Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th June 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

57: After Clause 17, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of pre-pack transactions
In Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, after paragraph 74 insert—“Review of pre-pack transactions“74A (1) The assets of a company may not be transferred under the terms of a pre-pack transaction unless the proposed purchaser has obtained an opinion in writing from a member of the Pre-Pack Pool that the transaction is not unreasonable.(2) In this paragraph, a “pre-pack transaction” means a transaction which is negotiated before a company enters administration, and under which all or a substantial part of the company’s assets are sold to an associate on or shortly after the appointment of an administrator.(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2), “associate” has the meaning given in section 435 of the Insolvency Act 1986.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a positive opinion to be obtained from a member of the Pre-Pack Pool before a company enters into a pre-pack transaction. The Pre-Pack Pool is an independent body of experienced business people set up in response to the recommendations of Teresa Graham’s report.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for rearranging his diary to enable us to complete Committee stage so quickly, the Whips Office for similarly reorganising things so that we can get on with it and, last but not least, the staff of the House for the work they have undertaken, particularly since we kept them here rather later than should have been the case yesterday evening. I am very grateful to them all, particularly my noble friend the Minister, who sat patiently and courteously through a very long and quite testing time yesterday.

I ask my noble friend the Minister’s help in just one thing, which concerns my blood pressure: could he possibly ask his Bill team, when they prepare his speaking notes, not to say, “The Bill is needed because of the pandemic”? The Bill is not needed because of the pandemic. Half the Bill is needed because of the pandemic, and if we were dealing only with that half, we would have been done and dusted and home in time for tea yesterday. As we unpicked and unpacked the Bill yesterday afternoon, we saw how much consideration still needed to be given to the bit of the Bill that has nothing to do with the pandemic. If he could just make that change to his speaking notes, it would do wonders for my blood pressure and, I suspect, for that of many other Members of your Lordships’ House.

Amendment 57 is designed to remedy a gap in the oversight and regulation of pre-packs. I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for her support on this amendment. I know that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, whom we will hear from later, probed in a similar way with Amendment 60, which we touched on yesterday afternoon.

During that debate, my noble friend the Minister said that pre-packs were a valuable tool in the insolvency toolkit. He is right that they are valuable but they are open to abuse, which is why I pressed for the House to have a chance to debate pre-packs in a separate group of amendments. First, the treatment and regulation of pre-packs is a loose end in insolvency law and practice. It has been so for 20 years; indeed, it has been a very loose end for the past six years. Secondly, at the margin, if pre-packs continue to grow unregulated, it will undermine the use of moratoriums, which are a much more carefully controlled and regulated way of dealing with company insolvency. Why go through all that if you can go to a pre-pack and therefore, in that sense, undermine the purposes of this Bill?

For those who have come late to the party, I have a few sentences on how pre-packs work, using an example of how the position can be abused. Directors decide that a company is no longer able to trade solvently and will shortly become insolvent. The probable reason is because the company has taken on a lot of debt from previous bad decisions. There are too many creditors and the bank is owed a great deal of money. However, within the company, there is an operational piece that the directors think can be salvaged, so they decide that they will make an offer for that operational piece, without the debts. They approach an administrator and say, “This is what we’d like to do.” They make a nominal offer—maybe only £1 or a similarly trivial sum.

The administrator then takes it on. He or she must decide that this is a fair offer, so it is usually advertised in the paper—usually on a Monday in the Financial Times. If noble Lords look at the Financial Times on a Monday, they will see businesses for sale; those are mostly pre-pack transactions. If no competing offer has been made by the Thursday, the administrator has tested the market and this is therefore the best available offer. The pre-pack can then be completed and the business rises like a phoenix from the ashes of the old, often being run by the same people who got it into trouble in the first place—but, of course, without all the creditors, who have been sloughed off along the way.

As a concept, pre-packs have considerable political appeal. Governments, local Members of Parliament and councillors can trumpet the fact that their actions have saved, say, 200 jobs. However, no one counts the jobs lost or the financial damage done to suppliers, to other firms locally or, indeed, to the Pension Protection Fund, whose position and role was carefully debated yesterday afternoon in relation to moratoriums. Indeed, the Minister kindly sent us an email this morning indicating that the Pension Protection Fund will have a particular place in moratoriums. So what we have is a superficially attractive mechanism but one that, in many cases, because of counterfactual information that you cannot gather, causes more harm than good.

