Maritime Transport Access to Trade and Cabotage (Revocation) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Monday 25th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Adonis is not being moved because he is not here. He asked me to say that he unavoidably could not be in the House between 6.30 pm and 8 pm and therefore anticipated that he would not be able to move his amendment, as has proved to be the case.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. She referred to the comments made by the Joint Committee on SIs. I agree with its criticism, as there are issues to be addressed in the clarity of the Explanatory Memorandum.

The Government claim that this SI will not have an impact on shipping operators. Nevertheless, whatever reassurances the Minister has sought to give us today, it removes cabotage rights. The Government’s defence is that the measure will put EU operators on the same basis as those from other countries—indeed, the Minister has just repeated that—but we are working to the lowest common denominator in these matters and one can never be sure.

Looking at such SIs always brings up some interesting piece of history. The history point from this one is that we will no longer be a member of the Rhine convention. Our membership of it goes back to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, and the convention goes back even further, to the Congress of Vienna of 1815—so we are looking at something that we have been a member of for 100 years, while the convention itself is more than 200 years old. The problem we face is that we renounced our membership while we were members of the EU and we are members of it now only through our membership of the EU. It is interesting to think about the purpose of the Rhine convention. As the world’s oldest international organisation, the commission’s intention was remarkably modern; namely, to increase European prosperity by guaranteeing a high level of security for navigation of the Rhine. I do not think that the Government are suggesting that we rejoin the Rhine convention in our own right. I seek clarity from the Minister that this is the case.

The SI removes those EU regulations designed to prevent unfair practices, either between member states or between a member and a third country, and to enshrine rights to maritime cabotage. In a nutshell, the SI removes the right to cabotage for the remaining EU states which wish to operate in the UK because the Government fear that we will not be given reciprocal rights within the EU 27. At what stage are negotiations with the remaining 27 countries on cabotage? Is it a matter of ongoing consultation, or has it been shelved for the moment?

Once again, consultation has been very limited. My concern is that this SI relates to devolved issues. Do the Welsh and Scottish Governments remain satisfied? I cannot quite understand the amendment referred to in paragraph 6.12 of the Explanatory Memorandum—I am sure that it is my deficiency. I have read it a couple of times and it is not clear to me what amendment is referred to in relation to the Welsh and Scottish Governments.

The Government say that UK ships undertake relatively little cabotage in EU waters. I am happy to accept that, but can the Minister give us some clarity on the value of such cabotage, the volume of it and the percentage of ships undertaking it so that we can get some handle on the level of activity concerned?

The Government seem to have a nonsensical position on this issue. They say that they do not want to restrict cabotage but are acting to delete guaranteed rights. It is another example of an inconsistent approach in these SIs. Some of them simply smooth it over—it will be the same system after a no-deal Brexit as there was before; we are going to tolerate what may be an inconsistency between the attitude of the EU 27 and our approach to transport issues. However, in this SI, because we might not get cabotage rights in Europe, we will take them away from EU countries operating in the UK. The SI takes away basic international maritime rights and it does not set out with any clarity what the Government intend to replace them with.

Operation of Air Services (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Wednesday 21st November 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Randerson]

My disappointment with the SI that we had a week or so ago was definitely with the lack of certainty about which criteria the Government would use. The Government adroitly managed to give themselves the broadest possible set of criteria and we are no nearer knowing how exactly those permits will be applied. The industry is worried as a result.

There has already been a degree of reorganisation within the aviation industry as airlines previously registered in the UK have moved abroad for their registration, with the inevitable drift of at least some jobs abroad. It is important that we bear in mind that this additional bureaucracy—the additional requirements as a result of Brexit—will put our expertise in such an important aviation market at a disadvantage.

The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee raised the issue of wet leasing, which, as the Minister explained, is when an airline releases an aircraft and its crew and so on. This is usually done at busy times or in exceptional circumstances. If the aircraft is not registered in the UK, the airline has to satisfy certain safety criteria. The airlines are concerned that this should be the subject of a reciprocal agreement with EU countries. Can the Minister explain what progress the Department for Transport has made in its discussions on this?

Public service obligations apply when a service would be uneconomical but is needed for economic and social reasons. They usually apply to far-flung places such as the Scottish islands. In future, such services could be operated by UK carriers and by others with cabotage rights—although, to be honest, that would be unlikely with no deal. These are sensitive and complex issues of state aid. As someone from Wales, I know that there has been a long debate on why rights are granted on some Scottish routes but similar rights were not granted in Wales. Could the Minister give us a little more detail on this?

State aid rules were previously adjudicated by the European Commission. This is a complex and controversial area, but the distance of the European Commission in power terms from the decisions that it made neutralised the issue to a large extent. Those powers will now be given to the CMA. What resources will it be given to deal with this? I also warn the Minister that those things are likely to become much more sharply controversial.

Paragraph 7.10 of the Explanatory Memorandum deals with the allocation of scarce capacity. The 2007 regulations dealt with air service agreements between EU members and third countries. Scarce capacity occurs when there are restrictions on the frequency of flights. The Explanatory Memorandum includes a political declaration that the UK Government will always seek to lift or remove such a cap but will hold a hearing to allocate frequencies if that is not possible. What is the legal force of that statement? It seems that it is simply a political declaration. It is a statement of intent by the current Government, but they cannot bind their successors. I would like some clarification on that.

Finally, it would be helpful, as we sit here week after week wading our way through dozens of these SIs, to be able to see the full context of where we are on air services. Maybe the Minister can tell us what other air services SIs we are waiting for.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for explaining the purpose and content of these regulations, which set out the contingency measures for the licensing and oversight of flights to and from the UK in the event of no deal with the European Union. UK carriers will require a route licence, as well as the operating licence that is currently required under EU law, for operations beyond the UK. Air carriers from the European Economic Area will also have to obtain a foreign carrier permit to operate in the UK.

