Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 26th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)]

My Lords, surely there is no more important issue in relation to this banking situation than whether to go with ring-fencing or with separation—we have had that very clearly debated today. The noble Baroness, Lady Cohen of Pimlico, raised an issue in relation to that, which my noble friend the Minister placed some emphasis on in responding earlier, as he did at the last stage of this debate—namely, to state that the cost of total separation would be exorbitant. The noble Baroness rightly made the riposte that the cost of policing the ring-fence will not be a one-off, as the cost of a separation would be; the cost will be year after year. The task of the regulators in policing a ring-fencing arrangement will be intensely difficult. It is easy to jibe at the regulators, but we may underestimate the extreme difficulty of doing a thorough job in this field, where you have a single holding company and two companies under it. I take the point made vividly by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson of Blaby, about cultural contamination that can easily infect a group, such as the one that the ring-fenced company will be part of.

I hope that my noble friend will feel able to accept Amendment 5. We are all speculating madly. To have a review of how this has gone, and to look at it coolly, objectively and professionally in the period prescribed, must make absolute sense. Frankly, it is not worth taking the risk of not having such a review. The cost of getting this wrong will be insupportable. We are apt to underestimate, in what has happened over the past five years, the cost to this country in all sorts of non-financial ways. We must not let it happen again. The review that Amendment 5 proposes must be prudent, sensible and ultimately economical.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Lawson’s amendment as well. Like him and the noble Baroness, Lady Cohen, I have always been a believer in Glass-Steagall, and in the complete separation of investment banks from clearing banks as the only way in which you can guarantee that there will be no contamination.

My noble friend the Minister described the ring-fencing as robust. I do not know how he can speak with such confidence about the robustness of the ring-fencing. I do know that many people in the City today are, as we speak, working on ways to get round the ring-fence and to make sure that money held in clearing banks can be used in investment banks. The problem is that there is an enormous financial incentive to get round this ring-fence. If that incentive remains when you do not have separation, it is only a matter of time before the clever people employed in the City will find a way round it.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Phillips. Much has been made of the cost of separation, but there is also the cost of ring-fencing. There are a one-off cost and a continuing cost. It would be regrettable if we did not support my noble friend Lord Lawson’s amendment and I intend to do so.

[Lord Deighton]

My Lords, before I turn to the substance of these amendments, I would like briefly to pause and reflect on the process that has brought us to this point. Throughout the course of this Bill the Government have consistently tried to adopt the most constructive approach possible, welcoming contributions from all sides to help us get this right. I am particularly grateful for the constructive comments to that effect from my noble friend Lord Lawson and the most reverend Primate. I thank them for those.

Our ambition has just been to get this right. Even before the Bill was introduced to Parliament, we asked the PCBS to conduct pre-legislative scrutiny. We considered seriously its recommendations both on the draft Bill and on banking conduct and standards more generally. Almost a third of the Bill before us today was either added or heavily amended in response to its recommendations. We have also showed ourselves to be open to considering ideas proposed by the Opposition, both in the Commons and in this House. Where we have been convinced by the points made, we have been willing to amend the Bill to reflect that. I think that the sentiment of the House has demonstrated that. That includes changes to the process of scrutiny of the ring-fencing proposals, introducing the single bank separation power, putting the so-called Haldane principles in the Bill and clarifying the regulator’s objectives.

EUC Report: MiFID II

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 26th March 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, made reference to the technical advances mentioned in our report, and the problem is that, as we all know, technology moves on. I am absolutely sure there is going to be another financial crisis, possibly as big as the one we have just seen; I am absolutely convinced that we cannot anticipate today what it is going to be. One of the weaknesses of regulation and moves such as those that have been made by the EU is that they definitely involve closing the stable door. You can always guarantee that the next financial crisis will be different from the ones we have seen in the past. I suspect that, if we are looking for a solution to this, we have to look to very agile national supervisors, because I do not think that the EU is in a position to stop this sort of thing happening in future.

I would like to move on to the slightly wider issues which the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, touched on, namely the financial transfer tax. Students of the Bible will remember that the Pharisee used to get up in the morning and say, “Thank God I’m not like other men”. I get up every morning saying, “Thank God I’m not a Europhile”. If I were, I would feel that the European Union was letting me down extremely badly. Its attempt to deal with a financial crisis has been so ham-fisted that it really makes one doubt its capacity to run anything at all.

The reality is that the financial transfer tax will be incredibly damaging to the eurozone and the financial institutions within it. It will reduce liquidity in eurozone companies; clearly, if you are going to tax transactions in shares, people will just not buy and sell those shares as much as they otherwise would. It will make it attractive for a number of them to relocate to markets elsewhere in the world where they do not have to pay the tax, and it will make it much more difficult for the EU to raise money. It defies all credibility that it should want to do this.

