Prosecutions and Sentencing
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(4 years, 7 months ago)
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Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. Does he agree that it is time to invest more in the justice system as a whole? Might he also agree that when Governments seek to encourage respect for the law in the country, they should begin by respecting the law themselves?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, this Government do respect the law. In addition, this Government understand the law and the distinctions that lie between matters of politics and matters of law. In some areas that is not properly understood. Of course, there is always room for further investment in the justice system, but the Government face an issue of priorities. The question of further investment must be balanced by other demands on government.
Criminal Justice System: Women
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(4 years, 9 months ago)
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Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, not just for all his work and his two incredibly impressive reports but for bringing this important debate to your Lordships’ House. I also thank all noble Lords who stayed; I hope they found their reward in the temperate climate in the Chamber, both literal and metaphorical, compared to the climate elsewhere.
In recent months, we have discussed many times the crisis in our criminal justice system and our prisons. It is a crisis of attitude, history and, fundamentally, funding. Women are its greatest victims, whether they are victims in the sense that people normally understand—victims of crime—or whether they are prisoners who are victims, as so many noble Lords suggested so eloquently in this debate. Human beings do not come in hermetically sealed categories of good and bad or perpetrator and victim. Many women who find themselves in prison, if not the majority, are victims of all kinds of abuse as well.
As I listened carefully to some wonderful speeches today, I was consistently reminded of the principle of non-discrimination which, for the most part, finds its place in our law as a result of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I was particularly reminded of a now famous case from 2000 against the state of Greece, called Thlimmenos v Greece, if anyone is interested or particularly wonkish about these things. It explains that discrimination does not always mean treating like cases differently; sometimes, it is equally discriminatory not to treat people who have different circumstances and lives differently. It is discriminatory not to recognise the different journey, circumstances, incapacities or problems of a category of people. Too many people, including sometimes very clever people in our public life, think that if there is no sign up saying, “You’re not welcome”, or if you got the vote, then it is all done. It is not. Discrimination in our world, even in 21st-century Britain, is much deeper, subtler and more endemic than that.
I felt that this understanding was very much present in so many of your Lordships’ speeches, including those from my noble friends Lord Parekh and Lady Uddin, the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Rochester, the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and, predictably, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, brought his unrivalled experience in these matters, and the remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, and the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, addressed the additional intersectional problems of BAME women.
We have to understand that the system is already in crisis for everyone, but the problem is multiplied and exacerbated for women and they require particular attention and help. As so many people have described so forensically, women in prison are more likely to have experienced abuse as children, or domestic abuse, even to the point of coercion leading to the offence that leads to incarceration. They are more likely to be homeless before custody and to suffer from substance abuse or mental health issues. Tragically, of course, so many leave custody to go straight on to the street once more. There were so many helpful recommendations from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, but the point about addressing homelessness immediately on release seems such phenomenal good sense. It is an acute issue, and surely the Minister and his colleagues will look at it with some urgency.
Crucially, as came out in so many of noble Lords’ speeches, a woman in prison is more likely to have committed a non-violent offence driven by poverty and for material gain, and to be serving probably a pointless short sentence. Your Lordships also pointed out the disastrous effect of incarceration on these women and their children—because so many of them have children. It leads to intergenerational problems including criminality, but also to problems in wider society, because these women are not rehabilitated under these short sentences in particular, so the effects are even worse.
What is to be done? Your Lordships have been very gracious in the way they have conducted the debate, but your Lordships’ House has been addressing these matters with that degree of care and temperance for many years. I look around this Chamber at so many experts who have been so gracious about making these observations again and again to Governments of both persuasions, it has to be said, but those arguments fall on deaf ears.
Of course we need more resources, not just in the system but before it, because the criminal justice system has been treated as a dustbin for humanity. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, who coined the idea of needing more social workers, not just more prison officers. Why leave everything until it is almost too late when it comes to intervening in the most vulnerable people’s chaotic lives?
We need a probation service and probation disposals that truly inspire the confidence of the electorate and wider society, so that it is possible to make these disposals and not have to resort to ridiculous short-term sentences that clearly are not working. I thought that there was much in the suggestion that there should be mandatory pre-sentence reports before any woman is sent to prison, but perhaps we ought to go further. I took on board my noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s point that there has to be an ultimate sanction for non-compliance with probation and so on. However, it is high time for consultation and a Green Paper on a legislative presumption against these short sentences. That is what my honourable friend the shadow Justice Secretary has indeed promised.
We need to change the culture of prison itself. Again, that takes funding, as was pointed out by my noble friend Lord Parekh. Prisons are very masculine environments. They have been modelled on very traditional lines. That applies even to women’s prisons. We need to look at the different suggestions for keeping women’s family ties, even if they have to be in prison for more serious sentences. I was attracted to the suggestion of a women’s justice board to take these issues forward. In the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said, I will certainly take that back to my colleagues.
There should be more women judges all the way through the system, including up at the top in the senior judiciary. I personally think that if that is not happening quickly enough, it is time to look at affirmative action in the judiciary. It is a question of not just expertise and life experience but legitimacy in the wider population, at a time when the judiciary is often under attack, as is the rule of law itself.
This is the last day of the last term. I wish all noble Lords well for a peaceful and well-earned break, though one which I suspect will not be without certain anxieties. We approach this recess with a new Foreign Secretary who has repeatedly suggested that feminism is bigotry. We have a new Home Secretary who has spoken in support of the death penalty. However, I believe in rehabilitation. That rehabilitation requires hard work and good counsel. I hope that the Minister, with all our support, is able to provide more of that in the autumn.
