to say and address that. The first may be that judicial discretion must be preserved. I agree entirely; that is precisely why this amendment preserves it. The court would retain an explicit power to refuse a measure where it would be contrary to the interests of justice. Defendants retain the right to object, and judges retain complete control over how the arrangements operate in practice. The amendment would remove unnecessary bureaucracy, not judicial judgment.

The second possible objection is that not every court can currently provide every measure in every case. Again, I understand that concern, but I do not believe that it is a reason for maintaining the present system. The Government are rightly investing in specialist rape and serious sexual offences courts and are to be commended for doing so. More broadly, screens, live links and video evidence facilities are now a normal part of criminal court infrastructure across England and Wales. If there are still places where these basic facilities are lacking, the answer is surely to improve the provision of the facilities or to move the case to a better equipped court and not to deny vulnerable witnesses a presumption in favour of their use. The risk that the infrastructure may occasionally—in my experience, rarely—fall short cannot justify preserving a system that routinely creates uncertainty for thousands of victims.

The third argument may be that better information and guidance can achieve the same outcome. I respectfully disagree. Better information is welcome, but it is not the same as better rights. A victim can be given excellent information about special measures and still be left wondering whether those measures will be available when they come to give evidence. Information cannot provide certainty; a statutory entitlement can.

There is also a wider practical benefit. Every routine application consumes time and wastes scarce public money. Police officers have to prepare paperwork; prosecutors then have to review that paperwork; the defence representatives then consider the paperwork, and the judges then also consider it and must determine it. All that effort is expended for an outcome that is, in most cases, entirely predictable. When the courts are under enormous pressure, we should be asking whether scarce resources are being used wisely. Surely judges should be spending their time deciding genuinely contested issues rather than processing applications that everyone expects to succeed.

My amendment adopts a practical and proportionate approach. It applies only to the most common and least controversial measures. It does not extend to measures such as prerecorded cross-examination under Section 28 or other arrangements that might require a more detailed judicial assessment. Those would continue to be dealt with through the ordinary application process, so this is not a radical amendment but a modest and targeted reform. Indeed, Scotland has already moved in this direction through its vulnerable witness reforms. Parliament there has recognised that some standard measures have become so routinely appropriate that requiring an application no longer serves a useful purpose. In truth, that is where we are as well. We would not design this system in this way if we were starting from scratch today.

The amendment says that where Parliament has already recognised that a witness is vulnerable and the protection sought is routinely granted in courts across the country, the default position should be that the witness receives it. It would reduce bureaucracy, save judicial and prosecutorial time, preserve defendants’ rights and preserve judicial discretion. Above all, it would give vulnerable witnesses something that they too often lack: a measure of certainty. For those reasons, I hope the Government will look favourably on this reform.

--- Later in debate ---
Moved by
50: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause—
“Directions on myths and stereotypes(1) In a trial on indictment for a sexual offence or an offence involving domestic abuse, the judge must give the jury a direction on myths and stereotypes that may affect their assessment of evidence, unless satisfied that such a direction is unnecessary having regard to the circumstances of the case.(2) A direction under subsection (1) may be given in general terms or by reference to any issue arising in the proceedings.(3) Such a direction should ordinarily be given before the prosecution calls evidence, unless the interests of justice require it to be given at another stage of the trial.(4) Where no direction is given at the commencement of the trial, it must be given when the relevant issue arises.(5) The judge must, when summing up, give a direction on myths and stereotypes appropriate to the issues in the case, whether or not such a direction has previously been given.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require judges in trials for sexual offences and domestic abuse offences to direct juries on myths and stereotypes that may affect their assessment of the evidence, unless such a direction is unnecessary in the circumstances of the case. It makes it clear that such directions should not ordinarily have to wait until the summing up but should be given to assist the jury before or at the time the issue arises.
Baroness Levitt Portrait Baroness Levitt (Lab)
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I am grateful for the support of Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner, Dame Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and His Honour Peter Rook KC, a former Old Bailey judge, former vice-chair of the Parole Board and co-author of one of the leading academic texts on sexual offences.

