Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Baroness Brinton

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and the other speakers, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, with whom I have worked for many years on this; I am very grateful for her support. I am also grateful that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, has shown some interest in this. I think the point raised about whistleblowing and making sure it is part of this package as well becomes vital. As we discussed yesterday on the Public Office (Accountability) Bill, it is absolutely key to changing the culture, which is what one wants in this sort of situation. I am also very grateful to the Minister for the detail he has gone into.

I should have made it clearer that the service stalking protection notices that my amendment seeks to create are different from the interim stalking orders, not least because they would be a tool that can be used by a police officer without having to go to a court. It is like the first step on the ladder. Going to court takes time and you have to assemble a case for it to be heard, whether by a magistrate or in another court. Therefore, it is a much more serious document, with more serious implications.

The point about these notices is that they are a tool to make the stalker aware very quickly that there are now certain rules they must follow and that things will escalate quickly if they disobey them. I am looking at the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, because I cannot remember what year they were added, but they were added because there was this lacuna between identifying a stalker and being able to get some protection for the victim.

On the other points, the Minister very kindly offered in his letter to meet me and anyone else interested, including the charities I have been working with. I think the best thing to do would be to have them with us at that meeting, because they have some very specific concerns about detail that I could not possibly go into in the Chamber at this particular time of night.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Of course.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I thank the Minister. I am very grateful to him for that. On that basis, depending on the meeting, I may bring an amendment back on Report, but for now I withdraw Amendment 21.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, again, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward these amendments, which are of significance to us all as we seek to improve the current situation. I also thank my noble friend Lord Stansgate for his contribution, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Goldie. I will address some of the points they made in my remarks.

On Amendment 24, as set out by the Government in the other place, we are already committed to reviewing Schedule 1 criminal conduct offences for summary hearings and Schedule 2 serious service offences in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as part of implementing this Bill following Royal Assent. However—and I hope this speaks to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie—for offences related to domestic abuse such as assault or assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the necessary changes will be made by secondary legislation following the review. That would obviously involve consultation with a wide range of people. Schedule 1 offences are summary offences and therefore the commanding officer has a role. Obviously, Schedule 2 offences are more serious. We are looking at what we do with respect to that and what changes may or may not be made.

The proposed changes would be consistent with current defence policy, which is that such cases should always be referred to the relevant police authority so that they can consider investigating them. Where offences are removed from Schedule 1 and added to the more serious Schedule 2, the practical effect would be that they are investigated by the Defence Serious Crime Command and, if a charge is directed, tried at the court martial rather than at a summary hearing. As I say, that will be subject to a review. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, raised quite considerable concern that if we did move forward, we needed to move forward constructively, carefully and with wide consultation. That review will take place to do that, but it is part of the implementation of the Bill and therefore the amendment is not acceptable to us. We do not want it in the Bill because that would prejudge any review which is to take place.

On Amendment 25, protecting victims is a clear priority. There is no question that we would ever restrict the application of the code for victims in the CJS in respect of victims of sexual offences or domestic abuse. The code for victims in the CJS is aligned with Section 2 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, which sets out the statutory rights of victims in England and Wales. The code for victims in the CJS and the code for victims in England and Wales will contain the same principles and the same 12 rights. This ensures that victims of service offences and civilian victims receive equivalent standards, protections and entitlements, which goes to the heart of what the noble Baroness was asking for.

If a serving person is engaged with the civilian justice system, they will still be entitled to the single service welfare support mechanisms, which are designed and tailored to support individual needs. A range of comprehensive support from both welfare professionals and the chain of command can be employed to support personnel, tailored to those individual circumstances, and can be provided by unit welfare officers, medical staff and pastoral support. Where needs are complex or relate to serious, enduring and/or multi-agency cases, a referral to specialist welfare support may be required. This is delivered by specialist trained staff, and each of the single services offers that option in addition to first-line welfare support. Although we are not where we should be, there has been some improvement.

I thank the noble Baroness for Amendment 26, relating to production orders, and for highlighting this important issue. This new clause is not required as any change to the procedures around production orders could be enacted through the relevant secondary legislation—if a change is needed, we can do that through secondary legislation—so long as a review of the current procedures has been completed so that we know what we are doing if we seek to make any change.