For a number of years, other Members of your Lordships’ House and I pressed Governments of all political persuasions not to be seduced by the attractions of unregulated pre-packs. To their credit, the coalition Government under Vince Cable recognised the problems and set up a review, which was carried out by Teresa Graham and backed by research from the University of Wolverhampton. Six years ago, her 2014 report was accepted by the Government.

Among the report’s recommendations was the establishment of what is known as Pre-Pack Pool Ltd, a company with access to a pool of experienced businessmen who could give a view on whether a proposed pre-pack was fair. They could reach one of only three conclusions: that a proposed transaction was reasonable; that it would be reasonable if changes were made; or that it was unreasonable. The pre-pack pool was established and remains self-funded through charging £800 for each opinion it gives. However—this is the critical weakness in the edifice—reference to it was optional. The results have therefore been entirely predictable. Who wants to pay £800 if they do not have to? The more ruthless and one-sided your proposed pre-pack is, the less likely it is that you will want to refer it to the pool. This device therefore rewards the good guys and does not catch the bad ones.

Now the pre-pack pool is on the edge of collapse. It had only 10 referrals this year, according to an article in the Times. If it collapses, the last vestiges of independent third-party regulation of pre-packs will disappear. Amendment 57 seeks to remedy this problem by making it compulsory to obtain an opinion from the pre-pack pool that a proposed pre-pack is not unreasonable. As my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe pointed out in her remarks yesterday, the Government had the power to make referrals mandatory under the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 but that power has now lapsed. I imagine that she will wish to use her Amendment 60 to review that decision and see what else can be done to reinstate that power.

Finally, I referred in my opening remarks to the possible damage to the flagship change in this Bill: the moratorium. No one—but no one—will prefer to undertake a highly regulated mortarium if they can get away with a virtually unregulated pre-pack.

The potential abuses of pre-packs have long been identified. They were reported on by an inquiry set up by the Government and solutions from that inquiry were accepted by the Government six years ago, yet still nothing has been done. By contrast, we are now rushing through a series of entirely new, untested and potentially controversial changes to our insolvency laws while leaving this loophole unblocked. My amendment closes the loophole and provides for proper regulation in this area.

My noble friend the Minister has an open goal. I hope that he will put the ball in the back of the net. If not—somehow I suspect that he will not—will he tell the House whether the Government are prepared to see the pre-pack pool collapse? No ifs, no buts; if the Government are to bring forward legislation at some point in the future, as is the hallowed phrase, what will we do about the pool in the meantime? I urge him to give a yes or no answer so that we can have some confidence in the way this matter is being tackled through the department’s policies. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

My Lords, we are aware of a technical problem meaning that those Members who are joining us remotely can hear us but not see us. We are working vigorously to bring about a resolution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in support of this amendment and the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and thank him for his support for the approach that we are taking. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, who has a lot of experience in this field; his evidence and his views were very persuasive indeed. To the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, who was a co-signatory, I say that the reason that I chose “not unreasonable” as opposed to “fair and reasonable” was to put the bar as low as possible, so we had the least problem getting the government horse over the jump. But even this, apparently, is not good enough.

I found my noble friend’s answer thin—and this describes only half of what I feel. To describe this as imposing an additional requirement at this time seems an extraordinary justification; and to say that it is not right to depend on the pre-pack pool alone—the pre-pack pool was set up as a result of a government review—seems equally dubious logic. He says that we are going to discuss options of a right way forward—but we are about to come out of lockdown. The result of the pandemic will be hundreds of firms in very grave difficulties. Some of them need saving. But they need saving in a way that is fair to the creditors, to the pension fund regulator and all the other people involved. I do not think that discussing options as we go into that storm—which is coming; it is bound to come—is right. I heard what he said, I regret that he cannot take this forward and make at least some compromise suggestions, and I reserve the right to bring this back on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 57 withdrawn.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Lennie, does not wish to speak, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 8, 21 and 42 in this group. I remind your Lordships’ House of my entry in the register of interests.

