Victim's Right to Review

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Wednesday 5th June 2013 Written Statements

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has today published interim guidance to Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) staff on handling cases that give rise to a victim’s right to review (VRR). The VRR guidance, which takes immediate effect, follows a judgment by the Court of Appeal (Thomas LJ, Dobbs J, and the Recorder of Redbridge) in R v Christopher Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608 that a victim of crime has a right, derived from the ordinary principles of English law, to seek a review of a CPS decision not to prosecute; meaning a clear procedure for the exercise of this right is required.

The guidance sets out when the victims’ right to review arises, the process for victims to request a review and how the review will be conducted by the CPS. Victims will be notified of their right to review when a CPS prosecutor decides not to charge or to terminate criminal proceedings involving that person as a victim. If the victim requests a review of the decision, a different prosecutor will consider the decision afresh and determine whether or not the decision of the original prosecutor was wrong. The decision on whether to reinstitute proceedings as a result of that review will be made at the level of deputy chief Crown Prosecutor or above.

The guidance has been issued on an interim basis and is the subject of a consultation exercise that will last for three months. The DPP will publish his final guidance later this year, once he has considered the responses to the consultation. Copies of the interim guidance have been placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

CPS Report

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Wednesday 13th March 2013 Written Statements

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is today publishing a study undertaken by the Crown Prosecution Service into perverting the course of justice and wasting police time in cases involving allegedly false rape and domestic violence allegations.

The DPP published new legal guidance on perverting the course of justice in July 2011 and, for a period of 17-months, required CPS areas to refer all cases involving an allegedly false allegation of rape, domestic violence or both to him to consider.

The report examines all of those cases and in only a very small number of cases was it considered that there was sufficient evidence and that it was in the public interest to prosecute a person suspected of making a false allegation of rape or domestic violence.

While the report shows that false allegations of rape and domestic violence are very rare, they are nevertheless very serious where they do exist. The report’s conclusions suggest that the CPS guidance for prosecutors on this issue is broadly in the right place and the findings will help the CPS ensure that they are able to make consistent and sound decisions in these difficult cases.

This publication is part of a wider programme of work for the CPS to improve its handling of cases involving violence against women and girls.

Copies of this report have been placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

Robert Powell

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2013 Westminster Hall

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff North (Jonathan Evans) on securing this debate.

My hon. Friend outlined the sad and unhappy history of this matter. At the outset, I acknowledge that it is clear that Mr Powell and his family feel, with justification, very let down by how this matter has been handled.

My hon. Friend’s concerns appear to fall into two categories. The first relates to the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service not to bring any criminal proceedings arising from the circumstances of Robbie Powell’s death. The second is whether, in light of the Crown Prosecution Service’s conduct of this matter, there should be a full public inquiry.

First, on the decision not to prosecute, it is right that Parliament holds public services to account, including the Crown Prosecution Service, for which I am ministerially accountable here. However, I have to preface my remarks with a note of caution. This debate cannot be the place to determine the guilt or innocence of those suspected of criminal activity, and it is not the place where I can engage in detailed analysis of the complex issues that this case involves. I must also be realistic about what I can achieve in the short time available to me in this debate. I do not make those remarks lightly or to brush the matters aside. I know that this is a case where there have been allegations of record falsification and cover up, and it would only fuel those concerns if I were to refuse to engage with them. So I will engage with them, to the extent that I can and that it is possible to do so in this Chamber.

The CPS reviews of evidence in the 1990s were in relation to evidence gathered during a criminal investigation by Dyfed-Powys police, which was later found, as my hon. Friend said, to be institutionally incompetent. It is hardly surprising that decisions made by the CPS on the strength of evidence gathered by an institutionally incompetent criminal investigation may be open to criticism. I will therefore focus on the review of the evidence conducted by CPS in 2003, which was based on police investigations conducted by an independent team supervised by the Police Complaints Authority.

The 2003 evidential review considered whether any of the medical professionals involved in the case could be prosecuted for gross negligence manslaughter. It also considered, in relation to the amended medical records and a backdated referral letter, whether proceedings could or should be brought for forgery and/or perverting the course of justice. That review encompassed a lengthy consideration of papers over a number of months and meetings with officers, initiating further inquiries and consulting the various medical and forensic experts in the case. A senior and eminent Queen’s counsel was instructed by the CPS throughout.

