National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by welcoming at long last the Government’s decision to bring this legislation forward. I say “at long last” advisedly and not as mere partisan point-scoring. This House will recall that the Opposition pressed the Government on no fewer than three separate occasions during the passage of the Crime and Policing Act in the previous Session to proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On three occasions, the House voted in favour of our amendments; on three occasions, the Government voted against them. Ministers resisted, delayed and demurred until, ultimately, the weight of public pressure, the urging of the Jewish community and the reality of what is happening on our streets became impossible to ignore. The Prime Minister made his announcement and here we are.

We do not begrudge the Government their change of position; we welcome it. The direction of travel is right, and this side of the House wants to see the Bill pass. But the circumstances of its arrival matter, because they help explain the deficiencies in the Bill as drafted. This legislation draws directly from the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, whose report was published 14 months ago. Yet we are now told that this is so urgent that the Government will not consider any amendments, which is highly disappointing, given that the Bill before us today contains gaps that, if not rectified, risk rendering its central purpose unenforceable— I will come to those in a moment.

We must be frank about the threat we face. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a distinct threat. It is an organisation that has been active on British soil, targeting British citizens and funding terrorism across the world. In October 2024, Ken McCallum, the director-general of the Security Service, said that MI5 and the police had responded to 20 Iran-backed plots since January 2022 involving

“potentially lethal threats to British citizens”.

In May 2025, three Iranian men were charged under the National Security Act after a major counterterrorism investigation, and prosecutors said that one of the men had carried out surveillance, reconnaissance and online research with the aim of committing serious violence against a person in Britain. In March this year, we saw the horrific arson attack on Jewish ambulances in Golders Green, responsibility for which was claimed by an Iran-aligned group.

The IRGC funnels billions of dollars to terrorist proxies worldwide. It gifts rockets and advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. It manages thousands of fighters operating across multiple continents. It co-ordinates assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage operations, including here in the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is entirely right that the law should treat association with, and support for, the IRGC as a criminal matter. That is what this Bill sets out to do and why we support its intentions.

However, good intentions poorly executed create only the illusion of security. I must be candid with the House: as drafted, the Bill contains at least four significant vulnerabilities that we believe must be addressed before it leaves this place. The first is the “prohibited purpose” requirement. The provisions in Clause 2 are modelled on Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the provision that makes it an offence to invite support for a proscribed terrorist organisation. However, the Government have introduced an additional element that does not appear in the Terrorism Act: a requirement that the support be given for a “prohibited purpose”, which is defined as conduct that is

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

I ask the Minister a simple question that I hope he will answer directly: what form of support for the IRGC do the Government consider to be beneficial to the United Kingdom? What type of assistance to the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism could possibly be regarded as in our national interests? If the answer is none—as it self-evidently must be—then why does this additional evidential standard exist at all?

What this provision creates in practice is a perverse hierarchy of culpability. Under the Bill, a prosecution against an individual for supporting the IRGC would require proof that their support was prejudicial to the United Kingdom. However, if that same individual were supporting one of the IRGC’s terrorist proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—they would face a lower bar to prosecution under existing terrorism legislation. The organisation responsible for inspiring, organising, arming and financing those groups would receive greater legal protection than the groups themselves. That cannot be the Government’s intention. I hope that the Minister will listen and bring his own amendment to this effect; if not, I most certainly will.

The second concern relates to an omission of provisions on uniforms and insignia. Under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, it is an offence to display in a public place

“an item of clothing, or … any other article, in such a way … as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.

It is also an offence to publish an “image” of such an article or item of clothing. That is the provision used to remove Hamas flags from our streets and to seize Hezbollah insignia. The Bill contains no equivalent provision whatever. If the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its symbols, insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. There is a gap in the legislation that is so obvious and damaging to public confidence that its presence in the Bill is difficult to explain.

I believe that the Government are of the view that this would somehow be inappropriate for this legislation. I wholly disagree. The Bill applies only to a UK person. We are not trying to ban Iranians displaying such insignia in Iran—of course we cannot do that—but why should anyone in the United Kingdom be permitted to wave the flag or wear the uniform of an organisation that we have deemed to be a threat worthy of designation under this legislation?