This amendment has two purposes. First, it would ensure that a direction on harmful myths and stereotypes is given to juries in all cases where such a direction is needed, but, importantly, it does not seek to dictate what the formal content of that direction should be. Secondly, it addresses timing. If these directions are to be effective, they should not necessarily be left until the very end of a trial, after assumptions and misconceptions may already have taken root in jurors’ minds. In appropriate cases, my amendment would encourage judges to give them at the outset and, where necessary, reinforce them during the course of the proceedings. The amendment enshrines a simple proposition: trials should be decided on evidence, not on misconceptions about how victims are expected to behave.

What are these harmful myths and stereotypes? They are assumptions about how a so-called “real” victim of rape or domestic abuse would behave. For example, some people assume that rape will usually result in visible injury and that, therefore, if there is no injury, the allegation is somehow less credible. Yet research demonstrates that many victims of rape sustain no physical injury at all. Some assume that a genuine victim would report what had happened to them immediately, yet delayed reporting is common. Some assume that, if a victim remains in contact with the perpetrator, returns to an abusive partner or continues with aspects of everyday life, that somehow demonstrates that they were not really a victim. Again, research and experience tell us that the reality is far more complex. Those are examples of things that are not evidential conclusions; they are harmful misconceptions based on stereotypes, and they matter because of the nature of the offences with which we are concerned.

Rape, serious sexual offending and domestic abuse usually occur in private. There are usually no eyewitnesses. Physical evidence may be limited or non-existent. As a result, in most of these cases juries are being asked to make difficult assessments of credibility and reliability. Jurors bring integrity, experience and common sense to their role, but they are ordinary members of the public. They are not specialists in trauma, victim behaviour, coercive control or the psychology of abuse. Faced with difficult questions, it is entirely understandable that jurors may ask themselves how they think they would have reacted, how a friend or a family member might have reacted or how a victim would usually behave. The difficulty is that those assumptions are often wrong. That is why the judicial directions on myths and stereotypes matter. Their purpose is not to tell a jury what conclusion it should reach. Their purpose is not to favour the prosecution. Their purpose is not to make convictions easier to obtain. Their purpose is to remind jurors that there is no single correct way for a victim to behave, and that assumptions therefore should play no part in their assessment of the evidence.

Far from undermining fairness, these directions are intended to protect it. Indeed, nothing in my amendment would prevent robust defence advocacy. Defendants are entitled to be defended fully and fairly, and defence advocates must remain free to challenge evidence, test reliability and explore apparent inconsistencies. What should not happen is an invitation, whether explicit or implicit, for a jury to reason from stereotype. The proposition that a complainant did not report immediately and therefore must be lying is not an evidential argument; it is reliance on myth and misconception. The purpose of a judicial direction is simply to ensure that jurors understand that distinction.

This amendment would not solve every problem that has been identified, particularly in some recent high-profile cases, but it would provide a modest and important step towards ensuring that our courtrooms consistently reinforce the principle that cases should be determined by evidence rather than by prejudice or stereotype. The principal objection raised to this proposal is that it intrudes upon judicial independence. During the Private Notice Question on 9 November, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, who I am sorry to see is not in his place this evening, asked whether it was

“unprecedented for Parliament to seek to instruct judges on how they should direct juries”,

and suggested that doing so would constitute

“an unacceptable intrusion upon judicial independence”.—[Official Report, 9/11/26; col. 17.]

I have the greatest respect for the noble and learned Lord and could not agree more that judicial independence is one of the cornerstones of our constitution. Indeed, if my amendment sought to tell judges how to decide cases, what verdict a jury should return, what evidence should be believed or what sentence should be imposed, I would oppose it myself—but it does none of these things. It would merely require a judge, in appropriate circumstances, to remind jurors that assumptions and stereotypes are not evidence. It does not seek to dictate the words used, because these are entirely matters for the discretion of the trial judge and will depend wholly on the issues in the case.

Judicial independence protects judges from interference in their decisions, but it does not prevent Parliament legislating for fair trial procedures. With the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, I question whether drawing that constitutional distinction is really sustainable. All jury directions are themselves part of the law. They exist only because Parliament and the senior courts recognise that certain things matter sufficiently that jurors must be reminded of them or helped with how to approach them.

