Artificial Intelligence: Regulation

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Tuesday 14th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government, following the action taken by the United States in respect of regulating artificial intelligence, including the recent signing of an Executive Order, whether they have plans to introduce similar provisions in UK law.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

In the AI regulation White Paper we set out our first steps towards establishing a regulatory framework for AI. We are aligned with the United States in taking a proportionate, context-based and evidence-led approach to AI regulation. The White Paper did not commit to new legislation at this stage. However, we have not ruled out legislative action in future as and when there is evidence of substantial risks, where non-statutory measures would be ineffective.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am a little disappointed in the Minister’s response, but we welcome the discussions that took place at Bletchley Park. While the Prime Minister says he will not rush to regulate, as the Minister knows, other jurisdictions— the US and the EU—are moving ahead. Labour in government would act swiftly to implement a number of checks on firms developing this most powerful form of frontier AI. A Bill might not have been in the King’s Speech, but that does not mean that the Government cannot legislate. Will the Minister today commit to doing so?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The Government are by no means anti legislation; we are simply anti legislation that is developed in advance of fully understanding the implications of the technology, its benefits and indeed its risks. This is a widely shared view. One of the results of the Bletchley summit that the noble Lord mentioned will be a state-of-the-science report convened by Professor Bengio to take forward our understanding on this, so that evidence-based legislation can then as necessary be put in place. As I say, we feel that we are very closely aligned to the US approach in this area and look forward to working closely with the US and others going forward.

[The Earl of Devon (CB)]

My Lords, the Government have noted that AI’s large language models are trained using copyrighted data and content that is scraped from the internet. This will constitute intellectual property infringement if it is not licensed. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that technology companies seek rights holders’ informed consent?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

This is indeed a serious and complex issue, and yesterday I met the Creative Industries Council to discuss it. Officials continue to meet regularly both with creative rights holders and with innovating labs, looking for common ground with the goal of developing a statement of principles and a code of conduct to which all sides can adhere. I am afraid to say that progress is slow on that; there are disagreements that come down to legal interpretations across multiple jurisdictions. Still, we remain convinced that there is a landing zone for all parties, and we are working towards that.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome what the Minister has just said, and he clearly understands this technology, its risks and indeed its opportunities, but is he not rather embarrassed by the fact that the Government seem to be placing a rather higher priority on the regulation of pedicabs in London than on AI regulation?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that I am not embarrassed in the slightest. Perhaps I can come back with a quotation from Yann LeCun, one of the three godfathers of AI, who said in an interview the other week that regulating AI now would be like regulating commercial air travel in 1925. We can more or less theoretically grasp what it might do, but we simply do not have the grounding to regulate properly because we lack the evidence. Our path to the safety of AI is to search for the evidence and, based on the evidence, to regulate accordingly.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, an absence of regulation in an area that holds such enormous repercussions for the whole of society will not spur innovation but may impede it. The US executive order and the EU’s AI Act gave AI innovators and companies in both these substantial markets greater certainty. Will it not be the case that innovators and companies in this country will comply with that regulation because they will want to trade in that market, and we will then be left with external regulation and none of our own? Why are the Government not doing something about this?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I think there are two things. First, we are extremely keen, and have set this out in the White Paper, that the regulation of AI in this country should be highly interoperable with international regulation—I think all countries regulating would agree on that. Secondly, I take some issue with the characterisation of AI in this country as unregulated. We have very large areas of law and regulation to which all AI is subject. That includes data protection, human rights legislation, competition law, equalities law and many other laws. On top of that, we have the recently created central AI risk function, whose role is to identify risks appearing on the horizon, or indeed cross-cutting AI risks, to take that forward. On top of that, we have the most concentrated and advanced thinking on AI safety anywhere in the world to take us forward on the pathway towards safe, trustworthy AI that drives innovation.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, given the noble Viscount’s emphasis on the gathering of evidence and evidence-based regulation, can we anticipate having a researchers’ access to data measure in the upcoming Data Protection and Digital Information Bill?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question and recognise her concern. In order to be sure that I answer the question properly, I undertake to write to her with a full description of where we are and to meet her to discuss further.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my technology interests as in the register. Does my noble friend agree that it is at least worth regulating at this stage to require all those developing and training AI to publish all the data and all the IP they use to train that AI on, not least for the point around ensuring that all IP obligations are complied with? If this approach were taken, it would enable quite a distance to be travelled in terms of people being able to understand and gain explainability of how the AI is working.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am pleased to tell my noble friend that, following a request from the Secretary of State, the safety policies of Amazon, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Inflection, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI and others have been published and will go into what we might call a race to the top—a competitive approach to boosting AI safety. As for enshrining those practices in regulation, that is something we continue to look at.

[Lord Knight of Weymouth (Lab)]

My Lords, further to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, around data—that the power of the AI is in many ways defined by the quality of the data—does the Minister have any concern that the Prime Minister’s friend, Elon Musk, for example, owns a huge amount of sentiment data through Twitter, a huge amount of transportation data through Tesla, and a huge amount of communication data through owning more than half the satellites orbiting the planet? Does he not see that there might be a need to regulate the ownership of data across different sectors?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Indeed. Of course, one of the many issues with regulating AI is that it falls across so many different jurisdictions. It would be very difficult for any one country, including the US, to have a single bit of legislation that acted on the specific example that the noble Lord mentions. That is why it is so important for us to operate on an international basis and why we continue not just with the AI safety summit at Bletchley Park but working closely with the G7 and G20, bodies of the UN, GPAI and others.

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

My Lords, there is significant public interest in the companies developing artificial intelligence working together on common safety standards, but in doing so they may run the risk of falling foul of competition law. Will the Minister be talking to the Competition and Markets Authority to make sure that one public good, preventing anti-competitive practices, does not impede another public good, the development of common safety standards?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, indeed. It is a really important point that the development of AI as a set of technologies is going to oblige us to work across regulators in a variety of new ways to which we are not yet used. That is indeed one of the functions of the newly formed central AI risk function within DSIT.

[Lord Patel (CB)]

My Lords, can I back up the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on access to data by research workers, particularly health data? Without access to that data, we will not be able to develop generative AI such as retinal scans, for instance, and many other developments in healthcare.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, indeed. In healthcare in this country, we have what perhaps may well be the greatest dataset for healthcare analysis in the world. We want to make use of that for analysis purposes and to improve health outcomes for everybody. We do, of course, have to be extremely careful as we use that, because that is as private as data can possibly get.

Counter-Disinformation Unit: Israel and Palestine

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps their Counter-Disinformation Unit is taking to identify and combat disinformation on social media in respect of the conflict in Israel and Palestine.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology takes the threat posed by disinformation in relation to the conflict extremely seriously. We are taking a three-pronged approach, working in lockstep with communities, technology companies and across government. The Government are working to identify fake accounts, known as bots, and working closely with social media companies to ensure the removal of illegal content and content in breach of their terms of service.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Given the second Question today, perhaps the Minister will confirm that much of the work of the unit is outsourced to an artificial intelligence company, logically.ai, which I understand is based in Yorkshire. I am interested in exactly how the output of the unit is conveyed to others. The Minister has confirmed that there is active interaction with social media companies, and there is an effort to identify the sources of this misinformation, many of which are state actors. However, some are individuals in this country and elsewhere. What happens when those sources have been identified? Who takes the action further?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I will have to write to the noble Lord to confirm the Counter-Disinformation Unit’s use of logically.ai. Where the unit identifies disinformation being deployed at scale, it would first engage with the relevant ministry to allow it to respond. On occasion, it will engage directly with social media companies, if the content it is seeing either is illegal or runs contrary to the terms of service declared by that company.

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, there has been a huge rise in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia on social media, much of it due to disinformation. What steps are His Majesty’s Government taking to educate the public to spot disinformation and stop them forwarding and repeating it?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My noble friend makes an important point. In the escalating battle between those pushing disinformation at us and our attempts to limit it, media literacy is key. Under the terms of the Online Safety Bill, which is due to become law in just a few days, Ofcom is obliged to produce a media literacy strategy to generate awareness of and resilience to misinformation and disinformation. It is obliged also to create an expert advisory committee on misinformation and disinformation online. In addition, there is now a media literacy programme fund that awards up to £700,000 of grant funding for media literacy programmes. All this is dependent on platforms setting out clearly their terms of service, so that users can access them in the full knowledge of the kind of information that they can expect to see.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, the EU Commission has formally opened an investigation into X, the platform previously referred to as Twitter, to ensure that it complies with the Digital Services Act following the onslaught of the current conflict in Israel and Gaza, Palestine. Could the Minister outline what discussions and engagement have taken place with the European Commission in relation to its and the UK’s investigations?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

On 11 October, shortly after the commencement of hostilities, the Secretary of State for DSIT convened a meeting of social media platforms. These included Google, YouTube, Meta, X, Snap and TikTok. She made her expectation very clear that not only would illegal content be rapidly and urgently removed but authoritative content would be promoted to create more clarity around what is accurate content in this fast-moving and difficult situation. Those meetings are ongoing daily at official level and are accompanied by detailed correspondence on the acts of those platforms.

[The Archbishop of York]

My Lords, it is good to hear that the Government are engaging with the social media platforms on this incredibly serious issue. Twitter has most aptly been renamed X, but without irony: one goes into this area with great caution, as it is distressing and nasty. I am told that X is currently laying off people whose job it is to monitor and remove posts that contain disinformation. Given this, and given that we have made progress in looking at social media platforms, what are we doing to require them to do this other than simply engaging with them?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I absolutely agree with the most reverend Primate about the seriousness and horror of the situation. On requiring social media companies to act, the Online Safety Bill will become law in a matter of days; it places much more rigorous requirements on the social media companies to remove content which is illegal and is harmful to children and to have only content that is consistent with their published terms of service.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, what are Ministers doing to engage with the leaders of the relevant religious communities to persuade their followers to avoid inflammatory actions and words, which are causing such trouble and intercommunity tension?

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

That is an important part of the Government’s approach to this very difficult, nasty situation. Last week, the Secretary of State met leaders of Jewish communities, and ongoing meetings are similarly being convened by DLUHC with all communities. We are establishing bridges between these communities and the social media platforms. One advantage they have in that dialogue is that they are accorded trusted flagger status, which greatly reduces the amount of time it takes to raise content of concern.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, the House has previously debated the role and work of the Counter-Disinformation Unit. I do not think anybody was particularly convinced by the assurances which the Minister gave back in July. These issues have been brought into sharp focus by recent events. At the time of that last debate, we were promised a meeting. Unless our Front Bench was left off the invite list, I am not aware of that follow-up meeting having taken place. Given some of the Minister’s responses today, that meeting is now more urgent than ever. Can the Minister commit to meet with those of us who are deeply concerned about this issue?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I remember the July debate very well. I made a commitment then to meet with concerned Members, which I am happy to repeat. Again, I ask that concerned Members write to me to indicate that they would like to meet. Those who have written to me, have met with me.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned that the Online Safety Bill will come into law very shortly. Will he commit to setting up the advisory committee on disinformation and misinformation as soon as possible after this? The current situation clearly demonstrates both the need for it and for it to come to swift conclusions.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I very much share the noble Lord’s analysis of the need for this group to come rapidly into existence. It is, of course, the role of Ofcom to create it. I will undertake to liaise with it to make sure that that is speeded up.