Mr Bergmann, the deputy to the Commissioner who deals with all this in Brussels, came to see our committee and said that when 11 countries entered into this agreement, they would set an example to others that would then follow. If you believe that, you will believe anything. The fact is that the United States would never follow down the road of having a financial transfer tax, and I very much doubt that Hong Kong or Tokyo would either. There is therefore never going to be a global financial tax; all that you might ever have is one or two more countries within the EU joining in with it.

One of the issues that came up during our discussions on this today was the big question of whether companies in the City of London would be forced to collect the tax on behalf of the European countries that were involved in the shares that were being traded. We were left completely confused because Mr Bergmann told us categorically that there would be no question of City firms collecting this tax, but on the other hand it seems that there is serious evidence that the plan is that it should be collected on behalf of other Governments. I know that the Minister cannot reply on that now, but it would be nice if he could search that out for us and try to get a definitive reply on where we stand on it; it is a fundamental question for the City of London.

Another reason why I am glad I am not a Europhile is the whole management of the economic crisis, which has been absolutely abysmal. It is now more than 12 months ago that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said that what Europe should do was get a big bazooka to solve the problems facing the eurozone. Chancellor Merkel was adamant: she was not going to expose the German taxpayer to picking up all the liabilities of the Club Med countries and the others that the Germans consider have not got their act together at all. A year to 18 months later, that is precisely what happened: the ECB got authorisation from the Germans to buy bonds in the secondary market across the whole of the eurozone. The result was that the crisis that there had been in funding government debt across the eurozone was completely stabilised overnight. It is quite interesting that to date the ECB has not had to buy any bonds in the secondary market of the eurozone, yet that stability has been brought about.

So what has happened in the mean time in the intervening 12 to 18 months? Chronic insecurity has spread across the whole of the eurozone, and people who might have made investment decisions have sat on their hands and done nothing. The result is that we have seen a much severer recession in the eurozone than we would have seen if that decision had been taken earlier. No doubt there were a whole mass of political reasons in Germany as to why Chancellor Merkel could not move quicker, but the fact remains that if that nettle had been grasped earlier, the eurozone would not have had as severe a recession as it has seen just recently. That recession has even spread as far as Germany as well. It is quite possible that Germany may pull out of it quite quickly but the fact is that the inactivity by Germany actually put that country into recession, which it has not seen for quite some time.

Now of course we see the Cyprus crisis being dealt with on the basis that the Cypriots themselves should pay a very serious price for the trouble that their country has got itself into. An amazing scheme was originally produced that said that all deposit-holders in banks in Cyprus should pay a tax. It had to be described as a tax because, as everybody knows, the EU has been working for some time on a deposit insurance scheme that means that people holding up to £100,000 in a bank will have that money secured. Somehow, when the whole country goes bust, your deposits are at risk, but if your bank goes bust your savings are secure. Come on—people are not going to sit there and say, “This raid on my savings is quite legitimate because it is a tax”. That decision has now been reversed and we are going to see deposit-holders above €100,000 maybe being taxed at 40% on their holdings.

What effect is this going to have on many of the other very unstable Club Med countries in the eurozone? Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who is the president of the Eurogroup, although I gather he has not been there for very long, came out with an incredible statement only yesterday, I think, saying that what had been done in Cyprus was a template for all the other countries in the eurozone. Can you imagine a more crass and stupid remark than to say that this was a template to be applied elsewhere? What it immediately does is put the frighteners on absolutely anybody—any company or any individual—who holds a bank account with money in it in any country such as Spain, Portugal, even Italy and certainly Greece. Greece is completely unstable. It is completely recognised that it is unsustainable as it is and that it cannot go on. The reason why nothing has been done about Greece is because German elections are coming up on 22 September. After that, they will want to restructure the whole debt of Greece. They will have to do it yet again and the Greeks will have to take another massive haircut. Any Greek who is standing around at that point with money in a Greek bank needs to have his head looked at. You are actually better off taking the money out and stuffing it under the mattress than you are leaving it in a bank account, where they can impose a tax on it.

This is absolute lunacy. Once again, I hate to say it, but this is why I am so glad that I am not a Europhile, because it strikes me that these people cannot run anything competently whatever. The choice for the future of the eurozone is quite simple. It can go mutual so that the rich countries have to guarantee all the poor ones, but the Germans are flatly refusing to do that and, if they do not, it is going to break up. As night follows day, the weak countries are going to go, and then eventually it will get to the centre and some of the stronger ones will go as well.

If the Germans did decide to underwrite all this, with some eurobond or something of that sort, then of course you have a future made up of fiscal transfers from the rich countries to the poor. We have seen a bit of that already with the so-called bailouts and so forth. They are bitterly resented by the Germans, who have to pay them; and because of the conditions with which they arrive in Greece, say, they are bitterly resented by the Greeks, who get the bailout.

With fiscal transfers, you will only have that continuing but writ large. This then of course encourages extremism in places such as Greece and very nasty parties start to crop up. If we go on like this, the whole of this system will just not work. The best thing that could possibly happen would be if the Germans pulled out of the eurozone and created, with other sensibly run countries within the eurozone, a strong currency which can actually survive. If we go on the way we are now, chaos beckons.