The third gap relates to the dissemination of publications and materials. Since 2006, it has been an offence under the Terrorism Act to disseminate terrorist publications. These are publications that encourage, glorify or provide practical assistance for acts of terrorism. That standard has been part of our counterterrorism framework for nearly two decades. This Bill makes no equivalent provision for designated hostile state bodies. Materials promoting, glorifying or facilitating the activities of designated groups could be distributed without triggering criminal liability. This is not a minor technical omission; it is a failure to apply a basic and well-established standard of counterterrorism law to a new category of threat.

The fourth and final concern is the absence of a preparatory conduct offence. The Bill as drafted captures those who assist, support or receive money from a designated group; it does not capture those who are in the process of planning to do so. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 addresses this gap in the terrorism context, making it clear that preparation for terrorist action is itself an offence. By the time someone has completed an act of support for a terrorist organisation, the damage may already be done. Catching people in the preparatory stages is operationally essential for our security services. As the Bill stands, an individual who has taken concrete steps towards assisting the IRGC cannot be prosecuted unless and until the act itself is complete. They cannot be prosecuted for those acts because preparatory acts are not covered by any of offences in the Bill. That is a vulnerability that we do not have in our terrorism legislation. It is a vulnerability we should not introduce here.

I will make one final point. I have read Hansard and looked at the response from the new Security Minister to my honourable friend Alicia Kearns in the other place, and I must say that I found it wanting. The Security Minister said:

“There are a couple of themes that run through my response to the hon. Lady’s amendments. The first is that it is not possible to treat a state body the same as a terrorist organisation, because one cannot abolish a state body”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/26; col. 922.]


This argument does not stand. Proscription does not abolish a terrorist group. Hamas is a proscribed group of the United Kingdom, yet we all know it still exists in the Middle East. Daesh was not defeated because the British Government had proscribed it. Would anyone argue that Palestine Action does not exist now that it has been proscribed?

The purpose of proscription is not to abolish a group but to degrade its ability to operate in the United Kingdom by prohibiting all forms of association with and support for it. That is precisely what the Government say they intend to do with designation under this Bill. Therefore, the reality is that proscription and designation are not really as different as the Minister would have us believe. Given that was the Government’s main justification for rejecting my honourable friend’s amendments last week, I hope they will rethink their objections.

The rushed nature of the Bill’s drafting is, I regret to say, visible in the legislation. When a Government spend months resisting legislation, then reverse course under political pressure and move quickly to announce a Bill, the risk of corners being cut is very real. We see the evidence of that here. None of our concerns is insurmountable. In each case, the amendments would bring this legislation into conformity with the counter- terrorism framework it is explicitly based on.

As I have just outlined, there is no reason why this should not happen. The threat from the IRGC—and, indeed, other state-linked groups—is present, documented and ongoing. The House has an obligation to ensure that when legislation is passed in response to that threat, it is legislation that works, is watertight and enforceable, and does not permit those who support one of the world’s most dangerous organisations to slip through its gaps. We support the Bill. We want to see it on our statute book, but we will not allow the urgency of the cause to excuse the inadequacy of the drafting. We will table amendments in Committee and we look forward to constructive engagement with Ministers.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

It took your Lordships quite a long time to get that one.

But seriously, I commend and congratulate my noble friend Lord Anderson and the Minister for the hard work they have done together in the last couple of days. I was attending a wonderful family wedding in Hereford Cathedral yesterday and was being informed, between bits of the service, of what was happening in the discussions. I am very happy with the result. What has been agreed gives sufficient protection for the concerns that have been expressed.

I mentioned at Second Reading my belief that the discretion vested in the DPP and the Attorney-General is a real protection and would be a real protection for those who might be faced with even a suspicion of prosecution in such a case. I think that we have reached a good way to deal with the matters raised by my noble friend Lord Anderson at Second Reading.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. It is vital to our national security that those who assist bodies designated under this Bill are appropriately and effectively punished. The Terrorism Act 2000 has no prohibited purpose condition analogous to that included in the Bill, which we on these Benches believe could be exploited by potential criminals.