The decision at the end was that no prosecution could be brought. That decision was taken on 14 March 2003. The family were informed by letter, which explained that the CPS intended to meet them to explain the background to the decision. Ahead of that meeting, the CPS and Dyfed-Powys police met the General Medical Council to determine what might be required to initiate a GMC inquiry.

The meeting with the family took place in early April 2003. It was explained at the meeting that this was an extremely difficult decision, based on a complicated set of facts, involving myriad differing medical opinions. The decision had to consider the impact of the earlier CPS decisions not to prosecute and the impact of the passage of time on the fairness of the prosecution, including matters such as the availability of evidence for both the prosecution and defence.

The letter of 17 April 2003, to which my hon. Friend refers, was sent to explain that decision in writing, following the meeting with the Powell family. I am afraid that I do not agree with the description of the letter as “a self-serving document”. Its purpose was to assist the Powell family in understanding the decision making in an extremely complicated case and to set out fairly the Crown Prosecution Service’s evaluation of what was and was not possible.

In 2004, an inquest was finally held in this case, after the then Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, consented to an application being made to the High Court for an order that it should take place. Following the inquest, Mr Powell complained that a number of the doctors had committed perjury during the inquest. That was again considered by the same reviewing lawyer and senior Queen’s counsel. In respect of one of the doctors, such a prosecution would have met the same problems as had been highlighted in 2003; in respect of the other doctor, the case was significantly weakened by the medical evidence heard during the inquest. The CPS decision not to prosecute for perjury and the reasons behind it were also explained to the family, in a letter dated 8 December 2005. It was, of course, open to the Powell family to ask for the CPS decisions not to prosecute in 2003 and 2005 to be reviewed within the CPS, or to institute judicial review proceedings.

It remains the case that such a review would still be available. I emphasise that I am not, in saying that, suggesting that the review could possibly come to any different conclusion, because I have no grounds for making that suggestion. I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me for saying that that is all I can say on that aspect of the matter in this context.

[Jonathan Evans]

Before the Attorney-General moves away from the 2003 letter, will he respond to my points on the aspect of the letter dealing with unqualified assurances that there would be no prosecution? It is one thing to tell someone that, on the basis of the current evidence, there will not be a prosecution; it is quite another for the Crown Prosecution Service to explain a decision not to prosecute on the basis of previous unqualified assurances that no prosecution would ever take place.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General]

I totally understand my hon. Friend’s point. My difficulty is that I am not in a position in this debate to analyse the assurances that were given, their exact terms or their effect. The CPS will have to consider that. What I can say is that, generally speaking, although it is true that there may be exceptional circumstances in which an assurance that a prosecution will not be brought can subsequently be ignored and overridden, and would survive an abuse of process application if a trial were ever to take place, such an assurance will be a powerful argument if someone wishes to argue that there would be an abuse of process if a prosecution were to be brought.

In any event, the abuse of process issue in respect of assurances that no prosecution would take place is only one element in the equation, as I hope I have been able to explain. It is not the sole argument; there are also evidential issues, and I do not think such things can be considered separately. I am afraid that is the best explanation I can give in the time available.

I know my hon. Friend has previously raised with me instances in which earlier decisions not to prosecute have been ignored with prosecutions being brought later, which I accept. I emphasise that such assurances are not an insuperable or absolute bar, but they are without doubt a major obstacle if any further prosecution is to take place.

[Jonathan Evans]

My final point is that it is one thing to say that, back in 1996, an unqualified assurance was given and that it was sufficiently important for it to appear in that letter, but in 1996 a letter was sent to a Member of Parliament saying that the CPS remained open to further evidence. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that that should at least be considered?

[The Attorney-General]

I have no reason to disagree, but, equally, I have no reason to disagree with the position that the CPS adopted in 2003. That really is as far as I can go on the matter. I have explained that the issue can be reviewed further, but, for the reasons I have already given, I have no reason to think that it will necessarily be a productive avenue. If that is something the family want, it is something they can ask for.

I am conscious that I have very little time, so I will explain the Law Officers’ approach to the public inquiry. The question was most recently considered by the former Solicitor-General, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier), in the summer of 2010. Prior to that, it was considered by Lord Goldsmith in early 2007.

