Immigration Control (Gross Human Rights Abuses) Bill [HL]

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 15th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, strongly support the Bill and warmly commend the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, on her commitment to this cause and her good fortune in the Private Member’s Bill ballot. As she has explained, essentially it seeks to complete what must surely be accepted by all as a compellingly necessary legislative response to the particular form of gross abuse of human rights to which it is directed.

We addressed part of that response—the monetary part, as has been explained—in the Criminal Finances Act earlier this year, which provides, by way of amendment to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, for the civil recovery of the proceeds of unlawful conduct. That unlawful conduct is now defined, pursuant to the 2017 Act, to include, under the title “gross human rights abuses or violation”, the appalling ill treatment of, in shorthand, whistleblowers and the like. Under the 2002 Act, as now amended, the financial gain from this form of gross human rights abuse can be frozen by establishing a “good arguable case” and recovered by legal action if the case is then established on the balance of probabilities.

Having supported that provision in my speech at Second Reading of the 2017 Bill, when I simply mentioned the name Magnitsky, I received by post a copy of Bill Browder’s book, Red Notice. Generally, one never gets around to reading such unsolicited books, but I was tempted to dip into it by the endorsements on the cover. Tom Stoppard called it,

“a shocking true-life thriller”,

while Lee Child said:

“Reads like a classic thriller … but it’s all true, and it’s a story that needs to be told”.


And so indeed it is. Having picked it up, I could not put it down and I finished it with a deep sense of outrage. Subsequently, I lent it to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, who described it as the best thriller he had ever read, and now I have it on loan to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

The Criminal Finances Act earlier this year dealt only with the material proceeds of that sort of appalling misconduct. As has been explained, United States legislation, which Mr Browder secured previously, prohibited—and surely rightly—the entry of certain individuals to the United States. It is essentially to achieve that that the Bill today is directed, and I applaud it, but there are two questions that are worth raising.

First, Clause 1(1) of the Bill provides for the banning on entry, and so forth, in respect of a third-country national,

“who is known to be, or to have been, involved in”,

the dreadful conduct in question. I would suggest that “known” is a pretty high test. What standard of proof is intended to apply? In what state of mind must the Secretary of State or immigration officer be before he can act as the Bill envisages? For what it is worth—and it may not be much—in a judgment that I gave in the Supreme Court in 2010, in the case of JS (Sri Lanka) v the Home Secretary, on the correct approach to deciding whether an asylum seeker was barred from refugee status as a war criminal under Article 1F(a) of the 1951 convention, we were concerned with the test of whether,

“there are serious reasons for considering”,

the applicant to be a war criminal. In considering what that involved, we concluded that, clearly, a lower standard is required than would be applicable to an actual war crimes trial, but that there was a higher test for exclusion than, say, having “reasonable grounds for suspecting”. We decided that the word “considering” approximated rather to “believing” than to “suspecting”.

I note from the short but helpful Library briefing on the Bill that the Home Office guidance on the approach to Immigration Rule 320(19), the paragraph that provides for an immigration officer to refuse entry if he,

“deems the exclusion of the person from the United Kingdom to be conducive to the public good”,

is that entry must be refused if the person is suspected of crimes against humanity. It is one thing to refuse entry clearance or leave to enter or leave to remain on the basis of mere suspicion, as the guidance suggests, but it is perhaps another thing, as the Bill envisages, to cancel or curtail an existing leave on that basis. At this stage, all I would say is that further thought may need to be given to the word “known”, which is perhaps too exacting a demand to make of the immigration officer and Secretary of State; it may need amendment in Committee.

Secondly, over the past few months, the House has devoted considerable time to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill. Knowing of this impending Private Member’s Bill, it has occurred to me from time to time that its objective could possibly have been encompassed within the sanctions provision in this substantially more comprehensive public Bill. The sanctions Bill has just reached Report in the House. Could and should this further Magnitsky provision now be introduced into that Act? At least, the possibility should be considered—unless, of course, it already has been, and for some reason of which I know nothing, it has been rejected. I suggest that thought be given to that. All that said, I repeat my strong support for introducing this further provision into our law, and I wish the Bill a fair wind.

Brexit: UK-EU Movement of People (EUC Report)

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Monday 17th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the committee members, their staff and advisers who contributed to this excellent report, and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, on her lucid opening of the debate. I confess to seeing this report as an opportunity seized rather than, unlike my noble friend Lord Green, as an opportunity lost.

A fortnight ago, I spoke in the debate on the committee report on the acquired rights of EU citizens introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. The report we are dealing with today is, to a degree, related. Both reports, for example, helpfully summarise the effect of the 2004 citizens directive, spelling out the directly enforceable rights conferred on all EU citizens, as subsequently developed by the ECJ and extended to all EEA nationals. However, whereas the earlier debate concerned the sufficiency of the offer that we are now making to the other 27 states about the rights already acquired by EU citizens, today’s report concerns rather the question of how far post Brexit we should restrict the rights of EU citizens to come here. In short, it deals with proposed immigration control, not with those who already have the right to be here.

