National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Pickles Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we cannot support these amendments. As we have heard several times, this is emergency legislation, introduced at a time when an urgent response is necessary to the activities of some truly malign state actors and their proxies.

There has been a dangerous escalation in recent months and years, not only of the threats of military and quasi-military attacks, but of cyber attacks on our energy and transport infrastructures and on our economy more widely. Then there has been an appalling outbreak of antisemitic attacks in the UK and abroad, and in allied countries such as Australia. Those attacks have also given occasion, we should remember, to anti-Muslim attacks at home and abroad. Our traditions of tolerance and peaceful co-existence have been, and have certainly seemed, constantly under threat.

Against that background, it has been considered that the mechanisms of proscription under existing terrorism legislation have needed supplementing with the provisions of this Bill concerning malign state-sponsored threats. As the Minister has confirmed, and I do not wish to be repetitive of what has been said many times in the debates today, there is to be further government legislation to tackle the growing threat from foreign state entities and their proxies, and to improve this country’s defences against cyber security threats. The Bill is, in that sense, work in progress.

We do not see the need to tack on to the Bill new offences of wearing items of uniform, dissemination of particular types of publication, or further complex new powers for seizure of passports, all in the last stages of a piece of emergency legislation. There may be a case for some version of some of the measures proposed, under some conditions, after careful later consideration.

I echo some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but there are other points about the difficulties we have had with the Terrorism Act and other legislation. I am not sure that I go as far as he does on split infinitives, although my personal preference echoes his. We should not be introducing legislation at this stage which would raise all the issues that have so troubled us under the Terrorism Act. Now is not the time for these measures and this emergency legislation is not the Bill.

[Lord Pickles (Con)]

My Lords, I normally bow to the views of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on these matters—I am not entirely sure I understand the point he made about split infinitives—but I am not sure he is right on this occasion; nor was the noble Lord who last spoke. The IRGC, for example, is not simply a military arm of the Iranian state. It also operates through propaganda, symbolism, recruitment and ideological influence. While the Bill addresses the hostile state activity, I do not believe it adequately addresses the ideological dimension.

Noble Lords have spoken about the level of antisemitism, which has been considerably worsened by the number of marches that we have seen display the symbols, flags and uniforms of terrorist organisations. There should be consistency between “designation” and a “proscribed organisation”. Designation should also have practical consequences. It would be very difficult to explain to members of the public why a designated organisation’s flags, insignia and symbols should continue to be displayed in support of that organisation at marches or on the street. Terrorism legislation already recognises the importance of symbols, uniforms and imagery in demonstrating support. This amendment would close a potential gap in the legislation.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Pickles Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pickles (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I very much look forward to hearing him develop those points in Committee.

Let me begin directly. Legislation of this kind is long overdue. As the Library briefing makes clear, the character of state threats has evolved over the years, and this legislation is necessary. It is not a criticism directed solely at this Government; successive Administrations have recognised the problem with reasonable clarity but have often been slow in delivering the remedy. We identify the threat, hesitate on the response and find ourselves, once again, playing catch-up. This Bill is an attempt to close that gap. It is necessary and welcome.

There is much within it that merits support: the updating of offences; the introduction of a foreign influence registration scheme; and the broader recognition, reflected in the Library material and other briefings, that hostile activity now spans a wide spectrum—it is no longer confined to classical espionage but extends into influence operations, economic pressure, covert funding and a steady shaping of information environments.

However, necessity should not be mistaken for sufficiency. My concern is that the Bill, while well-intended, is framed too much around the threats that we already understand rather than those that are evolving. Hostile actors adapt quickly. They learn from our frameworks and adjust their methods accordingly. If we legislate narrowly or too rigidly, we will find that the law is outpaced almost as soon as it is enacted. We cannot afford, once again, to legislate in arrears.

The reality is that modern state threats are often indirect. They are mediated through networks, proxies, front organisations and aligned movements that provide distance and deniability. Influence is rarely crude; it is incremental, sustained and frequently embedded within legitimate structures. That presents a challenge which the Bill does not fully meet. In particular, it requires us to take seriously the role of transnational ideological networks that may intersect with state interests, whether formally or informally.

The arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Godson in his recent article in the Spectator are both relevant and necessary to engage with. He draws attention to the way in which the Muslim Brotherhood operates less as a single organisation and more as a diffuse and adaptive network: a movement with affiliated bodies, overlapping structures and a capacity to project influence across civic, educational and political space. This strength lies not in overt confrontation but in persistence, organisation and reach over time. The point is not to collapse this into a simplistic category of state threat but to recognise that boundaries between state and non-state activity are often porous, and that serious actors are adept at operating across these boundaries.