[Lord Sterling of Plaistow (Con)]

My Lords, it was reported that a hospital had been hit. Immediately—sadly, in this modern day—the media like to break news, not to check how accurate it is. In practice, when we find out exactly what did happen, the damage has already been done because it went out to billions of people who wanted to believe that the Israelis did it.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

That was very concerning. I am unable to comment specifically on the role of the BBC reporting on it. Combined with other sources of misinformation and disinformation online, it greatly amplified the damage that was done. We continue to work with the social media companies to ensure that they promote authoritative versions of the truth based on their use of fact-checkers, whether third-party independents or part of their own organisation.

Artificial Intelligence: Regulation

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of existing regulations and practices in relation to artificial intelligence, and what plans they have to monitor and control artificial intelligence (1) in the UK, and (2) in cooperation with international partners.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

The AI Regulation White Paper set out our proposed framework for governing AI, including plans to establish a monitoring and evaluation process to track performance. This will complement the central AI risk function which we have established to identify measures and mitigate risks. We work closely with international partners through the G7, the GPAI and the Council of Europe to understand AI risks, and are leading the way by convening the AI Safety Summit in November.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the Government hosting the AI summit at Bletchley Park, which is an opportunity to define the guard-rails on the use and misuse of AI with international partners. AI is borderless, as we know, so co-operation with others such as the USA, China and the EU is vital. Given the advances in draft legislation on AI by our neighbours in the EU, what plans do the Government have to continue the co-operation and dialogue with these other interests to give our thriving UK AI businesses certainty in their ability to sell and trade into all jurisdictions?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My noble friend is absolutely right to highlight the essential need for interoperability of AI given the way that AI is produced across so many jurisdictions. In addition to the global safety summit next week, we continue our very deep engagement with a huge range of multilateral groups. These include the OECD, the Council of Europe, the GPAI, the UN, various standards development groups, the G20 and the G7, along with a range of bilateral groups, including —just signed this year—the Atlantic declaration with the US and the Hiroshima accord with Japan.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, Professor Stuart Russell memorably said:

“There are more regulations on sandwich shops than there are on AI companies”.


After a disappointing White Paper, in the light of the forthcoming summit will the Government put more risk and regulatory meat in their AI sandwich? Is it not high time that we started addressing the AI risks so clearly identified at the G7 meetings this year with clear, effective and proportionate regulation?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am pleased to say that the Government spend more on AI safety than any other Government of any country. We have assembled the greatest concentration of AI safety expertise anywhere and, based on that input, we feel that nobody has sufficient understanding of the risks or potential of AI at this point to regulate in a way that is not premature. The result of premature regulation is regulation that creates unnecessary friction for businesses, or runs the risk of protecting or failing to protect from emerging dangers of which we are as yet unaware.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, we learned again just this week that our own public sector is already using this very powerful technology across the board in Whitehall on matters such as criminal justice, health and education, with great opportunity but great risk. Where is the statutory framework for that current use of the technology? At a time when so many of the Minister’s colleagues in the Government want to walk away from international agreement, what hope is there for us to deal with technology on a global scale without new agreements, not fewer ones?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I certainly do not recognise a situation in which many of my governmental colleagues want to walk away from international regulations; indeed, I have just provided quite a long list of them. It is entirely appropriate that, within the bounds of safety and their remit, different public sector bodies use this crucial new technology. They do so not in an unregulated way but with strict adherence to existing regulations.

[Lord Patel (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister clarify how the Government intend to regulate the use of NHS data, particularly the contract for its collection, which is awarded to an overseas company? Furthermore, the UKRI has requested that the Government invest in the significant amount of computing power which we do not have but require for generating AI in healthcare.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The Independent Review of the Future of Compute, which we accepted in its entirety, guided us to commit £900 million initially to buying compute. We have confirmed the purchase of an exascale system in Edinburgh as well as the UK’s soon-to-be most powerful supercomputer, in Bristol. There will be further announcements on this as part of the summit next week. The use of NHS data is subject to not only stringent contractual requirements but, already, stringent regulations about data privacy.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that we need far greater public engagement and public discourse around AI? Is he aware of the alignment assemblies used in Taiwan to such good effect? Will he consider taking a similar approach to such benefits in the UK?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I very much agree with my noble friend that we need maximum public acceptance of AI. However, that must be based on its trustworthiness. That is why we are pursuing, among other things, the global AI Safety Summit next week. I am not familiar with the Taiwanese approach but will look into it, and look forward to discussing it in due course.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been reported that the Government want big tech companies to agree a set of voluntary guidelines at the AI summit. Can the Minister confirm this? If so, why are the Government not seeking more robust systems of oversight and regulation, notwithstanding some of the advantages of AI, when the dangers of unchecked technology are, as we have heard, so high?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I do not believe that anyone anywhere is advocating unregulated AI. The voluntary agreement is, of course, a United States agreement secured with the White House. We welcome it, although it needs to be codified to make it non-voluntary, but that will be discussed as part of the summit next week.

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because Professor Russell also said that he would like to ban certain types of AI deepfakes. With elections looming in this country, can the Minister tell the House whether he thinks AI developers should be banned from creating software that allows the impersonation of people, particularly high-profile politicians?

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The noble Viscount raises an extremely worrying and serious issue: the use of deepfakes to impersonate politicians. The integrity of our entire political process could be placed at risk with untrammelled and irresponsible use of these technologies. However, I simply cannot see any pathway to banning these technologies unilaterally, as where they are developed could be absolutely anywhere on earth. I am afraid that any step we are likely to take will not affect that.

[Noble Lords]

My Lords—

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I thank your Lordships’ House. I will follow on from the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. Huge commercial benefits are possible from AI. We have talked about the dangers, but there are benefits as well. However, as the Made Smarter Review made clear, the management skills to implement the digital opportunities of today are insufficient, so they are quite clearly not going to be there to implement the benefits of the future. In conjunction with his colleagues in the business department, what is the Minister doing to make sure that we have the skills to be able to take advantage of this technology?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, I thank the noble Lord for his point, which is a really important one. There is no defined curriculum of skills for AI anywhere, and there is such a very large range of different types of skills from data science, analytics and computer science, among others, to do that. I do not believe that anyone has produced what might look like a core curriculum of those things. We are, on the other hand, investing very serious funds into education at all levels, from school age to college age and advanced studies as well. I very much take the point, and driving global acceptance and adoption of AI is absolutely key to realising its value.

Semiconductors Manufacturing

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Monday 18th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what progress they have made towards engagement with the semiconductors manufacturing sector concerning funding to support future manufacturing in the United Kingdom, as set out in the Semiconductor Strategy, published on 19 May.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

The national semiconductor strategy sets out the Government’s plan to build on the UK’s strengths to grow our sector, increase our resilience and protect our security. We will also announce plans by the autumn to further support the competitiveness of the semiconductor manufacturing sector, which is critical to the UK tech ecosystem and our national security. We have engaged, and continue to engage extensively, with industry. The Government’s new semiconductor advisory panel met last week to inform our approach.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his Answer. I think the concern lies around the rhetoric that has surrounded the May announcement, which very much focused on research and design while coupling that to resilience. As the Minister knows, good design companies and good research get bought and leave the country, and they do not necessarily contribute to resilience, whereas manufacturing does. As the Minister said, we in this country are home to some very innovative, lower-cost, niche manufacturers, but for those investors to have the confidence to further those companies, a strategy needs to be set out. Can the Minister assure your Lordships’ House that his department is putting maximum pressure on the Chancellor so that, when his Autumn Statement comes out, a proper manufacturing strategy for semiconductors in this country will be forthcoming?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The noble Lord raises, as ever, an interesting point, but to build an advanced silicon fab would, first of all, cost tens of billions of pounds. It would run into not only costs of operation but substantial risks of uncompetitive yields and, as we have seen several times historically, shifts in demand for semiconductors. I remind the House that, although 40% of the value chain of semiconductors is represented by manufacturing, 30% is represented by design. It makes sense that our strategy should build on the country’s strengths, particularly in design.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, may I follow up that point and ask a little more about the detail of who runs this strategy? In addition to the independent regulator, the CMA, there are, as I understand it, three government departments directly involved: the Cabinet Office, the Department for Business and Trade, and DSIT, as represented by the Minister. The focus of the third leg of the national strategy engages with export control, hostile takeovers and mergers. Who is in charge of that, and can the Minister explain it?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Indeed I can, and I recognise the importance of the question around clarity between these various arms of government. The ownership of the semiconductor strategy sits squarely with DSIT. There is a range of Acts—to do with export controls and protection of investment from states seen to be hostile to us—that of course come under other departments, but overall ownership must sit, and continues to sit, within DSIT.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that some 90% of all advanced semiconductors are produced in Taiwan and that 60% of all semiconductors are produced in Taiwan, mostly by one company? Given the urgency that has arisen out of the hostile acts taking place in the South China Sea, can the Minister tell us what we are doing to bolster supply chain resilience and security? Can he tell the House the current position on the future of Newport Wafer Fab, given that a Chinese company attempted to buy it?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am of course aware of the overwhelming market position of TSMC in Taiwan. It is a manufacturing foundry for semiconductors, but that is the only slot in the supply chain that it occupies. Having a foundry by itself is nothing without the vast, complex, integrated global supply chain of all other companies. On the second part of the noble Lord’s question, any threat to peace and stability in the strait of Taiwan is a deeply serious concern for the Government. We are looking at all scenarios and contingency planning in preparation for any disruption to that.

