Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Fiona Bruce

Wednesday 22nd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

As I have already stated, I have deep concerns about the Bill. It comes back to what we define as freedom of speech. In the evidence sessions, we found different views and different incidents, in terms of no-platforming and organisations being stopped from using buildings. The hon. Member for Congleton raised Christian Concern. I have read its website. It holds some quite extreme views, and I could understand why it would cause offence to certain students. In my opinion, it is down to the institution whether they allow such an organisation’s event to take place. For example, a gay student would be concerned that the organisation in question was questioning things such as the ban on gay conversion therapy. I understand why people might think that is what their institution should be about—disagreements.

[Fiona Bruce]

I am actually very glad that the right hon. Member mentioned that point. That is the other issue that was mentioned in the press report that appeared to cause concern to the students who complained about it. Conversion therapy is going to be the subject of a Government consultation. It is a current, contentious issue, on which people have different views.

[Mr Jones]

They do. I think it is up to an institution whether they allow people to complain, if they want to complain about that. I am a bit concerned that Gerald Batten, a former UK Independence party leader, who has some quite horrific views on Islam, for example, wrote the foreword to one of the organisation’s documents. Putting that point to one side, people can complain about these organisations, which is good. I personally think it is down to the institution to decide whether it should allow its buildings to be used.

As I have said before, the reason the appointment is so important is that the individual will have a lot of power in deciding what is defined as freedom of speech. In the Bill, we skirt around the issue; we have not got a clear definition of freedom of speech. We know from the discussions that we have had in Committee that the definition varies between different individuals. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings, whom I have huge respect for, said that it is about people’s principles. That is what concerns me, because people’s principles are very different, and that is the problem. Today, it will be the Conservatives who can make political appointments, because they have a majority in this Parliament. They can appoint who they wish. But what happens if we have a Government of a very different complexion—they could be extreme right or extreme left—who want to put forward someone who will interpret the definition of freedom of speech? That could have a chilling—I will use that word again, because it is the in word—effect on the way the state or the Government of the day dictate to independent institutions what they can and cannot discuss, and what they can and cannot do. I say again that the Bill is very unconservative in that respect.

I do not think my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington is asking for something radical. I know it is out of favour with the current Government, but he is basically saying that we should have a system underpinned by the Nolan principles. Sir Christopher, you are long enough in the tooth to know why those principles were brought in. Let us be honest: they were brought in during a very squalid period of our history in the early 1990s, when individuals connected to the Government of the day were involved in some quite unsavoury practices. I am always wary that things such as the Nolan principles should not become like tablets of stone. However, they have served us as a nation well, not just for national appointments, but in local government and other institutions. We should ensure that people are appointed on merit and because of their abilities and expertise in an area.

If the Government’s current direction of travel is to ignore the Nolan principles in large part, I would be quite relaxed about it, but we have a Prime Minister who is determined to put a Government stamp on an array of institutions, from museums right through to universities. It concerns me that we do not have safeguards in the Bill as regards an individual who will have a lot of power.

Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Fiona Bruce

Wednesday 22nd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Fiona Bruce]

New clause 5 would ensure that employment tribunals had jurisdiction to hear claims relating to the duty in new section A1 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. This Bill has been introduced in part because of the high-profile instances of academics being dismissed. Many of the controversial examples have involved extramural speech rather than research or teaching, which again emphasises the importance of our earlier discussion grappling with the proper ambit of protection of academic freedom

The Committee will recall that Kathleen Stock, who gave oral evidence, faced calls for her dismissal due to her gender critical views. In 2019, we heard about Sarah Honeychurch, a lecturer who was sacked as editor of the academic journal Hybrid Pedagogy after signing an open letter to The Sunday Times criticising LGBT training in universities. What legal remedy do such academics currently have? One may argue that higher education providers, as public authorities, could be judicially reviewed, but judicial reviews are often prohibitively expensive, particularly for junior academics. Moreover, judicial review does not ordinarily review the merits of an decision, but more usually involves consideration of whether the correct procedures have been followed, which may still not capture some of the mischiefs identified by the Government before introducing the Bill.