Other countries have begun to engage with this reality. France and Austria, among them, have examined how such movements function, how they influence institutions and what risks they may pose to democratic resilience over the longer term. In the United Kingdom, our approach has been more cautious—arguably, too cautious—and the Bill reflects this caution. It is anchored firmly in the concept of state attribution which, while understandable, has created a limitation. If influence is exercised through networks that fall just outside that definition, a framework confined to it risks overlooking a significant part of the threat.

To be clear, this is not part of an argument for indiscriminate measures or broad-brush conclusions. It is an argument for clarity and completeness, to ensure that our understanding of modern threats is sufficiently wide, and that our response is capable of addressing them. At present, the alignment is not yet fully achieved. This is why the next stages of the Bill are so important.

As has already been demonstrated in another place, there is real scope to strengthen and redefine the framework. In particular, it is reasonable to apply three basic tests. First, flexibility: can the Bill adapt to new forms of threat without the need to repeat primary legislation? Secondly, scope: does it adequately capture indirect as well as direct forms of hostile influence? And, thirdly, clarity: are the definitions and mechanisms sufficiently precise to be both effective and enforceable?

If the Bill falls short against these tests, amendment is not an obstruction; it is responsible lawmaking. Those who seek to undermine open societies are neither static nor unsophisticated. They study our systems, identify ambiguities and exploit gaps with consistency and patience. If our legislative response is too narrow or too cautious, it will not be enough. The Bill is an important step forward, but it must also be a durable one. I believe that the Bill can be improved and that we can future-proof it, widen its scope where necessary and ensure that it addresses not only direct state action but the broader ecosystem in which influence is exercised. In conclusion, our task is simple: not to follow threat but to get ahead of threat and to stay there.

Rape Gangs: National Statutory Inquiry

Lord Pickles Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Let me first defend the Minister for Safeguarding. I know nobody else in the House of Commons who has committed so much time, energy and passion to ensuring that these issues are addressed. She is paramount in her ambition to secure some outcomes on safeguarding women and girls and on violence against women and girls. As I have said to other noble Lords and noble Baronesses today, the Home Secretary has been clear that the terms of reference will be determined and that the focus will be on grooming gangs and on ethnicity and background. That also means that we need to look at grooming gangs in the round, but there is a real focus on the ethnicity and background of a number of grooming gangs that have operated, which have caused distress and have led to this inquiry in the first place.

[Lord Pickles (Con)]

My Lords, when I was Secretary of State, I asked the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, to look at Rochdale. I know the kind of pressure that is placed on a politician when you take that kind of decision, so I am much more sympathetic to the Government. I do not think that this should be political. We are going to uncover some very unpleasant truths about how the establishment in this country looked the other way, so can I ask the Minister to give lots of consideration to the recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, that this should not be judge led? The nature of a public inquiry, led by a judge, will be overly daunting. We need the confidence of the victims, the confidence of the community and the confidence of the country.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s support in this area. He is right to draw attention to the fact that the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, recommended that we should try to move away from the judge-led model for this inquiry. That is what we have been trying to do. The very difficult issues that we have been discussing with victims and survivors—of who should be the chair and how the chair should be appointed—are one reason why there has been the delay to date and the very reason that the noble Baroness mentioned. As I said, the Covid inquiry and the Infected Blood Inquiry took seven months to get to a chair. It has been around three and a half to four months since the inquiry was announced. I hope we can make the appointment shortly, along the lines that the noble Lord mentioned.

Prevent: Learning Review

Lord Pickles Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I know he was elected in 1983 in North West Norfolk. It does not seem like 42 years ago. I went down in flames in Eddisbury on that day. I pay tribute to the fact that he won his seat, as did Sir David on that day. Again, from my perspective, we have a lot of political knockabout in both Houses at times, but you can also spot and respect integrity, and Sir David had integrity. It is important that we recognise and celebrate that.

While we will always have political differences, including with the noble Lord now, we must recognise that behind the politician is a person with a family and a commitment. Whatever drives us into politics for our own values, this is the place to debate them. We should be able to debate them outside, in our constituencies and in public, without the fear of attack or death by those who disagree with the principle of democracy, and not least with the individual who is the face of their ire. It is not just Sir David but my former colleague in the House of Commons, Jo Cox, and many people from Northern Ireland who have stood their ground, put their views forward, been in the public domain and found themselves subject to violence as a result. That is not the way we should be doing things in this United Kingdom.

[Lord Pickles (Con)]

My Lords, I too want to thank the Minister for what was not just a kind and generous tribute to Sir David but also an immensely sensitive Statement, and on point in terms of how to address the issue. These things affect us all. David was a neighbour of mine and was one of the first people to welcome me, a Yorkshireman, down to Essex, and to make me feel at home.

We are about to debate the Holocaust. A Holocaust survivor once said to me a few years back that the thing that she noticed most coming to Britain after the war was that the policemen smiled, and that it was easy to meet councillors and officials. What happened to David threatens that. That ease that we have in this country is very much central to what makes us tick and we need to be able to hold on to that.