Public Procurement (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Adonis and Lord Wallace of Saltaire

Monday 4th February 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, having read this lengthy SI and being conscious of the other 600 or so coming our way, my sympathy for the officials working on Brexit is deeper than before. My despair at the Government refusing to rule out a no-deal Brexit is deepened when I think that some of all this is to guard against the contingency of no deal and would not be necessary if we ruled out that possibility. I know that a huge amount of extra work is going on across Whitehall to guard against a contingency that Parliament would not accept if we found ourselves drifting towards it. However, in the event of a withdrawal agreement, we will still have public procurement issues.

I want to ask primarily about the agreement on government procurement and the adjustment of moving to WTO terms, so to speak, in moving from the EU regulations to the GPA. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I heard the Minister say that others have “agreed in principle” to this and that we are “working to join” the GPA, which suggests that we will not have joined by the end of March. I hope that he can tell us when we might do so and what will happen if we leave in an orderly fashion in the next few months—I do not know how we will manage that but we will try to do it somehow—before we have joined the GPA, with a gap in between.

I note that paragraph 12.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum says that,

“in a no deal scenario where the UK is not participating in the GPA, it may be that economic operators would no longer have guaranteed access to the procurement markets of GPA parties (including the EU) or the remedies provided for by them”.

I understand that to mean that British companies will suffer in having no access to other countries’ markets. What would the situation be? Can the Minister explain a little about the difficulties we appear to have run into between October and November last year in applying to become an independent member of the GPA? Why was the United States so resistant to UK admission, as some of the documents I have looked at suggest? Are Her Majesty’s Government confident that, in rejoining the GPA as an independent country, we will find that procurement in the United States—by states as well as by the federal Government—will be open to the UK? I recall from my time in the US as a student that other countries constantly complained about how they could access federal procurement but states did not think that they were bound by international agreements of that sort.

Why did New Zealand express reservations about the UK becoming a full member of the GPA? Given that Liam Fox provides constant assurances that New Zealand is willing to offer open arms to the UK through the most generous possible trade deal after Brexit, it struck me as rather odd that its Government did so. New Zealand is a massive friend to the UK, ever grateful for having been colonised by British people. One would have thought that there would be no problems what ever.

Will Irish firms be in an intermediate position in any way in terms of access to government procurement? I am conscious that the Belfast agreement and our future relationship with Ireland are not exactly foreign matters. Can the Minister say anything about our confidence in standards of enforcement in the GPA? Moving from the EU framework to the World Trade Organization GPA framework represents moving to a looser framework. It is a bit like moving from Europol to Interpol. Standards of enforcement tend to be lower; for example, I know that China is about to join the GPA but I cannot imagine the Chinese opening their domestic state procurement market as fully as we have managed with France, Italy or Spain. Is a little more assurance on that point possible or are we simply accepting that we are moving from a tighter, more effective framework to a looser and less effective one?

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, I will begin by asking the noble Earl some specific questions, and then make some wider remarks. First, what status would British public procurement contracts have in the Official Journal of the European Union? In a no-deal scenario, is it the intention that the United Kingdom would still advertise its contracts in the Official Journal? Indeed, would it be legally possible for it to do so? If it does not, either because it is not legally possible or because it is a policy of the Government not to do so in a no-deal scenario, will that not in practice mean that our procurement market in the United Kingdom is a great deal less competitive after than it was before because, if people do not know about contracts and there is not a level playing field for them to apply, fewer people will apply? That is an important point. I simply do not understand the position in a no-deal scenario.

Secondly, from what the Explanatory Memorandum says, I assume that it will still be entirely open to UK companies to bid into the EU procurement market, in the same way as it is open to countries outside the EU at the moment. It is the issue about the advertising of contracts in respect of the United Kingdom that seems significant.

My third question relates to the point just raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, of the slightly conditional language used by the noble Earl in his opening remarks about whether we will or will not be a member of the GPA by 29 March. I took him to say that we might be, but he could not give a guarantee. Having looked at the statements made by the WTO and Julian Braithwaite, the United Kingdom’s representative there, my under- standing is that our application has been accepted in principle but that there are a number of issues still being worked through. Perhaps the noble Earl could update us. That seems a point of some importance for people in these markets to understand—whether we definitely will or may not be an independent signatory to the GPA by the end of March—not least because of the remarks made by the noble Earl himself in his introduction, where he said, I think, that having that independent membership would give us,

“continued guaranteed … rights and remedies”.

I assume the reverse is also true: if we are not an independent member at the end of March, then for the period when we are not we will not have guaranteed rights and remedies, and this could leave British companies seriously vulnerable in enforcing their rights.

