(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThe world has clearly entered a new era of geopolitical volatility, with technology and strategic competition for resources driving an increasingly contested and competing world. This has not just happened since July 2024. It has been on the horizon for a good many years, and that intensifying and escalating rivalry between states is now the new normal. The United Kingdom must adapt to this new world, not cling to a dying world order, and this Bill is the latest recognition from the Government that they must and will adapt and respond, and that they will always put the national security of the UK first.
Today, I will centre my remarks on the state threats we face, on the Bill and on the wider response that is needed to tackle those state threats. The three greatest state threats facing the United Kingdom are from Russia, China and Iran, and they each pose a distinct and unique threat. Only this week it has been confirmed that Russian proxies set the Prime Minister’s house and car on fire. We need to urgently grasp the seriousness of that. It was abhorrent political violence targeted against the elected leader of the United Kingdom—our country—but that was not all. The individuals spread disinformation, whipped up community tensions and paid for far right posters to be put up and for “Stop Islam” graffiti to be sprayed. We must not tolerate this. That was not an isolated event. We have heard about the assassination of Litvinenko, the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, the attack on the warehouse in east London in March 2024 by the Wagner Group and many other suspicious attacks on these shores. These include the cyber-attacks on Jaguar Land Rover, on Marks & Spencer and on the British Library, which still has not recovered from the attack several years ago.
In October 2025, the director general of MI5, Ken McCallum, said that state threats had risen by a third over a year and were now equal to or even greater than the threat of terrorism. In the last year alone, there has been a 35% increase in state threat activity. For example, between 2022 and 2025, the UK prevented 20 Iran-backed plots, all of which were potentially lethal threats. Meanwhile, Chinese espionage and cyber-attacks are a continual threat. With China’s thousand grains of sand theory, every piece of information, no matter how small or seemingly unimportant, is of value. In May 2024, the director of GCHQ said that the service
“devotes more resource to China than any other single mission”
and that China poses a
“genuine and increasing cyber risk”
to the UK.
Those three countries present three different ideologies and three different strategies, but they all represent an intensifying and rapidly evolving threat to the United Kingdom. The Bill is another important step following the critically important National Security Act 2023 to protect the United Kingdom from these state threats. It will introduce a new power to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity, as we have heard, and create a new offence of supporting, assisting or benefiting from designated bodies. Of course, that follows the review by Jonathan Hall KC into whether existing terrorism powers could be used to address state threats. He found that the terrorism proscription charges would not be appropriate, so instead this legislation will now designate bodies, including proxies, such as the IRGC or the Wagner Group.
It was clear from the inquiry by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy into the China spy case that while the 2023 Act was a big step forward, the ever-evolving threat landscape means that it would need to evolve, be improved upon and be amended, just as we are doing today. I am pleased that the Government have taken up the recommendation and acted in the national interest. The designation of certain bodies should and must send a clear message to our adversaries that the person will be held responsible for it, with a maximum of 14 years in prison for such an offence.
It is slightly unusual for a Bill to be expedited in this way, but I recognise the urgency and thank the Department for its continued engagement with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. However, I do have one area of concern. The impact assessment outlines a potential long-term consequence that I would like to focus on. The assessment says that a long-term impact may be “Detrimental impact of foreign policy objectives/bilateral relationships”.
On the risks to bilateral relationships, my immediate thought is, of course, China. The Chinese state does not take kindly to accusations of espionage, as we saw with the collapsed China spy case whereby, under the last Conservative Government, the deputy National Security Adviser was unable to describe China as the enemy due to Government policy, despite the security threat—this tricky tightrope that we continue to have to walk. We have to engage with China. Its economic might and, quite frankly, our dependence on it, which we have to reduce in the long term, means that ignoring China is not an option, but how does the Minister plan to mitigate the risk to our national security while avoiding damaging that relationship? It seems that the contradiction here is yet to be fully resolved. Could the Minister assure me that there are clear contingency plans for an incident like that and that all civil servants, police forces and intelligence services are clear on the Government’s position regarding China?
I am pleased that this Labour Government have already taken a raft of measures to keep us secure and safe, with today being the latest piece of legislation to meet the moment. Of course, there will be other piece of legislation because the threats will become greater and even more diverse. The Representation of the People Bill, the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill and the Bill before us are all interlinked and should be seen as a co-ordinated effort, but there is more to be done.
We need to explain this very real threat to the public and build resilience in our institutions and businesses, and throughout the country for each and every individual. We need a national conversation with the public because the Government cannot do this alone. In this new era of state threats, legislation is crucial, and the Government have an integral role in keeping us all safe, but so does the public. We need to explain that and not shy away from the realities before us.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberJust nine days before Mr Churchill invited Ernie Bevin to become the Minister for Labour in his Government, Mr Bevin was stood in Hanley town hall in my constituency giving a public rally address on the importance of the working class towards the war effort, and it is believed that the coverage of that speech in The Times two days later is what caught Churchill’s eye and encouraged Mr Churchill to invite him into his Government, which is a testimony to the power of oratory that sometimes we miss in today’s debates—although obviously not this one—and also that, wherever we look, there is a Stoke-on-Trent connection to most parts of our social history.
That was a high-quality intervention.
I will try and raise my standards to the level of oratory that my hon. Friend would now expect.
The role of women in the war effort proved decisive, and the mobilisation proved decisive to the overall war effort and gave Britain an advantage over Nazi Germany. As striking was the effect of demobilisation on a peacetime economy. It was all this work that led Bevin’s Labour Ministry to be likened to Roosevelt’s new deal, a theme to which I will return.
Following Labour’s victory in the 1945 election, Bevin was appointed Foreign Secretary, a move that surprised many. Attlee’s justification was simple: he thought that affairs were going to be pretty difficult and that “a heavy tank” was going to be required “rather than a sniper.”
