Criminal Justice Bill (Eighth sitting)

Alberto Costa Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship, Ms Bardell. I am pleased to be able to speak to the provision contained in clause 22, which has had widespread support from Members across the House. In the past year or two, several high-profile murderers—Thomas Cashman, Jordan McSweeney, and most recently Lucy Letby—have refused to attend their sentencing hearings, causing the victims’ families significant further distress. This can be seen as the final insult, and it is also the coward’s approach, affronting the victims one last time by robbing their families of a chance to look them in the eye as the judge determines their fate. The worst offenders should be required to face the consequence of their actions, and hear society’s condemnation expressed through the sentencing remarks of the judge. Indeed, it is with those words ringing in their ears that they should hear the prison door clang shut.

Clause 22 inserts new sections 41A and 41B into a new chapter 2A within part 3 of the sentencing code. New section 41A creates an express statutory power for a Crown court judge to directly order the most serious offenders to attend their sentencing hearing. It applies to adults and children who are convicted of a sentence for which the maximum potential penalty is life. Any offender falling in that category who refuses to attend without a reasonable excuse commits a contempt of court. In the case of an adult offender they could face a maximum penalty of an additional two years in prison; in the case of a child offender who refuses to attend, the maximum penalty is a £2,500 fine.

New section 41B is intended to enshrine current common law practice in statute, making it absolutely clear that the Crown court has a power in law to direct a prison to produce any adult offender, not just those looking at a potential life sentence, to court for their sentencing hearing. It makes clear that prison officers and prisoner escort officers may use reasonable force to produce an adult offender to court for their sentencing hearing where it is necessary and proportionate. The final decision on reasonable force remains with the prison governor and the escorting staff working under his or her authority. Children will not be subject to reasonable force for that purpose, in line with existing policy. It will remain a matter for judges to decide whether to order an individual to attend court or to require a prison to produce them.

[Alberto Costa (South Leicestershire) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend and the Government for bringing forward this clause, which I wholeheartedly support. It is a way of ensuring that there is an element of responsibility that the public can see in what is, after all, an open court forum.

On the use of reasonable force—if the Minister does not have an answer today, perhaps she can write to me—is there a way of ensuring that there is a mitigation against the possibility of the offenders raising civil proceedings against the state for alleged excessive force? Has any thought been given to that? If not, perhaps the Department could write to the Committee to explain how that would be dealt with. We would not want a situation where the public then say, “How is this individual able to make a claim against the state on the grounds that he or she had to attend court?”

[Laura Farris]

I thank my hon. Friend for his sensible question; I will write to him. One of the points I have clarified is that prison officers understand the use of reasonable force, because they have to use it at other times, and it is well understood by the police. “Reasonable force” has a meaning in context—it is not just a judgment call to be made on the day. However, that is a good point, and it deserves a response.

Returning to my remarks, in exercising their discretion a judge may decide not to order an individual to attend if they may cause significant disruption in court or further distress to victims, or if there is a significant mental health complaint that may prevent their attendance. Courts will also be required to consult with young offending teams before any decision is made on a child offender. I recognise that the provisions may not guarantee that every offender will end up attending their sentencing hearing.

Criminal Justice Bill (Ninth sitting)

Alberto Costa Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Laura Farris]

It is in the Bill that the Bill itself is compliant with the European convention on human rights.

[Alberto Costa (South Leicestershire) (Con)]

This may well be helpful to the Minister: the ECHR may in fact apply extraterritorially to British subjects or British prisoners who are placed in prisons outwith the member states that are part of the Council of Europe. She might want to check whether it applies in extraterritorial circumstances. [Interruption.]

[The Chair]

Order. I know that Members feel passionately about this issue, and they are, of course, welcome to make further contributions. If they want to, can they please indicate that once the Minister has finished?

Criminal Justice Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Alberto Costa Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind Members that any speaking notes need to be sent by email to [email protected]. Please make sure that your devices are on silent. As you know, tea and coffee are not allowed during the sitting.

[Alberto Costa (South Leicestershire) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mrs Latham. I am wearing my spectacles today; I usually wear contact lenses. I have noticed that in this Committee room the LED lighting—I presume that is what it is—is perhaps set to cool white rather than warm white, and that has an impact on the sight of people like me.

Are you able to guide me on who I should speak to about this Committee room to ensure that the lighting is more appropriate for all Members, particularly people like me who find it very difficult to see in this cool light? Perhaps we could conduct a survey to see what type of optics LED lights work best with. Is Mr Speaker, somebody in facilities management or somebody else on the estate able to advise me on the best quality LED lights, whether warm or cool, for people with sight like mine?

[The Chair]

It is funny you should say that; I cannot see the Annunciator very well because of the lighting. You could go to the head of facilities or speak to Sir Charles Walker, who heads the Administration Committee where he will be able to bring the matter up. It meets every Monday.