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[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, before I begin I should say that the think tank that I chair, Policy Network, has received funding from the City of London Corporation.

I will make three points in introducing what I have to say. First, I agree with the final point of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and with his tribute to my noble friend Lord Harrison and his fellow committee members—that should go on the record—for the excellent work that they do in bringing informed debate to the House.

Secondly, I will avoid the considerable temptation offered by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, to engage in the debate about the euro that he has so richly offered. I will just say—this is not meant to be a cruel point—that he has been making the same speech ever since I was privileged to join the House in 2010, and the euro has not collapsed yet. Even in what I agree was the mismanaged Cyprus crisis, the Cypriot Government decided that they would prefer to take the pain and stay in the euro rather than leave it.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Does the noble Lord accept that the pain has not even started in Cyprus yet?

[Lord Liddle]

They knew perfectly well what they were doing by signing up to the deal that they did. Perhaps I may make another aside. The idea that taxpayers should always pick up the bill for the irresponsibility of bankers is offensive. A lot of people in Cyprus have enjoyed the benefits of relatively high interest rates, which pensioners in Britain have not enjoyed over the past few years. The idea that they made these investments in a noble way that should be protected by the European taxpayer is, I think, offensive.

Thirdly, I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, that the issues raised in this report are very complicated. I am certainly not in a position to talk about the details. Instead, I want to focus on the Government’s political strategy for handling these financial services questions. This is not a party point; it seems to me that as a nation we have a real difficulty here. A number of propositions form the approach on this side of the Room. The first is that we need a healthy financial services sector; I agree strongly with the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, and the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, on this. Yes, we need to rebalance our economy. My noble friend Lord Mandelson was right to say that we have had too much financial engineering and not enough real engineering, but the financial services sector is a huge overseas earner for us and we cannot do without it. It is a vital national interest where we have a comparative advantage. However, we have to acknowledge that things have gone wrong in the City in the recent past. Grave reputational damage has been done as the result of the LIBOR scandal and the scandals around mis-selling. Risks were taken that should never have been, and as a result we need to rethink the way we regulate the City.

The second proposition that should inform government policy on a national strategy in this area is that the City benefits hugely from being the financial centre of the European single market. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is right to say that what Britain achieved in the 1990s and the early 2000s—I was slightly involved in the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan—was tremendous. It opened up the market and ensured that London got a larger share of it. What happened, though, was that we had liberalisation without putting in place proper cross-country regulation, and we have to acknowledge that that was a UK mistake. It was a UK consensus that we should have light-touch regulation and we got it wrong. The Turner report that was published at the start of the financial crisis said that we have to choose between European regulation and being part of the European market or going back to national regulation, and that is basically right. I think that both the then Labour Government and the new Conservative/Lib Dem coalition have accepted that we are part of a properly regulated European single market in financial services.

However, the result of all this is that on the Continent there is now a great suspicion of UK motives in this field. I sense this an awful lot as I travel around to various meetings. Therefore, the third objective we have to set ourselves is to accept that we need re-regulation at the European level, but that it has to be done in a proportionate and sensible way. I have some sympathy with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, about shutting the stable door and things moving on so that the new regulations will not cope with the new circumstances, but we must recognise that we have to put a national effort, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, into getting our regulatory strategy right.

We face big problems here. There are some basic asymmetries that put us in a difficult position. We had very strong support from what you might call the northern liberals for the positions that we took in the 1990s and 2000s but I am not sure to what extent that support is as solid as it once was, which I think is one of the reasons why the coalition on the financial transaction tax that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, wants has not occurred. There is an asymmetry of expertise. People complain about the bureaucracy of the Commission, but when you look at the thousands of people employed in the regulatory agencies in London and the dozens who are dealing with these matters in the Commission—a very small group of people covering a very wide brief—it is not surprising that sometimes the proposals that come forward are flawed in key respects. The Commission tries to listen and amend in the light of representations made to it.

Another major asymmetry, which is a very serious one, is that there are euro-ins and euro-outs. We are among the euro-outs, and that is the way it is going to be, but we have to recognise, as a euro-out, that financial regulation is fundamental to the financial stability of the eurozone. If they are going to do whatever it takes to stabilise the euro then they will be prepared in the eurozone to adopt whatever financial regulations they believe are necessary to stabilise their currency.