In the event of there being no deal with the European Union, UK and EU airlines will no longer have the automatic right to operate air services between the UK and the EU without the need for advance permission from individual states. In this scenario, the Government expect to grant permission to EU carriers to operate to UK airports and for this to be reciprocated by EU states granting permission to UK air carriers to operate to points in the EU. Failing such a multilateral agreement, the Government’s intention would be to seek bilateral arrangements with individual states. I know that this point has been raised before but I raise it again: why do the Government believe that such bilateral arrangements between the UK and individual states could actually be put in place in the short time left even between now and 29 March 2019, let alone between early or mid-December and the end of March 2019?

Civil Aviation (Insurance) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Wednesday 24th October 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, the airline industry in this country is intensely competitive. It is a commercial environment where there is a real danger that airlines seeking to reduce costs will cut their insurance to the minimum in order to do so. It is obvious from this SI that freeing ourselves from EU standards means that we could allow airlines to have a lower level of insurance. The Minister read out an impressive but rather grim list of the risks that airlines face. Obviously those risks are also faced by their passengers and therefore I would be grateful if she could give some more detail about what restrictions will be put on airlines that are registered in Britain: how low can they go as regards their insurance cover?

It is obvious that the Government are anticipating a reduction because paragraph 7.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum makes it absolutely clear that this legislation will free airlines in the UK to take up lower levels of insurance cover than those required in the EU. It gives the example of “non-commercial operations”. As an aside, I would like to ask the Minister if she could define what the Government mean by that phrase. What sort of operations will need to have or will be allowed to have a lower level of cover? There is no point in freeing yourself up from EU controls if you are not going to allow variations from the standards that the EU has set. Will there be any guarantees of a minimum level of insurance cover or will we have some sort of free-for-all as a result of this? Air passengers will be concerned that there should always be an adequate level of cover.

I reiterate the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley: exactly how will this work? I have been trying to envisage the process. Thank goodness that several of our airlines have decided that they will neutralise some of the risks of Brexit and life after Brexit by registering in other countries. That covers their risks, which is a very good thing for them to have done. However, airlines are often based in more than one country. They may have their headquarters in one country but have most of their aircraft based in another one. Of course they fly between countries, so who will set the level of insurance that is required on each occasion? Will it depend on their country of origin, the flight that day, or will it depend on where the airline’s headquarters are based? If our UK-based planes fly from the UK to an EU country, will they not have the right to demand that those planes have an EU level of cover, not the reduced cover that the Government seem to envisage would be possible?

Finally, I put a rather prosaic point to the Minister. Paragraph 3.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“The territorial application of this instrument includes Scotland and Northern Ireland”.


What has happened to Wales, which has more than one airport? Can I ask for an assurance that the Scottish Government—sadly I cannot ask about Northern Ireland at this moment—have expressed their agreement to the concepts behind this SI and that the Welsh Government have done so as well, particularly since they do not seem to have been mentioned?

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I also thank the Minister for explaining the purpose of the regulations before us. Perhaps I may pursue the point that has been made about paragraph 7.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum to clarify what it means—or at least to establish that what I think it means is correct. It states:

“Article 6 sets out levels of insurance in respect of liability for passengers, baggage and cargo. Under Article 6(1), the minimum insurance cover for liability in respect of passengers is set at 250,000 SDRs per passenger”.


Can I take it that, as far as these regulations are concerned, there is no change and that the minimum insurance cover which applies at the moment will continue to be applied in the future and not be reduced? The memorandum continues:

“For non-commercial operations by aircraft with a MTOM of 2,700kg or less, there is an option for Member States to set a lower level of minimum insurance cover”—


I take it that that is the present situation with us being within the EU and that we already have the option because the memorandum says—

“which the United Kingdom has chosen to exercise. To ensure that the flexibility provided for in Article 6(1) is retained, Article 6(1) is amended to include a provision for the Secretary of State, by regulations, to set a lower level of minimum insurance cover in respect of non-commercial operations by aircraft with a MTOM of 2,700kg”.

Does the Secretary of State intend to go to a lower level of minimum insurance requirement than we have already exercised under what I understand is provided for under the existing arrangements? It is clear from looking at it that the Secretary of State could take the first opportunity to reduce it even further. What are the advantages of having the lower level of minimum insurance cover that the Secretary of State may set by regulations? To whose advantage is it? Is it safer to have a lower level of minimum insurance cover? It would be helpful to know what the advantages are and whether the Secretary of State intends to lower the level even further than I presume we have already reached.

Department for Transport (Fees) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Wednesday 17th October 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Randerson]

The noble Lord has found an ingenious way of adding an extra question and I will pass it on to the Minister.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for explaining the purpose and content of the SI, which we will not oppose. In the light of concerns that have been expressed about the possible effect on fees in future and other possible impacts, will the Minister gives us some clarification on the consultation? Paragraph 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“A consultation is not considered necessary as the amendments are minor and technical in nature and do not impact upon either business or the individual”.


Does that mean that there has been literally no consultation, or have some bodies or organisations been consulted? If so, which organisations or bodies have been consulted about this SI and its contents?