The starting point for those Law Officers who have previously considered the case is that a public inquiry is unnecessary, not because the matter is not serious—the matter is undoubtedly extremely serious—but because issues surrounding the circumstances of Robbie’s death have already been the subject of intense scrutiny. In 2003, there was an inquiry into Dyfed-Powys police’s handling of the case by Avon and Somerset constabulary. In 2007-08, the Independent Police Complaints Commission conducted two further investigations into complaints relating to Dyfed-Powys police. Additionally, the Welsh Assembly Government commissioned their own report, published in February 2012, into the handling of the care and treatment received by Robbie Powell. It is difficult to see that a public inquiry would uncover anything that has not already been uncovered or would identify lessons to be learned that have not already been identified.

Although it was the view of Lord Goldsmith and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough that a public inquiry is unnecessary, they both agreed that, if the Welsh First Minister maintained that such an inquiry needed to be established, they would not stand in his way provided that any inquiry encompassed the actions of both the police and the CPS. The main concern was that a public inquiry would be seriously impeded if it were not able to consider the actions of all those involved. It would serve no purpose for some participants in the Powell case to be within the scope of the inquiry only for others to be left out.

The Home Office took the view, however, that a public inquiry into the activities of the police was not necessary given the number of existing inquiries into the police arising from the case. The Home Office accordingly now takes the view that any new inquiry into the actions of the police is unlikely to produce any fresh information about the role of the police in this tragic case. For that reason, the Home Office is not convinced that there is a need for a joint inquiry. The decision is for the Home Office, but from the information available to me as a Law Officer, I have no reason to dispute the Home Office’s view.

Had the Home Office agreed to an inquiry, it would have been a further condition of the Law Officers’ consent that the inquiry did not extend to question the correctness or otherwise of a prosecutorial decision. That is because it is a fundamental constitutional principle that decisions by prosecutors are taken independently of the Executive and are free from political influence. If such decisions are reviewed anywhere, they have to be reviewed in a court of law. Any other approach risks the perception that the Government are holding the threat of an inquiry over the head of prosecutors to push them into making prosecutorial decisions in a way more to the Government’s liking.

Of course, the Home Office is right: this very tragic case has been the subject of a large number of reviews that have undoubtedly identified areas where things could have been done much better. It is important that the recommendations of those reviews are implemented.

Robbie Powell’s death was almost 23 years ago, and the passage of time continues to run. The concerns expressed by Lord Goldsmith and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough about whether a public inquiry could ever be appropriate in this case perhaps apply with greater force today than they did in 2010.

I can conclude only by expressing my sympathy for the family.

RSPCA (Prosecutions)

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Monday 4th February 2013 Ministerial Corrections

The following is an extract from a speech given by the Attorney-General, the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), during the Westminster Hall debate on RSPCA prosecutions on 29 January 2013.

[The Attorney-General]

Another issue raised by hon. Members is that when the RSPCA prosecutes, a cause for concern is that if the RSPCA prosecution is unsuccessful, costs are awarded to the defendant from central funds, and not from the RSPCA. I want to make it clear that first, that will only happen on indictable offences, and secondly, exactly the same rules apply to any other public or private prosecutor.

[Official Report, 29 January 2013, Vol. 557, c. 204WH.]

Letter of correction from Dominic Grieve:

An error has been identified in part of the speech I gave during the Westminster Hall debate on RSPCA prosecutions.

The correct response should have been:

[The Attorney-General]

Another issue raised by hon. Members is that when the RSPCA prosecutes, a cause for concern is that if the RSPCA prosecution is unsuccessful, costs are awarded to the defendant from central funds, and not from the RSPCA. I want to make it clear that exactly the same rules apply to any other public or private prosecutor.

RSPCA (Prosecutions)

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Westminster Hall

[Caroline Lucas]

The hon. Lady makes an incredibly good point. That is exactly where the focus of our ire should be, and not on the RSPCA, which had to step in to fulfil such work.

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

The assertion that has just been made is entirely and completely incorrect, as I will explain in my speech. The CPS will prosecute cases referred to it.

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the Minister for his intervention, but the evidence and experience that we have is that the CPS does not prosecute in the number of ways in which the RSPCA would. I am sorry that he disagrees, but that is our experience in the area.