As my noble friend Lord Cameron and I argued at Second Reading, the existence of a prohibited purpose requirement will add a large degree of subjectivity and present further evidential barriers for prosecutors in the majority of cases where offenders have no legitimate defence. This argument was also made by Conservative MPs in the other place. We were told, however, by the Government that they were unable to accept our amendment, that no amendments to this Bill would be accepted and that our only chance of engaging in meaningful dialogue was to wait until the next national security Bill, the date for which is unspecified.

It is in that context that I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A seek to create a defence for the offences of assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefit from a designated body. I understand the principle behind these amendments. However, we on these Benches worry that

“for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities”

is a potentially subjective criterion that may be misinterpreted and expanded by the judiciary or exploited by those seeking to harm the interests of the UK. Equally, the inclusion of a “reasonable excuse” defence for the obtaining of material benefit from designated bodies is a cause for concern. The wording is sufficiently broad that it may encompass excuses that are not intended to be captured. Moreover, the Minister has repeatedly resisted amendments with much tighter wording, arguing that the intention was for this Bill to be drawn as narrowly as possible.

Given the perhaps unhelpful manner that the Government have displayed during the passage of the Bill, I was extremely surprised to see these amendments appear on the supplementary Marshalled List last night. The tabling of amendments at the 11th hour, with minor drafting tweaks, would make the reasonable observer conclude that the Government have been involved in the drafting process. However, I struggle to believe that would be the case, given that the Government have told the Official Opposition on multiple occasions that they were unable to make further policy decisions during the interregnum. Indeed, they were so unwavering in this stance that they were unable to accept even amendments that had been confirmed as government policy, such as that on the seizure of passports. Therefore, I look to the Minister to assure the House that there has been no government involvement in the drafting of amendments in this group. Can he confirm that?

I can only reasonably assume that the Government will therefore be unable to accept the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. If the Government have offered assistance to the Liberal Democrats and are willing to accept the amendments in this group, I have several further questions for the Minister. Why did he inform us that the Government’s hands were tied and that no compromises could be made on the Bill between Second Reading and today? Given that the Conservatives also raised the issue of a defence to the offence of supporting a designated body, why were the Government willing to give preferential treatment and to work with Liberal Democrat Peers, but not the Conservatives? The Government informed us several times that, even with amendments they were sympathetic to, there simply was not enough time to draft them in an acceptable form during the passage of the Bill. Can the Minister now confirm that this was not the case, or did the Home Office increase the capacity of the legislative team over the weekend?

The concerns raised by the amendments in this group are not novel. In the spirit of collaboration, I even wrote to the Minister on 10 June, before Second Reading, outlining the issues on which we wished to work constructively. We were told in no uncertain terms that, on every issue raised, the Government were unable or indeed unwilling to act. The decision therefore to assist in the drafting of amendments that were published the night before Committee is just not satisfactory. It leaves noble Lords with very little time to consider amendments that concern national security and which are an unfortunate attempt at avoiding genuine parliamentary scrutiny. I would be very pleased if the Minister could address these concerns.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

For the avoidance of doubt, I quite like the noble Lord, and we have a good relationship on these matters. I think I have constructive discussions on these matters with both noble Lords opposite. But I want to say to the House that I have been very clear to the noble Lord from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition that there are certain things we can do and there are certain things we cannot. There are some issues we agree with, but not in this Bill, and there are other measures we will return to in future legislation. I have tried to not dilute the central purpose of this Bill, which is to give the Home Secretary a power to designate anybody that she, having taken advice from a range of sources in the Home Office and through agencies, thinks is a threat to the state.

As I have said, the issues the noble Lord has tried to shoehorn into the Bill are ones the Government in part agree with, and we will find a proper mechanism to implement those policies in due course. I did not want to extend the scope of the Bill, nor did I want to put in measures that, in my view, dilute its core purpose. That is why I have not been able to help the noble Lord.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover—and indeed the Liberal Democrat Front Bench—made points about the unintended consequence of humanitarian, journalistic or other agencies being caught. I have tried, privately and at Second Reading, to give assurances that the Bill as drafted would not lead to those unintended consequences.