[Lord Sterling of Plaistow (Con)]

My Lords, graphene is the thinnest material known to man. It is about 100 times stronger than steel and has the most exceptional electrical conductivity. I understand that huge research is being done on this throughout the world—billions—but there are some small companies in this country, with the finest brainpower, that are working on this. Do the Minister and his unit feel that the conductive capability of graphene is going to be the future for this world?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My noble friend reminds me that I had the pleasure of visiting the graphene centre at Manchester University just a couple of weeks ago. I share not only his positive views of the material but his positive estimate of its future uses. It will play a significant role in compound semiconductors of many different kinds, and that is one of the areas of focus for the UK’s semiconductor strategy.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

I am very grateful. I want to continue on the basis of the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, regarding the specific Newport Wafer Fab factory. I do not think the Minister got around to answering that fully, and I would be grateful to have his observations on the issue.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Lord for not having reached that bit. The concern about Newport Wafer Fab was that the ultimate owners of the buyer were Chinese investors; hence, under the NSI Act, that was blocked. I cannot comment any further on that specific case because it is under judicial review.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the Government may have finally published a strategy on semiconductors, but is investment in our great south Wales compound semiconductor hub going to be encouraged by his ministerial colleague Paul Scully’s remarks about not wanting to recreate Taiwan in south Wales? Also, as has been referred to, there is the very much delayed decision over the future of Newport Wafer Fab.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

What Minister Scully clearly meant was that there is no point attempting to construct an advanced silicon manufactory at the cost of tens of billions of pounds at considerable risk to both investors and the taxpayer when all those who have tried to mimic TSMC have failed at great expense. It is far better to focus on our strengths and on the compound semiconductor strategy that Minister Scully will have spoken about on that occasion. Again, Newport Wafer Fab is under judicial review and I cannot comment further.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, with regard to semiconductor investment, the US has tabled a package of $50 billion, China a package of $40 billion and India $10 billion, while the UK has put forward just £1 billion, or $1.2 billion, which is 1/13th of the subsidy given to railway companies. Can the Minister explain why the Government show so little ambition? Will he now publish all emails and minutes relating to the national semiconductor strategy document so that we can get some insights into its neglect of this vital field?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

In respect of the first point, as I say, it is a highly risky undertaking to construct advanced silicon fabs in the way that those countries are setting out to do. That is not the right strategy for the UK. With regard to publishing all the emails written by the department, perhaps the noble Lord could write to me and set out his reasons for wanting them and I will be happy to talk to him.

[Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)]

My Lords, can my noble friend estimate what proportion of the semiconductors in our critical national infrastructure comes from countries that do not have our best interests at heart?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The global integrated supply chain for semiconductors is of a scale and complexity that make any attempt to answer that question for any given semiconductor, given the sheer quantity of them and the number of companies that may or may not have contributed in some way along the supply chain, futile. I do not think any human being—or computer, for that matter—could possibly answer such a question. I am sorry.

Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Wednesday 13th September 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 10 July be approved.

Relevant document: 48th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 7 September.

Motion agreed.

Horizon Europe

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Wednesday 13th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper, and I hope that the House will understand how pleased I am that I will not have to ask it again.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

My Lords, on 7 September, the Prime Minister announced that the UK would associate to Horizon Europe. The Government have negotiated a bespoke deal in the UK’s national interest, and UK researchers and businesses can participate confidently in the world’s largest programme of research co-operation, worth more than £80 billion. UK applicants are eligible to apply to Horizon Europe calls, now and in the future, and the Government strongly encourage them to do so.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer and I welcome the decision. However, I hope the House will understand that great damage has been caused by the delay, and that this is not an automatic thing that you can restart, like pressing on a light switch. One of the things we must turn our attention to now to make Horizon Europe work properly is the visa system. The global talent visa system for STEM subjects needs reform. If we are to encourage the best and the brightest to come and do their research in Britain, would the Minister agree that tackling the visa system is an important priority for the Government now? Would he also agree that, if we are to be a science superpower, we really must tackle the visa problem and fix it to make it more easily possible for these researchers to come and do their work in Britain to the benefit of the UK?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Viscount for his question and pay tribute to his ongoing championship of our reassociation to the programme. I certainly agree on the importance of bringing in overseas talent via the visa system for this. We have roughly 1 million people today in this country working in R&D roles. We feel that, by 2027, due to retirement and bringing new researchers in, that number will have to increase by around 380,000, and overseas talent will be a very big piece of that. I am pleased to say that our very welcoming points-based visa immigration system is seeing quite strong increases in numbers. The skills-based visa system has seen increases of roughly 50% when compared to years before the pandemic.

[Lord Patel (CB)]

My Lords, I am pleased that we now have a settlement with Horizon Europe, and all the science institutions are very pleased with this news. It will allow us now to form collaborations with scientists in Europe and other parts of the world, which is an important part of research. We will also now be part of Copernicus, which drives research into space and satellite programmes, and that is also good news. The downside is that we will not be part of Euratom, because that is what the Government have decided. That is for nuclear research, which means that we will not be joining any nuclear research in Europe, where they are establishing the first trial fusion reactor in France. I hope that the new money that the Government will put forward instead of Euratom will be for nuclear research and will not be used for things such as manufacturing radioisotopes, which we have been short of since we came out of Europe—and we do need more of them. Can the Minister confirm when the Government will publish the forward plans for a replacement of Euratom and that the money will be for research?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his remarks overall concerning the Horizon programme. The reason the Government chose not to join Euratom and did not include it in our overall deal here was that the fusion nuclear sector very strongly advised us not to do so. That frees up approximately £650 million, which will be distributed in ways to be announced. I am afraid I do not have a date for that—these events have been very recent—but it will be announced as soon as practicably possible.

[Lord Hintze (Con)]

My Lords, let me first draw attention to my entry in the register of interests and congratulate the Government on a very effective way of putting ourselves back in play here. I also congratulate the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, on his tenacity. How does this fit with the AUKUS initiative on innovation and technology?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for his comments but his specific question with respect to AUKUS has rather stumped me, so I will have to write to him.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, the figures on those attracted by the global talent visa and others came before the latest announcement about the increases in visa charges and health charges. I emphasise that these are upfront charges, so if you are coming here for five years, you are paying £20,000 to £25,000 before you have started—unless your university repays it, in which case the university has extra costs. Those charges were imposed to support a public sector pay increase, thus contradicting the aim to be a science superpower. Can the Government please get their act together? We know that we need a large number of foreign researchers, and we want to make Britain a welcoming place for foreign researchers. This is doing the opposite. Will the Government not reverse the recent increase?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The Home Office recently announced increases to both the visa fees and the health surcharge fees, with the purpose of ensuring that the costs of our borders and migration system are borne by those who benefit most from that system. The timing of the increase of the costs has yet to be announced, although the announcement itself was made, and we will of course be keeping a close eye on its overall effects.

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Stansgate for his persistence on this. I was grateful for the Minister’s contributions in the Chamber last week on the subject of reinstating the Horizon programme—a very welcome announcement. Given his commitment to try to find out how much the substitute Pioneer programme had cost, including staff costs, what steps has he put in place to identify those costs and when does he expect to be able to share the information with the House?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I said at the time that I would ask for those costs to be analysed, and that is in train. When that will be shared, I do not know, but I invite the noble Baroness to consider that the costs of non-association to Horizon for us were those of uncertainty. How much greater would that uncertainty, and therefore the cost, have been had we not had a plan B in the form of Pioneer? Proceeding without Pioneer would have been reckless in the extreme. Whatever costs were incurred—and I will, as I promised, do my best to find out what they were—pale in comparison with what the costs of not doing it would have been.

[Baroness Rawlings (Con)]

My Lords, we have the finest universities in the world. What are the Government’s plans for Erasmus?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

At this time, the Government are not re-associating with Erasmus, instead relying on their innovative Turing programme.

[Lord Trees (CB)]

My Lords, as someone who has previously benefited from research support from Horizon, I join others in warmly welcoming this. Does the Minister agree that Horizon has been extremely important not only in strengthening research capability between the UK and continental Europe, and between the East and West, but between the north and south—Europe and the global South—which is hugely important strategically in areas such as health security, biosecurity, pandemic preparedness and climate change?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am very happy to agree. The work done collectively across all programmes in the last Horizon cut across 163 countries and created 237,000 collaborative links—although quite what that means I am not sure. To me, it paints a picture of a global, highly collaborative, shared investigative approach to probing the great scientific problems of our time.

[Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, there is clearly overwhelming relief from the academic community that we have at last rejoined, although I echo my noble friend’s point that there is a lot of ground to make up and a lot of good will and partnerships to be rebuilt. I will ask some practical questions of the Minister. What happens to researchers who have already been funded through the guarantee? Can they be transferred back into Horizon? What will happen to the underspend created by UKRI’s guarantee? Will it be reinvested in UK R&D before association takes place?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for the question. Any open calls now are for programme 24 or are outstanding for programme 23. Those calls will be dedicated to each programme. Those for programme 23—there are not very many left—are covered by the Horizon guarantee scheme or programme 24, in which we now participate. All of the underspend will go to our commitment to spend £20 billion a year on R&D by 2024-25, and exactly how we take full advantage of that will be the subject of future announcements.

Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Thursday 7th September 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023

Relevant document: 48th Report from Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

My Lords, these regulations were laid before the House on 10 July 2023, and they will be made under the powers provided by the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022 and the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. They will mandate that the manufacturers of consumer connectable products made available to customers in the UK are, unless excepted, required to meet minimum security requirements.

In doing so, this instrument will complete the introduction of the UK’s pioneering product security regime, established by Part 1 of the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022. Subject to noble Lords’ approval, this regime will afford UK citizens and businesses with world-leading protections from the threats of cybercrime, as well as equipping the Government with the tools to ensure the long-term security of a vital component of the broader technology ecosystem.

Acting to secure consumer connectable products has never been more critical than it is now, as we cross the threshold of the fourth industrial revolution. Before our eyes, artificial intelligence is rewriting how we live our lives, how we deliver our priorities and the rules of entire industries. AI models are already an inextricable part of the connectable products we use every day, from the convolutional neural networks that recognise the photos of loved ones on our smartphones, to the recurrent neural networks that allow our smart speakers to respond to our requests. The data collected through consumer devices is often also a vital part of a model’s training set.

These regulations are therefore not just crucial if we are to protect our citizens and economy from the array of threats posed by consumer connectable products today but a vital step if we are to mitigate the risks, and therefore fully realise the benefits, of the AI-enabled economy of tomorrow. With the support of this House and Members of another place, this is precisely what the Government aim to achieve with these regulations.

The key provisions of this instrument are as follows. First, the regulations mandate that manufacturers comply with the security requirements set out in Schedule 1. These requirements were selected, following extensive consultation, because they are applicable across a broad range of devices and are commended by security experts as the most fundamental measures for addressing cyber risks to products and their users. This means that businesses will no longer be able to sell consumer smart products with universal default or easily guessable default passwords to UK customers. These passwords not only expose users to unacceptable risks of cyberattack but can also allow malicious actors to compromise products at scale, equipping them with the computing power to launch significantly disruptive cyberattacks.

Manufacturers will also be required to publish, in a manner that is accessible, clear and transparent, the details of a point of contact for the reporting of security vulnerabilities. It pains me to share that, despite our entrusting the security of our data, finances and even homes to the manufacturers of these products, as of 2022, less than one-third of global manufacturers had a policy for how they can be made aware of vulnerabilities. With your support, the UK aims to change that.

The final security requirement in this instrument will ensure that the minimum length of time for which a product will receive security updates is not just published but published in an accessible, clear and transparent manner. We know that consumers value security and consider it when purchasing products. Equipped with the vital information mandated by this requirement, UK consumers will be able to drive manufacturers to improve the security protections they offer through market forces.

