Foreign Policy

Lord Frost Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd May 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the right reverend Prelate for giving us the opportunity for this debate and for his thoughtful opening remarks. I agree with large parts of what he said, and I am sure we can all endorse the wish that we should work to make this a more peaceful world.

This is a timely debate because it comes on the back of the Government’s Integrated Review Refresh on foreign policy, one of the rare intellectually coherent documents to come out of government. I pay tribute to the role of my friend Professor John Bew, foreign policy adviser now to three Prime Ministers, in writing it. I was a little involved in writing the 2021 original review, so I welcome the fact that this 2023 refresh maintains some fundamental elements of that review’s approach, particularly the emphasis on systemic competition as a key feature of today’s international system, and the clarity that

“traditional multilateral approaches and defending the post-Cold War ‘rules-based international system’ are no longer sufficient on their own”.

Too much of our post-Cold War diplomacy seemed to put too much emphasis on process rather than substance, a belief that the unique mission of the UK was to preserve the processes of international interaction —in which we, as a P5 member, have a privileged position—rather than to consider whether the outcomes of that system actually suited this country’s interests.

This new realism is welcome, and I hope it will be coupled in future with a more clear-sighted view of international institutions and how they work—to see them not so much as producers of global norms or as global NGOs but more, for the time being at least, as what they are: arenas for conflict between the great powers. We saw during the pandemic how the WHO became extremely influenced—perhaps captured—for a time by Chinese perspectives, and I look for these lessons to be learned in our attitude to the pandemic treaty currently being drafted in Geneva.

The IR refresh also states:

“Today’s international system cannot simply be reduced to ‘democracy versus autocracy’, or divided into binary, Cold War-style blocs”.


It is certainly true that that is not the only thing going on in the world, but at the same time it is hard to deny that it is a—perhaps the—major feature of the current world scene. The newly revived strength of purpose of NATO and its east Asian partners on the one hand, and, on the other, the closer relationship among China, Russia, Iran and others is surely a clear organising principle at the moment, and it is foolish to think that the latter countries wish us well or to deny that we are engaged in some sort of global competition with them.

It is true that many states around the world are not in either of those camps, but in this world, the strength of purpose and attractiveness of the main players is crucial in determining how those other states play their hand. We have seen in the reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that many of those countries, even those with broadly free societies and those we regard as our friends, do not necessarily always wish to line up with us in condemning Russia if it affects their own direct interests.

There are many reasons for this, but one, I fear, is the current perception that many have of the United States. The US remains the most powerful single country in the world, and it is our closest friend and ally, but it is made less attractive as a society and as an ally by its uncertain leadership under its current President and by the apparent grip that hard-left values have on the Democratic Party and on some parts of US society. We know from comment in other countries round the world that this is weakening US soft power. To many, the US seems in decline, as do we, its western allies.

Where the US and its allies withdraw, we see others occupy the space, most obviously in the recent China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in the gradual rehabilitation of Syria in the region and in the readiness of Turkey—an ally, at least on paper—to play with both sides in the Ukraine war. We must hope that the US finds it in itself, as so often in the past, to renew its strengths and return effectively to the world stage.

How can our country play its hand in this increasingly difficult world? I will suggest four ways from the many that one could list. First, we should not give in to those who say that we cannot have influence on our own—only as part of a bloc. Obviously, big countries are stronger and more powerful than smaller ones, but the same is not true of large groups of countries compared with smaller ones. The collective uncertainty of purpose shown by the EU in the early weeks of the Ukraine war and, more recently, with regard to China, suggests that the EU as a unit is, more often than not, less than the sum of its parts. Our ability to assess, decide and act quickly and show leadership is a huge advantage, as the early days of the Ukraine war showed.

Secondly, we must invest in our friends, new and old, through thick and thin, and build genuine partnerships and alliances through difficulties, avoiding a tendency we sometimes have to preachiness. Raising our own defence spending on hard power is a crucial part of building the credibility of these relationships. We have begun that with AUKUS and the incipient defence arrangements with Japan, and I hope that in due course the CPTPP will help us to strengthen all those relationships in Asia still further. We have newly strong partnerships with the countries of central and eastern Europe as a result of the Ukraine war, but we must also keep investing in others that matter, particularly the Gulf countries. I worry that some of our long-standing friends think we might be losing interest in them and beginning to look elsewhere.

Thirdly, one country that I am concerned that we do not influence as much as we should is the United States. Although the defence and security relationship is strong, the political relationship and the relationships between much of the bureaucracies are not as taut as they used to be. When I entered the Foreign Office 30 years ago it was a much stronger and closer relationship. I fear there is a view in Washington that the British effort, via the embassy and beyond, is not as dynamic or effective as it once was and not as well plugged into the Republican Party than it could be. Indeed, I have heard it said by well-placed commentators that not just Israel or Ireland but countries such as Poland or France are more effective on the Hill than the UK nowadays. I welcome the Minister’s thoughts on this.

Finally, we need a clear policy towards China. We had the Foreign Secretary’s speech at Mansion House last week. I did not see it as quite as accommodating as many commentators seemed to, and it certainly got across the multidimensionality of the relationship, but it still seemed to be trying to have it all ways and to overestimate our ability to persuade China on issues that are of importance to us. The four elements of our policy might be, “We talk to you, we seek to influence you if we can, but we don’t really trust you and we certainly want to make ourselves less dependent on you”. Overall in that relationship, the right place for us to be is tougher than the EU and closer to the US.

This is a difficult, dangerous and turbulent world. If we are to navigate it effectively, we must stick by our friends, raise our game and stand up to those who wish us harm. I am confident that this is the Government’s intention. If we can do this, I am sure that we will survive, prosper and succeed.