Eighty per cent. of people in Great Britain feel that, where there is evidence of people hunting illegally with dogs, such people should be prosecuted. In addition, 70% support animal welfare charities bringing private prosecutions against those whom they believe to have been hunting illegally, provided there is strong evidence and if the police or CPS, for whatever reason, do not proceed. In other words, the public want the RSPCA to prosecute in cases such as that of the Heythrop hunt; to do so is justified by their charitable aims.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

It is a great pleasure, Mr Williams, to serve under your chairmanship. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire (Simon Hart) on securing this debate. I know from discussions with him that he has considerable experience of the matter and feels strongly about it. I think the matter has been passed to me because, although my Department does not cover hunting—far from it—I superintend the prosecutorial services in England and Wales.

I shall start by dealing straight away with the point raised by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). The Crown Prosecution Service prosecutes cases instituted and referred to it by the police. They include hunting and wildlife offences. Since 2005, the CPS has prosecuted 378 offences under the Hunting Act 2004, and it regularly prosecutes other wildlife offences. In 2011-12, it prosecuted 298 offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006, 16 offences under the Deer Act 1991, 43 offences under the Protection of Badgers Act 1992, and 54 offences under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. The CPS publishes legal guidance on prosecutions under the Hunting Act 2004 and of prosecution of wildlife offences generally on its website. If I have time, I will return to that.

[Caroline Lucas]

The RSPCA has a 98% success rate in prosecutions, compared with around 50% for the CPS.

[The Attorney-General]

I am not sure whether the hon. Lady is talking about a general figure for the CPS or about wildlife figures for the CPS.

[Caroline Lucas]

I am talking about wildlife cases—comparable cases, so we are comparing like with like.

[The Attorney-General]

That may well be, but the point remains that the hon. Lady suggested that the CPS does not take on those cases. If a case is referred to the CPS by the police, it will be considered for prosecution, and if it passes the code test for Crown prosecutors, it will be prosecuted.

The RSPCA, on the other hand, is a private prosecutor when bringing prosecutions. It is an unusual set-up, but the right to bring a private prosecution in England and Wales is an ancient right, which has existed from the time when the state did not have prosecution authorities and citizens were required to prosecute cases themselves. That certainly was the position when the RSPCA was set up. Although most prosecutions are now conducted by public prosecuting authorities, the right to bring a private prosecution remains, preserved by Parliament in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

Speaking personally, I once threatened to bring a private prosecution when I was dissatisfied because the police were not taking action, which did at least lead to my getting a proper explanation from the police as to why they were behaving in the way they were. I believe that it is a fundamental and important right that we have in a free society. Private prosecutions allow an individual to bring a prosecution when the state, for whatever reason, does not. Prosecutions by the RSPCA are, however, just that—private prosecutions. It has no public or special status as a prosecutor. The RSPCA sets out, in accordance with its charitable aims and in its own literature, that it applies the full code test for Crown prosecutors. If I may say so—I do not mean this in any way pejoratively—that is a self-assertion. The RSPCA may well be correct, but it certainly cannot be independently verified, and it is in no position to do that.

To pick up on something that was said, I have no doubt that ACPO may well be correct in saying that were it not for the work of the RSPCA, the burden that would be placed on the police to investigate such crimes would be considerable. I am the first to recognise, as I am sure everybody in the room today does, that the RSPCA, through its charitable work, has performed an extremely valuable role in dealing with animal welfare and cruelty issues.

[Emily Thornberry]

Is it not right that the police go further than that? They actually say that no other public body would pick the work up, which takes that further and underlines the work of the RSPCA even more.

[The Attorney-General]

There must be no doubt that if the police do not feel they have the resources or expertise to take on that work, in those circumstances it might be difficult to do it, unless some other private body were to emerge. The point I picked up from the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion is that the CPS will take on cases referred to it and consider them.

[Chris Williamson]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Attorney-General]

I must make some progress.

A point was made about cautions. The RSPCA has no power to grant cautions at all. That must be done by the police. Obviously, if the police are involved with the RSPCA in an investigation, although they are fully entitled to use the RSPCA’s expertise to help them on a joint investigation, the police must apply their own criteria and codes when deciding how a case should be disposed of—whether it should be prosecuted or dealt with in some other way. The police should not be influenced—I have no reason to consider that they are being influenced—by any private organisation with its own agenda.