We are confident, based on extensive policy development, consultation and advice from the National Cyber Security Centre, that these security requirements will make a fundamental difference to the security of products, their users and the wider connected technology ecosystem.

We also recognise the importance of cutting red tape or, better still, not introducing it in the first place. For this reason, Regulation 4 allows manufacturers that are already compliant with provisions in international standards equivalent to our security requirements to more readily demonstrate their compliance with our security requirements.

The instrument also sets out a list of products excepted from the scope of the product security regime. First, it excepts select product categories where made available for supply in Northern Ireland. This exception ensures that the regime upholds the UK’s international commitments under the EU withdrawal agreement, while extending the protections and benefits offered by the regime to consumers and businesses across the UK.

In addition, smart charge points, medical devices and smart metering devices are excepted to avoid double regulation and to ensure that these products are secured with the measures most appropriate to the particulars of their functions. This instrument also excepts laptops, desktop computers and tablets without a cellular connection from the regime’s scope. Engagement with industry highlighted that the manufacturers of these products would face unique challenges in complying with this regime, and in many cases where these products are in use they are already subject to suitable cyber protections. It is therefore not clear at this stage that including these products in the regime’s scope would be proportionate.

Finally, the regulations also contain uncontroversial administrative provisions, including provisions relating to statements of compliance. The regime will require that these documents accompany products, serving as an audit trail to enable compliance across the supply chain and to facilitate effective enforcement.

These regulations and the regime of which they are a part represent a victory for UK consumers. They are the first in the world to recognise that the public has a right to expect that the products available for them to purchase are secure. These measures solidify the United Kingdom’s position at the forefront of the global cyber agenda, paving the way for other nations to follow in our footsteps. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction, which gave us the context for these regulations and the risks they are designed to mitigate and prevent. I agree with him about the importance of regulating in this area but, sadly—clearly—this is not box office today. We must live with that.

I welcome the regulations as far as they go. The one bright spot is that all regulations under the original Act, with one exception, are subject to the affirmative procedure, thanks to amendments put forward by us and accepted by the Government, which were designed to implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. That we are discussing the regulations in this way is testimony to that.

However, the regulations do not go far enough, despite being described by the Minister as a “pioneering product security regime”. As I said at Third Reading of the original Bill, last October, we did not specify enough security requirements for IoT devices in primary legislation. There was a commitment to regulate for only the top three guidelines covered by the 2018 Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security, namely: first, to prohibit the setting of universal default passwords and the ability to set weak or easily guessable passwords; secondly, to implement a vulnerability disclosure policy, requiring the production and maintenance by manufacturers of regularly publicly available reports of security vulnerabilities; and, thirdly, to keep software updated and ensure the provision of information to the consumer before the contract for sale or supply of a relevant connectable product detailing the minimum length of time for which they will receive software or other relevant updates for that product.

Those are now all in the regulations and I welcome that, but, sadly, many of the other guidelines were never going to be, and are not now, specifically covered in the regulations. Quite apart from the first three, there are a whole range of others: securely store credentials and security-sensitive data; communicate securely; minimise exposed attack surfaces; ensure software integrity; ensure that personal data is protected; make systems resilient to outages; monitor system telemetry data; make it easier for consumers to delete personal data; make the installation and maintenance of devices easy; and validate input data. All those are standards that should be adhered to in relation to these devices. Two of the guidelines that have not been made mandatory—ensure that personal data is protected, and make it easier for consumers to delete personal data—have been highlighted by Which? this very morning, which has produced research demonstrating that:

“Smart home device owners are being asked to provide swathes of data to manufacturers, which could compromise their privacy and potentially result in them handing their personal information to social media and marketing firms, Which? research has found”.


This is part of its press release.

“The consumer champion found companies appear to hoover up far more data than is needed for the product to function. This includes smart speakers and security cameras that share customer data with Meta and TikTok, smart TVs that insist on knowing users’ viewing habits and a smart washing machine that requires people’s date of birth. The research suggests that, despite consumers having already paid up to thousands of pounds for smart products, they are also having to ‘pay’ with their personal data”.


We need to make sure that the Government and the regulator, whether the ICO or others, are on the case in that respect.

Nor did we see any intention to introduce appropriate minimum periods for the provision of security updates and support, taking into account factors including the reasonable expectations of consumers, the type and purpose of the connectable products concerned and any other relevant considerations. During the passage of the Bill, the Government resisted that—unlike the EU, which has imposed a five-year mandatory minimum period in which products must receive security updates. So consumers in Northern Ireland, for instance, are going to be far better off as a result of the TCA and the Windsor agreement.

That has inevitably followed through into these disappointing regulations, but they are even more disappointing than previously anticipated. Online marketplaces are not covered. Why not? My noble friend Lord Fox tabled an amendment on Report that sought to probe whether online marketplaces would be covered, a question that I think we all agree is of great importance. My noble friend quoted a letter from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, dated 21 September 2022 stating that

“businesses need to comply with the security requirements of the product security regime in relation to all new consumer connectable products offered to customers in the UK, including those sold through online marketplaces”.

In response, the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, said:

“The Bill will ensure that where online marketplaces manufacture, import or sell products, they bear responsibility for the security of those products. Where this does not happen, I assure noble Lords that they should make no mistake: the regulator will act promptly to address serious risk from insecure products, and work closely with online marketplaces to ensure effective remedy”.


I accepted that assurance. I said:

“As regards the online marketplaces, I am grateful for those assurances, which are accepted and are very much in line with the letter”.—[Official Report, 12/10/22; cols. 794-95.]


That was the assurance that was given and accepted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, as ever, and to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his contribution. He had lots of questions, as ever, many the same as those we asked during the passage of the Bill.

The Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act creates a regime that has three purposes, which the Minister set out. They are to minimise default or easy-to-guess passwords, to maintain an awareness of security threats and publish contact information for use by consumers and owners, and to encourage greater transparency about how long the products covered by this legislation will receive security updates and support. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that these are low-hanging fruit for regulation. We should look at this instrument as a small step in the right direction.

With that in our minds, we supported the PSTI Bill during its passage and, in common with other Members of the House, tabled and supported a number of amendments to go further than the Government wished.

The requirements being imposed on manufacturers are widely supported by consumer groups, although they are rightly very nervous and watchful of the direction in which the legislation takes us in terms of data. Questions are being asked about whether the standards are sufficient and what role, if any, distributors will have in improving consumer knowledge of security issues.

As discussed in a debate earlier this week, people’s habits with regard to data and the digital world have changed enormously over the past few years. This includes the rapid take-up of smart and connectable devices, such as smart speakers, CCTV doorbells and so on. These products are highly desirable, and yet research has demonstrated that many contain significant security vulnerabilities and that consumers are generally not aware of the risks that they face.

A policy commitment was made back in January 2020 and the Bill was passed in December 2022, so why will the new regime come into force only by April next year? We understand the need for technical details to be worked through and for manufacturers to adjust their own systems, but could the Government not have moved more quickly than this? This is a fast-moving market, after all.

We supported the passage of the Bill and, as I said, worked with colleagues across the House to push the Government to be more ambitious about the regime’s scope and the security standards that should be met by manufacturers, but it seems that Ministers refused to raise the bar and continue to do so.

As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, Which? and others have noted that, while the Act allows the Government to place requirements on manufacturers, importers and distributors, these regulations cover only manufacturers. Is the hope that distributors and retailers will pass security information on to consumers voluntarily or is the department looking at other tailored requirements for them? If the latter, how long might this take? Perhaps the Minister could elucidate that.

It seems that every day we hear of another major hack or data breach. Some are used to defraud victims, while others harness networks of smart devices to launch attacks on major websites. Sadly, these dangers are likely only to grow, as we discovered in recent weeks, so it is vital that the Government keep their foot on the gas on these issues, rather than passing these regulations and considering them job done. There is much more to do.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I draw attention to the Which? briefing paper, reflected in a Guardian article today, which suggests that manufacturers may be using these devices to collect more data than the legislation seemingly enables, which is shocking. Asking for postcodes and date-of-birth data seems outwith the manufacturers’ immediate needs. Can the Minister throw some light on this issue? What are the Government’s intentions regarding it and how do they intend to address it? These issues of data retention and use are serious. They affect consumer behaviour, confidence and trust, and trust is a terribly important commodity in today’s world. I hope the Minister can answer those questions.

I am rather with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on smart meters. We have one; it is a scary device, and it has become scarier in the last year as the bills have gone up. I am not sure of its value but my wife tells me it is an invaluable tool. I hope that is the case, that we can get better and more confident about the data that these things produce, and that they are in the service of the consumer rather than of the manufacturer, because that is really where we should be coming from.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the crowds of noble Lords for their valuable contributions to the debate. I will make some general comments to start and then come to specific points that noble Lords have made.

Consumers assume that if a product is for sale it is secure, but too often—I think we are in agreement on this—that is not the case. Many consumers are at risk of cyberattacks, theft, fraud and even physical danger. These regulations will change that, ensuring that protections are implemented for our commonly used items such as smartphones, smartwatches and smart baby monitors, as well as the UK citizens and businesses that use them.

Cybercrime is thought to cost the UK billions of pounds every year, with one report by Detica and the Cabinet Office estimating the total cost at £27 billion a year. In 2020-21 the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau reported receiving over 30,000 reports of cybercrime, resulting in estimated losses of £9.6 million for the victims. Cybercrime is on the rise, and vulnerable internet-of-things products are a key attack vector for criminals. This instrument is an essential step in fighting the dangers of cyber risks.

While the product security regime will come into effect only next April, with the support of this House, I want to take this opportunity to reflect on how far we have come on this agenda. The development of the regime has been supported by a huge range of officials but I extend particular thanks to Peter Stephens, Jasper Pandza, Veena Dholiwar, Maria Bormaliyska, Jonathan Angwin, Warda Hassan, Howard Cheng and Eilidh Tickle for their dedicated and diligent advice.

I thank all experts who have contributed to delivering this regime since 2016. Among them stands Professor David Rogers, to whom I pay particular thanks for his leading role in developing the Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security on which the security requirements of this instrument are based. Lastly, I too thank Which? for being a champion of consumer security, and for holding the Government to account throughout the process of delivering these important measures and on this agenda more broadly.

I shall now respond to the questions that have been asked. On the topic of why the security baseline does not go further, a matter raised by both noble Lords, we do not believe at this stage that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that mandating security requirements beyond the initial baseline would be appropriate. Specifically, we do not currently consider it appropriate to mandate minimum security-update periods for relevant connectable products before the impact of the initial security requirements is known. Governments mandating necessarily broad regulation across a sector as inherently complex as technology security will always run the risk of imposing obligations on businesses that are disproportionate to the associated security benefits or of leaving citizens exposed to cyber threats.