Nor is it correct to suggest that statutory directions are unprecedented. Parliament has legislated before where it considered that fairness required a warning or direction to be given to the jury. I will give four examples. I am sorry to be boring about it, but it is important that they are on the record and it is known that this has happened. They are four examples of when Parliament has required that a jury be directed about particular topics. Section 77 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 requires a warning in relation to certain confessions made by mentally disabled people. Section 90 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 requires a warning to the jury where a witness anonymity order has been made. Section 32 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 requires a warning to be given where evidence has been given using special measures. Section 39 of the same Act requires a direction to the jury where a defendant has been prohibited from personally cross-examining a witness. In all four examples, the mandatory language is used in the statute.

The principle that Parliament may require a judge to warn a jury about a recognised evidential danger is well established. The real question is not whether Parliament may legislate in this area—Parliament plainly may—but whether myths and stereotypes create a sufficiently serious risk to the fairness of proceedings to justify legislative action. That is a policy question, not a constitutional one. In fact, Clauses 8 to 10 of this Bill all represent parliamentary intervention in areas where judges already apply the existing law. They do so because the Government have concerns about consistency of judicial approach and want to make the law clearer about admissibility of evidence and when certain applications can be made. This Bill itself therefore proceeds on the basis that Parliament may legitimately act where greater consistency or greater protection is required. If that proposition is constitutionally acceptable elsewhere in the Bill, it is difficult to see why it suddenly becomes objectionable here. The real issue is not whether Parliament can act but whether it should.

--- Later in debate ---
Baroness Brinton Portrait Baroness Brinton (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The noble Baroness said that both I and the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, had quoted myths about the public view. We were quoting from the findings of the 2024 CPS research on the public understanding of rape and sexual assault, and from the London Rape Review of 2019.

Baroness Levitt Portrait Baroness Levitt (Lab)
- Hansard - -

We also quoted from the Law Commission’s report.

Baroness Fox of Buckley Portrait Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I was suggesting that sometimes presumptions are made about the public’s views that are unfair, and I am challenging them. It is called stereotyping and myths. It happens to all sorts of people.

--- Later in debate ---
Baroness Levitt Portrait Baroness Levitt (Lab)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My Lords, I am very grateful to all Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken in this debate, which is so important not just to victims but to wider society. There is not much disagreement between us about the issue. The question is not whether these directions have value but whether relying on discretion alone is enough.

This ground has been covered comprehensively. The only point I make in response to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that I was puzzled when he said, “If it’s not done, you will receive a brown envelope from the Court of Appeal”. The whole point is that the prosecution cannot appeal, so there is no way of challenging a judge who does not do this.

I am not persuaded that this amendment would produce any dramatic change in practice. As I thought I had made clear—I say it again for the avoidance of doubt—I am not prescribing the content of any directions. That would, of course, be a matter for the discretion of each trial judge, according to the circumstances of the case. Those judges who are already following best practice would be entirely unaffected. The amendment would bite only if there were cases in which appropriate directions were not given.

I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the compendium is wonderful. I have relied on it extensively when crafting directions. The training, the advice, the words from the Court of Appeal and the compendium have been around for 20 years. If that is so, why are there still cases in which this is not being done?

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his offer to meet. I know that the Government take this really seriously, and I applaud both the Prime Minister and the Lord Chancellor for the things they have said. I hope it will give support to victims to know that this is being addressed directly. I remain of the view that it is an important issue to which we may return on Report, but for today I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 50 withdrawn.
Moved by
52C: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause—
“Criminal Division of the High Court(1) Section 5 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (divisions of High Court) is amended according to subsections (2) and (3).(2) In subsection (1)—(a) for “three divisions” substitute “four divisions”;(b) omit “and” at the end of paragraph (b);(c) at the end of paragraph (c) insert, “; and(d) the Criminal Division, consisting of the President of the Criminal Division, who may be either the Lord Chief Justice or a Lord Justice of Appeal, and such of the puisne judges as are for the time being attached in accordance with this section.”(3) After subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The establishment of the Criminal Division does not affect the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division or any other Division of the High Court.”(4) In making arrangements for the attachment of judges to the Criminal Division and for the deployment of those judges, the Lord Chief Justice must have regard to the complexity and sensitivity of criminal proceedings and must seek to ensure the effective use and development of judicial experience and expertise in—(a) criminal law,(b) criminal procedure,(c) evidence,(d) sentencing,(e) jury management, and(f) the participation of defendants, witnesses and victims in criminal proceedings.(5) The Lord Chief Justice must make arrangements for judges sitting in the Criminal Division to undertake criminal business appropriate to their experience and expertise, including sitting in the Crown Court and in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal.(6) Nothing in this section—(a) transfers the jurisdiction of the Crown Court or of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal to the High Court;(b) prevents a judge attached to another Division of the High Court from undertaking criminal business where appropriately experienced and qualified;(c) affects the independence of the judiciary in the allocation or determination of individual cases;(d) affects the assignment of cases presently assigned to the King’s Bench Division.(7) The Lord Chancellor must, before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament a statement, prepared after consulting the Lord Chief Justice, setting out the arrangements for implementing this section, including arrangements relating to judicial deployment, training and administrative support.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment establishes a Criminal Division of the High Court, recognising criminal law and procedure as a distinct judicial specialism and promoting the effective deployment and development of criminal expertise within the senior judiciary. The amendment preserves the existing jurisdiction of the Crown Court, the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal and the existing Divisions of the High Court, whilst maintaining judicial responsibility for deployment and case allocation.
Baroness Levitt Portrait Baroness Levitt (Lab)
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 52C, 67A and 70A standing in my name. I am very grateful to Professor David Ormerod, one of the most distinguished criminal lawyers of his generation, for his assistance in developing these amendments. They ask a straightforward question: why is criminal justice the only major jurisdiction of the High Court without a recognised institutional home of its own?