Although the 1985 Act preserves the right to bring a private prosecution, it also provides—this is absolutely key to the debate—that the DPP can take over the conduct of such proceedings. The CPS will always consider a request to exercise that power and take over such a private prosecution, including from defendants, and has received requests in relation to some RSPCA cases. I will come back to that in a moment. The approach that the CPS will take in such cases is published on its website. It will review the case in accordance with the full code test contained in the code for Crown prosecutors and consider first whether there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and if there is, whether a prosecution is in the public interest. It will also consider whether there is a particular need for the CPS to take over the prosecution, either to stop it or to continue it. That is entirely a decision for the CPS. The DPP’s policy is that a private prosecution should be taken over and stopped if, upon review of the case papers, either the evidential sufficiency stage or the public interest stage of the full code test is not met. The Supreme Court has recently upheld the DPP’s policy on private prosecutions in the case of Gujra.

The RSPCA says that it applies the full code test when deciding when to prosecute. It undoubtedly has its own prosecutions department and is seen as having expertise in this field, both as an investigator and prosecutor. However, if an RSPCA prosecution is referred to the CPS, and the CPS considers that the prosecution does not satisfy the code for Crown prosecutors, the CPS will take over that case and discontinue it. Since the CPS began to keep records in that area, it has been asked to review RSPCA prosecutions on only four occasions. One of those requests is still under consideration, but in relation to the other three, the CPS saw no reason to take over the prosecution, and it continued in the hands of the RSPCA. There are also safeguards in the trial process itself, including the court’s ability to exclude evidence from the trial, and to stop a case entirely if it is satisfied that the proceedings amount to an abuse of process—for example, when the court judges that a fair trial will be impossible.

As some hon. Members have mentioned, the Environmental Audit Committee’s report on wildlife crime reported in September last year. It recommended:

“The CPS should review its performance on prosecuting wildlife crime in England and Wales with a view to either employing specialist wildlife crime prosecutors or introducing specialist wildlife crime training for its generalist prosecutors.”

The Government are finalising their response to the recommendations in that report, and that will be sent to the Committee shortly. The response is being prepared by DEFRA in liaison with the CPS.

The CPS is prosecuting wildlife crime where wildlife crime is referred to it, and where it considers that such a prosecution is justified. It has a multi-agency approach and works closely with the police and other relevant agencies in case building, so that cases can be effectively prosecuted. There are 13 area co-ordinators. To support its wildlife specialists in assessing evidence in cases, the CPS has published legal guidance. It delivers wildlife training to prosecutors and has done so for some time. In particular, in 2006 and 2009, the CPS worked closely with the police and other stakeholders to hold a Partnership for Action against Wildlife Crime court training day, exploring how to investigate and prosecute cases involving wildlife issues. It is likely that further such events will take place. In February 2011, the CPS held a seminar on prosecuting wildlife and heritage crime for CPS prosecutors, which looked at specific cases involving the Hunting Act 2004, the convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, and the Control of Trade in Endangered Species (Enforcement) Regulations 1997, as well as the National Wildlife Crime Unit, the Bat Conservation Trust, gamekeeping and trade in plants. Those are offences that the CPS takes very seriously, and when cases are brought to it that pass the full code test, they will be prosecuted.

Another issue raised by hon. Members is that when the RSPCA prosecutes, a cause for concern is that if the RSPCA prosecution is unsuccessful, costs are awarded to the defendant from central funds, and not from the RSPCA. I want to make it clear that, first, that will happen only on indictable offences, and secondly, exactly the same rules apply to any other public or private prosecutor. The reason is that if somebody is acquitted, it does not necessarily mean that the prosecution was wrong in principle. There would be a detrimental effect on prosecutors if they were liable to pay costs each time a defendant was acquitted. That may result in prosecutors being more reluctant to bring prosecutions if they feared the cost consequences. Cases that are properly brought can end in an acquittal. Even those cases that are dropped before the trial begins may well be properly started. Although the decision to prosecute anyone should not be taken lightly, I suspect that nobody in the House would wish prosecutions to be brought only if there was an absolute certainty of success.[Official Report, 4 February 2013, Vol. 558, c. 1MC.]

However, in the event that a judge or magistrates thought that the prosecution had been wholly inappropriate, they would have enormously wide discretion in how to deal with the matter, including the possibility of ordering a prosecutor to pay the defendants’ costs out of their own pocket. Or on a conviction—as happened in the Heythrop case—they have the power to say that only a small part of the costs should be paid by the defendant, and the rest has to be borne by the RSPCA itself. It is a matter for the court’s judgment.

Finally, I have been asked whether Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service inspectorate could review the work of the RSPCA. That produces quite a big problem. The HMCPSI exists to review prosecution arms of the state. Applying that to a private prosecution would, I think, be extremely difficult.