Crucially, there is a real risk that, even if they were able to pursue a claim in the High Court, a dismissed academic may not be able to claim dismissal-related losses if they were dismissed due to an exercise of their lawful free speech and academic freedom. In the case of Johnson v. Unisys Ltd, the House of Lords took the view that the clear intent of Parliament was that dismissal-related cases and claims of a similar nature

“should be decided by specialist tribunals, not the ordinary courts of law.”

That is why I have tabled this modest but hugely significant amendment. We must ensure that those who have been dismissed due to the exercise of academic freedom have an appropriate route of challenge in the employment tribunal—a venue that has the relevant specialisms to deal with dismissal claims, recognising the spirit of and understanding the letter of the law the Bill will introduce. Employment tribunals also have appropriate procedures to simply and significantly reduce the cost burden of claims, especially when compared with the complexity and expense of claims in other proceedings, such as judicial review proceedings.

It may be argued that employment tribunals already deal with claims concerning free speech and that is correct, but invariably such claims must be linked to a protected characteristic, in particular freedom of religion or belief, which has a very specific meaning in equality and discrimination law. I anticipate that most academics would not ordinarily be able to argue that their academic viewpoint springs from their philosophical or religious beliefs, and nor should they have to. Academic freedom is there to ensure that academics have the space to rigorously test and develop new ideas. Dismissal on that basis ought to qualify for specific and special protection with meaningful remedies.

The amendment would address that problem and is consistent with evidence we heard, such as the recommendations from Tom Simpson, who said, for example,

“would seriously support considering introducing the employment tribunal as the first court to consider cases of dismissal in that situation, in addition to the existing measures in here.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 72, Q149.]

I spoke about the Bill to associate professor in the faculty of law at Oxford, Paul Yowell, and I thank him for his time. He particularly emphasised how important he considers such an amendment. I take the opportunity to refer colleagues to his Policy Exchange paper published in the last few days, “The Future of Equality”.

In his evidence, Professor Goodwin astutely pointed out:

“If the current system with regard to sacking and dismissal were working, we would not be having this conversation. We would not have had dozens of academics appearing in the newspapers. There was another one this weekend from the University of Bristol who was accused of being Islamophobic. The university had ruled that he was not Islamophobic, but had none the less removed his course in response to student satisfaction.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 96, Q195.]

He said “satisfaction”, but I think it might have been dissatisfaction. In any event, the academic’s course was removed in response to comments from students.

[Mr Jones]

Like the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings, the hon. Lady obviously reads a lot into individual cases that are highlighted in the press. I have some sympathy with her new clause, but it would not prevent people from being appointed. People would find other reasons for debarring people from applying. Could she address the issue of tenure? Employment tribunals deal in contract law—contracts between individuals—but tenure is slightly different. Would the new clause require a change to the way tenure is given to academics?

[Fiona Bruce]

That may require some consideration, but as I am sure the right hon. Member knows, tenure is attained only after very many years of often insecure academic life on the part of academics, and that is one of the issues of which we need to be acutely aware when looking at the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

I am aware of that, but if somebody who has tenure is dismissed from a university because of their views, they would not actually be protected by new clause 5. Although I agree with what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve, it may be difficult to achieve because of the issues around tenure.

[Fiona Bruce]

I am not entirely taking the right hon. Gentleman’s point—it probably requires some reflection on my part—but I thank him for raising it, and no doubt the Minister might do the same.

Professor Nigel Biggar noted that

“appeal to the courts is expensive and risky. It seems to me that academics who have lost their job ought to have readier access to lodge a complaint than through the courts.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 31, Q62.]

I hope the Minister will consider my comments.

[Matt Western]

I understand the points that have been made by the hon. Member for Congleton, and I appreciate the sentiment, but I disagree with how new clause 5 is worded, because implicit in its words is quite a narrow conception of unfair dismissal. New clause 13 is broader and affords greater protections, and I hope that the hon. Lady will support it.

Several witnesses underlined why the inclusion of employment law provisions in this conversation is so important. When questioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown on whether employment law would be a better basis for defining some of these rights, Professor Stephen Whittle responded with a categorical yes. In her evidence, lawyer Smita Jamdar said:

“there are often cases where there is a very vigorous disagreement about whether something was an exercise of academic freedom or not when it relates to criticism of the institution.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 57, Q110.]