The amendments are of a practical nature and are drawn from my experience as an investor in and director of private equity funds and small companies over many years. Before I turn to them, I will just repeat to the Minister how unsatisfactory is the way the Bill is being dealt with. We are mixing coronavirus amendments —which we all understand have to happen quickly—with permanent changes to our insolvency law, and this is a rushed job that may well rebound to cause more trouble for the Government than they like. The reason I want to repeat the points that I made at Second Reading is that since that debate on a Bill littered with Henry VIII clauses took place, we have had a report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I do not think I have ever read a report that is quite so critical of a Bill. I have to say to my noble friend that if Members of your Lordships’ House are inclined to push amendments to restrict those Henry VIII clauses today or at future date, I shall feel obliged to support them, because we have a very bad mix here.

The purpose of Amendment 8 is to facilitate and encourage the use of moratoriums. Events leading to a company’s collapse proceed at two speeds. It first happens at a slow speed, while the directors think, hope and pray that something will turn up—that a contract will be won, some money will come in, or an investor will appear. Inevitably, when Mr Micawber does not turn up, things have to move very quickly indeed. Then, if they decide to appoint a monitor, the time for him to make his decision is very limited indeed. As we know from the wording of the Bill, he has to make a statement that it is likely that a moratorium would result in the rescue of the company as a going concern.

--- Later in debate ---

Mine is nothing more than the pragmatic suggestion that the Government could, in this one respect, reduce some uncertainty for companies if they simply extended the provisions for the relaxation of wrongful trading from the end of June to the end of September. It is three months. Within that period, companies will still have to fit with the proposals in the Bill. They will still have to demonstrate that what is impacting their business is the virus, and that they are not knowingly gaming the system. This is an unsatisfactory debate, because it is so short, but that is the import of my amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I have Amendment 129 in this group. It seeks to equalise the different levels of protection afforded to firms in trouble under this legislation. It has been brought to my attention by a firm of solicitors that specialises in insolvency. The two critical dates in the legislation are 27 April, after which general protection is available; and 1 March, just under two months earlier, after which protection is afforded, but only if a statutory demand for payment has been made.

However, a statutory demand is not the only way that a company can be caused to fail. It is possible to go for a default judgment in a county court or a liability order in the magistrates’ court and proceed directly to a winding-up. Firms that are subject to either of these other two procedures do not benefit from protection from 1 March, but from 27 April only.

Firms are able to object and to fight these proceedings but, from 23 March, the country was in lockdown. Understandably, courts have found it more difficult to inform defendants about cases brought against them and, in many cases, smaller companies—where the proprietor is running the business almost on their own —may have been involved in self-isolation. They are therefore unable to access proper legal advice to protect their position. My amendment seeks merely to extend protection for these cases, particularly those affecting small companies, from 27 April to 23 March—the date on which lockdown began and the inequality of legal arms may have commenced.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted [V]]

My Lords, I can be brief because my amendment in this group contains a separated half of the GB-Northern Ireland pair of amendments relating to small businesses that I spoke about in the previous group, so I do not need to explain those again, and in the interests of time I will forgo speaking on anything else.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I begin by thanking my noble friend for his explanation of the Bill’s proposals. Secondly, I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the register of interests as a director of several companies that would be affected by the Bill’s provisions. It has been made clear that the Bill has been brought forward because of the pandemic. I understand and support that. Nobody who has been a director of a limited company will be unaware of the dangers of trading while insolvent, and who can judge what is solvent in the present very confused circumstances? This aspect of the Bill has my support for a further reason: all the provisions are time-limited, so even if our inevitably rushed judgment proves faulty the sunset clauses will ride to our rescue.

Wearing another hat, I chair your Lordships’ House’s Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which has been looking at, examining and reporting to the House on a great number of coronavirus regulations. There has emerged a tendency of the Government to try to tack on to coronavirus regulations some permanent changes to our law. These may not be objectionable, but they pass through under the radar of the coronavirus regime. We have been drawing these to the attention of your Lordships’ House in our weekly reports. Mixed provisions in regulations, which are of a lower order of significance, are one thing; mixed provisions in primary legislation, leading to statute law, which is what we have here, are quite another. Under the guise of the requirements of the pandemic, the Government are rushing through—I use that word advisedly—permanent changes to the insolvency laws of this country.