However, the Government agree that, for a number of consumer connectable product verticals, implementation of the three security requirements alone would not be sufficient. Legislation, however, is not the only incentive driving the security practices adopted by tech manufacturers. Evidence suggests that consumers value and consider the security of a product when making purchasing decisions, but assume that products available for them to purchase will not expose them to avoidable security risks.

In ensuring that manufacturers are transparent with UK consumers about how a product’s security will be maintained, we expect the product security regime to incentivise improved standards of cybersecurity beyond the initial three requirements. The Government will closely monitor the impact of the initial security requirements on standards of cybersecurity across the sector, and will not hesitate to mandate further requirements using the powers provided by the parent Act if necessary.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The Minister has moved on from talking about periods of assurance for consumers. I mentioned the EU introducing its five-year rule and the Northern Ireland aspect. That is rather useful for the Government to be able to see the impact of putting down a marker on a five-year period, because there is no alternative under the TCA and the Windsor agreement. Will the Government undertake to review how it is working in Northern Ireland? If it is working well and they think it is practical, will they introduce it across the UK?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

That is an interesting experimental chamber to have, because we can compare the two regimes, so I am happy to make that commitment, yes.

The assurances about online marketplaces from my noble friends Lord Kamall and Lord Parkinson remain true. Products sold through online marketplaces are subject to the same requirements as all other products. No regulation is perfect and, if relevant parties do not comply, the parent Act empowers the Secretary of State, or those whom the Secretary of State has authorised to carry out enforcement functions, with robust powers to address non-compliance, including monitoring the market, warning consumers of risks and, where appropriate, seizing products and recalling products from customers.

The Government have made it clear that they expect online marketplaces to do more to keep unsafe products off their platforms, and are conducting a review of the product safety framework. The product safety review consultation is open until 24 October. Following this, we will review and analyse stakeholder feedback and publish a government response. Any legislation will be brought forward in line with parliamentary procedures and timetables, which will include proposals to tackle the sale of unsafe products online. Officials will continue—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I apologise to the Minister, but what is the reason for having two separate processes for manufacturers and online distributors? The assurance that I quoted could not have been clearer, and we all thought that these regulations would include not only manufacturers but online distributors. It still baffles me and I am sure it baffles the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, as well. The logic of doing it in two separate tranches entirely escapes me.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The processes we have put here resulted from extensive consultation with the stakeholders, both the manufacturers and the retailers.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

So the Minister is saying that the retailers did not like it, did not have the systems required and could not do things quickly enough—despite the fact that some time has elapsed, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, mentioned—so they said, “Not now, Josephine”, basically.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

No, the consultation took place with a wide range of civil society and other stakeholders. Mechanisms are in place to update, should it not prove to be as proportionate as we believe it is. The Government are also engaging directly with online marketplaces to explore how they can complement the product security regime and further protect consumers.

On the question of how the regime accounts for the possibility of changing international standards, the instrument references specific versions of ETSI EN 303 645 and ISO/IEC 29147. Were the standards to be updated, the version cited would still be the applicable conditions in Regulation 2. Noble Lords should rest assured that any action by the Government to update the standards referenced in the regime would require further parliamentary scrutiny.

Turning to computers, we do not have evidence that including such products in the scope of the regime would significantly reduce security risk. There is a mature anti-virus software market that empowers customers to secure their own devices. Alongside this, mainstream operating system vendors already include security features in their services. The result is that they are not subject to the same level of risk as other consumer devices.

On smart meters and data, the smart metering product market is already regulated through the Gas Act 1986, the Electricity Act 1989 and the Smart Energy Code. Smart metering products are subject to tailored cyber requirements that reflect their specific risk profile. This exception ensures that smart meter products are not subject to double regulation without compromising their security.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

The Minister has referenced two pieces of legislation which almost—this is perhaps going a bit far—predate the digital age. Is he saying that those are fit for purpose, given that much has changed since 1986, to cite one of the dates he gave, and subsequent pieces of legislation? Are they right for what we are doing now?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I have to confess that my familiarity with some of that legislation is a bit limited, but I was attempting to convey that the full extent of the regulation covering those devices is collectively included in those three instruments. I recognise that that is not a wholly satisfactory answer, so I am very happy to write to the noble Lord. That legislation mandates compliance with the code collectively, which is kept up to date and includes robust modern cyber requirements. The UK already has a robust framework for data protection. While I absolutely agree that it is important, it is not the subject of these regulations.

I would like to return to a matter that I addressed earlier and point out that the cyber resilience Act that the noble Lord mentioned will in fact not, as per the current agreed version of the Windsor Framework, come into effect in Northern Ireland. The point remains that we will monitor its impact on the continent. I beg his pardon for not being clear about that.

Turning to the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, we agree that the challenges posed by inadequate consumer connectable product security require urgent action. However, regulating a sector as heterogeneous as connectable technology in its diversity of devices, user cases, threat profiles and extant regulation also requires careful consideration. We feel that we have acted as quickly as was appropriate, and in doing so we acted before any other nation.

On the role of distributors in communicating the defined support period to customers, products made available to consumers in the UK, or those made available to businesses but identical to those made available to consumers, are required to be accompanied by a statement of compliance, which will contain information about the minimum security update period for the product. Retailers are in fact required to ensure that the statement of compliance accompanies their product.

In addition, the SI requires manufacturers to publish information about the minimum security update periods, alongside invitations to purchase the product where certain conditions are met. The Government have no immediate plans to make it mandatory for the distributors of these products to publicise the defined support period. However, we encourage distributors to take this action voluntarily. If the manufacturer fails to publish the defined support period, the enforcement authority can issue notices demanding that the manufacturer make the necessary corrections, or demand that importers or distributors stop selling the product. It can also seize products and recall them from end users.

We will of course be monitoring the effectiveness of the product security regime when it comes into effect. If evidence emerges suggesting that further action to ensure the availability of the defined support period at points of purchase would be appropriate to enhance and protect the security of products and their users, the PSTI product security regime empowers Ministers to take such action.

In conclusion, I hope noble Lords will recognise the benefits that this regime will bring to the UK public and its ground-breaking influence on the world stage.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, I wonder whether he could return to his notes on the cyber resilience Act. I heard what he said but it may have been a slip of the tongue because he said that it has not yet come into effect but we will monitor its impact on the continent. I think—at least, I assume—that he meant we will monitor its impact when it comes into effect in Northern Ireland. It will inevitably come into effect into Northern Ireland, will it not?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I think we are talking about the continent.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Perhaps the Minister could write to me or to us. The fact, as I understand it, is that the Act is a piece of EU legislation that is going to come into effect across the EU under the Windsor agreement and the TCA. Northern Ireland is subject to EU legislation of that kind; it will therefore come into effect in Northern Ireland and we will be able to monitor its impact there. So, it is not just a question of monitoring its impact on the continent. We have a homegrown example of how it will be implemented—a test bed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I do not want to say anything inaccurate. I hope that it is acceptable for me to write to the noble Lord.

Motion agreed.

EU Programmes

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Thursday 7th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in the other place earlier today by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology. The Statement is as follows:

“Mr Speaker, this is a momentous day for British science and technology as we have negotiated a great landmark deal, designed in the UK’s best interest—a hard-fought-for deal that will allow the UK’s world-leading scientists, researchers and businesses to participate with total confidence in both Horizon Europe and Copernicus. It gives the best and brightest of the UK’s scientific community access to the world’s largest research collaboration programme. It means that British scientists and businesses can co-operate with researchers not just in the EU but in Norway, New Zealand and Israel—expanding the reach and impact of British science and technology to every corner of the globe. With Korea and Canada looking to join these programmes in the future, we are opening the doors to further pioneering, international collaboration with a growing group of countries tomorrow.

We were always clear that we wanted to associate with Horizon, and that is why we had it in the trade and co-operation agreement. However, as honourable Members will know, we were not able to commence negotiations for over two years because the EU had linked it to the Northern Ireland protocol. It was the Prime Minister’s Windsor Framework that broke the deadlock and allowed us to commence intense negotiations. We said all along that we would only accept a good deal, which is why we did not take the first deal that was offered to us. Instead, we pursued a bespoke agreement that delivers for British taxpayers, British researchers and British businesses.

We will not pay for a second of the time in which we were not members of the programme. Our deal also protects and benefits hard-working taxpayers through a new clawback mechanism. What is more, our scientists and researchers can benefit from Horizon today, meaning that they can immediately bid into the programme, with certainty over funding. All calls in the 2024 work programme, including those that open for bids this year, will be funded through our association to Horizon Europe, while the few remaining 2023 work programme calls will be funded by the UK guarantee, as they have been to date.

But this is not just about Horizon. We needed a bespoke deal that gave us access only to EU programmes that would benefit the UK. Having listened to voices from our world-leading fusion sector, we will not be joining the Euratom programme. Instead, we are investing an additional £650 million straight into cutting-edge fusion programmes over the same period—assisting our journey to become a science and technology superpower by 2030.

When I first started this job, I made it my number one priority to listen to the voices and views of the scientific and tech communities. They told me that almost two-thirds of research funded through Horizon’s European Research Council grants leads to major scientific advances. I heard loud and clear how essential associating to Horizon was for the sector. I am delighted to now deliver on that. The deal we have negotiated has been warmly welcomed by the whole scientific community. It gives them the certainty they need to continue delivering long-term research and innovation that changes people’s lives for the better and to be truly global in outlook. But Members do not need to take my word for it. Today’s news has been supported by Universities UK, the Russell group, all four of our prestigious national academies, leading tech businesses including Airbus and Rolls-Royce, and countless more.

But this is not just about funding and support for universities and businesses. It is a deal that has real-world impact for people and communities throughout the UK. This deal is set to create and support thousands of new jobs as part of the next generation of research talent. The deal we have negotiated will allow the UK to continue playing a leading role on the international stage in solving the grand challenges of our time—from climate change and the race to net zero to finding cures for cancer, dementia and other life-threatening diseases.

Alongside this deal, the Government are proudly backing our science and tech communities. We have committed to invest £20 billion in R&D by the next financial year. That means more record funding on wider priorities, from harnessing the power of AI to improve our public services to tapping the potential of quantum computing. We will continue to strengthen our collaboration with countries beyond Europe, building on the success of the international science partnership fund we launched earlier this year to deliver truly global science with truly global benefits. Today, we take another giant leap in our mission to make Britain a science and tech superpower, and I am confident that scientists and businesses are ready to seize the moment. The horizon could not be brighter for British science and technology”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I declare a strong interest. My son came back to the United Kingdom after 10 years working at American universities as a systems biologist—which is one of the Government’s strategic priorities in science, as the Minister will know—on a Marie Curie European Union scheme. Had we not left the EU, he would have been applying for a European science council grant.