As the Minister said, the regulations amend the Department for Transport’s fees orders covering the road traffic field. Fees orders do not set fees but specify functions and their costs which may be taken into account in setting fees. These regulations amend those orders by removing references to the Secretary of State having functions to carry out to comply with EU obligations or requirements on the basis that we are withdrawing from the European Union. Those functions referred to in the fees orders will no longer be carried out under EU legislation but will continue to be carried out by the Secretary of State under domestic law as provided for by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. As the Minister said, the functions currently carried out by the Secretary of State under EU legislation are those relating to international road haulage permits, type approval certification, tachograph calibration centres, international road passenger transport authorisations, driver licensing, vehicle registration, licences to operate public service vehicles and licences to operate goods vehicles.

The SI relates to a situation where we have withdrawn from the European Union. It would appear that it covers a no-deal situation and our intended departure on 29 March next year. What is the position if there is a deal approved by Parliament and that deal entails a transition period with continued membership of the customs union and/or the single market for an unspecified time or other provisions that do not provide for a clean break on 29 March next year? What is the need for this SI in that scenario? We may not in reality have withdrawn from the EU because we would still be bound to accept that some or all of its legislation applies to us. We would not be able to alter it unilaterally and we would also be bound by any subsequent amendments made to that legislation by the European Union pending our full withdrawal.

What then would be the relevance of an SI, such as the one we are now considering, coming into effect on 29 March next year, which asserts in paragraph 2.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum:

“The relevant EU related functions specified by the Fees Order will, after EU exit, no longer be carried out in pursuance of EU legislation”,


when, if there is a deal, these functions could have to be, including to the extent, for a possible period of time unknown, that we would also have to abide by EU legislation that was further amended by the EU without our agreement? Would it not be better, with a decision on a deal apparently close, to withdraw this SI and wait until we know whether there is a deal and, if there is, produce an SI which reflects the reality and terms of that deal? It is, after all, not the fault of this House if the Government are having difficulty adhering to their intended timetable for progress in negotiations with the EU, as appears to be the case. It would be helpful if the Minister could spell out what the impact of a deal with a transition period could be on the provisions and relevance of this SI, and whether during the transition period agreements could be reached or arrangements made that could have an impact on the terms and relevance of this SI.

I turn to one other point. The Haulage Permits and Trailer Registration Act gave the Secretary of State the power to introduce regulations to charge fees for international road transport permits if a new permit scheme is required, as UK-issued Community licences will no longer be valid in the EU if we leave, unless an agreement is reached otherwise. The Government have previously said that any permit fees would only cover the cost of any new scheme and that the detail on fees would be consulted on later in 2018 when the outcome of the negotiations was clearer. Has the consultation started, or has the lack of clarity at the moment over how the negotiations with the EU will end precluded the commencement of the consultation?

Since an issue of concern is that hauliers or taxpayers will incur additional costs if a new scheme is required, does that not underline the importance of continuing with the Community licensing system? Once again, would it not therefore be better to be discussing this SI once the outcome of the negotiations was clearer and the SI itself could reflect that outcome? The SI is not intended to come into force for another five and a half months, yet we are being asked to agree to it now when it is not clear to what extent we will or will not be continuing to follow EU legislation, including any subsequent amendments to the legislation, after the SI is intended to come into effect on 29 March 2019.

Railways: Update

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Wednesday 29th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the House of Commons. We welcome and advocate continuing investment in our rail industry and measures to enhance its role and importance in the economy of this country and in the lives of our citizens, including the reopening of some lines closed under the Beeching cuts.

The extent to which the content of the Statement and the associated strategic vision document will deliver those objectives is debatable. We have a Secretary of State who is very good at making grandiose statements about future rail developments—in fact, almost as good at doing that as he is in quietly announcing the abandonment or postponement of schemes that he has previously championed. No Government have cancelled or postponed more railway electrification schemes, or parts of schemes that they have previously espoused, than this one. On the roads, the policy is to reduce diesel mileage; on the railways, it is apparently to increase it above that previously planned. What is the Government’s strategic vision for rail in respect of the further electrification of our railways? I think the Statement was silent on that issue.

The Statement was pretty thin, too, on the issue of fares, as is the associated document called “a strategic vision for rail”. Fares have been deliberately and regularly increased by well above the rate of inflation in order to reduce the percentage of operating costs not covered by fares, and thus the costs to the Government, which they transfer on to the backs of commuters in particular. What is the Government’s strategic vision on fares? What is their objective in relation to the percentage of operating costs that should be covered by fares? How can you have a credible strategic vision without saying what your future intentions are in respect of the level of fares, fare increases in the future and the objectives that you are seeking to achieve and why?

The Statement made reference to the next South Eastern franchise and referred to providing space for additional passengers. However, that is not a strategic vision for addressing overcrowding in our railways. There are many other examples of overcrowding on our rail network, not solely in London and the south-east. Since the Government have chosen to describe their document as “a strategic vision for rail”, what are the objectives in relation to reducing overcrowding? What is the end game in respect of overcrowding and its elimination that the strategic vision is seeking to achieve? Just referring to new schemes, which may or may not be abandoned or postponed at some stage in the future, does not constitute a strategic vision against which success or failure in delivery can be judged.

The Statement set out proposals and intentions for tinkering with the organisational structure of the railways. It referred to a proposed alliance on the east coast main line, running intercity trains and track operation under one management. We had a similar arrangement between Stagecoach and Network Rail in the south-west, which did not seem to prove an unmitigated success. Why do the Government now think this proposed alliance will prove any more successful? What are the specific objectives that it will be expected to deliver under the strategic vision for rail?

As the Government thrash around to find an organisational structure for our railways and the train company franchises that they deem acceptable, they may care to look at the structure of the London Underground, which combines track and trains and has generated—in the public sector—significant increases in the numbers of passengers. It is also a system under which all the revenue goes back into providing and improving services for the travelling public, which cannot be said for our railway network as a whole. Indeed, so concerned was the Secretary of State about the success of Transport for London and London Underground in running services in the public sector, and the revitalisation of the London Overground network since it was taken over by TfL, that he felt it too politically dangerous to agree to the transfer of any further rail services within the GLA area to TfL—not much of a strategic vision there.