Let me be clear: I am not opposed to changes and review of insolvency laws. Some 15 years ago, I sat where the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, would be sitting if he was in the House, leading for the Conservative Party on what became the Companies Act 2006. We brought together every aspect of company law with two exceptions, one of which was insolvency law, because the complexities were too great for us to reconcile them there and then. So, 14 years later, I quite understand that the situation will not have improved, but it remains an immensely complex area, reconciling the irreconcilable. It is an area where unintended consequences, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, crop up with unhelpful frequency and where there are people who seek to exploit gaps with unattractive and unregulated behaviour.

What am I concerned about? My worries include the changes to the creditor position of HMRC; the ability of creditors to game the system where the banks and financial institutions are sufficiently bound into the new approach; the future role of the pre-pack watchdog; and provisions for appointing monitors and for ensuring that they are not conflicted. All these are no doubt answerable, but they are not properly answerable in a rush.

To conclude, I understand the need for this legislation to be passed speedily, but I deplore permanent changes to our laws being made under the guise of the pandemic. I hope that my noble friend will consider tabling amendments to apply sunset clauses to the whole Bill. The Government will get their Bill and we could then come back to these very knotty and conflicting issues in calmer times and with the benefit of some real-life experience. In his opening remarks, my noble friend referred to the R3 briefing from Scotland. The R3 briefing from England makes it clear that it is not clear about the detail yet. Indeed, the Minister’s own departmental website quotes Jennifer Marshall, a past president of the Insolvency Lawyers’ Association, as saying that she is looking forward to

“digesting the detail with interest.”

If these two people, with their great experience, are not able yet to understand the detail, surely we should not be rushing these provisions through now.

International Accounting Standards and European Public Limited-Liability Company (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2019 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)]

My Lords, these regulations, which were laid before the House on 31 January, aim to address failures of retained EU law to operate effectively in the field of accounts and reports of UK corporate bodies. They also address certain other deficiencies arising from the UK’s exit from the EU.

The international financial reporting standards, abbreviated to IFRS, are a set of international accounting standards used by multinational companies to produce their annual accounts. They are required or permitted in over 125 countries, including all EEA countries and 15 of the G20 countries.

EU Regulation 1606/2002, known as the IAS regulation, requires that all publicly traded companies in the EU use IFRS, as endorsed and adopted by the EU, when preparing their consolidated accounts. In the UK, the Companies Act 2006 also permits other UK companies to produce their accounts in accordance with these standards. In total, approximately 15,000 companies in the UK use IFRS.

Once the UK leaves the European Union, the EU framework for adopting IFRS will no longer apply. These regulations provide for the continued use of IFRS by implementing a national framework that provides continuity and clarity to UK business, and they aim to provide such continuity and clarity by bringing the European framework for adopting IFRS into UK law. This will ensure that UK-registered companies will not have to change their processes for preparing annual accounts.

The powers to endorse and adopt these international standards for use in the UK will be transferred to the Secretary of State. These transferred responsibilities will be bound by process and scrutiny. Furthermore, assessment criteria consistent with those in the European regulation will apply to all new endorsement decisions in the UK. They are that the standards provide a “true and fair” view of an undertaking’s financial position and that their adoption is conducive to the,

“long-term public good in the United Kingdom”.

The regulations also specify that, for all new endorsement decisions, the Secretary of State must consult stakeholders with an interest in the quality and availability of accounts, and that the final decisions will be published. The Secretary of State will be required to lay a report each year before Parliament detailing the carrying out of his responsibilities.

Further, the regulations provide for subdelegation of the endorsement and adoption powers to a designated UK body. A subsequent affirmative SI will transfer these powers to a new UK endorsement board. We currently expect this board to be hosted by a subsidiary of the Financial Reporting Council. As such, it will benefit from the FRC’s existing operational processes, such as HR and premises. The FRC’s role will be limited to monitoring governance and due process of the endorsement board. It will have no role in the process for adopting standards.

As the Committee will be aware, a comprehensive and detailed report of the independent review of the FRC, making 83 recommendations, was published in December. The Government welcome and share the review’s vision for a new regulator with a new mandate, new leadership and stronger statutory powers, and will take swift action to deliver that. The FRC’s role in relation to the endorsement board will be transferred to the new regulator once it is operational.

