Ministerial Severance: Reform

Debate between Michael Ellis and Kevin Brennan

Tuesday 6th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Ellis (Northampton North) (Con)]

I begin by making a disclosure to the House, which is of course in the public domain and has been for some time: I have received severance pay in the past. I want to make that clear from the outset. I also want to make it clear from the outset that, in my respectful view, some of the ad hominem attacks on named Members of Parliament that we have heard damage the institution of politics rather than working in a partisan way. Those individuals did not do anything wrong: they were part of a system that allocated funding to them, so there should be no legal or moral opprobrium attached to them in their absence, whether they have been notified or not. It is fine to say that the system ought to change, but surely it is not fair to criticise people for being subject to a system that has not been changed.

As I said, I have received severance pay, but I served in Government roles of one sort or another for over 10 years, if one includes non-ministerial positions. In terms of ministerial positions, I served as Deputy Leader of the House of Commons, Minister for the Arts, Minister for Transport, Solicitor General, Attorney General for the first time under one Prime Minister, Paymaster General, Minister for the Cabinet Office, and Attorney General for the second time under a second Prime Minister. In fact, I served under four Prime Ministers in one role or another, and in Cabinet on three occasions. Should I not receive severance pay?

The hon. Member for Sefton Central (Bill Esterson) asked where else this would happen in the outside world. Well, where else in the outside world would we have a situation where there are no redundancy arrangements, no notice periods, no contract between the parties and no consultations, and the employees—if they were employees—could be removed without cause? I am not criticising those things: that is the way Government works. Ministers take on those roles knowing that that is the position, so they should not criticise it—that is the way the cookie crumbles, and those who do not like it should not take the position.

However, there is no point in comparing chalk and cheese. The system operates in a different way from the outside world: we have a constitutional situation in which the Prime Minister, whether he or she be Labour or Conservative, has to have the right of hiring and firing his or her ministerial team. That is an essential prerequisite of the role, and the way it must work—the only way it can work—is by giving the Prime Minister that primus inter pares role, where he or she has that function.

[Kevin Brennan]

I agree with the right hon. and learned Member: Ministers should get severance pay, as I did when I was a Minister. That is absolutely right, but the motion does not suggest that they should not. He was a former Deputy Leader of the House; does he think it is right that a Deputy Leader of the House who served for 81 days should receive three months’ severance pay? That is the question that we are debating today, not the general principle. I agree that there should be appropriate severance pay, and I think other Labour Members do too, for exactly the reasons he has given.

[Sir Michael Ellis]

When one has a system in law, whether it was created 10 years ago, 30 years ago or 100 years ago, it must apply to all. If the system falls out of favour, it can be reviewed, but the example that the hon. Member has criticised is of someone who served in a role and was entitled to take a severance payment. As he himself alluded to, people in the last Labour Government received these payments; in fact, they received payments that were statistically more generous than has been the case under this Government—some £1.6 million in real terms in today’s prices. As has already been said, none of the four Labour leadership candidates in 2010 returned their severance pay; I think they were under some pressure to do so at the time, but declined. When Ministers have no contract, no notice period and no consultation or redundancy arrangements, and can be removed without cause, it is right that that is differentiated from what happens elsewhere, because there is an increased risk.

Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests Resignation

Debate between Michael Ellis and Kevin Brennan

Thursday 16th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

They have not always done so, and I gave examples last week in the Opposition day debate of cases where Labour Prime Ministers did not take resignations from Ministers who were found in breach of the ministerial code. I would rather not refer to those names again—they are on the record—but that is an example of a Prime Minister being able to say whether they continue to have confidence in their Ministers. That is a constitutional imperative. They must be able, whether a Labour Prime Minister such as Tony Blair or Gordon Brown, or a Conservative Prime Minister, to have confidence in their own Ministers. They cannot absolve themselves of that responsibility by farming it out to somebody else, however honourable that person is.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

I am incredibly grateful to the Minister for confirming to the House that the letter of resignation does exist, because the Deputy Prime Minister, who is also, I understand, a leading lawyer, said on the “Today” programme this morning that he did not know whether the letter exists, and then he went on to say that he had not read it. We are extremely grateful to the Minister for confirming that. Why is the letter not available to us now? He knew he was responding to this urgent question. We could have then discussed its contents. We have heard about Lady Bracknell; what we have before us this morning is Uriah Heep.

[Michael Ellis]

I think we can do without the literary references, but what I will say is that the letter does exist. I can confirm that, and it will be released very soon. By the way, it has only been about two working hours since this matter was dealt with, so the Government are acting very expeditiously.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Michael Ellis and Kevin Brennan

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 14th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

My right hon. Friend is quite right that it is not productive, and, in fact, it would not be in the interests of the judiciary themselves, for the courts to have such a role.

We committed to repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, as it had led to paralysis at a time when the country needed decisive action. In a similar vein, the Labour manifesto said that the 2011 Act

“stifled democracy and propped up weak governments.”

A vote in the Commons could create paralysis in a number of contexts, including minority Governments, coalition Governments, or where our parties, Parliament or even the nation, at some point in the future, were divided.

As a majority on the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act noted, a Commons vote would have a practical effect only where Parliament were gridlocked. The problem is that if the Government of the day had a comfortable majority, a vote would be unlikely to make any difference; it would have no meaningful effect, beyond causing unnecessary delay and expense. However, when Parliament is gridlocked, a vote could mean denying an election to a Government who were unable to function effectively. We witnessed the consequences of such a vote painfully in 2019, so let us not repeat that mistake by devising a system where those events could happen again. Lords amendment 1 is, therefore, with the greatest possible respect, without merit.

[Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has mentioned what happens in the event of a minority Government. What would happen where the Prime Minister of a minority Government wished to call a general election, but there was the possibility of an alternative Government being formed? Would that Prime Minister be able to dissolve Parliament by prerogative in those circumstances, or would another person be given an opportunity to form a Government and a majority in the House of Commons?

[Michael Ellis]

I do not want to get into hypotheticals, but what I will say is that the pre-2011 position worked extremely well. There is a reason why it worked well and it was proven to have functioned correctly. We seek to go back to a proven, tried and tested system, which works in a whole variety of different circumstances, not every one of which can be easily expostulated.