Code for Crown Prosecutors

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Monday 28th January 2013 Written Statements

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

On behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC, I am today depositing in the Libraries of both Houses an updated version of the Code for Crown Prosecutors. The code sets out how prosecutors working in the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) make decisions and is supported by comprehensive legal guidance on a range of topics, further details of which are available on the CPS website at: www.cps.gov.uk.

The code was last revised in February 2010 and has been updated following consultation to provide more focused and streamlined guidance for prosecutors. In this latest version, the evidential stage of the full code test remains much as before; however the code no longer lists the public interest factors tending in favour and against prosecution. Instead prosecutors are provided with questions to address to assist them in identifying the public interest factors relevant to the case. The revised code also highlights the need to consider proportionality at the public interest stage.

The code is published to provide transparency to the decisions taken by prosecutors. To ensure the code’s accessibility, it will be published in audio and Braille as well as in English, Welsh, and other languages. Copies of the “Code for Crown Prosecutors” will be available on the CPS website.

Guidelines for Prosecutors (Doctrine of Joint Enterprise)

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Thursday 20th December 2012 Written Statements

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has today published guidelines for prosecutors on the use of the doctrine of joint enterprise by prosecutors. On 17 January 2012, the House of Commons Justice Committee published its report on the use of the doctrine of joint enterprise by prosecutors (11th report of session 2010-12, HC 1597). In its conclusions and recommendations, at paragraph 3, the Committee recommended that the DPP issue guidance on

“the proper threshold at which association becomes evidence of involvement in crime”.

As a result of this recommendation, the DPP drafted guidelines to prosecutors on the use of the doctrine of joint enterprise. On 11 September, the DPP commenced a limited consultation on the draft guidelines with a number of interested parties. As is generally acknowledged, the law of joint enterprise is complex, and it was felt a targeted consultation with lawyers, academics and campaigners, rather than a general consultation, would be of most benefit. That consultation exercise concluded on 19 October and the DPP has now considered the guidelines in the light of the responses received and, where appropriate, amended the guidelines accordingly. Owing to the limited nature of the consultation exercise no interim guidelines were issued.

The guidelines clarify that where association evidence is relied on, the circumstances of the association of the suspect with the principal offender, together with the other evidence in the case, must give rise to the inference that the suspect was assisting or encouraging the principal’s offence. The guidelines note that in some circumstances it may be appropriate to consider alternative charges which may be available and which do not require the use of the joint enterprise doctrine. In the event that the particular circumstances apply and no such alternative is available, the guidelines caution the prosecutor to weigh carefully the merits of proceeding with the more serious charge under the doctrine of joint enterprise. Each case will need to be considered on its own facts and on its own merits before a decision is made on prosecution.

Copies of the guidelines will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

Social Media

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Written Statements

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has today launched a public consultation on his interim guidelines for prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media.

The guidelines set out the additional considerations which are relevant when prosecutors assess whether a prosecution is required in accordance with the code for Crown prosecutors. Each case will be considered on its own facts and on its own merits, and prosecutors have the task of balancing the fundamental right of free speech and the need to prosecute serious wrongdoing. The interim guidelines make a clear distinction between communications which amount to credible threats of violence, a targeted campaign of harassment or breach court orders on the one hand, and other communications —for example, grossly offensive communications—on the other. The first group will be prosecuted robustly, whereas the second group will be prosecuted only if they cross a high threshold and a prosecution is unlikely to be in the public interest if the communication is swiftly removed, blocked, not intended for a wide audience or not obviously beyond what could conceivably be tolerable or acceptable in a diverse society which upholds and respects freedom of expression.

The guidelines have been issued on an interim basis as they are the subject of a public consultation exercise that will last for three months. The DPP will publish his final guidelines next year once he has considered the responses to the consultation.

Copies of the interim guidelines have been placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

Serious Fraud Office

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 4th December 2012 Written Statements

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

The director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), David Green CB QC, and I are today outlining details of redundancy payments agreed by the SFO under the leadership of the former director, Richard Alderman, who left office in April of this year.

The SFO’s 2011-12 annual accounts, published in October, included payments made to the outgoing chief executive, Phillippa Williamson, which the National Audit Office (NAO) had deemed to be irregular as the appropriate approvals had not been obtained. It has since come to light that a further, similar arrangement had been entered into by the former director and the current director and I have therefore agreed to publish details to Parliament of all redundancy payments made by the SFO since May 2010.