On a point that the noble Baroness was asking about, we will consider further whether our procedures around production orders, specifically with regard to giving notice to the individual to whom the information relates and the provision that representations can be made, should fully reflect the relevant procedures in the civilian courts and whether it is appropriate and necessary that they do so. I reassure the noble Baroness that, while the requirement for further review around production orders is considered, victims of crime are informed about information requests from third parties. That is an important addition.

When a victim information request is submitted to a third party, service police must, under Section 44B of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, give notice to the person whose information is being sought. However, that requirement does not apply in certain circumstances; for example, where it is not reasonably practical in the circumstances or, importantly, where doing so might risk causing serious harm to the victim or another person. Again, that is an important qualification. The code of practice relating to these requests also states that when the victim is informed, their views should be sought and they are able to make representations—again, unless specific exemptions apply.

I hope that with those explanations and reassurances, particularly with respect to one or two of the reviews, the noble Baroness may find it appropriate to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to all the speakers. To address the question asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, I think he is looking at that clause the wrong way round. He asked about the definition of actual bodily harm, where the alleged conduct “amounts to” or “is alleged to amount to”. I think one is an incident that has been witnessed by someone who is not the victim, and the other may be where it has not and therefore it is a “he said/she said” situation. That is my understanding of why the wording is as it is. I hope that explanation helps him.

I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Smith. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, made an important point about the chain of command, and I do not underestimate that at all.

That takes me to my response to the Minister. I am glad that there is a review, and I am sure there are many other issues as well as the ones that I have raised. However, the message that I have been picking up from the organisations and individuals I have been talking to is that in 2026 it may not be completely appropriate in some of these justice issues for the old-style chain of command to remain with the commander. If the review is going to be looking at that, I will be content not to do anything at the next stage, and ditto with the secondary legislation. If I am unhappy with the secondary legislation, I may return to the next Armed Forces Bill after this one. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is, unfortunately, unable to be in his place tonight, so I am speaking on his Amendment 36.

In October 2006, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford moved an amendment to the Armed Forces Bill, with the support of Air Marshal Lord Garden to confine sentencing in court martials to the presiding judge advocate alone, following consultation with the members of the panel. He said: “The area of sentencing for criminal offences is difficult and complex. Sentencing is an exercise for which the members of the panel have no training whatever. They do not attend sentencing conferences or have the training on sentencing that the most junior assistant recorder in this country receives, let alone any further or higher training for dealing with serious offences”.

The 2006 Act was a major reform of the system but did not include this particular amendment. It did, however, abolish the pre-existing review system whereby the Judge Advocate-General reviewed the conviction and sentence before they became final, a process which historically had operated as a check on the sentence passed. The 2006 Act introduced a service supervision and punishment order under Section 173, which imposes a quite concrete restriction on a serving soldier’s movements.

A service community order employs the community order requirements contained in the civilian sentencing legislation, adapted for service courts. The court martial can impose one or more requirements on the convicted serviceman as part of such an order. However, the SCO is principally a sentence for someone who is being dismissed from the service, and it follows him into civilian life. The recent Sentencing Act 2026 brought in the possibility of new restrictions to the SCO, the most important of which is the imposition of a restriction zone to prevent an offender from entering a particular area with, for example, the intention of assaulting or harassing a victim. Other restrictions may prevent him drinking in certain pubs or attending public events or even impose restrictions on driving.

There is, therefore, a whole army of sentencing disposals for those who are convicted. Professional judges are trained to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of imposing particular restrictions on the individual who stands before them. This requires experience and judgment. The court martial panel consists of a president and members of warrant officer rank and above who are drafted in for a particular case. The president is usually an officer for whom the position is a final posting, but the members may never have been in any sort of court before. Compare that with a magistrates’ court. The sentencing powers of a magistrates’ court are still restricted to 12 months’ imprisonment on a single charge, even though the magistrates will individually have undergone considerable periods of training. The court martial panel, without any training, is unrestricted.

Further, there is no longer a review by a professional judge of the sentence they choose to pass. Certainly, the judge advocate at the hearing can advise the panel and has a casting vote in the event of equality of voting by the members, but he can be outvoted altogether and his advice ignored.

In 2014, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford gave evidence before a departmental review in Washington as part of an inquiry which led to widespread reforms of the military justice system in the United States, the equivalent of our 2006 Act. These reforms were intended to transform military justice from a disciplinary system operating under the chain of command to something increasingly resembling an independent criminal court operating within US Armed Forces. In its report, the 2015 Military Justice Review Group also pointed out, as my noble friend had urged, that military judges had greater experience and expertise in sentencing than randomly selected panel members. It was concerned about sentencing disparity. The existing system gave the panel very broad discretion and relatively little guidance. From a constitutional point of view, it was concerned that there was the perception of command influence over sentencing and military command culture could influence punishment. It is perhaps possible to detect such a culture in the public utterances of a certain Mr Hegseth.