The criminal law occupies a unique place within our legal system. Every day, judges sitting in the criminal courts determine questions of guilt and innocence, make decisions affecting personal liberty, protect the public from serious harm and give effect to the rights of victims. The consequences of those decisions are profound, not merely for defendants and victims but for public confidence in the justice system as a whole. Despite the significant of those responsibilities, the High Court contains a Family Division and a Business and Property Division, but no criminal division. Parliament has long recognised the distinctiveness of criminal justice at appellate level through the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. The question raised by these amendments is: why is that distinctiveness not recognised within the structure of the High Court itself?

Recent developments make that question particularly timely because, this year, the Business and Property Division replaced the former Chancery Division. Whatever view one takes of that change, it demonstrates an important constitutional point. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, clearly has some thoughts on that matter; I very much look forward to him sharing them with us. Whatever view one takes of that change, the divisional structure of the High Court is not fixed for all time, as is proved by this change. It can evolve where a convincing case exists for doing so. Such a case exists in relation to criminal justice.

My case rests on three propositions. First, criminal judging is a distinct judicial specialism. Secondly, criminal expertise should be recognised and deployed systematically. Thirdly, specialisation need not come at the expense of flexibility.

My starting point is that criminal judging is different. Of course, every branch of the law is demanding, and every division of the High Court contains judges of exceptional ability. Nothing in these amendments should be understood as a criticism of the King’s Bench Division or of the arrangements under which criminal work is currently undertaken. The issue is not capability; it is specialism.

Serious criminal trials require a combination of skills and experience that is not easily replicated elsewhere. Judges are required to manage vulnerable witnesses and defendants, rule on complex evidential questions in real time, assess the potential impact of disputed evidence on a jury and explain difficult legal principles to 12 citizens with no legal training. These are not skills that are acquired solely through academic study; they are developed through sustained practical experience. One senior criminal judge described trying a serious Crown Court case as being like driving a heavy goods vehicle with no brakes and unreliable steering, while somehow still being expected to arrive safely at the correct destination. Behind that humour lies an important truth: criminal trials are dynamic, highly pressured and unforgiving of error. That distinctiveness does not disappear on appeal. Criminal appellate judges are frequently required to evaluate decisions taken in fast-moving jury trials and to assess whether difficult rulings made under considerable pressure were, in fact, correct.

If criminal judging is distinctive, then criminal expertise has value. I do not mean the expertise acquired many years earlier before moving permanently into other fields of practice; I mean expertise grounded in the contemporary realities of criminal litigation. That should not be a controversial proposition. We readily accept that specialist experience matters in family law and in commercial and business litigation. There is no obvious reason why criminal law should be treated differently. Indeed, many criminal practitioners would argue that criminal law has too often suffered from an assumption that it is somehow less intellectually demanding than other legal specialisms.