This Statement does not represent a strategic vision. It is silent on too many issues, including future fares policy, and silent about too many overall objectives to be such a strategic vision. It is, frankly, more a hotchpotch of separate announcements, some of them regurgitated, since they have been made previously and do not represent anything new. While I reiterate what I said earlier about welcoming new investment in our railways if it materialises, tinkering with the structure, which seems to be the Government’s modus operandi at present, will not address rail’s urgent organisational and ownership problems. Indeed, to the extent that making the structural changes proposed deflects the attentions of managers and staff from the objective of running reliable and efficient services, tinkering with the structure is more likely, in fact, simply to add to the problems.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, one thing on which we agree with the Government is that the answer to improving the railways does not lie in renationalisation. I am disappointed in this strategic vision. It is largely a restatement of existing announcements, some of which I recognise from the days of the coalition.

However, on these Benches, we welcome the commitment to assess transport projects on the basis of their potential for unlocking future growth, rather than on a simplistic assessment of current overcrowding and journey time saved. I want to ask the Minister about the announcement on reopening old lines, which had a lot of publicity this morning—but it is obvious that no new money is involved, as otherwise we would have been told. The reference in the Statement is to partnership with metro mayors. That is usually a code for saying that local government will foot the bill. What are the terms on which these proposals are made? Where will the money come from and how advanced are the plans, with specific examples in mind?

This week, the Minister replied to a Written Question from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, setting out total transport expenditure across each region of England. I am grateful to the noble Lord for asking the Question. The Answer, which I recommend to your Lordships, makes extraordinary reading. Capital expenditure in the last year is a total of £16 billion across the whole of England, £6 billion of which was spent in London. Only £520 million was spent in the north-east, and £666 million in the east Midlands. This entrenches the inequality and the divide in our society, and I am disappointed that this Statement does not provide new announcements on projects for the north and the Midlands that are desperately needed. What are the Government going to do to change that balance of spending within the country?

Finally, there is no reference here to electrification projects. The stalling of electrification and the abandonment of those plans was a huge blow to those poorer parts of the UK, including south Wales—west of Cardiff being an example. It is important that they are given the renewed investment that electrification with provide. That will also improve the quality of our air.

Space Industry Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

Amendment 2 is another amendment that we discussed in Committee. Currently, the Bill provides that the regulator must take into account,

“any environmental objectives set by the Secretary of State”,

when exercising the powers given to it under the Bill. Our amendment adds a wider environmental duty; namely, that the regulator must take into account,

“the effect on the environment and on local communities of activities connected with the operation of spaceflight activities or the operation of a spaceport as licensed under this Act”.

In other words, this consideration would not be solely dependent on what the Secretary of State of the day decided should or should not be laid down as environmental objectives for the regulator to take into account.

The Government were not enthusiastic about our amendment in Committee, arguing that environmental and local community considerations were already covered by the provisions of Clause 2(2)(c) and (e) and local planning processes. However, the Government appeared to accept that a person with exemption from an operator licence would not be covered by some of the provisions of Clause 2(2) since the regulator would not be involved in issuing a licence.

The importance of taking into account the effect of spaceflight activities and the operation of a spaceport on the environment and local communities needs to be made much clearer in the Bill. It is too important an issue to be left open to potentially different interpretations of the less than precise wording currently in the Bill or to the whim of Secretaries of State as to what environmental objectives they decide to set or not to set. I expressed the hope in Committee that the Government might feel able to be more positive on this issue during the Bill’s later stages. In moving my amendment, I hope that the Minister will be able to indicate some movement on this point when she responds.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I was pleased to be able to add my name to Amendment 2. Before I speak to it, I welcome the Government’s Amendment 9, because it adds to Schedule 1 both noise and emissions as factors that should be taken into account when granting a licence. That is a step forward. However, it is still a narrow interpretation of the problems that I anticipate local communities and the slightly wider area might encounter. If these spaceports are a success—across the House we very much hope that they will be—they will have an impact on local communities and on the environment that those communities currently enjoy. These are by definition remote and peaceful places at this moment, and they will be significantly less remote and less peaceful after the development of a spaceport.

Other potential issues include the following. First, there is the issue of visual amenity in what could well be beautiful areas. These will be large installations and will not easily blend into the landscape. Secondly, there is the impact on local roads. I do not know the situation in Scotland, but I know that the roads in Wales are hardly even small motorways in that area. We are talking about moving large, wide loads across the country and along roads, often moving them slowly on to the site, and that will be disruptive. I remember how the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in a memorable phrase, described a rocket as a controlled explosion. There is also potentially air pollution, as well as noise pollution.

Finally, I point to the basics of many of the issues and problems arising from planning applications for large or even small developments. Clearing a site to establish a spaceport could well impact on existing wildlife, and the ongoing use of the spaceport could, for example, disturb nesting birds.

I do not want to be a doom-monger but we need to be realistic. The enthusiasm of the Welsh and Scottish Governments may not be shared by local people. Any of us here who have been local councillors— I was a councillor for 17 years, albeit a long time ago—know that what I have outlined are routine planning issues that, appropriately, get in the way of wholesale development that does not take into consideration the amenities of local people and the environment beyond. Spaceports should not be exempt from the rules, and that needs to be flagged in this Bill.