Crown Prosecution Service: Rape and Sexual Offences
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(4 years, 9 months ago)
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Baroness Chakrabarti
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of delays in processing rape cases by the Crown Prosecution Service; and what steps they are taking to review the Crown Prosecution Service’s Rape and Sexual Offences guidance.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am so grateful to your Lordships’ House for considering my Question on a burning hot day when so much attention is understandably elsewhere—I am grateful for the chill in your Lordships’ Chamber—but if the business of leadership and government is not to protect the most vulnerable among us, I honestly do not know why we are here.
Left or right, north or south, on the planet, let alone in our country, there is no democracy without the rule of law, and one of the indicators of that fundamental bedrock breaking down is when in any society, the most serious crimes, such as rape, may be perpetrated with increasing impunity. More than 98% of reported rapes will never even result in a criminal charge. Recent government figures show all prosecutions at their lowest levels since 1970, and prosecutions for sex offences have fallen by one-third between 2017 and 2018. Our underfunded criminal justice system is in a crisis of resources and morale, and never is this more alarmingly evidenced than by its handling of sexual violence. It has emerged that one-third of police files are being sent back for more information. A blame game seems to have developed between prosecutors and their colleagues in uniform. There is nothing like finger-pointing to demonstrate overworked people close to their wits’ end. Recent information disclosed by the Attorney-General’s Office shows a shocking increase of more than 140% in the time taken to charge suspects in rape cases. In an Answer to a Written Parliamentary Question from Her Majesty’s Opposition, the Government revealed that the average number of days from complaint until charge has risen from 32 in 2010-11 to 78 in 2017-18.
There are other serious problems with the way rape cases are handled. In my opinion the so-called “digital strip searching” of survivors’ mobile phones is probably unlawful. Consent for such an intrusion into private life in exchange for access to justice, in the absence of primary legislation, cannot surely be in accordance with the law or comply with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the human rights convention or the right to a fair trial under Article 6.
The prospective Prime Minister has in the past spoken in favour of the human rights convention. In 2016, he is reported to have said, “Keep the European Convention, it’s a fine thing ... We wrote it”. If we wrote it, Mr Johnson, let us keep it and abide by it in thought, word and deed. I am sure that—despite all the temptations—your Lordships’ House looks forward to the reaffirmation of that position today.
I pay tribute to the distinguished outgoing Victims’ Commissioner, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and I welcome the new one. I also commend the broad coalition of campaign groups for bringing the issue of the controversial digital processing notices, introduced for police in England and Wales earlier this year, to the fore today. Women—the overwhelming majority of rape victims—are already discriminated against in the system. A trawl through their intimate data only reinforces the idea and the feeling that they are the ones in the dock. That is the practical effect of the purported “consent form”.
When Ms Sirin Kale at VICE magazine contacted me a little while ago to tell me that rape victims with cases going through the courts are told not to tell therapists about their assaults, I could barely believe that this was true. The suggestion that victims should avoid vital therapy for fear of prejudicing trials is as cruel as it is clumsy. The poorly drafted CPS guidance appears to be at least 17 years old. Have there really been no developments in professional thinking about trauma, treatment and memory since then, or could it be that a system without funding for treatment is desperate enough to rely on the flimsiest excuse for not providing it?
To suggest that a rape victim be denied counselling or therapy for perhaps months and months while awaiting trial is as ridiculous as denying the victim of any other form of violence vital medical treatment for their physical wounds. In some cases, it might be even worse. I quote a survivor who cannot be named for legal reasons: “You are allowed limited pre-trial counselling but you aren’t allowed to discuss anything that is in your police notes, which is obviously what happened to you. The defence can request your notes, then some parts of what you said can be used against you or the therapist can be seen to be guiding you over what happened or what to say if it does go to court. I think therapy would have massively helped me—so many people credit counselling and therapy as being life-changing and it’s really frustrating for me that I felt like I desperately needed it and I haven’t been able to have that”. I commend VICE magazine for its investigation into the treatment of rape complainants in our country. Non-partisan ethical journalism still lives.
The End Violence Against Women Coalition has begun legal action against the authorities, claiming that the CPS has covertly changed its practice in relation to decision-making on rape cases and that this has contributed to a dramatic fall in the number being charged. The coalition has warned that cases with “extra vulnerabilities” such as child sexual exploitation and those where a woman might make allegations against a former partner are most likely to be dropped, due to the difficulties therein.
Because of the obliteration of civil legal aid since the coalition Government’s disastrous LASPO reforms, victims’ groups are having to crowdfund on the internet to seek legal redress—this in a legal system that was once the envy of the world. It is still a great legal system in that international oligarchs will come here for Rolls-Royce arbitration and justice against each other, but it is more like a soup kitchen for the most vulnerable.
I welcome that the Government under the outgoing Prime Minister agreed to review the treatment of rape complainants, but victims will need assurance that this will be meaningful. Surely a Government of any stripe should consult and value the expertise of judges, lawyers, mental health professionals, women’s organisations and survivor groups who have been fighting these burning injustices for some time. This system failure is a shameful breach of survivors’ human rights. Victims should never be required to make the false choice between justice and survival.
Therefore, I hope that we can all urge the incoming Prime Minister to make the rule of law and the rights of the most vulnerable among us an absolute priority if we are to hold the bare bones of our democratic society together in the difficult months ahead.