Throughout the development of these regulations, the Government worked closely with businesses and regulatory bodies. Informal consultations were carried out with companies, their advisors and investors. In addition, a dedicated stakeholder group also helped inform decisions about these regulations. Stakeholders were strongly in favour of both establishing a UK framework for the continued use of IFRS and the requirement for consultation before an international standard is adopted for use in the UK.

The regulations also make amendments relating to societas Europaea companies, or SEs: a Europe-specific type of public limited liability company that will not be able to register in the UK after EU exit. Regulation is already in place to convert automatically existing UK entities on exit day into a new corporate form—a UK societas—to ensure that they have a clear legal status. The amendments in the regulations relating to these entities do three things. First, they preserve a particular employee involvement provision to maintain employment rights wherever practicable. Secondly, they apply the Overseas Company Regulations 2009 to SEs registered in other member states. This will ensure that UK branches of entities registered in other member states are treated in the same way as UK branches of any other overseas company. Finally, they make a number of minor consequential amendments to other legislation, such as replacing references from SEs to UK societas to ensure that the UK has a functioning statute book on and after exit day.

A de minimis impact assessment of the regulations estimated low overall costs to business. The IFRS-related changes were estimated to have an equivalent annual net direct cost to business of £2.4 million per year. The estimated impact for the SE-related changes was £10,400 per year. Both figures are under the £5 million threshold necessary for a full impact assessment.

I commend these regulations to the Committee and ask the Committee to support and accept them. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by congratulating the Minister’s team—it is always said that the British Civil Service is the best in the world. They must have realised that their Minister might take a bit of incoming over the FRC tonight, as they produced this headline for the front page of the Financial Times: “FRC to make way for stronger accounts watchdog after a string of audit failures”. To get that on the front page of the FT just as we are to discuss the FRC as a possible delegated body is above and beyond the call of duty.

I need to declare some interests. I have served in the City for most of my life and remain a director of a number of limited companies, which are listed in the register of your Lordships’ House. I am also a member of Sub-Committee B of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which considered these regulations. I am coming back to have a second bite at the cherry, having had a go under the noble Lord, Lord Cunningham.

I will make a couple of points. It is easy—my noble friend, in his emollient style, flows so easily over the issues—to think that accounting standards are humdrum and commonplace. In fact, their exceptionally wide-ranging implications are felt in every part of our corporate system. They have an impact on directors and their boards and companies; if you serve as a company director, the two great things your lawyers and accountants always tell you about is trading while insolvent and maintaining capital. Failing to do that exposes you to some nasty and unpleasant risks and penalties—quite rightly. On the other side, they are for investors who need a clear basis on which to decide whether to invest their money in a particular venture.

Years ago, I was sitting where the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, is now sitting, leading the Opposition on what became the Companies Act 2006, to which my noble friend referred in his opening remarks. We spent quite a bit of time on the Section 393 “true and fair” view, which is a statutory requirement. If there is to be a clash between international standards and UK law, UK law must prevail because it is the law of this country. In those circumstances, how will we determine the final arbiter of what is true and fair?

I will give the Committee a brief example because although it may seem quite simple to decide what is true and fair, it is exceptionally difficult. Revenue and recognition have been a problem behind a number of companies recently—notably Carillion—where you have a long-term contract with an assured client, perhaps the Government. Let us say it is a 10-year contract. You will have to put in some additional work in year one to provide the systems that are going to last the 10 years. Boards and auditors will argue fiercely about how this should be done. Some people would say that to show that you would make a loss in the first year of a 10-year contract, when you will make additional profits in the next nine, is not a true and fair view from the investor’s point of view. A true and fair view can be conservative and restrictive, or neutral, or positive and expansive. Of course, in the case of Carillion, it was positive and expansive and they recognised too much revenue early on.