In this situation, the national strategy clearly has to be to go out of our way to win friends and influence people. That is where the Government—or perhaps only one part of the coalition—has got it so badly wrong. There is a difficult environment for us in the European Parliament. They think bankers are to blame for the crisis and that Britain is, in part, to blame because we pushed a deregulatory agenda. How do we deal with that? Not by going in with the Thatcher handbag, nor by doing what David Cameron did at the December 2011 European Council in circulating a paper—which, incidentally, has never been disclosed to Parliament, although we have seen it and know what is in it—that had “unanimity” written at the top and which, to anyone who looked at it, would look as though the British Government were basically seeking to reverse qualified majority voting on a large number of financial services questions. It was a disastrous strategy: how could you expect the eurozone to agree to surrender sovereignty over their currency to Britain through our having a veto over financial regulation? We have to argue from a position of qualified majority, and we have to win friends and base our position on reason and good argument.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that we have to point out to people the advantages of London being the global centre of the single market and all that that brings. At the same time, though, we have to acknowledge the criticisms of the City that have been made and demonstrate that we are prepared to see them tackled. That is basically the question that I put to the Minister: how are the Government going to do that? What is their political strategy for dealing with these questions, which are of vital national importance, even though they are of great complexity and difficulty for many members of the committee?

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[Lord Newby]

I am sure that some people in any country will want to do virtually anything, but the question I was addressing was whether the 11 countries that have signed up to this tax can be dismissed as not knowing what is best for them, even though we are deeply sceptical about it and are not going to sign up to it. We have had a number of debates in your Lordships’ House about Greece, for example, in which some noble Lords seem to have known what is best for Greece. It is just that the Greeks have not agreed. We have to let other member states move forward with this within the rules because they are keen to do so.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Does my noble friend accept that at one stage the Germans were very much against this proposal and then they changed their mind? Was it that they did not know what was best for them originally and then they did know subsequently, or did they get it the other way round?

[Lord Newby]

I think that my noble friend should ask them because I have not the faintest clue what was in their mind, but they have now formed a view. If the German Government have a settled view, even if I do not agree with it, I would not write it off as a mad one. I am sure that we will come back to the financial transaction tax, but it is not unreasonable to say that an extremely complicated tax using very difficult mechanisms to make it work should necessarily be capable of instant analysis in terms of how we are going to deal with it. We are looking at it. We have had the proposal for only a few weeks, and my right honourable friend Greg Clark, as the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, pointed out, is actually one of the better Ministers in any Government in terms of working with Parliament and, indeed, across the EU. I am sure that in due course he will come back with a full description of our response.

EU: Budget

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 4th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deighton]

I will address the narrower question; so many noble Lords have much more experience on the broader question. I do not know whether the European Parliament intends to vote in secret. If it does, that is completely wrong.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, will my noble friend comment on the reports in the papers yesterday that this budget agreement has been reached for certain sweeteners, amounting to billions of euros, being paid to practically every nation in Europe other than the United Kingdom?

[Lord Deighton]

In this budget we are talking about over €900 billion, six separate headings of component parts, and an ‘other items’ budget which includes a range of other things. It is a big and complex budget with many different components. There were lots of parts to the negotiation, and these particular transactions are indeed part of it.

Taxation: Tax Collection

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

I am surprised that the noble Lord does not know that the Government are committed to introducing a general anti-abuse rule in this year’s Finance Bill.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, the Government could do with fewer tax inspectors if they simplified the tax system. How are they doing on that?

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I think everybody agrees that we have a particularly barnacle-encrusted tax system. This Government have set up the Office of Tax Simplification, which has started work in this area. One advantage of the general anti-abuse rule is that once such a rule is in place, it should not be necessary to introduce as much new tax legislation to deal with tax abuse, because the general rule will cover it.

European Banking Union: EUC Report

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Like the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I pay tribute to our chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Harrison. He has always been a very genial and capable chairman. I am particularly grateful to him for the fact that we now seem to be getting before our committee rather more representative witnesses, who on occasions represent the majority of the British people. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who I enjoy having on our committee—we have our differences but they are always agreeable ones—I am not going to speak too much about the Prime Minister’s speech as my noble friend Lady Noakes has a debate on it next Thursday, to which I hope to contribute. All I would say is that it is a very clever speech. Rather like the Old Testament, there are bits in it which suit absolutely everybody. It does not really matter whether you are a Europhile or a Europhobe. There is something in the speech to keep everybody happy.

On our report, I do not know how many people have actually read it; certainly not an awful lot of action has been taken on it. We must be well aware that the single supervisory mechanism has been adopted, but an awful lot of other things that were heavily recommended in our report have not. I refer particularly to the recovery and resolution directive, which is possibly equally important, if not more so. Of course, the intention was that it would be introduced at the beginning of this year. I now gather that the Dutch and others who see themselves as picking up the tab for ECB intervention into banks have backed off. They do not want to get involved in that anymore. They are going back on earlier undertakings, which is rather typical of how the EU operates most of the time. It takes two steps forward and one step back, and if everything gets rather difficult or if things, as it seems to believe today, are looking rather better, it is a wonderful excuse to do nothing. If that is the EU of which we all want to be part, that is fine, but it certainly does not seem to be the answer for the United Kingdom. Earlier this week, we had some witnesses who described the state of European banks as they now are: they are European in life but still remain national in death.