We on these Benches wholeheartedly welcome this agreement. We all need to be grateful to all those in the scientific community and the Government who did their best to maintain links and keep the negotiations going in spite of all the difficulties. I regret the overhyping of this agreement. Among the comments that have emerged from the scientific community, I note that from Professor Sir John Hardy from University College London, who says:

“Going back in is good. But irreversible damage has been done”


in the interval. Our colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Rees, said that there was an

“unconscionable delay in reaching agreement”.

Now that we have an agreement, the hard work has to begin. If we are to become anything like a scientific superpower within the next seven years, a great deal needs to be done. One of the things that the Government have to recognise now is that there is a contradiction between their approach to how foreign scientists working in this country are treated when they are here—and, even more so, their families—and the idea that we will continue to attract the most talented in the world.

Scientific research is dependent on an international network, and that has to be a two-way network. Far too much in this announcement suggests that it is wonderful for British scientists and will give us access to foreign universities. We also want foreign scientists to work in British universities, but we have just had this announcement that the visa and health charges for foreign academics in this country and their wives, husbands and families will be increased from £15,000 to £25,000 in total over a five-year term. That is a severe disincentive. I heard about this 10 years ago when my son was first coming back, and some of his colleagues over there said that they would not come back to Britain because the way their American wives and families would be treated when they got here was so unwelcoming. That is a huge disincentive to Britain becoming a science superpower. It also contradicts government policy and suggests that the Home Office, the Department of Health and DSIT need to get their act together and sort this out.

The second thing we have to work on is pay. Academic pay for scientists in Britain has sunk by 25% in the last 10 to 15 years. The pay of a university lecturer running a laboratory in a British university is now lower than that of a post-doctoral researcher starting off in the United States—I speak with expertise on this. In an international market in which scientists are highly mobile, that is not attractive and will not get us anywhere like being a scientific superpower.

We on these Benches welcome this delayed decision. We regret that it is seen so much as a matter of what we get out of the hard bargain bilaterally and not as our joining a multilateral network in which there are multiple exchanges. There need to go on being multiple exchanges. We very much hope that DSIT will begin to learn the lessons of where we have made mistakes in recent years and on which we now need to improve.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Wallace of Saltaire. Dealing first with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, I think it is a stretch by anybody’s imagination to describe this as a climbdown and a humiliation, albeit while welcoming it. In principle, three major advances in our standing have been made with the deal: first, the creation of the clawback mechanism to mitigate the risk that we spend more than we receive; secondly, the fact that we do not spend any money on any time or activities to which we do not have access or where we are not a member; and, thirdly, the ability to withdraw from Euratom or other areas of the programme from which we did not benefit.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

Can the Minister clarify in which year, during any of the time that we were part of Horizon, we ever needed to have a clawback arrangement? My understanding was that we were net beneficiaries from Horizon for the entirety of the programme.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

As a number of noble Lords have observed in this debate and previously, the fact that we were not members of the Horizon programme was of great concern and probably did lasting damage to the UK’s scientific community. One way to protect ourselves from further lasting damage was to create the clawback mechanism, to make sure that the money we put in would not exceed the money we took out.

It is worth reminding noble Lords that the United Kingdom did not decide to withdraw from Horizon association; the EU withdrew our association from us—making an association with the Northern Ireland protocol—which we appealed. It has always been our preference to be a member of the Horizon programme. The negotiations were hard fought and necessarily took a long time. We feel that they have given us a more than reasonable result. I do not enjoy the overhyping that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, perhaps rightly points out, but on the other hand I think it a worthy cause for celebration that we are able to reassociate with the programme, which has been welcomed by the sector.

With respect to the Pioneer programme and the analysis of the opportunity cost, I argue that it would have been extremely reckless to have been negotiating with the EU and not had a programme. It would be like driving uninsured. I do not know the cost in terms of measuring the time of civil servants and other officials in creating the policy—I do not particularly know how to find out, but I am more than willing to try—but it was not a significant cost in that no actual investments were made beyond people’s time and effort to perform the preparations. The opportunity cost of the time we have missed in Horizon is a calculation that has to be performed at the end of the Horizon period in 2027, so that we can understand overall, end to end, what was paid and what was the effect of missing out.

Finally, I remind the House that the United Kingdom is putting £20 billion a year into R&D by 2024-25. This is the greatest increase ever in any public spending review period and shows how seriously we take our goals of becoming a science and technology superpower.

I will take back the comments that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, made on how visa charges and health charges will be very off-putting. I take that on board, as well as the comparison of academic pay for scientists. I will absolutely have a look at that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I say to the Minister that there are strings attached. Will he reassure the House and ask the Government not to allow the pressure from the Windsor Framework to inhibit our freedom to pursue scientific research, and get a cast-iron guarantee that it will not be used politically against us?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for the question. A statistic that I like to use, which maybe will give some reassurance that Horizon is not purely an EU-based body—I am sorry if it sounds rather arbitrary—is that our association with Horizon 2020 produced 237,000 collaborative links in 163 different countries, 28,000 of which were outside the EU, so although the EU is the largest body involved it does give global reach. I note also the proposed association of Korea and Canada in that light.

I cannot make a commitment as to whether forces adversarial to us could use our membership against us; it is not up to the British Government but to the Governments who choose to act in that way. However, we feel a renewed sense of partnership with our friends at the EU, particularly following the Windsor Framework. I hope that sets my noble friend’s mind somewhat at rest with respect to the internationally reaching nature of Horizon.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement—how could I not? I have devoted most of my precious Parliamentary Questions to seeking that the UK rejoins Horizon. However, I do not want the House to be under any doubt about the damage that has been done by the delay, including the six months or more since the Windsor Framework. I very much echo the words of our colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Rees, in that respect. From the Statement, you would never guess the frustration of the science community in having to take part in endless meetings and discussions about a Pioneer plan B, when the objective all along for the science community was to rejoin Horizon Europe.

I have only a few moments to ask a question, so to be practical, how quickly are we going to be able to wrap this up? I spoke today to the Royal Society. Is has no details at all as yet about the mechanisms that the Government are going to alert people to in order to enable them to apply—and we want people to apply as soon as possible. Visas have been mentioned, and this is a very important point: will they be special visas? As has been said already, we want the best and the brightest to come to Britain. These are important practical questions. In a way, it has never just been about the money; it is about the co-operation. I hope that this agreement will pave the way for improved relations between the UK and our European partners in other areas. I would very much welcome the Minister’s comments upon it.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question, and of course pay tribute to his relentless focus on holding us to account on making sure the Horizon deal went through. I am delighted that he at least welcomes that part of the news. On taking advantage of Horizon, I am told that, as of right now, British researchers and institutions can bid for Horizon 2024 calls. The vast majority of open calls now are for 2024, and those are open and available for British institutions. There are some remaining 2023 calls, which are supported by the Horizon guarantee scheme, as before. We are able now to move quite fast. On the question on visas, I will have to write to him, as I do not have any information on that at present.

[The Earl of Clancarty (CB)]

My Lords, this is, on the face of it, excellent news for the sciences. Now we need excellent news for education and those whose interests are in the arts and humanities as well as the sciences, through the Government renegotiating to rejoin Erasmus. If Turing was that great, Northern Ireland would not be as interested as it is in the access to Erasmus that Ireland is providing funding for. Turing might be better than nothing, but does the Minister not agree that better than nothing is a dispiriting ambition? We should rejoin Erasmus as soon as possible.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Better than nothing is indeed a dispiriting thing. Better than Erasmus is the assessment that the Government made when declining the opportunity, on negotiation of the TCA, to remain part of Erasmus and choosing instead to put in place the Turing scheme, on the grounds that it offers not only better outcomes but better value for money for British taxpayers.

[Baroness Donaghy (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount for accepting that this Statement is overblown. I think some of us are getting a bit fed up with these Statements that are claiming the earth when, really, it is a damage limitation exercise.

I chaired the EU Services Sub-Committee for two or three years, and we spent a lot of time discussing the importance of Horizon and Erasmus, and the importance of academic links and the mutuality of those links. I very much support what the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said about that mutuality, and the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, in his plea for Erasmus and getting the discussion back on a real basis.

The Statement says that this is

“why we did not take the first deal that was offered to us”.

At the time, we asked what that deal was. What were the details of the deal? Why did we not get the information to allow us to make the judgment about whether the Government had taken the correct decision? It is all very well putting these things in a Statement but all that does is trigger really poor memories about the fact that an unreasonable decision was taken. An unreasonable decision was also taken about Erasmus. Turing is very much a scaled-down and second-rate scheme. For it to be named after a genius is just disgraceful.

I should like to ask also about the so-called new clawback scheme. The old Horizon deal was the best clawback scheme in the business. We got a heck of a lot more money than we put in. You do not get better than that, so will the Minister say what clawback scheme could possibly be better?

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

First, as I was obliged to explain to the House at the time, I was unable to comment on ongoing negotiations for fear of prejudicing their outcome. The initial position of the EU was that we had to pay for the entirety of 2023, despite the fact that it was already March by the time this agreement was made, there were no mechanisms in the place for clawback, which I will come to in a moment, and it was all or nothing. I am pleased to say that thanks to the negotiations we have reached a deal that works for both sides.

On the clawback scheme, the preferred outcome is not to require a clawback. In common with every previous Horizon programme, we have gained more from the programme than we have put in, and we have every reason to believe that that will be the case, but there is always a risk that, because we are entering this particular Horizon programme late and many of the bids and activities will already have been allocated to different parties, we will not on this occasion be able to make as much money back for our institutions as we put in. In that instance, the clawback mechanism negotiated by our team mitigates that risk somewhat for any really significant disparity.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, without overegging the pudding, the whole point of Horizon is that there is international co-operation. There are issues with visas because we are going from the free movement of people to a visa-based system, so that is fundamental to how this works. However, my question is about Copernicus. We have not heard much today about that, so will the Minister tell your Lordships’ House where we are on that and how the deal reflects on that?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I will come back to the question of visas, and I take the point. I am pleased to say that we are also reassociating with Copernicus. It is such an important programme for the earth observation sector. Geospatial is in my portfolio as a Minister. I am a great believer in the value that it can bring. What particularly pleases and excites me about the association with Copernicus is access to the EU’s very comprehensive dataset that could help to kick-start our work and the work done in the EU. I am extremely positive about that.

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Minister for missing the opening sentences of his speech. By way of amends, I very much welcome this move. I know the Minister would agree with me that this is all about the exchange of ideas, which is crucial to development. Exactly the same argument could be made about the arts and musicians. The Minister said, very honestly, that lasting damage has been done as a result of this. I ask him to be good enough to take back to his colleagues that lasting damage is being done to music and the arts. Furthermore—this is the most extraordinary thing of all—the noble Lord, Lord Frost, who does not give way very easily, has admitted that the Government got these negotiations wrong. So, if the Government can put Horizon right, please will they put music, arts and touring right as well?

