Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Duddridge and James Heappey

Monday 12th December 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir James Duddridge (Rochford and Southend East) (Con)]

2. What steps his Department is taking to help tackle violent extremist organisations in Africa.

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

We are concerned by the growth of Daesh and the continued presence of al-Shabaab and Boko Haram across Africa. We are working closely with our partners across the continent, as well as with our international allies, to ensure that we counter the shared threats of violent extremism and terrorism. Obviously we are supportive of the missions led by the United Nations and the African Union, but we are also increasingly looking at how the UK can support regional solutions for regional problems, and how the UK works with friends such as Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria to support their leadership in the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia.

[Sir James Duddridge]

The Minister talks about recognised current terrorist organisations, but what assessment has he made of the Wagner Group in Africa, and would he recommend its proscription as a terrorist organisation?

[James Heappey]

Wagner’s presence in Africa is obviously deeply unhelpful, and it is cynical and opportunistic. It has no interest in the countries in which it operates; it is simply there to extract the maximum value for Russia, and potentially to cause as much chaos as it can for those of us who are trying to help on the continent. However, the Government do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is being considered for proscription.

Mali: UN Peacekeeping Mission

Debate between James Duddridge and James Heappey

Monday 14th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

Mr Speaker, I could not agree more. You know that the Secretary of State and I are not the sort of Ministers who play these games. There was no deliberate briefing, and we are angry that the discourtesy of someone within our organisation means that you have read about this in The Times rather than heard it from the Dispatch Box. That was not the plan.

The right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) had a long list of questions, which I will do my best to rattle through. I think that I covered some of them in the statement. On what is next for the UN force, the UN was already in a process of reconfiguration, given the changes in troop-contributing countries that it was facing and the reality of the situation on the ground. The insurgency has moved from the tri-border area of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to further south in Burkina. The challenge in the north of the country is no longer the insurgency against the al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM or Islamic State Greater Sahel, but the same competing tribes as five or six years ago. In the south of the country, the Malians are mostly focused on the survival of the junta that came to pass. There is an incoherent set of security challenges that the UN is trying to navigate, and I think it would be the first to admit that MINUSMA as a mission is struggling as a consequence of those three different challenges within the country.

That leads to the right hon. Gentleman’s absolutely correct question about stabilising the wider Sahel. It would be erroneous to think that MINUSMA, which was a UN mission struggling to match the excellent military endeavour of troop-contributing countries with any meaningful political progress, was really doing anything to stabilise the Sahel. The centre of mass of the insurgency has moved south into Burkina, where the competition is acute. Prigozhin has recently been in Ouagadougou offering Wagner’s services. I think that everybody is concerned that this is now about avoiding contagion from Burkina and ensuring that we work with the Burkinabé armed forces to get after the insurgency where it now is, because that is at the heart of the challenge in the Sahel. That is what the Accra initiative—a west-African designed solution to a problem in west Africa—is aiming to get after, and the UK, France, the EU and others are seeking to get behind it, because we think that is the most credible option for restoring stability in the Sahel.

The right hon. Gentleman asked, “Why now? Why wasn’t there a rush to make a decision back in February when the French left?” He knows that other countries from Europe have continued, and we have been in discussion with them about what we should do and what looks like the most sensible route forward. To have rushed to a decision back then, before we were sure what the right solution was in west Africa, would have been knee-jerk. The right thing to do, as I have been doing, is to travel around the region. I have been in Mali, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo, and my counterparts from France have been visiting Niger, Benin and other countries extensively, and between us we have been able to map out what we think the best solution is.

The CH-47 commitment to Barkhane was already drawn down, and I believe that that was the subject of a written ministerial statement when the decision was made. Although the Chinooks were left to help the French move out of Mali, they have not been actively participating since Barkhane ended. The casualty evacuation capability for MINUSMA remains for as long as MINUSMA is patrolling.

The IR’s relevance is borne out by the conclusion that we have come to, because its decision was around capacity building upstream and recognising that, often, our presence can be the catalyst to insurgency. That is very much what the western African nations feel: they do not want us on their borders physically fighting the insurgency as they think that accelerates things. They want us to be working with them to support them in generating capability. Finally, on defence spending, we all wait for Thursday.

[Sir James Duddridge (Rochford and Southend East) (Con)]

As ever, my right hon. Friend shows a mastery not only of defence, but of the very complicated politics in Mali. Clearly, after Operation Barkhane closed and the French left, it was only a matter of time before there was a withdrawal. In particular, the Chinooks were providing the heavy lift for the French, but it simply did not make sense if the French were not there. He touches on the Wagner Group, which has a pervasive influence across the Sahel into west Africa and further south. Does he think that the situation could be a lot worse after Ukraine? A lot of armed combatants from the Wagner Group have been sucked into the Ukraine conflict. If there is a resolution to that conflict, I suspect that the Wagner Group will flood back into west Africa, causing problems not only in the countries he mentioned but further south in places such as Zimbabwe.

[James Heappey]

I very much enjoyed working with my hon. Friend when he was the Minister for Africa. It is a shame, however, that his collection of African ties has been put out to retirement—they were quite something.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The role that the Wagner Group is playing in Africa is very different from the one it is playing in Ukraine. In Ukraine, it is effectively generating a force, apparently conscripted from Russian prisons, to augment the Russian frontline as a manoeuvre element. In Africa, the role is somewhat different. In Mali, it is there principally at the invitation of the coup leadership to ensure the survival of the coup. In the Central African Republic, it has been doing something broadly similar, but has in the process been engaged more widely in the security in that country. Nobody should pretend that the Wagner Group is up to any good—it is universally up to mischief—but across Africa it is doing different things depending on what the Governments who have brought them in have asked them to do. But it remains a bunch of murderous human rights-abusing thugs and there is not a country on the planet that is any better for its presence.