In the earlier debate I concentrated on the question of the enforcement of whatever substantive rights that ultimately come to be recognised in the withdrawal agreement, my essential point being that we should put aside our absurd red-line objection to the ECJ—perhaps in future with a co-opted British judge—having jurisdiction to resolve any disputes that may subsequently arise on the proper construction and application of the withdrawal agreement. “Enforcement” is the heading of a section of the present report, too, but here in a quite different context. Here it relates to the inevitable problems that will arise—creating, of course, reciprocal problems for our own citizens in other EU states—if we start enforcing strict immigration controls over EU citizens and, for that matter, over EEA nationals too, that are similar to those that we impose on third-country nationals. There will be problems for the Home Office, the Border Force, employers, possibly for landlords and so on. The stricter the controls, the more expensive and problematic enforcement becomes.

Even more significant than the cost and difficulty of enforcement is the price we shall have to pay for any such extensive restrictions on the free movement of workers in terms of our being allowed access to the single market, a topic upon which many of your Lordships have already spoken. I found the committee’s conclusions on this point, in paragraphs 77 to 80, of critical importance. Basically, we should be aiming to reach agreement for controls—hopefully, well short of those imposed on third-country nationals—which we hope will be compatible in the eyes of the other 27 with an acceptable free trade agreement. However, how achievable this will be and when relative to the two-year negotiating period remain to be seen.

Once again, as with the question of the future of ECJ jurisdiction, I implore the Government to set aside their red-line approach to free movement, at least to the extent of recognising the merits, certainly in the short to medium term, of exiting the single market—or, rather, the EU—by way of the EEA, a possibility that I dealt with at some length in the Brexit debate on the Queen’s Speech, when I made certain brief points in favour of taking EEA membership at least for a transition period.

For my part, I regard the total abolition of the rights of free movement of EU citizens, just as the total rejection of any future role for the ECJ, as an absurdly doctrinaire objective. Both seem to me to be misconceived as red-line issues and each is profoundly damaging to the prospects of successful Brexit negotiations. Just as the ECJ could play a useful role in resolving future supranational disputes, so too we shall continue to need a great many EU citizens who will wish to come here in the future. We should be trying to attract and encourage them rather than impose restrictions.

Obviously, the continued inclusion of students in the immigration statistics remains a puzzling and profoundly damaging mistake. The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, focused on the issue, and I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, may do so as well. But in addition to students, at any rate until some future date when we have trained up and persuaded our own citizens to do these jobs, we need health and care workers, plumbers and builders, workers in the hospitality industry, for crop harvesting and food processing, and so on and so forth.

I recognise and accept the need to place some limited restrictions on the present absolute right to freedom of movement of all EU citizens, not least to reflect the apparent wishes of many—although not all, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has made plain—who voted for Brexit in the referendum. Indeed, the goal of some limited restrictions on free movement now seems to be shared by a number of other EU states and before too long may well come to be accepted within the Union as a whole. By all means let us negotiate towards such a conclusion, but I urge the Government to abandon any absolutist, ideological, confrontational stance on this difficult issue. A high degree of freedom of movement for all EU workers will continue even after Brexit; it will remain an article of faith and a cardinal principle of the Union as a whole, and we shall not achieve a satisfactory future trading deal without recognising and respecting it. It is in that fundamental context that we should now consider this most valuable report.

Brexit: Acquired Rights (EUC Report)

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Tuesday 4th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I too congratulate the committee and its staff on producing this excellent report, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, on her illuminating opening of this debate. There is comparatively little I want to say about the substantive rights of EU citizens and their families to be enshrined in the withdrawal agreement. Mostly, I will focus on the enforcement of that agreement.

As to substantive rights, to my mind it is unsurprising that once we leave the EU, so that EU nationals no longer enjoy EU citizenship rights as such, we shall wish to put those who come to acquire settled status here on the same, rather than better, terms than British nationals, not least with regard to bringing in family members from overseas.

I would also entirely understand it if the UK were to reject what I understand to be proposed as a term of the rights to be protected—this is in paragraph 21(b)(ii) of the annex to the European Commission’s negotiating directives of 3 May—namely, certain social security rights, set out in two particular EU regulations,

“including future amendments of both Regulations”.

Surely, after withdrawal, acquired rights must be as fixed at that date—

“frozen as at the date of Brexit”—

as is suggested in paragraph 136 of the committee’s report.

