Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Brash and Blake Stephenson

Committee stage
Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

Q Just stepping back for a moment, do you expect the result of the Bill will be that the numbers arriving on small boats will decrease and the numbers removed from the UK will increase?

Anna Turley: As I said at the beginning, it is an important part of our armoury for reducing the numbers in small boats. We have evidence clearly showing that people who come to the country think we have, essentially, a more liberal system than many other countries in Europe. Of course, there are other reasons why people want to come to the UK, but people generally think that we have a looser interpretation of some of our responsibilities than other countries. It is important to us that we are clear, through the Bill, that we will fulfil our obligations, but also that we will ensure people cannot exploit the system or find loopholes, and that we will have a system that is fair, efficient and effective. This is one part of our armoury that, alongside all the other measures we are putting in place, will see our trajectory of reducing small boats continue.

I am convinced that the Bill will certainly speed up the time it takes to undertake removals and deal with some of the last-minute claims. You have heard from my colleague about people finding yet another opportunity to thwart the system when they are literally on their way to the planes.

Bas Javid: I would add that the very act of removal, when it is done properly and legitimately, acts as a deterrent in itself. For people who are looking to come to the UK or to remain illegally after a legal arrival, the very act of removal, done in the right way, is a deterrent.

[Mr Brash]

Q Minister, you are a neighbouring MP of mine, so you understand only too well the anger about illegal migrants in your constituency and my Hartlepool constituency, particularly given that the previous Government’s decision to outsource asylum accommodation led to our communities being unfairly targeted. The test for many of my constituents will come down to whether the Bill will result in a reduction in the number of illegal migrants in our communities. What modelling has been carried out to look at the effect of the Bill on reducing the number of illegal immigrants?

Anna Turley: As I said, it is part of our armoury. I recognise very deeply, as you do, the sense of fairness that people feel in communities such as ours, which are struggling on all kinds of levels, whether access to public services, employment opportunities, levels of poverty or the broader social fabric and community cohesion challenges that we face in this country—those are important issues. As a Labour Government, we always want fairness to be at the heart of everything we do.

Although it is part of a broader armoury, the priority for the Bill is to move to a system in which British people do not feel that their sanctuary is being exploited or that others have the opportunity to access what they might not be able to access. Where we do extend a hand and help people to find a life of safety and sanctuary in this country, and they are able to integrate and become part of our communities, they will be responsible for repaying that support. Fairness, responsibility and contribution are at the heart of everything we should do in this country, as we uphold our international obligations, of which we are rightly proud.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Brash and Blake Stephenson

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)]

Q You are right to say that boat crossings are down 43% this year. Do you feel that the NCA has the resources it needs to continue that trend and go further by implementing the proposals in the Bill?

Helen Rance: Yes. We have very much moved our operational capacity towards immigration crime. Of course, like all agencies, we have a finite budget, but we are focusing it on the disruption of the highest-harm organised immigration crime, individuals and networks. I do not think we would ever say that we have enough money, because more money could always be spent on increased intelligence capability and unique capabilities that we utilise, but we have certainly done a major pivot over the last 18 months towards organised immigration crime, and we have had some excellent results with that pivot.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q In answer to Matt Vickers’s question, you said that, as a result of the Bill, exploiting our borders will be less attractive for organised criminals. What specific measures in the Bill does your organisation think contributes to that assessment?

Helen Rance: The strongest deterrence effect will come from sustained law enforcement activity. If we can continue to disrupt facilitators, seize boats and engines, and target criminal finances, it will have an effect on the operation of organised immigration individuals and networks. The Bill makes it harder and less attractive for those networks to operate within the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brash]

Q Given the explosion in the number of people claiming asylum since 2021, it is fair to say that it is a widely held public view that a huge number of those are not genuine. This Bill aims to make it less attractive to people who do not qualify for protection. Does it, in your view? Which provisions specifically do you think make it less attractive to people who do not qualify for asylum?

Professor Ekins: I am not sure whether the Bill really does make it less attractive for people who fail to qualify. As I have said already, it rightly makes it more difficult for some unlawful migrants, who claimed asylum but whose claim has failed, to stay in the UK by relying on their claimed family connection. There are other grounds on which they may resist removal. The Bill expressly preserves the capacity for foreign criminals to resist deportation on family grounds, for example. The Bill, if enacted and well received, will make it marginally—I do not mean that dismissively—easier to remove some of those people. Major obstacles will remain, though.

The provisions you have in mind are perhaps those that concern the recovery of contributions for asylum support. I apologise if I have misread this, but I thought that that would hold regardless of whether one was a genuine refugee. The point is that the Home Secretary would have a power to recover funds from people who have received asylum support. There are limitations there, clearly: they have to have funds to make a contribution, and they cannot be left destitute as a consequence.