My fourth question relates to paragraph 7.39 of the Explanatory Memorandum and what the regime will be in respect of state aid. A number of questions arise from the paragraph, so I will quote it:

“In respect of abnormally low tenders submitted by bidders who may have been in receipt of state subsidies, the intention”,


of the Government,

“is to treat non-UK economic operators on a level playing field. Further, although a new UK State aid regime is envisaged in which the function for enforcement is to be conferred on the Competition and Markets Authority, in the area of public procurement, it would be inappropriate for economic operators established in the UK to be required to demonstrate that aid provided by the UK Government was compatible with the UK’s State aid regime in contrast to economic operators not established in the UK”.

Is my understanding of this correct, namely that whereas we intend to apply state aid rules to European bidders for our contracts, we are not intending with these regulations to insist on those same state aid rules being applied in respect of UK bidders for European contracts? The obvious point which arises if that is the case is that it will not be accepted at face value by our European partners, who will of course presumably continue to insist on the application of their state aid rules, which are the same as now. They will not change those rules. I therefore do not understand the actual effect, because the implication in paragraph 7.39 is that the UK could start, for example, flouting existing state aid rules to support UK bidders for EU contracts. As I understand it, that would be legal under the regime envisaged. What is the point of allowing that if those same rules are going to be applied by the EU in the first place? Let us think about real-life situations. It is not in the interest of the United Kingdom that we be regarded as an unreliable bidder in respect of state aid for EU contracts. If a belief gains ground that because these rules do not apply we are content for UK companies which are in receipt of state aid to bid, that will in quite short order lead to significant tension between us and the European Commission. Would a better arrangement not be to say that if we are so keen on state aid rules being applied in respect of EU bidders for UK contracts, the right, reasonable and collegiate thing for us to do would be to insist that those same rules applied in UK domestic law to UK bidders for European contracts? Is the noble Earl with me on those points? They are technical but extremely important for bidders for these contracts.

More broadly, we are again in a slightly surreal Alice in Wonderland situation. We are told—it comes up again in the impact assessment and the statement on consultation—that these changes are technical. Indeed, they are technical in the sense that they replace an existing procurement regime which operates within the European Union market with one that operates within the UK, only with minimal changes. That is certainly correct, and for that reason there is no impact assessment and there has been no consultation. However, at another level they are anything but technical; this relates to a point that my noble friend Lady Hayter made. The act of leaving the EU with no deal means that we are at one stroke potentially rupturing our entire access to these markets and the entire access arrangements of EU bidders to our market. As the noble Earl does not appear even to guarantee that we will be a member of the GPA—subject to what he says in his response—we cannot even be sure that we are able properly to enforce existing contracts which United Kingdom operators have entered into, because the ability to enforce those contracts depends upon our membership of the GPA.

While the technical wording of the rules may not have changed in terms of how we intend to operate public procurement, the act of leaving the EU will fundamentally rupture the entire regime for public procurement, including potentially closing European markets to UK operators over time and closing UK markets to EU operators. This goes against the whole drift and success of EU policy over the past 20 years, which has been systematically to open public procurement markets. I see from the latest EU statement on the three directives in this area that they are estimated to be worth €1.9 trillion a year, paid by 250,000 public buyers across the EU. This is a very significant reason why we engaged in the construction of the single market, why we have played such an active role in setting up the rules and why we have been absolute hawks on issues of state aid and intervention by EU Governments—some of our fellow European Governments have not been as open to the concept of competition in public procurement markets as we have been.

As this statutory instrument goes through, it is important to note that the loss to the UK will be huge. It relates directly to paragraph 12.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. Those of us who are becoming familiar with these statutory instruments after dozens of them are now used to this formula. The technical changes made in this statutory instrument to make it compatible with UK law on exit are minimal. However, the actual act of leaving the EU in relation to the real-world operation of the law is massive. Paragraph 12.3 is another statement exactly in that tradition. It says:

“An Impact Assessment has not been prepared for this instrument because the framework and principles underlying the Regulations have not been substantially amended”.


Three sentences later, however, it goes on to say:

“It will be open to UK economic operators to continue to respond to contract notices published on OJEU by member States but in a no deal scenario where the UK is not participating in the GPA, it may be that economic operators would no longer have guaranteed access to the procurement markets of GPA parties (including the EU) or the remedies provided for by them”.


Those euphemistic words amount to the undermining or closing of a substantial part of the markets in which UK companies currently operate. The fact that it is caused not directly by these regulations but by the decision to leave the EU in a no-deal scenario—which underpins these regulations—will not greatly satisfy or mollify those companies whose livelihoods are trashed as a result of a no-deal Brexit.