Bevin did not disappoint. His achievements were truly considerable. Bevin understood the threat of Stalin and his strategy sooner than any other leader, and Bevin’s intervention to secure Marshall aid in Europe, the recognition that western Europe needed political and economic unity, and his refusal to bow to Stalin’s demands must rate at the very top of all diplomatic successes.
Bevin and Attlee’s decision to allow US B-29 bombers to be stationed in the UK sent a clear message to Stalin that the UK and US were resolute in the defence of West Berlin and Europe. Although Bevin understood the importance of US support, he recognised the need to be independent and insisted on the UK securing its own atomic bomb with a
“Union Jack flying on top of it.”
However, perhaps his greatest achievement was the formation of NATO. It was largely his own initiative, as he drove forward the eventual signing of the treaty in 1949 through sheer determination.
I should take this moment to acknowledge that Bevin was a man, as well as a phenomenon, who had his faults and misjudgements: his staunch imperialism, manifesting itself in the rejection of Indian independence, his handling of Israel-Palestine or the Malayan uprising, and his antisemitic views were all wrong. I do not excuse him, but there is much to recognise in his vision of the wider world and its relevance to today. As he saw in the 1930s and in 1945, we now see order crumbling around us and certainties of the past no longer hold true.
What are the lessons to be learned from the great Bevin? He showed that Governments need to cajole, convince and collaborate, they cannot dictate and they must have dialogue with the public—let us call it a national conversation. They need to be honest about the reality of the threat, the necessity of public partnerships, both with industry and the workers, and the sacrifice that may be needed. That is why the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has launched its inquiry into a national conversation on societal resilience that seeks to raise awareness and build a deeper understanding of a whole of society approach to our security and our resilience.
Secondly, Bevin’s approach to foreign policy was rooted in his ideals, but he understood that to be a player, not a spectator, the UK needed a grand strategy built on hard power, resources, strategic partnerships and ultimately based on the national interest. He grasped that reality in 1945 and it propelled western Europe to a stronger, more unified place. That is how important he was. He did not cling on to the dying world order—he built a new one.
All Bevin’s achievements were made possible only by his energy, ingenuity and his ability as an organiser. Take the Marshall plan: Bevin seized on a speech delivered by George Marshall on helping Europe. He would co-ordinate a joint European response by all those nations. Marshall aid was secured and western Europe got the lifeline it needed to survive. It was so significant, but without his drive, the grand strategy and the ideals would never have materialised.
To conclude, in 2024 the Prime Minister said:
“We must mobilise what Bevin called our ‘collective moral and material force’.”
He was right. As Ernest Bevin, labourer, trade unionist, Minister and world statesmen would say, we need “action this day.” Ernest Bevin was a colossus. His achievements have few parallels, and we should celebrate his life.
I call the Minister to continue to elevate the quality of the debate.
(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberMay I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on the quality of this report? I have a family interest in undersea cables: it was my great-great-grandfather, Professor Fleeming Jenkin, who laid the first transatlantic telephone cable in 1858. On the question of deterrence, can we realistically deter this kind of behaviour by our adversaries if we continue to allow our hands to be tied by an overstrict interpretation of international law? The vandalism committed on undersea cables has very serious economic consequences, and maybe even national security consequences. It is being committed by ships that are themselves in breach of international law. Should we not just deal with them, particularly if they open fire on our military aircraft, as happened recently with lasers from a Russian ship?
I thank the hon. Gentleman, and I will keep my comments brief. I absolutely agree that the legal side of this urgently needs to be addressed, and I understand from the Government that they will look very closely at it in their defence resilience Bill.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the hon. Member for giving notice of this point of order. I have had no indication from Ministers that they intend to come to the House to make a statement on this matter, but I note that it is Home Office questions on Monday and he still has time to table an oral question to the Home Secretary.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, which I chair, is responsible for examining cross-cutting issues of national security. You will appreciate that the UK faces a great range of external threats and internal challenges around resilience and the choices it makes about its relationships with allies and partners. The JCNSS is following the Government’s efforts to address these matters very closely, and the work of the National Security Adviser is central to that success.
Since the role’s creation in 2010, every NSA has appeared before the Committee for a public accountability session—until now. Of course, some more sensitive conversations need to be held behind closed doors, but the public sessions are an essential way in which the Prime Minister’s primary adviser on issues of national security is held to account by Parliament.
Despite their commitment to transparency in numerous exchanges, the Government remain steadfast that the NSA will not be accountable to Parliament. I am concerned that the Government are using a quirk of his appointment—as a special adviser rather than the permanent official—to erode democratic norms, which future, less benevolent Governments could exploit. Madam Deputy Speaker, can you advise me on how my Committee can get the Government to prove that they are committed to increasing transparency, to recognise the dangerous precedent that they are setting and to allow the NSA to appear before us?
I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving notice of his point of order. The attendance of witnesses before Select Committees is not a matter for the Chair. However, it is surprising that the current National Security Adviser has declined to appear before the Joint Committee when all of his predecessors have been willing to do so. The Government’s own guidance on the matter states:
“Parliament has powers to call any individual to give evidence… When a Select Committee indicates that it wishes to take evidence from any particular names official, including special advisers, the presumption is that Ministers will seek to agree such a request.”
I am sure that the Clerks will be able to advise the hon. Member and his Committee on how best to pursue the matter further.
Bill Presented
Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 (Amendment) Bill
Presentation and First Reading (Standing Order No. 57)
Lisa Smart, supported by Ben Maguire and Josh Babarinde, presented a Bill to amend the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 to make provision about the interpretation of that Act in relation to domestic abuse.
Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 11 July, and to be printed (Bill 246).