That may have a modest deterrent effect, but that will hold for failed asylum seekers, including fraudulent asylum seekers—not every failed asylum seeker is fraudulent, of course—and genuine refugees too. But then it is the policy of the Government, rightly so, to deter genuine refugees from attempting to enter the country , certainly by contracting with people smugglers and entering unlawfully across the channel. That provision goes to your question, but I am not sure that it will have much difference in practice. Personally, I do not think that it is objectionable in principle that, if people have funds to make a contribution to the public funds that they have received, they should make it, but I doubt that many people will be in a position to deliver.

There is the other aspect though, which we have touched on: the changes that clause 22 will make in relation to the understanding of article 33 of the convention. Those provisions concern people who are genuine refugees; it just means that those genuine refugees can none the less be expelled, even to a country where their persecutors are waiting, if they are a danger to the community or a threat to national security. With respect, I find that provision quite oddly drafted; I am not sure why it is framed in the way that it is. It seems back to front, in a sense. At least the Government, and Parliament if it supports the Bill, will be addressing that provision. It is an important protection that we will not really be able to rely on, because any attempt to remove a person who is a threat to national security or a danger to the community will be predictably blocked by the ordinary operation of human rights law, which the Bill otherwise does not tame.

Dr Casey: I agree with Professor Ekins. I do not see the logical connection between the part 2 changes to the application of article 8 and deterring unlawful crossings. As I mentioned, I could see it having a modest to moderate impact, if interpreted according to the spirit of the Bill, on deterring things like overstaying on a visa or breaching a condition of your permission. One of the features of the Bill is that tribunals are directed that a family life formed when your immigration status is precarious or when you are unlawfully present should have little or no weight, respectively. If the courts took that very seriously and that became common knowledge, that might make you think, “Okay, it will be harder to leverage article 8 to stay.” That could have a deterrent effect, but not on unlawful crossings.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q Can we briefly return to clause 1(8), which I think you described, Professor Ekins, as a poor attempt at an ouster provision. Would you be able to describe why you think that? If it was better drafted, what would the constitutional and practical benefits be from that clause?

Professor Ekins: We have a long tradition in our country, and in the common law world more broadly, of interpreting ouster clauses—clauses in legislation that would limit the jurisdiction of the court on judicial review—narrowly. The courts take for granted that Parliament is probably not going be excluding their supervisory capacity; if a provision is going to genuinely exclude that capacity, the courts expect it to be spelled out categorically, in black and white. There is a long history of their looking at a clause that you might have thought, especially if you had not really been attending to these clauses and their tradition and reception, did say that, and interpreting it to have a much more limited effect or no effect at all in practice, whereas the point was perhaps to exclude review.

Looking at that clause and knowing what I do about the history of the reception of those clauses, I just do not think it will be understood to mean, “There can be no judicial review of a decision of the adjudicative body that, for example, is procedurally unfair, or that is so unreasonable that no adjudicative body would have reached it.” Now what it might do, and I think this is how it would be read, would be, “No judicial review challenges to that adjudicative decision on grounds of error of law, because, if you think there is an error of law, you appeal to the upper tribunal.” Fine: it would have some limited effect there. But if the point was to categorically exclude judicial review of adjudicative decisions of this body—and I do not know whether that was the policy of the Government or quite what the drafters had in mind—it certainly will not achieve that. I say “certainly”, I think it is probably the case, but I think it is very unlikely.

If you drafted a different ouster clause, then one might have more hope that it would be effective; in a sense, you could specify and categorically exclude the particular grounds of judicial review that you as Parliament do not want this decision of the body to be subject to. Then, in a sense, you are taking full responsibility for what judicial review should look like in relation to this body after the legislation comes into effect.

Parliament has in recent years enacted some more thoroughgoing and careful, if you like, precise, ouster clauses along those lines. These are sometimes called partial ouster clauses, because they do not categorically exclude judicial review, but they very severely limit it. There is one such ouster clause in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which protects some decisions of the upper tribunal from judicial review. That model could be applied here.

I should add there are some drawbacks to so doing, because this new adjudicative body, as our previous discussion may suggest and I think the structure of the Bill shows, is not a court. It will be an adjudicative body with some independence, but it will not be like the upper tribunal, which, frankly, is just like the High Court in a different mode. The constitutional case against doing it is certainly stronger than was the case with the upper tribunal; but, if Parliament takes the view that there should be no judicial review here or it should be only on these specified grounds, then there are other models available for drafting an ouster clause. If I were in your shoes, I would not rest content with clause 1(8) as it stands.