Lord Keen of Elie
As far as I am concerned, neither the DPP nor the CPS would endorse the implied threat that, if there was a reason for not signing a consent form for the disclosure of digital material, they would simply refuse to contemplate a charge on a case such as this, or indeed in any other case. I believe that the problem stems from the use of language, and that such terms as “digital strip search” merely seek to underline how it is possible for parties to misunderstand the scope of the inquiry that is being carried out here. What has to be emphasised is the need to secure justice for the complainant and for the accused.
Baroness Chakrabarti
On that point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, could the Minister tell the House what the legal foundation for this form is? Does it have foundation in any statute? I think we can all agree that it at least to some extent creates an interference with privacy rights; if it does so, where is the foundation that makes it in accordance with law? If it is consent, and therefore not based on any statutory foundation, is that consent real if complainants fear that their case will not be taken forward?
Lord Keen of Elie
In so far as I follow what the noble Baroness is saying, it requires first of all a balance between rights that arise under the European Convention on Human Rights—the right under Article 6 to a fair trial and the right under Article 8 to privacy—and the need to ensure that any intrusion into these matters is in the public interest and can be properly justified. As to the specific foundation for the consent form, in carrying through a prosecution it is necessary for reasonable and appropriate inquiries to be carried out in the public interest. A consent form is therefore produced for the complainant to consider signing. The situation is this: the complainant may refuse to sign that consent form, but in those circumstances that might well intrude upon the ability of the police properly to investigate a particular complaint.
Probation Reform
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(4 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am incredibly grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement. This is a welcome U-turn on a disastrous probation policy—but what a mess, what an absolute mess. I feel the need to probe the underlying thinking a little further to ensure that lessons are truly being learned in the Government. Those of us on these Benches have real constitutional concerns, and concerns about accountability for public safety in relation to privatising the criminal justice system.
Today’s U-turn, a necessary first step to cleaning up the probation mess, comes only after hundreds of millions of pounds have been squandered propping up failing private companies, and public safety has been put directly at risk as a result. So I must probe the Minister on the thinking for the future and the proportion of these funds that are to be preferred towards private companies as opposed to voluntary bodies and social enterprises. This is crucial to understanding whether failing outsourcing giants, such as G4S and Sodexo, are going to be offered a way back into the probation system.
Lord Dholakia (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. All of us think that it has been a long time coming and it is right that we should broadly welcome the thrust of the Government’s intention to reorganise this service.
I take our share of the blame as part of the coalition Government, during which we supported some of the reforms of the National Probation Service in 2014. Some of the principles of these reforms were very sound when they were introduced. It was right that supervision was available for at least the first year when inmates leave prison. It was important to provide through-the-gate services, so that people can have a place to live as well as continuity of training and treatment between prison and the community. To do all this, it was vital that voluntary organisations working in the criminal justice field were fully involved.
Mr Grayling has bungled and underfunded contracts so badly that his reforms failed to achieve these objectives. No wonder it is estimated that these botched reforms have cost the taxpayer more than £500 million, according to the National Audit Office. He is the most unfortunate Minister whose record is dismal, and it is a surprise that he has lasted so long, even at the Department for Transport at this stage.
We need some guarantees to ensure that the probation service is not let down again. Who is examining the existing case load of probation officers? What further resources are available to make them more effective? Is there any way of tying probation resources to the rise in the number of prisoners in our establishments? Is there some way of ensuring that more incarceration of prisoners will effectively mean more work for the probation service? A good many well-trained but disillusioned probation officers have left the service in the last few years. What is being done to bring them back into probation work?
The Minister has just announced a new targeted innovation fund. What share will voluntary organisations have in such funds in order to make the probation service more effective? The new targeted innovation fund ought to make sure that such organisations are not locked out. Of course reforms are necessary, but we should never lose sight of the fact that when the state incarcerates prisoners, it takes full responsibility for each individual. We would do well, in very difficult times, to say to ourselves that if we lose that responsibility we will lose control of our criminal justice system.
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(5 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
My Lords, I think it very appropriate that the Ministry of Justice should decide as a principle as far as possible to preserve the existing rules as they currently apply in the UK immediately after exit day. The purpose is,
“to provide maximum certainty and stability for businesses and individuals”.
However, I am concerned about the impact on business, even though the impact assessment does not throw up anything in particular. I am always very conscious of the strength of Hong Kong, which built its reputation and financial power on the fact that it uses English common law as the basis of its legal system. That means that contracts are readily made and understood, which has been of great economic benefit to Hong Kong. I notice that the impact assessment refers to the,
“strong international reputation as a centre of legal excellence”,
that this country currently enjoys. Anyone connected with the law knows that our legal profession has a great reputation, English law is frequently the preferred law and English courts are used even though a particular dispute has nothing to do with England, so this is a very profitable part of the legal world.
I shall take as an example one matter referred to in paragraph 7.7 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which refers to,
“the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising from infringements of unitary EU intellectual property rights … Trade Marks … Design Rights and … Plant Variety Rights. These unitary EU IP rights will no longer apply in the UK … and UK courts will no longer hear proceedings relating to such rights after exit day”.
It seems to me that there is a whole area of law which may be cut out from the jurisdiction of English courts and the services of English lawyers.