As to the questions asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, on how long into the distant future such rights will remain, I suppose that they will last as long as the person remains settled, with the consequent right in future to apply for UK citizenship. Perhaps the Minister will tell me whether my supposition is correct.

It is suggested that the EU 27 are disappointed by our proposals for EU nationals living here. What precisely, besides the question of enforcement, are the particular matters which concern them, and what do our own nationals living in other EU members states think about these proposals? Do they feel sold short by the UK? Let us remember that they will enjoy reciprocal rights under the agreement.

I turn to the enforcement of the withdrawal agreement, which is addressed by the committee in its report at paragraphs 136 to 138. In her Statement on the European Council on Monday 26 June, the Prime Minister said with regard to the offer on citizens’ rights:

“Our obligations in the withdrawal treaty with the EU will be binding on the UK as a matter of international law. We will incorporate commitments into UK law guaranteeing that we will stand firmly by our part of the deal”.—[Official Report, 26/6/17; Commons, col. 303.]


In the Government’s published proposals of the same date, Command Paper 9464, at paragraph 58 and under the heading “Legal status and enforceability”, appears this:

“The arrangements set out above will be enshrined in UK law and enforceable through the UK judicial system, up to and including the Supreme Court. We are also ready to make commitments in the Withdrawal Agreement which will have the status of international law. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)”—


which, I interpolate, is still generally referred to as the ECJ, which was its earlier incarnation—

“will not have jurisdiction in the UK”.

It is all very well for the UK Government to say that our obligations will be binding as a matter of international law, but, for my part, I could understand why that rather bland assertion might be greeted by the other 27 with some scepticism. In the Government’s original February 2017 White Paper on exiting the EU, in chapter 2 under the heading,

“Taking control of our own laws … Ending the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the UK”,

paragraph 2.3—I shall not quote it all; it is all easily available—ends thus:

“We will bring an end to the jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK. We will of course continue to honour our international commitments and follow international law”.


This red line in the Government’s position is plainly among the most damaging obstacles to the prospects of successful Brexit negotiations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said, on several fronts. Let me focus on that last sentence:

“We will of course continue to honour our international commitments and follow international law”,


which, of course, is what the Government now say in the present context of safeguarding citizen’s rights, but how confident of this can the other 27 states be? We have an international law commitment under the European Convention on Human Rights to give effect to Strasbourg court judgments, but we are in flagrant breach of that commitment on prisoner voting, for example. That may have been a dubious ruling, and it is highly likely that many in this country and all too probably several in Parliament muddle up Strasbourg judgments, which are those of the human rights court, and Luxembourg judgments, which are those of the EU court, and wrongly blame the ECJ for the prisoner voting decision and for other contentious decisions such as those which have periodically inhibited our ability to deport foreign terrorists.

Although this may go some way towards explaining our misconceived hostility to the European Court of Justice—its absurd and unfair demonisation, as I described it in last week’s Brexit debate—and the Government’s wish simply to acknowledge an international law commitment to abide by the terms of the withdrawal agreement, I am unsurprised that the EU 27 demand more; in short, that EU citizens’ acquired rights here should be put beyond the reach merely of the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty.

How then should this requirement best be met? The EU Committee recommends a reciprocal mechanism be established to ensure that UK and EU law each takes account of the relevant developments in the other’s law. To this end, the committee suggests an arrangement akin to that provided for under the 2006 extradition agreement between the EU, Norway and Iceland—see particularly Articles 36 and 37 of that agreement, as set out at paragraph 134 of the report.

For my part, however, I would regard this as a needlessly cumbersome and ultimately less effective route to finding a satisfactory, supranational tribunal to which a disappointed party could turn for a final definitive interpretation and application of an agreed provision—why not the ECJ itself? To anyone who questions that on the basis that, after Brexit, the ECJ will not be an independent supranational court but rather will be akin to the supreme court of one of the parties to the withdrawal agreement—namely, the other 27 EU states—I would respond, first, that this is an unreal objection given that, whatever the court were to rule on a reference would apply no less to UK nationals now settled in other member states. Indeed, those expatriate UK nationals will have no less, and sometimes perhaps rather more, of a need for a supranational tribunal to which to appeal from another member state’s supreme court. Secondly, I would suggest that, even though there may no longer be a UK judge on the ECJ after Brexit, one could be specifically nominated as a member of the court for the purpose of any UK reference. A close analogy here would be with the ECHR, where, on any application against a member state whose own judge may in the circumstances for any reason be unable to sit—they may be conflicted, unwell or whatever—that state can nominate another judge. Indeed, I twice sat on that basis as an ad hoc judge in the Strasbourg court.

If there is to be any hope of a successful Brexit negotiation on a number of issues, including that now before us, the Government will have to modify their puzzling ideological resistance to any future acceptance of the ECJ’s jurisdiction. Surely this would be a good place to start.