Air Travel Organisers' Licensing Bill

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, in the Government’s Oral Statement on Monarch Airlines of 9 October, the Secretary of State said that,

“right now our efforts are rightly focused on getting employees into new jobs and getting passengers home. After that, our effort will turn to working through any reforms necessary to ensure that passengers do not find themselves in this position again. We need to look at all the options—not just ATOL, but whether it is possible to enable airlines to wind down in an orderly manner and look after their customers themselves, without the need for the Government to step in. We will be putting a lot of effort into that in the months ahead”.—[Official Report, 9/10/17; Commons, cols. 27-28.]

The demise of Monarch Airlines, along with the Secretary of State’s Statement, has raised questions about the current UK financial protection regime generally for air travellers. The ATOL scheme is intended to ensure that those who purchase ATOL-protected flights and holidays are flown home at no extra cost if an ATOL company fails. However, the scheme does not offer that protection to customers who buy airline seats from airlines which are not within the ATOL scheme.

The Government have estimated that the proportion of Monarch Airlines passengers affected who were covered by the ATOL scheme and ATOL protection amounted to some 10% to 15%. As we know, the Government decided to step in and repatriate Monarch’s passengers regardless of whether they were among the small minority who were protected by the ATOL scheme, a decision which would appear at least to raise questions about the current scheme and arrangements.

While this Bill will update existing powers to enable different and separate arrangements to be established to align with new practices, such as linked travel arrangements, there remains a gap in consumer protection for flight-only seats sold by airlines, despite—I understand, perhaps incorrectly—the industry and the CAA’s previous calls for such a protection regime. The Bill does nothing to address that gap.

The amendment, whose intention has the support of ABTA, would through its proposed deletions to the 1982 Act provide an opportunity for the Government to say how they intend to review and update the existing arrangements and regulations, particularly in respect of flight-only travel under the Civil Aviation Act 1982, to ensure the protection of passengers in the event of a future airline failure—which as I understand it from the Secretary of State’s Statement of 9 October is, at least in part, what the Government intend and want to do.

It is really a matter for the Government, in consultation with the industry and consumers, to determine the precise framework and model for delivering any new protection regime. The Government appear to be looking for a new arrangement which would ensure that passengers in any subsequent Monarch situation are flown home at no extra cost but at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer and, presumably, to the airlines in particular and the travel industry in general.

A substantial proportion of the failure costs incurred in the ATOL scheme over the years has related to airline failures: Clarksons with Court Line; Laker and Arrowsmith Holidays with Laker Airways; ILG with Air Europe; XL Leisure Group with XL Airways; and now Monarch Travel Group with Monarch Airlines. These failures have also led to significant costs being incurred either by customers not protected under the ATOL scheme or by the taxpayer. Travel companies are also affected by the failure of an airline as they are liable for all aspects of a package holiday under the package travel regulations. While the exclusion of airlines from a scheme of protection means that their customers are not protected against financial loss, in practice those passengers—both British and those in other European countries such as Italy and Germany—have been repatriated at a cost to taxpayers and other industry participants. This surely adds to confusion when failure occurs, particularly around what is and what is not protected under the ATOL scheme. There is also a lack of clarity around the meaning of the ATOL-protected branding and ABTA has consistently called for it to be made much clearer that ATOL protection applies only to a particular set of holiday arrangements rather than the company as a whole.

The amendment is designed to provide the Government with the opportunity to say how they will end the area of exposure to the Government, passengers and taxpayers caused by unprotected airline seat-only sales, and to consider what a new regulatory framework might look like in the event of insolvency. In so doing, it would also enable the Government to fulfil the Secretary of State’s commitment of 9 October to,

“look at all the options”,

and,

“ensure passengers do not find themselves in this position again”.

The Government have said they are going to consult and look at all the options as part of the process of,

“working through the reforms necessary to ensure passengers do not find themselves in this position again”.

Indeed, the Government said in their 9 October Statement that they would be putting a lot of effort into this,

“in the weeks and months ahead”.

More than two weeks since that Statement, have the Government made official approaches to the industry and consumers with a view to commencing consultation about the sorts of mechanisms beyond ATOL which could be implemented to address the issue and consequences to passengers of future airline insolvency? What will be the timespan of such consultation? Which organisations, companies and bodies do the Government intend to consult, and who from beyond and outside the industry do they also intend to approach? Finally, by when do the Government expect to reach conclusions about the actions and changes they intend to make to deliver on the Secretary of State’s promise following the demise of Monarch airlines that,

“passengers do not find themselves in this position again”?

Presumably that commitment was not made without at least some idea of the possible ways of achieving that particular goal.

We certainly cannot continue with a situation where nobody is sure whether the Government will or will not fly people back home in future at no extra cost in the event of another airline failure, and where there is also an apparent lack of clarity for many passengers and potential passengers under the existing arrangements and ATOL scheme about their rights or lack of rights and their protections or lack of protections. In moving my amendment, I express the hope that the Minister will be able to give some answers to the points and questions I have made and asked in the light of the specific commitments given by the Secretary of State on future objectives and intentions in his Statement of 9 October. I beg to move.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because I felt that it raised some important issues for the Government to look at. I also felt it would be genuinely useful if the views of the Government on the progress made so far were put on record.

At the time of the failure of Monarch Airlines the Minister, in his Statement to the House, emphasised that it was the largest repatriation since D-day. But I put in contrast what the airline industry said in my discussions with it: that Monarch was a small airline and that the problems would arise if a big airline were to fail. Of course, those I spoke to believe that their whole industry is in robust health and that Monarch is definitely not an example of its state generally. The point is that, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has just said, airlines have failed before and undoubtedly, at some point in future, something like this will happen again.