That is compounded by the fact that these regulations remove the ability of UK courts to refer questions of interpretation of the 1980 Rome convention to the Court of Justice of the European Union—to my mind, that is a significant restriction—just as the interpretation of retained EU law generally cannot be decided by that court. We are going from a well understood legal system to something that is much more limited than we have been used to.
On the broad basis, however, the fact that the rights are generally retained is to be welcomed.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, in an attempt once more to be succinct, I can echo the point that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, was making. The concerns from this side are essentially about regulatory diversion. I do not think anybody is going to object to these regulations; the concern is with ongoing regulatory divergence and its potential impact, whether it is on unfair competition cases or IP cases and so on. Perhaps the Minister might consider briefly that risk of regulatory divergence in his reply.
In relation to insurance, the Explanatory Memorandum says:
“The Government engaged with representatives of the insurance industry”,
in relation to “insurance risks”. Can the Minister outline the types of risks identified in that engagement? We are told that banks and insurers are shifting hundreds of billions of pounds in assets out of the UK ahead of exit day to keep their contracts and policies within the EU area. We have learned that Aviva, Britain’s second largest insurer, will transfer around £9 billion in assets to a new Irish company, for example. Does the Minister agree with having that sort of risk to our economy? Does this reflect the concern about different outcomes that could result from insurance contract cases being resolved differently in our courts and those of our EU partners in the future?
As I say, my general proposition is on the risks of regulatory divergence, but one can hardly object to the instrument itself.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Lord and to the noble Baroness for their observations. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, observed, there will no longer be scope for a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union over the construction or interpretation of the convention. Given that the convention has been there since 1980, that may already have happened but we cannot say that it would never have happened again. But I say to the noble Lord—and I address this to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti as well—that, although there is no longer a basis for a reference by a UK court to the Court of Justice, the UK courts may of course have regard to the decisions of the Court of Justice going forward. Quite sensibly, they would have regard to decisions that bore upon the interpretation of the convention, or of Rome I and II as well. That would be of relevance to the incorporation in domestic law of provisions which had their genesis in those European Union provisions.
The immediate matter of insurance is quite narrow and concerns one of the limited derogations from the freedom to choose your own law, as it were. There is a limitation about choice of law where an insurance contract contains provision to cover risks located in the European Union. Essentially, there cannot be an insurance contract that covers risks in an EU member state where the law of Russia is chosen as the relevant law for resolving the contract. The difficulty faced in drafting these regulations was that the reference under the derogation was to a risk in an EU member state. We were going to be concerned not only with a risk in an EU member state but with a risk in the United Kingdom. This is why we have had to move from reference to “member state” to “relevant state”, which is, in turn, defined by reference to member states and the United Kingdom. It is a fairly narrow move, which I do not believe is, of itself, going to impact on the choice or application of law with regard to the type of contract to any material extent. I do not see how it would impact on the transfer of assets such as was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. This is not what this regulation is addressing.
I acknowledge that, if we leave the European Union without a deal—which is not this Government’s preferred option—there will be issues for banks, insurance companies and others with regard to their future arrangements in the European Union. No one would take away from that. That said, this is essentially implementing an existing scheme with just those changes necessary to make sure it operates in domestic law. I do not believe this is going to take away from the attractiveness of English law—or, indeed, Scots law—as a system for the resolution of commercial disputes. English law in particular remains the lingua franca for charter parties, major commercial contracts and so on. Because of the flexibility of common law, it will continue to be used for this reason. I do not see that this is going to result in any major change. No doubt there are options when it comes to choosing a common law system—such as the law of Hong Kong, Singapore or New York, for example. That already exists and we deal with it.
Noting all the observations that have been made, I beg to move.
Motion agreed.
Criminal Justice (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(5 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, in all sorts of matters, particularly perhaps in matters Brexit, it is not as fashionable as we might like either to be succinct or fair to one’s opponents. So as not to exacerbate the Alice in Wonderland world described by noble Lords, I would say that the Minister is in an unenviable situation. Surely we all know that the problems are not with this draft instrument but with any possibility of exiting the European Union without a deal. It would be a disaster in all sorts of areas—trade and other aspects of co-operation—but in the context of criminal justice co-operation, we all ought to acknowledge that the idea of no deal is particularly disastrous and dangerous for people in this country and in the European Union, especially for victims of violent crime and survivors of domestic abuse.
Having said that at the outset, I invite the noble and learned Lord the Minister to agree and to do his best with particular questions about the various areas of policy and co-operation covered here. We acknowledge that it is not about the instrument. We are in an unenviable position. The clock is ticking down and we seem to be no closer to a final scheme for what criminal justice co-operation will be. The problem is that the political declaration is vague on matters of security and justice co-operation. As we have heard from noble Lords, access to Europol and European criminal records is essential, as is access to the extensive database system. Perhaps we can all agree on this. I am sure that, in due course, the Minister will do so as well and he will suggest that this instrument and its provisions are not an ideal alternative to having a proper scheme for co-operation after Brexit.
If the Minister is able to do so, I wonder if he might discuss what the total cost to the UK authorities might be from not having, for example, access to the system of formal communication in relation to compensation for victims of violent crime. The Explanatory Memorandum makes a lot of store about the total number of requests in each relevant case. Can he assist on the total amount of compensation that has resulted in the past three years in relation to this request? Thare might give more of a sense of the importance and severity of the matters we are dealing with.
In relation to European protection orders, paragraph 7.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum states,
“the UK will no longer be able to issue requests to other EU Member States and expect them to be acted upon”.