But it is perfectly reasonable for a Minister, between Second Reading and Committee, to listen to representations that are made and, as has happened, to have my officials and other Ministers in the department meet a range of humanitarian bodies, and to have respected journalists, such as Alex Crawford and Kate Adie, who were mentioned, raise issues with Members of this House where they are concerned about the impact of a particular Bill; and for us as a Government to reflect on those matters and, when amendments are discussed, to agree, potentially, areas where we can accept them. Yes, I accept that they are checked by Home Office lawyers, because this is the law of the land which the Home Office has to implement, but, with due respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that that is rejecting the things that he said.

I have tried to have a focus on the Bill. In my view, the amendments we have accepted give additional certainty. We thought we had that certainty, but requests were made to give that additional certainty and therefore we have done so. There are amendments in this group that we have not accepted and I cannot accept—I am afraid I am a perpetual disappointment to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, on his Amendment 22. But, in saying that I cannot accept the amendment he has tabled, I reassure him that the Bill we have crafted is designed to ensure that legitimate activities such as diplomacy and journalism, and activities that support basic human needs, are not caught within its offences.

We have to be alive to the risks of creating blanket exemptions, which could easily be exploited by sophisticated state actors. We have genuine concerns that exemptions could create simple loopholes for hostile actors to exploit. Those hostile actors frequently operate behind front organisations and sometimes shell charities, so a general carve-out would allow those bodies to carry out activities under the guise of relief work. I know the noble Lord does not want that, and he will know that that would not be right. There is a risk that legitimate humanitarian organisations are infiltrated by hostile actors, and, again, we must avoid unintended consequences.

However, I have recognised the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and I said what I said in my earlier introductory remarks, which do not need repeating. I am grateful to the noble Lords for their thoughtful and constructive amendments. They have helped strengthen the Bill and broaden its support, and they have meant that we have been able to tighten in many ways the concerns that were raised and address those properly.

I come back to the final point that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned. He made some good points; for example, there are things that he said on passports that are important. I agree with him; I have said to him, privately and on the Floor of the House at Second Reading, and I say to him now, that the Government hope they can do those things in this Session of Parliament. But the Bill before us is narrowly defined for a specific purpose, which is one I suspect he supports and which, ultimately, if the Bill can achieve early passage, will be resolved.

In answer to the question on whether the amendments we accept have to go back to the House of Commons, I say yes, that is right, but I am confident they will be agreed. I cannot say when, because I am not the business manager for the House of Commons, but I expect it to be done as soon as possible. If those amendments are accepted here, I have 110% confidence that they will be accepted in the House of Commons. Therefore, the Bill, as amended, with the safeguards that have been sought, can be presented for potential Royal Assent, and the powers that are in it can be exercised by the Home Secretary as a matter of urgency.

I therefore commend the amendments that I have indicated—Amendments 12A, 13A, 17A, 18A and 19A—to the Committee in support of the noble Lords, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Alton, whether he will allow me to reflect still further on his Amendment 22, as discussed.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

20: Clause 2, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body(1) A person in a public place commits an offence if the person—(a) wears an item of clothing, or(b) wears, carries or displays an article,in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of—(a) an item of clothing, or(b) any other article,in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable— (a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and(b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.(7) The powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to seize, or require a person to remove, an item of clothing being worn next to the skin or immediately over a garment being worn as underwear.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public, or publishing an image of, an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I have already made it clear that the way the Government have dealt with this Bill is unfortunate, so I will not dwell on that any longer. The amendments in this group reflect the concerns that the Opposition have raised with the Government on a number of occasions. The Government have told us that they cannot accept any of them for myriad reasons. As I hope I will demonstrate to the Committee, every one of the Government’s arguments will fail at the first hint of scrutiny.