We are now in a very significant situation. The problem with the EU is that it does things, with enormous reluctance, only when faced with a very major economic crisis. You merely have to lurch from one crisis to another before any difficult measures are taken. There may be people in this House who are dreaming of the day when Europe moves towards much greater integration but it is quite difficult to see how that will happen. It also seems quite clear that it will happen only when there has been one crisis after another.

In 2011, the Prime Minister called for the “big bazooka”. He wanted a major move made that would stabilise the sovereign debt crisis in the EU. What happened? Absolutely nothing happened and things got worse and worse. Interest rates on Club Med debt went through the roof. It became such a crisis that eventually the Germans agreed that Mario Draghi should make his statement that he would do anything necessary to stabilise the eurozone. At that stage, the markets calmed down. It was only because it took that long for German agreement to come through and, by that time, confidence had been undermined all over the eurozone. Sovereign debt was getting completely out of control. Investment decisions were being put on hold. When you get that across a large economic area such as the eurozone, you see the economy moving into recession and things getting very much worse.

I always get a wonderful narrative from my son-in-law, who is German and works for a German bank in London. He says that Merkel is playing a fantastically clever game. She is delaying like mad and restructuring the economies of countries in the eurozone. But what she has actually done is bring recession across the whole of the eurozone. Germany itself is now in recession. That does not strike me as being statesmanship. It comes as no surprise to me that she has just lost some Länder elections in Germany. I will be quite surprised if she wins the general election in September of this year. I do not think that there is much to be happy about with the way in which the eurozone is performing at the moment.

Earlier this week, our witnesses said that eurozone bank indebtedness would disappear like the snow in the sunshine once we had economic growth in the eurozone. There are two problems with that. First, we have absolutely no idea of the scale of bank indebtedness in the Club Med countries in the eurozone. However, we know that we are reaching a situation where a number of countries—because they are faced by serious social problems—have said that their banks cannot repossess properties and throw people on to the street. That means that people in those houses stop paying their mortgages because they cannot afford to do so. The next thing you have is moral hazard when someone says, “Well, hold on, my neighbour is not paying his mortgage repayments because he can’t. But I think I won’t pay mine either, although I can”. That leads to a very major problem in the banking sector because all the mortgages are going wrong and you are talking about sliding property prices anyway.

I agree that economic forecasting seems to have gone a bit wobbly right across the board, but if there is any consensus it is that there will be absolutely minimal growth in the eurozone for the next two years. I do not think there is any point in looking much beyond that. However, two years is a long time to have no growth and no relief on this side of things. For that reason, the banking crisis is certainly not over. If the ECB is not going to make itself liable for bank debt, another banking crisis will lead to a sovereign debt crisis and we will be back in much the same situation we were in a few months ago.

There are also serious questions about how much freedom the ECB has to buy sovereign debt. Officially, it is not allowed to print money and the Germans are desperate to try to keep a hold on how much money the ECB spends. They want to pass resolutions in Parliament before very much more money is extended to the ECB. We must accept that, although the recovery and resolution directive has not gone through, there probably will be a crisis which will eventually force it through. Then we will have a very interesting situation. There has been a lot of comment in this debate already about whether we are covered by a double lock voting system in the European Banking Authority. But, come on, let us live in the real world. In the real world, the executive arm will be the ECB, which will make up the rules as it goes along. I do not think that it will constantly refer back and say, “We have a crisis on our hands. Is the EBA happy that we can do this, that or the other?”. I think that the guidance that will come from the EBA will be extremely broad in anybody’s language and that the ECB will become very much more powerful as it goes along.

We also have the problem of what on earth we do about democratic accountability. It is not going to be a very satisfactory situation when the ECB moves in on a large bank and says, “This thing is going absolutely nowhere. Its liabilities are appalling. We must lay off half the people, break it down and get it into a more sensible state”. That will not be a popular move when thousands of people are put on the street. You can imagine that at that point the local politicians will all say, “This is nothing to do with us, you know. It is the ECB that is doing this. We don’t like to mention it but it is the Germans standing behind them”. That is the sort of situation you are going to get. If you have no democratic accountability—there is absolutely none as regards the ECB—you will have some very serious problems when things start to go wrong with banks. This is all far from being satisfactory and does not bode well at all for those eurozone countries which desire this great process of integration.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

The problem of democratic accountability is very real, as described, but I think that everybody is well aware of it. Certainly the European Parliament is extremely well aware of it, which is why it is linking the two texts. The ECB text is nothing to do with the European Parliament but it will not agree it until it has agreed the EBA text, which is to do with it. I am sure that it will insist on some sort of democratic accountability provision being built in.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

I wish that I shared the noble Lord’s confidence, but I do not. I cannot see where this democratic accountability is going to come from because at the end of the day the EBA is the only thing that has any democratic accountability, and if it is laying down broad policies and the executive action is being taken by the ECB, that is where the rub is going to come—with the executive action being taken by the ECB. Perhaps something will happen, but there does not seem to be much sign of it at the moment.