This is predominantly about domestic violence. Can the Minister confirm that this change could make life less safe for the survivors of domestic abuse after exit day? Could the Minister perhaps articulate how travel restrictions would be placed on the perpetrators of domestic abuse in such a scenario—for example, on a man who is an EU citizen with a woman victim who is a UK citizen—without an EPO? Similarly, on financial penalties, does the Minister have any idea what the potential cost would be to the UK authorities for losing access to the framework?
In all this, I am making the point that it is not really fair to impugn the instrument itself but, as there are people beyond this Room who are still advocating a no-deal Brexit, it is none the less important to try to get the Minister’s thoughts on some of these matters.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions. I begin by observing that my noble friend Lord Deben has misunderstood the purpose of these regulations. They are not concerned with the transfer of data or information or with access to it; they are concerned with what the courts do with it once they have it. I will elaborate on that in a moment.
In light of the observations that have been made, particularly by the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Thomas—this is a bit like a rugby commentary featuring Joneses, but I will not go there—and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I shall take each of the five relevant regulations’ directives in turn, pick up each of the points that have been raised and then come back to the issue of data and how that is being addressed.
The first is the victims of crime compensation directive. Let us be clear: in the event of a no-deal exit—I am not seeking or advocating that; I am dealing with the situation that arises in that eventuality, as the noble Baroness observed—any EU citizen who is the victim of a violent crime in the UK will still be able to proceed to make an application under the UK scheme in respect of a violent criminal act in the UK. Conversely, even though we no longer have the relevant directive in place, where a UK citizen suffers such an act in a member state that has ratified the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, which is the preceding European Council convention, they will also be able to access compensation, and there are 18 EU members that are signatories to that convention. In addition, there are some member states that are not signatories to the convention but whose criminal compensation schemes admit of applications just like the UK’s for any citizen who suffers that violent criminal conduct within their country. There are at least two which fall into that category; I believe that they are Ireland and Latvia. There are in fact a total of 20 existing EU member states where it will be possible to continue applying for compensation under these schemes.
To follow up the point from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, the intention is that the CICA will support victims in accessing compensation from those countries where an application can be made—in other words, it will do essentially what it does at present, which is to assist the victim in directing how and where the application should be made in the circumstances. I readily accept that that is not a complete answer to the existing scheme; it is deficient to the extent that at least seven existing EU member states will not facilitate such an application. That said, it is important to put this into context. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, observed, not every application has been notified to the CICA in the UK. In so far as it is notified, though, we are aware that in the past year, 2017-2018 to the end of February, there were 59 requests for assistance, 29 notified unsuccessful applications and only two notified successful applications. I readily accede that not all those who made an application notified that fact and not all those who made a successful application notified that, so the data is limited. As a consequence we do not know the sums that were awarded in these cases because there is no requirement for notification. It is a limited compass and what will be in its place is not as good as what exists at present. Nobody is pretending otherwise, but it is appropriate that we put the statute book into proper form in order that people are not confused when they come to determine what their rights are in this context.
Turning to the European protection order and the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, it is simply not possible to operate that scheme if we leave without a deal because under the terms of the relevant provision only the court of a member state can make a request and under the scheme it can make a request only to the court of another EU member state. In the event that we receive an application before exit, we will process it because it will have been competently made by the other member state and we will be receiving it at a time when we are a member state, but after exit we cannot make such orders because they will not be accepted as competent by the EU 27 states, and we cannot expect to receive any because they cannot competently make such a request of the United Kingdom once it ceases to be a member state. To put this into context, I should emphasise that this order is very rarely used. Four EPOs have been issued by the English and Welsh courts and the Northern Ireland authorities since this provision was implemented in 2015, and only two of those were recognised by the receiving EU state over a period of four years. In the same period, six EPOs were received by the courts from other member states of which four were recognised and two were declined, so we are talking about tiny numbers in this context.
On the European supervision order, I would, with respect, seek to correct the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. The supervision order is directed to pre-criminal trial matters such as bail. It does not apply to any post-criminal trial order of the court. The reference to supervision is perhaps a little misleading in that context. It deals essentially with a situation in which somebody is placed on bail under bail conditions and the relevant supervision order can be enforced in another EU member state with the result that a citizen of an EU member state who is subject to bail may move into another EU member state without breaching the relevant conditions of their bail order. That is essentially what it deals with. It has again been very rarely used since implementation in 2015. The number we had received at the time the regulations were laid was four since 2015. Interestingly, a further six have emerged since the regulations were laid, I think five of which have come from Cyprus. I do not know whether they all pertain to the same group, but the numbers are very small. In turn, the courts in England and Wales have issued two such supervision orders, but neither is extant. They have both expired because the relevant parties have been discharged or have gone through the criminal trial process. We do not anticipate that this will have any major impact.
The financial penalties order came into force in 2012, since which time we have received about 3,759 requests for enforcement of civil penalties, most of them from the Netherlands, and we have issued about 3,400 requests for the recovery of financial penalties, most of them to Poland.
We have one point to bear in mind. Where we issue a request for a financial penalty to be recovered, we do not get the money. It is retained by the EU member state that makes the recovery. To that extent we do not get a financial benefit, but where we do benefit is in the event that we are requested to recover a financial penalty; we can then retain it. The sums involved are relatively modest. The average fine is in the region of £300 based on figures collected in 2015. If that is applied to the number of requests we are getting, we are still talking about a sum of approximately £100,000. However, I emphasise that these estimates are approximate. As I say, it is not a case of us recovering the money that has been imposed by a UK court for reasons best known to the European authorities, I am sure; rather, the proceeds go to the jurisdiction that actually recovers the funds in the event that they do so.