Amendment 20 would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body. This would include those who publish an image of such articles. This amendment seeks to correct the strange situation that could arise under this Bill whereby a state entity may be designated, but it would not be an offence to display its insignia or to glorify it online.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I am a little concerned by what is meant by an article of clothing. My noble friend will know that the keffiyeh is widely worn on the streets of London and was much associated, when worn by Yasser Arafat, with the PLO. Is there a risk that the wearing of the keffiyeh would be associated with support for a designated body? If there is, we are in very serious trouble.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am not well-acquainted with this article of clothing.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

It is an Arab headdress.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Should it come before a court, the court would have to decide. Further than that I cannot comment, but I take on board what the noble Lord says.

Getting back to what I was saying, such provisions already exist for proscribed organisations under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act. Where the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. Hordes of its supporters could wave IRGC flags on British streets and intimidate members of the Jewish community, and avoid any legal ramifications. This is an obvious legislative gap that is damaging to public confidence.

At Second Reading, the Minister said that banning uniforms would impact legitimate engagement of the designated state body, which would need to continue, for example, on diplomatic channels. I do not buy that argument. We are not legislating for Iran in this Bill; we are legislating for the United Kingdom. The offences do not apply to non-UK persons outside the United Kingdom. My amendments would not criminalise the display of IRGC insignia in Tehran. They would criminalise such acts only in Britain. I contend that, if, for some reason, an Iranian diplomat came to the country for diplomatic negotiations—although I do not believe that that has happened since 1980—it would be perfectly acceptable to require them not to wear an IRGC uniform or insignia.

If noble Lords are not convinced by my arguments then perhaps the following words will help put forward the case for my amendment. For the same reason as penalising support,

“it should also be an offence to display in public a flag or other insignia in such a way as to arouse reasonable suspicion that a person is a member or supporter of a”

foreign intelligence service subject to a statutory alert and liability threat notice. The argument continues:

“This is by parity with section 13 Terrorism Act 2000 which applies only to public displays.”


These were the words of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, in his report published last year.

Much of this legislation has been justified by the Government on the grounds that it is rooted in the recommendations made by Jonathan Hall in his independent review. This amendment is a policy recommendation explicitly called for in his review. If the Government believe that his recommendation is grounds for policy justification, why does that not apply to our amendment, or will the Minister say that he believes that Jonathan Hall was wrong to suggest that uniforms should be banned?

This Government have been one categorised and defined by reviews. On countless occasions, across a range of departments, my colleagues and I have been told by the Government that they are waiting for the outcome of a review before taking any decisive action. Well, the review has concluded and Jonathan Hall has been clear, and now the Government have decided that they want to pick and choose which recommendations they would like to take forward. That raises the important question: why bother having the review in the first place?

Amendment 23 would give the police and immigration officers the power to seize the passports of individuals attempting to leave the country to assist a designated body abroad. It would do that by replicating the provisions of Section 1 and Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The amendment details at length the powers available to police and immigration officers to seize passports, and would ensure that the same safeguards in the 2015 Act are in place.

I remind noble Lords that this too was a direct recommendation from Jonathan Hall’s report. He said:

“There is a strong case for enabling speedy action to remove a passport from a person who would otherwise leave the jurisdiction, where there is suspicion of involvement in foreign power threat activity”.


At Second Reading, the Minister stated:

“We are going to do it; we are just not going to do it in this Bill, which is a specifically designed piece of legislation to give powers to the Home Secretary. We will have further national security legislation later in his Parliament”.—[Official Report, 23/6/26; col. 614.].


In our discussions with the Government, they once again said that they agreed with Jonathan Hall KC and that they would do this at some point in this Session. When we asked the Government why, if they had accepted the recommendation, they would not implement it in this Bill, we were simply told that the Home Office did not have enough time to draft the amendment. But the Government have had over a year since Jonathan Hall KC’s report to sort out the policy detail. They have had a year to get the drafting right. Let us be under no illusion about how much time it would actually take them to draft this power. They are not starting from scratch. We already have the framework for the power in law in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, as I have already mentioned. Half the job has already been done.

I have tabled my amendment, which the Minister will know is a more comprehensive version of the amendment tabled in the Commons, to show the Government that it can be done. If the Opposition can draft a comprehensive amendment on past procedure in a few days then surely the Government, with their Civil Service, can do the same.