Employees need the full protection of the law, which is what new clause 13 seeks to provide. Employees would not have to conform to the stringent requirements for bringing an unfair dismissal claim—usually, a two-year qualification period and a range of reasonable responses test, which is construed broadly, often in favour of the employer. They also would not be subject to capped damages awards. There was cross-witness support for this, including from Thomas Simpson, who said:

“I would seriously support considering introducing the employment tribunal as the first court to consider cases of dismissal in that situation, in addition to the existing measures in here.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 72, Q149.]

On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Devizes (Danny Kruger) said:

“We should allow academics to appeal not just through the civil law but to an employment tribunal if their academic freedom is restricted.”—[Official Report, 12 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 76.]

New clause 13 is actually an extrapolation of new clause 5. We think that it is broader.

--- Later in debate ---

[Fiona Bruce]

The Government might want to continue to consider this issue as the Bill progresses.

[Mr Jones]

I am now a bit confused by what the Minister has said. Tribunal cases are done on case law. I am not aware of any case law in which unfair dismissal has been upheld on the basis of a freedom of speech issue, so I am at a loss as to what the Minister has said. However, I agree with the hon. Lady that this is something that needs to be looked at in detail on Report.

Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Fiona Bruce

Monday 13th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Fiona Bruce

Monday 13th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

Q Also McCarthyism, which was the reverse of that.

Professor Kaufmann: Sure, McCarthyism. All I am saying is: it is not unusual. If you have a corrupt police department or a school that is taken into special measures, government action is needed to protect liberties. This is clearly one of those situations.

I do not think that universities can reform themselves. The pressures on them are simply too powerful. I have seen this up close, as a head of department: in committee meetings, no one will speak up against what is an illiberal policy but will make them look like a racist or transphobe, and so the policy gets through. In the US, they have had speech codes in universities since the late 1980s. There have been complaints about them—they are a violation of the first amendment right to free speech—but they persist because the institutional forces are too strong. You need an outside force to come in to reform the system. Government action is absolutely central to this, and that is why the Bill is so important.

Professor Goodwin: To keep it brief, I think the Cambridge vote was very revealing. Publicly, you have an academic who struggles to get two dozen signatures, but the moment you ask academics to express their view in an anonymous situation under secret ballot you find that most academics are willing to speak up and challenge the consensus. That is, to me, direct evidence of the chilling effect, and the way in which once you remove the threat of being exposed people are more than willing to challenge that orthodoxy.

If the current system with regard to sacking and dismissal were working, we would not be having this conversation. We would not have had dozens of academics appearing in the newspapers. There was another one this weekend from the University of Bristol who was accused of being Islamophobic. The university had ruled that he was not Islamophobic, but had none the less removed his course in response to student satisfaction.

That is another example of how, to be frank, the broader system needs a good overhaul. We have generated a market-based system that is overwhelmingly skewed around student satisfaction rather than the pursuit of truth and intellectual exploration. If the current system were working, we would not be having this conversation. It is why, on the director of academic freedom, people who are dismissed for, they feel, political reasons need to have somebody to whom they can turn to explore their case and interrogate it.

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

Q Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. The Bill speaks of freedom of speech in relation to students as well as staff; however, academic freedom in the Bill is defined in relation only to academic staff. Should that definition also include students? I am thinking not only that academic freedom is important generally for anyone at a university, but that some students, such as doctoral students, may also be tutoring.

Professor Goodwin: My view would be that the protection of academic freedom should apply not just to established academics but, in particular in some cases, to academics who are at the beginning of their career and perhaps on fixed-term contracts, or who perhaps are doctoral students. They are the most likely to self-censor, for obvious reasons. They do not want to irritate their colleagues. They do not want to suffer reputational consequences.

My view would be that it should also apply to students, given that we have around a quarter, if we look at the King’s study, for example—I would add lots of emails from students in my 20-year career of teaching in universities—of students feeling that they cannot speak out about particular issues. I think you heard from Tom Simpson who made that point regarding his experience at Oxford, so I think that students definitely need to be included.

Professor Kaufmann: I agree with that absolutely.