In reality, criminal judges deal daily with difficult issues of evidence, disclosure, procedure, human rights and sentencing. They preside over proceedings involving digital evidence, scientific and expert testimony, and vulnerable witnesses and defendants. They operate in an environment where emotions run high and the consequences of error can be profound. Moreover, criminal law is marked by particularly frequent and significant change, particularly in the area of legislation. Few branches of the law evolve as rapidly or as fundamentally. Keeping abreast of those developments requires continuing specialist engagement. The structure of our courts should reflect that reality.

The second proposition is that the jury system should make systematic use of criminal expertise. This argument is not ideological but practical. A criminal division of the High Court would provide a clearer framework for identifying, retaining and deploying specialist criminal expertise. It would strengthen the contribution of experienced criminal judges to appellate decision-making, help ensure that the most serious criminal cases are heard by judges with the most relevant experience, and, above all, give institutional recognition to a specialism that already exists in practice.

There is also a broader point concerning progression, diversity and public confidence. For many years, Parliament, the judiciary and the legal profession have rightly sought to widen the diversity of those who reach the most senior judicial offices. Important progress has been made but concerns remain. I am sure it will readily be recognised that criminal practice has historically provided opportunities for lawyers from backgrounds that have traditionally been underrepresented at the highest levels of the profession. Many criminal practitioners are state educated, many are first-generation professionals, and many have spent their careers working directly with the communities most affected by the justice system. A significant number go on to become district judges, recorders and circuit judges, and acquire exceptional expertise in the conduct of criminal trials.

Yet criminal expertise has not always enjoyed the same institutional recognition as some other legal specialisms. That matters because structures influence careers; they influence aspirations, opportunities and progression. A criminal division would not of itself solve questions of judicial diversity but it would create a clearer route through which outstanding criminal practitioners and judges could progress to the most senior levels of the judiciary while remaining within the specialism to which they have devoted their professional lives. That is a question not simply of representation but of legitimacy and public confidence.

I turn briefly to two possible objections. The first is the concern that a criminal division would encourage excessive specialisation. I respectfully suggest that that concern is overstated. The principle of specialisation is already well established within the senior courts. Parliament accepted long ago that family justice warranted a separate division, and the existence of the Business and Property Division reflects a similar recognition in relation to commercial expertise. The real question, therefore, is not whether specialisation is acceptable but whether criminal justice is sufficiently distinctive to justify comparable treatment. For the reasons I have already outlined, I suggest that it is. Nor would these amendments create a judicial silo. The drafting deliberately preserves flexibility. Judges from other divisions could continue to undertake criminal work where appropriate, and cross-deployment and cross-fertilisation would remain possible, so the proposed division would be specialist but not isolated.

The second objection concerns cost. Again, I suggest that that concern is overstated. These amendments would not create a new court system, require new court buildings or establish a significant new administrative structure. This proposal concerns the organisation and deployment of judges who already exist within the courts. In any event, costs must be considered alongside effectiveness. The present system functions well because considerable effort is devoted to matching judges with cases according to their experience and expertise, but that process itself carries costs, as do appeals, retrials and delay. These burdens are borne not only by the courts but by victims, witnesses and defendants. Again, I am not suggesting that a criminal division would eliminate such difficulties, but it is reasonable to suppose that a structure designed to identify and utilise specialist expertise would assist in the effective deployment of judicial resources.

Most importantly, I ask that we remember what is at stake. The criminal courts determine whether individuals lose their liberty, whether victims receive justice and whether the public are protected. In that context, the relevant question is not whether expertise has a cost but whether we are making the fullest possible use of expertise where the consequences of error are greatest.

I have a final word on the drafting. The amendments are deliberately modest. The Lord Chief Justice—that is the traditional wording but, of course, at the moment it is a Lady Chief Justice—could serve as president of the division, avoiding the need for a new salaried leadership office. The amendments build on existing statutory mechanisms governing judicial deployment. Although Section 7 of the Senior Courts Act already provides machinery by which divisional arrangements may be altered, these amendments proceed on the basis that the creation of a criminal division is a matter of sufficient constitutional significance that Parliament should make the decision expressly.

I readily accept that this is an ambitious proposal. However, I hope that there can be agreement on a number of underlying propositions: that criminal judging is distinctive; that criminal expertise has value; that criminal judicial experience should be recognised, retained and developed; and that public confidence is strengthened when the most serious criminal cases are heard by judges with substantial and relevant expertise. If family justice merits a division and if business and property litigation merits a division, it is surely legitimate to ask whether criminal justice should continue to stand alone without equivalent institutional recognition. These amendments ask that question. I suggest that they provide the right answer. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---
Baroness Smith of Cluny Portrait Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, the structure of the courts and the deployment of judges are matters of considerable constitutional and operational importance. It is a well-established constitutional principle enshrined in Section 7 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 that decisions concerning the deployment of judges and the allocation of work to judges are for the judiciary.