We are looking here at whether the Government have set some kind of precedent by bringing everyone back, for understandable and excellent reasons. I think everyone supports the way that was done and the reasons for doing it. But the point is that if and when it happens again people will expect a similar response and, for that to be possible, there needs to be a scheme. The consumer understands that there is a need for a scheme and understands the ATOL scheme. What the Monarch passengers probably did not understand was why some of them were covered by something and others were not. In the end, the Government need to look at the new ways of working—the new ways in which travel is offered—and present a new scheme which covers them. In the days when the ATOL scheme was devised, package holidays covered a huge percentage of the market. That is very much less the case now.

It is also important to look not just at the passengers who are affected by this. One airline’s failure can often adversely affect a number of package holiday operators. If one airline fails, several package holiday operators will find their business seriously affected. There is a serious knock-on effect within the industry from this and it needs to be addressed. I shall listen to the Minister’s answer with interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Randerson]

The Minister has already referred to the importance of an airport strategy, and the Government are working on that. As the noble Lord states, there is clearly an interrelationship between the availability of flights and the availability of package holidays.

We need clear wording akin to the words used in the ATOL protection. That phrase “ATOL protection” works because over many years the consumer has come to understand what it means, partly through government advertising, partly through the work of consumer groups and, sadly, partly through the hard lesson of the failure of holiday companies. We need similar clear wording for any new scheme, and I fear that “linked travel arrangements” is not a phrase that trips off the tongue or that will be instantly understood by the holiday-buying public.

I turn to an issue that I have raised before: the variation in protection between credit cards, debit cards and PayPal. We might want to pay for a flight by debit card because in many cases, using a credit card costs additional money—a fee for the privilege of using it. However, it is important that at the point where consumers choose how to pay, they are warned that if they pay by debit card they will not get the same protection as if they pay by credit card. It is important that we modernise the system. I am not sure that this Bill is the place to do that, but it is important that the Government take the point away and look at it.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I add our support to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson. I do not intend to go through all the points she has so ably made, but I share her view that there seems to be a lack of clarity over the rights and protections—or lack of them—available, as the amendment says, to those,

“purchasing flights, package holidays and linked travel arrangements”.

Certainly, in some adverts, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, has already referred, the situation is not made clear. So we agree with the objective of the amendment, which is designed to make much clearer for people, when booking flights, package holidays or other travel arrangements, exactly what their rights are and are not, and what protections are and are not available.

Space Industry Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 16th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I just add one or two brief comments to what the noble Lord, Lord McNally, quite rightly said, seeking to explore further what the impact of withdrawal from the European Union might or might not have.

At Second Reading, the Minister made reference to the issue and said:

“The Government’s policy to exit the EU does not affect the UK’s membership of the European Space Agency. The UK has a strong and healthy space economy with an international outlook. We have a long history of collaboration and participation in European space programmes and missions through the European Space Agency. The Government will continue to take an active role in European space programmes, supporting UK industry in its bids to win contracts overseas and developing our national capability to keep the UK competitive in the global market”—[Official Report, 12/7/17; cols. 1268-69.]


Those were clearly welcome statements, but I am not sure that they went to the heart of the question: namely, what impact could our withdrawal from the European Union have on spaceflight and the space industry in this country? Apparently, there has been talk in government circles of the possibility of leaving on the basis of no agreement at all being reached with the European Union on the terms. Can the Minister spell out what the consequences might be for the space industry and the level of co-operation that currently takes place if we ended up withdrawing from the European Union without any agreement? Perhaps he could also compare and contrast that with the situation whereby we left with what I think is known in the official jargon as a soft Brexit.

The noble Lord, Lord McNally, rightly made reference to the fact that the industry would like a degree of clarity and certainty for the future. Indeed, that was the Government’s argument for bringing forward the Bill at a time when we know nothing about the regulations, on which consultation will not take place until next year and which will not be produced until 2019. Presumably, if the Government are saying that the Bill is needed because the industry requires clarity, they will use this opportunity to offer the industry clarity on the impact of our leaving the European Union on the space industry and spaceflight in this country.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, there are 38,000 jobs in the UK in the space sector, and they are top-quality, well-paid, highly skilled jobs. Brexit threatens the majority of those jobs, both directly and indirectly. Although the Bill is welcome and in itself uncontentious, it does nothing of any significance to plug the gaps that are threatening those jobs.

How and why does Brexit threaten those jobs? Two sets of work are ongoing on which we rely for a very large part of our jobs in this country relating to the space industry; they are funded by the Galileo and Copernicus projects. The UK Government have said that they want to remain part of those projects but they have failed to make a binding commitment to them. The problem is that talk of a no-deal Brexit seriously undermines the Government’s verbal assurances on this issue. They need to make it clear that they want to buy into those programmes in the future—beyond 2019. Clearly that could not happen in a no-deal scenario.

Let us be clear that we do very well out of EU space activity. In terms of what is technically called “geo return”, we put in 12.5% of funding and get back 14% of spend. We are talking about very large amounts of money. When applying for funds, companies now have to make it clear to the EU how they will ensure that after March 2019 they will still have a base in an EU country. This is a new requirement. The impact is that those companies with other EU sites are leading their bids from there, not from the UK. Those companies without another base are obviously thinking of moving to another EU country. Because there is such a long lead-in time in this industry, these decisions are being made now or in the very near future.

The second factor is the supply chain, a lot of which is foreign inward investment into the UK, and there is some current rethinking on that—so more good jobs in the UK are at risk. A major aspect of this problem is the free movement of people. The industry relies a lot on EU nationals, many of whom are already leaving. But British staff, working in the industry, are also looking abroad for opportunities and we cannot afford that brain drain. It is essential to the aerospace sector as a whole that there is free movement. The kind of visa for highly skilled workers that the Prime Minister has already talked about simply would not suit their needs. They need flexible, long-duration visas because they require staff to be so mobile and flexible. Their needs are very much like those for the rest of the aerospace sector.