We will face crisis after crisis, which will merely prolong the uncertainty and the general conditions that we have in the eurozone today whereby people are still very reluctant to invest in this area and stagnation seems to be continuing. Resentment will increase. Everybody says that we need a completely integrated fiscal union in the eurozone. Well, come on. You will have a growing problem with the Germans resenting massive transfers of money to the Greeks—to talk in extremes. The Germans will not allow those transfers of money to take place without enormous conditions being placed on the Greeks. The Greeks will all riot in the streets because they will say that the terms under which the money is being transferred are too stringent, and the Germans resent giving the money. Is this the sort of Europe we want to live in? Already we are beginning to see very extreme parties appearing in Greece. Everybody goes on about the fascists in Greece, but you have to bear in mind that the communists are much bigger than the fascists and much more likely to win the next election. Either way, we are seeing very extreme parties emerging.

Then we have the Prime Minister’s speech and the idea that we should have a referendum in 2017-18 on whether we should be in or out of the European Union. If the eurozone is going absolutely nowhere and is no better than it is today, as many people think will be the case, I cannot see this country ever voting to stay within the European Union.

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[Lord Dykes]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, because, whatever other interests and policies he has in his mind, he is always a very robust, fervent and positive European. We need more of that in this country. I am glad, too, that in recent years the Labour Party has become much more positive on Europe following the passage of the Lisbon treaty. That is a very good development for this country. It can emulate the good example of the Liberal Democrat party as being always in the vanguard of the pro-European position—patriotic Britishers, of course, but also enthusiastic Europeans, and those two things can go closely together.

Yesterday the Prime Minister made his sad speech—actually, it was not a sad speech but a sad occasion. One has to acknowledge that there were some good bits in the speech and, as my noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom said, he tried to appeal to everyone, and in that sense was quite clever. However, it was a sad occasion because he has unleashed for himself a number of very disturbing things, depending on how they develop in future, that are going to destabilise British politics significantly. I will return to those themes in my concluding remarks.

Many good things have been said so far about the EBU report. I shall refer to it briefly but that is not to decry its quality. In fact, we in this House are used to having reports of high quality from the European Union Select Committee and its sub-committees. I am going to embarrass the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, deliberately by saying that this report is outstanding. I thank him and his sub-committee members for having created this excellent report.

It highlights, in a disturbing and worrying way, the acute complexities of the architecture of the system. A number of significant members, led, I suppose, by the United Kingdom, which, in a way, is the largest of them, are not going to be involved in this important developing system and framework. That is a matter of great concern, and the sooner we have the courage to align ourselves with these proposals, the better. That may take some time, and of course nationalism raises its ugly head all the time and we have to contend with that. My noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom would not admit this or agree with me but, as a result of being driven out of the exchange rate mechanism in 1992—that hugely humiliating moment under a Conservative Government—the United Kingdom was subsequently very scared of the euro, afraid of the single currency, nervous as hell about what it might develop into and always looking for things to go wrong.

The fact that the report looks at the way in which this new system will control the banks—the clearing banks, the joint stock banks, the commercial banks and the other banks—in the eurozone area is an outstanding achievement. I want to quote from what was said by President Van Rompuy, but first I will give way to my noble friend.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Does my noble friend accept that if the United Kingdom were in the eurozone today, with the deficit that we are running and the debt levels that we have, we would be in intensive care?

[Lord Dykes]

I do not agree with that, and anyway it is too theoretical even to consider. By the way, our deficit is £100 billion and we have a free-floating currency that has now been devalued about eight times since the war, either formally in the marketplace or informally. It is interesting to measure and to see where that got us when we were kicked out of the exchange rate mechanism by market forces, when the Treasury was for a moment probably the worst ministry of finance in Western Europe. It has not carried on being like that—it recovered and has produced some very good decisions since then—but that was the lamentable position at the time.

President Van Rompuy, who met the committee, is quoted in the third paragraph on page 57 of the report as saying that,

“the EU was in a better place than a few months ago. No-one was now speaking about imminent eurozone collapse. Although the problems had not disappeared, things were ‘on the right track’ but the EU might ultimately need to give Greece more time”,

which is a very fair point. In the preceding paragraph, he also said that he had to remind the committee that these member states—sovereign member states, all of them—are very lively democracies, so it takes time to reach these decisions. So, although people complained about the process being slow, the slower it was, the better the structure that was emerging, as I hope the Minister will agree.

In the third paragraph of the summary, the committee states,

“we welcome the publication of the Single Supervisory Mechanism proposals as a significant first step towards banking union. We agree that the European Central Bank, to be given ultimate supervisory responsibility for every euro area bank, is the only organisation with the necessary credibility and authority to take on this role”.

When the Minister comes to sum up, will he deal with that matter and the concern that the committee expressed about the concentration of so much power and its practical effects on the institutional banking market place?