Cross-Border Mediation (EU Directive) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(5 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Beith
My Lords, this is another example of something we are losing, although in this instance the amount is relatively small. As the Minister has explained, this concerns mainly time and the confidentiality element as it is currently provided, and there are some alternatives to that.
It is extraordinary in that it repeals provisions that would be continued under the withdrawal Act—which we have already passed—in numerous other statutes, including the Equalities Act 2010, so we are bound to look at it suspiciously for that reason. The Government’s argument against continuing these provisions without guaranteed reciprocity—I accept that the Government cannot guarantee reciprocity—is that applying them unilaterally would result in preferential treatment for parties involved in EU cross-border mediations that they believe would no longer be justified when the UK ceases to be an EU member state.
If, however, the provisions can be used to assist in a mediation and the other EU state involved is willing to observe a reciprocal arrangement, why should we deny that benefit? What is the unfairness of that? There are many instances in which we have better arrangements with some states than with others in judicial matters, and in the case of our European neighbours it would be surprising if we could not have more arrangements facilitated than apply in other cases. We do not say that person X is being treated unfairly because their attempt to resolve a matter by mediation relates to a state that is not helpful, whereas person B is in a mediation involving a state with which we are able to make some reciprocal arrangement.
The Government have taken the view with most—although not all—of these statutory instruments that where we cannot have reciprocity we cannot have anything. That is not necessarily the case. The Minister kindly answered the question I asked him earlier in a way that seemed to imply that the Government, if there is an agreement during the transition period, would seek to negotiate back into existence something along these lines. Of course, during the transition period the provisions would continue to operate.
What if there is a no-deal Brexit, which looks increasingly likely? There is no reason why the Government should not seek to facilitate mediation with our former fellow EU states as a matter of policy. Clearly I am arguing that they should have a policy of negotiating during the transition for such arrangements—or even if there is no deal. The atmosphere might be less conducive but at some stage why should we not try to resurrect provisions of this kind?
Although, as I have said, the impact of removing these provisions is relatively small, it is another example of an area in which we ought to try to continue arrangements that are beneficial to people who have real problems to solve. Where possible, we should do so by direct agreement with the EU and, if not, by agreement with individual states.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, as we have heard, this instrument sits against a backdrop of completely inadequate planning for justice co-operation after Brexit. The danger is that that inadequate planning could put vulnerable people in our society at risk. Across Parliament, including from the Justice Select Committee, there has been concern that the Ministry of Justice has failed to provide sufficient detail or certainty about how co-operation on justice will be managed after we exit the European Union.
As we all know, we currently benefit from well-established, frequently updated and comprehensive reciprocal justice arrangements within the EU. Without an agreement with our European partners on what the future of those reciprocal arrangements looks like, people forced to go to court or mediation to protect their rights can face extremely damaging consequences.
We on this side of the House have consistently said that Brexit must not be used to lower standards or reduce rights. There is a fear of that. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, is a little sanguine about how significant that is in this instrument, but I am a bit less so. It nevertheless breaches that principle about a reduction in standards and rights.
Noble Lords will recall that the instrument was laid for sifting by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee on 16 November last year. The European Statutory Instruments Committee recommended that it be upgraded to the affirmative procedure because of its large volume of amendments to primary and secondary legislation, but also because it could diminish rights by disengaging from European Union obligations.
I may have misheard the Minister. He referred to an impact assessment. I do not know whether that included a consultation or whether he is instead relying on the Government’s general civil judicial co-operation framework. If it is the latter, the European Union Sub-Committee on Justice found that the framework contained little detail on how the Government’s aims for co-operation would be achieved.
This statutory instrument will repeal legislation enshrining the mediation directive. The directive extends time limits for bringing some civil claims—including child maintenance claims and employment tribunals—to enable mediation. I am sure we all agree that this is a very good thing. The directive is one of many examples whereby we have raised legal standards and protections across Europe through co-operation with our European partners.
The European Statutory Instruments Committee considered whether this instrument could diminish rights and found that it repeals legislation that extends the time limit for bringing certain claims in civil courts and employment tribunals to enable mediation. Shortening time limits in that regard can have significant consequences, prohibiting parties from reaching mediated solutions in child contact cases, for example. This statutory instrument clearly breaches the principle that standards should not be lowered; it lowers the standards for enabling cross-border mediation from the higher EU standard to a lower international one.
The Government accept that the UK could unilaterally continue to apply the mediation directive post exit but have decided not to do so. The noble and learned Lord will correct me, but my understanding of the Government’s position is that, if someone wants to stop a time limit running in mediation, they should issue proceedings before a court and apply to stay or stop those proceedings. That is unfair and unrealistic for so many people in their current financial circumstances, let alone in the context of the obliteration of civil legal aid, which we have discussed in your Lordships’ House so many times.
Put simply, this statutory instrument does what Ministers promised—in this House and elsewhere—would not happen: it breaches the principle of not reducing standards in people’s access to justice. That is very disappointing.