[Alberto Costa]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Latham. I was desperately trying to hear you and I could not, which is another issue that we ought to take into consideration. I know that colleagues have from time to time raised the issue that the acoustics in these wonderful neo-gothic Committee rooms are not necessarily appropriate for the mid-21st century.

Again I ask, Mrs Latham: do you know what the appropriate body is when it comes to acoustic issues? We must ensure that all of us can hear, whether we have hearing aids or not—in my case, I do not have a hearing aid; I like to think that my hearing is okay. Nevertheless, I did have difficulty in hearing the response that you gave to my previous point of order. I would be grateful if you could repeat that response, in addition to giving me another one about the person to whom I should direct complaints when it comes to acoustics in these types of Committee rooms.

[The Chair]

I said that you could either go to Sir Charles Walker or the head of admin services. My response is the same for the hearing issue. I said that I cannot really see the Annunciator because of the angle of the lights, so that is a problem. I do not have problems here, but I have great difficulty hearing in Portcullis House rooms; I find they are very poor. It is worth reporting the matter to Sir Charles Walker because he can raise it in the Administration Committee. Several of us in this room are on that Committee. We have heard what you said and we can back it up.

New Clause 45

Administering etc harmful substances (including by spiking)

(1) In the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, for sections 23 to 25 substitute—

“23 Administering etc harmful substance so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm

(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person intentionally or recklessly, and unlawfully, administers a harmful substance to another person, and

(b) the administration of the harmful substance endangers the other person’s life or inflicts grievous bodily harm on them.

(2) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person unlawfully causes a harmful substance to be administered to or taken by another person,

(b) the administration or taking of the harmful substance endangers the other person’s life or inflicts grievous bodily harm on them, and

(c) the person intends that, or is reckless as to whether—

(i) the harmful substance is administered to or taken by the other person, and

(ii) the administration or taking of the harmful substance will endanger the other person’s life or inflict grievous bodily harm on them.

(3) In this section “harmful substance” means any poison or other destructive or noxious thing.

(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine (or both).

24 Administering etc harmful substance with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy

(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person unlawfully administers a harmful substance to, or causes a harmful substance to be administered to or taken by, another person, and

(b) the person does so with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy the other person.

(2) In this section “harmful substance” has the meaning given by section 23.

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).

25 Alternative verdict on trial of offence under section 23

A person who is—

(a) charged with an offence under section 23, and

(b) found not guilty of that offence,

may be convicted of an offence under section 24 (if it is proved that they committed it).”

(2) In consequence of the amendment made by subsection (1), in the following provisions for “maliciously administering poison etc” substitute “administering etc harmful substance”—

(a) paragraph 8(e) and (f) of Schedule 1 to the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978;

(b) paragraph 5(g) and (h) of Schedule 2A to the Housing Act 1985;

(c) paragraph 10 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;

(d) paragraph 11 of Schedule 5 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003;

(e) in Schedule 2 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, paragraph (b) of the entry relating to offences under the Offences against the Person Act 1861;

(f) paragraph 7 of Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015;

(g) paragraph 4(c) of Schedule 1 to the Sentencing Act 2020;

(h) paragraph 23(f) of Part 2 of Schedule 9 to the Elections Act 2022;

and in section 72(2)(d) of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 for “poison” substitute “harmful substance”.”.—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause re-casts the offences under sections 23 and 24 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (administration etc of harmful substances) and the procedural provision under section 25 of that Act relating to those offences

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 46

Sexual activity in presence of child etc

(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 11(1) (engaging in sexual activity in presence of child), in paragraph (c) for the words from “he engages” to the end (not including the “and” at the end of the paragraph) substitute “A engages in it when another person (B) is present or is in a place from which A can be observed,”.

(3) In section 18(1) (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child), in paragraph (c) for the words from “he engages” to the end substitute “A engages in it when another person (B) is present or is in a place from which A can be observed,”.

(4) In section 32(1) (engaging in sexual activity in presence of person with mental disorder impeding choice), in paragraph (c) for the words from “he engages” to the end substitute “A engages in it when another person (B) is present or is in a place from which A can be observed,”.

(5) In section 36(1) (engaging in sexual activity in presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of person with mental disorder)—

(a) in paragraph (c) for the words from “he engages” to the end substitute “A engages in it when another person (B) is present or is in a place from which A can be observed,”;

(b) in paragraph (d) for “paragraph (c)(i)” substitute “paragraph (c)”.

(6) In section 40(1) (care workers: sexual activity in presence of person with mental disorder), in paragraph (c) for the words from “he engages” to the end substitute “A engages in it when another person (B) is present or is in a place from which A can be observed,”.”—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause amends offences of engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child or person with mental disorder (B) so as to remove the requirement that the person knows or believes that B is aware, or intends that B should be aware, that the person is engaging in it.

Brought up, and read the First time.