In its Military Justice Act 2016, Congress compromised on the issue. Judge-alone sentencing became the norm, but as a concession to tradition, a convicted person was entitled to opt for sentencing just by the panel alone. During the four years that followed that Act, it was observed that defendants chose judge-alone sentencing in 96% of the cases. As a result, the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, established in 2021 in the aftermath of intense congressional debate over sexual assault in the armed forces, was concerned in sexual offences cases that a service court martial panel would almost inevitably be male dominated, as in the case of Captain Jacob Wulfson from Lakenheath, that the noble Lord and I both referred to at Second Reading.

The commission recommended judge-alone sentencing in all non-capital general and special courts martial, subject to the establishment of sentencing parameters and mandatory restitution, akin to our own Sentencing Council. We have always led the USA in the reform of military justice, and it galls me that in this instance, it has taken the right and proper lead that sentencing is a matter for professionals and not for one-day amateurs.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken in the debate and for the thoughtful comments they have made. To deal with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, the information I have is that there is no shortage of court martial board members. I can give the figures that the ministry has provided to me: in 2025, 447 service personnel were sworn in for 283 trials, and there has been no difficulty in constituting boards. The court martial already draws from a sufficiently wide pool of eligible personnel, so, as such, the amendment is not required. If she has more detail that she would like to share, obviously that would be useful, but that is the information that I have been provided with.

It is vital that board members are up-to-date and possess the necessary practical experience of the latest single service policies, procedures, standards and values. For that reason, individuals who have left service even recently may no longer be as acquainted with changes across the services since their departure. The Government acknowledge the valuable, meaningful contribution that veterans continue to make across our society. However, we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to seek to draw on their past experience and knowledge for service on a court martial board, particularly when there is no shortage of board members.

Amendment 36, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, ably spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to remove military lay board members from the court martial sentencing process, so that sentence would be decided by the Judge Advocate alone. One argument often used is that this would mirror the Crown Court in England and Wales. However, I do not agree that the Crown Court model should simply be replicated in all cases within the UK service justice system. The current position is the same as that during the passage of the previous Armed Forces Bill in 2021, that the Judge Advocate and the service members of the board discuss and decide the sentence together. That is not an anomaly or a weakness; it is one of the strengths of the court martial to have service members and the Judge Advocate deciding on sentences together.

In answer to one of the specific points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that does not mean that the UK court martial has remained unchanged since the 2021 Act was implemented. In 2022, a new court martial rule was introduced that ensured that each court martial board includes at least one servicewoman. This is not sufficient, but it is a step forward. That is the only point I would make—which I am not sure my noble friends to the left of me totally agreed with—but all I am saying is that while it is not sufficient, it is a step forward.

In 2025, 28% of the service personnel who were sworn in as board members for court martial proceedings were women. Again, that is not what it should be, but it is a significant improvement. Since December 2024, court martial boards have been almost exclusively tri-service.

The judge advocate is of course the expert on sentencing. It is true that any sentence passed by the court martial must be determined by a majority vote, meaning that the judge advocate’s voice could, theoretically, be outweighed. However, the judge advocate will give the board the legal framework, identify the relevant sentencing guidelines and set the proper parameters within which the sentence must be considered. Failure to have regard to those guidelines and parameters opens the way to an appeal in the Court Martial Appeal Court.

The board members do not replace the judicial role. Their role is different and complementary. They bring current service experience to the assessment of what sentence is appropriate within the lawful framework. Service personnel are subject to rules, standards and operational expectations that go beyond ordinary civilian employment. Conduct that might appear straightforward in a civilian setting can have a markedly different impact in the military context, particularly where it affects discipline, cohesion, readiness, safety or operational effectiveness.

Board members bring up-to-date knowledge and real-time experience of single service policies, procedures, values and standards. The amendment would reduce the board’s role from one of equal participation to one of consultation only. There is a real difference between being consulted and being part of the decision. Consultation would mean that the judge advocate could hear the service perspective but reject it. The current system ensures that the service perspective is taken into account in the sentencing decision, while remaining subject to the judge advocate’s firm legal direction.