Lord Keen of Elie
On that last issue, I am somewhat puzzled by the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is endeavouring to make in this context. The time limits we are talking about are measured in years—three, four, six or 10 years. If a party is intent on mediation before they raise proceedings, it is unlikely that they will be so disinclined or uninterested in the issue that they will wait years before even attempting to go forward with mediation. Let us be realistic and practical. However, where they have already commenced proceedings, they may then be directed by their lawyers or others to consider mediation as an alternative means of resolving the dispute. In those circumstances, they have already dealt with the time limit by raising the legal proceedings. Pending mediation, all they need to do, if necessary, is stay those proceedings—or sist them, in Scottish terms—putting them on hold while the mediation process is carried on. I do not see that this is a diminution of rights at all.
I come to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. On the question of no deal, I understand his point entirely. If no deal occurs—which nobody wants—it will not be a case of switching off the lights and leaving the building. Clearly, we will want to continue discussing with our immediate European neighbours how we can best resolve any differences between us on judicial co-operation. One would hope that that would happen in any event, but I note the noble Lord’s point and cannot disagree. It might be more difficult in a no-deal scenario than during an implementation period, when we are negotiating a future agreement between ourselves and the EU 27.
On another point, it is not an issue only of preferential treatment—that is, the idea that parties from the EU would somehow have preference over those in the UK. There is a danger that we might mislead people if we do not deal with the directive provisions in this way. People may continue to believe that they are protected from having to raise proceedings beyond a limitation period because of the EU directive. We will have to make it clear to people that this will not be the case.
There is not the same issue with regard to confidentiality. The absolute confidentiality imposed by the directive is not immediately replicated in the law of England and Wales, but there is the usual provision for contractual agreement of confidentiality of the mediation process. In any event, as I sought to indicate, there is at least one High Court decision from 2009 that says that, even in the absence of an express contractual term, the court would readily imply an issue of confidence with regard to mediation.
In a way, then, the impact will be minimal, but I do not dismiss it out of hand. We are conscious that we are moving away from an EU-wide provision on mediation and we have to accommodate that at present. Our hope is that we will move into an implementation period when we continue to enjoy this reciprocity. We hope that, in due course and in the course of such an implementation period, we will agree future judicial co-operation, but that will require reciprocity. In these circumstances, I beg to move.
Judicial Pensions and Fee-Paid Judges’ Pension Schemes (Amendment) Regulations 2019
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Lord Faulks (Con)
My Lords, before my noble and learned friend answers that difficult question, I wonder whether he can help the House on a general question about judicial pensions and eligibility. Judges must now retire at the age of 70; there is strong feeling abroad that this often wastes judicial talent. In other fields, people often peak at 70 so a retirement age of 75 may be far more suitable, given that the same retirement age applies to magistrates, jurors and other people given the task of determining matters of justice.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, in a crowded and noisy political landscape, it is easy to overlook the importance of protecting our judiciary and making adequate pensions provisions for our people. Forgive me for suggesting this, but this House is perhaps uniquely qualified to value the importance of both.
I begin by politely disagreeing with the concerns expressed by my noble friend Lord Adonis a moment ago. I have no concerns about the Supreme Court’s ability to deal with any disputes relating to judicial pensions. Of course, the Opposition do not seek to divide the House on the interim provision set out by the Minister but I want to take this opportunity to urge him not to kick the can down the road into next year and beyond. It is concerning that the Government have recently had a number of disputes of this kind with judges, including the defeat referred to earlier. I agree with a number of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about the importance of a confident and, frankly, happy judiciary to which we can adequately recruit to protect our reputation as a rule-of-law nation, whether we are inside or outside the EU. We need to boost our judiciary’s morale now and for some years to come.
I agree with the one-year extension of this scheme but concerns over judicial pensions need to be considered in the broader context of the austerity measures that hit the Ministry of Justice particularly hard, including budget cuts of a third since 2010. Savings made in the revised pensions schemes are just one area where spending has been seriously squeezed. Devastating reductions to the court estate, further proposals for the relocation of case management functions, listings and scheduling, new off-site service centres and service centres supervised by authorised staff, not judges, are some of the issues we discussed last year in the context of the then courts and tribunals Bill.
We on these Benches are concerned about the judgment to which the Minister referred. A finding against the Government relating to unlawful age discrimination is very concerning. Going forward, I urge the Government, in as friendly a manner as possible, to consider the acute shortage of High Court judges. As I imagine many people in the Chamber will be aware, senior lawyers and practitioners are not putting themselves forward for High Court appointment—including some highly qualified people who would be keen to complete their prestigious careers in what is a vital public service in this country. Too many positions have been left vacant for years with the very slight prospect of them being filled in the next few years. Time and again one hears that this recruitment crisis is in no small way affected by the change in judicial pensions.
We must ensure confidence in our legal system, perhaps more than ever in the times we are all attempting to navigate now. We need our judicial Benches—the entire judiciary, whether tribunal panel members, chairs, district judges, county court judges or circuit judges—to be made up of exceptional individuals. Those stressful and expert roles need to be properly remunerated for that to continue. I urge the Minister and the rest of the Government to sit down promptly with judges and have a serious discussion about how to fund that vital part of our constitution going forward, and how to boost morale and recruitment to our judiciary. With that plea to the Government, there will be no objection from these Benches to this interim measure.
