Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness

Debate between Ben Obese-Jecty and Mike Martin

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

I beg to move,

That this House recognises the danger that Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine poses to European and British security; further recognises the threat to the international order and the UK posed by China; also recognises the increasing uncertainty surrounding the reliability of the US as an ally within NATO; acknowledges the current shortfalls in the UK’s ability to deploy a credible fighting force; further acknowledges that this lack of military capability is resulting in the coercion of Britain and its interests in the international sphere; and calls on the Government to begin a programme of rapid rearmament to strengthen the defence of the UK and its allies.

The key word of the motion on the Order Paper today is “rapid”—rapid rearmament, not eventual rearmament or rearmament with an asterisk. The reason it is the key word is that the clock is not ours to choose. Three weeks ago, before the defence investment plan came out, the Prime Minister said:

“it is our intelligence assessment, and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030.”

The deadline is not contested. Intelligence confirms it, NATO proclaims it—they are speaking of this in Ankara today—and our Government accept it. We must be ready by 2030.

That is why the defence investment plan is so maddening. I have read it from cover to cover—I am that kind of guy—and I cannot wrap my head around it. It fails the test of its own threat assessment. It does not go far enough, and what it does do, it does too slowly. Large parts of it are also unfunded. It is too little, too late, and there is not enough cash.

It is worth considering how this plan came into being. Lord Robertson, the lead author of the strategic defence review, wanted to have the DIP—that is, the money bit—as an annexe to the SDR. That is really good practice when making strategy: set out a vision, which is the SDR, and then set out the resources, which are the DIP. If a Government do not have the resources to deliver their vision, they need either to downgrade the vision somewhat or to increase their resources. The decoupling of the two documents by a year, with the vision coming a year ago in the SDR, and the money and resources just recently in the DIP, is the greatest failure of statecraft committed by this Labour Government in the two years they have been in office.

First, allow me to speak about the money in some detail. Quite well ventilated in the media is the £4.7 billion that quite blatantly must be found in the next Budget, in the autumn. Although the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) has said that he intends to fund defence seriously, he has not specifically said that he will find those sums in that Budget. As the Government repeatedly tell us, defence of the realm is the most important duty of any Government. So why is £5 billion of that sacred duty in the in-tray of the next Chancellor—a person unknown at this point?

Secondly, I would like to talk about these efficiency savings—£10.7 billion of them. Speaking in this Chamber, the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, the hon. Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown), called this the oldest accounting trick in the book. If we dig just one layer below, we can see the detail: £2.4 billion of that £10.7 billion is what the Ministry of Defence calls “high maturity initiatives”. I find that it is always worth really looking into what the MOD says, because the remaining £8.4 billion of that nearly £11 billion of efficiency savings is what the MOD calls “plans at lower maturity”. Lower-maturity plans, Madam Deputy Speaker, is MOD-speak for “we have not worked out how to deliver those savings yet.”

Thirdly, and most egregiously, is a theme that I will keep returning to: the fact that this is a DIP of two halves. The first period is from now until 2030, which is covered by the current spending review, subject to the caveats that I laid out earlier. However, the second part, which covers 2030 to 2035, has to be confirmed in the forthcoming spending review. If the future Chancellor or Prime Minister do not agree to those sums going into the next spending review—due, one assumes, in the spring of 2027—the DIP will then not exist. It will just be an unfunded piece of paper.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech. The first four years—the near-term investment period—covers the period until the next election. The second half—the longer-term investment period—covers the next five years, all the way up to 2035. However, the DIP is a 10-year plan, so it should in fact go beyond 2035, and beyond two elections’ time, to 2036, which it clearly does not, because the number “2036” does not appear once in the defence investment plan.

[Mike Martin]

This actually speaks to the delay. Had the DIP come out when it was meant to, in 2025, it would have been a 10-year plan, because it would have gone from 2025 to 2035. However, the Government were unable to get their ducks in a row and the DIP was delayed by a year. If we had waited for them to rejig the plan to go up until 2036, I think we might have waited until 2040 for the plan.

This is a DIP of two halves, and the really worrying bit is that most of the investment is in the second half, which is unfunded. Let me give the House some examples. In the air domain there is £27.8 billion before 2030, and £70 billion after—unfunded. In the maritime domain there is £18 billion before 2030, and £32 billion after—unfunded. In the land domain there is £19.2 billion before, and £36 billion after—unfunded. For weapons and munitions there is £11.1 billion before, and £20 billion after—unfunded. It beggars belief. Why bother publishing a plan when, by my calculations, almost two thirds of the investments that the Government seek to make are in the second half, which is unfunded?

One of the reasons that we have pulled this plan together is to give certainty to industry, so that they know how to invest.

Ukraine

Debate between Ben Obese-Jecty and Mike Martin

Wednesday 25th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I wholeheartedly concur. The Iranians, in particular, are global leaders in exporting terror, backing, as they do, the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas. Their provision of the Shahed drone to Russia and the bombardment that the Ukrainians face lead to a terrible toll and are a terrible result.

Anyone who has seen any of the innumerable videos of first-person-view drone footage of soldiers being stalked and killed by drones cannot fail to appreciate the new reality of modern warfare. On the point made by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward), the last year alone has seen Russia increase its use of drones by 200%. Such a capability sea change cannot be overstated.

Four years into Putin’s three-day special military operation, Russia has sustained a staggering 1.2 million casualties, 325,000 of them fatalities. That is fast approaching the number of soldiers that we lost in the entirety of the second world war. The majority of casualties—reportedly 70% to 80%—are now caused by drones. It is reported that Russia can no longer recruit new soldiers at the rate that they are being lost, and in the past fortnight, Ukraine has liberated 300 square kilometres in its southern counter-offensive.