These concepts go to the heart of our corporate governance and systems—and the public trust in and have confidence in those systems—so these are not just economic decisions; they have big political implications. I would argue that while the Secretary of State may appropriately delegate some of the detailed powers, he or she needs to retain an overarching power to ensure that the system works properly. Noble Lords on the Committee will have seen the ABI briefing, which says:

“We disagree that the Secretary of State should delegate all his functions to the Endorsement Board. Firstly, we think it would be counterproductive and secondly, we think it inconsistent with the aims of the Withdrawal Act … We strongly urge that, in the House of Lords debate on this SI, assurances are sought from the responsible minister that the new SI will provide for active political oversight of the Endorsement Board by the Secretary of State”.


If these matters are to be delegated in their entirety, this country will lose part of its political influence in international negotiations surrounding changes in these worldwide standards. That will impede the UK Government in ensuring that future IFRS continue to reflect the interests of UK companies. That would be a strange decision for us to take in the light of us looking to hew a more independent line, post Brexit. I hope that my noble friend can reassure me and the Committee that there is a real understanding of the political implications that overarch the accounting technical implications of this statutory instrument. That is my first point.

My second point concerns the body to which any delegation may be made. I do not want to dance on the grave of the FRC, but some of the reports to which my noble friend referred in his opening remarks are absolutely devastating. The points include that the FRC,

“is not fit for purpose”,

and that it,

“has serious problems in how it recruits top staff”.

Another point states:

“A new body should have statutory funding and a clearer remit”.


Another states:

“The watchdog needs some new powers”.


One wants an assurance from the Minister that this unfortunate body, which has undergone regulatory capture in the views of many, will not have anything other than a passing interest in the establishment of the body that will enforce the regulations in the future.

It would be helpful if my noble friend could give the Committee more detail on how we will move forward. When his department wrote to the Select Committee of the noble Lord, Lord Cunningham, on which I sit, it said:

“The Department is currently working with the FRC to build capacity to set up the new Endorsement Board (EB) in time for EU Exit”.


We must be quite well on in that process, since we are only 10 or so days away from it. The Committee was also told:

“In addition, stakeholder input helped us define the extent of the FRC’s role in relation to the new Endorsement Board”.


It is important that we get some clarity on where we are in that process. We really do not want stuff to be set in concrete at this point. We need to know how the FRC will slide away and how the new endorsement board will be set up in the next two or three weeks.

Inevitably, particularly tonight, our focus is on Brexit and associated issues. However, this statutory instrument and its successor, which will bring the endorsement board into being, will have serious long-term implications for our corporate governance, the way our companies operate and the confidence of investors in our corporate system—all of which have come into question in recent years over a series of failures and scandals. We need to learn from that and plot a better course for the future. I look forward to hearing from my noble friend how the Government anticipate that being done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I thank all three noble Lords for their interventions, which were based on considerably more expertise than I have. I hope they will be tolerant of my response. If I fail to answer any questions I might have to write to them.

It might be helpful if I remind them of the purpose of these regulations. As usual they have the words “EU exit” in them. They are designed for a no-deal exit and ensure that the IFRS can continue to be endorsed and adopted for use by UK-registered companies after exit from the EU. They are laid using powers under the EU withdrawal Act 2018. It is again worth reminding noble Lords of the constraints within that Act and that the powers within it would not allow the Secretary of State to go wider into some of the other matters that are of concern to all three noble Lords. That is why, as I made clear earlier, that there will be a further SI later on.

We have been talking about Kingman who, as we know, published his report on 18 December. We also know that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State issued his initial consultation on the recommendations on that only yesterday and that the closing date for responses is 11 June. No doubt all three noble Lords have copies of that. I think I saw a tweet from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on it today, so I presume she has seen a copy. I regret that we are not in a position to debate it today, but there will be many other opportunities to debate it and to feed in responses in due course.

To some extent, that deals with the initial concern from the noble Baroness about whether the FRC is a suitable body to host the new endorsement board, in light of Sir John Kingman’s report and the response that will have to be made to that. As I said, there are the constraints of the EU withdrawal Act. My right honourable friend is trying to deal with the deficiencies so that we can get on with the eventualities, should there be a no-deal Brexit.