Lord Judge (CB)
My Lords, I had not intended to speak but perhaps I should. I declare an interest as having been Lord Chief Justice when the shocking new arrangements for the judicial pension were imposed on the judiciary unilaterally by the Government. There was consultation—of the kind that enables the Government to do exactly what they like—but it was imposed on the judiciary. There was a unilateral change to the pension arrangements under which a significant proportion of the judiciary were working if they were below a certain age and had not given so many years’ service. The basis on which they joined the judiciary, which was clearly understood, was changed. That represented a betrayal. It greatly damaged confidence in the whole idea of a successful practitioner—a barrister or solicitor—seeking judicial appointment. If the Government could unilaterally change the arrangements, there was no point. We still suffer the consequences of that. There is nothing wrong with the present measure we are considering, but the consequences of what happened between 2010 and 2014 are with us still.
If I may answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, about the arrangements that are currently before and have been before the courts, the judges trying those cases are not those who will have been affected by these dramatic changes. The various matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, are well known. There is no point using this opportunity to stand on a hobby-horse to repeat them, but they do not go away. That is an issue the ministry has to grapple with as soon as practicable.
Assisted Suicide
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(5 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie
It is not the intention of the Government to seek to change the law in this area. I emphasise that every case has to be considered according to its own particular facts and circumstances. I readily acknowledge that many of these cases are extremely tragic.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, whatever the conflicting views—and there are many—on public and prosecutorial policy in this area, I hope we can all agree that the current situation presents loved ones of people with motor neurone disease and similar conditions at the end of their lives with an emotional, ethical and legal minefield. Is the Minister confident that these people, at a very difficult time, are getting the advice and support they need to navigate that?
Lord Keen of Elie
I am not in a position to say where such people seek advice on these matters, but such advice is available, and the policy of the CPS with regard to this matter is publicly available.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts(5 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement. Sadly, I am not grateful for its content, which offers very little very late. The Government wasted two years investigating their own devastating cuts, perpetrated by the coalition Government on so many ordinary people in this country, for whom access to justice is no longer a reality. The review is a missed opportunity to restore legal support to people facing rogue landlords, debilitating family breakups and the Government’s hostile environment to not just migrants but poor people and people living on benefits.
There have been 99% cuts to benefits legal aid for some of the most vulnerable people in our society, which is completely unacceptable. The Statement’s accompanying documents include an action plan that is incredibly disappointing, in many cases offering just more reviews rather than the action that the term “action plan” would normally suggest. Legal aid has been slashed by hundreds of millions of pounds. Even the Government’s target of saving £410 million was exceeded by £200 million. Is that a record of which the Ministry of Justice can be proud?
On many occasions technology, as with the Northern Ireland border, is offered as a panacea to replace real lawyers offering people early advice and subsequent representation where necessary. That is what anyone would want when dealing with a difficult dispute in their life, and it should be available to everyone—rich or poor.
Cuts to public services and austerity are always political choices, but when the cuts are to the legal advice and representation at the heart of our rule of law, they become particularly ideological. All the exquisite legislation brought forward and scrutinised in your Lordships’ House remains a dead letter in a closed book without adequate legal aid. That is the situation in the United Kingdom—one of the wealthiest countries on earth—at this moment in the 21st century. To my mind, this is a national disgrace.
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949. That piece of Labour legislation, of which we are proud, was as important in the post-war settlement as healthcare or universal education. I am sad to say this because I think that matters concerning the rule of law should be cross-party and bipartisan, but I have come to the view that only a Labour Government will restore access to justice, advice and representation for all.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, after a delayed process that took an entire year, we now have the post-implementation review of LASPO. I will focus on legal aid.
Of its four stated objectives, the MoJ claims success in just one: significant savings have been made. Well, we know that. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out, the savings wildly exceeded what was expected. However, on each of the other three objectives—discouraging unnecessary and adversarial litigation at public expense; targeting legal aid at those who need it most; and delivering better overall value for money for the taxpayer—the answer is an unimpressive “Don’t know”, dressed up in weasel words such as, “It is impossible to say with certainty”. I suspect that an independent review would have come to clearer conclusions.
The review identifies six themes echoing the experiences of all of us involved in the justice system. First, these changes in the scope of legal aid undermine value for money, particularly by preventing early intervention. Secondly, financial eligibility and operational requirements limit access to legal aid too harshly. Thirdly, the exceptional case funding scheme is not working well. Fourthly, legal aid fees are now so low that future provision by practitioners is at risk. Fifthly, increasing numbers of litigants in person increase costs and risk the perception of a two-tier justice system. Finally, advice deserts across our country threaten access to justice.
The legal support action plan seeks to address those issues, at least in part. I am more hopeful than the noble Baroness in saying that the action plan is welcome. Among the Government’s pledges, some of which were mentioned in the Statement, they promised to review eligibility requirements, increase public awareness of how to access legal aid, broaden the scope of legal aid in some immigration and family cases—that will not go nearly far enough—improve the exceptional case funding scheme, review criminal legal aid, widen access to the telephone gateway, increase support for litigants in person and examine complementary ways of providing legal support. Both those pledges and the others made must be kept and implemented soon. We will have further demands for improved support. We will hold the Government’s feet to the fire.
Can the Minister do two things today on this vital topic? Together, the four documents represent a massive report. Will he please use his influence to secure a debate, with adequate time and soon, on the reports and the action plan? Secondly, will he reassure us that where the promises in the action plan are not backed up by implementation dates—and some are—the MoJ will treat them with urgency?
Notwithstanding the warnings in the paper and in the Statement that all this cannot be delivered overnight and is the first step in the process, the rescue of our legal aid system and the improvement of our legal support system needs more urgency than was ever accorded to this review.