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for the question. I recognise the issue, and although my ability to fix that is pretty limited, I will of course take that back to my colleagues.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, a number of noble Lords have referred to the stress, pressure and extra work that the scientific community has had to suffer through the years of see-sawing and uncertainty about what is happening with Horizon. On 10 and 11 July, I was with ABX, the Antibiotic Discovery Accelerator Network. On 10 July, the papers were reporting that we were about to sign Horizon, which I told them. Then, on 11 July, I had to say, “No, apparently Rishi Sunak has kiboshed it, so it’s off”. Can the Minister therefore say whether the Government will put in extra resources and support to ensure that the scientific community is in fact able to access this opportunity, which has finally arrived after so many years of waiting?

I have a second question. The Statement refers to what might be described as two of the “buzz” areas of science: fusion, on which we are not joining the EU—I will refrain from commenting on fusion—and artificial intelligence. Can the Minister tell me whether the Government will really focus on and support systems biology, an area of science that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referred to—the kind of work that produces agro-ecological methods of producing food and managing our landscapes—and the modern, non-reductive biological sciences, given that the EU is, in many areas, far ahead of us in this research and this practice?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

To the noble Baroness’s first point, I am pleased to say that the EU has agreed jointly with us to help to publicise the new arrangements with the UK and our association and to make sure that all existing participants become rapidly aware of the opportunities for associating with UK institutions and working with us on programmes. I really welcome that as a positive step towards taking full advantage as quickly as possible. Engineering biology is one of the science and research priorities set out by DSIT and will indeed, therefore, remain very much part of our laser focus.

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have a few moments left, may I endorse all the comments made about the need to apply to the creative areas of music, dance and so on the same arguments that apply to Horizon Europe? I must also tell the Minister that during this exchange I have had a message from Cancer Research UK, which, as noble Lords may remember, has been very active in seeking to rejoin Horizon Europe, because it will make such a difference to the work done by these very important people in helping to solve one of the great diseases of our time.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I hope very much that Cancer Research UK, a body for which I have enormous respect, welcomes this news. I hope that the noble Viscount will pass on my very best wishes and that it is able to take full advantage of our new association.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

I welcome this deal. despite the fact that it is very late and overblown. We are glad to have it. I was chair of Lancaster University for seven and a half years, and the Horizon programme was one driver of a great interchange of staff across the continent. Some 20% of our staff at Lancaster were EU citizens not from the UK. Does the Minister think that that degree of freedom of movement will still be allowed as a result of the reinstatement of Horizon?

Secondly, does the Minister accept that there is a real problem, as a result of Brexit, in the decline in students from EU countries? It makes our universities more dependent on recruiting students from potentially problematic parts of the world, such as China, with respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, opposite.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that question. I slightly struggle on the subject of who is or is not allowed to work in our universities as a result of this. I am not aware that anything has changed there, but I have committed to come back to many noble Lords on visas and health charges. On the noble Lord’s other question, there is a whole world of researchers out there and it is incumbent on us to recognise our circumstances as a nation and engage globally with as broad a population as possible, recognising that good scientists are good scientists, wherever they happen to come from.

Beyond Digital (COVID-19 Committee Report)

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Wednesday 6th September 2023 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

My Lords, I join all those who have spoken in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, for tabling such an important debate. I do not know the exact optimal moment to have this debate but I find it not very agreeable to be plunged back into those miserable days when we were all locked at home. I remember reflecting, however much I was complaining, how far worse so many families had it—who were not lucky enough to have access to the internet or indeed the physical space to move around in. I also thank all members of the committee for their thoughtful, constructive and strongly reasoned report; it was much appreciated.

It is strange to think about the coronavirus now, 18 months since the last restrictions were lifted in England. But, as many noble Lords have observed today, the world that the pandemic ushered in or accelerated remains all around us. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, for his quote from Satya Nadella. In a very short time, so much of our lives moved online, including school classes and conference calls, not to mention hearings in court and committees in Parliament. That such a seismic change could happen in such a short time is testament not only to the brilliant inventions around digital but the decades of government investment in digital infrastructure and mobile connectivity.

Of course, it is no exaggeration to claim that the digital revolution has changed lives in the last half a decade, a great deal for the better but also in some ways for the worse. As many of today’s speakers have rightly emphasised, we know that the digital revolution will work only if we bring everyone with us. That is why DSIT’s mission, and the mission of the Central Digital and Data Office, is to ensure that tech does not diminish our lives but makes our lives longer, happier, healthier and safer.

I turn to some of the specific questions that were raised in the debate. Many noble Lords raised concerns about inequalities in our new digital or hybrid world. One priority of the new office is to increase the specialised talent and capability in all parts of government, so that the digital transformation of government remains supportive for all citizens. The work of the CDDO includes collaboration with the wider non-digital parts of government to drive the adoption of new technologies and break down those silos of digital and non-digital activity. That includes making sure that services are accessible to all users.

In June 2022, the CDDO presented its 21-point road map for digital transformation for central government. The road map sets out how the CDDO will achieve six missions, including transforming public services with efficient digital services. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, my noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, that the UK digital strategy is a cross-government strategy that sets out the Government’s ambitious agenda for digital policy. The strategy covers a wide range of areas, including digital skills, rolling out digital infrastructure and AI. DSIT continues to work across a broad spectrum of digital issues to continue building a more inclusive, competitive and innovative digital economy for the future.

Since the strategy was published last year, we have seen further progress of the Online Safety Bill in Parliament, which is being discussed at Third Reading as we speak. It will keep the UK safe and secure online once in effect. As many noble Lords have highlighted, there is also the continued rollout of world-class digital infrastructure nationwide, with more than 75% of premises in the UK now having access to gigabit-capable networks and 92% coverage of 4G mobile infrastructure.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, highlighted, access to affordable internet for vulnerable people is really important. Low-cost broadband and mobile social tariffs are available in 99% of the UK from 25 different providers. DSIT continues to work closely with Ofcom, operators and consumer groups to raise awareness among eligible groups.

On resilience, which was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Alderdice and Lord Bassam, the 2021 telecommunications Act introduced new powers for the Government to manage the presence of vendors when that presence in the UK networks poses particular national security risks. These set rigorous new obligations on public telecoms providers to ensure the security and resilience of their networks and services.

On digital skills, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, noted, as well as access to digital infrastructure and accessibility, digital skills are fundamental to addressing barriers associated with digital exclusion. In 2022, DCMS launched the Digital Skills Council, bringing together government and industry to drive industry-led action to grow the digital workforce. In partnership with FutureDotNow, the council co-funded a road map last year for collective action to build basic digital capability in working-age adults. Building on the £30 million investment made available in 2021 for the Connect the Classroom pilot programme, the Department for Education is investing up to a further £200 million to upgrade schools that fall below our wifi connectivity standards in priority areas.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, raised concerns about digital skills in the public sector, particularly in schools and hospitals. New teachers continue to benefit from mandatory training and the Keeping Children Safe in Education statutory safeguarding guidance, while employers in the health system continue to be responsible for ensuring that their staff are trained to the required standards.

Helping children and young people to fulfil their potential is a government priority, through an ambitious multiyear programme for education recovery, with almost £5 billion available. As the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, highlighted, access to devices is important. DfE delivered more than 1.95 million laptops and tablets to schools, trusts, local authorities and further education providers for disadvantaged children and young people as part of a £520 million government investment to support access to remote education and online social care services. To support levelling up education standards, DfE is targeting specific support in 55 education investment areas.

My noble friend Lady Fraser raised concerns about families who have children with special needs and disabilities. The Department for Education provides £27.3 million a year to deliver grants and support to low-income families raising disabled or seriously ill children and young people. These grants are for items and services not provided by the statutory system to improve quality of life and ease additional daily pressures; for example, paying for devices to help home learning.

On health, the Government agree with my noble friend Lady Fraser that a blended model with a mixture of face-to-face and digital services is needed to ensure that individuals receive the best treatment for them and their circumstances. The Department of Health is striving for digital services to improve access, outcomes and experience for the widest range of people, based on their preferences. Patients unable to use digital channels can continue to access services via telephone and through traditional face-to-face services. In June 2022, A Plan for Digital Health and Social Care was published. This set out a vision and plan for digitally transformed health and social care services, including a road map for providing additional functionality for patients and the public through our national digital channels.

My noble friend Lord Holmes highlighted the need to embrace new technologies. Work has continued to embed the digital technology assessment criteria within NHS organisations. In October 2022, the first NHS digital health technology audit was launched across secondary care to ensure that digital technologies continue to be incorporated safely and effectively.

The Government recognise that, for some people, interacting with the Department for Work and Pensions using digital technology brings challenges. From April 2021, jobcentres in England, Scotland and Wales returned to their pre-lockdown opening hours and restarted face-to-face appointments. The Chancellor announced a comprehensive package of measures at the Spring Budget targeted at increasing workforce participation and reducing economic inactivity. This includes investment to support disabled people and those with long-term health conditions, parents, over-50s, unemployed people and those on universal credit. The DWP Budget measures represent an investment of £3.5 billion over five years to boost workforce participation.

My noble friend Lady Fraser also highlighted the importance of the Government supporting flexible working. The Government remain committed to helping all individuals and businesses work flexibly. That is why we have supported the new employment relations Act, which updates and amends the existing right to request flexible working so that it better supports employers and employees to make arrangements that work for both sides. The Government have worked with the Flexible Working Taskforce to produce guidance on hybrid working. The guidance supports businesses in establishing this as best practice.

Finally, the Government are committed to building a more connected society, where everyone is able to build meaningful relationships. As my noble friend Lord Holmes has highlighted, we recognise that digital acceleration can be a barrier to as well as an enabler for social connection and we are taking action across government to support people who feel lonely. Since publishing our world-first tackling loneliness strategy in 2018, DCMS has supported thousands of people through targeted funding into community projects up and down the country. To help build communal spaces for business, education and community purposes, the Government have invested £2.35 million through the town deals fund and £830 million through the future high streets fund. These funds are transforming local communities across England.

In closing, I once again convey my thanks to the noble Baroness for securing today’s vital debate and indeed to the whole committee for its report. I am grateful, too, for the many thoughtful contributions that we have heard during the debate. The Government are unwavering in their commitment to bridge the digital divides that were laid bare by the Covid pandemic, exposing a marked and unacceptable gap between the digital haves and have-nots.

As I have referenced in my remarks today, since the Covid committee’s 2021 report, we have made real strides in closing that gap, whether that is in digital infrastructure, with over three-quarters of the country now accessing gigabit-capable broadband, or in digital skills and training, with roughly 42 million adults in the UK today having the essential digital skills that they need for day-to-day life. In our schools and colleges, we have delivered more than 1.95 million laptops and tablets to help some of the most disadvantaged children and young people. In our NHS, 47 million people can now book and manage their out-patient appointments.

