National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Pickles Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pickles (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I very much look forward to hearing him develop those points in Committee.

Let me begin directly. Legislation of this kind is long overdue. As the Library briefing makes clear, the character of state threats has evolved over the years, and this legislation is necessary. It is not a criticism directed solely at this Government; successive Administrations have recognised the problem with reasonable clarity but have often been slow in delivering the remedy. We identify the threat, hesitate on the response and find ourselves, once again, playing catch-up. This Bill is an attempt to close that gap. It is necessary and welcome.

There is much within it that merits support: the updating of offences; the introduction of a foreign influence registration scheme; and the broader recognition, reflected in the Library material and other briefings, that hostile activity now spans a wide spectrum—it is no longer confined to classical espionage but extends into influence operations, economic pressure, covert funding and a steady shaping of information environments.

However, necessity should not be mistaken for sufficiency. My concern is that the Bill, while well-intended, is framed too much around the threats that we already understand rather than those that are evolving. Hostile actors adapt quickly. They learn from our frameworks and adjust their methods accordingly. If we legislate narrowly or too rigidly, we will find that the law is outpaced almost as soon as it is enacted. We cannot afford, once again, to legislate in arrears.

The reality is that modern state threats are often indirect. They are mediated through networks, proxies, front organisations and aligned movements that provide distance and deniability. Influence is rarely crude; it is incremental, sustained and frequently embedded within legitimate structures. That presents a challenge which the Bill does not fully meet. In particular, it requires us to take seriously the role of transnational ideological networks that may intersect with state interests, whether formally or informally.

The arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Godson in his recent article in the Spectator are both relevant and necessary to engage with. He draws attention to the way in which the Muslim Brotherhood operates less as a single organisation and more as a diffuse and adaptive network: a movement with affiliated bodies, overlapping structures and a capacity to project influence across civic, educational and political space. This strength lies not in overt confrontation but in persistence, organisation and reach over time. The point is not to collapse this into a simplistic category of state threat but to recognise that boundaries between state and non-state activity are often porous, and that serious actors are adept at operating across these boundaries.

Other countries have begun to engage with this reality. France and Austria, among them, have examined how such movements function, how they influence institutions and what risks they may pose to democratic resilience over the longer term. In the United Kingdom, our approach has been more cautious—arguably, too cautious—and the Bill reflects this caution. It is anchored firmly in the concept of state attribution which, while understandable, has created a limitation. If influence is exercised through networks that fall just outside that definition, a framework confined to it risks overlooking a significant part of the threat.

To be clear, this is not part of an argument for indiscriminate measures or broad-brush conclusions. It is an argument for clarity and completeness, to ensure that our understanding of modern threats is sufficiently wide, and that our response is capable of addressing them. At present, the alignment is not yet fully achieved. This is why the next stages of the Bill are so important.

As has already been demonstrated in another place, there is real scope to strengthen and redefine the framework. In particular, it is reasonable to apply three basic tests. First, flexibility: can the Bill adapt to new forms of threat without the need to repeat primary legislation? Secondly, scope: does it adequately capture indirect as well as direct forms of hostile influence? And, thirdly, clarity: are the definitions and mechanisms sufficiently precise to be both effective and enforceable?

If the Bill falls short against these tests, amendment is not an obstruction; it is responsible lawmaking. Those who seek to undermine open societies are neither static nor unsophisticated. They study our systems, identify ambiguities and exploit gaps with consistency and patience. If our legislative response is too narrow or too cautious, it will not be enough. The Bill is an important step forward, but it must also be a durable one. I believe that the Bill can be improved and that we can future-proof it, widen its scope where necessary and ensure that it addresses not only direct state action but the broader ecosystem in which influence is exercised. In conclusion, our task is simple: not to follow threat but to get ahead of threat and to stay there.