Nor is there any legal issue that this amendment needs to address. Sentencing in the court martial is already subject to stringent legal controls. The court martial must have regard to the relevant sentencing guidelines, which for criminal offences incorporate the same guidelines used in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. The Judge Advocate-General also issues detailed sentencing guidance for the service courts. Aggravation and mitigation are fully addressed in open court by the prosecution and defence, and pre-sentence reports from experienced probation officers are available where required. Sentences are reasoned in open court and may be reviewed subsequently by the Court Martial Appeal Court.

It is also important to remember that, while military experience informs sentencing, it does not displace the legal principles governing it. Any mitigation advanced on behalf of an offender—whether arising from previous operational service, commendations, awards or personal circumstances—must be assessed within the sentencing framework directed by the judge advocate and in accordance with applicable sentencing guidelines. To be clear, board members are not free to substitute personal views of military merit for the lawful sentencing exercise, and any sentence that failed properly to reflect the relevant legal principles would be liable to appeal.

As court martial sentencing includes service-specific sentences such as dismissal, reduction in rank and service detention, military board members are particularly well placed to assess the practical effect of those sanctions on both the individual to be sentenced and the wider service community. Board members are lay decision-makers directed to exercise their own independent judgment: importantly, they are not representatives of the chain of command. Their current military experience assists the court; it does not compromise the court’s independence.

The Government argue that the amendment would therefore reduce the service character of the court martial without adding any significant additional safeguard. We believe that the current balance is the right one: the judge advocate provides the legal expertise and safeguards; the lay board members provide current military experience and independent judgment. Together, they produce a sentence that is lawful, reasoned and properly informed by the service context. For these reasons, I ask the noble Baronesses not to press the amendments.

Ministry of Defence: Palantir Contracts

Debate between Lord Coaker and Baroness Brinton

Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

If necessary, I will write to the noble Baroness, but let me reassure her that everything was done properly and appropriately. The decision to award the contract to Palantir was made by the Defence Secretary alone. Of course, I will reflect on what the noble Baroness has said, but what she said is something that a Government would not do in awarding a contract with respect to defence or any other part of the Government. That sort of thing is not allowed to influence decisions. The Defence Secretary made the decision, and he made it on the basis that Palantir was the right company to do this, the right business to do this, and that it was in the interest of our defence and that of our allies to award it that contract.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I want to return to the question from my noble friend Lord Fox. The Minister referred to the company not having a sovereign right, but the key issue is what the company can do with data. During the passage of the then Procurement Bill, we and Labour—then in opposition—argued for special arrangements for Palantir’s contract under health where it could access only extremely anonymised data. Do we have that assurance with this contract that data is safe and will not go to Palantir?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is an important question, which is why I tried to address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. The ability of our country to protect its data, its information and systems is very important. This is why I am saying that the control of that data is a sovereign decision-making power for the UK Government. Nothing can be done without the consent of the UK Government. Those protections and shields against anything moving from where it should be are in place. I hope that will satisfy the noble Baroness.

Armed Services: Sexual Violence

Debate between Lord Coaker and Baroness Brinton

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her Question, which I think is of importance and interest to us all. As I said, various units have been set up to deal with this problem. The MoD publishes annual statistics for sexual offending within the service justice system, and the Service Complaints Ombudsman for the Armed Forces reports on complaints of sexual harassment. In 2024, there were 294 criminal investigations into sexual offences, including rape and sexual assault, compared to 251 in 2023. Additionally, 37 cases were transferred to the Home Office police. A further 10 cases were recategorised as non-sexual offences but remained within the service justice system and were handled by commanding officers. The Service Prosecuting Authority brought 61 charges for sexual offences in 2024 based on cases received that year. I hope that is helpful to my noble friend.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, the Army website for the Victim Support Pathway for sexual offences is, helpfully, very clear and, most of all, encouraging, making it plain that it is not the victim’s fault and setting out a route for her—it usually is a her—to get help. I apologise for asking for more data, but is there data yet by rank to show what percentage of the military workforce has undertaken training recommended on the Victim Support Pathway? The key advice about not being a bystander will work only if there is extensive training throughout the military.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I agree with the noble Baroness about the importance of training all ranks. Certainly, I know that the military take that extremely seriously. The establishment of the victim care unit is part of ensuring that victims are supported through the process. On whether the training has been identified according to rank, I will go back and see whether that has been done.