For example, as many noble Lords will know, Airbus has plants in Toulouse, Broughton and a number of other places. A technician might arrive at work in Broughton one morning and be told that he is off to Toulouse by lunchtime and will be back tomorrow or the day after. Airbus, as a company, moved employees 80,000 times last year between the EU and the UK. It has its own jet shuttle between sites. The kind of visa that the Prime Minister talked about does not start to tackle that problem. The perception in Europe is that we have already left. So whatever the Government’s good intentions with this Bill, if you hollow out what we already have in our space industry in the way in which I have outlined, there is not much point in this Bill. We simply cannot afford to keep losing such high-value industries and high-quality jobs. It is important that the Government persuade us here today that they have already taken on board the key issues that we have raised in relation to Brexit and our relationship in the future with the EU.

Air Travel Organisers’ Licensing Bill

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th October 2017 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I apologise for my late arrival; I had to be on the Front Bench for the Home Office Private Notice Question in the Chamber. I do apologise for the delay I have caused.

I will be brief in speaking to the amendments. Their purpose is to raise the issue of linked travel and flight-only arrangements in relation to ATOL protection. In respect of linked travel arrangements, the Minister said that the Bill would extend protection to consumers making these less formal holiday arrangements. Can he say which clause or subsection says this specifically, or is this a matter that the Government intend to address in regulations? If it is the latter and the Government intend to address it in regulations, why not include the extension of the protection to linked travel arrangements on the face of the Bill, as provided for in my Amendment 2? I take it that linked travel arrangements will be quite significant. Will the Minister let me know, either now or later, what proportion of what I would describe as ATOL sales the Government think linked travel arrangements will make up? Are they contemplating a new separate air travel trust for linked travel arrangements, in view of later clauses?

Turning to flight-only arrangements, one issue that surfaced during the debate on the Monarch Airlines Statement on Monday was the very low percentage of Monarch passengers covered by the existing ATOL provisions. I think the Minister said it was likely to be some 10% to 15%, and that this percentage was unlikely to have been much higher even under the provisions of the revised EU directive and the Bill. As I understand it, that is because nearly all Monarch Airlines passengers were flight-only. The Government decided, particularly because of the numbers involved, to provide flights back home for those Monarch passengers stranded abroad. This is a power the Government have but as I understand it, it is entirely up to them when and if they use it. Surely that can only create a degree of uncertainty, which is not a desirable state of affairs, certainly not for stranded airline passengers.

I put it to the Minister that the Government should consider setting out clear criteria against which they will determine whether to provide flights back home for stranded flight-only passengers whose airline has become insolvent or, alternatively, consider extending the ATOL protection scheme to flight-only passengers, who made up the vast majority left stranded by the demise of Monarch Airlines. Perhaps in that regard, the Minister could give an estimate of the cost to travel organisations of extending the ATOL protection scheme in this way.

Can the Minister expand on the paragraph in the Government’s Statement on Monarch Airlines on Monday? It reads:

“But then our efforts will turn to working through any reforms necessary to ensure that passengers do not find themselves in this position again. We need to look at all the options, not just ATOL, but also whether it is possible for airlines to be able to wind down in an orderly manner and look after their customers themselves without the need for the Government to step in. We will be putting a lot of effort into this in the weeks and months ahead”.—[Official Report, 9/10/17; col. 46.]


What do the Government include in “look at all the options”? Can I take it that this will include flight-only passengers not ending up being stranded abroad with no automatic provision available to fly them back home at no additional cost? I beg to move.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for his remarks, which have provided a useful introduction to his thinking. Clause 1(3) inserts new subsection (1E) into Section 71 the 1982 Act to clarify that the Secretary of State can make regulations to exempt any form of flight-only arrangement from ATOL. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, most of the passengers in the Monarch situation were not covered by ATOL arrangements, but it inevitably leads one to reconsider the situation and what needs to be done—we will refer to this later on. The key question is whether it is desirable for flights-only to be covered by some kind of scheme of the ATOL type. That would inevitably mean an addition to the cost of flights. In the case of low-cost airlines, it would be a significant addition to the cost of a short-haul flight. In a situation of what I think the Minister will agree is brutal price competition, I suspect, although I do not know, that the airlines would not welcome any additional costs of this nature.

On Monday, the Minister emphasised the massive scale of the repatriation that the Government, via the CAA, have undertaken, and it has been a very effective way of dealing with the problem. However, Monarch was a small airline. It might have been, as the headlines said, the biggest repatriation since D-Day, but it was a small airline that went bust. When one combines the size and complexity of that situation with the issue of linked travel arrangements and the possible development of such a concept, we have to consider what sort of compensation should be available to people throughout the market. We are in a rapidly changing market and just because airlines seem to be in robust health at the moment, it does not mean, in the uncertain future we face, that this will necessarily continue in the decades ahead. I would welcome the Minister’s comments on what forms of compensation the Government are considering for those in situations where airlines go into liquidation, and by contrast what compensation should be considered for those who still stick to the old-style package holiday arrangements—if I can call them that.

Monarch Airlines

Debate between Baroness Randerson and Lord Rosser

Monday 9th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier in the Commons by the Secretary of State. I also appreciate that the Minister has himself been directly involved in these issues as the Aviation Minister.