It is essential that any structural change should be developed carefully with the senior judiciary, which has everyday responsibility for our courts. Where the senior judiciary seeks structural reforms, the Government are committed to working closely with it, as we have done with the measures in this Bill to unify the leadership of the tribunals and courts judiciary in England and Wales under the Lady Chief Justice, and recently in supporting the judiciary’s proposals to modernise the High Court with the historic creation of the Business and Property Division delivered via secondary legislation—with much heartache, it appears.

As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out, my noble friend Lady Levitt’s speech did not identify anything actually going wrong, so it appears that her amendment is a principled move not a practical one. The Government do not consider it appropriate to make any structural change to the High Court without detailed consideration by and engagement with the judiciary. Our focus is now on the structural reforms being planned for the magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court through the Bill. With this explanation, I hope my noble friend Lady Levitt will withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Levitt Portrait Baroness Levitt (Lab)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken, particularly to my noble and learned friend the Minister for her careful response. The purpose of these amendments was less to prescribe a particular institutional solution and more to start a conversation about how we recognise and nurture criminal judicial expertise within our senior courts.

I have, as I think the entire Chamber has, the most enormous respect for the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I hope that she will understand that I say with affection that I accurately predicted the outrage with which this amendment would be greeted by the senior judiciary. She did not disappoint.

There may be differences in views about the merits of a criminal division, but I hope there is broader agreement that criminal judging is a demanding specialism, that criminal expertise matters and that we should always be looking at how best to support and develop it. It is not an issue that will be resolved this evening. Questions about the structure of our senior courts deserve thoughtful reflection rather than hurried conclusions. I am grateful for the constructive and good-tempered engagement and hope that the discussion I have prompted may continue beyond Committee. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 52C withdrawn.

Violence Against Women and Girls

Baroness Levitt Excerpts
Monday 17th March 2025

(1 year, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Asked by
Baroness Levitt Portrait Baroness Levitt
- Hansard - -

To ask His Majesty’s Government what progress they have made in implementing a strategy to prevent violence against women and girls.

Baroness Smith of Cluny Portrait The Advocate-General for Scotland (Baroness Smith of Cluny) (Lab)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

The scale of the issue of violence against women and girls is such that this Government are treating it as a national emergency. We will publish a new strategy setting out how we will halve violence against women and girls within a decade, and we hope to publish this before the Summer Recess. Recently, we have taken important steps, including embedding domestic abuse experts in 999 control rooms in five police force areas, under Raneem’s law, and funding a new national policing centre for violence against women and girls and public protection, to improve policing response.

Baroness Levitt Portrait Baroness Levitt (Lab)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

I thank my noble and learned friend for her Answer. Does she agree that unmarked cars displaying flashing blue lights should be restricted to the absolutely necessary? I declare an interest because, in my former role as a judge, I have dealt with cases of men being stopped in cars that turned out to be fitted with blue lights. Can she explain what steps the Government will take to ensure that women are not fooled into stopping for a car which is not a genuine police car, particularly at night?

Baroness Smith of Cluny Portrait Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

My noble friend raises a very pertinent and distressing question for women, as she says, particularly at night. There are two parts to this answer; the first is on what the Government are doing and the second is on “What should a woman do tonight?” Should individuals be concerned if they are approached by a lone officer or someone in a car that they find suspicious, either because it is displaying blue lights that may or may not be authentic or because it is an unmarked but genuine police car, it is entirely reasonable for that woman to seek reassurance that the person is acting legitimately, and I would expect any officer receiving such a challenge from a member of the public to understand why it is being made and to do what they can to provide reassurance. This remains an issue of huge concern, and the Government will be addressing it through the work of the Angiolini Inquiry. Part 1 of the inquiry reported in February 2024, and we are committed to implementing the 16 recommendations made. Part 2 of the Angiolini Inquiry will look at the role and effectiveness of police initiatives to make women and girls safer when interacting with the police, and I feel sure that this Question will be addressed in that part.