We are four years into this conflict, and the remarkable bravery of the Ukrainian armed forces remains undiminished. Yes, we have supported them with matériel, intelligence, rapid procurement and funding, but the human sacrifice required to win, or crucially not lose, a war of sovereignty and survival is something that we perhaps do not address enough. Fifty-five thousand Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since 2022—the equivalent of more than two thirds of our regular Army. From the contributions this afternoon, it is clear that Members on both sides of this House want an end to this conflict, and an end on Ukraine’s terms—one that does not see them acquiesce to the Russian threat that it has given so much to keep at bay.

In the broader context of European security, what comes next? There are significant lessons to be learned from the conflict in Ukraine. No war has been as visually documented at such close quarters as this. The Lessons Exploitation Centre at the Land Warfare Centre will have been busy shaping our future tactics. An example of that is the recently released outcome of NATO’s Exercise Hedgehog 2025 in Estonia, in which a team of just 10, training against experienced Ukrainian drone operators, were able to render two battalions combat-ineffective in just half a day. We are through the looking glass.

Last Saturday, the Defence Secretary wrote a piece for The Telegraph in which he explicitly stated:

“I want to be the Defence Secretary who deploys British troops to Ukraine–because this will mean that the war is finally over.”

But to quote Winston Churchill, that will simply be

“the end of the beginning.”

The Minister does not need me to tell him that the ceasefire will simply facilitate a reconstitution of Russian forces. To use an old adage, Russia will trade space for time. When it returns to its barracks in the Leningrad military district, it will be based only a few minutes from the Estonian border. Pskov, home of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade, is just 35 km away.

The NATO Forward Land Forces already man the line in Estonia via Operation Cabrit—one of our ongoing commitments. The battlegroup deployed there serves as a deterrent to further Russian expansionism and belligerence. No longer just a strategic tripwire, it is now a force equipped with a capability in Project Asgard that presents a lethal recce-strike system—a force whose very presence provides Estonia with the security of the NATO umbrella; a force so vital that its ongoing presence is apparently written into Estonia’s defence strategy.

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making an excellent speech. While we want the war in Ukraine to end and, of course, for Britain to play a leading role in that, including, if appropriate, the provision of troops, does he not share my fear, when we zoom out and look at the geopolitical context, that putting the troops in Estonia in Ukraine stops us from guarding other areas on the eastern flank, and—to use military terminology—fixes most of our forces there when they might be needed elsewhere?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution. I hope he has not stolen a look at my speech, as I am about to come on to just that point, but I agree with him. There is potentially a trade-off to be made between putting troops on the ground in Ukraine and in the High North. There is a possibility that doing both those things to the sufficient level that we require may prove too much of a challenge.

We are committed in Estonia, just as we are to be committed in Ukraine. It has been reported that our commitment to a post-ceasefire force would be around 7,500 troops. That is smaller than our peak commitment in Afghanistan, but that reflects the difference in posture. While 7,500 does not sound like a lot—only circa 10% of the current Army—it does not reflect the fact that three times that number is needed to sustain the deployment. By the time of a second six-month rotation through Ukraine, we would have 7,500 who have just returned from the first tour, the second 7,500 currently doing the job and the next 7,500 training to go. That is 22,000-odd from a field army of, say, 40,000, meaning that over half the Army will be committed to manning the eastern flank deterrence line.

It was reported in The Telegraph yesterday that multiple members of the coalition of the willing have privately conceded that their contributions to the post-ceasefire peacekeeping mission depend on permission from Vladimir Putin. Could the Minister in his summing-up confirm whether every country in the coalition of the willing has committed to deploying troops to the peacekeeping mission in Ukraine alongside us?

If we include the aforementioned battlegroup in Estonia, that is another 3,000 troops operating on the same cycle. If we factor in ongoing commitments, such as NATO’s Allied Reaction Force special operations component, which we lead for the next year, the Falkland Islands Roulement Infantry Company and the Resident Infantry Battalion in Dhekelia, as well as the process of retraining and rearming for the plethora of planned new capabilities, the number of personnel quickly adds up under the stacked readiness of multiple commitments. With the Prime Minister announcing our commitment to Operation Firecrest this year with the carrier strike group, as well as the expanded Royal Marines commitment in Norway, suddenly our armed forces are on the cusp of looking overstretched, and doubly so in the event that anything else comes into scope or goes hot.

I highlight these challenges to draw out the complexity of the broader strategic issue. The only way this level of operational commitment will be feasible is if, like our European allies, we properly fund defence. That is why we have called on the Government to go faster and spend 3% of GDP on defence by the end of this Parliament to ensure that they can deliver the 62 recommendations in the strategic defence review that they have already pledged to deliver. But the defence investment plan itself is six months late, strongly suggesting that the plan as it stands is unaffordable. Can the Minister confirm that the plan will finally be published before the Easter recess? It is imperative that the plan addresses the growing capability gaps as the warfare spiral develops in eastern Europe.

In conclusion,

“I believe we are on a collision course with a Russia that is on a war footing, that is replenishing its lost equipment and that is re-arming fast… Putin will only take us seriously when he sees our factories producing at wartime rates. And that’s why I believe so strongly in the need to rebuild our own national arsenal and reconnect society with its Armed Forces… The urgency could not be clearer. Just ask yourself: If you knew now that our soldiers would be involved in large-scale combat operations in 2027, what would you be doing differently—and why are you not doing it?”

Those are not my words, but the words of the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker. He said them yesterday. As we mark the fourth anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s needless and tragic war, I am sure everyone in this House would agree with me when I say that I hope we are not here to mark a fifth. Slava Ukraini.