As an independent body, the director of the SFO is the accounting officer for that organisation and as such is directly accountable to Parliament for the money the SFO spends. Details of redundancy payments were not disclosed to superintending Ministers by the former director. On learning of these agreements, the current director sought legal advice on whether these arrangements may be reopened and money recovered. The advice he received is that the agreements, while entered into without the necessary approvals, are binding on the SFO.

As set out in the 2011-12 annual accounts, the cost to the SFO of chief executive Phillippa Williamson’s redundancy was between £450,000 and £475,000.

A further redundancy agreement was entered into by Richard Alderman and will take effect in December 2012 when Christian Bailes’s post as chief operating officer is made redundant. The current director has been obliged to seek and obtain the appropriate approval in relation to the exit payment. The cost to the SFO is likely to be in the range of £450,000 and £475,000 and will be noted in the 2012-13 annual accounts.

Richard Alderman received a payment into his pension scheme of £44,179.59 (under an early exit agreement) to enable his early retirement at the end of his four-year contract and the appointment of a new director.

In addition, a redundancy payment of between £25,000 to £50,000 to an individual, who operated at senior civil service level, for loss of office was agreed by Richard Alderman and took effect at the end of May 2012.

An individual received a payment of between £25,000 to £50,000 under a voluntary exit scheme which was accounted for in the 2011-12 accounts. Two smaller, non-redundancy exit payments for staff below the senior civil service have been made since May 2010 as disclosed in the 2011-12 accounts (note 7), including one payment

from the previous year (2010-11). These two payments were for termination of contracts. The total combined cost of these exits is under £31,000.

The NAO has the statutory right to inspect how the SFO spends its money and the current director is committed to working closely with them. The director has put in place controls to ensure that proper procedures are followed in the future.

The publication in November of the report on case work at the SFO by HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI) was an important step in building the effectiveness of the SFO and showed the benefits to both the SFO and the Government of independent external inspection. It is proposed that there should be a follow-up inspection early next year. The director and I believe that the arrangements should be put on a more formal basis. I am therefore proposing to place the office on the same footing as the CPS and have agreed with the director that I will seek to legislate for statutory inspection of the SFO by HMCPSI as soon as parliamentary time allows.

Jury Checks and Crown's Right of Stand By

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 27th November 2012 Written Statements

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

I have today published revised guidelines on jury checks and the exercise by the Crown of its right of stand by. In 1988 the defence right to challenge jurors without cause was abolished; the prosecution right to do so was, however, retained. In effect, this means that the prosecution can object to a potential juror without giving any reason. It is, however, a right which should be used only sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. It is because of the exceptional nature of this right that my predecessors have previously issued guidelines to prosecutors on its exercise and that I do so today.

The guidelines identify those classes of case in which it may be necessary to conduct checks of a juror which go beyond the investigation of criminal records. Broadly speaking the cases in which this would be appropriate are those in which national security is involved, and part of the evidence is likely to be heard in camera; and security and terrorist cases in which a juror’s extreme beliefs could prevent a fair trial.

The checks, which are termed “authorised checks”, are checks which go beyond criminal records and for purposes wider than the mere discovery of previous convictions. I consider that it is in the public interest that the prosecution should continue to make use of its right to make inquiries about a jury panel with a view to exercising its right to stand by a potential juror.

The guidelines were last revised in 1989, shortly after the implementation of section 118 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which abolished the right of peremptory challenge. Since 1989 there have seen significant developments in the law relating to disclosure; and also changes to the structure and organisation of the police and Security Services. Over recent months consultations on the content of the guidelines have taken place with interested parties, these have included the Court Service, the senior judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, the police and Crown Prosecution Service. The new guidelines are intended to reflect the changes to the law since 1989 and the observations of the various organisations consulted.

The previous guidelines also included an annex, completed by the Association of Chief Police Officers, which provided guidance to police officers on the conduct of antecedent checks on potential jurors. The modern-day practice of Her Majesty’s Court Service when selecting jurors has now rendered the ACPO guidance otiose. Having consulted with ACPO it has been agreed that their guidance is no longer required and, accordingly, it is not included in the revised guidelines.

A copy of the revised guidelines has been placed in the Libraries of both Houses.