The other criticism the Government have raised is that the amendment retabled in the Commons was too narrow, as they want the power to be extended further than to just those travelling abroad to assist a designated group. To do that, the Government say they need more time to ensure that this legislative gap is properly addressed, but all the while they prevaricate the legislative gap remains in place. If the Government want a wider power of passport seizure, applying to more offences in the National Security Act, they can bring forward a wider power in future legislation. I would be fine with that, but why will they not accept this narrower power for now as a stopgap while they draft the wider power?

Finally, Amendment 21 seeks to emulate the offence of disseminating terrorist publications in the Terrorism Act 2006. I have heard what the Minister has said about the differences between designating state-linked bodies and proscribing terrorist groups. I accept that there is a difference, but this is an issue where the difference in treatment is not borne out by the facts. The bodies we are dealing with in this threats regime are the very bodies engaging in propaganda to further their nefarious ends. The IRGC distributes materials encouraging others to wage war against the West. For example, the IRGC has founded news outlets, including Sepah News, Tasnim News Agency and Fars News Agency among others. The Seraj Cyberspace Organization serves as a central organisation that recruits and mobilises pro-regime users to conduct online operations for the IRGC. This includes social media campaigns, spreading disinformation online, and fomenting divisions among opposition groups through targeted operations. It has developed an expanded initiative to increase the IRGC’s human capacity online—its so-called soft war officers, who have been particularly active since the anti-regime protests in Iran in 2022 and the Hamas terrorist attacks on 7 October.

Other countries are taking action against the propaganda spread by the IRGC. In May, Europol’s internal referral unit launched co-ordinated action to target the IRGC’s online content after the EU designated it a terrorist organisation. It took down a total of 14,200 posts linked to the group. This operation exposed the enormous extent and reach of the IRGC’s online activities. Europol said:

“The content was spread across mainstream social media platforms as well as streaming services … Propaganda was identified in several languages, including Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, English, French, Persian, and Spanish. The material ranged from speeches blending religious martyrdom narratives with highly charged political messaging to AI-generated videos glorifying the IRGC and calls to avenge the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei”.


There we have it—AI-generated videos glorifying the IRGC, calls to violence, blogs, recruitment of online operatives and more. The reach of the IRGC’s propaganda and violent material is vast and it is only growing.

I will not accept that designated bodies are different from terrorist groups when it comes to the dissemination of propaganda material. The Government stated that they believed dissemination would fall under the Section 17A offence of inviting support for a designated body. However, the reality is that many publications may not explicitly invite support for, in the limited sense as applied in Section 17A. They may simply glorify the actions and activities of the designated body. I have already given many examples of the myriad ways in which groups like the IRGC disseminate material. If this is the reality then it is abundantly clear that there is a gaping hole in the Bill.

The corresponding terrorism offence that my Amendment 21 is modelled on is contained in Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. The offence in new Section 17A of inviting support for a designated body is modelled on the offence in Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000. These two offences were enacted six years apart. It is therefore evident that the Government and Parliament believed in 2005, when the new Terrorism Bill was introduced, that the original Section 12 offence in the 2000 Act was insufficient to deal with the full range of terrorist publications. If they believed otherwise, they would not have sought to create a separate stand-alone offence of dissemination in the 2006 Act. In other words, Parliament has already confirmed its belief that “inviting support for” does not sufficiently cover the wider dissemination of supportive materials. That is clearly evidenced by the arguments from the Government at the time. In 2005 the Minister responsible, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, said that the Government wanted to give law enforcement agencies the tools they needed to tackle a particular mischief: the dissemination of publications in context, which means that they will either encourage terrorism or be of use to terrorists in practical ways. That was a very clear statement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for giving the Committee the opportunity to debate these amendments, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for articulating the general position that the Government will take. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for the comments that he made, which mirror some of the points I will make in my response.

I completely understand why the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Pickles—who has just spoken—Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, wish to pass these amendments. They make a legitimate argument. The Government are clear in their opposition to all forms of terrorist support, particularly in the current context of antisemitism, and there are key issues that the Government wish to take specific action on. I will say a few words about each of the proposed offences in turn.