At the same time, we are not complacent about the scale of the challenges that remain. That is why we are pressing ahead with the Online Safety Bill and are fulfilling our commitment to spend at least £20 billion per annum on R&D by 2024-25. Our upcoming AI Safety Summit will provide a unique opportunity for the UK to work with countries around the globe to ensure that this transformative technology works for humanity and not against it.

These are just some of DSIT’s priorities over the coming weeks and months, and I can assure the noble Baroness and noble Lords across the Committee that we really are keen to work hand in hand with them to make this a success. Together, we will continue to build the stronger, safer and fairer post-Covid world that we all want to see.

Advanced Artificial Intelligence

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Monday 24th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

I join all noble Lords in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, for tabling such an important debate on how we establish the right guardrails for AI—surely, as many noble Lords have said, one of the most pressing issues of our time. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this so persuasively and impactfully; it has been a debate of the highest quality and I am delighted to take part in it. A great many important points have been raised. I will do my best to address them all and to associate noble Lords with the points they have raised. If I inadvertently neglect to do either, that is by no means on purpose and I hope noble Lords will write to me. I am very keen to continue the conversation wherever possible.

As many have observed, AI is here right now, underpinning ever more digital services, such as public transport apps, and innovations on the horizon, from medical breakthroughs to driverless cars. There are huge opportunities to drive productivity and prosperity across the economy, with some analysts predicting a tripling of growth for economies that make the most of this transformational technology.

However, with rapid advances in AI technologies come accelerated and altogether new risks, from the amplification of unfair biases in data to new risks that may emerge in the made-up answers that AI chatbots produce when there are gaps in training data. Potential risks may be difficult to quantify and measure, as mentioned by many today, such as the possibility of super-intelligence putting humanity in danger. Clearly, these risks need to be carefully considered and, where appropriate, addressed by the Government.

As stated in the AI regulation White Paper, unless our regulatory approach addresses the significant risks caused or amplified by AI, the public will not trust the technology and we will fail to maximise the opportunities it presents. To drive trust in AI, it is critical to establish the right guardrails. The principles at the heart of our regulatory framework articulate what responsible, safe and reliable AI innovation should look like.

This work is supported by the Government’s commitment to tools for trustworthy AI, including technical standards and assurance techniques. These important tools will ensure that safety, trust and security are at the heart of AI products and services, while boosting international interoperability on AI governance, as referenced by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Initiatives such as the AI Standards Hub and a portfolio of AI assurance techniques support this work.

The principles will be complemented by our work to strengthen the evidence base on trustworthy AI, as noted by the noble Lords, Lord Ravensdale and Lord St John. Building safe and reliable AI systems is a difficult technical challenge, on which much excellent research is being conducted. To answer the point on compute from the noble Lords, Lord Ravensdale and Lord Watson, the Government have earmarked £900 million for exascale compute and AI research resource as of March this year. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, that data access is critical for the UK’s scientific leadership and competitiveness. The National Data Strategy set out a pro-growth approach with data availability and confidence in responsible use at its heart.

I say to my noble friend Lord Holmes that, while synthetic data can be a tool to address some issues of bias, there are additional dangers in training models on data that is computer-generated rather than drawn from the real world. To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, this Government have invested significant amounts in AI since 2014—for the better part of 10 years; some £2.5 billion, in addition to the £900 million earmarked for exascale compute that I have mentioned, in specific R&D projects on trustworthy AI, including a further £31 million UKRI research grant into responsible and trustworthy AI this year.

The Foundation Model Taskforce will provide further critical insights into this question. We have announced £100 million of initial funding for the Foundation Model Taskforce and Ian Hogarth, as its chair—to address the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Browne—will report directly to the Prime Minister and the Technology Secretary. Linked to this, I thank my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston for raising the Communications and Digital Committee’s inquiry into large language models, which she will chair. This is an important issue, and my department will respond to the inquiry.

As the Prime Minister has made clear, we are taking action to establish the right guardrails for AI. The AI regulation White Paper, published this March, set out our proportionate, outcomes-focused and adaptable regulatory framework—important characteristics noted by many noble Lords. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, noted, our approach is designed to adapt as this fast-moving technology develops and respond quickly as risks emerge or escalate. We will ensure that there are protections for the public without holding businesses back from using AI technology to deliver stronger economic growth, better jobs and bold new discoveries that radically improve people’s lives.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford and my noble friend Lord Holmes raised points about ethics and accountability. Our approach is underpinned by a set of values-based principles, aligned with the OECD and reflecting the ethical use of AI through concepts such as fairness, transparency and accountability. To reassure the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, we are accelerating our work to establish the central functions proposed in the White Paper, including horizon-scanning and risk assessment. These central functions will allow the Government to identify, monitor and respond to AI risks in a rigorous way—including existential risks, as raised by my noble friend Lord Fairfax, and biosecurity risks, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

We recognise the importance of regulator upskilling and co-ordination, as noted by several noble Lords. Our central functions will support existing regulators to apply the principles, using their sectoral expertise, and our regulatory sandbox will help build best practice.

I thank noble Lords for their emphasis on stakeholder inclusion. We made it clear in the White Paper that we are taking a collaborative approach and are already putting this into practice. For example, to answer the inquiry of the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, I am pleased that the White Paper sets out plans to create an education and awareness function to make sure that a wide range of groups are empowered and encouraged to engage with the regulatory framework.

In addition to meetings with the major AI developers—the multinational conglomerates noted by the noble Lord, Lord Rees—the Prime Minister, the Technology Secretary and I have met British-based AI start-ups and scale-ups. We heard from more than 300 people at round tables and workshops organised as part of our recent consultation on the White Paper, including civil society organisations and trade unions that I was fortunate enough to speak with personally. More than 400 stakeholders have sent us written evidence. To reassure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, we also continue to collaborate with our colleagues across government, including the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, which leads the Government’s work to enable trustworthy innovation, using data and AI to earn public trust.

It is important to note that the proposals put forward in the White Paper work in tandem with legislation currently going through Parliament, such as the Online Safety Bill and the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. We were clear that the AI regulation White Paper is a first step in addressing the risks and opportunities presented by AI. We will review and adapt our approach in response to the fast pace of this technology. We are unafraid to take further steps if needed to ensure safe and responsible AI innovation.

As we have heard in this debate, the issue of copyright protection and how it applies to training materials and outputs from generative AI is an important issue to get right. To the several noble Lords who asked for the Government’s view on copying works in order to extract data in relation to copyright law, I can confirm this Government’s position that, under existing law, copying works in order to extract data from them will infringe copyright, unless copying is permitted under a licence or exception. The legal question of exactly what is permitted under existing copyright exceptions is the subject of ongoing litigation on whose details I will not comment.

To respond to my noble friend Lady Stowell and the noble Lords, Lord Watson and Lord Clement-Jones, we believe that the involvement of both the AI and creative sectors in the discussions the IPO is currently facilitating will help with the creation of a balanced and pragmatic code of practice that will enable both sectors to grow in partnership.

The noble Earl, Lord Devon, raised the question of AI inventions. The Government have committed to keep this area under review. As noble Lords may be aware, this issue is currently being considered in the DABUS case, and we are closely monitoring that litigation.

The noble Lord, Lord Rees, and the noble Baroness, Lady Primarolo, raised the important issue of the impact of AI on the labour market. I note that AI has the potential to be a net creator of jobs. The World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs Report 2023 found that, while 25% of organisations expect AI to lead to job losses, 50% expect it to create job growth. However, even with such job growth, we can anticipate disruption—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and others.

Many of you asked whether our postgraduate AI conversion courses and scholarship will expand the AI workforce. We are working with partners to develop research to help employees understand what skills they need to use AI effectively. The Department for Work and Pensions’ job-matching pilot is assessing how new technologies like AI might support jobseekers.

To address the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Primarolo, on workplace surveillance, the Government recognise that the deployment of technologies in a workplace context involves consideration of a wide range of regulatory frameworks—not just data protection law but also human rights law, legal frameworks relating to health and safety and, most importantly, employment law. We outline a commitment to contestability and redress in our White Paper principles: where AI might challenge someone’s rights in the workplace, the UK has a strong system of legislation and enforcement of these protections.

In response to the concerns about AI’s impact on journalism, raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, I met with the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport last week. She has held a number of meetings with the sector and plans to convene round tables with media stakeholders on this issue.

To address the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, companies subject to the Online Safety Bill’s safety duties must take action against illegal content online, including illegal misinformation and disinformation produced by AI. I also note that the Online Safety Bill will regulate generative AI content on services that allow user interaction, including using AI chatbots to radicalise others, especially young people. The strongest protections in the Bill are for children: platforms will have to take comprehensive measures to protect them from harm.

The Government are, of course, very aware of concerns around the adoption of AI in the military, as raised by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton. We are determined to adopt AI safely and responsibly, because no other approach would be in line with the values of the British public. It is clear that the UK and our allies must adopt AI with pace and purpose to maintain the UK’s competitive advantage, as set out in the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy.

On the work the UK is doing with our international partners, the UK’s global leadership on AI has a long precedent. To reassure the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, the UK is already consistently ranked in the top three countries for AI across a number of metrics. I also reassure the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, that the UK already plays an important role in international fora, including the G7’s Hiroshima AI Process, the Council of Europe, the OECD, UNESCO and the G20, as well as through being a founding member of the Global Partnership on AI. Our leadership is recognised internationally, with President Biden commending the Prime Minister’s ambition to make the UK the home of AI safety. Demonstrating our leadership, on 18 July the Foreign Secretary chaired the first ever UN Security Council briefing on AI, calling on the world to come together to address the global opportunities and challenges of AI, particularly in relation to peace and security.

To reassure my noble friend Lord Udny-Lister and the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, on the importance of assessing AI opportunities and risks with our international partners, it is clear to this Government that the governance of AI is a subject of global importance. As such, it requires global co-operation. That is why the UK will host the first major global summit on AI safety this year. Some noble Lords have questioned the UK’s convening power internationally. The summit will bring together key countries, as well as leading tech companies and researchers, to drive targeted, rapid international action to guarantee safety and security at the frontier of this technology.

To bring this to a close, AI has rapidly advanced in under a decade and we anticipate further rapid leaps. These advances bring great opportunities, from improving diagnostics in healthcare to tackling climate change. However, they also bring serious challenges, such as the threat of fraud and disinformation created by deepfakes. We note the stark warnings from AI pioneers —however uncertain they may be—about artificial general intelligence and AI biosecurity risks.

The UK already has a reputation as a global leader on AI as a result of our thriving AI ecosystem, our world-class institutions and AI research base and our respected rule of law. Through our work to establish the rules that govern AI and create the mechanisms that enable the adaptation of those rules, the Foundation Model Taskforce and the forthcoming summit on AI safety, we will lead the debate on safe and responsible AI innovation. We will unlock the extraordinary benefits of this landmark technology while protecting our society and keeping the public safe. I thank all noble Lords for today’s really important debate—the insights will help guide our next steps on this critical agenda.