I shall say something about the consultation on the Kingman review. It is important and we are grateful for the very comprehensive review he gave. We think the recommendations are well-considered, far-reaching and transformational. As noble Lords know, the Government published our initial consultation on those recommendations, highlighting our approach in taking forward the review’s recommendations. The Government welcome and share the review’s vision for a new regulator with a new mandate, new leadership and stronger statutory powers and intend to move as fast as possible on this. I would say move swiftly, but the noble Lord will have to be tolerant because the process to implement reforms and overhaul the sector must be gone through. In the interim, until the new regulation is in place, the Government will work with the FRC to take forward 48 of the review’s recommendations, including addressing issues such as lack of transparency and shortcomings in the enforcement activities. Further detailed consultation on those measures will follow.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

One of the words that worries me is “hosting”; this relates to the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. Are we just getting a defective organisation—Sir John Kingman’s review makes it clear that it is defective—to be the handmaiden or midwife of this new organisation? What does hosting mean? Does it mean that all the staff are the same? Will there be an independent unit within the FRC? This may be too detailed for this discussion and I would be perfectly happy if my noble friend wrote to us. However, for the reasons we have explained, and in order to have the public’s trust, it is important that it must be seen to be independent and not infected with the problems of the FRC.

[Lord Henley]

I take my noble friend’s point. In my opening remarks, I tried to make clear that the FRC would host it purely in terms of human resources and other such matters. It will be an independent body to which my right honourable friend can delegate powers. Some noble Lords—I think it was my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson—asked about this. My right honourable friend will retain overarching power to ensure that that endorsement function operates well. If he retains that overarching power, he can revoke designation and retain overall control.

The endorsement board will be required to report annually to the Secretary of State on carrying out its functions. Sitting with the FRC is a matter of convenience in terms of HR and such matters, but it does not mean that its staff has to come from there. If there is anything more I can say, it might be best if I wrote to my noble friend and copied the letter to other noble Lords. I want to make it clear that the board will be made up of independent members. Its chair will be independent and it will not be part of the FRC. Having used the word “hosting”, I am trying to think of some appropriate metaphor but I cannot offhand. I hope that my noble friend will understand what I am getting at.

Unpaid Internships

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

I note that the noble Lord says that his policy is to legislate in this area. He quoted Matthew Taylor, who made it quite clear that:

“There have been calls for a separate ‘intern’ status in employment law but we believe this is unnecessary. We believe that the law is clear as it currently stands. If a person is obtaining something of value from an internship, they are most likely to be a worker and entitled to the National Minimum or Living Wage”.


We do not believe it is necessary to legislate. I will certainly look at whatever research we are doing in this area and let the noble Lord know.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, in any action my noble friend takes, will he bear in mind the impact on the charity and voluntary sector? A lot of charity and voluntary groups like to take on interns, and do so to the mutual benefit of both sides, but not all charities—especially smaller ones—can afford to pay.

[Lord Henley]

I note what my noble friend says and that he feels that charities might not be able to afford to pay, but if people are offering something that amounts to work, the simple fact is that the law says that they should be paid. That is where I stand.

Shale Gas

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, for giving us the chance to debate this important matter. I will focus on one small aspect of the shale gas revolution; that is, the proposal to create a shale wealth fund. I had a very modest role in its creation and I would like my noble friend to update us on progress as far as this is concerned. Progress has been disappointingly slow, like so many aspects of the shale gas revolution, but it is important because its successful creation would be a useful way of bringing uncommitted public opinion on side to support the wider development of shale gas. It would be an example of effective public engagement, to quote the noble Lord, Lord Mair.

The reasons for my interest in this are as follows. I see our natural energy resources coming from two main blocks—infinite and finite. Infinite, obviously, is the energy that flows from the sun, the wind, the waves, the flow of the rivers and so on. The finite resources are coal, referred to by my noble friend Lord Ridley, which for a time made this country the workshop of the world, and in 1970 of course we received the gift from nature of North Sea oil. It was assumed that the oil would have run out by now, and at some point it will run out. We have been able to extract more than we thought we would because of technology, but it will eventually run out.

Successive Governments and the country as a whole have benefited from the oil. Estimates of the revenue flows are around £400 billion. But every penny of that revenue has been spent—every penny. The debate on whether it has been spent well or foolishly would occupy your Lordships’ House for many a long day—but that is not a point for this evening. However, spent it has been. Across the North Sea, Norway took a different approach. After a strenuous debate, it decided that it would be worth while creating a sovereign wealth fund. Norway has a much smaller population and commensurately much more gas, so I am not pushing the metrics too far, but in 25 short years Norway has created a sovereign wealth fund which last June was valued at $850 billion—about £680 billion. As I say, in this country we took a different approach and made a different decision and every penny that we receive now and in the future will be spent until the oil finally runs out.