In paragraph 3 on page 7, the report states:

“Although the Government have made clear that the UK will not participate in a banking union … the UK’s decision not to participate, should not and need not adversely affect London’s position as the leading financial centre in Europe, nor undermine the single market. The strength of this argument may soon be tested”.

That is quite an ominous point and I would welcome the Minister’s reassurance on that matter.

I repeat my warm thanks for a truly excellent report. It has helped a great deal in taking an immensely complicated subject further. In his distinguished opening speech, the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, set an admirable precedent by referring to yesterday’s referendum decision and so on. I should like to conclude by making a few points on that in this debate.

It was a sad day for the reasons that I have suggested and the effects will be very disturbing as time goes on. I am very glad to see that the Deputy Prime Minister, quite rightly, established a different position—that there might in future be a need for a referendum depending on the outcome of any negotiations, but to threaten one now, when no negotiating posture is being created and there are many years to go before we reach the end year of this decision-making suggestion, will create a great many difficulties and uncertainty, particularly in the business world. There have been many comments to that effect.

It is sad that we have got ourselves into the position of being the bad member of the club. It is a great pity. It is rather foolish of this country to lecture other countries on the crucial importance of competitiveness and efficiency in their economies when we have a terrible statistical deficit in our own trading and do not have a very strong economy. To suggest to the Germans that they need to improve their economy in comparison with English examples is going too far. I wish I did not have to say that, but that is the reality of the situation. The Germans remain modest about their economic achievements.

The sheer awkwardness of examining the subjects in this report while not being in the eurozone will come out more and more as time goes on. If we could only restore our courage and become a mature and enthusiastic member of the European Union, it would be very good for this country.

There were some interesting points made in the press yesterday about Mr Cameron’s speech. In an article today in the best newspaper in the country—the Guardian, of course—Martin Kettle states:

“Cameron’s speech was not brave. It was reckless. The brave stance yesterday was Ed Miliband’s, sticking to Labour’s practical pro-Europeanism and refusing to follow suit. Instead, yesterday marks the moment when Cameron’s pragmatic centre-right political project finally bent the knee to the ideological fantasy about Europe that still grips the Tory party”.

Anthony Hilton, who has been a long-standing supporter of the euro and the eurozone and now feels that the eurozone has passed the danger point—after all, it has never been a weak currency; it has always remained a strong currency despite the crisis and it is only that there were four or five weak members of that currency which had to have assistance provided by collective action—says in today’s Evening Standard:

“If Cameron thinks these concessions”—

to what I believe he used to call the head-bangers—

“are going to appease his lunatic fringe and calm things down, he might equally consider applying to be Prime Minister of the planet Zog. The sad reality of his capitulation to Eurosceptic pressure is it virtually guarantees that Tory backbenchers and their media acolytes will talk about nothing else between now and an election which is still two years off”.

Of course, they might be tempted to cite the Irish as saying that it will be a good occasion, they are quite relaxed and will go along with it, but that is not true either. I quote the Irish reaction in today’s Irish Times, where Arthur Beesley says that,

“it is readily acknowledged in official circles that the British debate and uncertainty over its EU membership have clear potential to destabilise European politics and create friction with other member states”.

Finally, I shall quote my right honourable friend in the other place, Sir Menzies Campbell:

“This was never about the UK; it was always about Ukip. The declarations of satisfaction which came from the Tory right immediately following Mr Cameron’s speech were disturbing for those of us who are supporters of European engagement. Mr Cameron’s speech had nothing to do with Britain’s place in Europe and everything to do with his leadership of a bickering and divided party. Tory leaders of the past who have had to fight sections of their party over Europe have found it an unrewarding experience. Mr Cameron is fated to be among their number”.

I regret that because I think that in many ways Mr Cameron has been an excellent Prime Minister and a very personable senior political colleague, so it is a great shame that he has allowed himself to be put in that position.

As my noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom said, there is to be a major debate in this House next week on the decisions that were announced yesterday and the future outlook, in which I hope to take part. I shall therefore leave it at that for the moment, but it is part and parcel of everything that we will examine in our Select Committee and its sub-committees. It is all about the huge complexities of Britain remaining a bad member of the club and refusing to co-operate in these matters when co-operation is absolutely essential.

Banking: Offshore Accounts

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

I can reassure the noble Lord that we are being constrained not by European Law but by international accounting standards. There is no suggestion that Starbucks and the other companies are breaking the law but the accounting standards allow them to manipulate the point at which they take a tax charge on revenues that they raise.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, would it be possible to stop Google paying the minimal amount of tax as it is an international global company in whatever part of the world where the tax is the lowest?

[Lord Newby]

This is why we need increased international co-operation and why the G20 initiative is so important. Obviously if people can just shift off all their revenues to a low tax jurisdiction, some companies are going to do so. We are working very hard with our international partners on this because we have a common interest in making sure that these companies pay a fair share of tax.