As has been said, Amendment 20 is modelled on Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which relates to organisations proscribed for being concerned with terrorism. Section 13 has proved to be operationally useful as a strict liability offence, meaning the prosecution does not have to prove an individual’s intention or state of mind. Terrorist organisations seek to recruit others to further their harmful ideologies, and wearing a terrorist uniform or displaying insignia, a flag or a logo are all acts of strength or dominance, if not terror. Section 13 seeks to deny proscribed organisations that oxygen of publicity.

However—this is where I hope I can offer an explanation to the Committee—as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for bodies involved in state threat activity, the situation is different. Foreign intelligence services and their proxies largely operate covertly and discreetly. This means that acts of flag waving and wearing a uniform in allegiance to a designated body are less of a concern. Notwithstanding difficulties that may arise with immunity from prosecution, in the event that a state body is designated, the offence could criminalise, among other things, a visiting military attaché, an embassy worker, or a cultural delegation. This could have profound consequences for diplomatic relations, and, where a designated body is a front company that was previously perceived as legitimate, this strict liability offence might punish those who simply fail to remove that body’s branding. Any need for the offence is especially limited, given that the offence of “supporting a designated body” under new Section 17A is wide enough in scope to capture the same activities. I therefore cannot accept Amendment 20.

I shall comment also on Amendment 21, which relates to a new offence:

“Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body”.


It includes a power for constables to seek the removal of internet-based publications. Again, the amendment replicates Sections 2 and 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006, but for designated entities. These offences cover the sale or other dissemination of books or other publications that encourage people to engage in terrorism or provide information that could be useful to terrorists. The Act, as currently constituted, provides a power for police to require the takedown of such material by internet service providers.

Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 is designed to criminalise the dissemination of terrorist publications. It was introduced recognising the significant harm that can be caused. This offence purposely is not dependent on an organisation having been proscribed, recognising that terrorist publications may include publications which include and encourage the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism more broadly. In contrast, this Bill focuses on the strengthening of our response to organisations involved in foreign power threat activities that pose an acute threat to the UK and its interests. The threat from publications in this context is, I would suggest, not the same.

Offences in the National Security Act were specifically designed to target threats from state-linked activity, and that Act contains a number of offences that do not appear in terrorism legislation, including assisting a foreign intelligence service. In addition, this Bill includes offences under new Section 17A if a person

“invites support for, or expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of, a designated body, and does so for a prohibited purpose”.

I contend that this offence is wide enough to capture the dissemination of publications where those requirements are met. A replicated offence in this case is not appropriate or required to address the state threats, and, incidentally, it was not recommended by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, who cautioned against directly copying these offences. He said:

“There is no evidence that penalising general encouragement of state threat activity is needed to avert harm to national security”.


Therefore, I suggest to the noble Lord that this amendment is unnecessary: it is not recommended by Jonathan Hall and the powers should not be included in the Bill.

The final amendment is one we have discussed on several occasions, including today. Amendment 23 seeks to give effect to Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendation that the police be given the power to seize passports. Whereas Jonathan Hall KC recommended that the power should be available on the basis of suspected foreign power threat activity, as currently exists for terrorism-related activity, this amendment is more limited in its application. Noble Lords will be aware that the Bill before us covers a range of issues, but as to the proposal in this amendment, I have already given a commitment on several occasions to deliver all Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendations in the report that inspired this Bill, including the question of passport seizure, which Amendment 23 seeks to examine. However, I have been clear that, in doing so, the Bill should focus narrowly on the new proscription-like power to tackle state threats, and it is not the right vehicle for this proposal.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 23 covers pages 14 to 26 of the amendment paper, the Marshalled List that is in front of us today. It takes 13 pages to give implementation to the policy objective of banning passports. I suggest that the noble Lord will probably ask me, at some point, why I will not accept his amendment. He has tabled 13 pages full of detailed points, which he suggests will meet the objective, but I cannot necessarily say to the Committee that they do meet that objective.