The demise of Monarch Airlines has caused a great many problems and much distress for both passengers and certainly some 2,000 staff who have lost their jobs. Could the Minister say how many Monarch staff have so far either found alternative employment or, perhaps more realistically at this stage, been offered alternative employment?

The government Statement said that the CAA had essentially set up one of the UK’s largest airlines to conduct this operation. I agree that this is a very good example of how a state-run enterprise can deliver effectively and efficiently. Those involved in bringing home Monarch customers left stranded by its demise are to be congratulated, not least the staff of the Civil Aviation Authority. There are, though, a few questions I would like to raise.

First, how long before the demise of Monarch Airlines did the CAA start to organise aircraft to bring stranded passengers home, since concerns have been expressed about the reality that Monarch Airlines was still selling flights a few hours before it ceased trading? If the CAA knew that Monarch Airlines was on the verge of failing, and it must have done otherwise there would not have been the issue over renewing the licence, why did it not warn the public of the potential adverse consequences of continuing to purchase Monarch flights? Is this part of a general issue that the Government are looking at in the light of the comment in the penultimate paragraph of the Statement that they intend to look at all the options for ensuring that passengers do not find themselves in this situation again?

Secondly, the organisation that took over Monarch in 2014, Greybull Capital, a private investment firm, frankly has form when it comes to the collapse of companies—My Local convenience stores and Comet, for example. Bearing in mind that the taxpayer is having to pick up at least part of the price tag of Monarch’s failure, do the Government intend to consider what role they should play in future when companies are being taken over in situations where the taxpayer is likely to have to pick up a not insignificant part of the bill if the company that has been taken over then fails?

Thirdly, I understand that KPMG was appointed to seek buyers for Monarch’s short-haul business prior to the airline’s collapse, and was actively doing so. If that is correct, is it also correct that KPMG is now acting as Monarch’s administrator, and, if so, does that not raise questions about at least potential conflicts of interest?

Fourthly, I understand that that there was a report in yesterday’s Sunday Times suggesting that the £165 million rescue package to Monarch last year was largely funded by Boeing as part of a cut-price deal for an order for aircraft. Is that suggestion correct or incorrect? It has also been claimed that Monarch had £50 million in the bank. Is that correct and, if so, who will get that money, and indeed the money from the value of Monarch’s landing slots, claimed to be £60 million?

Fifthly, the Statement says that the Government are currently engaged in discussions with the relevant credit and debit card providers with a view to recouping from them some of the cost to taxpayers of what the Government describe as repatriation flights. What is the current cost to taxpayers of these flights? What is the likely final cost before any money is recouped? What is the legal position of credit and debit card providers, and indeed the other travel providers with which the Government have said they are in discussions, when it comes to paying the cost of those government repatriation flights?

Sixthly, and finally, the government Statement says that the CAA’s responsibility for bringing passengers back extends only to customers whose trips are covered by ATOL, but that the Government instructed the CAA to ensure that all those currently abroad were offered an alternative flight home, although I understand this does not apply to those returning after next Sunday. Perhaps the Government could say if, and if so why, this latter point is the situation. In the light of the penultimate paragraph of the Government’s Statement, which referred to looking at the options and trying to prevent passengers being, to put it mildly, inconvenienced in this way again, there appear to be issues about the Government’s future intentions, to be pursued perhaps more appropriately during the Committee stage of the ATOL Bill on Wednesday.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister for repeating the Statement and for having provided the opportunity to talk to him about this issue following the failure of Monarch.

Clearly, this is a massive task and our thanks must go to those who are engaged in bringing people back to Britain. This is probably the first failure of a major UK company that can be directly ascribed to the impact of the falling pound caused by the Brexit vote. I fear that it will not be the last such failure and that the Government will have to intervene to alleviate the impact of Brexit-induced failure on numerous occasions in the future.

It is true that other factors, such as increased costs of security, were involved in this situation, but the falling value of the pound increased the costs of fuel, handling charges and lease payments in a way that proved fatal for this company. So, despite a 14% growth in the number of passengers travelling with Monarch, the company was not viable any more and nearly 1,900 Monarch employees have lost their jobs. Our sympathy must go to those who have been made redundant. It also needs to go to those customers who experienced distress and will face considerable financial loss, as many are not covered by the ATOL scheme.

My questions to the Minister are as follows. First, rumours about the financial instability of Monarch had been swirling around for weeks, yet it continued trading. I received an email a couple of days before the company collapsed tempting me to buy one of hundreds of thousands of holidays on offer. Why was the company allowed to continue not just to provide holidays to those who had already booked but to entice new customers at a time of such instability?

Secondly, it appears to have been revealed that credit card firms withheld from the airline an estimated £30 million from ticket sales because they feared that it would go under. Is the Minister satisfied that this practice was legal and that it did not contribute to tipping Monarch over the edge? Do the Government intend to investigate this situation and to ensure that in future cases of a similar nature there is no knock-on effect from action of this sort by credit card companies?

Thirdly, what percentage of customers are not covered by the ATOL scheme? I appreciate that the Minister may not be able to give us a precise figure at this stage but some indication would be helpful. In what respect will the ATOL Bill, which is before this House at the moment and will be discussed in Grand Committee on Wednesday, improve the situation in the future? Will he undertake to re-examine that Bill in the light of these events to see whether more could or should be done to protect customers buying flights as part of a holiday in the new online arrangements that the vast majority of us now participate in?

Finally, how much will the repatriation cost? How far do the Government believe that they will be able to recover that cost and what steps will they take to do so?

This collapse of a company nearly 50 years old and the sheer number of customers involved emphasises how much we travel abroad these days and how important it is that the Government grapple urgently with the challenges that the transport industry faces in relation to many aspects of Brexit.