EU: UK Net Contributions

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

What I can confirm is that the UK’s priorities for expenditure include the following: substantial cuts to the common agricultural policy. However, I agree with the noble Lord that priorities for the UK include growth and competitiveness, climate change and external action. I am not going to speculate on how the negotiations will play out.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Will my noble friend confirm that, in the absence of any compromise, what is being asked for by the European Commission is a 6.8% increase in the budget? Is this not an extraordinarily high figure which shows an unbelievable insensitivity to the problems that Governments are facing across the EU as they try to rein back their deficits?

[Lord Sassoon]

Yes, I completely agree with my noble friend.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be committed to a Grand Committee.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, this Bill is of major importance—this is not my idea; it comes from the Minister—and is very significant indeed. However, for some reason the Minister wants to shuffle it off into the Grand Committee Room. The Bill needs close scrutiny and will bring forth the exquisite qualities of your Lordships’ House. There is a massive amount of expertise here that can make positive comment on the Bill and make it better than it is today. It would be quite wrong if we were to vote for the Bill to go into the Grand Committee Room. It should be debated in Committee on the Floor of the House and I hope that the committal Motion will be negatived by the House.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, it is seldom that the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, and I agree. We were introduced into the House on the same day and I found it a privilege to be introduced on that day. However, I fully agree with him on this issue. I returned from the Recess to find this Motion on the Order Paper. I was not aware of it before and, as far as I know, there was no consultation about it. Members did not know that it was going to be remitted to a Grand Committee. I may have shown a lack of acuity in picking this up but I have discussed today the fact that many Members were not aware that it was going to be suggested that this important Bill should be committed to a Grand Committee.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, said, this is an important issue. It may not be politically contentious but it is vital. As the Minister said, it arises to some extent from a major financial crisis that hit the headlines. He described the Bill as major legislation and, after talking with Members who have been in the House much longer than me, I believe it is very unusual for such major legislation to be remitted to a Grand Committee for discussion. As the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, said, it would be normal for it to be taken on the Floor of the House.

There may be other reasons—far be it from me to suggest them—why the Government want to remit the Bill to a Grand Committee, but our decisions as Members of the House should be on the merits of the Bill and not on any secondary reasons beyond the basis of the Bill.

It would be unfortunate if we had to divide on this, so I urge the Minister to withdraw his Motion on the basis that there will be further discussion and consultation with all parties and all sides of the House. I hope he will see fit to do so.

EU: Euro Area Crisis

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Thursday 24th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

What does my noble friend think about the article in the Times yesterday in which the German Foreign Minister said that within the European budget there were resources that could be used to stimulate the eurozone economy, including about €80 billion which remains unspent as we speak?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, within what needs to be tight discipline—tighter than has been exhibited in recent years—over the overall European budget, certainly these ideas of targeting funds better within the existing budget envelope need to be looked at very hard.

Euro Area Crisis: EUC Report

Lord Hamilton of Epsom Excerpts

Monday 21st May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marlesford]

When Sub-Committee A looked at the bailout, we saw again and again that the figures produced as necessary to prevent a catastrophe became ever greater by magnitudes. There is the old cliché about “A billion here and a billion there—you are talking serious money”; we almost reached the stage where it was “A trillion here and a trillion there”. If the prospects are for bailout, and that just continues, whatever happens and however much worse it gets, it has been fairly conclusively proved that people will take advantage of a bailout. It is human nature. It was the present governor of the Bank who said that if there is a run on the bank, the sensible thing is to join it. Therefore, if the bank is prepared to bail you out, the sensible thing is to accept the money.

My solution is that you impose a requirement to earn the euros—but with some help through the IMF, eurobonds, or eurobond investments—and you are thus able to rebuild your economy. I do not see, from the point of view of people living in Greece, that there is much difference between perhaps starting off with saying, “We are going to recreate the drachma; and the drachma is equal to a euro”, and then finding that the next day it is worth only half a euro, or, as the noble Lord, who likes speculating on these matters, might think, the drachma would soon be worth only a quarter of the euro. It would be a great deal better to recognise that the flexibility of having to have the euros with which to buy and pay for things would itself generate a reality that, I believe, is lacking.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

I am rather uncertain as to how, if the Greeks basically default but stay with the euro, they would raise new debt in euros.

[Lord Marlesford]

I do not think that they could do so as such, except that, as I say, you might have a euro project in which people would invest. It would perhaps be somewhat similar to the private finance initiatives that have been used by the British Government—not entirely with success, maybe, but on balance they have been a useful source of making things actually happen. If people could see a good return, they would invest in it. That is a perfectly sensible way of doing it and, therefore, Greece would not be able to raise euro debt as such, unless the markets thought that that was viable. That is where the self-discipline is. The self-denial of recourse to the printing press would be a solution. I suppose I am really saying that if we get this form of self-discipline, which reality should require, and if this were to work in the case of Greece, it could be an example to other countries either not to follow suit and to grasp the nettle for themselves, or to recognise that this would be a viable way forward.