On Amendment 23, I told the noble Lord that we will achieve the objective he described in our own time, with proper legal facility. The noble Lord shakes his head, or perhaps I should say he looks quizzically at me: I think he will agree with that. I assure him that we want to meet the objective he set, but not in this Bill. I cannot be any clearer than that. I recognise that, at 13 pages, such provisions require detailed policy work, done in concert with key operational partners. While noble Lords have sensibly drawn their inspiration from the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, it is an assumption that all those provisions are fit for the purpose of the state threats context. The detailed policy work needs to be completed, and we need to ensure that we have operational guidance for partners, to be ready on commencement of the legislation. I am afraid the noble Lord’s Amendment 23 does not meet that objective.

I assure the noble Lord that we are not on different pages on this. The Bill is a specific Bill for a specific purpose and, while I agree with its general direction of travel, Amendment 23 is not fit for purpose. I therefore ask the noble Lord not press Amendments 20, 21 or 23, for the reasons I have outlined. However, should he choose to do so, I invite my noble friends to vote against them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lord Pickles, for their support, and I thank the Minister for his response. I listened to what the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Carlile of Berriew, had to say about this. However, I remain unconvinced. The very act of wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated body can intimidate members of our society and damage community cohesion. I do not believe that the Bill, as drafted, offers sufficient safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals and communities who are targeted by foreign state powers.

If an individual wore an IRGC uniform and sat outside a synagogue, any reasonable member of the public would consider this an intimidatory act. However, the threshold for successful prosecution under a Section 17A offence would remain unacceptably high. The individual could argue that the purpose of wearing the uniform was not to express support for the designated body and that it was worn in a satirical context. Even if this extremely subjective intention could be disproved, it would then fall on the prosecution to show that such actions were prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, which is another subjective and potentially problematic barrier to prosecution.

I suggest that my amendment fixes this glaring loophole. It shuts down any avenues through which those who seek to terrorise others can evade prosecution. There are simply no justifications for why someone in the UK should be wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated state threat. Therefore, in line with Jonathan Hall’s recommendation, we should make it an offence to do so.

Amendment 23 concerns the seizure of passports of those suspected of supporting designated bodies, and this amendment has been unequivocally supported by Jonathan Hall, and is already a power which the police possess when combating terrorism. Let us be clear about this: it is not a new police power. It was a direct recommendation of a government-sanctioned review, and the Government have said that they will commit to implementing this policy. There is therefore no good reason to oppose this amendment, nor is there a logical or practical one.

Although the Government have pledged to implement this power in a future Bill, there are three concerns that remain which have not been assuaged by the Minister. First, any such future Bill will not receive Royal Assent before the Summer Recess. This means that those who support the IRGC will be protected from these police powers for a considerable length of time. What is the point of rushing to designate a group before Parliament concludes, but not giving the police force the necessary teeth to operate effectively?

Secondly, as I have made clear, the Government have perhaps acted in bad faith on this Bill. We on these Benches simply cannot wait for an unspecified date to enact a policy that can be accepted today. Thirdly, the Minister has acknowledged that his party is currently undergoing vast leadership changes. What is government policy today may not be government policy tomorrow.

I turn now to Amendment 21. As stated previously, this amendment would close yet another legislative gap in this Bill.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There is absolutely no indication from any potential new Prime Minister that any changes to security legislation will be made. The King’s gracious Speech, and this Bill, both stand.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Amendment 21, as stated previously, would close yet another legislative gap in the Bill, a gap that was recognised 20 years ago and subsequently rectified in the Terrorism Act 2006. I remain unconvinced by the Government’s justification for opposing our amendment. If the Government and Parliament recognised 20 years ago that a specific criminal offence of dissemination was required to address a lacuna in the law in relation to terrorism, surely we must recognise today that it is precisely the same lacuna in this Bill.

If my amendments do not form part of the final Act, I fear that the types of propaganda by designated bodies that I mentioned earlier will be allowed to flourish, that the IRGC will be able to parade in its uniforms and with its flags, and that those seeking to travel abroad to assist the IRGC will not be stopped. If any of these things happen, a crucial test of the Bill— namely, its ability to target and disrupt state threats to the United Kingdom—will have failed.

The Government have shown that they are not willing to take the necessary action to strengthen the Bill. If that is the case, I am left with no choice but to test the opinion of the House.