Now we have another potential gift from nature, with natural gas extracted by this fracking process. I believe that we should be doing something to follow the Norwegian example, avoid the mistakes we have made in the past and put aside some portion of this for the future. I accept that one problem at this stage is that we do not know what funds will flow—or whether, indeed, any funds will flow—from shale gas. Equally, I am sure that if we fail to establish some structure before the funds start to flow, the chances of our doing so afterwards are vanishingly small.

As a result of this, in November 2014 I tabled amendments in Committee on the Infrastructure Bill suggesting that it would be advantageous to follow this approach. I expected that my amendments would be roundly rejected and I was not disappointed; they were. But a couple of days later I had a call from the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s office to say that he actually thought it was quite a good idea and that if I chose to retable my amendments on Report he would be prepared to give a commitment to undertake some form of shale wealth fund. As your Lordships may imagine, I did not need to be asked twice to do that, so I retabled them and on 10 November 2014 the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, speaking for the Treasury, said that,

“we commit to the principle. The Chancellor will demonstrate his commitment to bring forward a proposal in the next Parliament in his Autumn Statement”.—[Official Report, 10/11/14; col. 102.]

I am glad to say that the Chancellor did fulfil that commitment.

I should have known that pride cometh before a fall because, since October 2015, progress has been—well, “glacial” is probably the right word, bearing in mind what we are discussing this evening. A consultation document was published in August of last year and any strategic vision had been carefully excised. Now one reads that the fund is to have a maximum life of 25 years and a maximum size of £1 billion—this is hardly a sovereign wealth fund, Norway-style. Indeed, as I pointed out in my response to the consultation, the emphasis on local distribution of any money received leads one to fear that it is no more than a bribe to draw the sting of local opposition to fracking.

My reactions are that this proposal should not be limited to a 25-year life; that some proportion of the fund should be invested on an endowment basis—that is, disbursement should be limited to a level at which you preserve the capital for future generations; and that the fund should not be used exclusively to benefit what might be quite small communities which happen to be sitting on top of a gas access point. By my calculations, with a suitable split between immediate spending and endowment, by the end of the 25 years the fund would—assuming that you had reached the £1 billion figure—be distributing £8 million a year to local and regional projects, and would have an endowment fund valued at £600 million capable of throwing off about £20 million per annum, inflation-proofed in perpetuity. This would be an extremely modest project by comparison with Norway’s but it might provide a working example for a more visionary follow-on.

Sadly, vision still seems to be in short supply, and since that consultation closed at the end of October there has been silence. In reply to a Parliamentary Question that I put down in February, my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe said:

“A government response to the consultation will be published shortly”.


This sounds to me as if the long grass is beckoning.

In summary, I feel that the dead hand of Her Majesty’s Treasury, with its dislike of anything financial outside its control and terror of anything approaching hypothecation—although this is a very unusual form of hypothecation—is gradually squeezing the life out of this idea. Perhaps when he comes to wind up, my noble friend the Minister could confirm or deny my worst fears.

Employment: Remuneration

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Thursday 8th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

The noble Baroness is right that there is a place for comparisons, although, as somebody who sat on a number of boards, I actually think that one needs to look at the overall position and in relation to the wider workforce. That is something that we will certainly look at as part of the consultation that we will publish, because some of this stuff is complicated and we need to make sure that we talk to people on the detail.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend referred to the importance of increasing shareholder power. Is she aware that individual shareholders in particular are increasingly under pressure to hold their shares through nominees? The nominee holder is not required to send on information to the individual shareholder about the company in which he or she has a holding. They are therefore disenfranchised. Would it not be a good idea to make a simple legal change which would require nominee companies to enfranchise and inform the people who actually hold the shares?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My noble friend, as always, brings unusual insights to the debate. It sounds as though this is a point that he and I should discuss further, because clearly we want to make sure that shareholders are exercising the oversight that we all want.